Chapter XVIII. God Uses The Agency Of The Impious, And Inclines Their

Minds To Execute His Judgments, Yet Without The Least Stain Of His Perfect

Purity.

A question of greater difficulty arises from other passages, where God is

said to incline or draw, according to his own pleasure, Satan himself and

all the reprobate. For the carnal understanding scarcely comprehends how

he, acting by their means, contracts no defilement from their criminality,

and, even in operations common to himself and them, is free from every

fault, and yet righteously condemns those whose ministry he uses. Hence

was invented the distinction between _doing_ and _permitting_; because to

many persons this has appeared an inexplicable difficulty, that Satan and

all the impious are subject to the power and government of God, so that he

directs their malice to whatever end he pleases, and uses their crimes for

the execution of his judgments. The modesty of those who are alarmed at

the appearance of absurdity, might perhaps be excusable, if they did not

attempt to vindicate the Divine justice from all accusation by a pretence

utterly destitute of any foundation in truth. They consider it absurd that

a man should be blinded by the will and command of God, and afterwards be

punished for his blindness. They therefore evade the difficulty, by

alleging that it happens only by the permission, and not by the will of

God; but God himself, by the most unequivocal declarations, rejects this

subterfuge. That men, however, can effect nothing but by the secret will

of God, and can deliberate on nothing but what he has previously decreed,

and determines by his secret direction, is proved by express and

innumerable testimonies. What we have before cited from the Psalmist, that

“God hath done whatsoever he hath pleased,”(496) undoubtedly pertains to

all the actions of men. If God be the certain arbiter of war and peace, as

is there affirmed, and that without any exception, who will venture to

assert, that he remains ignorant and unconcerned respecting men, while

they are actuated by the blind influence of chance? But this subject will

be better elucidated by particular examples. From the first chapter of Job

we know that Satan presents himself before God to receive his commands, as

well as the angels, who yield a spontaneous obedience. It is, indeed, in a

different manner, and for a different end; yet he cannot attempt any thing

but by the Divine will. Although he seems to obtain only a bare permission

to afflict that holy man, yet, since this sentence is true, “The Lord

gave, and the Lord hath taken away,”(497) we conclude that God was the

author of that trial, of which Satan and mischievous robbers and assassins

were the immediate agents. Satan endeavours to drive him by desperation

into madness. The Sabeans, in a predatory incursion, cruelly and wickedly

seize upon property not their own. Job acknowledges that he was stripped

of all his wealth, and reduced to poverty, because such was the will of

God. Therefore, whatever is attempted by men, or by Satan himself, God

still holds the helm, to direct all their attempts to the execution of his

judgments. God intends the deception of that perfidious king Ahab; the

devil offers his service for that purpose; he is sent with a positive

commission to be a lying spirit in the mouth of all the prophets.(498) If

the blinding and infatuation of Ahab be a Divine judgment, the pretence of

bare permission disappears. For it would be ridiculous for a judge merely

to permit, without decreeing what should be done, and commanding his

officers to execute it. The Jews designed to destroy Christ; Pilate and

his soldiers complied with their outrageous violence; yet the disciples,

in a solemn prayer, confess that all the impious did nothing but what “the

hand and the counsel of God determined before to be done;”(499) agreeably

to what Peter had already preached, that he was “delivered by the

determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God,” that he might be “crucified

and slain.”(500) As though he had said that God, who saw every thing from

the beginning, with a clear knowledge and determined will, appointed what

the Jews executed; as he mentions in another place: “Those things which

God before had showed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should

suffer, he hath so fulfilled.”(501) Absalom, defiling his father’s bed

with incest, perpetrated a detestable crime; yet God pronounces that this

was his work; for his words are, “Thou didst it secretly; but I will do

this thing before all Israel, and before the sun.”(502) Whatever cruelty

the Chaldeans exercised in Judea, Jeremiah pronounces to be the work of

God;(503) for which reason Nebuchadnezzar is called the servant of God.

God frequently proclaims, that the impious are excited to war by his

hissing, by the sound of his trumpet, by his influence, and by his

command: he calls the Assyrian the rod of his anger, and the staff which

he moves with his hand. The destruction of the holy city and the ruin of

the temple he calls his own work.(504) David, not murmuring against God,

but acknowledging him to be a righteous Judge, confesses the maledictions

of Shimei to proceed from his command. “The Lord,” says he, “hath said

unto him, Curse.”(505) It often occurs in the Sacred History, that

whatever comes to pass proceeds from the Lord; as the defection of the ten

tribes,(506) the death of the sons of Eli,(507) and many events of a

similar kind. Those who are but moderately acquainted with the Scriptures

will perceive that, for the sake of brevity, out of a great number of

testimonies, I have produced only a few; which, nevertheless, abundantly

evince how nugatory and insipid it is, instead of the providence of God,

to substitute a bare permission; as though God were sitting in a

watchtower, expecting fortuitous events, and so his decisions were

dependent on the will of men.

II. With respect to his secret influences, the declaration of Solomon

concerning the heart of a king, that it is inclined hither or thither

according to the Divine will,(508) certainly extends to the whole human

race, and is as much as though he had said, that whatever conceptions we

form in our minds, they are directed by the secret inspiration of God. And

certainly, if he did not operate internally on the human mind, there would

be no propriety in asserting, that he causes “the wisdom of the wise to

perish, and the understanding of the prudent to be hid; that he poureth

contempt upon princes, and causeth them to wander in the wilderness, where

there is no way.”(509) And to this alludes, what we frequently read, that

men are timorous, as their hearts are possessed with his fear.(510) Thus

David departed from the camp of Saul, without the knowledge of any one;

“because a deep sleep from the Lord was fallen upon them all.”(511) But

nothing can be desired more explicit than his frequent declarations, that

he blinds the minds of men, strikes them with giddiness, inebriates them

with the spirit of slumber, fills them with infatuation, and hardens their

hearts.(512) These passages also many persons refer to permission, as

though, in abandoning the reprobate, God permitted them to be blinded by

Satan. But that solution is too frivolous, since the Holy Spirit expressly

declares that their blindness and infatuation are inflicted by the

righteous judgment of God. He is said to have caused the obduracy of

Pharaoh’s heart, and also to have aggravated and confirmed it. Some elude

the force of these expressions with a foolish cavil—that, since Pharaoh

himself is elsewhere said to have hardened his own heart, his own will is

stated as the cause of his obduracy; as though these two things were at

all incompatible with each other, that man should be actuated by God, and

yet at the same time be active himself. But I retort on them their own

objection; for if _hardening_ denotes a bare permission, Pharaoh cannot

properly be charged with being the cause of his own obstinacy. Now, how

weak and insipid would be such an interpretation, as though Pharaoh only

permitted himself to be hardened! Besides, the Scripture cuts off all

occasion for such cavils. God says, “I will harden his heart.”(513) So,

also, Moses says, concerning the inhabitants of Canaan, that they marched

forth to battle, because the Lord had hardened their hearts;(514) which is

likewise repeated by another Prophet—“He turned their hearts to hate his

people.”(515) Thus, also, in Isaiah, he declares he will “send the

Assyrian against a hypocritical nation, and will give him a charge to take

the spoil, and to take the prey;”(516) not that he meant to teach impious

and refractory men a voluntary obedience, but because he would incline

them to execute his judgments, just as if they had his commands engraven

on their minds. Hence it appears that they were impelled by the positive

appointment of God. I grant, indeed, that God often actuates the reprobate

by the interposition of Satan; but in such a manner that Satan himself

acts his part by the Divine impulse, and proceeds to the extent of the

Divine appointment. Saul was disturbed by an evil spirit; but it is said

to be “from the Lord;”(517) to teach us that Saul’s madness proceeded from

the righteous vengeance of God. Satan is also said to blind “the minds of

them which believe not;”(518) but the strength of the delusion proceeds

from God himself, “that they should believe a lie, who believe not the

truth.”(519) According to one view of the subject, it is said, “If the

prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived

that prophet.”(520) But, according to another, God is said himself to

“give men over to a reprobate mind,”(521) and to the vilest lusts; because

he is the principal author of his own righteous vengeance, and Satan is

only the dispenser of it. But as we must discuss this subject again in the

second book, where we shall treat of the freedom or slavery of the human

will, I think I have now said, in a brief manner, as much as the occasion

required. The whole may be summed up thus; that, as the will of God is

said to be the cause of all things, his providence is established as the

governor in all the counsels and works of men, so that it not only exerts

its power in the elect, who are influenced by the Holy Spirit, but also

compels the compliance of the reprobate.

III. But, as I have hitherto only recited such things as are delivered

without any obscurity or ambiguity in the Scriptures, let persons who

hesitate not to brand with ignominy those oracles of heaven, beware what

kind of opposition they make. For, if they pretend ignorance, with a

desire to be commended for their modesty, what greater instance of pride

can be conceived, than to oppose one little word to the authority of God!

as, “It appears otherwise to me,” or, “I would rather not meddle with this

subject.” But if they openly censure, what will they gain by their puny

attempts against heaven? Their petulance, indeed, is no novelty; for in

all ages there have been impious and profane men, who have virulently

opposed this doctrine. But they shall feel the truth of what the Spirit

long ago declared by the mouth of David, that God “is clear when he

judgeth.”(522) David obliquely hints at the madness of men who display

such excessive presumption amidst their insignificance, as not only to

dispute against God, but to arrogate to themselves the power of condemning

him. In the mean time, he briefly suggests, that God is unaffected by all

the blasphemies which they discharge against heaven, but that he

dissipates the mists of calumny, and illustriously displays his

righteousness; our faith, also, being founded on the Divine word,(523) and

therefore, superior to all the world, from its exaltation looks down with

contempt upon those mists. For their first objection, that, if nothing

happens but by the will of God, he has in him two contrary wills, because

he decrees in his secret counsel what he has publicly prohibited in his

law, is easily refuted. But before I reply, I wish the reader again to be

apprized, that this cavil is directed, not against me, but against the

Holy Spirit, who dictated to the pious Job this confession, that what had

befallen him had happened according to the Divine will: when he had been

plundered by banditti, he acknowledged in their injuries the righteous

scourge of God.(524) What says the Scripture in another case? “They,” the

sons of Eli, “hearkened not unto the voice of their father, because the

Lord would slay them.”(525) The Psalmist also exclaims, that “God,” who

“is in the heavens, hath done whatsoever he hath pleased.”(526) And now I

have sufficiently proved, that God is called the author of all those

things, which, according to the system of these censors, happen only by

his uninfluential permission. He declares that he creates light and

darkness, that he forms good and evil,(527) and that no evil occurs, which

he has not performed. Let them say, then, whether he exercises his

judgments voluntarily or involuntarily. But as Moses suggests, that he who

is killed by the fortuitous fall of an axe, is delivered by God to the

stroke,(528) so in the Acts, the whole church asserts that Herod and

Pilate conspired to do what the hand and the counsel of God had

predetermined.(529) And indeed, unless the crucifixion of Christ was

according to the will of God, what becomes of our redemption? Yet the will

of God is neither repugnant to itself, nor subject to change, nor

chargeable with pretending to dislike what it approves; but whilst in him

it is uniform and simple, it wears to us the appearance of variety;

because the weakness of our understanding comprehends not how the same

thing may be in different respects both agreeable to his will, and

contrary to it. Paul, after having said that the vocation of the Gentiles

was a hidden mystery, adds, that it contained a manifestation of the

manifold wisdom of God.(530) Now, because, through the dulness of our

capacity, the Divine wisdom appears to us manifold, (or multiform, as it

has been translated by an ancient interpreter,) shall we therefore dream

of any vanity in God himself, as though his counsels were mutable, or his

thoughts contradictory to each other? Rather, while we comprehend not how

God intends that to be done, the doing of which he forbids, let us

remember our imbecility, and at the same time consider, that the light

which he inhabits, is justly called inaccessible,(531) because it is

overspread with impenetrable darkness. Therefore all pious and modest men

will easily acquiesce in this opinion of Augustine: “That a man may

sometimes choose, with a good intention, that which is not agreeable to

the will of God; as, if a good son wishes his father to live, whilst God

determines that he shall die. It is also possible for a man to will with a

bad design, what God wills with a good one; as, if a bad son wishes his

father to die, which is also the will of God. Now, the former wishes what

is not agreeable, the latter what is agreeable to the Divine will. And yet

the filial affection of the former is more consonant to the righteous will

of God, than the want of natural affection in the latter, though it

accords with his secret design. So great is the difference between what

belongs to the human will, and what to the Divine, and between the ends to

which the will of every one is to be referred, for approbation or censure.

For God fulfils his righteous will by the wicked wills of wicked men.”

This writer had just before said, that the apostate angels, and all the

reprobate, in their defection, acted, as far as respected themselves, in

direct opposition to the Divine will; but that this was not possible with

respect to the Divine omnipotence; because, while they are opposing the

will of God, his will is accomplished concerning them. Whence he exclaims,

“The works of the Lord are great, prepared according to all his

determinations;”(532) so that, in a wonderful and ineffable manner, that

is not done without his will which yet is contrary to his will; because it

would not be done if he did not permit it; and this permission is not

involuntary, but voluntary; nor would his goodness permit the perpetration

of any evil, unless his omnipotence were able even from that evil to educe

good.

IV. In the same manner we answer, or rather annihilate, another

objection—that, if God not only uses the agency of the impious, but

governs their designs and affections, he is the author of all crimes; and

therefore men are undeservedly condemned, if they execute what God has

decreed, because they obey his will. For his will is improperly confounded

with his precept, between which innumerable examples evince the difference

to be very great. For although, when Absalom defiled the wives of his

father, it was the will of God by this disgrace to punish the adultery of

David,(533) he did not therefore command that abandoned son to commit

incest, unless perhaps with respect to David, as he speaks of the

reproaches of Shimei.(534) For when he confesses Shimei’s maledictions to

proceed from the Divine command, he by no means commends his obedience, as

though that impudent and worthless man were fulfilling a Divine precept;

but acknowledging his tongue as the scourge of God, he patiently submits

to the chastisement. Let it be remembered, that whilst God by means of the

impious fulfils his secret decrees, they are not excusable, as though they

were obedient to his precepts, which they wantonly and intentionally

violate. The direction of the perverse actions of men, by the secret

providence of God, is illustriously exemplified in the election of

Jeroboam to the regal dignity.(535) The temerity and infatuation of the

people in this proceeding are severely condemned,(536) because they

perverted the order established by God, and perfidiously revolted from the

family of David; and yet we know that this event was agreeable to the

Divine will. Whence there is an appearance of contradiction also in the

language of Hosea; for in one place God complains that the erection of

that kingdom was without his knowledge and against his will; but in

another declares that he gave Jeroboam to be a king in his anger.(537) How

can these things be reconciled, that Jeroboam did not reign by the will of

God, and yet that God appointed him to be king? Why, thus: because neither

could the people revolt from the family of David, without shaking off the

yoke which God had imposed upon them; nor yet was God deprived of the

liberty of thus punishing the ingratitude of Solomon. We see, then, how

God, while he hates perfidy, yet righteously and with a different design

decrees the defection; whence also Jeroboam is, beyond all expectation,

constrained by the holy unction to assume the regal office. In the same

manner, the Sacred History relates, that God raised up an enemy, to

deprive the son of Solomon of part of the kingdom.(538) Let the reader

diligently consider both these things: because it had pleased God that the

people should be under the government of one king, their division into two

parts was contrary to his will; and yet from his will the schism first

originated. For certainly since a Prophet, both by a prediction and by the

ceremony of unction, excited a hope of succeeding to the kingdom, in the

mind of Jeroboam, who before entertained not a thought of such an event,

this could not be done, either without the knowledge, or against the will,

of God, who commanded it to be done; and yet the rebellion of the people

is justly condemned, because, in opposition to the Divine will, they

revolted from the posterity of David. Thus, also, it is afterwards

subjoined, that “the cause” of the haughty contempt of the people

manifested by Rehoboam “was of God, that the Lord might perform his word,

which he spake by the hand of Ahijah” his servant.(539) See how the sacred

union is divided, in opposition to the will of God, and yet by his will

the ten tribes are alienated from the son of Solomon. Let us add another

similar example, where, with the consent, and even by the assistance of

the people, the sons of Ahab are massacred, and all his posterity

exterminated.(540) Jehu, indeed, truly observed that “there had fallen

unto the earth nothing of the word of the Lord,” but that he had “done

that which he spake by his servant Elijah.” And yet he justly reprehends

the citizens of Samaria for having lent their assistance. “Are ye

righteous?” says he; “behold, I conspired against my master, and slew him;

but who slew all these?” If I am not deceived, I have now clearly

explained how the same act displays the criminality of men and the justice

of God. And to modest minds this answer of Augustine will always be

sufficient: “Since God delivered Christ, and Christ delivered his own

body, and Judas delivered the Lord, why, in this delivery, is God

righteous and man guilty? Because in the same act, they acted not from the

same cause.” But if any persons find greater difficulty in what we now

assert, that there is no consent between God and man, in cases where man

by his righteous influence commits unlawful actions, let them remember

what is advanced by Augustine in another place: “Who can but tremble at

those judgments, when God does even in the hearts of the wicked whatsoever

he pleases, and yet renders to them according to their demerits?” And

certainly it would no more be right to attribute to God the blame of the

perfidy of Judas, because he decreed the delivery of his Son, and actually

delivered him to death, than to transfer to Judas the praise of

redemption. Therefore the same writer elsewhere informs us, that in this

scrutiny God inquires, not what men could have done, nor what they have

done, but what they intended to do, that he may take cognizance of their

design and their will. Let those to whom there appears any harshness in

this procedure, consider a little how far their obstinacy is tolerable,

while they reject a truth which is attested by plain testimonies of

Scripture, because it exceeds their comprehension, and condemn the

publication of those things which God, unless he had known that the

knowledge of them would be useful, would never have commanded to be taught

by his Prophets and Apostles. For our wisdom ought to consist in embracing

with gentle docility, and without any exception, all that is delivered in

the sacred Scriptures. But those who oppose this doctrine with less

modesty and greater violence, since it is evident that their opposition is

against God, are unworthy of a longer refutation.

BOOK II. ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD THE REDEEMER IN CHRIST, WHICH WAS

REVEALED FIRST TO THE FATHERS UNDER THE LAW, AND SINCE TO US IN THE

GOSPEL.

Argument.

The discussion of the first part of the Apostolic Creed, on the knowledge

of God the Creator, being finished, is followed by another, on the

knowledge of God the Redeemer in Christ, which is the subject of this

Second Book.

It treats, first, of the occasion of redemption, that is, the fall of

Adam; secondly, of the redemption itself. The former of these subjects

occupies the first five chapters; the remaining ones are assigned to the

latter.

On the occasion of redemption, it treats, not only of the fall in general,

but also of its effects in particular; that is, of original sin, the

slavery of the will, the universal corruption of human nature, the

operation of God in the hearts of men—Chap. I.‐IV., to which is subjoined

a refutation of the objections commonly adduced in defence of free

will—Chap. V.

The discourse on redemption may be divided into five principal parts. It

shows,

1. In whom salvation must be sought by lost man, that is, in Christ—Chap.

VI.

2. How Christ has been manifested to the world; which has been in two

ways; first, under the law (which introduces an explanation of the

Decalogue, and a discussion of some other things relative to the

Law)—Chap. VII. VIII.; secondly, under the Gospel, which leads to a

statement of the similarity and difference of the two Testaments—Chap.

IX.‐XI.

3. What kind of a being it was necessary for Christ to be, in order to his

fulfilment of the office of a Mediator; that is, God and man in one

person—Chap. XII.‐XIV.

4. The end of his mission from the Father into the world—Chap. XV., which

explains his prophetical, regal, and sacerdotal offices.

5. The methods or steps by which he fulfilled the part of a Redeemer, to

procure our salvation—Chap. XVI.; which discusses the articles relating to

his crucifixion, death, burial, descent into hell, resurrection, ascension

to heaven, session at the right hand of the Father, and the benefits

arising from this doctrine. Then follows Chap. XVII., a solution of the

question, Whether Christ merited for us the grace of God and salvation.

Chapter I. The Fall And Defection Of Adam The Cause Of The Curse Inflicted

On All Mankind, And Of Their Degeneracy From Their Primitive Condition.

The Doctrine Of Original Sin.

There is much reason in the old adage, which so strongly recommends to man

the knowledge of himself. For if it be thought disgraceful to be ignorant

of whatever relates to the conduct of human life, ignorance of ourselves

is much more shameful, which causes us, in deliberating on subjects of

importance, to grope our way in miserable obscurity, or even in total

darkness. But in proportion to the utility of this precept ought to be our

caution not to make a preposterous use of it; as we see some philosophers

have done. For while they exhort man to the knowledge of himself, the end

they propose is, that he may not remain ignorant of his own dignity and

excellence: nor do they wish him to contemplate in himself any thing but

what may swell him with vain confidence, and inflate him with pride. But

the knowledge of ourselves consists, first, in considering what was

bestowed on us at our creation, and the favours we continually receive

from the Divine benignity, that we may know how great the excellence of

our nature would have been, if it had retained its integrity; yet, at the

same time, recollecting that we have nothing properly our own, may feel

our precarious tenure of all that God has conferred on us, so as always to

place our dependence upon him. Secondly, we should contemplate our

miserable condition since the fall of Adam, the sense of which tends to

destroy all boasting and confidence, to overwhelm us with shame, and to

fill us with real humility. For as God, at the beginning, formed us after

his own image, that he might elevate our minds both to the practice of

virtue, and to the contemplation of eternal life, so, to prevent the great

excellence of our species, which distinguishes us from the brutes, from

being buried in sottish indolence, it is worthy of observation, that the

design of our being endued with reason and intelligence is, that, leading

a holy and virtuous life, we may aspire to the mark set before us of a

blessed immortality. But we cannot think upon that primeval dignity,

without having our attention immediately called to the melancholy

spectacle of our disgrace and ignominy, since in the person of the first

man we are fallen from our original condition. Hence arise disapprobation

and abhorrence of ourselves, and real humility; and we are inflamed with

fresh ardour to seek after God, to recover in him those excellences of

which we find ourselves utterly destitute.

II. This is what the truth of God directs us to seek in the examination of

ourselves: it requires a knowledge that will abstract us from all

confidence in our own ability, deprive us of every cause of boasting, and

reduce us to submission. We must observe this rule, if we wish to reach

the proper point of knowledge and action. I am aware of the superior

plausibility of that opinion, which invites us rather to a consideration

of our goodness, than to a view of our miserable poverty and ignominy,

which ought to overwhelm us with shame. For there is nothing more desired

by the human mind than soothing flatteries; and therefore, it listens with

extreme credulity, to hear its excellences magnified. Wherefore it is the

less wonderful that the majority of mankind have fallen into such a

pernicious error. For, an immoderate self‐love being innate in all men,

they readily persuade themselves that there is nothing in them which

justly deserves to be an object of aversion. Thus, without any extraneous

support, this very false opinion, that man has in himself sufficient

ability to insure his own virtue and happiness, generally prevails. But if

some prefer more modest sentiments, though they concede something to God,

in order to avoid the appearance of arrogating every thing to themselves,

yet they make such a distribution, that the principal cause of boasting

and confidence always remains with them. If they hear any discourse that

flatters the pride already operating spontaneously in their hearts,

nothing can gratify them more. Therefore every one who in his preaching

has kindly extolled the excellence of human nature, has received great

applause from almost all ages. But such a commendation of human excellence

as teaches man to be satisfied with himself, only enamours him of his own

amiableness, and thus produces an illusion which involves those who assent

to it in most dreadful perdition. For to what purpose is it for us,

relying on every vain confidence, to deliberate, to determine, and to

attempt things which we think tend to our advantage, and in our first

efforts, to find ourselves destitute of sound understanding and true

virtue, yet securely to proceed, till we fall into destruction? But this

must be the fate of all who confide in the efficacy of their own virtue.

Whosoever, therefore, attends to such teachers as amuse us with a mere

exhibition of our virtues, will make no progress in the knowledge of

himself, but will be absorbed in the most pernicious ignorance.

III. Therefore, whilst the truth of God agrees in this point with the

common consent of all mankind, that the second branch of wisdom consists

in the knowledge of ourselves, yet with respect to the knowledge itself

there is no small disagreement. For, according to carnal apprehension, a

man is thought to be well acquainted with himself, when, confiding in his

own understanding and integrity, he assumes a presumptuous boldness,

incites himself to the duties of virtue, and, declaring war against vice,

uses his most strenuous endeavours to adhere to what is fair and

honourable. But he, who inspects and examines himself by the rule of the

Divine judgment, finds nothing that can raise his mind to a genuine

confidence; and the more fully he has examined himself, the greater is his

dejection; till, entirely discarding all confidence, he leaves himself no

ability for the proper conduct of his life. Yet it is not the will of God

that we should forget the primitive dignity conferred by him on our father

Adam, which ought justly to awaken us to the pursuit of righteousness and

goodness. For we cannot reflect on our original condition, and on the end

of our creation, without being excited to meditate on immortality, and to

aspire after the kingdom of God. But this reflection is so far from

elating us with pride, that it rather produces humility. For what is that

original condition? That from which we are fallen. What is that end of our

creation? That from which we are wholly departed; so that we should lament

the miseries of our present state, and in the midst of our lamentation,

aspire after the dignity which we have lost. Now, when we say that man

should behold in himself nothing that might elate him with pride, we mean

that there is nothing in him in the confidence of which he ought to be

proud. Wherefore we may divide the knowledge man ought to have of himself

into these two parts. First, he should consider the end of his being

created and endued with such estimable gifts; a reflection which may

excite him to the consideration of Divine worship, and of a future life.

Secondly, he should examine his own ability, or rather his want of

ability, the view of which may confound and almost annihilate him. The

former consideration is adapted to acquaint him with his duty, the latter

with his power to perform it. We shall treat of them both in regular

order.

IV. But, since it could not have been a trivial offence, but must have

been a detestable crime, that was so severely punished by God, we must

consider the nature of Adam’s sin, which kindled the dreadful flame of

Divine wrath against the whole human race. The vulgar opinion concerning

the intemperance of gluttony is quite puerile; as though the sum and

substance of all virtues consisted in an abstinence from one particular

kind of fruit, when there were diffused on every side all the delights

which could possibly be desired, and the happy fecundity of the earth

afforded an abundance and variety of dainties. We must therefore look

further, because the prohibition of the tree of knowledge of good and evil

was a test of obedience, that Adam might prove his willing submission to

the Divine government. And the name itself shows that the precept was

given for no other purpose than that he might be contented with his

condition, and not aim with criminal cupidity at any higher. But the

promise which authorized him to expect eternal life, as long as he should

eat of the tree of life, and, on the other hand, the dreadful denunciation

of death, as soon as he should taste of the tree of knowledge of good and

evil, were calculated for the probation and exercise of his faith. Hence

it is easy to infer by what means Adam provoked the wrath of God against

him. Augustine, indeed, properly observes, that pride was the first of all

evils; because, if ambition had not elated man beyond what was lawful and

right, he might have continued in his honourable situation. But we may

obtain a more complete definition from the nature of the temptation as

described by Moses. For as the woman, by the subtlety of the serpent, was

seduced to discredit the word of God, it is evident that the fall

commenced in disobedience. This is also confirmed by Paul, who states that

all men were ruined by the disobedience of one.(541) But it is also to be

observed, that when the first man rebelled against the government of God,

he not only was ensnared by the allurements of Satan, but despised the

truth, and turned aside to falsehood. And there certainly can be no

reverence of God left, where his word is contemned; for we preserve a

sense of his majesty and the purity of his worship, no longer than we

implicitly attend to his voice. Infidelity, therefore, was the root of

that defection. But hence sprang ambition, pride, and ingratitude, since

Adam, by coveting more than was granted, offered an indignity to the

Divine goodness, which had so greatly enriched him. Now, it was monstrous

impiety, that a son of the earth should not be satisfied with being made

after the similitude of God, unless he could also be equal to him. If

apostasy, which consists in revolting from the government of the Creator,

and petulantly rejecting his authority, be a base and execrable crime, it

is a vain attempt to extenuate the sin of Adam. Though the transgression

of our first parents was not simple apostasy; they were also guilty of

vile reproaches against God, in consenting to the calumnies of Satan, who

accused God of falsehood, envy, and malignity. Finally, infidelity opened

the gate to ambition, and ambition produced obstinacy, so that they cast

off the fear of God, and precipitated themselves whithersoever they were

led by their lawless desires. With propriety, therefore, Bernard teaches

that the gate of salvation is opened to us, when in the present day we

receive the Gospel with our ears, as death was once admitted at the same

doors when they lay open to Satan. For Adam had never dared to resist the

authority of God, if he had not discredited his word. This was certainly

the best check for a due regulation of all the affections, that the chief

good consists in the practice of righteousness, in obedience to the

commands of God; and that the ultimate end of a happy life is to be

beloved by him. Being seduced, therefore, by the blasphemies of the devil,

he did all that was in his power towards a total annihilation of the glory

of God.

V. As the spiritual life of Adam consisted in a union to his Maker, so an

alienation from him was the death of his soul. Nor is it surprising that

he ruined his posterity by his defection, which has perverted the whole

order of nature in heaven and earth. “The creatures groan,” says Paul,

“being made subject to vanity, not willingly.”(542) If the cause be

inquired, it is undoubtedly that they sustain part of the punishment due

to the demerits of man, for whose use they were created. And his guilt

being the origin of that curse which extends to every part of the world,

it is reasonable to conclude its propagation to all his offspring.

Therefore, when the Divine image in him was obliterated, and he was

punished with the loss of wisdom, strength, sanctity, truth, and

righteousness, with which he had been adorned, but which were succeeded by

the dreadful pests of ignorance, impotence, impurity, vanity, and

iniquity, he suffered not alone, but involved all his posterity with him,

and plunged them into the same miseries. This is that hereditary

corruption which the fathers called _original sin_; meaning by sin, the

depravation of a nature previously good and pure; on which subject they

had much contention, nothing being more remote from natural reason, than

that all should be criminated on account of the guilt of one, and thus his

sin become common; which seems to have been the reason why the most

ancient doctors of the Church did but obscurely glance at this point, or

at least explained it with less perspicuity than it required. Yet this

timidity could not prevent Pelagius from arising, who profanely pretended,

that the sin of Adam only ruined himself, and did not injure his

descendants. By concealing the disease with this delusion, Satan attempted

to render it incurable. But when it was evinced by the plain testimony of

the Scripture, that sin was communicated from the first man to all his

posterity, he sophistically urged that it was communicated by imitation,

not by propagation. Therefore good men, and beyond all others Augustine,

have laboured to demonstrate that we are not corrupted by any adventitious

means, but that we derive an innate depravity from our very birth. The

denial of this was an instance of consummate impudence. But the temerity

of the Pelagians and Celestians will not appear surprising to him who

perceives from the writings of Augustine, what a want of modesty they

discover in every thing else. There is certainly no ambiguity in the

confession of David, that he was shapen in iniquity, and in sin his mother

conceived him.(543) He is not there exposing the sins of his mother or of

his father; but to enhance his commendations of the Divine goodness

towards him, he commences the confession of his depravity from the time of

his conception. As it is evident that this was not peculiar to David, it

is fairly concluded, that his case exemplifies the common condition of

mankind. Every descendant, therefore, from the impure source, is born

infected with the contagion of sin; and even before we behold the light of

life, we are in the sight of God defiled and polluted. For “who can bring

a clean thing out of an unclean?” The book of Job tells us, “Not

one.”(544)

VI. We have heard that the impurity of the parents is so transmitted to

the children, that all, without a single exception, are polluted as soon

as they exist. But we shall not find the origin of this pollution, unless

we ascend to the first parent of us all, as to the fountain which sends

forth all the streams. Thus it is certain that Adam was not only the

progenitor, but as it were the root of mankind, and therefore that all the

race were necessarily vitiated in his corruption. The Apostle explains

this by a comparison between him and Christ: “As,” says he, “by one man

sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all

men, for that all have sinned,”(545) so, by the grace of Christ,

righteousness and life have been restored to us. What cavil will the

Pelagians raise here? That the sin of Adam was propagated by imitation? Do

we then receive no other advantage from the righteousness of Christ than

the proposal of an example for our imitation? Who can bear such blasphemy?

But if it cannot be controverted that the righteousness of Christ is ours

by communication, and life as its consequence, it is equally evident that

both were lost in Adam, in the same manner in which they were recovered in

Christ, and that sin and death were introduced by Adam, in the same manner

in which they are abolished by Christ. There is no obscurity in the

declaration that many are made righteous by the obedience of Christ,(546)

as they had been made sinners by the disobedience of Adam. And, therefore,

between these two persons there is this relation, that the one ruined us

by involving us in his destruction, the other by his grace has restored us

to salvation. Any more prolix or tedious proof of a truth supported by

such clear evidence must, I think, be unnecessary. Thus also in the First

Epistle to the Corinthians, with a view to confirm the pious in a

confidence of the resurrection, he shows, that the life which had been

lost in Adam, was recovered in Christ.(547) He, who pronounces that we

were all dead in Adam, does also at the same time plainly declare, that we

were implicated in the guilt of his sin. For no condemnation could reach

those who were perfectly clear from all charge of iniquity. But his

meaning cannot be better understood than from the relation of the other

member of the sentence, where he informs us that the hope of life is

restored in Christ. But that is well known to be accomplished, only when

Christ, by a wonderful communication, transfuses into us the virtue of his

righteousness; as it is elsewhere said, “The Spirit is life, because of

righteousness.”(548) No other explanation therefore can be given of our

being said to be dead in Adam, than that his transgression not only

procured misery and ruin for himself, but also precipitated our nature

into similar destruction. And that not by his personal guilt as an

individual, which pertains not to us, but because he infected all his

descendants with the corruption into which he had fallen. Otherwise there

would be no truth in the assertion of Paul, that all are by nature

children of wrath,(549) if they had not been already under the curse even

before their birth. Now, it is easily inferred that our nature is there

characterized, not as it was created by God, but as it was vitiated in

Adam; because it would be unreasonable to make God the author of death.

Adam, therefore, corrupted himself in such a manner, that the contagion

has been communicated from him to all his offspring. And Christ himself,

the heavenly Judge, declares, in the most unequivocal terms, that all are

born in a state of pravity and corruption, when he teaches, that

“whatsoever is born of the flesh is flesh,”(550) and that, therefore, the

gate of life is closed against all who have not been regenerated.

VII. Nor, to enable us to understand this subject, have we any need to

enter on that tedious dispute, with which the fathers were not a little

perplexed, whether the soul of a son proceeds by derivation or

transmission from the soul of the father, because the soul is the

principal seat of the pollution. We ought to be satisfied with this, that

the Lord deposited with Adam the endowments he chose to confer on the

human nature; and therefore that when he lost the favours he had received,

he lost them not only for himself, but for us all. Who will be solicitous

about a transmission of the soul, when he hears that Adam received the

ornaments that he lost, no less for us than for himself? that they were

given, not to one man only, but to the whole human nature? There is

nothing absurd therefore, if, in consequence of his being spoiled of his

dignities, that nature be destitute and poor; if, in consequence of his

being polluted with sin, the whole nature be infected with the contagion.

From a putrefied root, therefore, have sprung putrid branches, which have

transmitted their putrescence to remoter ramifications. For the children

were so vitiated in their parent, that they became contagious to their

descendants: there was in Adam such a spring of corruption, that it is

transfused from parents to children in a perpetual stream. But the cause

of the contagion is not in the substance of the body or of the soul; but

because it was ordained by God, that the gifts which he conferred on the

first man should by him be preserved or lost both for himself and for all

his posterity. But the cavil of the Pelagians, that it is improbable that

children should derive corruption from pious parents, whereas they ought

rather to be sanctified by their purity, is easily refuted. For they

descend from their carnal generation, not from their spiritual generation.

Therefore, as Augustine says, “Neither the guilty unbeliever, nor the

justified believer, generates innocent, but guilty children, because the

generation of both is from corrupted nature.” If they in some measure

participate of the sanctity of their parents, that is the peculiar

benediction of the people of God, which supersedes not the first and

universal curse previously denounced on the human nature. For their guilt

is from nature, but their sanctification from supernatural grace.

VIII. To remove all uncertainty and misunderstanding on this subject, let

us define original sin. It is not my intention to discuss all the

definitions given by writers; I shall only produce one, which I think

perfectly consistent with the truth. Original sin, therefore, appears to

be an hereditary pravity and corruption of our nature, diffused through

all the parts of the soul, rendering us obnoxious to the Divine wrath, and

producing in us those works which the Scripture calls “works of the

flesh.”(551) And this is indeed what Paul frequently denominates _sin_.

The works which proceed thence, such as adulteries, fornications, thefts,

hatreds, murders, revellings, he calls in the same manner “fruits of sin;”

although they are also called “sins” in many passages of Scripture, and

even by himself. These two things therefore should be distinctly observed:

first, that our nature being so totally vitiated and depraved, we are, on

account of this very corruption, considered as convicted and justly

condemned in the sight of God, to whom nothing is acceptable but

righteousness, innocence, and purity. And this liableness to punishment

arises not from the delinquency of another; for when it is said that the

sin of Adam renders us obnoxious to the Divine judgment, it is not to be

understood as if we, though innocent, were undeservedly loaded with the

guilt of his sin; but, because we are all subject to a curse, in

consequence of his transgression, he is therefore said to have involved us

in guilt. Nevertheless we derive from him, not only the punishment, but

also the pollution to which the punishment is justly due. Wherefore

Augustine, though he frequently calls it the sin of another, the more

clearly to indicate its transmission to us by propagation, yet, at the

same time, also asserts it properly to belong to every individual. And the

Apostle himself expressly declares, that “death has therefore passed upon

all men, for that all have sinned;”(552) that is, have been involved in

original sin, and defiled with its blemishes. And therefore infants

themselves, as they bring their condemnation into the world with them, are

rendered obnoxious to punishment by their own sinfulness, not by the

sinfulness of another. For though they have not yet produced the fruits of

their iniquity, yet they have the seed of it within them; even their whole

nature is as it were a seed of sin, and therefore cannot but be odious and

abominable to God. Whence it follows, that it is properly accounted sin in

the sight of God, because there could be no guilt without crime. The other

thing to be remarked is, that this depravity never ceases in us, but is

perpetually producing new fruits, those works of the flesh, which we have

before described, like the emission of flame and sparks from a heated

furnace, or like the streams of water from a never failing spring.

Wherefore those who have defined original sin as a privation of the

original righteousness, which we ought to possess, though they comprise

the whole of the subject, yet have not used language sufficiently

expressive of its operation and influence. For our nature is not only

destitute of all good, but is so fertile in all evils that it cannot

remain inactive. Those who have called it _concupiscence_ have used an

expression not improper, if it were only added, which is far from being

conceded by most persons, that every thing in man, the understanding and

will, the soul and body, is polluted and engrossed by this concupiscence;

or, to express it more briefly, that man is of himself nothing else but

concupiscence.

IX. Wherefore I have asserted that sin has possessed all the powers of the

soul, since Adam departed from the fountain of righteousness. For man has

not only been ensnared by the inferior appetites, but abominable impiety

has seized the very citadel of his mind, and pride has penetrated into the

inmost recesses of his heart; so that it is weak and foolish to restrict

the corruption which has proceeded thence, to what are called the sensual

affections, or to call it an incentive which allures, excites, and

attracts to sin, only what they style the sensual part. In this the

grossest ignorance has been discovered by Peter Lombard, who, when

investigating the seat of it, says that it is in the flesh, according to

the testimony of Paul,(553) not indeed exclusively, but because it

principally appears in the flesh; as though Paul designated only a part of

the soul, and not the whole of our nature, which is opposed to

supernatural grace. Now, Paul removes every doubt by informing us that the

corruption resides not in one part only, but that there is nothing pure

and uncontaminated by its mortal infection. For, when arguing respecting

corrupt nature, he not only condemns the inordinate motions of the

appetites, but principally insists on the blindness of the mind, and the

depravity of the heart;(554) and the third chapter of his Epistle to the

Romans is nothing but a description of original sin. This appears more

evident from our renovation. For “the Spirit,” which is opposed to “the

old man” and “the flesh,” not only denotes the grace, which corrects the

inferior or sensual part of the soul, but comprehends a complete

reformation of all its powers. And therefore Paul not only enjoins us to

mortify our sensual appetites, but exhorts us to be renewed in the spirit

of our mind;(555) and in another place he directs us to be transformed by

the renewing of our mind.(556) Whence it follows, that that part, which

principally displays the excellence and dignity of the soul, is not only

wounded, but so corrupted, that it requires not merely to be healed, but

to receive a new nature. How far sin occupies both the mind and the heart,

we shall presently see. My intention here was only to hint, in a brief

way, that man is so totally overwhelmed, as with a deluge, that no part is

free from sin; and therefore that whatever proceeds from him is accounted

sin; as Paul says that all the affections or thoughts of the flesh are

enmity against God, and therefore death.(557)

X. Now, let us dismiss those who dare to charge God with their

corruptions, because we say that men are naturally corrupt. They err in

seeking for the work of God in their own pollution, whereas they should

rather seek it in the nature of Adam while yet innocent and uncorrupted.

Our perdition therefore proceeds from the sinfulness of our flesh, not

from God; it being only a consequence of our degenerating from our

primitive condition. And let no one murmur that God might have made a

better provision for our safety, by preventing the fall of Adam. For such

an objection ought to be abominated, as too presumptuously curious, by all

pious minds; and it also belongs to the mystery of predestination, which

shall afterwards be treated in its proper place. Wherefore let us

remember, that our ruin must be imputed to the corruption of our nature,

that we may not bring an accusation against God himself, the author of

nature. That this fatal wound is inherent in our nature, is indeed a

truth; but it is an important question, whether it was in it originally,

or was derived from any extraneous cause. But it is evident that it was

occasioned by sin. We have therefore no reason to complain, but of

ourselves; which in the Scripture is distinctly remarked. For the Preacher

says, “This only have I found, that God hath made man upright; but they

have sought out many inventions.”(558) It is clear that the misery of man

must be ascribed solely to himself, since he was favoured with rectitude

by the Divine goodness, but has lapsed into vanity through his own folly.

XI. We say, therefore, that man is corrupted by a natural depravity, but

which did not originate from nature. We deny that it proceeded from

nature, to signify that it is rather an adventitious quality or accident,

than a substantial property originally innate. Yet we call it natural,

that no one may suppose it to be contracted by every individual from

corrupt habit, whereas it prevails over all by hereditary right. Nor is

this representation of ours without authority. For the same reason the

Apostle says, that we are all by nature the children of wrath.(559) How

could God, who is pleased with all his meanest works, be angry with the

noblest of all his creatures? But he is angry rather with the corruption

of his work, than with his work itself. Therefore, if, on account of the

corruption of human nature, man be justly said to be naturally abominable

to God, he may also be truly said to be naturally depraved and corrupt; as

Augustine, in consequence of the corruption of nature, hesitates not to

call those sins natural, which necessarily predominate in our flesh, where

they are not prevented by the grace of God. Thus vanishes the foolish and

nugatory system of the Manichæans, who, having imagined in man a

substantial wickedness, presumed to invent for him a new creator, that

they might not appear to assign the cause and origin of evil to a

righteous God.

Chapter II. Man, In His Present State, Despoiled Of Freedom Of Will, And

Subjected To A Miserable Slavery.

Since we have seen that the domination of sin, from the time of its

subjugation of the first man, not only extends over the whole race, but

also exclusively possesses every soul, it now remains to be more closely

investigated, whether we are despoiled of all freedom, and, if any

particle of it yet remain, how far its power extends. But, that we may the

more easily discover the truth of this question, I will first set up by

the way a mark, by which our whole course must be regulated. The best

method of guarding against error is to consider the dangers which threaten

us on every side. For when man is declared to be destitute of all

rectitude, he immediately makes it an occasion of slothfulness; and

because he is said to have no power of himself for the pursuit of

righteousness, he totally neglects it, as though it did not at all concern

him. On the other hand, he cannot arrogate any thing to himself, be it

ever so little, without God being robbed of his honour, and himself being

endangered by presumptuous temerity. Therefore, to avoid striking on

either of these rocks, this will be the course to be pursued—that man,

being taught that he has nothing good left in his possession, and being

surrounded on every side with the most miserable necessity, should,

nevertheless, be instructed to aspire to the good of which he is

destitute, and to the liberty of which he is deprived; and should be

roused from indolence with more earnestness, than if he were supposed to

be possessed of the greatest strength. The necessity of the latter is

obvious to every one. The former, I perceive, is doubted by more than it

ought to be. For this being placed beyond all controversy, that man must

not be deprived of any thing that properly belongs to him, it ought also

to be manifest how important it is that he should be prevented from false

boasting. For if he was not even then permitted to glory in himself, when

by the Divine beneficence he was decorated with the noblest ornaments, how

much ought he now to be humbled, when, on account of his ingratitude, he

has been hurled from the summit of glory to the abyss of ignominy! At that

time, I say, when he was exalted to the most honourable eminence, the

Scripture attributes nothing to him, but that he was created after the

image of God; which certainly implies that his happiness consisted not in

any goodness of his own, but in a participation of God. What, then,

remains for him now, deprived of all glory, but that he acknowledge God,

to whose beneficence he could not be thankful, when he abounded in the

riches of his favour? and that he now, at least, by a confession of his

poverty, glorify him, whom he glorified not by an acknowledgment of his

blessings? It is also no less conducive to our interests than to the

Divine glory, that all the praise of wisdom and strength be taken away

from us; so that they join sacrilege to our fall, who ascribe to us any

thing more than truly belongs to us. For what else is the consequence,

when we are taught to contend in our own strength, but that we are lifted

into the air on a reed, which being soon broken, we fall to the ground.

Though our strength is placed in too favourable a point of view, when it

is compared to a reed. For it is nothing but smoke, whatever vain men have

imagined and pretend concerning it. Wherefore it is not without reason,

that that remarkable sentence is so frequently repeated by Augustine, that

free will is rather overthrown than established even by its own advocates.

It was necessary to premise these things for the sake of some, who, when

they hear that human power is completely subverted in order that the power

of God may be established in man, inveterately hate this whole argument,

as dangerous and unprofitable; which yet appears to be highly useful to

us, and essential to true religion.

II. As we have just before said that the faculties of the soul consist in

the mind and the heart, let us now consider the ability of each. The

philosophers, indeed, with general consent, pretend, that in the mind

presides Reason, which like a lamp illuminates with its counsels, and like

a queen governs the will; for that it is so irradiated with Divine light

as to be able to give the best counsels, and endued with such vigour as to

be qualified to govern in the most excellent manner; that Sense, on the

contrary, is torpid and afflicted with weakness of sight, so that it

always creeps on the ground, and is absorbed in the grossest objects, nor

ever elevates itself to a view of the truth; that Appetite, if it can

submit to the obedience of reason, and resist the attractions of sense, is

inclined to the practice of virtues, travels the path of rectitude, and is

formed into will; but that, if it be devoted to the servitude of sense, it

is thereby so corrupted and depraved as to degenerate into lust. And as,

according to their opinion, there reside in the soul those faculties which

I have before mentioned, understanding, sense, and appetite, or

will,—which appellation is now more commonly used,—they assert that the

understanding is endued with reason, that most excellent guide to a good

and a happy life, provided it only maintains itself in its own excellence,

and exerts its innate power; but that the inferior affection of the soul,

which is called _sense_, and by which it is seduced into error, is of such

a nature that it may be tamed and gradually conquered by the rod of

reason. They place the will in the middle station between reason and

sense, as perfectly at liberty, whether it chooses to obey reason, or to

submit to the violence of sense.

III. Sometimes, indeed, being convinced by the testimony of experience,

they admit how extremely difficult it is for a man to establish within him

the kingdom of reason; while he is exposed at one time to the

solicitations of alluring pleasures, at another to the delusions of

pretended blessings, and at others to the violent agitations of immoderate

passions, compared by Plato to so many cords dragging him in various

directions. For which reason Cicero says that the sparks kindled by nature

are soon extinguished by corrupt opinions and evil manners. But when such

maladies have once taken possession of the human mind, they acknowledge

their progress to be too violent to be easily restrained; nor do they

hesitate to compare them to fierce horses, who, having rejected reason,

like horses that have thrown off the charioteer, indulge themselves in

every extravagance, without the least restraint. But they consider it as

beyond all controversy, that virtue and vice are in our own power; for if

it be at our election, they say, to do this or that, therefore it must

also be, to abstain from doing it. And, on the other hand, if we are free

to abstain from it, we must also be free to do it. But we appear freely

and voluntarily to do those things which we do, and to abstain from those

things from which we abstain; therefore, if we do any good action, when we

please we may omit it; if we perpetrate any evil, that also we may avoid.

Moreover, some of them have advanced to such a degree of presumption, as

to boast, that we are indebted to the gods for our life, but for a

virtuous and religious one to ourselves; whence also that assertion of

Cicero, in the person of Cotta, that, since every man acquires virtue for

himself, none of the wise men have ever thanked God for it. “For,” says

he, “we are praised for virtue, and in virtue we glory; which would not be

the case, if it were a gift of God, and did not originate from ourselves.”

And a little after: “This is the judgment of all men, that fortune must be

asked of God, but that wisdom must be derived from ourselves.” This, then,

is the substance of the opinion of all the philosophers, that the reason

of the human understanding is sufficient for its proper government; that

the will, being subject to it, is indeed solicited by sense to evil

objects, but, as it has a free choice, there can be no impediment to its

following reason as its guide in all things.

IV. Among the ecclesiastical writers, though there has not been one who

would not acknowledge both that human reason is grievously wounded by sin,

and that the will is very much embarrassed by corrupt affections, yet many

of them have followed the philosophers far beyond what is right. The early

fathers appear to me to have thus extolled human power from a fear lest,

if they openly confessed its impotence, they might, in the first place,

incur the derision of the philosophers, with whom they were then

contending; and, in the next place, might administer to the flesh, of

itself naturally too torpid to all that is good, a fresh occasion of

slothfulness. To avoid delivering any principle deemed absurd in the

common opinion of mankind, they made it their study, therefore, to

compromise between the doctrine of the Scripture and the dogmas of the

philosophers. Yet it appears from their language, that they principally

regarded the latter consideration, that they might leave no room for

slothfulness. Chrysostom says, “Since God has placed good and evil things

in our power, he has given us freedom of choice; and he constrains not the

unwilling, but embraces the willing.” Again: “Oftentimes a bad man, if he

will, is changed into a good one; and a good one falls into inactivity,

and becomes bad; because God has given us naturally a free will, and

imposes no necessity upon us, but, having provided suitable remedies,

permits the event to depend entirely on the mind of the patient.” Again:

“As without the assistance of Divine grace we can never do any thing

aright, so unless we bring what is our own, we shall never be able to gain

the favour of heaven.” He had before said, “That it may not be entirely of

the Divine assistance, it behoves us also to bring something.” And this is

an expression very familiar with him: “Let us bring what is ours; God will

supply the rest.” Agreeably to which Jerome says, “That it belongs to us

to begin, and to God to complete; that it is ours to offer what we can,

but his to supply our deficiencies.” In these sentences you see they

certainly attributed to man more than could justly be attributed to him

towards the pursuit of virtue; because they supposed it impossible to

awaken our innate torpor, otherwise than by arguing that this alone

constitutes our guilt; but with what great dexterity they did it, we shall

see in the course of our work. That the passages which we have recited are

exceedingly erroneous, will be shortly proved. Although the Greeks, beyond

all others, and among them particularly Chrysostom, have exceeded all

bounds in extolling the ability of the human will, yet such are the

variations, fluctuations, or obscurities of all the fathers, except

Augustine, on this subject, that scarcely any thing certain can be

concluded from their writings. Therefore we shall not scrupulously

enumerate the particular opinions of them all, but shall at times select

from one and another so much as the explication of the argument shall

appear to require. Succeeding writers, being every one for himself

ambitious of the praise of subtlety in the defence of human nature,

gradually and successively fell into opinions more and more erroneous;

till at length man was commonly supposed to be corrupted only in his

sensual part, but to have his will in a great measure, and his reason

entirely, unimpaired. In the mean time, it was proclaimed by every tongue,

that the natural talents in men were corrupted, but the supernatural taken

away—an expression of Augustine, of the import of which scarcely one man

in a hundred had the slightest idea. For myself, if I meant clearly to

state wherein the corruption of nature consists, I could easily content

myself with this language. But it is of great importance to examine with

attention what ability is retained by man in his present state, corrupted

in all the parts of his nature, and deprived of supernatural gifts. This

subject, therefore, has been treated in too philosophical a manner by

those who gloried in being the disciples of Christ. For the Latins have

always retained the term _free will_, as though man still remained in his

primitive integrity. And the Greeks have not been ashamed to use an

expression much more arrogant; for they called it αυτεξουσιον, denoting

that man possesses sovereign power over himself. Since all men, therefore,

even the vulgar, are tinctured with this principle, that man is endued

with free will, and some of those who would be thought intelligent know

not how far this freedom extends,—let us first examine the meaning of the

term, and then let us describe, according to the simplicity of the

Scripture, the power which man naturally possesses to do either good or

evil. What _free will_ is, though the expression frequently occurs in all

writers, few have defined. Yet Origen appears to have advanced a position

to which they all assented, when he calls it a power of _reason_ to

discern good and evil, of _will_ to choose either. Nor does Augustine

differ from him, when he teaches that it is a power of reason and will, by

which good is chosen when grace assists; and evil, when grace is wanting.

Bernard, while he affects greater subtlety, has expressed himself with

more obscurity: he says, it is a consent on account of the liberty of

will, which cannot be lost, and the judgment of reason, which cannot be

avoided. The definition of Anselm is not sufficiently plain, who states it

to be a power of preserving rectitude for its own sake. Therefore Peter

Lombard and the schoolmen have rather adopted the definition of Augustine,

because it was more explicit, and did not exclude the grace of God,

without which they perceived that the will had no power of itself. But

they also make such additions of their own, as they conceived to be either

better, or conducive to further explication. First, they agree that the

word _arbitrium_, _will_ or _choice_, should rather be referred to reason,

whose office it is to discern between good and evil; and that the epithet

_free_ belongs properly to the faculty of the will, which is capable of

being inclined to either. Wherefore, since liberty belongs properly to the

will, Thomas Aquinas says, that it would be a very good definition, if

free will were called _an elective power_, which, being composed of

understanding and appetite, inclines rather to appetite. We see where they

represent the power of free will to be placed; that is, in the reason and

will. It now remains briefly to inquire how much they attribute

respectively to each.

V. Common and external things, which do not pertain to the kingdom of God,

they generally consider as subject to the free determination of man; but

true righteousness they refer to the special grace of God and spiritual

regeneration. With a view to support this notion, the author of the

treatise “On the Vocation of the Gentiles” enumerates three kinds of

will—the first a sensitive, the second an animal, and the third a

spiritual one; the two former of which he states to be freely exercised by

us, and the last to be the work of the Holy Spirit in us. The truth or

falsehood of this shall be discussed in the proper place; for my design at

present is briefly to recite the opinions of others, not to refute them.

Hence, when writers treat of free will, their first inquiry respects not

its ability in civil or external actions, but its power to obey the Divine

law. Though I confess the latter to be the principal question, yet I think

the other ought not to be wholly neglected; and for this opinion I hope to

give a very good reason. But a distinction has prevailed in the schools,

which enumerates three kinds of liberty—the first, freedom from necessity,

the second, freedom from sin, the third, freedom from misery; of which the

first is naturally inherent in man, so that nothing can ever deprive him

of it: the other two are lost by sin. This distinction I readily admit,

except that it improperly confounds necessity with coaction. And the wide

difference between these things, with the necessity of its being

considered, will appear in another place.

VI. This being admitted will place it beyond all doubt, that man is not

possessed of free will for good works, unless he be assisted by grace, and

that special grace which is bestowed on the elect alone in regeneration.

For I stop not to notice those fanatics, who pretend that grace is offered

equally and promiscuously to all. But it does not yet appear, whether he

is altogether deprived of power to do good, or whether he yet possesses

some power, though small and feeble; which of itself can do nothing, but

by the assistance of grace does also perform its part. Lombard, in order

to establish this notion, informs us that two sorts of grace are necessary

to qualify us for the performance of good works. One he calls operative,

by which we efficaciously will what is good; the other coöperative, which

attends as auxiliary to a good will. This division I dislike, because,

while he attributes an efficacious desire of what is good to the grace of

God, he insinuates that man has of his own nature antecedent, though

ineffectual, desires after what is good; as Bernard asserts that a good

will is the work of God, but yet allows that man is self‐impelled to

desire such a good will. But this is very remote from the meaning of

Augustine, from whom, however, Lombard would be thought to have borrowed

this division. The second part of it offends me by its ambiguity, which

has produced a very erroneous interpretation. For they have supposed that

we coöperate with the second sort of Divine grace, because we have it in

our power either to frustrate the first sort by rejecting it, or to

confirm it by our obedience to it. The author of the treatise “On the

Vocation of the Gentiles” expresses it thus—that those who have the use of

reason and judgment are at liberty to depart from grace, that they may be

rewarded for not having departed, and that what is impossible without the

coöperation of the Spirit, may be imputed to their merits, by whose will

it might have been prevented. These two things I have thought proper to

notice as I proceed, that the reader may perceive how much I dissent from

the sounder schoolmen. For I differ considerably more from the later

sophists, as they have departed much further from the judgment of

antiquity. However, we understand from this division, in what sense they

have ascribed free will to man. For Lombard at length pronounces, that we

are not therefore possessed of free will, because we have an equal power

to do or to think either good or evil, but only because we are free from

constraint. And this liberty is not diminished, although we are corrupt,

and the slaves of sin, and capable of doing nothing but sin.

VII. Then man will be said to possess free will in this sense, not that he

has an equally free election of good and evil, but because he does evil

voluntarily, and not by constraint. That, indeed, is very true; but what

end could it answer to decorate a thing so diminutive with a title so

superb? Egregious liberty indeed, if man be not compelled to serve sin,

but yet is such a willing slave, that his will is held in bondage by the

fetters of sin. I really abominate contentions about words, which disturb

the Church without producing any good effect; but I think that we ought

religiously to avoid words which signify any absurdity, particularly when

they lead to a pernicious error. How few are there, pray, who, when they

hear free will attributed to man, do not immediately conceive, that he has

the sovereignty over his own mind and will, and is able by his innate

power to incline himself to whatever he pleases? But it will be said, all

danger from these expressions will be removed, if the people are carefully

apprized of their signification. But, on the contrary, the human mind is

naturally so prone to falsehood, that it will sooner imbibe error from one

single expression, than truth from a prolix oration; of which we have a

more certain experiment than could be wished in this very word. For

neglecting that explanation of the fathers, almost all their successors

have been drawn into a fatal self‐confidence, by adhering to the original

and proper signification of the word.

VIII. But if we regard the authority of the fathers—though they have the

term continually in their mouths, they at the same time declare with what

extent of signification they use it. First of all, Augustine, who

hesitates not to call the will a slave. He expresses his displeasure in

one place against those who deny free will; but he declares the principal

reason for it, when he says, “Only let no man dare so to deny the freedom

of the will, as to desire to excuse sin.” Elsewhere he plainly confesses,

that the human will is not free without the Spirit, since it is subject to

its lusts, by which it is conquered and bound. Again: that when the will

was overcome by the sin into which it fell, nature began to be destitute

of liberty. Again: that man, having made a wrong use of his free will,

lost both it and himself. Again: that free will is in a state of

captivity, so that it can do nothing towards righteousness. Again: that

the will cannot be free, which has not been liberated by Divine grace.

Again: that the Divine justice is not fulfilled, while the law commands,

and man acts from his own strength; but when the Spirit assists, and the

human will obeys, not as being free, but as liberated by God. And he

briefly assigns the cause of all this, when, in another place, he tells

us, that man at his creation received great strength of free will, but

lost it by sin. Therefore, having shown that free will is the result of

grace, he sharply inveighs against those who arrogate it to themselves

without grace. “How, then,” says he, “do miserable men dare to be proud of

free will, before they are liberated, or of their own strength, if they

have been liberated?” Nor do they consider that the term _free will_

signifies liberty. But “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is

liberty.”(560) If, therefore, they are the slaves of sin, why do they

boast of free will? “For of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he

brought in bondage.”(561) But if they have been liberated, why do they

boast as of their own work? Are they so much at liberty as to refuse to be

the servants of him who says, “Without me ye can do nothing”?(562)

Besides, in another place, also, he seems to discountenance the use of

that expression, when he says that the will is free, but not liberated;

free from righteousness, enslaved to sin. This sentiment he also repeats

and applies in another place, where he maintains that man is not free from

righteousness, but by the choice of his will, and that he is not made free

from sin, but by the grace of the Saviour. He who declares that human

liberty is nothing but an emancipation or manumission from righteousness,

evidently exposes it to ridicule as an unmeaning term. Therefore, if any

man allows himself the use of this term without any erroneous

signification, he will not be troubled by me on that account: but because

I think that it cannot be retained without great danger, and that, on the

contrary, its abolition would be very beneficial to the Church, I would

neither use it myself, nor wish it to be used by others who may consult my

opinion.

IX. Perhaps I may be thought to have raised a great prejudice against

myself, by confessing that all the ecclesiastical writers, except

Augustine, have treated this subject with such ambiguities or variations,

that nothing certain can be learned from their writings. For some will

interpret this, as though I intended to deprive them of the right of

giving their suffrages, because their opinions are all adverse to mine.

But I have had no other object in view than simply and faithfully to

consult the benefit of pious minds, who, if they wait to discover the

sentiments of the fathers on this subject, will fluctuate in perpetual

uncertainty. At one time they teach man, despoiled of all strength of free

will, to have recourse to grace alone; at another, they either furnish, or

appear to furnish, him with armour naturally his own. Yet that, amidst all

this ambiguity of expression, esteeming the strength of man as little or

nothing, they have ascribed the praise of every thing that is good

entirely to the Holy Spirit, is not difficult to prove, if I introduce

some passages from them, in which this sentiment is clearly maintained.

For what is the meaning of that assertion of Cyprian, so frequently

celebrated by Augustine, “That we ought to glory in nothing, because we

have nothing of our own;” but that man, completely impoverished in

himself, should learn to depend entirely on God? What is the meaning of

that observation of Augustine and Eucherius, when they represent Christ as

the tree of life, to whom whosoever shall have stretched forth his hand

shall live; and free will as the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and

say that whosoever forsakes the grace of God and tastes of it shall die?

What is the meaning of that assertion of Chrysostom, that every man by

nature is not only a sinner, but altogether sin? If we have not one good

quality, if from his head to his feet man be entirely sin, if it be wrong

even to try how far the power of the will extends,—how, then, can it be

right to divide the praise of a good work between God and man? I could

introduce many such passages from other fathers; but lest any one should

cavil, that I select only those things which favour my own cause, but

artfully omit those which oppose it, I refrain from such a recital. I

venture to affirm, however, that though they sometimes too highly extol

free will, yet their design was to teach man to discard all reliance on

his own power, and to consider all his strength as residing in God alone.

I now proceed to a simple explication of the truth in considering the

nature of man.

X. But I am obliged to repeat here, what I premised in the beginning of

this chapter—that he who feels the most consternation, from a

consciousness of his own calamity, poverty, nakedness, and ignominy, has

made the greatest proficiency in the knowledge of himself. For there is no

danger that man will divest himself of too much, provided he learns that

what is wanting in him may be recovered in God. But he cannot assume to

himself even the least particle beyond his just right, without ruining

himself with vain confidence, and incurring the guilt of enormous

sacrilege, by transferring to himself the honour which belongs to God. And

whenever our minds are pestered with this cupidity, to desire to have

something of our own, which may reside in ourselves rather than in God, we

may know that this idea is suggested by the same counsellor, who excited

in our first parents the desire of resembling “gods, knowing good and

evil.”(563) If that term be diabolical, which exalts man in his own

opinion, let us not admit it, unless we wish to take the counsel of an

enemy. It is pleasant, indeed, to have so much innate strength as to

confide in and be satisfied with ourselves. But from being allured into

this vain confidence, let us be deterred by the many awful sentences which

severely humble us to the dust; such as “Cursed be the man that trusteth

in man, and maketh flesh his arm.”(564) Again: “God delighteth not in the

strength of the horse; he taketh not pleasure in the legs of a man. The

Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear him, in those that hope in his

mercy.”(565) Again: “He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have

no might he increaseth strength. Even the youths shall faint and be weary,

and the young men shall utterly fall; but they that wait upon the Lord

shall renew their strength.”(566) The tendency of all which is to prevent

us from depending, in the smallest degree, on our own strength, if we wish

God to be propitious to us, who “resisteth the proud, but giveth grace

unto the humble.”(567) Then let us remember these promises; “I will pour

water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground:”(568)

again; “Ho! every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters:”(569) which

declare, that none are admitted to a participation of the blessings of

God, but those who are pining away with a sense of their own poverty. Nor

should such promises as this of Isaiah be overlooked: “The sun shall be no

more thy light by day; neither for brightness shall the moon give light

unto thee; but the Lord shall be unto thee an everlasting light.”(570) The

Lord certainly does not deprive his servants of the splendour of the sun

or of the moon; but because he will appear exclusively glorious in them,

he calls off their confidence to a great distance, even from those things

which in their opinion are the most excellent.

XI. I have always, indeed, been exceedingly pleased with this observation

of Chrysostom, that humility is the foundation of our philosophy; but

still more with this of Augustine: “As a rhetorician,” says he, “on being

interrogated what was the first thing in the rules of eloquence, replied,

‘Pronunciation;’ and on being separately interrogated what was the second,

and what was the third, gave the same reply; so, should any one

interrogate me concerning the rules of the Christian religion, the first,

second, and third, I would always reply, Humility.” Now, he does not

consider it as humility, when a man, conscious to himself of some little

power, abstains from pride and haughtiness; but when he truly feels his

condition to be such that he has no refuge but in humility, as he

elsewhere declares. “Let no man,” says he, “flatter himself: of himself he

is a devil: every blessing he enjoys is only from God. For what have you

that is your own, but sin? Take to yourself sin, which is your own; for

righteousness belongs to God.” Again: “Why do men so presume on the

ability of nature? It is wounded, maimed, distressed, and ruined. It needs

a true confession, not a false defence.” Again: “When every one knows,

that in himself he is nothing, and that he cannot assist himself, the arms

are broken within him, and the contentions are subsided.” But it is

necessary that all the weapons of impiety should be broken in pieces and

consumed, that you may remain unarmed, and have no help in yourself. The

greater your weakness is in yourself, so much the more the Lord assists

you. So in the seventieth Psalm he forbids us to remember our own

righteousness, that we may know the righteousness of God; and shows that

God so recommends his grace to us, that we may know that we are nothing,

and are solely dependent on the Divine mercy, being of ourselves

altogether evil. Here, then, let us not contend with God concerning our

right, as though what is attributed to him were deducted from our welfare.

For as our humility is his exaltation, so the confession of our humility

has an immediate remedy in his commiseration. Now, I do not expect that a

man unconvinced should voluntarily submit, and, if he has any strength,

withdraw his attention from it to be reduced to true humility; but I

require, that, discarding the malady of self‐love and love of strife,

which blinds him, and leads him to entertain too high an opinion of

himself, he should seriously contemplate himself in the faithful mirror of

the Scripture.

XII. And, indeed, I much approve of that common observation which has been

borrowed from Augustine, that the natural talents in man have been

corrupted by sin, but that of the supernatural ones he has been wholly

deprived. For by the latter are intended, both the light of faith and

righteousness, which would be sufficient for the attainment of a heavenly

life and eternal felicity. Therefore, when he revolted from the Divine

government, he was at the same time deprived of those supernatural

endowments, which had been given him for the hope of eternal salvation.

Hence it follows, that he is exiled from the kingdom of God, in such a

manner, that all the affections relating to the happy life of the soul,

are also extinguished in him, till he recovers them by the grace of

regeneration. Such are faith, love to God, charity towards our neighbours,

and an attachment to holiness and righteousness. All these things, being

restored by Christ, are esteemed adventitious and preternatural; and

therefore we conclude that they had been lost. Again, soundness of mind

and rectitude of heart were also destroyed; and this is the corruption of

the natural talents. For although we retain some portion of understanding

and judgment together with the will, yet we cannot say that our mind is

perfect and sound, which is oppressed with debility and immersed in

profound darkness; and the depravity of our will is sufficiently known.

Reason, therefore, by which man distinguishes between good and evil, by

which he understands and judges, being a natural talent, could not be

totally destroyed, but is partly debilitated, partly vitiated, so that it

exhibits nothing but deformity and ruin. In this sense John says, that

“the light” still “shineth in darkness,” but that “the darkness

comprehendeth it not.”(571) In this passage both these ideas are clearly

expressed—that some sparks continue to shine in the nature of man, even in

its corrupt and degenerate state, which prove him to be a rational

creature, and different from the brutes, because he is endued with

understanding; and yet that this light is smothered by so much ignorance,

that it cannot act with any degree of efficacy. So the will, being

inseparable from the nature of man, is not annihilated; but it is fettered

by depraved and inordinate desires, so that it cannot aspire after any

thing that is good. This, indeed, is a complete definition, but requires

more diffuse explication. Therefore, that the order of our discourse may

proceed according to the distinction we have stated, in which we divided

the soul into understanding and will, let us first examine the power of

the understanding. To condemn it to perpetual blindness, so as to leave it

no intelligence in any thing, is repugnant, not only to the Divine word,

but also to the experience of common sense. For we perceive in the mind of

man some desire of investigating truth, towards which he would have no

inclination, but from some relish of it previously possessed. It therefore

indicates some perspicuity in the human understanding, that it is

attracted with a love of truth; the neglect of which in the brutes argues

gross sense without reason; although this desire, small as it is, faints

even before its entrance on its course, because it immediately terminates

in vanity. For the dulness of the human mind renders it incapable of

pursuing the right way of investigating the truth; it wanders through a

variety of errors, and groping, as it were, in the shades of darkness,

often stumbles, till at length it is lost in its wanderings; thus, in its

search after truth, it betrays its incapacity to seek and find it. It also

labours under another grievous malady, frequently not discerning what

those things are, the true knowledge of which it would be proper to

attain, and therefore torments itself with a ridiculous curiosity in

fruitless and unimportant inquiries. To things most necessary to be known

it either never adverts, or contemptuously and rarely digresses; but

scarcely ever studies them with serious application. This depravity being

a common subject of complaint with heathen writers, all men are clearly

proved to have been implicated in it. Wherefore Solomon, in his

Ecclesiastes, after having enumerated those pursuits in which men consider

themselves as displaying superior wisdom, concludes with pronouncing them

to be vain and frivolous.

XIII. Yet its attempts are not always so fruitless, but that it makes some

discoveries, particularly when it applies itself to inferior things. Nor

is it so stupid, as to be without some slender notion also of superior

ones, however negligently it attends to the investigation of them; but it

possesses not an equal ability for both. For it is when it goes beyond the

limits of the present life, that it is chiefly convinced of its own

imbecility. Wherefore, that we may better perceive how far it proceeds in

every case according to the degrees of its ability, it will be useful for

us to propose the following distinction; that there is one understanding

for terrestrial things, and another for celestial ones. I call those

things terrestrial which do not pertain to God and his kingdom, to true

righteousness, or to the blessedness of a future life; but which relate

entirely to the present life, and are in some sense confined within the

limits of it. Celestial things are the pure knowledge of God, the method

of true righteousness, and the mysteries of the heavenly kingdom. In the

first class are included civil polity, domestic economy, all the

mechanical arts and liberal sciences; in the second, the knowledge of God

and of the Divine will, and the rule for conformity to it in our lives.

Now, in regard to the first class, it must be confessed, that as man is

naturally a creature inclined to society, he has also by nature an

instinctive propensity to cherish and preserve that society; and therefore

we perceive in the minds of all men general impressions of civil probity

and order. Hence it is that not a person can be found who does not

understand, that all associations of men ought to be governed by laws, or

who does not conceive in his mind the principles of those laws. Hence that

perpetual consent of all nations, as well as all individuals, to the laws,

because the seeds of them are innate in all mankind, without any

instructor or legislator. I regard not the dissensions and contests which

afterwards arise, while some desire to invert all justice and propriety,

to break down the barriers of the laws, and to substitute mere cupidity in

the room of justice, as is the case with thieves and robbers. Others—which

is a fault more common—think that unjust which legislators have sanctioned

as just; and, on the contrary, pronounce that to be laudable which they

have forbidden. For the former of these hate not the laws from an

ignorance that they are good and sacred; but, inflamed with the violence

of their passions, manifestly contend against reason, and under the

influence of their lawless desires, execrate that which their judgments

approve. The controversy of the latter of these is by no means repugnant

to that original idea of equity which we have mentioned; for when men

dispute with each other on the comparative merits of different laws, it

implies their consent to some general rule of equity. This clearly argues

the debility of the human mind, which halts and staggers even when it

appears to follow the right way. Yet it is certainly true, that some seeds

of political order are sown in the minds of all. And this is a powerful

argument, that in the constitution of this life no man is destitute of the

light of reason.

XIV. Next follow the arts, both liberal and manual; for learning which, as

there is in all of us a certain aptitude, they also discover the strength

of human ingenuity. But though all men are not capable of learning every

art, yet it is a very sufficient proof of the common energy, that scarcely

an individual can be found, whose sagacity does not exert itself in some

particular art. Nor have they an energy and facility only in learning, but

also in inventing something new in every art, or in amplifying and

improving what they have learned from their predecessors. Though this

excited Plato erroneously to assert that such an apprehension is only a

recollection of what the soul knew in its preëxistent state, before it

came into the body, it constrains us, by the most cogent reasons, to

acknowledge that the principle of it is innate in the human mind. These

instances, therefore, plainly prove, that men are endued with a general

apprehension of reason and understanding. Yet it is such a universal

blessing, that every one for himself ought to acknowledge it as the

peculiar favour of God. To this gratitude the Author of nature himself

abundantly excites us, by his creation of idiots, in whom he represents

the state of the human soul without his illumination, which, though

natural to all, is nevertheless a gratuitous gift of his beneficence

towards every individual. But the invention and methodical teaching of

these arts, and the more intimate and excellent knowledge of them, which

is peculiar to a few, are no solid argument of general perspicacity; yet,

belonging to both the pious and the impious, they are justly numbered

among the natural talents.

XV. Whenever, therefore, we meet with heathen writers, let us learn from

that light of truth which is admirably displayed in their works, that the

human mind, fallen as it is, and corrupted from its integrity, is yet

invested and adorned by God with excellent talents. If we believe that the

Spirit of God is the only fountain of truth, we shall neither reject nor

despise the truth itself, wherever it shall appear, unless we wish to

insult the Spirit of God; for the gifts of the Spirit cannot be

undervalued without offering contempt and reproach to the Spirit himself.

Now, shall we deny the light of truth to the ancient lawyers, who have

delivered such just principles of civil order and polity? Shall we say

that the philosophers were blind in their exquisite contemplation and in

their scientific description of nature? Shall we say that those, who by

the art of logic have taught us to speak in a manner consistent with

reason, were destitute of understanding themselves? Shall we accuse those

of insanity, who by the study of medicine have been exercising their

industry for our advantage? What shall we say of all the mathematics?

Shall we esteem them the delirious ravings of madmen? On the contrary, we

shall not be able even to read the writings of the ancients on these

subjects without great admiration; we shall admire them, because we shall

be constrained to acknowledge them to be truly excellent. And shall we

esteem any thing laudable or excellent, which we do not recognize as

proceeding from God? Let us, then, be ashamed of such great ingratitude,

which was not to be charged on the heathen poets, who confessed that

philosophy, and legislation, and useful arts, were the inventions of their

gods. Therefore, since it appears that those whom the Scripture styles

“natural men,” ψυχικους, have discovered such acuteness and perspicacity

in the investigation of sublunary things, let us learn from such examples,

how many good qualities the Lord has left to the nature of man, since it

has been despoiled of what is truly good.

XVI. Yet let us not forget that these are most excellent gifts of the

Divine Spirit, which for the common benefit of mankind he dispenses to

whomsoever he pleases. For if it was necessary that the Spirit of God

should infuse into Bezaleel and Aholiab the understanding and skill

requisite for the construction of the tabernacle,(572) we need not wonder

if the knowledge of those things, which are most excellent in human life,

is said to be communicated to us by the Spirit of God. Nor is there any

reason for inquiring, what intercourse with the Spirit is enjoyed by the

impious who are entirely alienated from God. For when the Spirit of God is

said to dwell only in the faithful, that is to be understood of the Spirit

of sanctification, by whom we are consecrated as temples to God himself.

Yet it is equally by the energy of the same Spirit, that God replenishes,

actuates, and quickens all creatures, and that, according to the property

of each species which he has given it by the law of creation. Now, if it

has pleased the Lord that we should be assisted in physics, logic,

mathematics, and other arts and sciences, by the labour and ministry of

the impious, let us make use of them; lest, if we neglect to use the

blessings therein freely offered to us by God, we suffer the just

punishment of our negligence. But, lest any one should suppose a man to be

truly happy, when he is admitted to possess such powerful energies for the

discovery of truth relating to the elements of this world, it must

likewise be added, that all that faculty of understanding, and the

understanding which is the consequence of it, is, in the sight of God, a

fleeting and transitory thing, where there is not a solid foundation of

truth. For the sentiment of Augustine, with whom, as we have observed, the

Master of the Sentences and the Schoolmen have been constrained to

coincide, is strictly true—that as the gratuitous or supernatural gifts

were taken away from man after the fall, so these natural ones which

remained have been corrupted; not that they can be defiled in themselves

as proceeding from God, but because they have ceased to be pure to

polluted man, so that he can obtain no praise from them.

XVII. Let us conclude, therefore, that it is evident in all mankind, that

reason is a peculiar property of our nature, which distinguishes us from

the brute animals, as sense constitutes the difference between them and

things inanimate. For whereas some are born fools and idiots, that defect

obscures not the general goodness of God. Such a spectacle should rather

teach us that what we retain ought justly to be ascribed to his

indulgence; because, had it not been for his mercy to us, our defection

would have been followed by the total destruction of our nature. But

whereas some excel in penetration, others possess superior judgment, and

others have a greater aptitude to learn this or that art, in this variety

God displays his goodness to us, that no one may arrogate to himself as

his own what proceeds merely from the Divine liberality. For whence is it

that one is more excellent than another, unless it be to exalt in our

common nature the special goodness of God, which in the preterition of

many, proclaims that it is under an obligation to none? Moreover, God

inspires particular motions according to the vocation of each individual;

of which many examples occur in the book of the Judges, where the Spirit

of the Lord is said to “come upon” those whom he called to govern the

people.(573) Finally, in all important actions there is a special

instinct; for which reason it is said that Saul was followed by valiant

men, “whose hearts God had touched.”(574) And Samuel, when he predicts his

inauguration into the kingdom, thus expresses himself: “The Spirit of the

Lord will come upon thee, and thou shalt be turned into another man.”(575)

And this is extended to the whole course of his government; as it is

afterwards narrated concerning David, that “the Spirit of the Lord came

upon him from that day forward.”(576) But the same expression is used in

other places in reference to particular impulses. Even in Homer, men are

said to excel in abilities, not only as Jupiter has distributed to every

one, but according as he guides him from day to day. And experience

clearly shows, since the most ingenious and sagacious of mankind

frequently stand still in profound astonishment, that the minds of men are

subject to the power and will of God to govern them every moment; for

which reason it is said, that “he taketh away the heart of the chief

people of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a wilderness where

there is no way.”(577) Yet in this diversity we perceive some remaining

marks of the Divine image, which distinguish the human race in general

from all the other creatures.

XVIII. We now proceed to show what human reason can discover, when it

comes to the kingdom of God, and to that spiritual wisdom, which consists

chiefly in three things—to know God, his paternal favour towards us, on

which depends our salvation, and the method of regulating our lives

according to the rule of the law. In the two first points, but especially

in the second, the most sagacious of mankind are blinder than moles. I do

not deny that some judicious and apposite observations concerning God may

be found scattered in the writings of the philosophers; but they always

betray a confused imagination. The Lord afforded them, as we have before

observed, some slight sense of his Divinity, that they might not be able

to plead ignorance as an excuse for impiety, and sometimes impelled them

to utter things, by the confession of which they might themselves be

convinced. But they saw the objects presented to their view in such a

manner, that by the sight they were not even directed to the truth, much

less did they arrive at it; just as a man, who is travelling by night

across a field, sees the coruscations of lightning extending for a moment

far and wide, but with such an evanescent view, that so far from being

assisted by them in proceeding on his journey, he is re‐absorbed in the

darkness of the night before he can advance a single step. Besides, those

few truths, with which they, as it were, fortuitously besprinkle their

books, with what numerous and monstrous falsehoods are they defiled!

Lastly, they never had the smallest idea of that certainty of the Divine

benevolence towards us, without which the human understanding must

necessarily be full of immense confusion. Human reason, then, neither

approaches, nor tends, nor directs its views towards this truth, to

understand who is the true God, or in what character he will manifest

himself to us.

XIX. But because, from our being intoxicated with a false opinion of our

own perspicacity, we do not without great difficulty suffer ourselves to

be persuaded, that in Divine things our reason is totally blind and

stupid, it will be better, I think, to confirm it by testimonies of

Scripture, than to support it by arguments. This is beautifully taught by

John, in that passage which I lately cited, where he says that, from the

beginning, “in God was life, and the life was the light of men. And the

light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not.”(578) He

indicates, indeed, that the soul of man is irradiated with a beam of

Divine light, so that it is never wholly destitute either of some little

flame, or at least of a spark of it; but he likewise suggests that it

cannot comprehend God by that illumination. And this because all his

sagacity, as far as respects the knowledge of God, is mere blindness. For

when the Spirit calls men “darkness,” he at once totally despoils them of

the faculty of spiritual understanding. Wherefore he asserts that

believers, who receive Christ, are “born not of blood, nor of the will of

the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God;”(579) as though he had said

that the flesh is not capable of such sublime wisdom as to conceive of God

and Divine things, without being illuminated by the Spirit of God; as

Christ testified that his being known by Peter was owing to a special

revelation of the Father.(580)

XX. If we were firmly persuaded of what, indeed, ought not to be

questioned, that our nature is destitute of all those things which our

heavenly Father confers on his elect through the Spirit of regeneration,

here would be no cause of hesitation. For this is the language of the

faithful by the mouth of the Prophet: “With thee is the fountain of life;

in thy light we shall see light.”(581) The Apostle confirms the same, when

he says that “no man can say that Jesus is Lord, but by the Holy

Ghost.”(582) And John the Baptist, perceiving the stupidity of his

disciples, exclaims, that “a man can receive nothing except it be given

him from above.”(583) That by “gift” he intends a special illumination,

not a common faculty of nature, is evident from the complaint which he

makes of the inefficacy of the many discourses in which he had recommended

Christ to his disciples. “I see that words are unavailing to instruct the

minds of men in Divine things, unless God give them understanding by his

Spirit.” And Moses also, when he reproaches the people for their

forgetfulness, yet at the same time remarks, that they cannot be wise in

the mysteries of God but by the Divine favour. He says, “Thine eyes have

seen the signs and those great miracles; yet the Lord hath not given you a

heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear.”(584) What more

would he express, if he had called them blockheads, destitute of all

understanding in the consideration of the works of God? Whence the Lord,

by the Prophet, promises, as an instance of peculiar grace, that he will

give the Israelites “a heart to know” him;(585) plainly suggesting that

the mind of man has no spiritual wisdom any further than as it is

enlightened by him. Christ also has clearly confirmed this by his own

declaration, that no man can come to him, except the Father draw him.(586)

What! is he not himself the lively image of the Father, representing to us

all “the brightness of his glory”?(587) Therefore, he could not better

manifest the extent of our capacity for the knowledge of God, than when he

affirms that we have no eyes to behold his image where it is so plainly

exhibited. What! did he not descend to the earth in order to discover to

men the will of the Father? And did he not faithfully fulfil the object of

his mission? He certainly did; but his preaching is not at all

efficacious, unless the way to the heart be laid open by the internal

teaching of the Spirit. Therefore, none come to him but they who have

heard and learned of the Father. What is the nature of this hearing and

learning? It is when the Spirit, by a wonderful and peculiar power, forms

the ears to hear and the mind to understand. And lest this should appear

strange, he cites the prophecy of Isaiah, where, predicting the

restoration of the Church, he says, that all those who shall be saved

“shall be taught of the Lord.” If God there predicts something peculiar

concerning his elect, it is evident that he speaks not of that kind of

instruction which is common also to the impious and profane. It must be

concluded, therefore, that there is no admission into the kingdom of God,

but for him whose mind has been renewed by the illumination of the Holy

Spirit. But Paul expresses himself more clearly than all the others.

Having professedly entered upon this argument, after he has condemned all

human wisdom as folly and vanity, and even reduced it to nothing, he comes

to this conclusion: “The natural man receiveth not the things of the

Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know

them, because they are spiritually discerned.”(588) Whom does he call the

natural man? him who depends on the light of nature. He, I say, has no

apprehension of the mysteries of God. Why so? because through slothfulness

he neglects them? Nay, even his utmost endeavours can avail nothing,

“because they are spiritually discerned.” This implies, that being

entirely concealed from human perspicacity, they are discovered only by

the revelation of the Spirit; so that where the illumination of the Spirit

is not enjoyed, they are deemed foolishness itself. He had before extolled

“the things which God hath prepared for them that love him”(589) above the

capacity of our eyes, our ears, and our minds; he had even asserted that

human wisdom was a kind of veil, by which the mind is prevented from a

discovery of God. What do we want more? The Apostle pronounces that “God

hath made foolish the wisdom of this world;”(590) and shall we ascribe to

it such a degree of sagacity, as would enable it to penetrate to God, and

to the most secret recesses of the heavenly kingdom? Far be from us such

extreme stupidity.

XXI. That which he here detracts from men, he in another place ascribes

exclusively to God. Praying for the Ephesians, he says, “May God, the

Father of glory, give unto you the Spirit of wisdom and revelation.”(591)

You hear now that all wisdom and revelation is the gift of God. What

follows? “The eyes of your understanding being enlightened.” If they need

a new revelation, they are certainly blind of themselves. It follows,

“that ye may know what is the hope of your calling,” &c. He confesses,

then, that the minds of men are not naturally capable of so great

knowledge, as to know their own calling. Nor let any Pelagian here object,

that God assists this stupidity or ignorance, when, by the teaching of his

word, he directs the human understanding to that which, without a guide,

it never could have attained. For David had the law, in which all

desirable wisdom was comprised: yet, not content with this, he requested

that his eyes might be opened to consider the mysteries of that law.(592)

By this expression he clearly signifies, that the sun arises on the earth,

where the word of God shines on mankind; but that they derive little

advantage from it, till he himself either gives them eyes or opens them,

who is therefore called “the Father of lights;”(593) because wherever he

shines not by his Spirit, every thing is covered with darkness. Thus also

the Apostles were rightly and abundantly taught by the best of all

teachers: yet, if they had not needed the Spirit of truth(594) to instruct

their minds in that very doctrine which they had previously heard, they

would not have been commanded to expect him. If, in imploring any favour

of God, we confess our need, and if his promising it argues our poverty,

let no man hesitate to acknowledge, that he is incapable of understanding

the mysteries of God, any further than he has been illuminated by Divine

grace. He who attributes to himself more understanding, is so much the

blinder, because he does not perceive and acknowledge his blindness.

XXII. It remains for us to notice the third branch of knowledge, relating

to the rule for the proper regulation of our life, which we truly

denominate the knowledge of works of righteousness; in which the human

mind discovers somewhat more acuteness than in the two former particulars.

For the Apostle declares, that “when the Gentiles, which have not the law,

do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law,

are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their

hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean

while accusing or else excusing one another.”(595) If the Gentiles have

naturally the righteousness of the law engraven on their minds, we

certainly cannot say that they are altogether ignorant how they ought to

live. And no sentiment is more commonly admitted, than that man is

sufficiently instructed in a right rule of life by that natural law of

which the Apostle there speaks. But let us examine for what purpose this

knowledge of the law was given to men; and then it will appear how far it

can conduct them towards the mark of reason and truth. This is evident

also from the words of Paul, if we observe the connection of the passage.

He had just before said, “As many as have sinned without law, shall also

perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged

by the law.” Because it might appear absurd that the Gentiles should

perish without any previous knowledge, he immediately subjoins that their

conscience supplies the place of a law to them, and is therefore

sufficient for their just condemnation. The end of the law of nature,

therefore, is, that man may be rendered inexcusable. Nor will it be

improperly defined in this manner—That it is a sentiment of the conscience

sufficiently discerning between good and evil, to deprive men of the

pretext of ignorance, while they are convicted even by their own

testimony. Such is the indulgence of man to himself, that in the

perpetration of evil actions he always gladly diverts his mind as much as

he possibly can from all sense of sin; which seems to have induced Plato

to suppose, that no sin is committed but through ignorance. This remark of

his would be correct, if the hypocrisy of men could go so far in the

concealment of their vices, as that the mind would have no consciousness

of its guilt before God. But since the sinner, though he endeavours to

evade the knowledge of good and evil imprinted on his mind, is frequently

brought back to it, and so is not permitted to shut his eyes, but

compelled, whether he will or not, sometimes to open them, there is no

truth in the assertion, that he sins only through ignorance.

XXIII. Themistius, another philosopher, with more truth, teaches that the

human understanding is very rarely deceived in the universal definition,

or in the essence of a thing; but that it falls into error, when it

proceeds further, and descends to the consideration of particular cases.

There is no man, who, if he be interrogated in a general way, will not

affirm homicide to be criminal; but he who conspires the death of his

enemy, deliberates on it as a good action. The adulterer will condemn

adultery in general; but will privately flatter himself in his own. Here

lies the ignorance—when a man, proceeding to a particular case, forgets

the rule which he had just fixed as a general position. This subject is

very excellently treated by Augustine, in his exposition of the first

verse of the fifty‐seventh Psalm. The observation of Themistius, however,

is not applicable to all cases; for sometimes the turpitude of the crime

so oppresses the conscience of the sinner, that, no longer imposing on

himself under the false image of virtue, he rushes into evil with the

knowledge of his mind and the consent of his will. This state of mind

produced these expressions, which we find in a heathen poet: “I see the

better path, and approve it; I pursue the worse.” Wherefore the

distinction of Aristotle between incontinence and intemperance appears to

me to be highly judicious. Where incontinence predominates, he says, that

by the perturbation of the affections or passions, the mind is deprived of

particular knowledge, so that in its own evil actions it observes not that

criminality which it generally discovers in similar actions committed by

other persons; and that when the perturbation has subsided, penitence

immediately succeeds; that intemperance is not extinguished or broken by a

sense of sin, but, on the contrary, obstinately persists in the choice of

evil which it has made.

XXIV. Now, when you hear of a universal judgment in man to discriminate

between good and evil, you must not imagine that it is every where sound

and perfect. For if the hearts of men be furnished with a capacity of

discriminating what is just and unjust, only that they may not excuse

themselves with the plea of ignorance, it is not at all necessary for them

to discover the truth in every point; it is quite sufficient if they

understand so much that they can avail themselves of no subterfuge, but

being convicted by the testimony of their own conscience, even now begin

to tremble at the tribunal of God. And if we will examine our reason by

the Divine law, which is the rule of perfect righteousness, we shall find

in how many respects it is blind. It certainly is far from reaching the

principal points in the first table; such as relate to trust in God,

ascribing to him the praise of goodness and righteousness, the invocation

of his name, and the true observation of the Sabbath. What mind, relying

on its natural powers, ever imagined that the legitimate worship of God

consisted in these and similar things? For when profane men intend to

worship God, though they are recalled a hundred times from their vain and

nugatory fancies, yet they are always relapsing into them again. They deny

that sacrifices are pleasing to God, unaccompanied with sincerity of

heart; thereby testifying that they have some ideas concerning the

spiritual worship of God, which, nevertheless, they immediately corrupt by

their false inventions. For it is impossible ever to persuade them that

every thing is true which the law prescribes concerning it. Shall I say

that the mind of man excels in discernment, which can neither understand

of itself, nor hearken to good instructions? Of the precepts of the second

table it has a little clearer understanding, since they are more

intimately connected with the preservation of civil society among men.

Though even here it is sometimes found to be deficient; for to every noble

mind it appears very absurd to submit to an unjust and imperious

despotism, if it be possible by any means to resist it. A uniform decision

of human reason is, that it is the mark of a servile and abject

disposition patiently to bear it, and of an honest and ingenuous mind to

shake it off. Nor is the revenging of injuries esteemed a vice among the

philosophers. But the Lord, condemning such excessive haughtiness of mind,

prescribes to his people that patience which is deemed dishonourable among

men. But in the universal observation of the law, the censure of

concupiscence wholly escapes our notice. For the natural man cannot be

brought to acknowledge the disorders of his inward affections. The light

of nature is smothered, before it approaches the first entrance of this

abyss. For when the philosophers represent the inordinate affections of

the mind as vices, they intend those which appear and manifest themselves

in the grosser external actions; but those corrupt desires which more

secretly stimulate the mind, they consider as nothing.

XXV. Wherefore, as Plato has before been deservedly censured for imputing

all sins to ignorance, so also we must reject the opinion of those who

maintain that all sins proceed from deliberate malice and pravity. For we

too much experience how frequently we fall into error even when our

intention is good. Our reason is overwhelmed with deceptions in so many

forms, is obnoxious to so many errors, stumbles at so many impediments,

and is embarrassed in so many difficulties, that it is very far from being

a certain guide. Paul shows its deficiency in the sight of the Lord in

every part of our life, when he denies “that we are sufficient of

ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves.”(596) He does not speak of

the will or of the affections, but he also divests us of every good

thought, that we may not suppose it possible for our minds to conceive how

any action may be rightly performed. Are all our industry, perspicacity,

understanding, and care so depraved, that we cannot conceive or meditate

any thing that is right in the sight of God? To us, who do not contentedly

submit to be stripped of the acuteness of our reason, which we esteem our

most valuable endowment, this appears too harsh; but in the estimation of

the Holy Spirit, who knows that all the thoughts of the wisest of men are

vain,(597) and who plainly pronounces every imagination of the human heart

to be only evil,(598) such a representation is consistent with the

strictest truth. If whatever our mind conceives, agitates, undertakes, and

performs, be invariably evil, how can we entertain a thought of

undertaking any thing acceptable to God, by whom nothing is accepted but

holiness and righteousness? Thus it is evident that the reason of our

mind, whithersoever it turns, is unhappily obnoxious to vanity. David was

conscious to himself of this imbecility, when he prayed that understanding

might be given him, to enable him rightly to learn the commandments of the

Lord.(599) For his desire to obtain a new understanding implies the total

insufficiency of his own. And this he does not once, but almost ten times

in one Psalm he repeats the same petition—a repetition indicating the

greatness of the necessity which urges him thus to pray. What David

requests for himself alone, Paul frequently supplicates for the churches

at large. “We do not cease to pray for you,” says he, “and to desire, that

ye might be filled with the knowledge of his will in all wisdom and

spiritual understanding; that ye might walk worthy of the Lord unto all

pleasing.”(600) Whenever he represents that as a blessing of God, we

should remember that he thereby testifies it to be placed beyond the

ability of man. Augustine so far acknowledges this defect of reason in

understanding the things of God, that he thinks the grace of illumination

no less necessary to our minds than the light of the sun to our eyes. And

not content with this, he subjoins the following correction—that we

ourselves open our eyes to behold the light, but that the eyes of our

minds remain shut, unless they are opened by the Lord. Nor does the

Scripture teach us that our minds are illuminated only on one day, so as

to enable them to see afterwards without further assistance; for the

passage just quoted from Paul(601) relates to continual advances and

improvements. And this is clearly expressed by David in these words: “With

my whole heart have I sought thee; O let me not wander from thy

commandments.” For after having been regenerated, and made a more than

common progress in true piety, he still confesses his need of perpetual

direction every moment, lest he should decline from that knowledge which

he possessed. Therefore, in another place, he prays for the renewal of a

right spirit, which he had lost by his sin;(602) because it belongs to the

same God to restore that which he originally bestowed, but of which we

have been for a time deprived.

XXVI. We must now proceed to the examination of the will, to which

principally belongs the liberty of choice; for we have before seen that

election belongs rather to the will than to the understanding. In the

first place, that the opinion advanced by philosophers, and received by

general consent, that all things, by a natural instinct, desire what is

good, may not be supposed to prove the rectitude of the human will, let us

observe, that the power of free choice is not to be contemplated in that

kind of appetite, which proceeds rather from the inclination of the nature

than from the deliberation of the mind. For even the schoolmen confess

that there is no action of free choice, but when reason sees and considers

the rival objects presented to it; meaning that the object of appetite

must be such as is the subject of choice, and that deliberation precedes

and introduces choice. And in fact, if you examine the desire of good

which is natural to man, you will find that he has it in common with the

brutes. For they also desire to be happy, and pursue every agreeable

appearance which attracts their senses. But man neither rationally chooses

as the object of his pursuit that which is truly good for him, according

to the excellency of his immortal nature, nor takes the advice of reason,

nor duly exerts his understanding; but without reason, without reflection,

follows his natural inclination, like the herds of the field. It is

therefore no argument for the liberty of the will, that man is led by

natural instinct to desire that which is good; but it is necessary that he

discern what is good according to right reason; that as soon as he knows

it, he choose it; and as soon as he has chosen it, he pursue it. To remove

every difficulty, we must advert to two instances of false argumentation.

For the desire here intended is not a proper motion of the will, but a

natural inclination; and the good in question relates not to virtue or

righteousness, but to condition; as when we say a man is well or in good

health. Lastly, though man has the strongest desire after what is good,

yet he does not pursue it. There is no man to whom eternal felicity is

unwelcome, yet no man aspires to it without the influence of the Spirit.

Since, therefore, the desire of happiness natural to man furnishes no

argument for the liberty of the will, any more than a tendency in metals

and stones towards the perfection of their nature argues liberty in them,

let us consider, in some other particulars, whether the will be in every

part so entirely vitiated and depraved that it can produce nothing but

what is evil; or whether it retain any small part uninjured which may be

the source of good desires.

XXVII. Those who attribute it to the first grace of God, that we are able

to will effectually, seem, on the contrary, to imply that the soul has a

faculty of spontaneously aspiring to what is good, but that it is too weak

to rise into a solid affection, or to excite any endeavour. And there is

no doubt that the schoolmen have in general embraced this opinion, which

was borrowed from Origen and some of the fathers, since they frequently

consider man in things purely natural, as they express themselves,

according to the description given by the Apostle in these words: “The

good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do. To

will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good, I find

not.”(603) But this is a miserable and complete perversion of the argument

which Paul is pursuing in that passage. For he is treating of the

Christian conflict, which he more briefly hints at to the Galatians; the

conflict which the faithful perpetually experience within themselves in

the contention between the flesh and the spirit. Now, the spirit is not

from nature, but from regeneration. But that the Apostle speaks concerning

the regenerate, is evident from his assertion, that in himself dwelt

nothing good, being immediately followed by an explanation that he meant

it of his flesh. And therefore he affirms that it is not he that does

evil, but sin that dwells in him. What is the meaning of this correction,

“in me, that is, in my flesh?” It is as if he had expressed himself in the

following manner: No good resides in me originating from myself, for in my

flesh can be found nothing that is good. Hence follows that form of

exculpation: “I do no evil, but sin that dwelleth in me;”(604) which is

inapplicable to any but the regenerate, who, with the prevailing bias of

their souls, aim at what is good. Now, the conclusion which is subjoined

places all this in a clear point of view: “I delight,” says he, “in the

law of God after the inward man; but I see another law in my members,

warring against the law of my mind.”(605) Who has such a dissension in

himself, but he who, being regenerated by the Divine Spirit, carries about

with him the relics of his flesh? Therefore Augustine, though he had at

one time supposed that discourse to relate to the natural state of man,

retracted his interpretation, as false and inconsistent. And, indeed, if

we allow that men destitute of grace have some motions towards true

goodness, though ever so feeble, what answer shall we give to the Apostle,

who denies that we are sufficient of ourselves to entertain even a good

thought?(606) What reply shall we make to the Lord, who pronounces, by the

mouth of Moses, that every imagination of the human heart is only

evil?(607) Since they have stumbled on a false interpretation of one

passage, therefore, there is no reason why we should dwell on their

opinion. Rather let us receive this declaration of Christ, “Whosoever

committeth sin is the servant of sin.”(608) We are all sinners by nature;

therefore we are all held under the yoke of sin. Now, if the whole man be

subject to the dominion of sin, the will, which is the principal seat of

it, must necessarily be bound with the firmest bonds. Nor would there

otherwise be any consistency in the assertion of Paul, “that it is God

that worketh in us to will,”(609) if any will preceded the grace of the

Spirit. Farewell, then, all the idle observations of many writers

concerning preparation; for although the faithful sometimes petition that

their hearts may be conformed to the Divine law, as David does in many

places,(610) yet it should be remarked that even this desire of praying

originates from God. This we may gather from the language of David; for

when he wishes a clean heart to be created within him,(611) he certainly

does not arrogate to himself the beginning of such a creation. Let us

rather, therefore, attend to this advice of Augustine: “God will prevent

you in all things: do you also sometimes prevent his wrath.” How? “Confess

that you have all those things from God; that whatever good you have, it

is from him; but whatever evil, from yourself.” And a little after,

“Nothing is ours, but sin.”

Chapter III. Every Thing That Proceeds From The Corrupt Nature Of Man

Worthy Of Condemnation.

But man cannot be better known in either faculty of his soul, than when he

is represented in those characters by which the Scripture has

distinguished him. If he be completely described in these words of Christ,

“That which is born of the flesh is flesh,”(612) as it is easy to prove,

it is evident that he is a very miserable creature. For, according to the

testimony of the Apostle, “to be carnally minded is death, because the

carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of

God, neither indeed can be.”(613) Is the flesh so perverse, that, with all

its affections, it entertains a secret hatred against God? that it cannot

consent to the righteousness of the Divine law? in a word, that it can

produce nothing but what tends to death? Now, grant, that in the nature of

man there is nothing but flesh, and elicit any good from it, if you can.

But the name of flesh, it will be said, pertains only to the sensual, and

not to the superior faculties of the soul. This is abundantly refuted by

the words of Christ and of the Apostle. For the argument of our Lord is,

that man must be born again, because he is flesh. He does not teach a new

birth in regard to the body. Now, a new birth of the soul requires not a

correction of some portion of it, but an entire renovation. And this is

confirmed by the antithesis in both places; for there is such a comparison

between the flesh and the spirit, that there is no medium left. Therefore,

every thing in man that is not spiritual, is, according to this mode of

reasoning, denominated carnal. But we have nothing of the spirit, except

by regeneration. Whatever, therefore, we have from nature is carnal. But

if on that point there could otherwise be any doubt, we have it removed by

Paul, when, after a description of the old man, which he had asserted to

be “corrupt according to the deceitful lusts,”(614) he directs us to “be

renewed in the spirit of our mind.” You see that he places unlawful and

corrupt affections not only in the sensitive part, but also in the mind

itself, and, therefore, requires a renovation of it. And, indeed, he had

just before drawn such a picture of human nature, as showed us to be in

every part corrupted and depraved. For his description of all the

Gentiles, as “walking in the vanity of their mind, having the

understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the

ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart,”(615)

is undoubtedly applicable to all those whom the Lord has not yet renewed

to the rectitude of his wisdom and righteousness. This is still more

evident from the comparison soon after introduced, where he reminds the

faithful, that they “have not so learned Christ.” For from these words we

conclude, that the grace of Christ is the only remedy, by which we can be

liberated from that blindness, and from the evils consequent upon it. And

this is what Isaiah had prophesied concerning the kingdom of Christ, when

he predicted that the Lord would be “an everlasting light” to his Church,

whilst at the same time “darkness covered the earth, and gross darkness

the people.”(616) When he declares, that the light of God will only arise

upon the Church, beyond the limits of the Church he certainly leaves

nothing but darkness and blindness. I will not particularly recite all the

passages which are to be found, especially in the Psalms and in the

Prophets, concerning the vanity of man. It is a striking observation of

David, that “to be laid in the balance, they are altogether lighter than

vanity.”(617) It is a severe condemnation of his understanding, when all

the thoughts which proceed from it are derided as foolish, frivolous, mad,

and perverse.

II. Equally severe is the condemnation of the heart, when it is called

“deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked.”(618) But as I study

brevity, I shall be content with citing a single passage, which, however,

will resemble a very lucid mirror, in which we may behold at full length

the image of our nature. For the Apostle, when he wishes to demolish the

arrogance of mankind, does it by these testimonies: “There is none

righteous, no, not one; there is none that understandeth, there is none

that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are

together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no, not one.

Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used

deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips; whose mouth is full of

cursing and bitterness; their feet are swift to shed blood; destruction

and misery are in their ways; there is no fear of God before their

eyes.”(619) In this terrible manner he inveighs, not against particular

individuals, but against all the posterity of Adam. He does not declaim

against the depraved manners of one or another age, but accuses the

perpetual corruption of our nature. For his design in that passage is not

simply to rebuke men, in order that they may repent, but rather to teach

us that all men are overwhelmed with an inevitable calamity, from which

they can never emerge unless they are extricated by the mercy of God. As

this could not be proved unless it were evinced by the ruin and

destruction of our nature, he has adduced these testimonies, which

demonstrate our nature to be totally ruined. Let this, then, be admitted,

that men are such as they are here described, not only by corrupt habits,

but also by a depravity of nature; for otherwise the reasoning of the

Apostle could not be supported, “that there is no salvation for man but

from the mercy of God; since in himself he is in a ruined and desperate

condition.” Here I shall not attempt to establish the application of the

testimonies, to preclude the appearance of their being improperly

introduced. I shall treat them just as if they had been originally uttered

by Paul, and not quoted from the Prophets. He divests man first of

righteousness, that is, integrity and purity, and then of understanding.

Defect of understanding is proved by apostasy from God, the seeking of

whom is the first step in the path of wisdom; but this loss must

necessarily befall those who have revolted from God. He adds, that all

have gone out of the way, and are become altogether corrupt, that there is

not one that does good. Then he subjoins the flagitious crimes, with which

they, who are once abandoned to iniquity, contaminate all the members of

their bodies. Lastly, he declares them to be destitute of the fear of God,

the rule by which all our steps ought to be directed. If these are the

hereditary characters of mankind, in vain do we seek in our nature for any

thing that is good. I grant, indeed, that all these crimes are not

exhibited in every individual; yet it cannot be denied that this monster

lurks in the hearts of all. For as the body, which already contains within

itself the cause and matter of a disease, although it has yet no sensation

of pain, cannot be said to enjoy good health, neither can the soul be

esteemed healthy, while it is full of such moral maladies; although this

similitude will not correspond in every particular; for in the body,

however diseased, there remains the vigour of life; but the soul, immersed

in this gulf of iniquity, is not only the subject of vices, but totally

destitute of every thing that is good.