extent the point is frequently made that the vigour with which it has
recently been exposed and attacked is in itself evidence of moral
health and harbinger of ultimate victory over the evil. Such exposure
and attacks, it is said, signify the development of higher ideals
measured by which practices formerly tolerated are now condemned by
public opinion and will later be condemned by law. As to the emergence
of higher ideals there can be no doubt, and so far we have just
ground for encouragement. Reform sentiment as a whole, however, can
scarcely be accepted at its full face value. A considerable part of
the denunciation which accompanies it is as much exaggerated as the
corresponding campaign “literature” and “oratory” of the practical
politician. Thus the volume of clamour is augmented and the difficulty
of correctly estimating honesty in public life increased. There are
always those who deliberately attach themselves to reform movements
solely because they foresee victory at the polls with office and
emoluments and other less legitimate opportunities for themselves.
In other words while ostensibly fighting corruption the motives of
such persons are at bottom corrupt from the start. Bandit Mendoza
of the Sierras, that eminent socialist of Shaw’s creation, was not
entirely wrong in maintaining that “a movement which is confined to
philosophers and honest men can never exercise any real political
influence: there are too few of them. Until a movement shows itself
capable of spreading among brigands, it can never hope for a political
majority.” In some American cities charges have even been made that
corporate interests which did not enjoy the favour of the gang or
boss have contributed largely to “anti-graft” campaigns, their real
purpose being to place themselves in a position to claim the favour
of the “honest” administration elected by their efforts. Knowledge of
corrupt transactions, discretely hinted at in the press, has been used
in other instances as a sort of political blackmail to club the gang
or boss into the granting of privileges to applicants who had hitherto
been denied. The mere volume of clamour developed by reform movements
against corrupt practices is, therefore, no certain index of higher
moral standards. There is even danger that we may too complacently
accept mere denunciation for real achievement. Nor can the work be
deemed finished when popular uproar has secured new legislation, for
laws, notoriously, do not execute themselves. Discouragement then too
easily overtakes the rank and file of the anti-corrupt element; hence,
in part, the spasmodic character of many reform movements. When every
necessary deduction has been made, however, the fundamental strength
and continued progress of the cause of honesty in politics is beyond
question. Even the selfish interests that attach themselves to it
prove this contention. It is true they bring no enthusiasm for higher
standards as such, and also that the results of alliances of this
character are often disheartening. Nevertheless the mere fact that such
alliances are entered into by practical politicians is pretty strong
testimony, coming as it does from men who are very little affected by
considerations of sentiment, to the power of the sincere reform element
which is pursuing no ulterior ends. In all cases of this sort the
selfish politician is seeking to strike with the strength of others,
and this strength must be reckoned with as a real factor, no matter
what uses designing men endeavour to make of it. Here as elsewhere the
counterfeit bears witness to the value of the genuine.
Whatever may be the extent of corruption in the United States it is
under fire all along the line. Moreover we regard and attack as abuses
practices which in other countries are considered free from reproach or
even as pillars of the state. Comparisons to our disadvantage on the
score of corruption are most frequently made with England and Germany.
In England, however, the privileges of peerage, gentry, clergy, and
the landholding class generally are enormous.[109] Land is assessed at
a fraction of its real value, local rates are thrown upon the tenant,
railroads seeking charters and cities seeking legislation to wipe
out disease-breeding slums or to take over badly managed docks find
themselves mulcted by special acts exacting excessive prices for the
property taken, and the interests responsible for all these conditions
sit enthroned in an omnipotent parliament. Landlordism has progressed
to a considerable degree in the United States, to be sure, and we
possess a more than plentiful supply of slum landlords. Property rights
in realty are abundantly protected among us, but our landowners are
very far from enjoying the class privileges or the social standing
accorded them in England. Moreover when abuses arise in connection
with their management, public opinion does not hesitate to express
itself unmistakably, nor is corrective legislation difficult to
procure. In Germany, which like England is frequently extolled for its
high political morality, autocracy, aristocracy, _Junkertum_, and the
swaggering military class are sacrosanct. Landtag and city councils in
Prussia are elected under a three-class voting system which fills these
bodies with agents of the landed and plutocratic interests and deprives
the great mass of the people of adequate representation. Against these
and kindred abuses has risen the menace of social-democracy. The
prospects for peaceful reform in the near future are not altogether
bright. Autocratic, aristocratic, and plutocratic rule is seated firmly
in the saddle, and is not inclined to listen to proposals that it shall
reduce its own powers. Special privileges exist in the United States,
it is true, but they are always regarded as questionable, they must
continually justify themselves to a majority of the whole people, they
can never feel themselves secure in public opinion even if for the time
being they have the support of law. “Grafting,” said Governor Folk of
Missouri, “may or may not be unlawful. It is either a special privilege
exercised contrary to law or one that the law itself may give. Special
privileges are grafts and should be hateful to all good citizens.”[110]
The statement is an unguarded one, but it is thoroughly typical of a
deep-seated American tendency to suspect corruption in every special
privilege, whether it be legal or illegal, whether it be condemned by
a sweeping consensus of moral opinion or only by some reforming voice
crying in the wilderness.
It is no part of this argument to assert that the rights and immunities
enjoyed by the English aristocracy, for example, are corrupt. Under
the definition earlier proposed this is clearly not the case. On the
contrary these privileges have as yet the support of law, tradition,
custom, public opinion, and public deference. A radical democrat might
say that all this simply proves the blind ignorance of the great mass
of Englishmen and the fatal ease with which they can be exploited by a
horde of social parasites. From an unprejudiced point of view, however,
we must concede the right of a people to govern itself according to
its own lights. The English may be committing a monstrous political
blunder in tolerating their aristocracy, but if they decide to do so
that is their own concern, and the privilege so established is, both
in morals and in law, beyond the accusation of corruption. Exactly the
same defence may be made for the Prussian _Junkertum_ and the German
military class, or, for that matter, for the caste system of India. The
development of new standards of public opinion, morals, and politics,
in these countries may at some time bring their privileged classes
under effective criticism; the conviction that they are socially
harmful may gain ground; and out of this conviction may come reform
movements designed to secure their abolition. Until that time, however,
while we may perceive clearly enough the political ills entailed upon
our neighbours by special privilege, we cannot denounce them as corrupt
because they tolerate it.
It may even be conceded that in some cases the glorification of a class
is in the best interests of the state as a whole. Feudal aristocracy
was certainly functional and efficient, whatever one may think of its
modern descendants. Considering Germany’s powerful neighbours and her
extended frontier there is much to be said even for the privileges at
present granted to her military class, however odious they may appear
to the citizen of a non-militant country. One need not go far afield
in search of illustrations of this sort. Under our tariff system
advantages accrue particularly to manufacturers that are not entirely
dissimilar to the special privileges referred to above. Protection was
established, however, on the ground that while manufacturers might
benefit primarily by duties on imports, the resulting advantages
would be widely diffused, and the interests of the country as a whole
advanced by this policy. It is possible that the majority was mistaken
in so thinking, just as the English may be mistaken in thinking that
the maintenance of an aristocracy is to their national advantage.
Deeply as our protective system is entrenched, however, it has no such
support as aristocracy in England, as militancy in Germany. It has
continuously been criticised by very large minorities, and the only
real basis of defence it possesses is the conviction of the majority
that it is conducive to the welfare of the country as a whole. If it
once loses this support its ultimate fall is assured. Other forms of
privilege existing among us,—railroad interests, franchise interests,
interests seeking land, timber, and mineral grants, or subsidies, and
corporations generally,—are on the defensive to an even greater degree
than the protective system.
The argument so far as it relates to special privileges may now be
summed up as follows: Special privileges are not necessarily corrupt;
they may be in the public interest and recognised as such. They exist
in the United States, but are much more common in England and Germany.
We, however, have chosen to regard all of them with suspicion and to
attack many of them vigorously, charging them not only with corruption
but with every other political crime in the calendar. Abroad they
enjoy greater security and respectability. Even when they are assailed
by English and continental publicists more deferential methods of
attack are employed than we are used to in America. Rude words such
as “graft” are avoided.[111] Hence in part the greater appearance of
corruption which we present to Europe, and which we seem to confirm by
the criminations and recriminations which issue from our own mouths.
Mr. Frederic C. Howe is therefore right in maintaining the probability
that “it is not so much in the badness, as in our knowledge of the
badness, that America differs from the rest of the world.” Without
underestimating the enormous power of the forms of special privilege
which exist among us, and the difficulty of restraining and regulating
them,[112] European nations may nevertheless find it a far more trying
task to adjust the claims of their own widespread and deeply rooted
forms of privilege when they come into conflict with the rising tide
of democratic and socialistic sentiment. So far as privilege in
autocratic, aristocratic, and clerical forms, is concerned we have
every reason to be grateful that the fathers of the Republic long
ago made away with it. They left the awful heritage of slavery, but
privilege resting upon that basis has also been wiped out. We ourselves
must face the power of the political machine and massed wealth, and
we are facing it. Momentous as is the issue, we have, at least, the
satisfaction of being able to rejoice, in the trenchant and essentially
true words of Mr. William Allen White, that the United States is “a
country where you can buy men only with money.”[113]
In comparing the political morality of Europe and America reference
must finally be made, even at the risk of repetition, to the greater
political trust imposed in the mass of our people. As regards the
number participating suffrage is not materially different in the United
States from the systems of the leading European nations. The tendency
abroad, however, is to limit the direct popular vote to legislative
offices only and to the smallest possible number of these. It is
undeniable that we have gone too far in the opposite direction. We
crowd not only legislative but also many judicial and administrative
offices on our “blanket” ballots, and as a result the total number of
places submitted to the popular vote passes all bounds. Instead of
realising greater democracy by this method we enable the machine to
take advantage of the confusion which the elector feels when confronted
by so many places and candidates, and his consequent inclination to
vote “straight.”[114] Apart from this point, however, it is extremely
important to note that the power of the vote to confer place is much
greater in the United States than abroad, and consequently, if it is
to be corruptly purchased or misused, its value is higher. To put
the matter in another way, the trust imposed by the Republic in the
voter is greater. The number of offices to which the ordinary citizen
is eligible by ballot without regard to class standing or desirable
preparation, the greater importance of state and local government,
and the placing of the latter under popular control,—all contribute
to increase the burden of responsibility which is imposed upon
the great mass. We must admit that the trust thus created is often
violated, but on the other hand we deserve such credit as may arise
from the fact that we have deliberately chosen to believe in the
virtue of the whole people and have established a system which puts
that virtue to a supreme test. European nations which take the “holier
than thou” attitude with reference to our corruption might be forced
to abandon their pretensions if they were to lodge as much power in
their electorates as we do in ours. Given two communities, one “dry”
and the other “wet,” the mere fact that there was more drunkenness in
the latter would not prove a less degree of moral control of appetite
on the part of its inhabitants. One would have to take into account
that the citizens of the “wet” community could satisfy their thirst
openly and frequently, whereas some of the “drys” must be sober at
times simply because they cannot get liquor. On the other hand, those
citizens of the “wet” community who abstain must do so of their own
volition and in the face of constant temptation. Similarly it may be
said of the political vice existing in the United States that its
magnitude is in part due to the fact that, loving democracy “not
wisely but too well,” we have distributed powers and responsibilities
broadcast with the consequence that they have fallen partly into
unworthy hands. And of such political virtue as we possess at least we
may assert that it is not the anemic innocence which has never known
the approach of temptation.
It would appear from the foregoing that the various factors which must
be taken into account in attempting to determine the extent of existing
corruption are extremely conflicting and uncertain. As between country
and country, city and city, comparisons are certain to be odious and
likely to be misleading. Each has problems sufficiently pressing and
extended to occupy its reform energies to better advantage. We in the
United States may not be so wicked as our neighbours believe, but our
work is cut out for us, and it is work that will require the greatest
intelligence and the greatest virtue that the republic possesses.
Hasty conclusions regarding the outcome, and particularly such as
lean towards pessimism, should be avoided. Although as a general
proposition it is unquestionably true that universal corruption would
mean social disintegration, extreme caution should be employed before
venturing such a prediction in a given case. Prophecies of this
character have been made in almost countless numbers and in almost
every age and country. In the overwhelming majority of cases they have
been falsified by subsequent events. It is easy to underestimate the
essential strength of the more fundamental social institutions and
to forget the long course of evolution during which they have become
delicately adapted to human needs. So far as the more progressive
countries of the modern world are concerned,—England, France, Germany,
Austria, Italy, no less than the United States,—there would seem to
be ground for the conclusion that political and social corruption is
decreasing in extent and virulence. At bottom government rests as much
upon confidence as does a savings bank. Now in spite of the current
and very pointed query:—“Where did he get it?”—the greatest harm done
by corruption is not that it enables some men to acquire fortune and
power rapidly at the expense of others. Resentment at the constant
repetition of this spectacle is natural, and the influence which it
exerts as a bad example is most deplorable. But far in excess of this
is the evil which corruption inflicts by destroying the confidence of
men in their social institutions. In the field of politics this evil
is particularly great because of the wide extension of governmental
functions in recent times and the great possibilities which might be
realised by further extensions. To cite tangible examples, it is both
exasperating and dangerous that much needed plans for the building
of a school, hospital, asylum, sewerage system, or a State Capitol,
or for the establishment of departments of inspection to supervise
industrial plants, theatres, or tenement houses, should be halted
by the fear that corrupt interests will take an initial toll out of
the expenses of installation and thereafter seek to pervert these
services to their private advantage. Just so far as this retarding
condition exists the state is prevented from realising its present
possibilities and from undertaking other beneficent work which it might
perform particularly in the fields of education, art, sanitation, and
philanthropy. Yet in spite of this heavy drag the more progressive
modern states are extending their functions and, on the whole, giving
better satisfaction to the needs of larger populations than ever
before. Petty principalities and the city states of former times have
passed away forever. The dominant modern national type of state stands
for populations that must be reckoned by tens of millions.
Even more significant than growth in population and territory, however,
is the growth that has taken place in the number and complexity of
political and other social relationships. It is true that far back
in antiquity there were great and powerful despotisms, but they were
held together largely by the strong hand, and, as compared with modern
governments, performed very few services for their peoples. Within
recent times inventions annihilating time and space have brought men
closer together but they would not _cohere_ as they do in government,
in business, and in other social activities, were the requisite moral
factors not present. Civilisation has developed these factors, but at
the same time, unfortunately, a new breed of parasites has come into
existence to destroy in part the fruits of our more intelligent, more
honest, and better equipped labour. Vigorous fighting is necessary
to limit the damage inflicted by the type of social marauder which
Professor Ross so trenchantly describes,—“the respectable, exemplary,
trusted personage who, strategically placed at the focus of a spider
web of fiduciary relations, is able from his office chair to pick a
thousand pockets, poison a thousand sick, pollute a thousand minds, or
imperil a thousand lives.”[115] With full recognition of the danger
threatening our highly specialised society from resourceful enemies of
this character there is still another aspect of the case which should
not be forgotten. One must learn “to look at the doughnut as well as
the hole.” While insisting upon the enormity of the offences committed
by our modern social pirates let us not ignore the significance of the
multiplication of foci strategically placed within the spider webs
of fiduciary relations. If social trusts were habitually betrayed
they could not increase in number and importance. Such enormous and
complex aggregations as are brought together under modern governments,
for example, mean that men numbered on the scale of millions are
convinced of the substantial fidelity to their deepest interests of
the governmental structures to which they acknowledge allegiance.
If this were not the case, if corruption and other abuses infected
governments to such an extent as to render them unfaithful to their
peoples, disloyalty would take the place of loyalty, disintegration
would succeed integration. No doubt many causes besides those mentioned
conspired to bring about the appearance of the large, potent, and
complex units which now prevail in government. While this process was
being accomplished various hostile conditions had to be attacked, of
which corruption was only one, although one of the most threatening. As
these unfavourable conditions were and are being overcome it is safe to
conclude, in spite of all superficial appearances to the contrary, that
the relative extent and harmfulness of corruption are decreasing in the
more progressive modern countries. A similar line of argument supports
the same conclusion with regard to business institutions, which also
have been increasing both in size, complexity, and the importance of
the functions which they perform. The household industry of a few
generations ago has given way to corporations employing their tens of
thousands of men, trusting them with property worth millions, and,
particularly in transportation, with the safety of myriads of lives.
Such developments would be impossible either in politics or in business
without greater intelligence, a greater degree of fair dealing, and
greater confidence and loyalty from man to man. Corruption which
exalts the selfish interest above the general interest has doubtless
hindered, but it has not stopped, this process. Never before have men
co-operated on so large a scale and so honest a basis as here and now.
If corruption had really penetrated to the vitals of our economic and
governmental organisations this development could not have taken place.
FINIS
FOOTNOTES:
[104] _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. xix (1904), p. 676.
[105] G. Myers, “History of Tammany Hall,” p. 285.
[106] Mr. Ernest Poole under the title of “New Readers of the News”
in the _American Magazine_ for November 1907, (65:41), presents an
extremely interesting study of the broadening power of the press along
this line.
[107] “The France of To-day,” pp. 223 _et seq._
[108] As, _e.g._, fraudulent promotion, adulteration, the building
of unsanitary tenements, failure to provide proper safety devices in
theatres and factories or on railroads and steamships.
[109] _Cf._ Mr. Frederic C. Howe’s admirable article on “Graft in
England,” _American Magazine_, vol. lxiii (1907), p. 398.
[110] _Nation_, lxxxi (November 23, 1905), p. 422.
[111] Note, for example, the very different treatment of the campaign
contribution question in the two countries. It may be conceded that
America has much to learn from England with regard to the control
of election expenditures. On the side of collections, however, it
is notorious that in England both political parties unblushingly
barter titles for financial support. There is something particularly
despicable in this pollution of the “fountain of honour” to procure
campaign funds, yet on the rare occasions when the matter is brought
up in Parliament its discussion is characterised by hilarity rather
than by moral earnestness. In American politics the corresponding evil
is felt to be a scandal and as such provokes not only the curative
legislation discussed in an earlier study but also much bitter and
noisy denunciation.
[112] Any illusion as to the ease of restraining privilege in the
United States is likely to be speedily dispelled by the reading of
President Arthur T. Hadley’s masterly discussion in the _Independent_
of April 16, 1908, of “The Constitutional Position of Property in
America.”
[113] In “The Old Order Changeth,” _American Magazine_, lxvii (1909),
p. 219.
[114] No political reform now before the American people promises more
beneficent results than the short ballot movement. It advocates the
principle “that democracy can reach more efficient working through a
drastic reduction in the present number of officials selected by the
individual voter, thus securing a ballot which is very short and which
includes only offices that are of sufficient public interest to attract
from the voters a scrutiny and comparison of candidates that will be
adequate to make their relative individual merits a matter of common
knowledge.” _Cf._ the vigorous little pamphlet by Richard S. Childs on
“The Short Ballot: A New Plan of Reform,” reprinted from the _Outlook_
of July 17, 1909, New York, 127 Duane St., 1909.
[115] “Sin and Society,” pp. 29-30.
INDEX
Adams, Professor Henry C., 110, 177.
Addams, Jane, 215.
Ade, George, 146.
Advantage, personal, the end of a corrupt act, 59, 60.
Alger, G. W., 70.
Allen, William H., 185.
American Bar Association, 121.
Anarchy, 17, 21, 29, 66, 82.
Anthracite coal committees, 34.
Apologies for political corruption, 3, 37.
Aquinas, Thomas, 70.
Aristotle, 87.
Association to Prevent Corrupt Practices at Elections, New York, 272.
“Auto-corruption,” 46, 60, 170, 199.
Bacon, Lord, 90.
Belmont, Perry, 239, 271.
“Big Business,” 115, 163.
Blackmail, 63.
Bodley, J. E. C., 71.
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 83.
Boss, The (see also Machine), 23, 26, 71, 73, 105, 240, 278, 279.
Bribery, 44, 49, 59.
Brinkley, Captain F., 102.
Bryce, James, 216.
Bureau of Corporations, 175.
Bureau of Municipal Research, 184.
Burke, Edmund, 213.
Business, alleged to be made good by corruption, 4-13;
and social morals, 67, 68, 75;
and politics, corruption in, 161;
state regulation of, 165, 171;
and campaign contributions, 264;
consolidation of, 163.
“Business administration” of public affairs, 46.
Campaign contributions, danger of plutocracy involved in, 71-74;
problem of, 76;
and theory of party support, 213;
congressional appropriations, 221;
publicity, 229;
prohibition and restriction of, 244;
from corporations, 244;
from candidates, 248;
from civil servants, 256;
from individuals, 258;
and campaign literature, 260;
in small amounts, 261;
time limits, 262;
geographical limits, 263;
and business interests, 264;
of services, 267;
in state and local contests, 268;
in primaries and conventions, 270;
results of reform, 273.
Candidates, corruption and personal immorality as disqualifications,
15;
and publicity, 240;
contributions of, 248.
Caritative function of the state, 70.
Carnegie Foundation, 138, 149.
Census statistics of cities, 186.
Charles II., 89.