device of rhetoric. It is not transferred to poetic until George
Whetstone's _Dedication_ to his _Promos and Cassandra_. For Whetstone
asserts that in his comedy he has intermingled all actions "in such sorte
as the grave matter may instruct, and the pleasant delight ... and the
conclusion showes the confusion of Vice and the cherising of Vertue."[370]
That the philosophy of this moral improvement resides in the extreme
application of poetic justice he shows as follows: "For by the reward of
the good the good are encouraged in wel doinge: and with the scowrge of
the lewde the lewde are feared from evill attempts." Whetstone's
_Dedication_ was published in 1578, one year before Gosson launched his
attack against poetry and poets in his _School of Abuse_, which was
answered by Lodge and Sidney in their _Apologies_. In this controversy, in
which Whetstone later took sides with the anti-stage party in his
_Touchstone for Time_ (1584), the age-long conflict between the poets and
the philosophers was renewed with vigor and acrimony. But both the
attackers and the defenders argued from the same premise, that the purpose
of poetry was to afford pleasant moral instruction. Gosson and the
Puritans objected that current poetry and plays failed to afford this
moral instruction and should consequently be condemned. Lodge, Sidney and
the other defenders of poetry retorted that poetry had a noble
function--the teaching of morality, and that an occasional poem which did
not serve this purpose did not invalidate the claims of poetry as a whole.
Gosson writes:
The right use of auncient poetrie was to have the notable exploytes of
worthy captaines, the holesome councels of good fathers and vertuous
lives of predecessors set down in numbers, and sung to the instrument at
solemne feastes, that the sound of the one might draw the hearers from
kissing the cup too often, and the sense of the other put them in minde
of things past, and chaulke out the way to do the like.[371]
The benefit, according to Gosson, which poetry should produce is that of
good moral example. Moral doctrine, he believes accessible in the
churches, and against the poets he urges that the evil social environment
of the theatre offsets the benefit to be derived even from good plays.
What profits the moral lesson of such a play if after witnessing the
performance a man walk away with a woman whose acquaintance he has just
made in the theatre.[372] He may drink wine, he may play cards, he may
even enter a brothel.
In his _Defence of Poetry_ (1579), Lodge retreats to the caverns of the
middle ages to equip himself with arms. Under the influence of Campano,
who died in 1477, he advances allegory as the explanation which makes the
apparently light and trifling poets moral teachers of the utmost
seriousness. Addressing Gosson he exclaims:
Did you never reade that under the persons of beastes many abuses were
dissiphered? Have you not reason to waye that whatsoever ether Virgil
did write of his gnatt or Ovid of his fley was all covertly to declare
abuse?... You remember not that under the person of Aeneas in Virgil the
practice of a dilligent captaine is described; you know not that the
creation is signified in the Image of Prometheus; the fall of pryde in
the person of Narcissus.[373]
And he quotes Lactantius as comparing poetry with the Scriptures. If
either are taken literally, they will seem false. We should judge by the
poet's hidden meaning.[374] The purpose of the poets, to Lodge, was "In
the way of pleasure to draw men to wisdome." When he defends comedy, Lodge
drifts away from allegory. Terence and Plautus he praises for furnishing
examples of virtue and vice upon the boards, thus to amend the manners of
his auditors. He believed that poetry did amend manners, and correct
abuses--if properly used. But he is very quick to admit the very abuses
which Gosson attacked.
I abhore those poets that savor of ribaldry: I will admit the expullcion
of such enormities, poetry is dispraised not for the folly that is in
it, but for the abuse whiche manye ill Wryters couller by it.[375] I
must confess with Aristotle that men are greatly delighted with
imitation, and that it were good to bring those things on stage that
were altogether tending to vertue; all this I admit and hartely wysh,
but you say unlesse the thinge be taken away the vice will continue. Nay
I say if the style were changed the practise would profit.[376]
Thus he defends poetry bcause it teaches morality by example and by
allegory.
With that higher intelligence and learning which have already been
contrasted with the unthinking acceptance of his times[377] Sir Philip
Sidney wrote his _Apologie for Poetrie_. In this dignified and vigorous
pamphlet, written about 1583, and published in 1595, Sidney presents the
best and most consistent argument for the moral purpose of poetry that
appeared in England. That the main line of his argument and his best
material is drawn from Minturno and Scaliger, as Spingarn has
demonstrated,[378] in no way invalidates his claim to distinction. The
purpose of poetry is to Sidney, in the first place, to teach and
delight,[379] "that fayning notable images of vertues, vices, or what els,
with that delightfull teaching which must be the right describing note to
know a poet by."[380] But as the end of all earthly learning is virtuous
action, in Sidney's mind, he agrees with Minturno and Scaliger in
borrowing from rhetoric Cicero's three-fold aim of the orator: to teach,
to delight, to move. Sidney says that the poets "imitate both to _delight_
and _teach_, and delight to _move_ men to take the goodnes in hande ...
and _teach_, to make them know that goodnes whereunto they are
mooved."[381] It is incredible that he did not know this terminology as
rhetoric. Poetry, he believes, fails if it does not persuade its reader to
abandon evil and adopt good.
And that _mooving_ is of a higher degree than _teaching_, it may by this
appeare, that it is well nigh the cause of teaching. For who will be
taught, if he bee not mooved with desire to be taught? and what so much
good doth that teaching bring forth (I speak still of morall doctrine)
as that it mooveth one to do that which it dooth teach?[382]
The effectiveness of poetry, then, in accomplishing this moral end lies in
its pleasantness. The poet, says Sidney, in that most famous passage which
is too frequently quoted incompletely,
commeth to you with words sent in delightful proportion, either
accompanied with, or prepared for, the well inchaunting skill of
Musicke; and with a tale forsooth he commeth unto you, with a tale which
holdeth children from play, and old men from the chimney corner. And
_pretending no more, doth intende the winning of the mind from
wickedness to vertue_: even as the childe is often brought to take most
wholsom things by hiding them in such other as have a pleasant
tast.[383]
According to Sidney, then, it is the very purpose of poetry to win men to
virtue by pleasant instruction. The argument of poetry in accomplishing
this end is primarily the example. Sidney compares very elaborately
philosophy, history, and poetry in an endeavor to show that poetry is the
most effective instrument for forwarding virtue. In the first place poetry
is better adapted than philosophy to win men to virtue because it
persuades both by precepts and by examples, while philosophy persuades by
precepts alone. His sanction for this high opinion of the persuasive power
of example is the rhetorical commonplace of the renaissance that the way
is long by precept and short by example.[384] To enforce this point he
tells the story of how Menenius Agrippa won over the people of Rome to
support the Senate by telling them the story of the revolt of the members
against the belly. Quintilian[385] and Wilson[386] had already told this
story to prove the effectiveness of the example as a rhetorical argument,
a device of the public speaker.
The main advantage which poetry possesses over history, Sidney goes on, is
that while the historian must stick to his facts, which too frequently are
unedifying, the poet can and does create a world better than nature, and
presents to his reader ideal figures of human conduct such as Pylades,
Cyrus, and Æneas.[387] This is Sidney's application of Aristotle's
assertion that history is particular and poetic universal; history records
things as they are and poetic as they are, worse than they are, or better.
Lest his readers might fear that the arguments of the poet might lose some
of their persuasive force from their being fictitious, Sidney hastens to
add: "For that a fayned example hath as much force to teach as a true
example (for as for to moove, it is cleere, sith the fayned may be tuned
to the highest key of passion);"[388] and here he is drawing from
Aristotle's _Rhetoric._[389] Through admiration of the noble persons of
poetry, the reader is won to a desire for emulation. "Who readeth _Æneas_
carrying olde _Anchises_ on his back, that wisheth not it were his fortune
to perfourme so excellent an acte?"[390]
Although Sidney believes the principal moral value of poetry to reside in
its power to teach and move by the use of examples, he devotes at least
half a page to the beneficent effect of parables and allegories. The
parables which he uses, however, are all Christian, and the allegories are
all the _Fables_ of Æsop. From the allegorical interpretation of poetry
current in the middle ages and to a scarcely less degree among his English
contemporaries Sidney remains conspicuously aloof.
In answering the specific charges against poetry, that it is a waste of
time, the mother of lies, the nurse of abuse, and rejected by Plato,
Sidney asserts that a thing which moves men to virtue so effectively as
poetry cannot be a waste of time; that since poetry pretends not to
literal truth, it cannot lie,[391] that poetry does not abuse man's wit,
but man's wit abuses poetry, for "shall the abuse of a thing make the
right use odious?"[393] and that Plato objected not to poetry but to its
abuse.
Sir John Harington[392] who published his _Brief Apologie of Poetrie_ in
1591, four years before the publication of Sidney's _Apologie_, based much
of his treatise on Sidney. Unfortunately, he did not digest fully the
arguments of the manuscript in his hand, and instead of a first-hand
knowledge of Minturno and Scaliger had only the commonplaces of Plutarch.
In spite even of Plutarch, allegory, not moral example, is his main line
of defence. His fundamental basis is the stock Horatian "omne tulit
punctum qui miscuit utile dulci," or as Harington paraphrases, "for in
verse is both goodness and sweetness, Rubarb and Sugarcandie, the pleasant
and the profitable."[394] The objection that poets lie Harington meets as
Sidney does, "But poets never affirming any for true, but presenting them
to us as fables and imitations, cannot lye though they would."[395] At
this point Harington parts company with his master and goes back to the
middle ages.
The ancient Poets have indeed wrapped as it were in their writings
divers and sundry meanings, which they call the senses or mysteries
thereof. First of all for the litteral sence (as it were the utmost
barke or ryne) they set downe in manner of an historie the acts and
notable exploits of some persons worthie memorie: then in the same
fiction, as a second rine and somewhat more fine, as it were nearer to
the pith and marrow, they place the Morall sence profitable for the
active life of man, approving vertuous actions and condemning the
contrarie. Many times also under the selfesame words they comprehend
some true understanding of naturall Philosophie, or sometimes of
politike government, and now and then of divinitie: and these same
sences that comprehend so excellent knowledge we call the
Allegorie.[396]
Nothing could be more specifically mediaeval. He then proceeds to explain
the historical, moral, and three allegorical senses of the story of
Perseus and the Gorgon--the highest allegory being theological. Further,
to defend the allegorical senses of poetry, which conceals a pith of
profit under a pleasant rind, Harington explains fully how Demosthenes,
Bishop Fisher, and the Prophet Nathan enforced their arguments by
allegorical stories. To Harington, then, poetry is useful as an
introduction to Philosophy. Paraphrasing Plutarch _On the Reading of
Poets_, he says:
So young men do like best that Philosophy that is not Philosophie, or
that is not delivered as Philosophie, and such are the pleasant writings
of learned Poets, that are the popular Philosophers and the popular
divines.[397]
_A Discourse of English Poetrie_ (1586) by the laborious but uninspired
tutor, William Webbe,[398] is not a defense; but interspersed among his
remarks advocating the reformed versifying, and his arid catalog of poets,
ancient and modern, is a good deal about the moral purpose and value of
poetry. A thoroughgoing Horatian, he cannot forbear to quote at length and
comment upon the "miscere utile dulci," of his master. Poetry, in Webbe's
conception, therefore, is especially effective in its "sweete allurements
to vertues and commodious caveates from vices."[399] In appraising the
methods of producing the moral effect, Webbe fails to share with his
contemporaries their high opinion of moral example and their depreciation
of precept. Poetry, he says, contains great and profitable fruits for the
instruction of manners and precepts of good life[400]. And he finds much
profit even in the most dissolute works of Ovid and Martial because they
abound in moral precepts. He does not, however, entirely discount the
moral effect of example. Ovid and Martial should be kept from young people
who have not yet gained sufficient judgment to distinguish between the
beneficial and the harmful, and Lucian should not be read at all. But he
seems to fear the moral effect of bad example more than he applauds the
effect of good. Thus his main reliance is upon allegory. The
_Metamorphoses_ of Ovid, for instance,
though it consisted of fayned Fables for the most part, and poeticall
inventions, yet being moralized according to his meaning, and the trueth
of every tale beeing discovered, it is a worke of exceeding wysedome and
sounde judgment [and the rest of his writings] are mixed with much good
counsayle and profitable lessons, if they be wisely and narrowly
read.[401]
Perhaps because he was not pledged to defend poetry against the attacks of
the Puritans, Webbe thus allows himself to admit "the very summe or
cheefest essence of poetry dyd alwayes for the most part consist in
delighting the readers or hearers with pleasure." Aside from his
emphasizing allegory, which Plutarch had rejected, Webbe is thus closer to
the doctrines of Plutarch than he is to the Italians. Poetry has, he
believes, a moral effect, but he does not establish this moral effect as
its motivating purpose[402]. And again, after descanting on the
exhortations to virtue, dehortations from vices, and praises of laudable
things which characterized the early poets, he defines the comical sort of
poetry as containing "all such _Epigrammes_, _Elegies_, and delectable
ditties, which Poets have devised respecting onely the delight
thereof.[403]
Like Webbe, the author of _The Arte of English Poesie_ (1589) ascribed to
Puttenham,[404] believes much in the pleasure of poetry. He does not,
however, advance pleasure as the purpose any more than he does profit.
Instead of endeavoring to discover what the end or purpose of poetry may
be, Puttenham explains why certain forms of poetry were devised, or what
may be the intention of certain poets in certain poems. The passage is
worth quoting at length. The use of poetry, says Puttenham,
is the laud, honour, & glory of the immortall gods (I speake now in
phrase of the Gentiles); secondly, the worthy gests of noble Princes,
the memoriall and registry of all great fortunes, the praise of vertue &
reproofe of vice, the instruction of morall doctrines, the revealing of
sciences naturall & other profitable Arts, the redresse of boistrous &
sturdie courages by perswasion, the consolation and repose of temperate
myndes: finally, the common solace of mankind in all his travails and
cares of this transitorie life; and in this last sort, being used for
recreation onely, may allowably beare matter not alwayes of the gravest
or of any great commoditie or profit, but rather in some sort vaine,
dissolute, or wanton, so it be not very scandalous & of evill
example.[405]
The poems of "this last sort" which Puttenham had in mind were anagrams,
emblems, and such trifling verse especially, which, as he says, have been
objected to by some grave and theological heads as "to none edification
nor instruction, either of morall vertue or otherwise behooffull for the
commonwealth." These trifles "have bene in all ages permitted as the
convenient solaces and recreations of man's wit."[406] But Puttenham does
not advocate that these poems whose only aim is recreation should be
released from the restraints of accepted morality. They may be vain,
dissolute or wanton, but not very scandalous. They should not offer evil
examples, nor should their matter be "unhonest."
Not all poetry, according to Puttenham, is given over to refreshing the
mind by the ear's delight. Although the poet is appointed as a pleader of
lovely causes in the ear of princely dames, young ladies, gentlewomen, and
courtiers,[407] none the less much poetry has a didactic purpose. Satire
was first invented to administer direct rebuke of evil, comedy to amend
the manners of common men by discipline and example, tragedy to show the
mutability of fortune and the just punishment of God in revenge of a
vicious and evil life, pastoral to inform moral discipline, for the
amendment of man's behavior, or to insinuate or glance at greater matters
under the veil of rustic persons and rude speeches.[408] Here Puttenham
pays his respects to all accepted methods of poetical instruction: in
satire, to precepts; in comedy and tragedy, to example; in pastoral, to
allegory. Yet it is in historical poetry, which may indifferently be
wholly true, wholly false, or a mixture, the moral effect of example is
most potent. Speaking of examples in poetry, he says, "Right so no kinde
of argument in all the Oratorie craft doth better perswade and more
universally satisfie then example."[409] It is on this account that
historical poetry is, next the divine, the most honorable and worthy. For
the historians have always been not so eager that what they wrote should
be true to fact as that it should be used either for example or for
pleasure.
Considering that many times it is seene a fained matter or altogether
fabulous, besides that it maketh more mirth than any other, works no
less good conclusions for example then the most true and veritable, but
often more, because the Poet hath the handling of them to fashion at his
pleasure.[410]
This conception of history as moral example is common enough. To Budé all
history was a moral example[411] and Puttenham's inclusion of didactic
fiction is in line with much renaissance thought, which regarded the two
as almost interchangeable.[412]
Puttenham, like Webbe, was more in accord with Horace in admitting both
the pleasant and profitable effects of poetry than he was with Minturno,
Scaliger, and Sidney. He grants that some poetry exists only for pleasure,
but he puts his emphasis on poetry as a power of persuasion[413]
accomplishing the moral improvement of society. As late as the
_Hypercritica_ (1618) of Bolton, history is defined as nothing else but a
kind of philosophy using examples. Bolton enforces his view by quotation
from Bede, William of Malmesbury, and Sir Thomas North.[414]
3. The Displacement of Allegory by Example
A most interesting view of the purpose of poetry was evolved in the brain
of Francis Bacon--that baffling complexity of mediaeval tradition and
penetrating original thought. To him the use of feigned history, as he
defines poetry, "hath beene to give some shadowe of satisfaction to the
minde of man in those points wherein the Nature of things doth deny
it."[415] That is, poetry represents the world as greater, more just, and
more pleasant than it really is. "So as it appeareth that _Poesie_
serveth and conferreth to Magnanimitie, Moralitie, and to delectation."
Here Bacon seems to imply that the essential pleasure of poetry is in
affording vicarious experience through imaginative realization. Poetry
does this by "submitting the shewes of things to the desires of the
minde." It truly makes a world nearer to our heart's desire. But while
Bacon derives the moral benefit of poetry from examples of conduct and
outcomes of events more nearly just than those of actual life, when he
analyses poetry into its kinds, he makes a place for allegory. In this
division he provides for narrative, drama, and allegory. But with
penetration he sees what few renaissance critics had noted before--that
allegory is of two varieties. The first variety is essentially the same as
a rhetorical example; it is an extended metaphor used as an argument to
enforce a point and thus persuade an audience. The fables of Aesop are
such allegories or examples; and they are useful because they make their
point more interestingly than other arguments and more clearly. The other
sort of allegory, says Bacon, instead of illuminating the idea, obscures
it. "That is, when the Secrets and Misteries of Religion, Pollicy, or
Philosophy, are involved in Fables or Parables." He then gives political
allegorical interpretations of the myths of Briareus and of the Centaur
and suddenly adds: "Nevertheless in many the like incounters, I doe rather
think that the fable was first and the exposition devised than that the
Morall was first and thereupon the fable framed."[416] Bacon's final
conclusion seems to be that, although allegorical poetry does exist,
allegory is not essential to poetry and that the wholesale allegorizing of
the middle ages was far off the mark. In his suspicion that in most cases
the fable was first and the interpretation after, Bacon was in complete
agreement with Rabelais in the prologue of _Gargantua_.[417] At any rate
Bacon seems to have given the _coup de grace_ to allegory in England.
Under the influence of Pico della Mirandola it was resurrected from its
tomb by Henry Reynolds; but it was a much less moral allegory and a more
mystical. In his _Mythomystes_ (licensed 1632) Reynolds admits, that the
ancients mingled moral instruction in their poetry, but reprehends this as
an abuse. Prose is the proper vehicle of moral doctrine and should have
been employed by Spenser. The true function of poetry, then, is to give
secret knowledge of the mysteries of nature to the initiated. Thus the
story of the rape of Proserpine signifies, when allegorically interpreted;
"the putrefaction and succeeding generation of the Seedes we commit to
Pluto, or the earth."[418] This is the most plausible example of mystical
interpretation to be found in the whole treatise.
To the allegorist, the fable or plot in epic or dramatic poetry was only a
rind to cover attractively the kernel of truth. It was a means to an end,
not an end in itself. As the influence of Aristotle's _Poetics_ spreading
through Italy, Germany, France, and England, gave the plot or fable more
importance, allegory lost its hold on the minds of the critics. When Ben
Jonson writes in his _Timber_ "For the Fable and Fiction is, as it were,
the forme and Soule of any Poeticall worke or _Poeme_"[419] the change had
come. Jonson, like Sidney, was steeped in classical criticism as
interpreted and spread abroad by the sixteenth-century critics of the
continent. But while Sidney made a place for allegory in his scheme of
poetry, Jonson does not so much as mention it. His idea of the teaching
power of poetry, for to him poetry and painting both behold pleasure and
profit as their common object,[420] is rhetorical--depending on precept
and example--and attaining its true aim when it moves men to action. Poesy
is "a dulcet and gentle _Philosophy_, which leades on and guides us by the
hand to Action with a ravishing delight and incredible Sweetnes."[421]
Jonson evidently knew that he was merging oratory and poetry in their
common purpose of securing persuasion; for he says:
"The _Poet_ is the neerest Borderer upon the Orator, and expresseth all
his vertues, though he be tyed more to numbers, is his equal in ornament,
and above him in his strengths: Because in moving the minds of men, and
stirring of affections, in which Oratory shewes, and especially approves
her eminence, hee chiefly excells."[422]
In his dedication to _Volpone_ he says this power of persuasion which the
poet possesses to so eminent a degree is to be applied to the moral
well-being of men, "to inform men in the best reason of living."[423]
Himself a writer for the theatre, Jonson is naturally more concerned with
comedy and tragedy than he is with any narrative forms of poetry. And to
him the office of the comic poet is "to imitate justice and instruct to
life--or stirre up gentle affections."[424] In _Timber_ he iterates the
same praise of poetry as being no less effective than philosophy in
instructing men to good life, and informing their manners, but as even
more effective in that it persuades men to good where philosophy threatens
and compels. In order to accomplish this beneficial effect on public
morals, the poet must have an exact knowledge of all virtues and vices
with ability to render the one loved and the other hated.[425] As a
natural result of this conception, so similar to Cicero's demand that the
orator must know all things and in line with Aristotle's _Rhetoric_,
Jonson concludes that the poet, like Quintilian's orator, must himself be
a good man; for how else will he be able "to informe _yong-men_ to all
good disciplines, inflame _growne-men_ to all great vertues, keepe _old
men_ in their best and supreme state."[426]
Aside from Sidney and Jonson no English critic, however, thought through
to the logical conclusion that in moral purpose rhetoric and poetic are
identical. The others continued to echo Horace, or lean toward allegory,
or see profit in poetry from its moral example. For instance in his
preface to his second instalment of Homer entitled _Achilles' Shield_
(1598) Chapman dwells at length on the moral value and wisdom contained in
the _Iliad_,[427] and enunciates the same idea in his _Prefaces_ of
1610-16.[428] Peacham, in his _Compleat Gentleman_ (1622), repeats the
usual commonplaces to the effect that poetry is a dulcet philosophy, for
the most part lifted from Puttenham.[429] In his _Argenis_ (1621) Barclay
reminds his reader of the children who for so many centuries had shunned
the cup of physic until the bitter taste had been removed by sweet syrop.
Thus also, says he, is it with the moral value of poetry disguised with
sweet music. "Virtues and vices I will frame, and the rewards of them
shall suite to both"; for it is on the moral example of poetic justice
that Barclay depends. The models of virtue will be followed.[430]
The Earl of Stirling, in _Anacrisis_ (1634?) acknowledges the works of the
poets to be the chief springs of learning, "both for Profit and Pleasure,
showing Things as they should be, where Histories represent them as they
are." Consequently he has a high opinion of the _Cyropaedia_ of Xenophon,
the _Arcadia_ of Sir Philip Sidney, and other such poems, as "affording
many exquisite Types of Perfection for both the Sexes."[431] These types
the reader is expected to imitate in his own conduct, guided by the moral
precepts with which the poet must not neglect to decorate his work.
* * * * *
Within the period of this study two views were taken of the moral element
in poetry. With the exception of Sidney and Jonson, who knew the theories
of the Italian renaissance, the English critics believed with Horace that
poetry was at once pleasant and profitable, and agreed with Plutarch that
poetry, if rightly used, would be of benefit in the education of youth.
But there was little tendency to follow this to the conclusion of
asserting that because poetry has a moral effect on the reader, it is the
purpose of poetry as an art to exert this moral effect for the good of
society. Most of these critics believed that the moral effect which poetry
did exert came through allegory. In this respect, as has been shown, they
were carrying on the traditions of the middle ages.
The opposing view derived ultimately from the classical rhetorics, and
entered England through the criticism of the Italian
scholars--particularly Minturno and Scaliger. Starting from the saying of
Horace that poets aim to please or profit, or please and profit together,
these critics borrowed from rhetoric Cicero's three-fold aim of the
orator: to teach, to please, to move, and applied these three aims to the
poet. Accordingly, to them the poet has the same aim as the
orator--persuasion. He pleases not for the sake of giving pleasure, but
for the sake of winning his readers so that he may better attain his real
object of teaching morality and moving men to action in its practice. The
emphasis on the example as the means of attaining this end was further
derived from scholastic philosophy which, as has been shown, classed
logic, rhetoric, and poetic together as instruments for attaining truth
and improving the morality of the state. Furthermore, according to this
scholastic view, the three arts differed only as they utilized different
means to attain this end. Logic used the demonstrative syllogism and the
scientific induction, rhetoric used the enthymeme or rhetorical syllogism
and the example or popular induction, poetic used the example alone.
According to the renaissance developments of this last view, allegory was
emphasized less and less as the example was felt to be more appropriate.
Thus Sidney and Jonson, the outstanding classicists in English renaissance
criticism, exhibit to the highest degree the influence of the most
rhetorical of Italian renaissance critics. They alone in England assert
that the purpose of poetry is to move men to virtuous action.
* * * * *
Thus a study of rhetorical terminology in English renaissance theories of
poetry throws into sharp relief the fact that all criticism of the fine
art of literature in England in the 16th century and the first half of the
17th century was profoundly influenced by rhetoric. This influence was
two-fold. On the one hand the less scholarly critics perpetuated the
popular traditions of rhetoric which they inherited from the middle ages.
These traditions of allegory and the ornate style were, as has been shown,
in turn derived from post-classical rhetoric. On the other hand the more
scholarly critics applied to poetry the canons of classical rhetoric which
they derived in part from the classics themselves and in part from the
critics of the Italian renaissance.
In one sense this has been a study of critical perversions. Although many
of the critics of the English renaissance are remarkable for their wisdom
and discerning judgments, their writings are far less valuable than those
of Longinus and Aristotle. But Aristotle and Longinus did not allow their
theories of poetry to be contaminated by rhetoric. The best modern critics
have studied and understood the classical treatises on poetic and have
consequently avoided the confusion between rhetoric and poetic into which
many renaissance critics fell. Others have not been so fortunate. For
these the object-lesson of renaissance failure should serve as a warning.
Index
Abelard
Aeschylus
Aesop
Agathon
Agricola, Rudolph
Alanus de Insulis
Alciati
Alcidamas
Albucius
Aldus
Alfarabi
Alstedius
Anaxagoras
Annaeus Florus
Appian
Apsinus
Apthonius
Apuleius
Aristenetus
Aristophanes
Aristotle
Aristides
Ascham
Athenagoras
Augustine
Averroes
Bacon, Francis
Barclay, John
Barton, John
Basil the Great
Bede
Bokenham
Boccaccio
Bolton, Edmund
Bornecque, Henri
Boethius
Brunetto Latini
Butcher, S.H.
Buchanan, George
Budé
Butler, Charles
Can Grande
Campano, G.
Campion, Thomas
Casaubon
Cassiodorus
Castelvetro
Castiglione
Cato
Caussinus, N.
Chapman, G.
Chaucer
Chemnicensis, Georgius
Cicero
Clement of Alexandria
Cox, Leonard
Croce, B.
Croll, Morris
Curio Fortunatus
Daniel, Samuel
Daniello
Dante
Darwin, Charles
Demetrius
Demosthenes
de Worde, Wynkyn
Dio Chrysostom
Dionysius of Halicarnassus
Dolce
Drant, Thomas
Drummond of Hawthornden
DuBellay
Ducas
DuCygne, M.
Dunbar, William
Earle, John
Eastman, Max
Empedocles
Emporio
Erasmus
Eratosthenes
Estienne, Henri
Etienne de Rouen
Euripides
Farnaby, Thomas
Fenner, Dudley
Filelfo
Fraunce, Abraham
Gascoigne
George of Trebizond (Trapezuntius)
Gorgias
Gosson, Stephen
Gower
Gregory Nazianzen
Guarino
Guevara
Hall, Joseph
Harington, John
Harvey, Gabriel
Hawes, Stephen
Heinsius, D.
Henryson
Heliodorus
Herodotus
Hermagoras
Hermannus Allemanus
Hermogenes
Hilary of Poitiers
Holland, P.
Homer
Horace
Hermas
Hesiod
Heywood, John
Isidore of Seville
Isocrates
James I
James VI
Jerome
John of Garland
John of Salisbury
Jonson, Ben
Julian
Kechermann
Lactantius
Langhorne
Lipisius
Livy
Lodge
Lombardus, B.
Longinus
Loyola
Lucan
Lucian
Lucretius
Lydgate, John
Lyly, John
Lyndesay, David.
Lysias
Maggi
Martial
Martianus Capella
Mazzoni
Melanchthon
Menander
Menenius Agrippa
Milton
Minturno
Nash, T.
Newman, J.H.
Norden, Eduard
North, Sir Thomas
Origen
Overbury, Thomas
Ovid
Palmieri
Pazzi
Peacham, Henry
Petrarch
Piccolomini
Pico della Mirandola
Plato
Plautus
Pliny
Plutarch
Poggio
Pontanus, Jacob
Prickard, A. O.
Puttenham
Quintilian
Rabelais
Ramus, Peter
Reynolds, Henry
Robortelli
Ronsard
Rufinus
Sappho
Savonarola
Scaliger, J.C.
Schelling, Felix
Segni
Seneca
Servatus Lupus
Shakespeare
Sherry, Richard
Sidney
Sidonius, Apollinaris
Simonides
Smith, John
Soarez
Socrates
Sopatrus
Sophocles
Sophron
Spenser
Spingarn, J.E.
Stanyhurst
Stesimbrotus of Thasos
Strabo
Strebaeus
Sturm, John
Tacitus
Tasso, B.
Tatian
Terence
Tertullian
Theognis of Rhegium
Theon
Theophilus
Theophrastus
Themistocles
Thomas Aquinas
Thomasin von Zirclaria
Tifernas
Timocles
Valla
Valladero, A.
Van Hook, L.
Varchi
Vettore
Vicars, Thomas
Victor, Julius
Victorino, Mario
Vida
Virgil
Vives, L.
Vossius (J.G. Voss)
Vossler, Karl
Wackernagel, Jacob
Walton, John
Watson, Thomas
Webbe, William
Whetstone, George
William of Malmesbury
Wilson, Thomas
Xenarchus
Xenophon
Footnotes:
[1] _Modern Philology_, Vol. XVI, No. 8, Dec., 1918.
[2] _Poetics_, I, 8.
[3] _Quomodo historia conscribenda sit_, 8.
[4] _De institutione oratoria_, X, ii, 21.
[5] _Poetik, Rhetorik, und Stilistik_ (Halle, 1886), pp. 14, 261.
[6] _Poetry, with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics_, Ed. A.S. Cook
(Boston, 1891), pp. 10-11.
[7] _Estetica_ (Milano, 1902), I, II, and appendix.
[8] _Enjoyment of Poetry_ (New York, 1916), p. 66.
[9] Georges Renard, _La method scientifique de l'histoire littéraire_.
(Paris, 1900), p. 385.
[10] III, 1.
[11] I, 8; and IX, 2.
[12] Prickard thinks Aristotle misread in this passage. According to
Prickard, Aristotle means that poetry must be in meter, but that not all
meter is poetry. Aristotle's _Poetics_, p. 60. Most critics do not share
Prickard's opinion.
[13] _Ibid._, I, 6.
[14] _Ibid._, IV, 2.
[15] _Psychology_, ed. E. Wallace, III, 3, cf. also introd., p. 77, ff.
[16] _Poetics_, I.
[17] VII, 3.
[18] VII, 5.
[19] S.H. Butcher, _Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art_, p. 123.
Poetics, II, 1.
[20] III, 1.
[21] _Ibid._, IX.
[22] _Ibid._, IX, 3-4; of. XV, 6.
[23] _Ibid._, X, 3.
[24] _Ibid._, XXIV, 9-10.
[25] Butcher, _op. cit._ p. 392.
[26] _Poetics_, XVII.
[27] VI, 18.
[28] Longinus, _On the Sublime_, trans, by A. O. Prickard (Oxford, 1906) I
and XXXIII. The treatise has been variously ascribed to the first and
fourth centuries. A valuable edition of the text accompanied by
translation and critical apparatus, was published by W. Rhys Roberts,
Cambridge University Press.
[29] _Ibid._, VIII.
[30] _Ibid._, X.
[31] _Ibid._, XII.
[32] _Ibid._, XV. This is almost exactly Aristotle's phrase in the
_Rhetoric_.
[33] _Ibid._
[34] _Ibid_, X.
[35] _De audiendis poetis_, VII, VIII.
[36] III.
[37] _Rhetoric_ (J. E. C. Welldon's trans., London, 1886), I, ii.
[38] _Rhetoric_, I, i.
[39] _Ibid._, I, i.
[40] Wilkin's ed. of Cic. _De oratore_, introd. p. 56.
[41] Cope, _Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle_ (London, 1867), p.
149.
[42] _Ad Herennium_, I, 2. Published in the _Opera Rhetorica_ of Cicero,
edited by W. Friedrich for Teubner (Leipzig, 1893), Vol. 1.
[43] _De oratore_, I, 138.
[44] _De institutione oratoria_, II, xv, 38.
[45] _Ibid._, XI, i, 9-11. The "vir bonus dicendi peritus" is from Cato.
[46] _Gorgias_, St. 453.
[47] _Loci cit._
[48] I, v.
[49] I, 213.
[50] _Op. cit._, I, 64.
[51] _De inst. orat._, II, xxi, 4.
[52] _Rhet._, I, ix.
[53] _De inst. orat._, III, iv, 6.
[54] _Ibid._, X, i, 28.
[55] γραθική, Rhet. III, xii.
[56] _Orator_, 37-38.
[57] _Rhet._, I, ix.
[58] _Ad Herennium_, I, 2; Cicero, _De inventione_, I, vii. _De oratore_,
I, 142; Quintilian, _De inst. orat._, III, iii, i.
[59] Aristotle, _Rhetoric_, III, xiii-xix; Cicero, _Partit. orat._, 15.
[60] See above, pp. 13-14.
[61] Cicero, _De oratore_, I. 143; Quint., _De inst. orat._, III, ix.
[62] I, 4. Cicero, also, _De invent._, I, xiv.
[63] _Opera omnia_ (1622), p. 1028.
[64] _De nuptiis_, 544-560.
[65] _The Arte of Rhet._, p. 7.
[66] _De inst. orat._, VIII, i, I
[67] _De inst. orat._, VIII, vi, I ff.
[68] _Rhetoric_, III, ii.
[69] _Ibid._, III, xi.
[70] _Enjoyment of Poetry_, pp. 76-78. The best classical treatments of
style are to be found in Arist. _Rhet._, III; Cic., _Orat._; Quint., _De
inst. orat._, VIII, x; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _De comp. verb._; and
Demetrius, _De elocutione_.
[71] Sec. 54.
[72] _Commentarioum Rhetoricorum libri_ IV, I, i, 3, in his _Opera_, III.
(Amsterdam, 1697).
[73] VI, 1.
[74] _Rhet._, III, 1.
[75] The six elements are Plot, Character, Thought, Diction, Spectacle,
and Song. _Poetics_, VI, 7 and 16.
[76] Butcher, _op. cit._, pp. 339-343.
[77] _Poetics_, VI, 16, and XIX, 1-2.
[78] _De inst. orat._, X, i, 46-51.
[79] _De inventione_, I, xxiii, 33.
[80] _Die antike kunstprosa_ (Leipzig, 1898), p. 884, note 3.
[81] See above, p. 17.
[82] _De optimo genere oratorum_, I, 3; _Orator_, 69; _De oratore_, II,
28.
[83] _De inst. orat._, VI, ii, 25-36.
[84] _Poetics_, XVII, 2.
[85] Arist. _Rhet._, III. xi; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _De Lysia_, 7;
Quintilian, VIII, iii, 62.
[86] _Rhetoric_, III, i.
[87] _Op. cit._, pp. 883-884.
[88] La Rue Van Hook, "Alcidamas _versus_ Isocrates," _Classical Weekly_,
XII (Jan. 20, 1919), p. 90. Professor Van Hook here presents the only
English translation of Alcidamas, _On the Sophists_. Isocrates made his
reply in his speech _On the Antidosis_.
[89] _Rhetoric_, III, ii.
[90] _Ibid._, III, viii.
[91] _Orator_, 66-68.
[92] _De oratore_, I, 70.
[93] "Verba prope poetarum," _ibid._, I, 128.
[94] "Id primum in poetis cerni licet, quibus est proxima cognatio cum
oratoribus." _De orat._, III, 27. cf. also I, 70.
[95] Xenophon, _Banquet_, II, 11-14.
[96] _Die antike kunstprosa_, pp. 75-79.
[97] _De compositione verborum_, XXV-XXVI.
[98] Sénèque le rheteur, _Controverses et suasoires_, ed. Henri Bornecque
(Paris). Introduction pp. 20 ff.
[99] _Ibid._
[100] _Op. cit._ vol. II, p. 5.
[101] _Dialogus_, 20.
[102] _Op. cit._, Introd. p. 23.
[103] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _De comp. verb._, XXIII.
[104] Hardie, _Lectures_, VII, p. 281.
[105] _Quomodo historia conscribenda sit_, Sec. 8. Trans, of Lucian by
H.W. Fowler and F.G. Fowler (Oxford, 4 vols., 1905).
[106] Id quoque vitandum, in quo magna pars errat, ne in oratione poetas
et historicos, in illis operibus oratores aut declamatores imitandos
putemus. _De inst. orat_, X, ii, 21.
[107] Virgilius orator an poeta? quoted by Karl Vossler, _Poetische
Theorien in der italienischen Frührenaissance_. (Berlin, 1900) p. 42, note
2.
[108] _Etymologiae_, II.
[109] P. Abelson, _The Seven Liberal Arts_ (New York, 1906), p. 60, ff.
[110] _Poetria magistri Johannis anglici de arte prosayca metrica et
rithmica_, ed. by G. Mari, _Romanische Forschungen_ (1902), XIII, p. 883
ff.
[111] _Ibid._, p. 894.
[112] _Ibid._, p. 897.
[113] Cf. G. L. Hendrickson, "The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient
Characters of Style," _Am. Jour. of Phil._ (1905), xxvi, p. 249.
[114] Cf. the _auctor ad Her._, I, 4, who gives them as exordium,
narratio, divisio, confirmatio, confutatio, conclusio.
[115] _Ibid._, p. 918.
[116] III, 3.
[117] "Rhetoricâ, kleit unser rede mit varwe schône." Ed. by H. Rückert,
_Bibl. der Deutsch. Lit._, Vol. 30, 1. 8924.
[118] Caius Sollius Apollinaris Sidonius (430-488) can be consulted in a
modern ed. by Paulus Mohr (Leipzig, 1895).
[119] Doctrina dell' ornato parlare." Woodward, _Educ. in the Ren._ p. 75.
[120] _Chron. Troy_ (1412-20), Prol. 57.
[121] I am indebted to my friend Dr. Mark Van Doren for the transcript
which I am here publishing.
[122] _Mor. Fab._ Prol. 3. (c. 1580).
[123] _Poems_, LXV, 10 (1500-20).
[124] _Clerk's Prolog._ 32.
[125] _Life of our Lady_ (1409-1411), (Caxton) lvii b.
[126] Trans, of Boethius (1410), quoted by Skeat, _Chaucer_, II, xvii.
[127] _Kingis Q._ (1423), CXCVII.
[128] _Test. Papyngo_ (1530), II.
[129] _Seyntys_ (1447), Roxb. 41.
[130] _Serp. Devision_, c. iii b.
[131] Reprinted from the ed. of 1555 for the Percy Society (London, 1845),
p. 2.
[132] _Ibid._, p. 55.
[133] _Ibid._, p. 28.
[134] _See_ p. 27.
[135] _Ibid._, p. 37.
[136] _Ibid._, p. 46.
[137] "Proximum grammatice docet, quae emendate & aperte loquendi vim
tradit: Proximum _rhetorice, quae ornatum orationis cultum que & omnes
capiendarum aurium illecebras invenit_. Quod reliquum igitur est videbitur
sibi dialectice vendicare, probabliter dicere de qualibet re, quae
deducitur in orationem." _De inventione dialectica_ (Paris, 1535), II, 2.
cf. also II, 3.
Cf. "_Gram_ loquitur; _Dia_ vera docet; _Rhet_ verba colorat." Nicolaus de
Orbellis (d. 1455), quoted by Sandys, p. 644.
[138] _Ibid._, I, 1.
[139] _Rule of Reason_ (1551), p. 5. Fraunce, _Lawiers Logike_, takes the
same view.
[140] _Dialecticae libri duo_, A. Talaei praelectionibus illustrati
(Paris, 1560), I, 2.
[141] _Rule of Reason_, p. 3.
[142] Wilkins introd. to Cic. _De orat._, p. 57.
[143] _De inst. orat._, VI., v, 1-2.
[144] Printed in London by John Day, without a date. The dedication is
dated Dec. 13, 1550. The title page says it was "written fyrst in
Latin--by Erasmus."
[145] Ascribed to Dudley Tenner by Foster Watson, _The English Grammar
Schools_ (Cambridge, 1908), p. 89.
[146] Chapter IX.
[147] Thomas Heywood, _Apology for Actors_ (London, 1612), in _Pub. Shak.
Soc._, Vol. III, p. 29.
[148] Book I, ch. 1.
[149] "Rhetorica est ars ornate dicendi." _Rhetoricae libri duo quorum
prior de tropis & figuris, posterior de voce & gestu praecepit: in usum
scholarum postremo recogniti._ (London, 1629)
[150] _The Art of Rhetorick concisely and completely handled, exemplified
out of Holy Writ_, etc. (London, 1634)
[151] Dekker and Middleton, _The Roaring Girl_, III, 3.
[152] Dekker, III, 1.
[153] Spingarn, _Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century_, I, 2.
[154] χειραγωγια _Manductio ad Artem Rhetoricam ante paucos annos
in privatum scholarium usum concinnata_ (London, 1621). "Rhetorica est ars
recte dicendi, etc."
[155] Norden, _op. cit._, pp. 699-703.
[156] A.C. Clark, _Ciceronianism_, in _Eng. Lit. and the Classics_, ed.
Gordon (Oxford, 1912), p. 128.
[157] Woodward, _Educ. in the Ren._, p. 45.
[158] Erasmus, _Dialogus, cui titulus ciceronianus, sive, de optimo
dicendi genere_, in _Opera omnia_ (Lugduni Batavorum, 1703), I. It was
composed in 1528.
[159] _Arte of Rhet._, p. 109.
[160] I, 4. Wilson follows the analysis on p. 7.
[161] I, x, 17.
[162] _An Apology for Actors_, p. 29.
[163] This count is based on the Cicero MSS. listed by P. Deschamps,
_Essai bibliographique sur M. T. Ciceron_ (Paris. 1863). Appendix.
[164] H. Rashdall, _Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages_ (Oxford,
1895), I, 249.
[165] J. E. Sandys, _History of Classical Scholarship_, p. 590.
[166] Sandys, p. 624 _seq._
[167] Deschamps, _op. cit._, pp. 59-63.
[168] Arber reprint, p. 124.
[169] M. Schwab, _Bibliographie d'Aristote_ (Paris, 1896).
[170] Rashdall, II, 457.
[171] Fierville, C. _M. F. Quintiliani de institutione oratorio, liber
primus_ (Paris, 1890). Introduction, xiv-xxxii. M. Fierville prints for
the first time the complete texts of these abridgments in an appendix.
[172] Arber, p. 95.
[173] The pseudo-Demetrius, author of the _De elecutione_.
[174] P. 316.
[175] Sandys, _History of Classical Scholarship_, pp. 541-2.
[176] M. Schwab, _op. cit._
[177] _Poetische Theorien in der italienischen Frührenaissance_ (Berlin,
1900), p. 88.
[178] _Defense_, in Smith, I, 196-197.
[179] Vossius, _De artis poeticae natura_, II, 3-4.
[180] _Poetics_, I, 2.
[181] _Poetica_, 23, 190.
[182] _De artis poeticae natura_, II, 4.
[183] _Euphues_, edited by M. W. Croll and H. Clemens (New York), Introd.
iv.
[184] Preface to Maggi's _Aristotle_ (1550), p. 2.
[185] Prolog. _ibid._, p. 15.
[186] Spingarn, p. 312.
[187] Jacob Pontanus, S. J., _Poeticarum institutionum libri tres_
(Ingolstadi, 1594), p. 36.
[188] _Ibid_, p. 81.
[189] "Tres autem sunt virtutes narrationis, brevitas, perspicuitas,
probabilitas. Secundam & tertiam diligentissime consectabitur Epicus,
earumque rationem a Rhetoricae magistris percepiet," p. 72. These three
virtues of a "narratio" are based on the analysis of the _Rhetorica ad
Alexandrum_.
[190] Arist., _Rhet._, III. 16.
[191] _Op. cit_,, p. 26.
[192] Spingarn, p. 313.
[193] _Lit. Crit._, p. 255.
[194] _Ibid._, p. 262.
[195] Arber, pp. 138-141.
[196] Spingarn, pp. 174, 256.
[197] Smith, I, 48.
[198] Smith, I, 59.
[199] _Ibid._, p. 60.
[200] I, 2.
[201] II, 12.
[202] IV, 63.
[203] _Topics_, 83.
[204] VI, ii, 8 _seq._ Quintilian also uses the Greek terms.
[205] X, i, 46-131.
[206] _Op. cit._, pp. 275-398.
[207] II, 154 seq.
[208] P. 187.
[209] G.S. Gordon, "Theophrastus" in _Eng. Lit. and the Classics_, p.
49-86.
[210] Smith, I, 128
[211] _Ibid._, 130-131.
[212] Cf. Spingarn, pp. 298-304, for a good account of reformed versifying
in England.
[213] Smith, I, 137.
[214] John Northbrooke anticipated Gosson by two years in his attack on
the stage, but did not include poets in his title.
[215] Spingam, pp. 256-258.
[216] Smith, I, 158.
[217] _Ibid._, I, 172.
[218] _Ibid._, I, 185.
[219] _Ibid._, I, 158-159.
[220] _Ibid._, I, 160.
[221] I, 183.
[222] I, 201.
[223] Arist. _Rhet._, III, 2; Quint. VIII, iii. 62; Scaliger, iii, 25. Cf.
ante p. 33.
[224] _De aug._ II, 13.
[225] See pp. 18, 19.
[226] I, 203.
[227] I, 202.
[228] Smith, I, 227-228.
[229] I, 256.
[230] I, 231.
[231] I, 247-248.
[232] I, i.
[233] I, ii.
[234] I, viii.
[235] I, iv.
[236] La Rue Van Hook, "Greek Rhetorical Terminology in Puttenham's _The
Arte of English Poesie." Trans. of the Am. Phil. Ass._ (1914) XLV, 111.
Puttenham was also familiar with the _ad Herennium_ and with _Cicero_.
[237] (Philadelphia, 1891), p. 59.
[238] III, i.
[239] III, xix, p. 206 Arber reprint; of. also p. 230, on the figure
_Merismus_ or the Distributor, and the remainder of the chapter.
[240] Smith, II, 249, 282.
[241] _Ibid_, II, 274.
[242] Preface to Homer, in Spingarn, _Critical Essays of the Seventeenth
Century_, I, 81.
[243] Spingarn, I, 5.
[244] _Literary Criticism in the Seventeenth Century, Introduction_, I,
xiii.
[245] _Timber_, Sec. 128. Cf. _Pastime of Pleasure_, VIII, 29.
[246] Spingarn, I, 211.
[247] _Timber_, Sec. 109.
[248] _Timber_, Sees. 132-133.
[249] Spingarn, I, 214.
[250] _Ibid._, p. 210, 213.
[251] Vossler, _op. cit._, p. 48.
[252] Spingarn, I, 107.
[253] _Ibid._, I, 142.
[254] _Ibid._, I, 182.
[255] _Ibid._, I, 188, 185.
[256] Spingarn, I, 206.
[257] Pseudo-Demetrius, _De elocutione_.
[258] The _De sublimitate_.
[259] _De sublimitate_, VIII.
[260] Spingarn, I, 206.
[261] _Reason of Church Government_ (1641), in Spingarn, I, 194.
[262] _Introd. to Eliz. Crit. Essays_, I, lxx.
[263] Pp. 23-25.
[264] VI, 2.
[265] Poetica est facultas videndi quodcunque accommodatum est ad
imitationem cuiusque actionis, affectionis, moris, suavi sermone, ad vitam
corrigendam & ad bene beateque vivendum comparata. _Praefatio_ to
_Maggi's_ ed. of the _Poetics_ (1550), p. 9.
[266] Spingarn, p. 35.
[267] La poetica è una facoltà, la quale insegna in quai modi si debba
imitare qualunque azione, affetto e costume, con numero, sermone ed
armonia; mescolatamente a di per sè, per remuovere gli uomini dai vizi e
accendergli alle virtù, affine che conseguano la perfezione e beatitudine
loro. _Lezione della poetica_ (1590) in _Opere_ (Trieste, 1859), II, 687.
[268] Verses 1008-1010.
[269] Verse 1055.
[270] _The Women at the Feast of Bacchus_, quoted by Emile Egger,
_L'Histoire de la Critique chez les Grecs_ (Paris, 1886), p. 74.
[271] _Protagoras_, 325-326, Jowett's translation.
[272] _Republic_, 596-598.
[273] _Ibid._, 605-606.
[274] _Ibid._, 607
[275] _Laws_, 663.
[276] _Poetics_, IV, 2.
[277] _Ibid._, VI, 15.
[278] _Ibid._, VII.
[279] _Ibid._, IX, 7.
[280] _Ibid._, XIII. Cf. also XXVI.
[281] _Ibid._, XXIV.
[282] _Ibid._, XXVI.
[283] _Politics_, V, v.
[284] _Poetics_, VI. (Butcher). Cf. Butcher's _Aristotle's Theory of Fine
Art_, Chapter VI, for a full discussion of katharsis.
[285] _Politics_, V, vii.
[286] _Poetics_, XIII.
[287] _Panegyric_, § 159.
[288] _Symposium_, III, 5.
[289] _Geography_, I, ii, 3. Trans, by H. C. Hamilton (Bohn ed, London,
1854), 1, 24-25.
[290] _De audiendis poetis_, trans, by F.M. Padelford under the title
_Essays on the Study and Use of Poetry_ (New York, 1902), I. Cf. also
Julian, _Epistle_ 42.
[291] _Ibid._
[292] _Ibid._ XIV. Cf. Harrington in Smith's _Eliz. Crit. Essays_, II,
197-198.
[293] _Ibid._ XII. Cf. Chemnicensis, _Canons_, LII, in Smith, I, 421.
[294] _Ibid._, IV. Cf. Aristotle, _Rhetoric_, II, xx.
[295] _Ibid._, III.
[296]
Aut prodesse volunt, aut delectare poetae
Aut simul et jucunda et idonea dicere vitae
* * * * *
Centuriae seniorum agitant expertia frugis;
Celsi praetereunt austera poemata Rhamnes:
Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci,
Lectorem delectando, periterque monendo.
Hic meret aera liber Sosiis; hic et mare transit,
Et longum noto scriptori prorogat aevum.
_Ad Pisonem_, 333-334, 342-346.
[297] _Epistles_, II, i, 11. 126 ff. Conington's trans.
[298] _Metamorphoses_, X, 2.
[299] _De rerum natura_, I, 936-950.
[300] _Phaedrus_. See also _Republic_, II.
[301] _How to Study Poetry_, IV.
[302] Cf. Cicero, _De nat. deor._ i, 15-38 ff., and Hatch, _Hibbert
Lectures_, 1888, Ch. III.
[303] A. Schlemm, _De fontibus Plutarchi commentationum De aud. poet._
(Göttingen, 1893), pp. 32-36.
[304] "Iam cum confluxerunt plures continuae tralationes, alia plane fit
oratio; itaque genus hoc Graeci appellant ἀλληγορίαν nomine recte genere
melius ille qui ista omnia tralationes vocat." _Orator_, 94. Cf. _Ad.
Att._ ii, 20, 3.
[305] Quintilian, VIII, vi, 44. Isidore, _Etym._ I, xxxvii, 22.
[306] _De doctrina christiana_ (397), III, 29, 40.
[307] _Confessions_ (Watts's trans.), III. vi., Lionardo Bruni, _De
studiis et literis_ (1405), uses the same argument to defend poetry.
[308] Terence, _Eun._ 585-589, shows a young man justifying his vices on
this ground.
[309] _Poetics_, IX.
[310] _Literary Criticism_, p. 18.
[311] _Rhet._ II, xxi.
[312] _Rhetoric_, II, xx. (Weldon's translation).
[313] _De inst. orat._ V, xi, 6, 19.
[314] Edited from the edition of 1560 by G.H. Mair (Oxford, 1909), p. 198.
[315] _Ibid._, p. 3.
[316] "Docere debitum est, delectare honorarium, permovere necessarium."
_De optimo genere oratorum_, I, 3. He gives the same threefold aims as "ut
probet, ut delectet, ut flectet," in the _Orator_, 69; and in the _De
oratore_, II, 121.
[317] _Vide_ pp. 136-137.
[318] Cf. _ante_, I, iv.
[319] _Controv._ II, 2 (10). Bornecque ed., I, 145-148.
[320] Quoted by Padelford, p. 36.
[321] _Orat._ xi, p. 308.
[322] Padelford, _op. cit._ pp. 39-43.
[323] Karl Vossler, _Poetische Theorien in der italienischen
Frührenaissance_ (Berlin, 1900), pp. 5, 18, 45.
[324] Boethius, _De consolatione philosophiae_, Book I, prose 1. Boethius
lived 480-524. Cf. Skeat, _Chaucer_, II, introd. xiv ff. for references to
the surprising number of translations in most European languages
throughout the Middle Ages. The most famous are, perhaps, those of Ælfred,
Notker, and Chaucer.
[325] _Ibid_, Book V, prose v.
[326] "Quidam autem poetae Theologici dicti sunt, quoniam de diis carmina
faciebant. Officium autem poetae in eo est ut ea, quae vere gesta sunt, in
alias species obliquis figurationibus cum decore aliquo conversa
transducant." _Etym._ VIII, vii, 9-10.
[327] "Fabulas poetae quasdam delectandi causa finxerunt, quasdam ad
naturam rerum, nonnullas ad mores hominum interpretati sunt." _Etym._ I,
xl, 3.
[328] "Una verita ascosa sotto bella menzogna." II, 1.
[329] _Epistle_, X, 11, 160-1. Quoted by Wicksteed, _Temple Classics_, pp.
66-67.
[330] "Vesta di figura o di colore rettorico." _La Vita Nuova_, XXV.
[331] See above, pp. 45-47.
[332] "Per nimpham fingitur caro, per iuvenem coruptorem mundus vel
dyabolus, per proprium amicum ratio." _Poetria magistri Johannis anglici
de arte prosayca metrica et rithmica_. Ed. by G. Mari, Romanische
Forschungen (1902) XIII, 894.
[333] "Est furor Eacides ire sathanas," _Ibid_, p. 913.
[334] See above, pp. 51-55.
[335] _Pastime of Pleasure_, p. 29.
[336] _Ibid._, p. 38.
[337] _Ibid._, p. 54; see further above, p. 54.
[338] Cf. ante, pp. 97-99.
[339] _Lit. Crit._, p. 47-59.
[340] _Ibid._, p. 58.
[341] I _anal._ 1a.
[342] _Lit. Crit._, p. 25.
[343] André Schimberg, _L'education morale dans les collèges de la
compagnie de Jésus en France_ (Paris, 1913). p. 138.
[344] _Opus de divisione, ordine, ac utilitate omnium scientiarum, in
poeticen apologeticum_. Autore fratre Hieronymo Savonarola (Venetiis,
1542), IV, pp. 36-55. Savonarola died in 1498.
[345] Cartier, "L'Esthetique de Savonarola," in Didron's _Annales
Archoelogiques_ (1847). vii, 255 ff.
[346] "Rhetorica, Poeticaque contra: quod non adeo vere ac proprie Logicae
appellantur, neque, syllogismo fere, sed exemplo atque enthymemate,
rationibus quasi popularibus utuntur...." Poetic, furthermore, differs
from rhetoric, "neque usurpat enthymema fere, sed exemplum." Vincentius
Madius et Bartholomaeus Lombardus. In _Aristotelis Librum de poetica
communes explanationes_ (Venetiis, 1550), pp. 8-9.
[347] "Onde come il loico usa per suo mezzo il più nobile strumento, ciò è
la dimostrazione o vero il sillogismo dimonstrativo; cosi usa il
dialettico il sillogismo topico; il sofista il sofistico, ciò è apparente
ed ingannevole: il retore l'entimema, e il poeta l'esempio, il quale è il
meno degno di tutti gli altri. É adunque il subbietto della poetica il
favellare finto e favoloso, ed il suo mezzo o strumento l'esempio." _Delia
Poetica in Generale, Lezione Una _ I, 2. _Opere_ (Trieste, 1850), II, 684.
In his paraphrase of this passage and in his comments, Spingarn (_Lit.
Crit._ pp. 25-26) misunderstands both his author and his rhetoric when he
says, "The subject of poetry is fiction, or invention, arrived at by means
of that form of the syllogism known as the example. Here the enthymeme or
example, which Aristotle has made the instrument of rhetoric, becomes the
instrument of poetry."
[348] _Rhet._ I, ii.
[349] "Nimirum arbitrantur, quemadmodum Rhetorice ab Aristotele ipso
appellatur particula Dialecticae; idque propterea, quod doceat rationem,
qua enthymema applicetur ad materiam civilem: ita & Poeticen esse Logices
partem, quia aperit exempli usum in materia ficta ... at Rhetorice, &
Poetice, non solum docere student, sed etiam delectare; nec cognitionem
tantum spectant, sed & actionem. Quamquam vero hoc commune habet cum
Rhetorica, quod utraque sit famula Politicae." Gerardi Joannis Vossii, _De
artis poeticae, natura, ac constitutions liber_, cap VII, in _Opera_
(Amsterdam, 1697), III.
[350] "Inductio delectat, et est vulgo apta, propter similitudines et
exempla. Hanc argumentationem frequentant Rhetores et Poetae, praesertim
Ovidius; quia venuste ac perspicue explicat argumenta." I, ii.
[351] _Vide_, pp. 103-104.
[352] _Vide_, pp. 119-120.
[353] _Poetica_ (Vinegia, 1536), p. 25. Spingarn, p. 48.
[354] "Sic dicere versibus, ut doccat, ut delectet, ut moveat." _De
poeta_, p. 102.
[355] _Rhetoric_, I, ii.
[356] XII, i, 1.
[357] _De poeta_, p. 79. Vossius echoes the same idea from the same
rhetorical source.
[358] "Sed & docendi, & movendi, & delectandi." _Poetice_ (1561), III,
xcvii.
[359] _Ibid._, I, i.
[360] _Arte of Rhet._ p. 176.
[361] These two names were frequently connected in the renaissance.
[362] _Ibid_, p. 195.
[363] _Arber Reprint_ (London, 1870), p. 151.
[364] _Ibid._, pp. 142-143.
[365] _Ibid._, p. 80.
[366] _Vide_, p. 132.
[367] _Vide_, pp. 77-78.
[368] Smith, _Eliz. Crit. Essays_, I, 48.
[369] Croll, Introd. to ed. of _Euphues_ (New York, 1916), p. vii.
[370] Smith, I, 60.
[371] _School of Abuse_ (Pub. of the Shak. Soc., 1841), Vol, 2, p. 15.
[372] _Ibid._, pp. 20, 25, 29.
[373] Smith, I, 65.
[374] Smith, I, 73.
[375] Smith, I, 76.
[376] Smith, I, 83.
[377] _Vide_, pp. 86-87.
[378] _Lit. Crit. in the Ren._ 2d ed., pp. 269-274.
[379] Smith, I, 158-160.
[380] _Ibid._, 160.
[381] _Ibid._, I, 159.
[382] _Ibid._, I, 171.
[383] _Ibid._, p. 172.
[384] Cf. above, p. 138.
[385] _De inst. orat._, V, xi, 19.
[386] _Arte of Rhet._, p. 198.
[387] _Ibid._, I, 157.
[388] Smith, I, 169.
[389] _Rhetoric_, II, xx.
[390] Smith, I, 173.
[391] Cf. St. Augustine, _Confessions_, III, vi.
[392] Smith, I, 187. Cf. Arist. _Rhet._ I, i, and Quint. _De inst. orat._
II, xvi, who defend rhetoric on the same ground. Sidney's "with a sword
thou maist kill thy Father, and with a sword thou maist defende thy Prince
and Country" is in Quintilian.
[393] See also p. 38.
[394] Smith, II, 208.
[395] Smith, II, 201.
[396] _Ibid._
[397] _De audiendis poetis_, XIV. Plutarch believed that poetry gained
this end by enunciating moral and philosophical _sententiae_, not by
allegory, which Plutarch made sport of.
[398] See pp. 87-89.
[399] Smith, I, 250-252.
[400] Smith, I, 232.
[401] Smith, I, 238-239.
[402] Smith, I, 235-236.
[403] Smith, I, 248-249.
[404] _Vide_, pp. 89-92.
[405] Smith, II, 25.
[406] Smith, II, 115-116.
[407] Smith, II, 160.
[408] Smith, II, 32-40.
[409] Smith, II, 41-42.
[410] _Ibid._
[411] Woodward, _Educ. in the Ren._ p. 135.
[412] Krapp, _Rise of Eng. Lit. Prose_ (New York, 1915), pp. 408-409.
[413] _Vide_, pp. 91-92.
[414] Spingarn, _Crit. Essays of the 17th Century_, I, 98, 99.
[415] Springarn, I, 6.
[416] Spingarn, I, 6-8.
[417] The author's prolog to the first book.
[418] Spingarn, I, 170.
[419] Spingarn, I, 50; for Jonson see also pp. 93-96.
[420] Spingarn, I, 29.
[421] _Ibid._, 51-52.
[422] _Ibid._, p. 55. Cf. Cicero, _ante_ p. 37.
[423] Ded. to _Volpone_, Spingarn, I. 15.
[424] _Ibid._
[425] Spingarn, I, 28-29.
[426] Ded to _Volpone_, Spingarn, I, 12.
[427] Smith, II, 306.
[428] Spingarn, I, 67.
[429] Spingarn, I, 117-120.
[430] A.H. Tieje, _Theory of Characterization in Prose Fiction Prior to_
1740 (Minneapolis, 1916), p. 14.
[431] Spingarn, I, 186-187.