ON THE RUSSIAN ARMY.[101]
Large proportion of Russian population in the army—Military
organization—Peaceable natural disposition of Russian
people—Strong feelings when roused—Obedience to
orders—Anecdotes—Commercial disposition of the Russian
people—Their wish to mix with European nations—Education
checked by the government—Military system of Peter the
Great—His great objects—Faults of our government with
respect to Russian policy—The army, whence recruited—Great
Russians—Poles—Little Russians—Finns, Jews, &c.—Name
“Ruski” or Russian—Its origin—The conscription—Soldiers’
marriages—The cantonists—Emperor’s efforts to improve
condition of common soldier generally unsuccessful—Corporal
punishment—Labour—“Indefinite leave”—Division of empire
for conscription—Amount of population per cent. taken from
1840-1855—Expense of the Russian soldier—Democratic system
of army—The cross of St. George—Classification of Russian
army—Into 1st, Corps d’Armée, or complete armies—2nd, Local
Regular Troops—3rd, Irregulars—Don, Black Sea, and Ural
Cossacks—Value and number of Cossack troops—Various Asiatic
irregulars—General observations.
Having given a sketch of the Russian navy, perhaps another short
digression may be permitted in order to give my readers a concise
account of the organization and disposition of the army in Russia, which
occupies so large a portion of the population, and consumes so much of
the revenues of that country. Taking the army, with all the reserves, at
a million,[102] and the male population of Russia at thirty millions,
and the able-bodied males at fifteen millions, it follows that every
fifteenth man is a soldier, either in active service, or liable to be
called out, which is certainly the case at the present moment.
In our own country about one man in fifty is a regular soldier, and in
other European countries the proportion is greater, but nowhere so large
as in Russia.
We, in this industrious and commercial country, can hardly conceive
what it is to have a military organization such as prevails in Russia,
where nothing but a uniform is respected, and where the highest civil
officers have military titles given them as the only means of indicating
their rank. Indeed there are none but military titles in Russia with
which to reward all kinds of merit. Professor Pallas relates that the
Grand Mufti, or Chief Priest of the Tatars, was made a general after the
conquest of the Crimea—the Professor himself was made a major-general;
an old Armenian school-master I used to know at Tiflis, although a very
unwarlike character, was a field officer; and all members of the civil
service have military rank, and are called by the common people according
to their military titles.
The most singular thing is, that the people among whom this military
organization of the whole nation prevails, is, without exception, the
most pacific people on the face of the earth, and upon this point I
believe no difference of opinion exists among all observers. Having
lived for several years in a position which enabled me to mix much with
the officers and men of the Russian army, such is my strong conviction
of the Russian character. M. Haxthausen mentions, as a point admitting
of no doubt, “the absence of all warlike tendency among the Russian
people, and their excessive fear of the profession of a soldier.”[103]
The Russian people have no pleasure in wearing arms, like the Turk or
the Pole: even in their quarrels among themselves, which are rare, they
hardly ever fight, and the duel, which now often takes place among
Russian officers, is contrary to the national manners, and a custom
imported from the West. The people take no pleasure in the fighting
of beasts or birds, as in bull-fights, or ram-fights, or cock-fights,
which are common amusements among some Eastern as well as most European
nations; and when the Russian is drunk, which often happens, he is never
quarrelsome, but on the contrary caressing and given to tears. But,
on being roused, he exhibits a degree of patient endurance which is
astonishing, and a steady enthusiasm which shows great power of feeling,
and which is very deeply seated in the national character. He meets death
and the severest punishment without fear, and strange anecdotes are told
of the impossibility, as it seems to him, of disobeying the letter of the
orders he has received. I have lately read a story somewhere which well
illustrates this trait of character:—
A soldier on duty at the palace of the Emperor at Petersburg, which was
burnt a few years ago, was stationed and had been forgotten in one suite
of apartments that was in flames: a Greek priest was the last person to
rush through the burning rooms, at the imminent risk of his life, to save
a crucifix in a chapel, and returning he was hailed by the sentry, who
must in a few instants more have been suffocated. “What do you want?”
cried the priest, “save yourself or you will be lost.” “I can’t leave,”
replied the sentry, “because I am unrelieved, but I called to you to give
me your blessing before I die.” The priest blessed him, and the soldier
died at his post.
The late Emperor himself on one occasion attempted to pass a sentinel in
one of the corridors of the palace at Petersburg, who had orders to let
no person pass, but the man resisted him, and when the Emperor tried to
disarm him, wrestled with him, and flung him back against the wall.
The patience also of the Russian peasants is astonishing, in submitting
without a murmur to the most cruel treatment when they happen to belong
to a bad master, until at last they rise in a body, and, armed with
their hatchets, massacre their oppressor. When such instances occur, the
affair is quickly hushed up. The patient sufferings of the dissenters, of
whom it is said that there are in Russia no less than two hundred sects,
prove their deep feeling on religious matters. I have seen thousands
marched, with their wives and children, from their native country, into
the Caucasus, where they were colonized on bleak plains in the month of
October, and the greater number perished of cold and starvation.
If the military organization of Russia could be once broken up, the
people would turn to their natural pursuits, which are decidedly
commercial and agricultural. And again, if free trade were allowed in the
empire, and the commercial spirit could satisfy its natural cravings,
the increased riches, luxuries, and civilization of the country would
show such obvious advantages, that the military system could not hold its
ground. English merchants in Russia have assured me, that although there
are now few Russian merchants engaged in foreign commerce, no people show
such natural aptitude for commercial concerns. The high tariff which
is in force, and the absolute prohibition there is against educating
their children in Europe, as no young persons between the ages of twelve
and twenty-five are allowed under any pretext to be absent from their
country, alone repress for political purposes their natural tendencies.
The Russian people wish for European civilization, and to mix with the
other European nations, but they are not allowed to do so by their
Government; and to check their desire for civilization and their liberal
tendencies, I have been informed by a German professor, who had minutely
studied their educational system, which is under the absolute control
of the Government throughout the whole empire, that within the last
fifteen years the course of study has been checked and thrown back in
all the universities and schools of the empire. It is a well-known fact
to all who have lived in Russia, that the Government grew more and more
jealous of education up to the breaking out of the present war. Foreign
tutors and governesses, who are absolutely essential for all parents who
wish to give their children a good education in Russia, were as far as
possible prevented from entering the empire, and two years ago the Poles
were prohibited from studying at the university of Odessa. It must be
remembered that this town is the commercial débouché and the capital of
all the southern provinces of Poland, the nobility of which generally
go there to spend the fashionable season, and that it contains the only
superior educational institutions within their reach.
It is well known that the Russian army which had served in Europe
during the wars of Napoleon, returned with very liberal tendencies,
and preferred the manner of life of the nations they had left to their
own. They were consequently divided, separated, sent into dangerous
situations, and thus gradually disposed of.
The military system which Peter the Great[104] so strongly recommended to
his successors, was devised, and has been continued down to the present
time, in order that a great framework of empire might be made, which
should be filled up gradually by successive generations. He thought
he could lay down a plan by which a stupendous sovereignty might be
constructed, which should overshadow the whole earth.
It is but fair to say, however, that the Tzar is, to a certain degree,
the incarnation of the national will, and that the whole nation, from
the highest to the lowest, have a vague, but deep-seated notion, that
some future glories are in store for the Slavonic name, and they will
always approve their Tzar, when they think that he is following out the
destiny of the nation. That they do not grow wiser, however, but continue
to attach too much importance to military glory, and the absorbing and
conquering of all surrounding nations, is the fault of the Government
and not of the people. The Tzars have kept them back from mixing with
civilized nations and from commercial pursuits, in order that they might
not learn more just notions of the qualities in which consists the true
glory of nations, and might remain a great encamped people, content with
a military despotism, and ready to be the instruments of restless schemes
of ambition.
The possession of India, of the Mediterranean, and of the Sound, were
three principal objects of Peter the Great’s ambition. The Sound has been
prospectively guaranteed to Russia by the treaty which Lord Palmerston
concluded three years ago, in which the reversion of the Danish throne is
secured to the Czar. Our present expedition to Sevastopol is to prevent
her first step in the Mediterranean by the possession of Constantinople
and the Dardanelles. With respect to India, Russia has quietly worked
her way as far as the Sea of Aral, by advancing villages of Cossacks and
digging wells every ten miles. The English Government have for many years
past been remiss in noticing these aggressive measures, and even now it
is to be feared that our agents in Persia, whence we act upon Central
Asia, are not men fitted to oppose the experienced and able agents of
Russia, or to give us that reasonable probability of success in our
Eastern campaign which proper measures might command.
There was something vague about the schemes of Peter and Catherine in
the last century; and their successors, if we had been firm during the
last twenty years in resisting the first symptoms of encroachment, would
have given up many projects as impracticable. In necessary firmness our
Government has throughout been deficient, and the consequence is, that we
are involved in the present war, and have a gloomy and uncertain future
before us.
The army, the great instrument of Russian aggression, draws the main body
of its recruits from the thirty-four millions of Great Russians who form
a compact body round Moscow. This population is of pure Slave blood, and
forms the heart and core of the Russian empire. They give the tone to all
the other populations, are superior to them in energy and grandeur of
character, as well as numbers, and stand with relation to Russia much as
the inhabitants of Britain do to the other nations of the British empire.
The Great Russians have a natural aptitude for the infantry, which is
almost entirely composed of them, and they form also the bulk of the
corps of officers and non-commissioned officers.
The Poles are found in every part of the army, and particularly in the
cavalry. They are born soldiers, and like no trade so well as war. After
the Polish revolution, vast numbers of the Polish gentry were sent
as common soldiers to the Caucasus; and at one fell swoop the whole
University of Wilna, the capital of the Polish country of Lithuania,
professors as well as students, were condemned to the same hard fate.
It has often happened to me when I have been staying with officers in
the Caucasus, to be called aside by the servant, who has whispered to
me in French, “Sir, I am a Pole, an European, a gentleman born, but I
was degraded and sent here for fighting for my country.” And the poor
fellow was always very glad to have a little sly chat, and a talk on the
forbidden subject of European politics. The Russian officers are very
kind to these unfortunate men, for they are a thoroughly good-natured
race, and are glad to get men of intelligence as servants, instead of
common drunken boors.
The Little Russians (Malo Ruski), as the inhabitants of the Ukraine
are called, are reckoned peculiarly fit for the cavalry, which is not
the case with the Slave race in general. The Great Russians never ride
on horseback, but always travel very fast in carriages, of which they
are remarkably skilful drivers. Even the Cossacks originally were
not horsemen. The Little Russians are small, strong men, remarkably
well conducted, but of very obstinate temper. The Great Russians are
accustomed to be beaten, and indeed are so used to it at home, that it is
difficult to keep them well behaved in the army without the free use of
the stick. They bear no ill-will after castigation, and cheerfully amend
their faults; but the Little Russian becomes dogged if corrected, resents
his punishment, and is often totally ruined by its frequency. The reason
for this is obviously that he enjoyed his freedom later than the others;
and he still retains some sparks of independence, for serfdom was only
introduced into the Ukraine by Paul at the close of the last century,
while the serfs in Great Russia were “ascripti glebæ” by Boris Godounof
about the year 1600. Little Russians may be known by their names, which
generally end in “enko,” and one or two other well-known terminations.
The Finlanders are on a totally different footing to the common Russian
soldiers: they are enrolled in six battalions of riflemen, and are all
volunteers, and receive high pay. They are much better educated than
the Russians, and resemble in their ideas and habits the nations of
Western Europe, to whom, in reality, they belong. The Jews have been
subject to the conscription in Russia since 1827, and in Poland since
the revolution in 1831. It is found almost impossible to make soldiers
of them, and they generally find the means to escape. The story is told
of the late Emperor, that on one occasion, when he was reviewing some
troops, he found out all the Jews by snapping his fingers in each man’s
face. If they stood immoveable they were Russians, and if they flinched
they were invariably Jews. On the other hand, the Jews make capital
military workmen, who in Russia are always attached to the fleet and
the army, and they also make very fair sailors, and are often employed
as constables in towns, on the principle, as it is said, of setting a
thief to catch a thief. There is a Georgian and a Circassian militia, but
these are never removed from their own country, and I do not know, at the
present moment, whether they continue to exist.
The principal nations which compose the Russian army have been enumerated
above, but there are besides various remnants of ancient nations, such
as the Tatars, Mordvins, Tcheremisses, Tschouvashes, Lettes, and others,
who all furnish a small number of men. There are indeed no less than
eighty-five of these tribes or nations in the empire, of which forty
furnish contingents to the regular troops.[105]
The soldiers and officers are generally very religious, and a priest and
a moveable tent for divine service always accompanies each battalion, and
often each company, when on detached duty.
The number of musicians in the army is great, and the soldiers all
sing in parts, and have songs composed on every event which they think
redounds to their honour. In one of their favourite songs the chorus is,
“But the weapon of the Russian soldier is the bayonet;” and this notion
is in accordance with the advice of Souvárof, a real genius, to the
Russian soldier, given in his celebrated Catechism, which will be found
in the Appendix—“The bayonet is a hero, the musket a fool: stab; toss the
Turk off your bayonet, and stab again.”
There is often a buffoon attached to each company, who amuses his
comrades by his jests and antics, and is generally a great favourite. On
one occasion in the Caucasus, when the troops were driven back by the
Circassians, the buffoon was wounded and left behind. A favourite jest of
his had been to crow like a cock, and as he lay on the ground he thought
of the only way to save himself, and crowed. This had such an effect on
his comrades that they rallied, charged again, and saved him.
The Russians are extremely proud of the name “Ruski,” or Russian, and
feel the same patriotic pride in it as we do in the term “British.”
Perhaps it may not be out of place here to give the origin of this name,
out of the Chronicles of old Nestor,[106] who wrote about 200 years after
its first application. He says, “We know that the Russian language and
the Slavonic language are the same, and this name of ‘Russian’ was given
us by the Varangians (the Normans), and that before that time we were
known under the name of Slaves, and the Polanians (Poles), who were also
among the Slaves, had no other language. The name of Polanians was given
them from the fields they cultivated, and because they inhabited the
plain, but they were of Slave origin, and had no other language but the
Slavon.”[107]
The greatest part of the army is raised in Russia by conscription, a
system which was introduced among the other nations of the continent of
Europe by the French at the time of the Revolution, but which has existed
in Russia since the time of Peter the Great.
The conscription is conducted in the following manner. A certain number
per cent. of all persons who are not noble is demanded, and the number
taken each second year, in time of peace, is generally about five in
a thousand, or one-half per cent. Families which have only one male
member, orphans, and fathers of a family of more than three children,
are exempted, and the state leaves the choice of the conscripts to the
lords, who generally take this opportunity of getting rid of troublesome
characters. Formerly there were dreadful scenes when the conscripts
were taken, and they frequently ran away, and were hunted through the
woods like wild beasts; but of late years the condition of the soldier
has been improved, and the dread of the service is not so great as in
former times. The separation of the conscript from his family is still
a heart-rending spectacle, for he may be marched to any part of the
enormous empire, and his chance of seeing them again is but small.
Formerly one-half of the recruits died from neglect within a short time
of their joining, and, although ameliorations have been introduced,
it is still asserted that one-third fall victims.[108] How much the
service is still disliked may be judged of by the fact that in so poor a
country as Russia a substitute in time of peace cannot be obtained under
100_l._,[109] and he is never a Russian, but generally a Finn or a Pole.
Formerly the conscripts were always chained like malefactors, and
one-half of their heads was at once shaven, that they might be
recognised. This is not now the case, but the beard, the great glory of
the Russian peasant, is still shorn off.
It must not be forgotten that the army in Russia answers the purpose
of a penitentiary system, that all malefactors under the age of thirty
are condemned to it as a regular sentence, and that it is viewed by the
people very much as transportation is with us.
As soon as the conscript joins the army his lord loses all power over
him; all his children born after he enters the service belong to the
state, and the males are trained in Government establishments, to become
soldiers. If a wife does not follow her husband, and has no news of him
for either three or five years, she may marry again.
The state encourages marriage among the soldiers, because their children
enable it to fill the ranks of the army, and the wives and children of
the soldiers of Georgia, Siberia, and the military colonies, follow the
troops, and receive certain allowances from the Government. In other
corps the families are often left behind, but in every case the rule
is rigidly adhered to, that the children of every soldier’s wife, no
matter how long he has been absent, unless she has married again, are the
property of the Emperor. There are no less than 360,000 of these widows
in the country. The children are brought up in special establishments,
entirely at the expense of the Government.
In 1842 there were 36,000 of them who were formed into a little army,
divided into twenty-five battalions of infantry, twenty squadrons of
cavalry, and five batteries with wooden cannon. When they grow up
they fill the subordinate situations in the army, such as sergeants,
musicians, assistant-surgeons, and a very useful body of men called the
topographers. The separation from home, however, greatly injures their
moral character, and the Cantonists, as they are called, very often turn
out ill.
The late Emperor made great efforts to improve the condition of the
common soldier in Russia, although it is very doubtful whether he
succeeded in doing so. One great boon, however, granted by him, which has
really bettered the condition of the soldier, is the diminution of his
time of active service, or the introduction of the system of “indefinite
leave,” which will be presently explained.
There are rules against the too frequent infliction of punishment,
and the most stringent regulations to secure to the soldier his fair
rations; but every officer still inflicts what punishment he pleases, and
nothing is more common than for every officer and even every foreigner
to send their servant with a little note to the police-master of the
town, requesting him to administer so many lashes. The officers also, in
drilling the men, frequently strike them in the face with their fist, and
over the body with a stick. Women, also, are constantly whipped on their
bare bodies at the police stations in certain parts of the empire, and
as custom is stronger than law, it has hitherto been found impossible to
prevent these hateful abuses.
The soldier lives well as long as he is in cantonments, which is the
case with a large portion of the Russian army, for then he lives upon
the peasants, and is a great charge upon them. He lives badly when he is
in barracks, because he seldom gets the food to which he is entitled. He
ought to have nearly as much food as the English soldier, according to
M. Haxthausen, but I think there are few people who will say that in the
great majority of instances he ever gets it. He lives in a kind of mess,
and his rations are paid once or twice a month to those who manage the
mess, which is called the “artel,” of which there is one or more to each
company, and the managers are non-commissioned officers and privates,
chosen among themselves. This artel is a fund to which all contribute
something out of their savings, to improve their food; and when their
time of service is over, they have a right to a certain portion of the
balance which remains. A proportion of all they earn by their labour
goes to the artel, and the Government recognises its existence, and by
a recent law its funds are divided into two distinct parts,—one for the
mess, and the other to pay back a certain sum to each man on his retiring
from active service, so that it thus answers the purpose of a kind of
savings-bank.
In the Caucasus, Prince Woronzof very much improved the condition of the
Russian soldier; and no less than twenty-four field officers were brought
to courts-martial, principally about the soldier’s food, during his first
year of office; but I fear that in the interior of Russia things remain
in much the same state as formerly.
The Russian soldier has been called by high Russian military authorities
the most miserable being in existence; and certainly a decided difference
is apparent between the sallow, dejected soldier, and the bluff, hearty,
well-fed, off-hand Russian peasant.
Soldiers are always employed as labourers by independent persons, and
soldiers’ labour is to be had in the market of all towns. The merchants
at Odessa always pay soldiers, even as porters, about 25 per cent. below
other labourers, because they are not so strong. In Odessa, the common
pay of a labourer is forty copecks silver, or about eighteen pence a-day,
and a soldier is highly paid at a shilling. In harvest-time a good
labourer near Odessa gets as much as seven shillings a-day.
The time of service is still twenty-two years for the Guards; twenty-five
years for the other troops; and twenty years for conscripts of the
military colonies.
Between 1833 and 1840 was introduced the system mentioned before, by
which every man has the right to what is called “indefinite leave,” after
ten or fifteen years’ service, according to the part of the empire from
which he happens to come. During the rest of his time of service he is
always liable to be called upon, in the case of war, to form part of one
of the two armies of reserve, or to assist at some of the grand reviews
that periodically take place. In the latter case a great injury is
inflicted upon him; for he is sometimes marched two thousand miles for a
mere parade, and of course, if he is a tradesman engaged in business, his
interests suffer very severely.
The system of indefinite leave is said to answer admirably. The poor
soldiers may perhaps see their homes again after ten years, though they
never could hope to survive twenty-five years’ service; and since this
measure has been adopted, the health of the army, which is in this case
equivalent to its happiness, has much improved.
The empire is now divided into two parts, east and west, for purposes of
the conscription, and regularly each division can only be called upon for
recruits once in two years, although this rule, as all rules in Russia,
has often been disregarded. The following is the amount per cent. which
has been levied in ten years, from 1840 to 1850:—
1840. Both divisions 5 per 1000
Then till 1848, eight years, the regular quota of each
division of 5 per 1000 every other year, or 2½ per
1000 per annum on both divisions 20 per 1000
1849. On account of the movements of troops in } 12 per 1000 on
1848-49, and the expeditions in Hungary, Wallachia, } both divisions
and Transylvania } was levied.
-----------
Total 37 per 1000
Thus a total of 37 per 1000, or upwards of 3½ per cent. of the
able-bodied male population, were taken for the military service in ten
years. Taking the male population of Russia, subject to conscription, at
twenty millions, this would make 700,000 able-bodied men who were drafted
into the army in the ten years from 1840 to 1850; but the army in 1840
already consisted of at least 700,000 men, which, added to the number of
the recruits, would give 1,400,000 men devoted to the military service
during that period, and, as the army in 1850 was certainly not above
800,000, there would remain 600,000 men to be accounted for.
It is not too much to suppose that in 1850-51 and 52, the ordinary number
of 2½ per 1000 (7½ per 1000 for the three years), was levied. In 1853,
in the Turkish campaign, the losses were probably as great as in the
Hungarian, and the army had to be augmented. In 1854 we know that great
efforts have been made, and therefore, in these two years, it is fair to
suppose that 12 per 1000 were levied each year. This would make, in the
five years since 1850, a levy of 31½ per 1000, or upwards of 3 per cent.
on twenty millions, about 700,000 men. But the levy in the last year
(1854) has certainly been more than 12 per 1000, for, besides the regular
recruits, waggons, with men to attend upon them, have been pressed, and
the waggoners have been required by the Government to be of a certain
standard and able-bodied, and when they are at a distance from home they
have been obliged to serve as soldiers. Including these peasants, and
supposing the conscription in 1854 to have required a number above the
12 per 1000 which has been allowed for it, we may perhaps add another
200,000 men as the result of the great efforts that have been made to get
conscripts up to the 1st of January, 1855.
Then in the last fifteen years there will be a total of—
Men.
Regular army, 1840 700,000
Ten years conscripts, 1840-50 700,000
Five years conscripts, 1850-54 600,000
Additional for extra conscription in 1854 200,000
-------
A grand total of 2,200,000
—men who have passed through the Russian service since 1840, and who are
represented now, by the very highest calculation, that of M. Tegoborski,
by from 800,000 to 900,000 men, which he says was the number upon which
the military budget was calculated in the year 1854. Consequently
1,350,000 men have disappeared through the agency of the Russian army
since 1840.
This enormous sacrifice of men to the military system is very severely
felt, and must have gone far to neutralize any increase of the
population of late years. Haxthausen says, “These oukases for levying
the conscriptions always spread mourning and consternation. The nobility
suffers great losses. The Scheremeteff, the Demidoff, and the Orloffs,
are often obliged to furnish several hundred recruits. Families lose
their best workmen, and their fathers and their brothers; for the number
of bad characters, who possess the physical qualities necessary to enter
the service, is not enough to realize the number of troops demanded by
the Emperor.”
Now as to the expense of the Russian soldier to the state. It will be
seen from the following passage that M. Tegoborski, the mouthpiece of
the Russian Government on statistical subjects, estimates it at a very
low figure. He says, “the military budget of Russia for 1854, for an
effective of from 800,000 to 900,000 men, was estimated at 84,200,000
silver roubles, and that of the navy at 14,400,000 silver roubles, or
nearly 16,000,000_l._ altogether, which would give an average of 100
roubles or 16_l._ per head per annum, for the maintenance of the troops.
Admitting that the effective of the army was carried to 1,250,000 men
in the year 1855, which would suppose an augmentation of 450,000 men,
or 50 per cent., and adding to the military budget of 84,200,000 silver
roubles, in a round sum 50,000,000 silver roubles, or 8,000,000_l._, the
whole military budget of Russia for the year 1855 would then only amount
to about 24,000,000_l._”
In calculating the means of Russia to pay this sum, we do not know
the exact amount of the Russian revenue beyond the year 1853, when,
according to M. Tegoborski, it amounted to 37,384,660_l._ But the
Russian revenue in the year 1839, which is the only other year he gives,
is stated to have been upwards of one-third less, so that in the last
fifteen years there is stated to have been the enormous increase of 36
per cent. without the levying of any new taxes. As the accounts of the
Russian revenue are not published, we cannot place implicit reliance
on a mere statement of results by an interested party. But we all know
that estimates are generally much below the real expense, and it is
probable that the military budget, considering the enormous expenses of
the transport of stores and materials, and the movement of troops, and
the losses which have been sustained, must be nearly the double of M.
Tegoborski’s calculation, or, let us say at least 40,000,000_l._ instead
of 24,000,000_l._ On the other hand, considering the great injury to
the peasants from the increased number of recruits and their own forced
services for transport, and an acknowledged diminution of 20 per cent.
in the exports and imports, which will be much greater next year if an
efficient blockade be kept up, shall we be wrong in considering the
Russian realized revenue of 1854 as very much below that of 1853?
M. Tegoborski calculates the diminution of the revenue in 1854 at about
2,000,000_l._ from the falling off of the customs duties alone. It
is probable, therefore, that the revenue of the country, during the
past year, will not have even sufficed by several millions to pay the
expenses of the army and navy alone, while, besides these expenses, there
is the interest of the debt and the expenditure of the civil government
to be met, which is reckoned at about 8,000,000_l._ Thus it may be fairly
supposed that Russia will want at least 48,000,000_l._ to cover the
expenses of the year 1854, which is eleven millions more than the total
amount of her revenue during the last year of peace, 1853. Her credit in
Europe[110] is indeed pretty good, but it is notorious that she depends
upon foreign capital for the cultivation of her soil. The precious metals
have almost disappeared from the empire: paper alone is seen there; and
if we press her hard during the next six months she must be reduced to
very great straits.
Although the Russian soldier has a hard life of it as a private, yet if
he rises to be a non-commissioned officer, he then, after twelve years’
service, becomes ennobled, and receives his commission, or retires with a
pension. Thus a considerable number of the officers of the Russian army
have risen from the ranks, and all who obtain commissions are obliged
to serve as non-commissioned officers for a certain period. Formerly the
length of time was six months, but it has lately been extended to two
years, so that I suppose the system is found to answer.
None are exempted from this condition except those who have gone through
the military schools, in which they are allowed to pass their probation
as non-commissioned officers, and then enter the army as officers. An
officer in his probationary state is called a “younker,” and he wears the
drab greatcoat, and regularly performs the duties of a sergeant. His only
privilege is to have his dress of finer materials than that of the common
men,—if he chooses to pay for it. Off duty he lives among his equals, and
is often seen in his soldier’s coat at the table of generals. Thus the
system of promotion in the army, and indeed the whole feelings of the
Russian people, are far less aristocratic than among ourselves.
The common soldiers in Russia are also frequently decorated with the
medal which is by far the most prized, even by the highest ranks of
officers, namely, the Soldier’s Cross of St. George. This is the one
given only for distinguished bravery, and it is very much sought after.
A certain number of these crosses are distributed after every remarkable
achievement. It is given not only after great battles, but whenever any
man has performed a signal act of valour.
The cross is simply of lead, while other crosses are of more precious
material, and it is alike for soldiers and officers. The Grand Cross
of St. George is given for having taken the capital of an enemy, or
having fought a battle which has decided the fate of an empire. The
late Emperor himself wore only the Soldier’s Cross of St. George, which
he gained under fire in the Turkish war. There were only two Grand
Crosses in existence a few years ago, one of which was worn by our own
Duke of Wellington, and the other by Marshal Paskiévitch, who received
his for the taking of Arzeroom, which was considered as the capital of
Armenia.[111]
The order of St. George is universally regarded in Russia with the same
pride and respect as the orders of “the Iron Cross,” that of “Maria
Theresa,” and that “of Merit” are in other European countries.
Since the last few years also there exists in Russia an imitation
of the distinction accorded to Latour d’Auvergne, that of being “le
premier grenadier de France.” Archippus Ossipof, in 1840, blew up the
fort Michailof, and himself in it, to prevent its being taken by the
Circassians; and his name is still kept on the lists as the first
grenadier of the first company of the infantry regiment of Tenginsk. When
his name is called, the second soldier always answers, “Dead for the
honour of the Russian arms in the fort Michailof.”
There also exist in Russia orders and medals of honour conferred upon
regiments, which recall the epoch of their creation, the names of their
founders, and their famous actions. These formerly existed in the French
and all the German armies, but are now only found in the Austrian and
English armies, and a few Prussian regiments. In Russia the regiments
have continued to exist since Peter the Great, and keep up by outward
signs the remembrance of their services. The Preobrajenski guards,
the few companies which Peter undertook to drill ostensibly for his
amusement, and which became the nucleus of the whole Russian army, still
wear the original helmets of his time; and it is a glory among the men
to have those that are the most pierced by bullets and battered by
sabre-cuts.
The regiment of Tchérnigof obtained the privilege of alone wearing
red-stockings (probably gaiters to the knee, which were then worn all
over Europe), because at the battle of Pultava they marched in blood up
to their knees.
The regiment of Novogínsk is allowed to carry the standard of St. George
since the battle of the Trebbia and the passage of the Alps under
Suvórof, in 1799; and this regiment possesses silver trumpets, given to
it in consequence of the passage of the Gulf of Bothnia upon the ice,
under Bagration in 1807. The Russians have also copied the system of
giving their generals titles commemorative of the victories they have
gained in foreign countries. Thus in ancient Rome there was Scipio
Africanus; in modern France there are a host of titles of the time of the
Empire, of which Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, and Ney, Prince of the Moskowa,
are examples; and in our own country, the title of Lord Mahon perpetuates
the victories of Lord Peterborough, and the Duke of Wellington was made
Marquis of Douro, and Lord Kean Baron of Ghuzni. The Russians keep more
strictly to the Roman style in their titles of honour, and thus we find a
Suvórof Italínski, a Diébitch Sabalkánski, and a Paskiévitch Erivánski.
The dress of the Russian soldier consists of a dark-green coatee, which
he very seldom wears, except on parade; a drab greatcoat, which is his
constant dress; two pairs of trousers, one for summer and one for winter;
a cravat; three shirts; three pairs of boots, and a cap. The whole of
these articles cost the Government about 2_l._, with 1_l._ 3_s._ 6_d._
each year for renewal, and they remain the property of the soldier.
It will be observed that no stockings are mentioned, as no soldiers
wear them; and many officers cannot afford such luxuries, and only wear
bandages wrapped round the legs, something like the piferari in Italy.
All articles of clothing are made up by workmen in each battalion, and
these amount to fifty men, who are constantly employed, and consequently
by this system the effective force of the army is considerably reduced.
Many classifications may be made of the Russian army, as into,—1st,
regular and irregular troops; 2nd, grand army, always ready for offensive
operations, and troops employed on local services; 3rd, the active
army and the reserve, although all the reserves are on active service
at the present moment; 4th, according to the system of numbering from
each regiment upwards; or, 5th, according to its division into—first,
corps or regular armies, each composed of a certain proportion of
infantry, cavalry, and artillery;—second, battalions not formed into
regiments;—and, third, irregular cavalry and militia.
This is the classification which I will now follow—1st, then, as to the
regular corps, there is:—
1. The corps of Guards, consisting of 38,000 infantry, with 60 squadrons
of regular and 17½ of irregular cavalry, one division of mounted
engineers, and 116 pieces of artillery. The station of this corps is at
Petersburg in time of peace; but it has recently been moved into Poland.
2. The corps of Grenadiers, likewise consisting of 38,000 infantry, but
only 32 squadrons of cavalry, and 88 pieces of artillery. Their station
is at Novgorod, ninety miles from Petersburg, where they still remain.
3-8. Six corps of infantry, as they are called, although they are
complete armies like the two that have been named. They form the bulk
of the Russian army, and have each 50,000 infantry, 32 squadrons of
cavalry, and 112 pieces of artillery; making a total for the six corps of
300,000 infantry; 192 squadrons of lancers and huzzars, and 672 pieces of
artillery.
The following are the stations of these six corps, which are echelloned
in a semicircle round the frontiers of the Russian Empire, beginning with
the Baltic Provinces, then passing through Poland and Bessarabia, and
along the shores of the Black Sea and the Azof, and upwards to Moscow,
where the 6th corps is stationed.
The first four corps form the Grand Army under Prince Paskiévitch,
whose head-quarters are at Warsaw, and who is also Viceroy of Poland.
The regular station of the first corps of infantry is in the Baltic
Provinces, where it generally remains more stationary than the next
three corps. It has now recently been moved to Grodno and Bialostok, in
Lithuania, and has been ordered to advance into the kingdom of Poland. It
is commanded by General Sievers, a German, of Livonia.
The next three corps, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, are regularly stationed in
the kingdom of Poland, and revolve in a certain circle of cantonments,
being never allowed, for obvious reasons, to remain more than three years
in the same place.
The 2nd corps has now been removed to replace the third corps on the
Dniestr and the Pruth, and is commanded by General Paniútin, a Russian.
The 3rd corps has its usual head-quarters at Kremenetz in Wolhynia, and
has now been moved to the Crimea. The arrival of one of its divisions,
the eighth in the general system of the army, at Baktchéserai, was
announced in our papers about the 20th of January, when it was addressed
by Prince Gortchakoff. This corps is commanded by General Riad, who has
served in the Caucasus.
The 4th corps has been moved to the Crimea, and was commanded by General
Dannenberg, who was deprived of it in consequence of losing the battle
of Inkerman, on November 5th, 1854, and he has been succeeded by General
Osten Sacken, who before that time had all the recruiting of New Russia
under his care. Both these generals are Germans.
The regular station of the 5th corps is in New Russia, and its
head-quarters are at Odessa. One division is usually kept in the Crimea,
one on the Dniepr and Dniestr, and one in Bessarabia. Its cavalry station
is on the Boug, at Nemírgorod and other places. Its artillery station is
at Tyraspol on the Dniestr, which is one of the great arsenals of Russia.
It was borrowed to reinforce the army of Caucasus in 1843, and returned
in 1846. One division of it was again sent there in 1854, and it has been
commanded since about 1840 by General Luders, a German. He replaced
General Mouravióf, a man of considerable ability, who was then disgraced,
but has been recently restored to favour, and is now governor-general of
the Caucasus. Since this war began, many able men, obnoxious on account
of their liberal opinions, or from other causes, have been restored
to favour and employed, no doubt because there is felt in the present
crisis a great scarcity of men fitted to fill high appointments. We, on
the contrary, have an “_embarras de richesses_” of good men, but our
government, unlike that of Russia, unfortunately appears to have allowed
private considerations and official routine to stand too much in the way
of their appointment. The whole of the 5th corps has now been moved into
the Crimea.
The 6th corps is regularly stationed at Moscow in time of peace, but it
has now been moved to the south. Of its three divisions, Nos. 16 and 17
are in the Crimea, and No. 18 in the Caucasus. It is nominally commanded
by Prince Gortchakoff the Third (tretiey), as he is called in Russia, but
the real active commander is General Tchlodaieff, an officer of great
ability. Such have been the locations and “dislocations” of the six corps
of infantry.
9thly and 10thly, in the general list of corps, come the two reserve
corps of cavalry. The first of these consists of 80 squadrons and 48
pieces of artillery. Its regular station is at Nemírgorod, on the Boug,
and it has been moved to the seat of war. The second corps of cavalry
of reserve consists of 82 squadrons, and a division of light cavalry of
reserve of 24 squadrons, or altogether, 108 squadrons, and 72 pieces of
artillery.[112] This is the corps of the dragoons, or soldiers intended
to act either as infantry or cavalry, according to the ideas of those who
first invented the Dragoon. This notion of having the same soldier fit
for both services was given up in Europe after the wars of Napoleon, but
revived by the Emperor of Russia, with whom it is a favourite notion. It
is, however, generally disapproved of by Russian officers, who do not
consider that the men gain in efficiency by having to perform double
duties. The station of the second cavalry reserve corps is at Kharkof.
11thly, The corps of the Caucasus, which a few years ago consisted
altogether of a very mixed army of 170,000 men, so scattered over the
country, that 20,000 men could with difficulty be got together.
Besides these eleven regular corps, which are most of them complete
armies, there are also in Russia a large body of regular infantry for the
internal service of the country, which is supplied with the necessary
complement of cavalry and artillery by the Cossacks. This force of
infantry amounts altogether to 200,000 men, and is divided into separate
battalions, called “battalions of the line,” and not into regiments.
These troops are used as garrisons for fortresses and towns; they are
placed in some turbulent countries on the frontiers of the empire, and
are employed in various ways in the civil and military administration.
Fifty of them are “the garrison battalions,” and together form what is
called “the guard of the interior,” separated into ten districts, and
the capital of each government in European Russia has generally one and
sometimes two of these battalions. They count among their ranks many
veterans, and are generally cantoned in open towns, as their health is
then better and the expense of their maintenance less. In Siberia two
battalions and a half form the interior guard of the country.
Besides the garrison battalions there are 84 battalions of the line,
disposed in various groups:—47 are placed in the Caucasus, and have
already been counted; 12 are Finnish, and form the 22nd division of
infantry, whose station is in Finland; 10 belong to Orenbourg, and
compose the 23rd division of infantry; 15 are Siberian battalions, who
have also some artillery (12 pieces), and are stationed in Siberia.
There are besides these the corps of veterans and invalids, and the corps
of military workmen, as follows:—
(1.) 552 companies of veterans of infantry, of about 40 men each, who do
duty in district towns, the imperial palaces, and other places, = 22,080
men.
(2.) 138 companies of invalids, of about 100 men each, occupied with the
same duties, = 13,800 men.
(3.) 115 companies of veterans and artillery workmen, of 150 to 200 men
each, for the service of the artillery of the fortresses, the workshops
of the artillery, and the manufactories of guns, powder, &c. = say 20,000
men.
(4.) 105 companies of veterans, workmen, and soldiers belonging to the
corps of engineers, likewise of 150 to 200 men each, and = say 20,000 men.
There is besides a corps of police, amounting to 3000 men, scattered over
all the towns of the empire. The Cossacks also partly perform the duties
of the police in the towns, and in the country there is no police at all.
Thus the corps of veterans and invalids equal altogether—
Men.
Infantry veterans 22,080
Ditto 13,800
Veteran workmen of artillery, &c. 40,000
------
Total 75,880
Add to these—
Fifty-two battalions and a half of the interior guard 52,500
Eighty-four battalions of the line 84,000
-------
Total of local regular troops 212,380
Haxthausen, adding in the regular troops of the corps of the Caucasus,
makes the local regular troops = 299,800 men, and adding further the
reserves of the battalions of the line, upwards of 15,000 men, makes a
grand total for the local regular troops of 315,000 men.
The total of the “troupes mobiles,” or aggressive army, being 699,000
men, it follows that in the present military organization of Russia, in
ordinary times of peace, she can furnish upwards of a million of regular
troops.
The irregular troops of the Russian army are also very numerous, and
mostly consist of light cavalry. By far the most important of these are
the Cossacks, who are mostly of Russian extraction.
There are, however, besides the Cossacks, irregular troops taken from
every tribe or nation which Russia has conquered, and this system is
followed, not so much because of the value of their services, as to teach
them to expend their military energies in her service, and by accustoming
them to good pay and the luxuries of civilized life, to wean their
affections from their own people.
There is a regular line of Cossacks all the way from the banks of the
Danube along the north of the Caspian, and all through Tatary and
Mongolia, to the extreme verge of eastern Asia at Kamstchatka.
Along a part of this line, from the Caspian to Kamstchatka, there is
also a chain of tribes, the rightful possessors of the country, allied
together, beginning with the Kirgúiz, and ending with the pacific
population of Kamstchatka. The Cossacks prevent the Kirgúiz from
levying a tribute on the Russian merchants and colonists, and force the
Kamstchatkans to pay their tribute to the Russian government.
The following is an enumeration from M. Haxthausen’s work of the force
which the Cossacks, according to their constitution and ordinances, are
bound to furnish, if a levy of the whole of them were made. In case of
urgency, they would be able to bring into the field at least one-fourth
more of practised warriors, especially if the State assisted them in
their equipment.
At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the Cossacks are
occupied in the labours of agriculture, and the abstraction of so large
a proportion of them as took place of late years in time of peace has
been a material injury to their interests.[113] If so large a number were
taken as M. Haxthausen supposes, the tillage of the fields could hardly
be effected.
1. The Cossacks of the Don can put on foot 58 regiments of cavalry, of
which two belong to the Guard, and 14 batteries of horse artillery. Each
regiment is composed of 6 sotni[114] or centuries; total = 348 sotni and
112 guns.
2. The Cossacks of the western side of the Sea of Azof. These are the
best sailors of the south of Russia. They possess 30 gun-boats, and
in time of peace are exclusively occupied in blockading the coasts of
Circassia. They belong properly to the navy.
3. The Cossacks of the Danube. They can put on foot 2 regiments of
cavalry. Each regiment is composed of 6 sotni, and numbers 870 men.
4. The Cossacks of the Black Sea, or the Tchernomorski Cossacks, who are
the ancient Zaporogues of the Dniepr. These can furnish 12 regiments of
cavalry, 1 division (2 sotni) of Cossacks of the Guard, 9 battalions of
riflemen, 3 batteries of horse artillery, and 1 of foot artillery.
Each regiment has about 6 sotni, and therefore their total would be 9
battalions, 74 sotni of cavalry, and 32 guns.
5. The Cossacks of the Line, or of the Caucasus: 18 regiments of cavalry,
and 3 batteries of horse artillery.
According to the ordinance of 1845, they were to be raised to 20
regiments of cavalry, and of 884 men each; and, in addition, they were
to furnish an escort for the Emperor at Petersburg, and one division (I
suppose 2 sotni) for the active Polish army.
Counting upon the old state of things before 1845, the total was 108
sotni and 24 guns.
6. The Cossacks of the Ural Mountains: 12 regiments of cavalry, of 5
sotni each, making altogether 60 sotni.
7. The Cossacks of Orenbourg: 10 regiments of cavalry, of 6 sotni each,
and 3 batteries of horse artillery; total 60 sotni and 24 guns.
8. The Cossacks of the Line of Siberia, who must not be confounded with
the Cossacks of the towns in that country: 9 regiments of cavalry, and 3
batteries of horse artillery; total 54 (?) sotni and 24 guns.
9. The Cossacks of the frontiers of China: 8 sotni.
10. The Cossacks of Astrakhan: 3 regiments of cavalry, and 1 battery of
horse artillery; 18 sotni and 8 guns.
11. The town Cossacks of Siberia: 8 regiments of infantry (? battalions).
The number of the Cossack infantry is very uncertain, because the force
of the Siberian battalions is unknown.
The most important question for Europe to inquire is, as to how many of
these Cossacks are available during a European war like the present? On
this point the following calculation must of course be only approximative.
1. If Russia continues the war of the Caucasus on its present footing.—In
this case the Cossacks of the Don, 9 or 10 regiments of which are
ordinarily employed in the Caucasus, would only offer of—
Disposable troops 38,000 cavalry 100 pieces of artillery.
Cossacks of Danube 1,700 ” ”
Cossacks of Ural 5,000 ” ”
Cossacks of Orenbourg 5,000 ” 10 ”
------ ---
Total 49,700 ” 110 ”
2. If Russia restricted herself to a purely defensive war in the
Caucasus, and abandoned her more advanced posts, without leaving
her frontiers undefended, there might be added 2000 men of the Don,
2000 Tchernomorski or Black Sea Cossacks, 4000 Cossacks of the Line;
altogether 10,000 additional men.
The total force available would then be 60,000 cavalry and 110 guns. In
each of these cases 20,000 to 30,000 cavalry of the new formation might
be drawn from Siberia, and directed successively to the theatre of war.
There are, besides, a number of irregular troops not of Russian origin,
but organized after the manner of the Cossacks; and although their
military importance is not great, I will enumerate them.
Many of the tribes that will be mentioned have long served under the
Russian banner, as anciently the Gauls served in the armies of Cæsar.
Their motive has been not attachment to the Russians, but fear of them.
Long habit and traditions of submission have much modified their state of
feeling, and has at last made these people pretty faithful servants of
the Russian government; as, for example, the Bashkírs, who used formerly
to have constant sanguinary collisions with the Cossacks of the Ural
Mountains. _There are other tribes who now serve the Russians, because
they are forced to do so, and who would willingly fight against them, if
they had not a conviction of their own inferiority._
Other tribes would suffer the supremacy of Russia pretty patiently,
if that power was not so severe in making them respect the rights of
property, and if she did not prevent their indulging their old habits of
levying blackmail on their neighbours, and the merchants and travellers
who pass through their territory.
It is therefore evidently not from any great benefits to be derived from
their military organization, but in order to watch them, that they are
brought into close relations with the Cossack troops charged with the
defence of the Russian authority in the countries inhabited by them.
The following is a concise account of these nations:—
(A.) The Tatars of Crimea. These feeble remains of the ancient
sovereigns of Southern Russia belong to that horde whose Khans
had formerly more than once penetrated as far as the Oka, and
never at the head of less than 150,000 cavalry. They now furnish
to the Imperial Guard a squadron of fine irregular troops.
(B.) The warlike tribes of the Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia.
They furnish to the Russian government auxiliary troops for
the wars in those countries. These troops are very useful,
although dependence cannot be always placed on them; but for
wars beyond their own country, any number might be obtained by
voluntary enlistment. They furnish to the Russian army—
1. A squadron of the guard forming the personal escort of
the Emperor, and constituting, with a squadron of the
Cossacks of the Line, “the Tcherkess Guards.”
2. A regiment of 6 squadrons serving in the army of Poland.
3. An infantry regiment of Georgian militia to reinforce
the military cordon established against the Lesghins,
beyond the Alezan, a river of Kakhetia, in Georgia.
Total of these:—2 battalions and 7 squadrons.
(C.) The Bashkírs and Metschériacks. They inhabit in part as
nomades Perm and Orenbourg, and belong to the army of the
Cossacks of Orenbourg. In 1813 many of these served in Germany.
(D.) The Buriates and the Toungouses:—5 regiments of cavalry.
They form part of the Cossack force on the Chinese frontier.
Russia might march forward a large portion of these irregular troops,
but they are yet so little civilized that the Russian government does
not like to bring them to the West, because their want of discipline
and obedience in fighting would make them rather an impediment than an
advantage on the field of battle. They are, however, of some importance,
as they might be used to replace the best corps of Cossacks in the East
and in the Caucasus, while the latter were moved away to the West.
The native cavalry of the Caucasus alone, on account of their great
courage and address, would offer a precious auxiliary force to the
Russian army in wars on her western frontier, if they could be brought to
fight under her banner.[115]
The regiments of irregular cavalry among the Russians are principally
intended to serve for a war of skirmishers. Their chief business is
to provide for the security of the Russian army, and its means of
communication, by protecting the baggage and the convoys of prisoners.
They are also very useful in carrying orders, and forming relays for
correspondence; and, lastly, are of the greatest importance in annoying
the enemy with constant skirmishes.
They show great skill and a liking for these various duties, which are
not only in perfect harmony with their military habits, but which give
them frequent opportunities of plunder. It is said that during the years
1812-1814 they established themselves, privately, a chain of Cossack
posts, from the Seine to the Don, to pass along their booty; and without
some such plan it is difficult to understand how during those campaigns
they could have sent so many precious objects home from the West to offer
to the image of “the Mother Mary,” or “the beautiful Minka,” of the Don,
as they called their favourite image of the Virgin.
In most armies the duties of providing for the safety of the army are
regulated in a very precise order, with vigorous dispositions relative
to the organization and employment of patrols, guards of the camp, and
piquets. The Cossacks know none of these arrangements. They surround
on all sides the corps of troops which they are told to protect, and
by the delicacy of their senses, and their instinctive quickness, it
is possible for the Russian regular troops to give themselves up to a
more complete security than any Western armies provided with the most
intelligent officers and sergeants. Suvórof called the Cossacks “the eye
of the army;” and he might have said that they were also its ears and its
antennæ.
The irregular troops are of the more utility in the Russian army, because
the regular corps do not show much aptitude for the minor duties of
the military service. There is therefore in the Russian army the most
rigorous division of labour that was ever seen in any army; to the
regular troops are allotted the labours of war, and to the irregular
troops those of general surveillance. The Cossack has no equal for
surprises and skirmishes. No cavalry in Europe could make such marches
as they constantly perform, without ruining their horses. In Europe
they often carried with them a pack-horse; but even without this they
performed incredible feats, and fifty miles is with them an ordinary
day’s journey. Of the 3500 men of regular troops who were sent on the
expedition to Khiva in 1840, only 1000 returned. Of 1200 Cossacks who
made part of that same expedition only 60 perished; and of 2000 or 3000
Kirgúiz who accompanied it the loss was still less. If on the one hand
this was the result of their familiarity with the steppes and the climate
of these countries, on the other hand it was partly owing to their
fitness for making forced marches.
The Cossack, who is generally a strong man, appears to be too heavy
for his horse, but this is not really the case. The Cossack horse is a
wonderful animal to endure fatigue. He has a good head, a ewe neck, a
large arm, short legs, broad chest, and a sound hoof. His back often
seems too long; but it is said[116] that he is often found with two
ribs more than ordinary horses. In winter he seeks his pasture in the
snows of the steppes, and thus learns to be very hardy; and he can do
an immense deal of work when he is fed on oaten bread or barley, wheat,
straw, or good or bad hay, all of which he will eat. He is very active in
climbing mountains, and swimming rivers. At Marshal Munich’s assault on
the lines of Perecop the Cossacks arrived at the top of the rampart as
soon as the first men of the infantry. The Cossack horse is accustomed
to eat at all hours of the day; and his master continually feeds him
whenever he has an opportunity. If he stops but for a moment, even under
the fire of cannon in time of war, the Cossack always feeds his horse
with something; and the horse never refuses any food, either on account
of its bad quality or the time at which it is given. “He alone” (I use
the words of Haxthausen) “who has had the pain to see his fine and
faithful horse refuse his oats after the fatigue of a battle; he who has
counted with anguish the minutes in time of war which have been allowed
him to feed his horse, and which have passed without the horse being able
to eat; he who has seen his beautiful steed, accustomed to delicate food,
become day by day more thin and feeble from bad nourishment and forced
marches, such a soldier can alone understand how precious in the Cossack
horse are his strong stomach and power of endurance.”[117]
The Cossacks now have trumpets, and under the cover of cannon spread
themselves out like a swarm, dashing upon the enemy when any one of their
number, and not their officer only, sees a favourable opportunity and
gives the signal. They dislike to face fire-arms, because, M. Haxthausen
says, they only come out to fight for plunder, but sometimes they will
do a daring exploit in hope of a cross, as they are very vain, and
love decorations even more than the Russians. Their superstition is
remarkable; they believe in all sorts of auguries; which, although also
the case with the Russian soldier, in him is neutralized by military
discipline. The Cossacks, fighting singly, have no esprit-de-corps to
counteract their natural feelings, and the crossing of a hare with them
may lose an engagement. The meeting of a priest is also considered very
unlucky.
To sum up: it may be said that at present, with regard at least to the
Cossacks of the Don, the horse is better than his master. They were
of great use in the wars of Napoleon, when they were still a frontier
people, continually exercised in war at home, and possessed of a
democratic constitution, which allowed only merit to raise its head.
Since that time the advance of the Russian frontiers to the South
has given the Cossacks internal peace and security, and their old
constitution has been either taken away or made a dead letter. Thus, with
the loss of their liberty, they have become indifferent soldiers and idle
agriculturists.
Russian military men have not, I believe, a high opinion of the Don
Cossacks, and although they still acknowledge their utility in guarding
regular troops, and relieving them from many laborious duties, are
well aware how much they have lost of their ancient martial spirit. I
believe the opinion of our own military authorities is, that they are not
very formidable in the field, and before Sevastopol have shown little
inclination to run any great risks.
Had they stood at all firmly at the affair of Balaclava, not a man of
our unfortunate light cavalry could have been saved. When our men were
returning from that fearful ride of death, they saw swarms of Cossacks,
several thousand in number, descend from the hills to intercept their
return. They thought all was over with them, as they quickened their pace
to charge; but the Cossacks shrank from the encounter, opened to the
right and left, and let them pass in safety.[118]
RECAPITULATION OF EFFECTIVE COSSACKS.
+-------------------------+----------------------------------------+
| | ENUMERATION OF THEIR FORCE. |
| +--------+--------+-----------+----------+
| Names of the | | | | |
| Cossack Corps. |Regiment| | | |
| | of | Sotni |Battalions.|Batteries.|
| |Cavalry.|Cavalry.| | |
+-------------------------+--------+--------+-----------+----------+
| 1. Army of the Don | 58 | 348 | | 14 |
| 2. ” Azof | | | | |
| 3. ” Danube | 2 | 12 | | |
| 4. ” Black Sea| 12 | 74 | 9 | 4 |
| 5. ” Caucasus | 18 | 108 | | 3 |
| 6. ” Oural | 12 | 60 | | |
| 7. ” Orenburg | 10 | 60 | | 3 |
| 8. ” Siberia | 9 | 54 | | 3 |
| 9. ” frontiers| | 8 | | |
| of China| | | | |
|10. ” Astrakhan| 3 | 18 | | 1 |
|11. ” Siberia | | | 24 | |
| +--------+--------+-----------+----------+
| Total | 124 | 742 | 33 | 28 |
+-------------------------+--------+--------+-----------+----------+
+---+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
| | ENUMERATION OF THEIR FORCE. |
| +-------------------------+----------------+----------------------+
| | Pieces. | Approximative | |
| +--------+---------+------+ Force, | |
| |Cavalry.|Infantry.|Total.| without | OBSERVATIONS. |
| | | | | Artillery. | |
+---+--------+---------+------+----------------+----------------------+
| 1.| 112 | | 112 | 42,000 cavalry | |
| 2.| | | | |{The Army of Azof is |
| | | | | |{ entirely employed to|
| | | | | |{ man the gun-boats on|
| | | | | |{ the Sea of Azof. |
| 3.| | | | 1,700 cavalry | |
| 4.| 24 | 8 | 32 |{ 9,000 infantry| |
| | | | |{ 9,000 cavalry | |
| 5.| 24 | | 24 | 16,000 cavalry | |
| 6.| | | | 7,500 cavalry | |
| 7.| 24 | | 24 | 7,500 cavalry | |
| 8.| 24 | | 24 | 6,500 cavalry | |
| 9.| | | | 1,000 cavalry | |
|10.| 8 | | 8 | 2,000 cavalry | |
|11.| | | | 24,000 infantry| |
| +--------+---------+------+----------------+----------------------+
| | 216 | 8 | 224 |126,200 men | 93,200 cavalry. |
| | | | | | 33,000 infantry. |
+---+--------+---------+------+----------------+----------------------+
Taken from M. Haxthausen, vol. iii.
I have now given a short account of the forces, regular and irregular,
composing the whole Russian army, which is, perhaps, the most stupendous
military engine which the world has ever yet seen.
While the nations of Europe have been disarming, Russia has been
augmenting her forces, and spending a very large proportion of her
revenue in storing up weapons of destruction. Peaceful avocations have
been discouraged by her, and men of peace looked upon with contempt.
She knows no titles but military ones; and rewards no virtues except
those calculated to support her despotism. She has resisted the natural
influence of Europe upon her people, and kept them in poverty-stricken
isolation; by her stupendous military force she prevents the further
disarming of the nations of Europe. In proportion as they approach the
Russian frontier, they are obliged to keep up larger armies, and waste
more of their revenues on fortresses and military preparations. The
threatening aspect of the Russian army towards its neighbours will be
more distinctly seen if we look at it according to its division into the
active, mobilized army, always assembled in Poland, with its reserves
behind it to the eastward, and the local troops, which have been already
mentioned.
Every regiment is divided into a certain number of battalions for active
service, ready immediately to enter the field, and others which form
the reserve or dépôt, whose duty it is to instruct recruits, and, like
the Prussian landwehr, to form skeleton battalions for veterans, and
those absent on “indefinite leave.” The artillery is arranged in the
same manner. The active troops, distributed in corps, are completely
organized, with staff, engineers, train-equipage, and parks of artillery;
and even all the necessary horses are kept ready, in time of peace, for
entering instantly upon a campaign. To use the words of M. Haxthausen,
writing before the present war, “there is no army in the world, with the
exception of the Austrian army in Italy, that up to 1848 was always so
completely ready for war as the great, active army of Russia in Poland.”
The composition of this army is given in the following table, taken from
M. Haxthausen, and its effective force is stated by him as follows (see
p. 134):—
After a deduction of 50 soldiers for the train, the musicians, and
the superior officers, every battalion of infantry counts about 1000
combatants, _i. e._, soldiers and non-commissioned officers; and the
battalions of riflemen, 653 men.[119]
The number of officers is 22 for each battalion; and the musicians,
besides the band, which is very numerous in many regiments, are generally
about 25. As there are 8 battalions of riflemen, the Grand Army counts—
360 battalions of 1050 men each = 378,000 men.
8 battalions of 700 men each = 5,600 ”
-------
Total of infantry combatants 383,600 men.
Absent on “indefinite leave” 51,500 ”
-------
Nominal total 332,100 infantry.
A further deduction must be made for deaths, discharges, deserters,
reducing the battalions to about 700 men, which is believed to be their
real numbers, from which no further deduction need be made. This will
leave 260,000 infantry combatants really under arms.
A squadron of cavalry contains, on an average, 190 combatants in time of
war, and therefore—
Men.
460 squadrons of regular cavalry, at 190 men each = 87,400
10 per squadron on leave = 4,600
------
Leaves 82,800
of regular cavalry, always ready to march.
The above deduction will be more than sufficient, if there be allowed
a loss of 27 or 28 men in each squadron before it can arrive at the
frontier. The lowest force, then, of regular cavalry immediately
disposable for the army of operation is about 70,000 men. No deduction
need be made from the artillery, which, on the contrary, must be
increased by the artillery of the Cossacks. The reserves are divided
into two levies, of which the details are given in the note.[120] They
amount—the first levy, to 98,000 men and 192 guns; and the second levy to
115,000 men and 280 guns.
RECAPITULATION of the DIVISIONS of TROOPS composing the GRAND ARMY,
according to data of the Year 1852.
+----------------------------+-------------------------------------------
| | Infantry.
| +----------+---------+----------+-----------
| |Divisions.|Brigades.|Regiments.|Battalions.
| +----------+---------+----------+-----------
|Corps of the Guard | 3 | 6 | 12 | 37
|Corps of Grenadiers | 3 | 6 | 12 | 37
|6 Corps of Infantry | 18 | 36 | 72 | 294
|1st Corps Cavalry in reserve| | | |
|2nd Corps Cavalry in reserve| | | |
|With a division of Light | | | |
| Cavalry of reserve | | | |
| +----------+---------+----------+-----------
| TOTAL TEN CORPS | 24 | 48 | 96 | 368
+----------------------------+----------+---------+----------+-----------
-----------------------------------------------------
Cavalry.
----------+---------+----------+---------------------
Divisions.|Brigades.|Regiments.| Squads.
| | +---------+-----------
| | |Regulars.|Irregulars.
----------+---------+----------+---------+-----------
3 | 6 | 12 | 60 | 17½
1 | 2 | 4 | 32 |
6 | 12 | 24 | 192 | ?
3 | 6 | 12 | 80 |
2 | 4 | 8 | 80 |
1 | 2 | 4 | 24 |
----------+---------+----------+---------+-----------
16 | 32 | 64 | 468 | 17½
----------+---------+----------+---------+-----------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Artillery.
----------+---------+----------+----------+----------+-----+-----+------
Divisions.|Brigades.|Batteries.| Horse | Foot |Heavy|Light|Total.
| | |Artillery.|Artillery.|Guns.|Guns.|
----------+---------+----------+----------+----------+-----+-----+------
1 | 5 | 15½ | 44 | 72 | 56 | 60 | 116
1 | 4 | 14 | 16 | 72 | 48 | 40 | 88
6 | 24 | 84 | 96 | 576 | 192 | 480 | 672
1 | | 6 | 48 | | 16 | 32 | 48
1 | | 6 | 48 | | 16 | 32 | 48
1 | | 3 | 24 | | | 24 | 24
----------+---------+----------+----------+----------+-----+-----+------
11 | 33 | 128½ | 276 | 720 | 328 | 668 | 996
----------+---------+----------+----------+----------+-----+-----+------
-------------------------------+
Engineers. |
----------------------+--------+
Battalions of Sappers.|Mounted.|
----------------------+--------+
1 | 2 |
1 | |
6 | |
| |
| 2 |
| |
----------------------+--------+
8 | 4 |
----------------------+--------+
Taken from M. Haxthausen, vol. iii. p. 288.
There is attached to each corps a “brigade du train,” who are
non-combatants. The Engineers attached have their proper place
in the Brigades of Engineers.
The regiments of Cossacks and their batteries were even in time
of peace incorporated in the Grand Army; but their number used
to vary.
Such were the numbers of the Russian active army in Poland in 1848; and
it was further increased in 1850. At that time (the end of 1850) the
active army of operation, according to the official account, consisted as
follows:—
Men. Guns.
Disposable army 486,000 996
First levy of reserve 98,000 192
Second levy 115,000 280
------- ----
Total 699,000 1468
To which must be added the engineers, the train, and the irregular corps.
Of course, as has been observed, the whole disposition of the army has
been altered since the present war began. The Moscow corps has been
moved to the Caucasus; the Polish corps have been moved south, and the
Grenadiers have taken their place; and the reserves have, I believe, been
all called out, and probably consumed in replacing those who have fallen
in the last two years.
So that when we look at the Russian forces now assembled in the Caucasus,
the Crimea, and the German and Baltic frontiers, we see the whole of the
Russian army, including its reserves, which cannot be easily augmented.
Each man that falls now becomes of great importance to the Emperor; for
the conscription is becoming more and more difficult, and bearing with
increased severity upon all the interests of the empire. The age at which
conscripts are taken is now raised to thirty-seven;[121] and the sons of
aged or widowed parents, who have hitherto been exempted, are to serve,
and be formed into separate corps. I believe that in the manufacturing
establishments in Russia as many as 25 per cent. of the workmen have
lately been carried off for the conscription.
The difficulties of Russia are increasing every day; and it is hardly
possible for her to carry on the war for another six months, if with our
change of Ministry we likewise have a change of system, and if at home
and in the Crimea our superior officials, both military and civil, have
anything like that intelligence, activity, intrepidity, and single-minded
love of their country displayed by the common soldiers and regimental
officers of our army, who have hitherto been the only bulwarks to save us
from national disgrace.