We now come to what I will term Milton's hypothesis--the hyp

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AMERICAN ADDRESSES, WITH A LECTURE ON THE STUDY OF BIOLOGY

by

THOMAS H. HUXLEY.

London: MacMillan and Co.

London: R. Clay, Sons, and Taylor, Printers, Bread Street Hill,

Queen Victoria Street.

1877

"Naturæ leges et regulæ, secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis

formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eadem."

B. DE SPINOZA, _Ethices_, Pars tertia, Præfatio.

CONTENTS.

I. THREE LECTURES ON EVOLUTION (New York, September 18, 20, 22, 1876).

LECTURE I. THE THREE HYPOTHESES RESPECTING THE HISTORY OF NATURE

LECTURE II. THE HYPOTHESIS OF EVOLUTION. THE NEUTRAL AND THE

FAVOURABLE EVIDENCE

LECTURE III. THE DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE OF EVOLUTION

II. AN ADDRESS ON THE OCCASION OF THE OPENING OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS

UNIVERSITY (Baltimore, September 12, 1876)

III. A LECTURE ON THE STUDY OF BIOLOGY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE LOAN

COLLECTION OF SCIENTIFIC APPARATUS (South Kensington Museum,

December 16, 1876)

NEW YORK.

LECTURES ON EVOLUTION.

LECTURE I.

THE THREE HYPOTHESES RESPECTING THE HISTORY OF NATURE.

We live in and form part of a system of things of immense diversity and

perplexity, which we call Nature; and it is a matter of the deepest

interest to all of us that we should form just conceptions of the

constitution of that system and of its past history. With relation to

this universe, man is, in extent, little more than a mathematical point;

in duration but a fleeting shadow; he is a mere reed shaken in the winds

of force. But, as Pascal long ago remarked, although a mere reed, he is

a thinking reed; and in virtue of that wonderful capacity of thought, he

has the power of framing for himself a symbolic conception of the

universe, which, although doubtless highly imperfect and inadequate as a

picture of the great whole, is yet sufficient to serve him as a chart

for the guidance of his practical affairs. It has taken long ages of

toilsome and often fruitless labour to enable man to look steadily at

the shifting scenes of the phantasmagoria of Nature, to notice what is

fixed among her fluctuations, and what is regular among her apparent

irregularities; and it is only comparatively lately, within the last few

centuries, that the conception of a universal order and of a definite

course of things, which we term the course of Nature, has emerged.

But, once originated, the conception of the constancy of the order of

Nature has become the dominant idea of modern thought. To any person who

is familiar with the facts upon which that conception is based, and is

competent to estimate their significance, it has ceased to be

conceivable that chance should have any place in the universe, or that

events should depend upon any but the natural sequence of cause and

effect. We have come to look upon the present as the child of the past

and as the parent of the future; and, as we have excluded chance from a

place in the universe, so we ignore, even as a possibility, the notion

of any interference with the order of Nature. Whatever may be men's

speculative doctrines, it is quite certain, that every intelligent

person guides his life and risks his fortune upon the belief that the

order of Nature is constant, and that the chain of natural causation is

never broken.

In fact, no belief which we entertain has so complete a logical basis as

that to which I have just referred. It tacitly underlies every process

of reasoning; it is the foundation of every act of the will. It is based

upon the broadest induction, and it is verified by the most constant,

regular, and universal of deductive processes. But we must recollect

that any human belief, however broad its basis, however defensible it

may seem, is, after all, only a probable belief, and that our widest and

safest generalizations are simply statements of the highest degree of

probability. Though we are quite clear about the constancy of the order

of Nature, at the present time, and in the present state of things, it

by no means necessarily follows that we are justified in expanding this

generalisation into the infinite past, and in denying, absolutely, that

there may have been a time when Nature did not follow a fixed order,

when the relations of cause and effect were not definite, and when

extra-natural agencies interfered with the general course of Nature.

Cautious men will allow that a universe so different from that which we

know may have existed; just as a very candid thinker may admit that a

world in which two and two do not make four, and in which two straight

lines do inclose a space, may exist. But the same caution which forces

the admission of such possibilities demands a great deal of evidence

before it recognises them to be anything more substantial. And when it

is asserted that, so many thousand years ago, events occurred in a

manner utterly foreign to and inconsistent with the existing laws of

Nature, men, who without being particularly cautious, are simply honest

thinkers, unwilling to deceive themselves or delude others, ask for

trustworthy evidence of the fact.

Did things so happen or did they not? This is a historical question, and

one the answer to which must be sought in the same way as the solution

of any other historical problem.

* * * * *

So far as I know, there are only three hypotheses which ever have been

entertained, or which well can be entertained, respecting the past

history of Nature. I will, in the first place, state the hypotheses, and

then I will consider what evidence bearing upon them is in our

possession, and by what light of criticism that evidence is to be

interpreted.

Upon the first hypothesis, the assumption is, that phenomena of Nature

similar to those exhibited by the present world have always existed; in

other words, that the universe has existed from all eternity in what may

be broadly termed its present condition.

The second hypothesis is, that the present state of things has had only

a limited duration; and that, at some period in the past, a condition of

the world, essentially similar to that which we now know, came into

existence, without any precedent condition from which it could have

naturally proceeded. The assumption that successive states of Nature

have arisen, each without any relation of natural causation to an

antecedent state, is a mere modification of this second hypothesis.

The third hypothesis also assumes that the present state of things has

had but a limited duration; but it supposes that this state has been

evolved by a natural process from an antecedent state, and that from

another, and so on; and, on this hypothesis, the attempt to assign any

limit to the series of past changes is, usually, given up.

It is so needful to form clear and distinct notions of what is really

meant by each of these hypotheses that I will ask you to imagine what,

according to each, would have been visible to a spectator of the events

which constitute the history of the earth. On the first hypothesis,

however far back in time that spectator might be placed, he would see a

world essentially, though perhaps not in all its details, similar to

that which now exists. The animals which existed would be the ancestors

of those which now live, and similar to them; the plants, in like

manner, would be such as we know; and the mountains, plains, and waters

would foreshadow the salient features of our present land and water.

This view was held more or less distinctly, sometimes combined with the

notion of recurrent cycles of change, in ancient times; and its

influence has been felt down to the present day. It is worthy of remark

that it is a hypothesis which is not inconsistent with the doctrine of

Uniformitarianism, with which geologists are familiar. That doctrine was

held by Hutton, and in his earlier days by Lyell. Hutton was struck by

the demonstration of astronomers that the perturbations of the planetary

bodies, however great they may be, yet sooner or later right themselves;

and that the solar system possesses a self-adjusting power by which

these aberrations are all brought back to a mean condition. Hutton

imagined that the like might be true of terrestrial changes; although no

one recognised more clearly than he the fact that the dry land is being

constantly washed down by rain and rivers and deposited in the sea; and

that thus, in a longer or shorter time, the inequalities of the earth's

surface must be levelled, and its high lands brought down to the ocean.

But, taking into account the internal forces of the earth, which,

upheaving the sea-bottom give rise to new land, he thought that these

operations of degradation and elevation might compensate each other; and

that thus, for any assignable time, the general features of our planet

might remain what they are. And inasmuch as, under these circumstances,

there need be no limit to the propagation of animals and plants, it is

clear that the consistent working-out of the uniformitarian idea might

lead to the conception of the eternity of the world. Not that I mean to

say that either Hutton or Lyell held this conception--assuredly not;

they would have been the first to repudiate it. Nevertheless, the

logical development of their arguments tends directly towards this

hypothesis.

The second hypothesis supposes that the present order of things, at some

no very remote time, had a sudden origin, and that the world, such as it

now is, had chaos for its phenomenal antecedent. That is the doctrine

which you will find stated most fully and clearly in the immortal poem

of John Milton--the English _Divina Commedia--Paradise Lost_. I believe

it is largely to the influence of that remarkable work, combined with

the daily teachings to which we have all listened in our childhood, that

this hypothesis owes its general wide diffusion as one of the current

beliefs of English-speaking people. If you turn to the seventh book of

_Paradise Lost_, you will find there stated the hypothesis to which I

refer, which is briefly this: That this visible universe of ours came

into existence at no great distance of time from the present; and that

the parts of which it is composed made their appearance, in a certain

definite order, in the space of six natural days, in such a manner that,

on the first of these days, light appeared; that, on the second, the

firmament, or sky, separated the waters above, from the waters beneath

the firmament; that, on the third day, the waters drew away from the dry

land, and upon it a varied vegetable life, similar to that which now

exists, made its appearance; that the fourth day was signalised by the

apparition of the sun, the stars, the moon, and the planets; that, on

the fifth day, aquatic animals originated within the waters; that, on

the sixth day, the earth gave rise to our four-footed terrestrial

creatures, and to all varieties of terrestrial animals except birds,

which had appeared on the preceding day; and, finally, that man appeared

upon the earth, and the emergence of the universe from chaos was

finished. Milton tells us, without the least ambiguity, what a spectator

of these marvellous occurrences would have witnessed. I doubt not that

his poem is familiar to all of you, but I should like to recall one

passage to your minds, in order that I may be justified in what I have

said regarding the perfectly concrete, definite picture of the origin of

the animal world which Milton draws. He says:--

"The sixth, and of creation last, arose

With evening harps and matin, when God said,

'Let the earth bring forth soul living in her kind,

Cattle and creeping things, and beast of the earth,

Each in their kind!' The earth obeyed, and, straight

Opening her fertile womb, teemed at a birth

Innumerous living creatures, perfect forms,

Limbed and full-grown. Out of the ground uprose,

As from his lair, the wild beast, where he wons

In forest wild, in thicket, brake, or den;

Among the trees in pairs they rose, they walked;

The cattle in the fields and meadows green;

Those rare and solitary; these in flocks

Pasturing at once, and in broad herds upsprung.

The grassy clods now calved; now half appears

The tawny lion, pawing to get free

His hinder parts--then springs, as broke from bonds,

And rampant shakes his brinded mane; the ounce,

The libbard, and the tiger, as the mole

Rising, the crumbled earth above them threw

In hillocks; the swift stag from underground

Bore up his branching head; scarce from his mould

Behemoth, biggest born of earth, upheaved

His vastness; fleeced the flocks and bleating rose

As plants; ambiguous between sea and land,

The river-horse and scaly crocodile.

At once came forth whatever creeps the ground,

Insect or worm."

There is no doubt as to the meaning of this statement, nor as to what a

man of Milton's genius expected would have been actually visible to an

eye-witness of this mode of origination of living things.

The third hypothesis, or the hypothesis of evolution, supposes that, at

any comparatively late period of past time, our imaginary spectator

would meet with a state of things very similar to that which now

obtains; but that the likeness of the past to the present would

gradually become less and less, in proportion to the remoteness of his

period of observation from the present day; that the existing

distribution of mountains and plains, of rivers and seas, would show

itself to be the product of a slow process of natural change operating

upon more and more widely different antecedent conditions of the mineral

framework of the earth; until, at length, in place of that framework, he

would behold only a vast nebulous mass, representing the constituents of

the sun and of the planetary bodies. Preceding the forms of life which

now exist, our observer would see animals and plants not identical with

them, but like them; increasing their differences with their antiquity

and, at the same time, becoming simpler and simpler; until, finally, the

world of life would present nothing but that undifferentiated

protoplasmic matter which, so far as our present knowledge goes, is the

common foundation of all vital activity.

The hypothesis of evolution supposes that in all this vast progression

there would be no breach of continuity, no point at which we could say

"This a natural process," and "This is not a natural process;" but that

the whole might be compared to that wonderful process of development

which may be seen going on every day under our eyes, in virtue of which

there arises, out of the semi-fluid, comparatively homogeneous substance

which we call an egg, the complicated organization of one of the higher

animals. That, in a few words, is what is meant by the hypothesis of

evolution.

* * * * *

I have already suggested that in dealing with these three hypotheses, in

endeavouring to form a judgment as to which of them is the more worthy

of belief, or whether none is worthy of belief--in which case our

condition of mind should be that suspension of judgment which is so

difficult to all but trained intellects--we should be indifferent to all

_à priori_ considerations. The question is a question of historical

fact. The universe has come into existence somehow or other, and the

problem is, whether it came into existence in one fashion, or whether it

came into existence in another; and, as an essential preliminary to

further discussion, permit me to say two or three words as to the nature

and the kinds of historical evidence.

The evidence as to the occurrence of any event in past time may be

ranged under two heads which, for convenience' sake, I will speak of as

testimonial evidence and as circumstantial evidence. By testimonial

evidence I mean human testimony; and by circumstantial evidence I mean

evidence which is not human testimony. Let me illustrate by a familiar

example what I understand by these two kinds of evidence, and what is to

be said respecting their value.

Suppose that a man tells you that he saw a person strike another and

kill him; that is testimonial evidence of the fact of murder. But it is

possible to have circumstantial evidence of the fact of murder; that is

to say, you may find a man dying with a wound upon his head having

exactly the form and character of the wound which is made by an axe,

and, with due care in taking surrounding circumstances into account, you

may conclude with the utmost certainty that the man has been murdered;

that his death is the consequence of a blow inflicted by another man

with that implement. We are very much in the habit of considering

circumstantial evidence as of less value than testimonial evidence, and

it may be that, where the circumstances are not perfectly clear and

intelligible, it is a dangerous and unsafe kind of evidence; but it must

not be forgotten that, in many cases, circumstantial is quite as

conclusive as testimonial evidence, and that, not unfrequently, it is a

great deal weightier than testimonial evidence. For example, take the

case to which I referred just now. The circumstantial evidence may be

better and more convincing than the testimonial evidence; for it may be

impossible, under the conditions that I have defined, to suppose that

the man met his death from any cause but the violent blow of an axe

wielded by another man. The circumstantial evidence in favour of a

murder having been committed, in that case, is as complete and as

convincing as evidence can be. It is evidence which is open to no doubt

and to no falsification. But the testimony of a witness is open to

multitudinous doubts. He may have been mistaken. He may have been

actuated by malice. It has constantly happened that even an accurate man

has declared that a thing has happened in this, that, or the other way,

when a careful analysis of the circumstantial evidence has shown that it

did not happen in that way, but in some other way.

We may now consider the evidence in favour of or against the three

hypotheses. Let me first direct your attention to what is to be said

about the hypothesis of the eternity of the state of things in which we

now live. What will first strike you is, that it is a hypothesis which,

whether true or false, is not capable of verification by any evidence.

For, in order to obtain either circumstantial or testimonial evidence

sufficient to prove the eternity of duration of the present state of

nature, you must have an eternity of witnesses or an infinity of

circumstances, and neither of these is attainable. It is utterly

impossible that such evidence should be carried beyond a certain point

of time; and all that could be said, at most, would be, that so far as

the evidence could be traced, there was nothing to contradict the

hypothesis. But when you look, not to the testimonial evidence--which,

considering the relative insignificance of the antiquity of human

records, might not be good for much in this case--but to the

circumstantial evidence, then you find that this hypothesis is

absolutely incompatible with such evidence as we have; which is of so

plain and so simple a character that it is impossible in any way to

escape from the conclusions which it forces upon us.

You are, doubtless, all aware that the outer substance of the earth,

which alone is accessible to direct observation, is not of a homogeneous

character, but that it is made up of a number of layers or strata, the

titles of the principal groups of which are placed upon the accompanying

diagram. Each of these groups represents a number of beds of sand, of

stone, of clay, of slate, and of various other materials.

[Illustration: FIG. 1.--IDEAL SECTION OF THE CRUST OF THE EARTH.]

On careful examination, it is found that the materials of which each of

these layers of more or less hard rock are composed are, for the most

part, of the same nature as those which are at present being formed

under known conditions on the surface of the earth. For example, the

chalk, which constitutes a great part of the Cretaceous formation in

some parts of the world, is practically identical in its physical and

chemical characters with a substance which is now being formed at the

bottom of the Atlantic Ocean, and covers an enormous area; other beds of

rock are comparable with the sands which are being formed upon

sea-shores, packed together, and so on. Thus, omitting rocks of igneous

origin, it is demonstrable that all these beds of stone, of which a

total of not less than seventy thousand feet is known, have been formed

by natural agencies, either out of the waste and washing of the dry

land, or else by the accumulation of the exuviæ of plants and animals.

Many of these strata are full of such exuviæ--the so-called "fossils."

Remains of thousands of species of animals and plants, as perfectly

recognisable as those of existing forms of life which you meet with in

museums, or as the shells which you pick up upon the sea-beech, have

been imbedded in the ancient sands, or muds, or limestones, just as they

are being imbedded now, in sandy, or clayey, or calcareous subaqueous

deposits. They furnish us with a record, the general nature of which

cannot be misinterpreted, of the kinds of things that have lived upon

the surface of the earth during the time that is registered by this

great thickness of stratified rocks. But even a superficial study of

these fossils shows us that the animals and plants which live at the

present time have had only a temporary duration; for the remains of such

modern forms of life are met with, for the most part, only in the

uppermost or latest tertiaries, and their number rapidly diminishes in

the lower deposits of that epoch. In the older tertiaries, the places of

existing animals and plants are taken by other forms, as numerous and

diversified as those which live now in the same localities, but more or

less different from them; in the mesozoic rocks, these are replaced by

others yet more divergent from modern types; and in the palæozoic

formations the contrast is still more marked. Thus the circumstantial

evidence absolutely negatives the conception of the eternity of the

present condition of things. We can say with certainty that the present

condition of things has existed for a comparatively short period; and

that, so far as animal and vegetable nature are concerned, it has been

preceded by a different condition. We can pursue this evidence until we

reach the lowest of the stratified rocks, in which we lose the

indications of life altogether. The hypothesis of the eternity of the

present state of nature may therefore be put out of court.

We now come to what I will term Milton's hypothesis--the hypothesis that

the present condition of things has endured for a comparatively short

time; and, at the commencement of that time, came into existence within

the course of six days. I doubt not that it may have excited some

surprise in your minds that I should have spoken of this as Milton's

hypothesis, rather than that I should have chosen the terms which are

more customary, such as "the doctrine of creation," or "the Biblical

doctrine," or "the doctrine of Moses," all of which denominations, as

applied to the hypothesis to which I have just referred, are certainly

much more familiar to you than the title of the Miltonic hypothesis. But

I have had what I cannot but think are very weighty reasons for taking

the course which I have pursued. In the first place, I have discarded

the title of the "doctrine of creation," because my present business is

not with the question why the objects which constitute Nature came into

existence, but when they came into existence, and in what order. This is

as strictly a historical question as the question when the Angles and

the Jutes invaded England, and whether they preceded or followed the

Romans. But the question about creation is a philosophical problem, and

one which cannot be solved, or even approached, by the historical

method. What we want to learn is, whether the facts, so far as they are

known, afford evidence that things arose in the way described by Milton,

or whether they do not; and, when that question is settled, it will be

time enough to inquire into the causes of their origination.

In the second place, I have not spoken of this doctrine as the Biblical

doctrine. It is quite true that persons as diverse in their general

views as Milton the Protestant and the celebrated Jesuit Father Suarez,

each put upon the first chapter of Genesis the interpretation embodied

in Milton's poem. It is quite true that this interpretation is that

which has been instilled into every one of us in our childhood; but I do

not for one moment venture to say that it can properly be called the

Biblical doctrine. It is not my business, and does not lie within my

competency, to say what the Hebrew text does, and what it does not

signify; moreover, were I to affirm that this is the Biblical doctrine,

I should be met by the authority of many eminent scholars, to say

nothing of men of science, who, at various times, have absolutely denied

that any such doctrine is to be found in Genesis. If we are to listen to

many expositors of no mean authority, we must believe that what seems so

clearly defined in Genesis--as if very great pains had been taken that

there should be no possibility of mistake--is not the meaning of the

text at all. The account is divided into periods that we may make just

as long or as short as convenience requires. We are also to understand

that it is consistent with the original text to believe that the most

complex plants and animals may have been evolved by natural processes,

lasting for millions of years, out of structureless rudiments. A person

who is not a Hebrew scholar can only stand aside and admire the

marvellous flexibility of a language which admits of such diverse

interpretations. But assuredly, in the face of such contradictions of

authority upon matters respecting which he is incompetent to form any

judgment, he will abstain, as I do, from giving any opinion.

In the third place, I have carefully abstained from speaking of this as

the Mosaic doctrine, because we are now assured upon the authority of

the highest critics, and even of dignitaries of the Church, that there

is no evidence that Moses wrote the Book of Genesis, or knew anything

about it. You will understand that I give no judgment--it would be an

impertinence upon my part to volunteer even a suggestion--upon such a

subject. But, that being the state of opinion among the scholars and the

clergy, it is well for the unlearned in Hebrew lore, and for the laity,

to avoid entangling themselves in such a vexed question. Happily, Milton

leaves us no excuse for doubting what he means, and I shall therefore be

safe in speaking of the opinion in question as the Miltonic hypothesis.

Now we have to test that hypothesis. For my part, I have no prejudice

one way or the other. If there is evidence in favour of this view, I am

burdened by no theoretical difficulties in the way of accepting it; but

there must be evidence. Scientific men get an awkward habit--no, I won't

call it that, for it is a valuable habit--of believing nothing unless

there is evidence for it; and they have a way of looking upon belief

which is not based upon evidence, not only as illogical, but as immoral.

We will, if you please, test this view by the circumstantial evidence

alone; for, from what I have said, you will understand that I do not

propose to discuss the question of what testimonial evidence is to be

adduced in favour of it. If those whose business it is to judge are not

at one as to the authenticity of the only evidence of that kind which is

offered, nor as to the facts to which it bears witness, the discussion

of such evidence is superfluous.

But I may be permitted to regret this necessity of rejecting the

testimonial evidence the less, because the examination of the

circumstantial evidence leads to the conclusion, not only that it is

incompetent to justify the hypothesis, but that, so far as it goes, it

is contrary to the hypothesis.

The considerations upon which I base this conclusion are of the simplest

possible character. The Miltonic hypothesis contains assertions of a

very definite character relating to the succession of living forms. It

is stated that plants, for example, made their appearance upon the third

day, and not before. And you will understand that what the poet means by

plants are such plants as now live, the ancestors, in the ordinary way

of propagation of like by like, of the trees and shrubs which flourish

in the present world. It must needs be so; for, if they were different,

either the existing plants have been the result of a separate

origination since that described by Milton, of which we have no record,

nor any ground for supposition that such an occurrence has taken place;

or else they have arisen by a process of evolution from the original

stocks.

In the second place, it is clear that there was no animal life before

the fifth day, and that, on the fifth day, aquatic animals and birds

appeared. And it is further clear that terrestrial living things, other

than birds, made their appearance upon the sixth day, and not before.

Hence, it follows that, if, in the large mass of circumstantial evidence

as to what really has happened in the past history of the globe we find

indications of the existence of terrestrial animals, other than birds,

at a certain period, it is perfectly certain that all that has taken

place since that time must be referred to the sixth day.

In the great Carboniferous formation, whence America derives so vast a

proportion of her actual and potential wealth, in the beds of coal which

have been formed from the vegetation of that period, we find abundant

evidence of the existence of terrestrial animals. They have been

described, not only by European but by your own naturalists. There are

to be found numerous insects allied to our cockroaches. There are to be

found spiders and scorpions of large size, the latter so similar to

existing scorpions that it requires the practised eye of the naturalist

to distinguish them. Inasmuch as these animals can be proved to have

been alive in the Carboniferous epoch, it is perfectly clear that, if

the Miltonic account is to be accepted, the huge mass of rocks extending

from the middle of the Palæozoic formations to the uppermost members of

the series, must belong to the day which is termed by Milton the sixth.

But, further, it is expressly stated that aquatic animals took their

origin upon the fifth day, and not before; hence, all formations in

which remains of aquatic animals can be proved to exist, and which

therefore testify that such animals lived at the time when these

formations were in course of deposition, must have been deposited during

or since the period which Milton speaks of as the fifth day. But there

is absolutely no fossiliferous formation in which the remains of aquatic

animals are absent. The oldest fossils in the Silurian rocks are exuviæ

of marine animals; and if the view which is entertained by Principal

Dawson and Dr. Carpenter respecting the nature of the _Eozoön_ be well

founded, aquatic animals existed at a period as far antecedent to the

deposition of the coal as the coal is from us; inasmuch as the _Eozoön_

is met with in those Laurentian strata which lie at the bottom of the

series of stratified rocks. Hence it follows, plainly enough, that the

whole series of stratified rocks, if they are to be brought into harmony

with Milton, must be referred to the fifth and sixth days, and that we

cannot hope to find the slightest trace of the products of the earlier

days in the geological record. When we consider these simple facts, we

see how absolutely futile are the attempts that have been made to draw a

parallel between the story told by so much of the crust of the earth as

is known to us and the story which Milton tells. The whole series of

fossiliferous stratified rocks must be referred to the last two days;

and neither the Carboniferous, nor any other, formation can afford

evidence of the work of the third day.

Not only is there this objection to any attempt to establish a harmony

between the Miltonic account and the facts recorded in the fossiliferous

rocks, but there is a further difficulty. According to the Miltonic

account, the order in which animals should have made their appearance in

the stratified rocks would be this: Fishes, including the great whales,

and birds; after them, all varieties of terrestrial animals except

birds. Nothing could be further from the facts as we find them; we know

of not the slightest evidence of the existence of birds before the

Jurassic, or perhaps the Triassic, formation; while terrestrial animals,

as we have just seen, occur in the Carboniferous rocks.

If there were any harmony between the Miltonic account and the

circumstantial evidence, we ought to have abundant evidence of the

existence of birds in the Carboniferous, the Devonian, and the Silurian

rocks. I need hardly say that this is not the case, and that not a trace

of birds makes its appearance until the far later period which I have

mentioned.

And again, if it be true that all varieties of fishes and the great

whales, and the like, made their appearance on the fifth day, we ought

to find the remains of these animals in the older rocks--in those which

were deposited before the Carboniferous epoch. Fishes we do find, in

considerable number and variety; but the great whales are absent, and

the fishes are not such as now live. Not one solitary species of fish

now in existence is to be found in the Devonian or Silurian formations.

Hence we are introduced afresh to the dilemma which I have already

placed before you: either the animals which came into existence on the

fifth day were not such as those which are found at present, are not the

direct and immediate ancestors of those which now exist; in which case

either fresh creations of which nothing is said; or a process of

evolution must have occurred; or else the whole story must be given up,

as not only devoid of any circumstantial evidence, but contrary to such

evidence as exists.

I placed before you in a few words, some little time ago, a statement of

the sum and substance of Milton's hypothesis. Let me now try to state as

briefly, the effect of the circumstantial evidence bearing upon the past

history of the earth which is furnished, without the possibility of

mistake, with no chance of error as to its chief features, by the

stratified rocks. What we find is, that the great series of formations

represents a period of time of which our human chronologies hardly

afford us a unit of measure. I will not pretend to say how we ought to

estimate this time, in millions or in billions of years. For my purpose,

the determination of its absolute duration is wholly unessential. But

that the time was enormous there can be no question.

It results from the simplest methods of interpretation, that leaving out

of view certain patches of metamorphosed rocks, and certain volcanic

products, all that is now dry land has once been at the bottom of the

waters. It is perfectly certain that, at a comparatively recent period

of the world's history--the Cretaceous epoch--none of the great physical

features which at present mark the surface of the globe existed. It is

certain that the Rocky Mountains were not. It is certain that the

Himalaya Mountains were not. It is certain that the Alps and the

Pyrenees had no existence. The evidence is of the plainest possible

character, and is simply this:--We find raised up on the flanks of these

mountains, elevated by the forces of upheaval which have given rise to

them, masses of Cretaceous rock which formed the bottom of the sea

before those mountains existed. It is therefore clear that the elevatory

forces which gave rise to the mountains operated subsequently to the

Cretaceous epoch; and that the mountains themselves are largely made up

of the materials deposited in the sea which once occupied their place.

As we go back in time, we meet with constant alternations of sea and

land, of estuary and open ocean; and, in correspondence with these

alternations, we observe the changes in the fauna and flora to which I

have referred.

But the inspection of these changes give us no right to believe that

there has been any discontinuity in natural processes. There is no trace

of general cataclysms, of universal deluges, or sudden destructions of a

whole fauna or flora. The appearances which were formerly interpreted in

that way have all been shown to be delusive, as our knowledge has

increased and as the blanks which formerly appeared to exist between the

different formations have been filled up. That there is no absolute

break between formation and formation, that there has been no sudden

disappearance of all the forms of life and replacement of them by

others, but that changes have gone on slowly and gradually, that one

type has died out and another has taken its place, and that thus, by

insensible degrees, one fauna has been replaced by another, are

conclusions strengthened by constantly increasing evidence. So that

within the whole of the immense period indicated by the fossiliferous

stratified rocks, there is assuredly not the slightest proof of any

break in the uniformity of Nature's operations, no indication that

events have followed other than a clear and orderly sequence.

That, I say, is the natural and obvious teaching of the circumstantial

evidence contained in the stratified rocks. I leave you to consider how

far, by any ingenuity of interpretation, by any stretching of the

meaning of language, it can be brought into harmony with the Miltonic

hypothesis.

There remains the third hypothesis, that of which I have spoken as the

hypothesis of evolution; and I purpose that, in lectures to come, we

should discuss it as carefully as we have considered the other two

hypotheses. I need not say that it is quite hopeless to look for

testimonial evidence of evolution. The very nature of the case precludes

the possibility of such evidence, for the human race can no more be

expected to testify to its own origin, than a child can be tendered as a

witness of its own birth. Our sole inquiry is, what foundation

circumstantial evidence lends to the hypothesis, or whether it lends

none, or whether it controverts the hypothesis. I shall deal with the

matter entirely as a question of history. I shall not indulge in the

discussion of any speculative probabilities. I shall not attempt to show

that Nature is unintelligible unless we adopt some such hypothesis. For

anything I know about the matter, it may be the way of Nature to be

unintelligible; she is often puzzling, and I have no reason to suppose

that she is bound to fit herself to our notions.

I shall place before you three kinds of evidence entirely based upon

what is known of the forms of animal life which are contained in the

series of stratified rocks. I shall endeavour to show you that there is

one kind of evidence which is neutral, which neither helps evolution nor

is inconsistent with it. I shall then bring forward a second kind of

evidence which indicates a strong probability in favour of evolution,

but does not prove it; and, lastly, I shall adduce a third kind of

evidence which, being as complete as any evidence which we can hope to

obtain upon such a subject, and being wholly and strikingly in favour of

evolution, may fairly be called demonstrative evidence of its

occurrence.

LECTURE II.

THE HYPOTHESIS OF EVOLUTION. THE NEUTRAL AND THE FAVOURABLE EVIDENCE.

In the preceding lecture I pointed out that there are three hypotheses

which may be entertained, and which have been entertained, respecting

the past history of life upon the globe. According to the first of these

hypotheses, living beings, such as now exist, have existed from all

eternity upon this earth. We tested that hypothesis by the

circumstantial evidence, as I called it, which is furnished by the

fossil remains contained in the earth's crust, and we found that it was

obviously untenable. I then proceeded to consider the second hypothesis,

which I termed the Miltonic hypothesis, not because it is of any

particular consequence to me whether John Milton seriously entertained

it or not, but because it is stated in a clear and unmistakable manner

in his great poem. I pointed out to you that the evidence at our command

as completely and fully negatives that hypothesis as it did the

preceding one. And I confess that I had too much respect for your

intelligence to think it necessary to add that the negation was equally

clear and equally valid, whatever the source from which that hypothesis

might be derived, or whatever the authority by which it might be

supported. I further stated that, according to the third hypothesis, or

that of evolution, the existing state of things is the last term of a

long series of states, which, when traced back, would be found to show

no interruption and no breach in the continuity of natural causation. I

propose, in the present, and the following lecture, to test this

hypothesis rigorously by the evidence at command, and to inquire how far

that evidence can be said to be indifferent to it, how far it can be

said to be favourable to it, and, finally, how far it can be said to be

demonstrative.

From almost the origin of the discussions about the existing condition

of the animal and vegetable worlds and the causes which have determined

that condition, an argument has been put forward as an objection to

evolution, which we shall have to consider very seriously. It is an

argument which was first clearly stated by Cuvier in his criticism of

the doctrines propounded by his great contemporary, Lamarck. The French

expedition to Egypt had called the attention of learned men to the

wonderful store of antiquities in that country, and there had been

brought back to France numerous mummified corpses of the animals which

the ancient Egyptians revered and preserved, and which, at a reasonable

computation, must have lived not less than three or four thousand years

before the time at which they were thus brought to light. Cuvier

endeavoured to test the hypothesis that animals have undergone gradual

and progressive modifications of structure, by comparing the skeletons

and such other parts of the mummies as were in a fitting state of

preservation, with the corresponding parts of the representatives of the

same species now living in Egypt. He arrived at the conviction that no

appreciable change had taken place in these animals in the course of

this considerable lapse of time, and the justice of his conclusion is

not disputed.

It is obvious that, if it can be proved that animals have endured,

without undergoing any demonstrable change of structure, for so long a

period as four thousand years, no form of the hypothesis of evolution

which assumes that animals undergo a constant and necessary progressive

change can be tenable; unless, indeed, it be further assumed that four

thousand years is too short a time for the production of a change

sufficiently great to be detected.

But it is no less plain that if the process of evolution of animals is

not independent of surrounding conditions; if it may be indefinitely

hastened or retarded by variations in these conditions; or if evolution

is simply a process of accommodation to varying conditions; the argument

against the hypothesis of evolution based on the unchanged character of

the Egyptian fauna is worthless. For the monuments which are coeval with

the mummies testify as strongly to the absence of change in the physical

geography and the general conditions of the land of Egypt, for the time

in question, as the mummies do to the unvarying characters of its living

population.

The progress of research since Cuvier's time has supplied far more

striking examples of the long duration of specific forms of life than

those which are furnished by the mummified Ibises and Crocodiles of

Egypt. A remarkable case is to be found in your own country, in the

neighbourhood of the falls of Niagara. In the immediate vicinity of the

whirlpool, and again upon Goat Island, in the superficial deposits which

cover the surface of the rocky subsoil in those regions, there are found

remains of animals in perfect preservation, and among them, shells

belonging to exactly the same species as those which at present inhabit

the still waters of Lake Erie. It is evident, from the structure of the

country, that these animal remains were deposited in the beds in which

they occur at a time when the lake extended over the region in which

they are found. This involves the conclusion that they lived and died

before the falls had cut their way back through the gorge of Niagara;

and, indeed, it has been determined that, when these animals lived, the

falls of Niagara must have been at least six miles further down the

river than they are at present. Many computations have been made of the

rate at which the falls are thus cutting their way back. Those

computations have varied greatly, but I believe I am speaking within the

bounds of prudence, if I assume that the falls of Niagara have not

retreated at a greater pace than about a foot a year. Six miles,

speaking roughly, are 30,000 feet; 30,000 feet, at a foot a year, gives

30,000 years; and thus we are fairly justified in concluding that no

less a period than this has passed since the shell-fish, whose remains

are left in the beds to which I have referred, were living creatures.

But there is still stronger evidence of the long duration of certain

types. I have already stated that, as we work our way through the great

series of the Tertiary formations, we find many species of animals

identical with those which live at the present day, diminishing in

numbers, it is true, but still existing, in a certain proportion, in the

oldest of the Tertiary rocks. Furthermore, when we examine the rocks of

the Cretaceous epoch, we find the remains of some animals which the

closest scrutiny cannot show to be, in any important respect, different

from those which live at the present time. That is the case with one of

the cretaceous lamp-shells (_Terebratula_), which has continued to exist

unchanged, or with insignificant variations, down to the present day.

Such is the case with the _Globigerinæ_, the skeletons of which,

aggregated together, form a large proportion of our English chalk. Those

_Globigerinæ_ can be traced down to the _Globigerinæ_ which live at the

surface of the present great oceans, and the remains of which, falling

to the bottom of the sea, give rise to a chalky mud. Hence it must be

admitted that certain existing species of animals show no distinct sign

of modification, or transformation, in the course of a lapse of time as

great as that which carries us back to the Cretaceous period; and which,

whatever its absolute measure, is certainly vastly greater than thirty

thousand years.

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