All British soldiers will welcome this excellent translation by
Major Bridges of a new work by General von Bernhardi, whose intimate
knowledge of cavalry and brilliant writings have won for him such a
great European reputation.
Some prominence has lately been given in England to erroneous views
concerning the armament and tactics of cavalry. General von Bernhardi's
book contains sound doctrine on this subject, and will show to every
one who has an open mind and is capable of conviction by reasoned
argument how great is the future rôle of cavalry, and how determined
are the efforts of the great cavalry leaders of Europe to keep abreast
with the times, and to absorb, for the profit of the arm, every lesson
taught by experience, both in peace and war.
In all theories, whether expounded by so eminent an authority as
General von Bernhardi or by others who have not his claims to our
attention, there is, of course, a good deal that must remain a matter
of opinion, and a question open for free and frank discussion. But
I am convinced that some of the reactionary views recently aired in
England concerning cavalry will, if accepted and adopted, lead first
to the deterioration and then to the collapse of cavalry when next it
is called upon to fulfil its mission in war. I therefore recommend
not only cavalry officers, but officers of all arms and services, to
read and ponder this book, which provides a strengthening tonic for
weak minds which may have allowed themselves to be impressed by the
dangerous heresies to which I have alluded.
* * * * *
Is there such a thing as the cavalry spirit, and should it be our
object to develop this spirit, if it exists, to the utmost, or to
suppress it? General von Bernhardt thinks that this spirit exists and
should be encouraged, and I agree with him. It is not only possible
but necessary to preach the Army spirit, or, in other words, the close
comradeship of all arms in battle, and at the same time to develop
the highest qualities and the special attributes of each branch. The
particular spirit which we seek to encourage is different for each
arm. Were we to seek to endow cavalry with the tenacity and stiffness
of infantry, or to take from the mounted arm the mobility and the cult
of the offensive which are the breath of its life, we should ruin not
only the cavalry, but the Army besides. Those who scoff at the spirit,
whether of cavalry, of artillery, or of infantry, are people who have
had no practical experience of the actual training of troops in peace,
or of the personal leadership in war. Such men are blind guides indeed.
Another reason why I welcome this book is because it supplies a timely
answer to schoolmen who see in our South African experiences, some
of which they distort and many of which they forget, the acme of all
military wisdom. It is always a danger when any single campaign is
picked out, at the fancy of some pedagogue, and its lessons recommended
as a panacea. It is by study and meditation of the whole of the long
history of war, and not by concentration upon single and special phases
of it, that we obtain safe guidance to the principles and practices of
an art which is as old as the world.
It is not only the campaigns which we and others have fought which
deserve reflection, but also the wars which may lie in front of us.
General von Bernhardi does not neglect the lessons of past wars, but he
gives the best of reasons for thinking that the wars in South Africa
and Manchuria have little in common with the conditions of warfare in
Europe. We notice, as we read his book, that he has constantly in his
mind the enemies whom the German Army must be prepared to meet, their
arms, their tactics, and their country, and that he urges his comrades
to keep the conditions of probable wars constantly before their eyes.
It passes comprehension that some critics in England should gravely
assure us that the war in South Africa should be our chief source of
inspiration and guidance, and that it was not abnormal. All wars are
abnormal, because there is no such thing as normal war. In applying
the lessons of South Africa to the training of cavalry, we should be
very foolish if we did not recognise at this late hour that very few of
the conditions of South Africa are likely to recur. I will name only
a few of them. The composition and tactics of the Boer forces were as
dissimilar from those of European armies as possible. Boer commandos
made no difficulty about dispersing to the four winds when pressed, and
re-uniting again some days or weeks later hundreds of miles from the
scene of their last encounter. Such tactics in Europe would lead to the
disruption and disbandment of any army that attempted them.
Secondly, the war in South Africa was one for the conquest and
annexation of immense districts, and no settlement was open to us
except the complete submission of our gallant enemy. A campaign with
such a serious object in view is the most difficult that can be
confided to an army if the enemy is brave, enterprising, well-armed,
numerous, and animated with unconquerable resolve to fight to the
bitter end. I am not sure that people in England have ever fully
grasped this distinctive feature of our war with the Dutch Republics.
Let me quote the opinion of the late Colonel Count Yorck von Wartenburg
on this subject. In his remarkable book "Napoleon as a General," Count
Yorck declares that if, in the campaign of 1870-71, the absolute
conquest and annexation of France had been desired, German procedure
would not have been either logical or successful, and that the Germans
would have failed as completely as Napoleon failed in Spain. But
Count Yorck shows that when plans have a definite and limited object
in view--namely, to obtain peace on given conditions--the situation
is altered. Count Yorck shows that the German plans in 1870-71 were
perfectly appropriate to this limited aim, and that they were therefore
successful. The very serious task which British policy imposed upon
British strategy in South Africa must never be forgotten.
Thirdly, we did not possess any means for remounting our cavalry with
trained horses, such as we are endeavouring to secure by our new system
of cavalry depôts and reserve regiments. After the capture, in rear
of the army, of the great convoy by De Wet, our horses were on short
commons, and consequently lost condition and never completely recovered
it.
Lastly, owing to the wholesale and repeated release of prisoners who
had been captured and who subsequently appeared again in the field
against us, we were called upon to fight, not, as is stated, 86,000 or
87,000 men, but something like double that number or more, with this
additional disadvantage, that the enemy possessed on his second or
third appearance against us considerable experience of our methods, and
a certain additional seasoned fitness.
Nevertheless we are now invited to throw away our cold steel as useless
lumber owing to some alleged failures of the cavalry in South Africa.
Were we to do so, we should invert the rôle of cavalry, turn it into
a defensive arm, and make it a prey to the first foreign cavalry
that it meets, for good cavalry can always compel a dismounted force
of mounted riflemen to mount and ride away, and when such riflemen
are caught on their horses they have power neither of offence nor of
defence and are lost. If, in European warfare, such mounted riflemen
were to separate and scatter, the enemy would be well pleased, for he
could then reconnoitre and report every movement and make his plans in
all security. In South Africa the mounted riflemen were the hostile
army itself, and when they had dispersed there was nothing left to
reconnoitre; but when and where will these conditions recur?
Even in South Africa, grave though were the disadvantages under which
our cavalry laboured from short commons and overwork, the Boer mounted
riflemen acknowledged on many occasions the moral force of the cold
steel, and gave way before it. The action at Zand River in May, 1900,
was a case in point, and I only quote a personal experience because the
venerable maxim that an ounce of practice is worth a ton of theory has
still a good deal to be said for it. The rôle of the Cavalry Division
on the day to which I refer was to bring pressure to bear on the right
flank of the Boer army in order to enable Lord Roberts to advance
across the river and attack the main Boer forces. Having crossed the
river to the west of the Boers, we determined, with the inner or
easterly brigade, to seize an important kopje lying on the right flank
of the Boer position, and, pivoting upon this, to throw two brigades
against the right flank and rear of the enemy.
The Boers told off a strong force of picked mounted riflemen to oppose
this movement, which they expected. The kopje was seized by the inner
brigade, and the brigade next to it made some progress; but the Boer
mounted riflemen attacked the flank brigade to the extreme west, and
began to drive it back. I galloped from the kopje to the outer brigade
with the thought that either every idea which I had ever formed in
my life as to the efficacy of shock action against mounted riflemen
was utterly erroneous, or that this was the moment to show that it
was not. On reaching the outer brigade I ordered it to mount and form
for attack. All ranks were at once electrified into extraordinary
enthusiasm and energy. The Boers realised what was coming. Their fire
became wild, and the bullets began to fly over our heads. Directly the
advance began, the Boers hesitated, and many rushed to their horses.
We pressed forward with all the very moderate speed of tired horses,
whereupon the whole Boer force retired in the utmost confusion and
disorder, losing in a quarter of an hour more ground than they had won
during three or four hours of fighting. A cavalry which could perform
service like this; which held back, against great numerical odds, the
Dutch forces at Colesberg; which relieved Kimberley; which directly
made possible the victory at Paardeberg by enclosing Kronje in his
entrenchments; which captured Bloemfontein, Kroonstadt, and Barberton,
and took part successfully in all the phases of the long guerilla war
and in countless drives, can afford to regard with equanimity the
attacks of those who have never led, trained, nor understood the arm to
which I am proud to have belonged.
* * * * *
I have already, in an introduction to another book by General von
Bernhardi, expressed my high sense of the general soundness of his
teaching. Were I to do full justice to the merits of this new work,
I should be compelled to make long extracts and to repeat matter
which every reader will perhaps do better to search for and select
for himself. But I would invite particular attention to the General's
remarks on the subjects of reconnaissance, the cavalry fight, the
combination of fire and shock, the divisional cavalry, the rôle of the
strategical cavalry, training, and organisation. The masterly summary
of the qualifications which should be possessed by squadron and patrol
leaders is, in particular, an extremely valuable contribution to the
study of a most important subject.
The General does not always agree with the Regulations of his own Army,
and he is specially in conflict with them when he recommends raids
by cavalry corps against the enemy's communications. My opinion upon
this point is that every plan should be subordinate to what I consider
a primary necessity--namely, the absolute and complete overthrow of
the hostile cavalry. So long as that cavalry remains intact with its
_morale_ unshaken, all our enterprises must of necessity be paralysed.
The successful cavalry fight confers upon the victor the command of
ground, just in the same way that successful naval action carries with
it command at sea. For effective enterprises in either sphere command
is absolutely necessary, and can only be obtained by successful battle,
whether on land or sea.
I agree generally with the German Regulations when they suggest that
raids against communications should not divert cavalry from their true
battle objective, and consequently I must venture to differ from the
author on this point, though I do not approve of all that the German
Regulations say concerning the employment of cavalry in battle. The
opinion which I hold and have often expressed is that _the true rôle
of cavalry on the battlefield is to reconnoitre, to deceive, and
finally to support_. If the enemy's cavalry has been overthrown, the
rôle of reconnaissance will have been rendered easier. In the rôles of
deception and support, such an immense and fruitful field of usefulness
and enterprise is laid open to a cavalry division which has thought out
and practised these rôles in its peace training and is accustomed to
act in large bodies dismounted, that I cannot bring myself to believe
that any equivalent for such manifest advantages can be found even in
the most successful raid against the enemy's communications by mounted
troops.
I entirely agree with General von Bernhardi's conclusion that very
important duties will fall to the lot of the divisional cavalry in war,
and that the fulfilment of these duties has become more difficult of
late years. The necessity for, and the value of, divisional cavalry are
often not properly appreciated. What the strategical cavalry is to the
Army in the greater sphere, the divisional cavalry is to the division
in the lesser.
Most cavalry soldiers of good judgment will agree with the lucid
arguments of the author on the subject of cavalry armament. It is
suggested to us, by critics of the cavalry, that the lance is an
impediment to dismounted action. If this difficulty ever existed, it
has been overcome by the method of carrying the lance which has been
adopted and practised with marked success for the past two years. It is
also objected by the same critics that a thin bamboo pole, carried by
the side of a mounted man, will hinder him in reconnaissance and reveal
his position to the enemy. The mere statement of this argument absolves
me from the duty of replying to it.
General von Bernhardi very wisely says that it is not a question
whether cavalrymen should fight mounted or dismounted, but whether
they are prepared and determined to take their share in the decision
of an encounter and to employ the whole of their strength and mobility
to this end. In our training during the last few years I have
endeavoured to impress upon all ranks that when the enemy's cavalry
is overthrown, our cavalry will find more opportunities of using
the rifle than the cold steel, and that dismounted attacks will be
more frequent than charges with the _arme blanche_. By no means do I
rule out as impossible, or even unlikely, attacks by great bodies of
mounted men against other arms on the battlefield. But I believe that
such opportunities will occur comparatively rarely, and that undue
prominence should not be accorded to them in our peace training, to the
detriment of much more solid advantages which may be gained by other
means.
I think that every one who reads this book will understand that the
sphere of action of cavalry is steadily widening, and is, at the same
time, making increased demands as the years go on upon all ranks of
the arm. Those who wish to recall what cavalry has done in the past,
should read and reread "The Achievements of Cavalry," by Field-Marshal
Sir Evelyn Wood, one of the very few soldiers in the Army who has
taken part as a combatant in European warfare. Sir Evelyn Wood's war
record probably surpasses that of any other officer in the Army. His
knowledge of horses and his horsemanship are second to none, and
though seventy-two years of age, he is still one of the hardest and
straightest riders to hounds in England. It should be a constant
encouragement to the cavalry that such an experienced and sagacious
leader should entertain such a firm faith in the destinies of an arm
with which he is so thoroughly conversant.
* * * * *
A few words in conclusion. We hear it said, and see it written, that
we ought not to accept any guidance from military Europe, because
our own experience of war has been so considerable that we can learn
nothing from Europe which we do not know better ourselves. The truth
is, that since the Crimean War we have had little or no experience of
the kind of effort which will be required of us when next we meet the
trained army of a European Power. In deluding ourselves with the false
notion that our campaigns of the last fifty years represent the sum of
military wisdom, we merely expose our ignorance and conceit, and do our
utmost not only to cause disaster, but to invite it.
The cavalry soldier must not be misled by these appeals of ignorance
to vanity. Let him continue to study profoundly the training, tactics,
and organisation of the best foreign cavalry. Let him reflect long
and deeply upon the opinions of such acknowledged authorities as
Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood and General von Bernhardi. Let him keep
himself abreast with every change in the tendencies of cavalry abroad,
so that he may help us to assimilate the best of foreign customs to
our own. Finally, let him realise the great intellectual and physical
strain that modern war will impose upon the cavalry, and let him
preserve the _mens sana in corpore sano_, that equable balance between
study and action, which alone will enable him to rise superior to every
difficulty in the great and honourable calling to which he belongs.
J.D.P. French.