7. _The Oeconomy of Nature, and fit Subordination of one part of the
World to another._
_The_ five first of these Heads are Prerequisites and Preparatives to
the Formation of a World, and the two last are as the Image and
Character of its Maker, of his Power, Goodness and Wisdom, imprest upon
it. Every one of them might well deserve a Chapter to it self, if the
Subject was to be treated on at large; but this is only an occasional
Dissertation, to state the Powers of Matter, lest they should be thought
boundless, and the Author of Nature unnecessary, as the _Epicureans_
pretend; but notwithstanding their vain Confidence and Credulity, I defy
them, or any Man else, to make Sense of the material World, without
placing a God at the Center of it.
TO these Considerations, taken wholly from the corporeal World, give me
leave to add one of a mix’d Nature, concerning the _Union of our Soul
and Body_. This strange Effect, if rightly understood, doth as truly
discover the Author of Nature, as many Effects that are accounted more
supernatural. The Incarnation, as I may so say, of a spiritual Substance
is to me a kind of standing Miracle; that there should be such an Union
and Connexion reciprocally betwixt the Motions of the Body, and the
Actions and Passions of the Soul; betwixt a Substance intellectual, and
a Parcel of organiz’d Matter, can be no Effect of either of those
Substances; being wholly distinct in themselves, and remote in their
Natures from one another. For Instance, when my finger is cut, or when
’tis burnt, that my Soul thereupon should feel such a smart and violent
Pain, is no Consequence of Nature, or does not follow from any Connexion
there is betwixt the Motion or Division of that Piece of Matter, I call
my Finger, and the Passion of that Spirit I call my Soul; for these are
two distinct Essences, and in themselves independent upon one another,
as much as the Sun and my Body are independent; and there is no more
Reason in strict Nature, or in the essential Chain of Causes and
Effects, that my Soul should suffer, or be affected with this Motion in
the Finger, than that the Sun should be affected with it; nay, there is
less Reason, if less can be, for the Sun being corporeal, as the Finger
is, there is some remote Possibility that there might be Communication
of Motion betwixt them; but Motion cannot beget a Thought, or a Passion,
by its own Force; Motion can beget nothing but Motion, and if it should
produce a Thought, the Effect would be more noble than the Cause.
Wherefore this Union is not by any Necessity of Nature, but only from a
positive institution or Decree, establish’d by the Author of Nature,
that there should be such a Communication betwixt these two Substances
for a time, _viz._ during the Vitality of the Body.
’TIS true indeed, if Thought, Apprehension, and Reason, was nothing but
corporeal Motion, this Argument would be of no Force; but to suppose
this, is to admit an Absurdity to cure a Difficulty; to make a Thought
out of a local Motion is like making a God out of a Stock, or a Stone;
for these two are as remote in their Nature, and have as different
_Idea’s_ in the Mind, as any two desperate Things we can propose or
conceive; Number and Colour, a Triangle and Virtue, Free-will and a
Pyramid, are not more unlike, more distant, or of more different Forms,
than Thought and local Motion. Motion is nothing but a Body’s changing
its Place and Situation amongst other Bodies, and what Affinity or
Resemblance hath that to a _Thought_? How is that like to Pain, or to a
Doubt of the Mind? To Hope or to Desire? To the _Idea_ of God? To any
Act of the Will or Understanding, as judging, consenting, reasoning,
remembring, or any other? These are Things of several Orders that have
no Similitude, nor any Mixture of one another. And as this is the Nature
of Motion, so, on the other Hand, in a _Thought_ there are two Things,
_Consciousness_ and a _Representation_; Consciousness is in all Thoughts
indifferently, whether distinct or confus’d, for no Man thinks but he is
conscious that he thinks, nor perceives any Thing but he is conscious
that he perceives it; there is also in a Thought, especially if it be
distinct, a Representation; ’tis the Image of that we think upon, and
makes its Objects present to the Mind. Now what hath local Motion to do
with either of these two, Consciousness or Representativeness? How doth
it include either of them, or hold them any way affix’d to its Nature? I
think one may with as good Sense and Reason ask of what Colour a Thought
is, Green or Scarlet, as what Sort of Motion it is; for Motion of what
Sort soever can never be conscious, nor represent Things as our Thoughts
do. I have noted thus much in general, only to shew the different Nature
of Motion and Cogitation, that we may be the more sensible that they
have no mutual Connexion in us, nor in any other Creature, from their
Essence or essential Properties, but by a supervenient Power from the
Author of Nature, who hath thus united the Soul and the Body in their
Operations.
WE have hitherto only consider’d the ordinary Course of Nature, and what
Indications and Proofs of its Author, that affords us: There is another
remarkable Head of Arguments from Effects, extraordinary and
supernatural, such as Miracles, Prophecies, Inspirations, Prodigies,
Apparitions, Witchcraft, Sorceries, _&c._ These, at one Step, lead us to
something above Nature, and this is the shortest way and the most
Popular; several Arguments are suited to several Tempers, and God hath
not left himself without a proper Witness to every Temper that is not
willfully blind. Of these Witnesses we now speak of, the most
considerable are Miracles, and the most considerable Records of them are
the Books of Scripture; which if we consider only as an History, and as
having nothing sacred in them more than other good Histories, that is,
Truth in Matter of Fact, we cannot doubt but there have been Miracles in
the World: That _Moses_ and the Prophets, our Saviour and his Apostles,
wrought Miracles, I can no more question, than that _Cæsar_ and
_Alexander_ fought Battles, and took Cities. So also that there were
true Prophecies and Inspirations, we know from Scripture, only
consider’d as a true History. But as for other supernatural Effects that
are not recorded there, we have Reason to examine them more strictly
before we receive them, at least as to particular Instances; for I am
apt to think they are like Lotteries, where there are ten or twenty
Blanks for one Prize; but yet if there were no Prizes at all, the
Lottery would not have Credit to subsist, and would be cry’d down as a
perfect Cheat: So if amongst those many Stories of Prodigies,
Apparitions, and Witchcrafts, there were not some true, the very Fame
and Thought of them would die from amongst Men, and the first Broachers
of them would be hooted at as Cheats. As a false Religion, that hath
nothing true and solid mix’d with it, can scarce be fix’d upon Mankind;
but where there is a Mixture of true and false, the Strength of the one
supports the Weakness of the other. As for Sorcery, the Instances and
Examples of it are undeniable; not so much those few scatter’d Instances
that happen now and then among us, but such as are more constant, and in
a manner National, in some Countries, and amongst barbarous People.
Besides, the Oracles, and the Magick that was so frequent amongst the
Ancients, shew us that there have been always some Powers more than
Humane, tampering with the Affairs of Mankind. But this Topick from
Effects, extraordinary and supernatural, being in a great measure
Historical, and respecting evil Spirits as well as the Author of Nature,
is not so proper for this Place.
THERE is a third Set or Head of Arguments, that to some Tempers are more
cogent and convictive than any of these, namely, Arguments _Abstract_
and _Metaphysical_; And these do not only lead us to an Author of Nature
in general, but shew us more of his Properties and Perfections;
represent him to us as a supreme Deity, infinitely perfect, the Fountain
of all Being, and the steady Center of all Things. But Reasons of this
Order being of a finer Thread, require more Attention, and some
Preparation of Mind to make us discern them well and be duly sensible of
them. When a Man hath withdrawn himself from the Noise of this busy
World, lock’d up his Senses and his Passions, and every thing that would
unite him with it; commanded a general Silence in the Soul, and suffers
not a Thought to stir, but what looks inwards; let him then reflect
seriously, and ask himself, _What am I_, and _How came I into Being_? If
I was Author and Original to my self, surely I ought to feel that mighty
Power, and enjoy the Pleasure of it; but, alas, I am conscious of no
such Force or Virtue, nor of any thing in my Nature, that should give me
necessary Existence; it hath no Connexion with any part of me, nor any
Faculty in me, that I can discern. And now that I do exist, from what
Causes soever, _Can I secure my self in Being_? Now that I am in
Possession, am I sure to keep it? Am I certain that three Minutes hence
I shall still exist? I may or I may not, for ought I see; either seems
possible in it self; and either is contingent as to me; I find nothing
in my Nature that can warrant my Substance for one Day, for one Hour,
for one Moment longer. I am nothing but Thoughts, fleeting Thoughts,
that chase and extinguish one another; and my Being, for ought I know,
is successive, and as dying as they are, and renew’d to me every Moment.
This I am sure of, that so far as I know my self, and am conscious what
I am, there is no Principle of Immutability, or of necessary and
indefectible Existence in my Nature; and therefore I ought in Reason to
believe, that I stand or fall at the Mercy of other Causes, and not by
my own Will, or my own Sufficiency.
BESIDES, I am very sensible, and in this I cannot be mistaken, that my
Nature is in several Respects weak and imperfect, both as to Will and
Understanding. I _Will_ many Things in vain and without effect, and I
Wish often what I have no Ability to execute or obtain. And as to my
Understanding, how defective is it? How little or nothing do I know in
Comparison of what I am ignorant of? Almost all the intellectual World
is shut up to me, and the far greatest Part of the corporeal; and in
those Things that fall under my Cognizance, how often am I mistaken? I
am confin’d to a narrow Sphere, and yet within that Sphere I often err;
my Conceptions of Things are obscure and confus’d, my reason
short-sighted; I am forc’d often to correct my self, or to acknowledge
that I have judg’d false, and consented to an Error. In sum, all my
Powers I find are limited, and I can easily conceive the same kind of
Perfections in higher Degrees than I possess them, and consequently
there are Beings, or may be, greater and more excellent than my self,
and more able to subsist by their own Power, (Τὸ τέλειον πρότερον τῇ
Φύσει τοῦς ἀτελοῦς Arist.) Why should I not therefore believe that my
Original is from those Beings rather than from my self? For every
Nature, the more great and perfect it is, the nearer it approaches to
Necessity of Existence, and to a Power of producing other Things. Yet,
the Truth is, it must be acknowledg’d, that so long as the Perfection of
those other Beings are limited and finite, tho’ they be far superior to
us, there is no Necessity ariseth from their Nature that they should
exist; and the same Arguments that we have us’d against our selves, they
may, in Proportion, use against themselves; and therefore we must still
advance higher to find a self-originated Being, whose Existence must
flow immediately from his Essence, or have a necessary Connexion with
it.
AND indeed all these different Degrees of higher and higher Perfections,
lead us directly to an highest, or supreme Degree, which is infinite and
unlimited Perfection. As subordinate Causes lead to the first, so
Natures more perfect one than another lead us to a Nature infinitely
perfect, which is the Fountain of them all. Thither we must go, if we
will follow the Course of Reason, which cannot stop at one more than
another, till it arrive there; and being arriv’d there at that sovereign
and original Perfection, it finds a firm and immovable Ground to stand
upon; the steady Centre of all Being, wherein the Mind rests and is
satisfied. All the Scruples or Objections that we mov’d against our
selves, or other Creatures, take no Place here: This Being is conscious
of an Allsufficiency in it self, and of Immutability as to any Thing
else; including in it all the Causes of Existence, or, to speak more
properly, all Necessity of Existence. Besides, that _we exist our
selves_, notwithstanding the Imperfection and Insufficiency of our
Nature, is a just, collateral Proof of the Existence, of this supreme
Being; for such an Effect as this cannot be without its Cause, and it
can have no other competent Cause but what we mention. And as this Being
is its own Origin, so it must needs be capable of producing all
Creatures; for whatsoever is possible, must be possible to it; and that
Creatures or finite Beings are possible, we both see by Experience, and
may also discern by Reason; for those several Degrees of Perfection or
Limitations of it, which we mention’d before, are all consistent
Notions, and consequently make consistent Natures, and such as may
exist; but contingently indeed, and in Dependance upon the first Cause.
THUS we are come at length to a fair Resolution of that great Question,
_Whence we are_, and _how_ we continue in Being? And this hath led us by
an easy Ascent to the supreme Author of Nature, and the first Cause of
all things; and presents us also with such a Scheme and Draught of the
Universe, as is clear and rational; every thing in its Order, and in its
Place, according to the Dignity of its Nature, and the Strength of its
Principles. When the Mind hath rais’d it self into this View of a Being
infinitely perfect, ’tis in a Region of Light, hath a free Prospect
every Way, and sees all Things from Top to Bottom, as pervious and
transparent. Whereas without God and a first Cause, there is nothing but
Darkness and Confusion in the Mind, and in Nature; broken Views of
Things, short interrupted Glimpses of Light, nothing certain or
demonstrative, no Basis of Truth, no Extent of Thought, no Science, no
Contemplation.
YOU will say, it may be, ’tis true, something must be _eternal_, and of
_necessary Existence_, but why may not _Matter_ be this eternal
necessary Being? Then our Souls and all other Intellectual Things must
be Parts and Parcels of Matter; and what Pretensions can Matter have to
those Properties and Perfections that we find in our Souls, how limited
soever? Much less to _necessary Existence_, and those Perfections that
are the Foundation of it? What _exists_ eternally, and from it self, its
Existence must flow immediately from its Essence, as its Cause, Reason,
or Ground; for as Existence hath always something antecedent to it in
Order of Nature, so that which is antecedent to it, must infer it by a
necessary Connexion, and so may be call’d the Cause, Ground, or Reason
of it. And nothing can be such a Ground, but what is a Perfection; nor
every Perfection neither, it must be sovereign and infinite Perfection;
for from what else can necessary Existence flow, or be infer’d? Besides,
if that Being was not infinitely perfect, there might be another Being
more powerful than it, and consequently able to oppose and hinder its
Existence; and what may be hinder’d is contingent and arbitrary. Now
_Matter_ is so far from being a Nature infinitely perfect, that it hath
no Perfection at all, but that of bare _Substance_; neither Life, Sense,
Will or Understanding; nor so much as Motion from it self; as we have
shew’d before. And therefore this brute inactive Mass, which is but, as
it were, the Drudge of Nature, can have no Right or Title to that
sovereign Prerogative of Self-existence.
WE noted before, as a Thing agreed upon, _that something or other must
needs be Eternal_. For if ever there was a Time or State when there was
no being, there never could be any. Seeing _Nothing_ could not produce
_Something_. Therefore ’tis undeniably true on all Hands, that there was
some Being from Eternity. Now, according to our Understanding, _Truth_
is _Eternal_: Therefore, say we, some intellect or intelligent Being. So
also the Reasons of _Goodness_ and _Justice_ appear to us Eternal; and
therefore some good and just Being is Eternal. Thus much is plain, that
these Perfections which bear the Signatures of Eternity upon them, are
Things that have no Relation to _Matter_, but relate immediately to an
intellectual Being: Therefore some such Being, to whom they originally
belong, must be that _Eternal_. Besides, We cannot possibly but judge
such a Being more perfect than Matter. Now every Nature, the more
perfect it is, the more remote it is from _Nothing_; and the more remote
it is from Nothing, the more it approaches to Necessity of Existence,
and consequently to eternal Existence.
THUS we have made a short Survey, so far as the Bounds of a Chapter
would permit, of those Evidences and Assurances which we have from
abstract Reason and the external World, that there is an Author of
Nature; and that a Being infinitely perfect, which we call _God_. We may
add to these, in the last Place, that universal Consent of Mankind, or
natural Instinct of Religion which we see, more or less, throughout all
Nations, barbarous or civil. For tho’ this Argument, ’tis true, be more
disputable than the rest, yet having set down just Grounds already from
whence this natural Judgment or Persuasion might spring, we have more
Reason to impute it to some of those, and their insensible Influence
upon the Mind, than to the Artifices of Men, or to make it a Weakness,
Prejudice, or Error of our Nature. That there is such a Propension in
humane Nature, seems to be very plain; at least so far as to move us to
implore, and have recourse to invisible Powers in our Extremities.
Prayer is natural in certain Cases, and we do at the mere Motion of our
natural Spirit, and indeliberately, invoke God and Heaven, either in
case of extream Danger, to help and assist us; or in case of Injustice
and Oppression, to relieve or avenge us; or in case of false
Accusations, to vindicate our Innocency; and generally in all cases
desperate and remediless as to humane Power, we seem to appeal and
address our selves to something higher. And this we do by a sudden
Impulse of Nature, without Reflexion or Deliberation. Besides, as
Witnesses of our Faith and Veracity, we use to invoke the Gods, or
superior Powers, by Way of Imprecation upon our selves, if we be false
and perjur’d; and this hath been us’d in most Nations and Ages, if not
in all. These Things also argue, that there is a natural Conscience in
Man, and a Distinction of moral _Good_ and _Evil_; and that we look upon
those invisible Powers as the Guardians of Virtue and Honesty. There are
also few or no People upon the Earth but have something of external
Religion, true or false; and either of them is an Argument of this
natural Anticipation, or that they have an Opinion that there is
something above them, and above visible Nature; tho’ what that
_something_ was, they seldom were able to make a good Judgment. But to
pursue this Argument particularly, would require an historical Deduction
of Times and Places, which is not suitable to our present Design.
TO conclude this Chapter and this Subject; if we set Religion apart, and
consider the Deist and Atheist only as two Sects in Philosophy, or their
Doctrine as two different _Hypotheses_ propos’d for the Explication of
Nature, and in Competition with one another, whether should give the
more rational Account of the Universe, of its Origin and _Phænomena_? I
say if we consider them only thus, and make an impartial Estimate
whether System is more reasonable, more clear, and more satisfactory; to
me there seems to be no more Comparison than betwixt Light and Darkness.
The _Hypothesis_ of the Deist reacheth from Top to Bottom, both through
the intellectual and material World, with a clear and distinct Light
every where; is genuine, comprehensive, and satisfactory; hath nothing
forc’d, nothing confus’d, nothing precarious; whereas the _Hypothesis_
of the Atheist is strain’d and broken, dark and uneasy to the Mind,
commonly precarious; often incongruous and irrational, and sometimes
plainly ridiculous. And this Judgment I should make of them abstractly
from the Interest of Religion, considering them only as Matter of Reason
and Philosophy. _And_ I dare affirm with Assurance, if the Faculties of
our Souls be true, that no Man can have a System of Thoughts reaching
thorough Nature, coherent and confident in every Part, without a Deity
for the Basis of it.