In 1899 Count Okuma expressed himself publicly as being very anxious

for Great Britain’s co-operation with Japan, and the Anglo-Japanese

Agreement of 1902 had no more zealous supporter of the policy involved,

nor is there a more thorough admirer of British institutions, though

he has never visited our shores, than Count Okuma. Indeed he has

not, so far, quitted his own land, yet he knows from close study of

contemporary literature as much about the countries and peoples of the

Occident as he would probably have acquired in years of travel. In

private life his hobby is horticulture. At Waseda he has a magnificent

collection of orchids and tropical plants in general, sheltered within

huge conservatories which stand in the spacious gardens attached to

his residence, and he is a great lover of the chrysanthemum, of which

he cultivates many new varieties. The mansion itself is in two parts,

one purely Japanese in style and construction, the other European, and

he entertains his friends accordingly, the privileged visitor being

received in the Japanese apartments even though he may be a foreigner. In

adopting this plan of building Count Okuma has followed a practice that

is becoming almost general among the Japanese nobility.

XV

FIELD-MARSHAL MARQUIS IWAO OYAMA

Born sixty-four years ago at Kagoshima, the chief town of the famous

province of Satsuma, in Kiu-shiu, Marshal Iwao Oyama is a nephew of the

renowned Marshal Saigo Takamori, and a type of the _bushi_ of which

the nucleus of the army of Japan was largely composed. He was in his

twenty-fifth year when the war of the Restoration took place, a contest

that it will be remembered arose between the followers of the Sho-gun

and those of the Dai-mios or feudal chieftains who had practically ruled

their own provinces in the south and west. On the side of the Sho-gun

were ranged the Tokugawa barons, and the northern clans generally, while

for the south and progress there stood the men of Satsuma, Nagato, Hizen,

and Tosa. By Japanese Nagato is commonly known nowadays as Cho-shiu,

and Satsuma is officially styled Sasshiu. Satsuma had taken the lead in

many respects in introducing the arts and sciences of the Occident into

Japan, for she had not only established a cotton mill at Kagoshima some

years before, and owned several very useful steamers of small tonnage,

but had drilled a body of troops on the western system. It was this

foreign-drilled corps that took so prominent a part in the operations

near Kioto, in which the Shogun’s adherents were signally defeated and

the opposition of the northern clans finally overcome. Oyama took his

share of the hard work entailed in this memorable struggle, and was

head of one of the Satsuma companies that shone conspicuously in the

engagement at Fushimi, a village situated midway between Osaka and Kioto,

close to the existing main line of railway. When the civil war was over,

and the reign of Mei-ji had fairly begun under the beneficent auspices

of the present occupant of the throne, the organisation of a regular army

on an Occidental model occupied the attention of all who were interested

in the rise of their country to power and wealth. If she would take her

place among the nations of the West, skilled as they were in all the arts

of modern warfare, Japan must provide herself, it was seen, with the

means of securing peace within her borders to develop her energies and

call up all her resources. Peace, as no people were better able than the

Satsuma clansmen to perceive, was only to be attained by making the most

complete preparations for war. Satsuma was foremost in advocating the

adoption and assimilation of every improvement in the mechanical arts and

the earnest study of every science that would be likely to promote the

welfare of the nation, more especially those that might lead to military

success if ever the country should be plunged into hostilities with

either an Eastern or a Western Power.

[Illustration: MARQUIS OYAMA]

Marquis Oyama was in part educated in France, and after the Restoration

had been accomplished and the existing Mei-ji era of Enlightenment had

been inaugurated, he was sent to Paris as Military Attache, and was

in Europe throughout the Franco-German War, his sympathies, no doubt

from early association, having been keenly aroused in favour of France.

Naturally he was greatly disappointed with the result of the campaign,

and there can be no doubt that he laid to heart the lessons which the

failure of the French arms in this gigantic struggle were well calculated

to impress upon his receptive mind. Immediately on his return to Japan

he received a command in the army, and he had opportunities at this

comparatively early period of turning to account the knowledge that he

had acquired of Occidental systems of warfare, though as yet he held

no position of paramount responsibility that admitted of his putting

his ideas into actual practice. The ball was not yet at his feet: his

consummate ability was yet to be manifested.

The year 1877 is especially memorable in the annals of Japan as being

that in which clan dissensions, despite the genuine endeavours of able

statesmen, culminated in a disastrous internecine strife. It is not

necessary to enter into a consideration of all the events which led

to that deplorable result, for they have been set forth at length in

connection with the life story of Marshal Saigo Takamori, elsewhere

recorded in these pages, and it is only necessary for the moment to

refer to the part which Marshal Oyama took in the suppression of the

rebellion. He was despatched to Kiushiu at the outbreak of hostilities

and his division was conspicuous among the Imperial forces that landed

at Hakata, the chief town of the province of Chiku-zen, in March, some

five weeks after the Satsuma men had marched out of Kagoshima 12,000

strong. An ardent believer in the efficacy of military training, and

a most enthusiastic supporter of the principles of universal military

service, as the sole security of a nation against foreign aggression,

Oyama now found himself, by the force of circumstances, compelled to

take the field against one to whom he was closely related, and who had

been the consistent upholder of an identical policy, if not, indeed, its

originator,—as far as Japan was concerned,—and who had himself occupied

the post of Minister of War in the first State Council of the Meiji era.

General Oyama, as he was then, distinguished himself in connection with

many engagements at Minami-no-seki (South Barrier), Takase (High Rapids),

Kawajiri (River’s end), and Kumamoto (Bear’s origin), and on other fields

of battle, being present at the final scene at Kagoshima, late in the

year 1877, when the remnants of Saigo’s troops were annihilated and their

leader met a soldier’s death, fighting to the last.

At the close of this regrettable civil war General Oyama was sent to

Europe specially to study the working of the military systems then

in operation, and he visited the principal capitals and made himself

master in every instance of the needful details. He spent much time in

Berlin during this later visit to Europe, for the German system had been

definitely adopted in Japan as the most suitable to the needs of the

nation. But he did not wholly dissociate himself from his former friends

in France, and in the course of his stay took opportunity more than once

to pass a day or two in Paris, combining pleasure with profit, for he

continued to find in the methods of the French most valuable features,

admirable from every point of view, but especially so when applied under

given circumstances to the peculiar needs of the Japanese army. It was

designed that the studies to which he had to devote himself in Berlin

should be of a character to enable him to render Marquis Yamagata the

maximum of assistance in the grand work of reorganising the army and

providing adequately for military education. When, therefore, his mission

in Europe was deemed sufficiently accomplished he was recalled to Tokio

and made Chief of the Staff under General Yamagata, and when in 1890

Marquis Yamagata was the Minister-president of State in the First Cabinet

formed after the proclamation of the New Constitution, Marshal Oyama, as

he had by that time become, held the portfolio of Minister for War. That

administration lasted until April 1901, and was followed by the Matsukata

and Ito Cabinets, in both of which Oyama Iwao was War Minister, and when

in 1894 the great conflict with China began, he begged to be relieved of

his post in the administration with all speed in order that he might be

able to take part in the actual fighting in Manchuria. He was given the

command of the Second Army Corps, Marshal Yamagata being at the time with

the First Army in Liao-tung, and while the preparations for despatching

the Second Army over-sea to the capture of Port Arthur were in progress,

the Commander of it dwelt at the town of Hiroshima, in south-west Japan,

close to the port of embarkation, named Ujina. While organising the

expedition he took up his quarters in a very unpretending little shop in

Hiroshima, and there the final arrangement of the campaign was planned in

company with the late General Kawakami, by common consent esteemed the

greatest of Japan’s strategists.

The Second Army consisted of the First Division, and a mixed brigade of

the Sixth, with a siege train, and it was despatched in part at the end

of September 1894, to Chemulpo, and partly to the Ping Yang inlet in the

middle of October, the Japanese fleet being there already, keeping watch

on the movements of the Chinese squadron and reconnoitring the coasts of

the Liao-tung peninsula for a suitable landing-place for Marshal Oyama’s

force. There was little cause to apprehend interference from the vessels

of Admiral Ting’s fleet after its defeat at the mouth of the Yalu in

September, however, and on the evening of the 23rd October the first

convoy of sixteen ships steamed over from the Ping Yang inlet to a point

on the coast at the mouth of the river Hwa-yuan. Ten Japanese men-of-war

acted as escort, but the Chinese made no attempt to interfere with the

landing of the troops. At this time the Chinese held Ta-lien-wan and the

adjacent walled city of Kinchau with some 6000 men, and Port Arthur was

garrisoned with 10,800 men after the 6th of November.

On that date the Japanese captured Kinchau and next day Ta-lien-wan forts

fell into their hands, and the port was thenceforward their base of

operations against the fortress at the extremity of the “Regent’s Sword.”

Marshal Oyama’s army remained in the region of the Talienwan isthmus

until the 18th, and then the advance towards Port Arthur was commenced.

On the 20th the Marshal issued orders for the attack to be made at

daylight the next day, his whole force at that time numbering 25,700

combatants. The Chinese had 4050 men in the coast forts in addition

to the 10,800 men before mentioned in the various land forts which

formed the semicircle of the defences, of about two and a half miles

radius. These land forts were armed with a great variety of ordnance,

including Krupp, mountain, field and siege guns, 40-pounder Armstrongs,

10-barrelled Gatlings, and even Chinese pieces of antique design. Long

before daylight on the 21st November the assailants were on the move,

and had reached their assigned positions by 7 A.M. without encountering

the least opposition. The famous Itsushan forts were taken in the first

onset, and General Hasegawa, commanding the mixed brigade, speedily took

the positions on the Two-dragons’ hill and adjacent heights, the fighting

being practically over by noon. At 3 P.M. the Japanese were in possession

of the town, and though the coast forts continued to fire at the fleet,

which took no notice of them, the positions were evacuated during the

night, and Marshal Oyama, with the headquarters of the First Division,

returned to Kinchau.

The Chinese fleet lay at Wei-hai-wei, a danger to any expedition which

might cross the gulf of Pechili, and as it was part of the Japanese

plan to march to the Chinese capital, the capture or destruction of the

ships became imperative. It was therefore resolved that Marshal Oyama

should lead his army to the assault of the Shantung fortress. For this

purpose it was decided to reinforce him to the extent in all of 24,000

combatants, and the fleet of transports with the men on board left Ujina

early in January 1895, and steamed to Talienwan, where the bulk of the

troops which had been victorious at Port Arthur were likewise embarked

and the whole expedition set sail for Yung-cheng Bay, at the extreme

north-east point of the Shantung peninsula, which was reached on the

early morning of the 20th January. By degrees all the men were landed,

with provisions for six weeks. From Yung-cheng the advance was made by

two roads, six days after the landing was commenced, and the ridges to

the south of the harbour were carried without any difficulty on the 30th.

It was part of the Japanese plan to turn the guns of the Chinese land

forts, as soon as they could be taken, against the men-of-war in harbour

commanded by Admiral Ting, and it is to this officer’s credit that he had

foreseen this and had even begun to dismantle the eastern forts in good

time, but he was over-ruled, and the guns replaced in their positions in

obedience to peremptory orders from Tien-tsin. So confident was Marshal

Oyama that he would be able to turn these heavy guns to account that

he had brought bluejackets with him to man them, with sundry stores

and fittings from Port Arthur to replace similar articles which it was

thought probable the Chinese would either remove or destroy. There was

somewhat hard fighting on the 1st of February, but next day the Japanese

forces entered Wei-hai-wei unopposed, and it was found that the guns in

the western defences had been rendered useless. The cold was at this

time so intense that the ships were covered with ice, and blocks of ice

three inches thick were frozen into the muzzles of the guns. Marshal

Oyama’s army had, however, completed the work assigned to it, and it only

remained for the fleet to bring about the reduction of the forts on the

island of Liu-kung-tao, and the destruction or surrender of the Chinese

vessels. It was effected by a series of daring torpedo-boat attacks, in

the first week of February, followed by a systematic bombardment of the

island positions, and the surrender of Admiral Ting took place on the

12th of that month.

Having captured Wei-hai-wei and removed the danger to the Peking

expedition which the presence of a Chinese fortress on its flank would

have created, the next step of the Japanese was to prepare for the march

to the Chinese capital itself. Marshal Oyama returned to Talienwan,

and the troops were disposed between there and Port Arthur, or at the

fortress itself, in readiness for the final concentration.

On the 14th of April the Guard and the Fourth Division passed through

the Straits of Shimonoseki in fifty transports on their way to Talienwan

to unite with the troops under Marshal Oyama. Prince Komatsu accompanied

them as Commander-in-chief of the Land and Sea Forces, intending to

set up his headquarters in Port Arthur. The entire Japanese forces now

included seven divisions, and the Chinese had massed practically an equal

number between Shanhaikwan and Peking, in addition to the army they

still had in Manchuria. But on the 17th of April the treaty of peace

was signed, and an armistice established until the 8th of May, when

ratifications were exchanged at Chifu and the war of 1894-5 was at an end.

In the course of the war the total losses on the Japanese side were:—

Killed 739

Died of wounds 230

” cholera 1602

” other diseases 1546

----

Total deaths 4117

Wounded 3009

Cholera patients 2689

Invalids from other causes 51,164

------

56,862

------

Total loss, 60,979

In the settlement with China it had been agreed that she should cede

the peninsula of Liao-tung to Japan. But Russia, France, and Germany

stepped in to deprive her of these legitimate spoils of war, in order

that Russia, and at no distant date, might seek to permanently occupy

the territory herself. The wrong done was never forgiven nor forgotten

in Japan, and when Marshal Oyama took up his position as Chief of the

General Staff in Tokio, shortly after the conclusion of peace, both he

and Marshal Yamagata set about the task of making Japan’s military power

sufficient to secure her against the peril which they foresaw would

continue to menace their land while the advance of Russia southward might

remain unchecked.

Marshal Oyama held the post indicated, at the General Staff, during the

intervening years down to 1904, and it was a period of steady and eager

preparation for the inevitable, by reorganisation of every branch of the

military system, and by paying very particular attention to the education

and training of the Japanese military officer. What that training is may

be ascertained from the Kinkodo Company’s excellent history of the late

war.

In Japan the law is that all citizens are under the obligation of

military service for a certain term of years, and therefore the necessity

of complying with its provisions is as great as that of the payment of

taxes. In practice the duty is accepted as just as much a matter of

course as any other feature of citizenship. It was adopted at the outset

and no one seriously offers an objection to it. He would be deemed a

most unpatriotic man who did not revel in the thought that he might be

chosen to serve his country, and every man in Japan rejoices to think

that he knows how to handle a weapon and take his share of the task

which may some day be that of the Emperor’s loyal subjects to defend the

island empire against a foe. Mere drilling and parades are not so much

valued as rifle practice, fencing, the bayonet exercise, skirmishing,

and gymnastics. Work begins at 6 A.M. and with little appreciable

interval, never more than five minutes, goes on until the midday meal

is served. Afterwards it is resumed for four hours, then bath, supper,

recreation, and bed betimes. The officers share in all the exercises of

the men, very little being left to non-commissioned officers, sergeants,

and corporals. The officers are always on duty. It is in this way that

complete harmony has been established between all ranks and the dread

of a martinet sergeant is unknown among the men in Japanese barracks.

Promotion from the ranks, however, is not possible as no one is eligible

for a commission who has not entered himself in the first place as a

candidate, and to do so he must be either a graduate of the Cadet school,

or have graduated from a middle school licensed or recognised by the

Government, public or private, or be able to show that his education has

brought him up to the standard needed in order to obtain the certificate

granted on leaving a middle School. And in either of the two latter

cases the candidate must have a letter from the Commanding officer of

the regiment he wishes to join, signifying that officer’s willingness to

accept him eventually as an officer in that regiment.

As soon as he is accepted as a candidate he joins his regiment _as a

private_, spending one year in the ranks as an “officer candidate,” thus

gaining a practical acquaintance with all the duties of a common soldier,

and then he is sent for one year more of study to the Military College

in Tokio. Next he returns to his regiment as an aspirant, to learn the

duties of a subaltern, and at last, when about two years and a half

have elapsed from the time when he first entered as a candidate, he is,

if approved of at a meeting of the officers of the regiment, accepted

and commissioned as a sub-lieutenant. He can choose whichever arm he

prefers, when he goes to the Military College, as there are departments

for infantry, cavalry, field artillery, fortress artillery, Engineers,

and military train. He may select his own regiment, subject to the

consent of the commanding officer of that regiment, and should the number

of candidates exceed the number of vacancies the choice falls on those

who have won most marks, in rotation. Every year on the 1st of December

the batches of candidate officers are distributed to the regiments,

as privates. They receive their uniforms, food, arms, etc., from the

State but no money allowance. They must drill and go through their

exercises just like other men in their company, but they enjoy certain

privileges, for example, they have special rooms in barracks, and mess

with the officers, this association with their superiors in rank being

regarded as part of their education. During the year they may be promoted

to lance-corporal or non-commissioned officer grade, and they receive

lessons in military science from the regimental instructors.

The Military College stands on a wide plateau in Tokio, at Ichigaya,

where there is excellent air, and abundance of space. The students are

divided into three companies each under the command of a captain of

infantry. Each company is in six sections, of twenty-five to thirty

students each, a lieutenant of infantry in charge of each section. The

studies prescribed are the same for all arms—viz. Tactics, Artillery,

Science, Fortification, Topography, Military administration, Field

hygiene and farriery, Foreign languages, Surveying, and Practical

work. For exercise the students have drill (distinct for each arm),

gymnastics, fencing, sabre exercise, riding, and shooting. Study and

exercise together keep the youths at work the whole day, save for

half-an-hour after supper, when they unbend. The school year begins on

the 1st of December, to agree with conscription arrangements, and the

first examination is in April or May, the second in September or October.

At the end of October there are annual manœuvres, and the graduation

ceremony is in November, when the Emperor makes a point of being present.

There is a Military staff college, designed to give further instruction

in the higher branches of military science to junior officers of promise.

Its students are lieutenants and sub-lieutenants of all arms who have

been at least two years with their regiments or battalions, and whose

physical health, intellectual qualifications, morals, diligence, and

general conduct have shown them to be suitable recipients of the higher

training. Here the course is for three years, and for about ten weeks the

students are with regiments different from their own arm, participating

in the annual manœuvres. Graduates receive diplomas, and a badge which

they wear like a medal, and one year after graduation they are eligible

for staff appointments, instructorships, and other more or less coveted

posts. Artillery and Engineer Lieutenants are eligible for the College

of Artillery and Engineering, wherein special instruction is given on

subjects required in these two arms, the course including strategy,

equitation, mathematics, chemistry, drawing, and foreign languages. At

the gunnery school for fortress artillery, and for field artillery,

practical instruction is given for periods of two or three months to

students who comprise captains and lieutenants from each of the field

artillery regiments, or of fortress artillery, or they are lieutenants or

sub-lieutenants who have just graduated from the College. At the cavalry

training school the course lasts eleven months, and includes practical

testing of all sorts of riding material and harness. It may, in fact, be

claimed that the system of military instruction in the army of Japan is

as complete as that of the armies of Europe, but the government still

sends annually some dozens of promising young officers abroad to perfect

themselves in their studies in the Occident.

Makers of Japan · 第 23 / 29 段