The Divine Image, Free Will, And The Original Purity Of His Nature.
We must now treat of the creation of man, not only because he exhibits the
most noble and remarkable specimen of the Divine justice, wisdom, and
goodness, among all the works of God, but because, as we observed in the
beginning, we cannot attain to a clear and solid knowledge of God, without
a mutual acquaintance with ourselves. But though this is twofold,—the
knowledge of the condition in which we were originally created, and of
that into which we entered after the fall of Adam, (for indeed we should
derive but little advantage from a knowledge of our creation, unless in
the lamentable ruin which has befallen us we discovered the corruption and
deformity of our nature,)—yet we shall content ourselves at present with a
description of human nature in its primitive integrity. And, indeed,
before we proceed to the miserable condition in which man is now involved,
it is necessary to understand the state in which he was first created. For
we must beware lest, in precisely pointing out the natural evils of man,
we seem to refer them to the Author of nature; since impious men suppose
that this pretext affords them a sufficient defence, if they can plead
that whatever defect or fault they have, proceeds in some measure from
God; nor do they hesitate, if reproved, to litigate with God himself, and
transfer to him the crime of which they are justly accused. And those who
would be thought to speak with more reverence concerning the Deity, yet
readily endeavour to excuse their depravity from nature, not considering
that they also, though in a more obscure manner, are guilty of defaming
the character of God; to whose dishonour it would redound, if nature could
be proved to have had any innate depravity at its formation. Since we see
the flesh, therefore, eagerly catching at every subterfuge, by which it
supposes that the blame of its evils may by any means be transferred from
itself to any other, we must diligently oppose this perverseness. The
calamity of mankind must be treated in such a manner as to preclude all
tergiversation, and to vindicate the Divine justice from every accusation.
We shall afterwards, in the proper place, see how far men are fallen from
that purity which was bestowed upon Adam. And first let it be understood,
that, by his being made of earth and clay, a restraint was laid upon
pride; since nothing is more absurd than for creatures to glory in their
excellence, who not only inhabit a cottage of clay, but who are themselves
composed partly of dust and ashes.(378) But as God not only deigned to
animate the earthen vessel, but chose to make it the residence of an
immortal spirit, Adam might justly glory in so great an instance of the
liberality of his Maker.
II. That man consists of soul and body, ought not to be controverted. By
the “soul” I understand an immortal, yet created essence, which is the
nobler part of him. Sometimes it is called a “spirit;” for though, when
these names are connected, they have a different signification, yet when
“spirit” is used separately, it means the same as “soul;” as when Solomon,
speaking of death, says that “then the spirit shall return unto God, who
gave it.”(379) And Christ commending his spirit to the Father,(380) and
Stephen his to Christ,(381) intend no other than that, when the soul is
liberated from the prison of the flesh, God is its perpetual keeper. Those
who imagine that the soul is called a spirit, because it is a breath or
faculty divinely infused into the body, but destitute of any essence, are
proved to be in a gross error by the thing itself, and by the whole tenor
of Scripture. It is true, indeed, that, while men are immoderately
attached to the earth, they become stupid, and, being alienated from the
Father of lights, are immersed in darkness, so that they consider not that
they shall survive after death; yet in the mean time, the light is not so
entirely extinguished by the darkness, but that they are affected with
some sense of their immortality. Surely the conscience, which, discerning
between good and evil, answers to the judgment of God, is an indubitable
proof of an immortal spirit. For how could an affection or emotion,
without any essence, penetrate to the tribunal of God, and inspire itself
with terror on account of its guilt? For the body is not affected by a
fear of spiritual punishment; that falls only on the soul; whence it
follows, that it is possessed of an essence. Now, the very knowledge of
God sufficiently proves the immortality of the soul, which rises above the
world, since an evanescent breath or inspiration could not arrive at the
fountain of life. Lastly, the many noble faculties with which the human
mind is adorned, and which loudly proclaim that something Divine is
inscribed on it, are so many testimonies of its immortal essence. For the
sense which the brutes have, extends not beyond the body, or at most not
beyond the objects near it. But the agility of the human mind, looking
through heaven and earth, and the secrets of nature, and comprehending in
its intellect and memory all ages, digesting every thing in proper order,
and concluding future events from those which are past, clearly
demonstrates that there is concealed within man something distinct from
the body. In our minds we form conceptions of the invisible God and of
angels, to which the body is not at all competent. We apprehend what is
right, just, and honest, which is concealed from the corporeal senses. The
spirit, therefore, must be the seat of this intelligence. Even sleep
itself, which, stupefying man, seems to divest him even of life, is no
obscure proof of immortality; since it not only suggests to us ideas of
things which never happened, but also presages of future events. I briefly
touch those things which even profane writers magnificently extol in a
more splendid and ornamented diction; but with the pious reader the simple
mention of them will be sufficient. Now, unless the soul were something
essentially distinct from the body, the Scripture would not inform us that
we dwell in houses of clay,(382) and at death quit the tabernacle of the
flesh;(383) that we put off the corruptible,(384) to receive a reward at
the last day, according to the respective conduct of each individual in
the body.(385) For certainly these and similar passages, which often
occur, not only manifestly distinguish the soul from the body, but, by
transferring to it the name of “man,” indicate that it is the principal
part of our nature. When Paul exhorts the faithful to cleanse themselves
from all filthiness of the flesh and of the spirit,(386) he points out two
parts in which the defilement of sin resides. Peter also, when he called
Christ the Shepherd and Bishop of souls,(387) would have spoken
improperly, if there were no souls over whom he could exercise that
office. Nor would there be any consistency in what he says concerning the
eternal salvation of souls, or in his injunction to purify the souls, or
in his assertion that fleshly lusts war against the soul,(388) or in what
the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says, that pastors watch to give
an account of our souls,(389) unless souls had a proper essence. To the
same purpose is the place where Paul “calls God for a record upon his
soul,”(390) because it could not be amenable to God, if it were not
capable of punishment; which is also more clearly expressed in the words
of Christ, where he commands us to fear him, who, after having killed the
body, is able to cast the soul into hell.(391) Where the author of the
Epistle to the Hebrews distinguishes between the fathers of our flesh, and
God, who is the only Father of spirits,(392) he could not assert the
essence or existence of the soul in more express terms. Besides, unless
the soul survived after its liberation from the prison of the body, it was
absurd for Christ to represent the soul of Lazarus as enjoying happiness
in the bosom of Abraham, and the soul of the rich man as condemned to
dreadful torments.(393) Paul confirms the same point, by informing us that
we are absent from God as long as we dwell in the body, but that when
absent from the body we are present with the Lord.(394) Not to be too
prolix on a subject of so little obscurity, I shall only add this from
Luke, that it is reckoned among the errors of the Sadducees, that they
believed not the existence of angels or of spirits.(395)
III. A solid proof of this point may also be gathered from man being said
to be created in the image of God.(396) For though the glory of God is
displayed in his external form, yet there is no doubt that the proper seat
of his image is in the soul. I admit that external form, as it
distinguishes us from brutes, also exalts us more nearly to God; nor will
I too vehemently contend with any one who would understand, by the image
of God, that
“—— while the mute creation downward bend
Their sight, and to their earthly mother tend,
Man looks aloft, and with erected eyes
Beholds his own hereditary skies.”(397)
Only let it be decided that the image of God, which appears or sparkles in
these external characters, is spiritual. For Osiander, whose perverse
ingenuity in futile notions is proved by his writings, extending the image
of God promiscuously to the body as well as to the soul, confounds heaven
and earth together. He says, that the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit,
fixed their image in man, because, even if Adam had remained in his
integrity, Christ would, nevertheless, have become man. Thus, according to
him, the body which had been destined for Christ was the exemplar and type
of that corporeal figure which was then formed. But where will he find
that Christ is the image of the Spirit? I grant, indeed, that the glory of
the whole Deity shines in the person of the Mediator; but how shall the
eternal Word be called the image of the Spirit, whom he precedes in order?
Lastly, it subverts the distinction between the Son and Spirit, if the
former be denominated the image of the latter. Besides, I could wish to be
informed by him, how Christ, in the body which he has assumed, resembles
the Spirit, and by what characters or lineaments his similitude is
expressed. And since that speech, “Let us make man in our own image,”(398)
belongs also to the person of the Son, it follows that he is the image of
himself; which is altogether repugnant to reason. Moreover, if the notion
of Osiander be received, man was formed only to the type or exemplar of
the humanity of Christ; and the idea from which Adam was taken was Christ,
as about to be clothed in flesh; whereas the Scripture teaches, in a very
different sense, that man was “created in the image of God.” There is more
plausibility in the subtlety of those who maintain that Adam was created
in the image of God, because he was conformed to Christ, who is the only
image of God. But this also is destitute of solidity. There is no small
controversy concerning “image” and “likeness” among expositors who seek
for a difference, whereas in reality there is none, between the two words;
“likeness” being only added by way of explanation. In the first place, we
know that it is the custom of the Hebrews to use repetitions, in which
they express one thing twice. In the next place, as to the thing itself,
there is no doubt but man is called the image of God, on account of his
likeness to God. Hence it appears that those persons make themselves
ridiculous who display more subtlety in criticising on these terms,
whether they confine _zelem_, that is, “image,” to the substance of the
soul, and _demuth_, that is, “likeness,” to its qualities, or whether they
bring forward any different interpretation. Because, when God determined
to create man in his own image, that expression being rather obscure, he
repeats the same idea in this explanatory phrase, “after our likeness;” as
though he had said that he was about to make man, in whom, as in an image,
he would give a representation of himself by the characters of resemblance
which he would impress upon him. Therefore Moses, a little after, reciting
the same thing, introduces the image of God, but makes no mention of his
likeness. The objection of Osiander is quite frivolous, that it is not a
part of man, or the soul with its faculties, that is called the image of
God, but the whole Adam, who received his name from the earth whence he
was taken; it will be deemed frivolous, I say, by every rational reader.
For when the whole man is called mortal, the soul is not therefore made
subject to death; nor, on the other hand, when man is called a rational
animal, does reason or intelligence therefore belong to the body. Though
the soul, therefore, is not the whole man, yet there is no absurdity in
calling him the image of God with relation to the soul; although I retain
the principle which I have just laid down, that the image of God includes
all the excellence in which the nature of man surpasses all the other
species of animals. This term, therefore, denotes the integrity which Adam
possessed, when he was endued with a right understanding, when he had
affections regulated by reason, and all his senses governed in proper
order, and when, in the excellency of his nature, he truly resembled the
excellence of his Creator. And though the principal seat of the Divine
image was in the mind and heart, or in the soul and its faculties, yet
there was no part of man, not even the body, which was not adorned with
some rays of its glory. It is certain that the lineaments of the Divine
glory are conspicuous in every part of the world; whence it may be
concluded, that where the image of God is said to be in man, there is
implied a tacit antithesis, which exalts man above all the other
creatures, and as it were separates him from the vulgar herd. It is not to
be denied that angels were created in the similitude of God, since our
highest perfection will consist, according to the declaration of Christ,
in being like them.(399) But it is not in vain that Moses celebrates the
favour of God towards us by this peculiar title; especially as he compares
man only to visible creatures.
IV. No complete definition of this image, however, appears yet to be
given, unless it be more clearly specified in what faculties man excels,
and in what respects he ought to be accounted a mirror of the Divine
glory. But that cannot be better known from any thing, than from the
reparation of his corrupted nature. There is no doubt that Adam, when he
fell from his dignity, was by this defection alienated from God.
Wherefore, although we allow that the Divine image was not utterly
annihilated and effaced in him, yet it was so corrupted that whatever
remains is but horrible deformity. And therefore the beginning of our
recovery and salvation is the restoration which we obtain through Christ,
who on this account is called the second Adam; because he restores us to
true and perfect integrity. For although Paul, opposing the quickening
Spirit received by the faithful from Christ, to the living soul in which
Adam was created,(400) celebrates the degree of grace displayed in
regeneration as superior to that manifested in creation, yet he
contradicts not that other capital point, that this is the end of
regeneration, that Christ may form us anew in the image of God. Therefore
he elsewhere informs us, that “the new man is renewed in knowledge after
the image of him that created him.”(401) With which corresponds the
following exhortation—“Put on the new man, which after God is created in
righteousness and true holiness.”(402) Now, we may see what Paul
comprehends in this renovation. In the first place, he mentions knowledge,
and in the next place, sincere righteousness and holiness; whence we
infer, that in the beginning the image of God was conspicuous in the light
of the mind, in the rectitude of the heart, and in the soundness of all
the parts of our nature. For though I grant that the forms of expression
are synecdochical, signifying the whole by a part, yet this is an axiom
which cannot be overturned, that what holds the principal place in the
renovation of the Divine image, must also have held the same place in the
creation of it at first. To the same purpose is another passage of the
Apostle, that “we, with open face beholding the glory of Christ, are
changed into the same image.”(403) We see, now, how Christ is the most
perfect image of God, to which being conformed, we are so restored that we
bear the Divine image in true piety, righteousness, purity, and
understanding. This position being established, the imagination of
Osiander, about the figure of the body, immediately vanishes of itself.
The passage where Paul calls the man “the image and glory of God,”(404) to
the exclusion of the woman from that degree of honour, appears from the
context to be confined to political subordination. But that the image
which has been mentioned comprehended whatever relates to spiritual and
eternal life, has now, I think, been sufficiently proved. John confirms
the same in other words, by asserting that “the life” which was from the
beginning in the eternal Word of God, “was the light of men.”(405) For as
he intended to praise the singular favour of God which exalts man above
all the other animals; to separate him from the common number, because he
has attained no vulgar life, but a life connected with the light of
intelligence and reason,—he at the same time shows how he was made after
the image of God. Therefore, since the image of God is the uncorrupted
excellence of human nature, which shone in Adam before his defection, but
was afterwards so corrupted, and almost obliterated, that nothing remains
from the ruin but what is confused, mutilated, and defiled,—it is now
partly visible in the elect, inasmuch as they are regenerated by the
Spirit, but it will obtain its full glory in heaven. But that we may know
the parts of which it consists, it is necessary to treat of the faculties
of the soul. For that speculation of Augustine is far from being solid,
that the soul is a mirror of the Trinity, because it contains
understanding, will, and memory. Nor is there any probability in the
opinion which places the similitude of God in the dominion committed to
man; as though he resembled God only in this character, that he was
constituted heir and possessor of all things, whereas it must properly be
sought _in_ him, not _without_ him; it is an internal excellence of the
soul.
V. But, before I proceed any further, it is necessary to combat the
Manichæan error, which Servetus has attempted to revive and propagate in
the present age. Because God is said to have breathed into man the breath
of life,(406) they supposed that the soul was an emanation from the
substance of God; as though some portion of the infinite Deity had been
conveyed into man. But it may be easily and briefly shown how many
shameful and gross absurdities are the necessary consequences of this
diabolical error. For if the soul of man be an emanation from the essence
of God, it will follow that the Divine nature is not only mutable and
subject to passions, but also to ignorance, desires, and vices of every
kind. Nothing is more inconstant than man, because his soul is agitated
and variously distracted by contrary motions; he frequently mistakes
through ignorance; he is vanquished by some of the smallest temptations;
we know that the soul is the receptacle of every kind of impurity;—all
which we must ascribe to the Divine nature, if we believe the soul to be
part of the essence of God, or a secret influx of the Deity. Who would not
dread such a monstrous tenet? It is a certain truth, quoted by Paul from
Aratus, that “we are the offspring of God,” but in quality, not in
substance; forasmuch as he has adorned us with Divine endowments.(407) But
to divide the essence of the Creator, that every creature may possess a
part of it, indicates extreme madness. It must therefore be concluded
beyond all doubt, notwithstanding the Divine image is impressed on the
souls of men, that they were no less created than the angels. And creation
is not a transfusion, but an origination of existence from nothing. Nor,
because the spirit is given by God, and returns to him on its departure
from the body, is it immediately to be asserted, that it was plucked off
like a branch from his essence. And on this point also Osiander, while he
is elated with his own illusions, has involved himself in an impious
error, not acknowledging the image of God in man without his essential
righteousness, as though God could not, by the inconceivable power of his
Spirit, render us conformable to himself, unless Christ were to transfuse
himself substantially into us. However some persons may attempt to gloss
over these delusions, they will never so far blind the eyes of sensible
readers, as to prevent their perceiving that they savour of the error of
the Manichæans. And where Paul treats of the restoration of this image, we
may readily conclude from his words, that man was conformed to God not by
an influx of his substance, but by the grace and power of his Spirit. For
he says that, by beholding the glory of Christ, we are transformed into
the same image as by the Spirit of the Lord;(408) who certainly operates
in us not in such a manner as to render us consubstantial with God.
VI. It would be folly to seek for a definition of the soul from the
heathen philosophers, of whom Plato is almost the only one who has plainly
asserted it to be an immortal substance. Others indeed, the disciples of
Socrates, hint at it, but with great doubts; no one clearly teaches that
of which he was not persuaded himself. The sentiment of Plato, therefore,
is more correct, because he considers the image of God as being in the
soul. The other sects so confine its powers and faculties to the present
life, that they leave it nothing beyond the body. But we have before
stated from the Scripture, that it is an incorporeal substance; now we
shall add, that although it is not properly contained in any place, yet,
being put into the body, it inhabits it as its dwelling, not only to
animate all its parts, and render the organs fit and useful for their
respective operations, but also to hold the supremacy in the government of
human life; and that not only in the concerns of the terrestrial life, but
likewise to excite to the worship of God. Though this last point is not so
evident in the state of corruption, yet there remain some relics of it
impressed even on our very vices. For whence proceeds the great concern of
men about their reputation, but from shame? but whence proceeds shame,
unless from a respect for virtue? The principle and cause of which is,
that they understand themselves to have been born for the cultivation of
righteousness; and in which are included the seeds of religion. But as,
without controversy, man was created to aspire to a heavenly life, so it
is certain that the knowledge of it was impressed on his soul. And,
indeed, man would be deprived of the principal use of his understanding,
if he were ignorant of his felicity, the perfection of which consists in
being united to God. Thus the chief operation of the soul is to aspire
after it; and, therefore, the more a man studies to approach to God, the
more he proves himself a rational creature. Some maintain that in man
there are more souls than one, a sensitive and a rational one; but
notwithstanding some appearance of probability in what they adduce, yet,
as there is nothing solid in their arguments, we must reject them, unless
we are fond of tormenting ourselves with frivolous and useless things.
They say that there is a great repugnancy between the organic motions and
the rational part of the soul; as though reason were not also at variance
with itself, and some of its counsels were not in opposition to others,
like hostile armies. But as this confusion proceeds from the depravity of
nature, it affords no ground for concluding that there are two souls,
because the faculties are not sufficiently harmonious with each other. But
all curious discussion respecting the faculties themselves I leave to the
philosophers; a simple definition will suffice us for the edification of
piety. I confess, indeed, that the things which they teach are true, and
not only entertaining to be known, but useful and well digested by them;
nor do I prohibit those who are desirous of learning from the study of
them. I admit, then, in the first place, that there are five senses, which
Plato would rather call organs, by which all objects are conveyed into a
common sensory, as into a general repository; that next follows the fancy
or imagination, which discerns the objects apprehended by the common
sensory; next reason, to which belongs universal judgment; lastly, the
understanding, which steadily and quietly contemplates the objects
revolved and considered by reason. And thus to the understanding, reason,
and imagination, the three intellectual faculties of the soul, correspond
also the three appetitive ones—the will, whose place it is to choose those
things which the understanding and reason propose to it; the irascible
faculty, which embraces the things offered to it by reason and
imagination; and the concupiscible faculty, which apprehends the objects
presented by the imagination and sensation. Though these things are true,
or at least probable, yet, since I fear that they will involve us in their
obscurity rather than assist us, I think they ought to be omitted. If any
one chooses to make a different distribution of the powers of the soul, so
as to call one appetitive, which, though void of reason in itself, obeys
reason, if it be under the guidance of any other faculty; and to call
another intellective, which is itself a partaker of reason; I shall not
much oppose it. Nor have I any wish to combat the sentiment of Aristotle,
that there are three principles of action—sense, intellect, and appetite.
But let us rather choose a division placed within the comprehension of
all, and which certainly cannot be sought in the philosophers. For when
they wish to speak with the greatest simplicity, they divide the soul into
appetite and intellect, and make both these twofold. The latter, they say,
is sometimes contemplative, being content merely with knowledge, and
having no tendency to action,—which Cicero thinks is designated by the
word _ingenium_,—and sometimes practical, variously influencing the will
with the apprehension of good or evil. This division comprehends the
science of living in a just and virtuous manner. The latter, that is,
appetite, they divide into will and concupiscence; they call it “will,”
whenever appetite obeys reason; but when, shaking off the yoke of reason,
it runs into intemperance, they give it the name of “concupiscence.” Thus
they imagine that man is always possessed of reason sufficient for the
proper government of himself.
VII. We are constrained to depart a little from this mode of instruction,
because the philosophers, being ignorant of the corruption of nature
proceeding from the punishment of the fall, improperly confound two very
different states of mankind. Let us, therefore, submit the following
division—that the human soul has two faculties which relate to our present
design, the understanding and the will. Now, let it be the office of the
understanding to discriminate between objects, as they shall respectively
appear deserving of approbation or disapprobation; but of the will, to
choose and follow what the understanding shall have pronounced to be good;
to abhor and avoid what it shall have condemned. Here let us not stay to
discuss those subtleties of Aristotle, that the mind has no motion of
itself, but that it is moved by the choice, which he also calls the
appetitive intellect. Without perplexing ourselves with unnecessary
questions, it should be sufficient for us to know that the understanding
is, as it were, the guide and governor of the soul; that the will always
respects its authority, and waits for its judgment in its desires. For
which reason Aristotle himself truly observed, that avoidance and pursuit
in the appetite, bear a resemblance to affirmation and negation in the
mind. How certain the government of the understanding is in the direction
of the will, we shall see in another part of this work. Here we only
intend to show that no power can be found in the soul, which may not
properly be referred to one or the other of those two members. But in this
manner we comprehend the sense in the understanding, which some
distinguish thus: sense, they say, inclines to pleasure, whereas the
understanding follows what is good; that thence it happens that the
appetite of sense becomes concupiscence and lust, and the affection of the
understanding becomes will. But instead of the word “appetite,” which they
prefer, I use the word “will,” which is more common.
VIII. God has furnished the soul of man, therefore, with a mind capable of
discerning good from evil, and just from unjust; and of discovering, by
the light of reason, what ought to be pursued or avoided; whence the
philosophers called this directing faculty το ἠγεμονικον, the principal or
governing part. To this he has annexed the will, on which depends the
choice. The primitive condition of man was ennobled with those eminent
faculties; he possessed reason, understanding, prudence, and judgment, not
only for the government of his life on earth, but to enable him to ascend
even to God and eternal felicity. To these was added choice, to direct the
appetites, and regulate all the organic motions; so that the will should
be entirely conformed to the government of reason. In this integrity man
was endued with free will, by which, if he had chosen, he might have
obtained eternal life. For here it would be unreasonable to introduce the
question respecting the secret predestination of God, because we are not
discussing what might possibly have happened or not, but what was the real
nature of man. Adam, therefore, could have stood if he would, since he
fell merely by his own will; but because his will was flexible to either
side, and he was not endued with constancy to persevere, therefore he so
easily fell. Yet his choice of good and evil was free; and not only so,
but his mind and will were possessed of consummate rectitude, and all his
organic parts were rightly disposed to obedience, till, destroying
himself, he corrupted all his excellencies. Hence proceeded the darkness
which overspread the minds of the philosophers, because they sought for a
complete edifice among ruins, and for beautiful order in the midst of
confusion. They held this principle, that man would not be a rational
animal, unless he were endued with a free choice of good or evil; they
conceived also that otherwise all difference between virtue and vice would
be destroyed, unless man regulated his life according to his own
inclination. Thus far it had been well, if there had been no change in
man, of which as they were ignorant, it is not to be wondered at if they
confound heaven and earth together. But those who profess themselves to be
disciples of Christ, and yet seek for free will in man, now lost and
overwhelmed in spiritual ruin, in striking out a middle path between the
opinions of the philosophers and the doctrine of heaven, are evidently
deceived, so that they touch neither heaven nor earth. But these things
will be better introduced in the proper place. At present be it only
remembered, that man, at his first creation, was very different from all
his posterity, who, deriving their original from him in his corrupted
state, have contracted an hereditary defilement. For all the parts of his
soul were formed with the utmost rectitude; he enjoyed soundness of mind,
and a will free to the choice of good. If any object, that he was placed
in a dangerous situation on account of the imbecility of this faculty, I
reply, that the station in which he was placed was sufficient to deprive
him of all excuse. For it would have been unreasonable that God should be
confined to this condition, to make man so as to be altogether incapable
either of choosing or of committing any sin. It is true that such a nature
would have been more excellent; but to expostulate with God as though he
had been under any obligation to bestow this upon man, were unreasonable
and unjust in the extreme; since it was at his choice to bestow as little
as he pleased. But why he did not sustain him with the power of
perseverance, remains concealed in his mind; but it is our duty to
restrain our investigations within the limits of sobriety. He had received
the power, indeed, if he chose to exert it; but he had not the will to use
that power; for the consequence of this will would have been perseverance.
Yet there is no excuse for him; he received so much, that he was the
voluntary procurer of his own destruction; but God was under no necessity
to give him any other than an indifferent and mutable will, that from his
fall he might educe matter for his own glory.