Having given an Account of this whole Work in the first Chapter, and of
the Method of either Book, whereof this Volume consists, in their proper
Places, there remains not much to be said here to the Reader. This
Theory of the Earth may be called _Sacred_, because it is not the common
Physiology of the Earth, or of the Bodies that compose it, but respects
only the great Turns of Fate, and the Revolutions of our natural World;
such as are taken notice of in the Sacred Writings, and are truly the
Hinges upon which the Providence of this Earth moves; or whereby it
opens and shuts the several successive Scenes whereof it is made up.
This _English_ Edition is the same in Substance with the _Latin_,
though, I confess, ’tis not so properly a Translation, as a new
Composition upon the same Ground, there being several additional
Chapters in it, and several new-moulded.
As every Science requires a peculiar Genius, so likewise there is a
Genius peculiarly improper for every one: And as to Philosophy, which is
the Contemplation of the Works of Nature, and the Providence that
governs them, there is no Temper or Genius, in my Mind, so improper for
it, as that which we call a _mean_ and _narrow Spirit_; and which the
_Greeks_ call _Littleness of Soul_. This is a Defect in the first Make
of some Mens Minds, which can scarce ever be corrected afterwards,
either by Learning or Age. And as Souls that are made little and
incapacious cannot enlarge their Thoughts to take in any great Compass
of Times or Things; so what is beyond their Compass, or above their
Reach, they are apt to look upon as fantastical, or at least would
willingly have it pass for such in the World. Now as there is nothing so
great, so large, so immense, as the Works of Nature, and the Methods of
Providence, Men of this Complexion must needs be very unfit for the
Contemplation of them. Who would set a purblind Man at the Top of the
Mast to discover Land? Or upon an high Tower to draw a Landskip of the
Country round about? For the same Reason, short-sighted Minds are unfit
to make Philosophers, whose proper Business it is to discover and
describe in comprehensive Theories the _Phænomena_ of the World, and the
Causes of them.
This Original Disease of the Mind is seldom cur’d by Learning, which
cures many others; like a Fault in the first _Stamina_ of the Body, it
cannot easily be rectified afterwards. ’Tis a great Mistake to think
that every sort of Learning makes a Man a competent Judge of Natural
Speculations: We see unhappy Examples to the contrary amongst the
Christian Fathers, and particularly in St. _Austin_, who was
unquestionably a Man of Parts and Learning; but interposing in a
Controversy where his Talent did not lie, shew’d his Zeal against the
_Antipodes_ to very ill purpose, though he drew his Reasons partly from
Scripture. And if within a few Years, or in the next Generation, it
should prove as certain and demonstrable that the _Earth is mov’d_, as
it is now, that there are _Antipodes_; those that have been zealous
against it, and engag’d the Scripture in the Controversy, would have the
same Reason to repent of their Forwardness, that St. _Austin_ would have
now, if he was alive. ’Tis a dangerous thing to engage the Authority of
Scripture in Disputes about the Natural World, in Opposition to Reason;
lest Time, which brings all Things to Light, should discover that to be
evidently false which we had made Scripture to assert: And I remember
St. _Austin_, in his Exposition upon _Genesis_, hath laid down a Rule to
this very purpose, though he had the Unhappiness, it seems, not to
follow it always himself. The Reason also, which he gives there for his
Rule, is very good and substantial: For, saith he[1], _if the
Unbelievers or Philosophers shall certainly know us to be mistaken, and
to err in those things that concern the Natural World, and see that we
alledge our (Sacred) Books for such vain Opinions, how shall they
believe those same Books when they tell them of the RESURRECTION of the
Dead, and the World to come, if they find them to be fallaciously writ
in such things as lie within their certain Knowledge?_
We are not to suppose that any Truth concerning the Natural World can be
an Enemy to Religion; for Truth cannot be an Enemy to Truth, God is not
divided against himself; and therefore we ought not upon that Account to
condemn or censure what we have not examin’d or cannot disprove; as
those, that are of this narrow Spirit we are speaking of, are very apt
to do. Let every thing be try’d and examin’d in the first Place, whether
it be _True_ or _False_; and if it be found false, ’tis then to be
consider’d whether it be such a Falsity as is prejudicial to Religion or
no. But for every new Theory that is propos’d, to be alarm’d, as if all
Religion was falling about our Ears, is to make the World suspect that
we are very ill assur’d of the Foundation it stands upon. Besides, do
not all Men complain, even these as well as others, of the great
ignorance of Mankind? how little we know, and how much is still unknown?
and can we ever know more, unless something new be discover’d? It cannot
be old when it comes first to light, when first invented, and first
propos’d. If a Prince should complain of the Poorness of his Exchequer,
and the Scarcity of Money in his Kingdom, would he be angry with his
Merchants, if they brought him home a _Cargo_ of good Bullion, or a Mass
of Gold out of a foreign Country? and give this Reason only for it, He
would have no _new Silver_; neither should any be current in his
Dominions but what had his own Stamp and Image upon it: How should this
Prince or his People grow rich? To complain of Want, and yet refuse all
offers of a Supply, looks very sullen, or very fantastical.
* * * * *
I might mention also upon this occasion another Genius and Disposition
in Men, which often makes them improper for Philosophical
Contemplations; not so much, it may be, from the Narrowness of their
Spirit and Understanding, as because they will not take Time to extend
them. I mean Men of Wit and Parts, but of short Thoughts and little
Meditation, and that are apt to distrust every Thing for a Fancy or
Fiction that is not the Dictate of Sense, or made out immediately to
their Senses. Men of this Humour and Character call such Theories as
these philosophick Romances, and think themselves witty in the
Expression; they allow them to be pretty Amusements of the Mind, but
without Truth or Reality. I am afraid if an Angel should write the
Theory of the Earth, they would pass the same Judgment upon it; where
there is Variety of Parts in a due Contexture, with something of
surprizing Aptness in the Harmony and Correspondency of them, this they
call a Romance; but such Romances must all Theories of Nature and of
Providence be, and must have every Part of that Character with
Advantage, if they be well represented. There is in them, as I may so
say, a _Plot_ or _Mystery_ pursued thro’ the whole Work, and certain
grand Issues or Events upon which the rest depend, or to which they are
subordinate; but these Things we do not make or contrive our selves, but
find and discover them, being made already by the great Author and
Governor of the Universe: And when they are clearly discover’d, well
digested, and well reason’d in every Part, there is, methinks, more of
Beauty in such a Theory, at least a more masculine Beauty, than in any
Poem or Romance; and that solid Truth that is at the Bottom gives a
Satisfaction to the Mind, that it can never have from any Fiction how
artificial soever it be.
To enter no further upon this Matter, ’tis enough to observe, that when
we make Judgments and Censures upon general Presumptions and Prejudices,
they are made rather from the Temper and Model of our own Spirits, than
from Reason; and therefore, if we would neither impose upon our selves,
nor others, we must lay aside that lazy and fallacious Method of
censuring by the Lump, and must bring things close to the Test of _True_
or _False_, to explicit Proof and Evidence; and whosoever makes such
Objections against an _Hypothesis_, hath a Right to be heard, let his
Temper and Genius be what it will. Neither do we intend that any thing
we have said here should be understood in another Sense.
To conclude, This Theory being writ with a sincere Intention to justify
the Doctrines of the _Universal Deluge_, and of a _Paradisiacal_ State,
and protect them from the Cavils of those that are no Well-wishers to
sacred History, upon that Account it may reasonably expect fair Usage
and Acceptance with all that are well-dispos’d; and it will also be, I
think, a great Satisfaction to them to see those Pieces of most ancient
History, which have been chiefly preserv’d in Scripture, confirm’d anew,
and by another Light, that of Nature and Philosophy; and also freed from
those Misconceptions or Misrepresentations, which made them sit uneasie
upon the Spirits even of the best Men that took Time to think. _Lastly_,
In things purely speculative, as these are, and no Ingredients of our
Faith, it is free to differ from one another in our Opinions and
Sentiments; and so I remember St. _Austin_ hath observ’d upon this very
Subject of _Paradise_; wherefore as we desire to give no Offence our
selves, so neither shall we take any at the Difference of Judgment in
others; provided this Liberty be mutual, and that we all agree to study
_Peace_, _Truth_, and a _good Life_.
Footnote 1:
Gen. ad lit. lib. 1. c. 19. Plerumque accidit ut aliquid de Terrâ de
Cœlo, de cæteris hujus mundi elementis, _&c._ Cùm enim quenquam
Christianorum in eâ re quam optimè nôrunt, errare deprehenderint, &
vanam sententiam suam ex nostris libris asserere, quo pacto illis
libris credituri sunt de Resurrectione Mortuorum, & spe vitæ æterne
regnoque cœlorum, quando de bis rebus quas jam experiri vel
indubitatis numeris percipere potuerunt, fallaciter putaverint esse
conscriptos?