“Of all the substitutes for the classical discipline there is none

more popular and, when applied to immature minds, more pernicious

than economics. To a very considerable degree the present peril of

socialism and other eccentricities of political creed is due to

the fact that so many young men are crammed with economical theory

(whether orthodox or not) when their minds have not been weighted with

the study of human nature in its larger aspects. From this lack of

balance they fall an easy prey to the fallacy that history is wholly

determined by economical conditions, or to the sophism of Rousseau

that the evil in society is essentially the result of property. The

very thoroughness of this training in economics is thus a danger.”[52]

The positions both of Mr. Ghent and of Mr. More are extreme. As for

the special ethics of the trading class, of which the former makes

so much, it is doubtful if anything exists more foreign to current

academic ideals. So marked is this aversion that it is distinctly

difficult for the ordinary professor to estimate correctly the real

value to the community of the service of the business man. That equal

difficulty exists on the other side is apparent from the openly

expressed conviction of many business men that the college teacher is

a thoroughly unpractical sort of person. The latter attitude, by the

way, is a most remarkable one for a client to assume toward his social

apologist,—taking Mr. Ghent’s view of the situation. A prisoner at the

bar who should rail at the abilities of his counsel is certainly not

putting himself in the way of acquittal. As for “moral weaklings,” no

profession can honestly deny the existence of some examples of this

pestiferous species in its ranks. If academic promotion depended upon

moral weakness, however, the bankruptcy of the profession would have

been announced long ago. As a matter of fact, the system of selection

and advancement employed by colleges is admirably adapted to their

requirements. In spite of the machinations of occasional cliques,

chiefly of a personal or churchly character, it usually succeeds

in placing the best prepared and most capable men in desirable and

influential positions. Certainly college administration as a whole

deserves the reputation of success which it enjoys, a reputation, by

the way, much superior to that of most of our governmental machinery.

If, for example, an equally effective system could be employed in the

selection of the administrative heads of American city governments it

is safe to say that many of our municipal problems would find a speedy

solution.

As between Mr. Ghent and Mr. More, the latter is much nearer the

truth in his main contention. It is hardly the case, however, as Mr.

More would seem to imply, that thorough training in economics is more

likely to produce half-baked agitators than is a mere smattering of the

subject. Here as elsewhere “a little knowledge is a dangerous thing,”

and the students who afterwards run amuck in radicalism are drawn to

a very slight extent from the ranks of those who acquire a really

thorough knowledge of economics or the other social sciences. Without

recourse to the old classical discipline, as proposed by Mr. More,

the study of history and of the theory of evolution should furnish an

excellent corrective to the excessively _a priori_ processes employed

in some fields of economics. Apart from these exceptions Mr. More is

clearly right in maintaining that the net result of college instruction

in this subject is radical rather than reactionary. However, the

impress finally given to the overwhelming majority of college students

is not that of radicalism but rather that of willingness to work

patiently, constructively, and progressively for social betterment.

In either event the sweeping assertion that college teachers are the

hirelings of capitalistic conspirators finds little ground for support.

* * * * *

One who attempts a survey of the whole field of corruption is apt to

be impressed at first with its hopeless complexity and heterogeneity.

There are many petty forms of evil, the shady moral character of which

is as yet hardly perceived. The spirit thus revealed is, however,

identical with that which expresses itself in the major forms of

corruption which are so obvious and threatening that they have become

subject to public criticism. It cannot be denied that some abuses of

a grave character make their appearance in the learned professions,

journalism, and higher education. In all such cases, however, vigorous

reform work is in progress. A very gratifying feature of the situation

is that the most effective and sincere efforts for improvement are

being made from the inside. Our “men of light and leading” are sound

at heart. It is not necessary to prove to them, as unfortunately it

sometimes is to those in other walks of life, that corruption does

not pay. Rehabilitated by some of its more recent forms journalism

exercises an alert and resourceful influence upon the opinion of the

day. More hopeful still is the fact that our institutions of higher

learning are moulding both the men and the measures of to-morrow into

nobler forms.

FOOTNOTES:

[40] Corruption in the professions might also be dealt with as a

subdivision of economic corruption. All professional services, it

could be argued, must be remunerated, and the abuses which have grown

up in connection with them are the outgrowth of a commercial spirit

antagonistic to professional ideals. While this is doubtless true,

the persistence of the older ideals and the efforts to rehabilitate

and extend them are facts of sufficient importance, in the opinion of

the writer, to justify the separate treatment of corruption in the

professions. Even if this distinction did not exist convenience would

make a division of the fields for the purpose of discussion highly

desirable.

[41] _Cf._ G. W. Alger’s “Generosity and Corruption,” _Atlantic_, vol.

xcv (1905), p. 781.

[42] Even if it be sneered at in certain quarters as a mere counsel

of perfection, the following statement of the principles underlying

“the lawyer’s duty in its last analysis” is of great significance:—“No

client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil

or political, however important, is entitled to receive, nor should

any lawyer render, any service or advice involving disloyalty to the

law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office,

which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons

exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal

of the public. When rendering any such improper service or advice, the

lawyer invites and merits stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly,

he advances the honour of his profession and the best interests of his

client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon

the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest

principles of moral law.” The “Canons of Professional Ethics,” adopted

by the American Bar Association at its thirty-first annual meeting at

Seattle, August 27, 1908, are conceived in the spirit of the foregoing,

taken from Canon 32. Canons 2, 3, 6, 26, 29, and 31 also declare

specifically and unqualifiedly against various forms of corruption.

[43] Quoted in Lester F. Ward’s “Pure Sociology,” p. 487. Professor

Ward himself says: “The newspaper is simply an organ of deception.

Every prominent newspaper is the defender of some interest and

everything it says is directly or indirectly (and most effective when

indirect) in support of that interest. There is no such thing at the

present time as a newspaper that defends a principle.”

[44] _Cf._ “Is an Honest Newspaper Possible,” by “A New York Editor,”

in the _Atlantic_, vol. cii (1908), p. 441.

[45] “Orations and Addresses,” vol. i, p. 303.

[46] “Journalism, Politics, and the University,” _North American

Review_, vol. clxxxvii (1908), p. 598.

[47] It is perhaps worth noting that the debatable subjects of to-day

are not those of a generation or so ago. Geology and biology were

then the dangerous chairs, the occupants of which frequently found

themselves in conflict with straight-laced followers of various

religious sects. Occasionally professors of philosophy and ethics

became involved in similar controversies. At the present time conflicts

of this character are much less frequent and are confined for the most

part to theological seminaries and those smaller colleges which are

still dominated by narrow denominational influences. Nearly all our

leading universities have so far emancipated themselves from sectarian

control that controversies with their professors on this basis are

virtually impossible. In such institutions the chairs which present

difficulties nowadays are those in economics, political science, and

sociology, although, as we shall see, these difficulties are greatly

exaggerated in popular estimation. It is hardly necessary to add that

(with the exception in some small measure of sociology) the area

of friction in these subjects is not at all in their contact with

religious, but almost exclusively in their contact with business and

political activities outside university walls.

[48] “Leviathan,” pt. ii, ch. xxx.

[49] _Cf._ his annual report for 1904-05, pp. 19-20, for a brief but

very interesting reference to the “tainted money” charge.

[50] “The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Third

Annual Report,” 1908, pp. 82-91.

[51] “Mass and Class,” pp. 14, 82, 83, 105, 243.

[52] _Bookman_, p. 652, August, 1906.

CORRUPTION IN BUSINESS AND POLITICS

V

CORRUPTION IN BUSINESS AND POLITICS

No form of corruption can exist without reacting upon the life of

the state. Pollution of the sources of public instruction defiles

individuals and all the manifold non-sovereign social organisations,

but it culminates in an infection of public opinion which directly

contaminates the body politic. Even more immediately corrupt business

practices lead to corrupt political practices. This is so conspicuously

the case that separate discussion of the two subjects is virtually

impossible. It is feasible, however, and should prove profitable,

to distinguish the various subdivisions of economic and political

corruption and to point out certain lines of the development which have

bound the two so closely together in our modern life.

Pre-eminent among the forms of business corruption are the vicious

practices which have grown up in the general relation of buyer and

seller. Purveyors of adulterated, infected, or diseased consumption

goods, such as food stuffs, and particularly meat and milk; dealers in

sweatshop clothing; vendors of patent medicines; owners and builders of

unsanitary tenement houses, of unsafe theatres, and excursion steamers;

managers of railroad and trolley companies who neglect to install

devices to protect their passengers may serve as illustrations. A

further branch of this form of corruption, the importance of which

would perhaps justify separate classification, occurs in connection

with the dealers in vice,—the dive keepers, policy kings, gamblers,

and procurers. The relation of master and servant furnishes a

second subdivision of the primarily economic forms of corruption.

Transportation companies, mine owners, manufacturers, and others who

neglect the installation of safety devices to protect labourers; the

employers of child labour; the labour leaders who extort blackmail by

threatening strikes are cases in point. Still another subdivision of

economic corruption centres about the fiduciary business relations

such as occur particularly in connection with savings banks, trust

companies, corporate directorships in general, and with the work of the

promoter. Underlying nearly all these kinds of economic corruption,

and emerging in the corruption of public instruction and political

corruption as well, is competition,—itself a force or method rather

than a form. Some species of corruption belonging logically under one

or another of the preceding heads exhibit the effects of competition

more plainly than others. Thus many practices common to those periods

of forced competition which so frequently precede the formation of

trusts have come to be looked upon as essentially corrupt and deserving

of legal restraint. Corruption does not disappear when competition is

practically eliminated, however. Some of the most difficult problems

involved in dealing with it notoriously result from the existence of

monopolies which have outstripped if they have not exterminated their

rivals.

To attempt the adequate discussion of all the forms of economic

corruption would require extended treatises on the labour problem,

the trust problem, banking, transportation, insurance, and many other

special subjects. The limitations of the present study exclude anything

beyond a few general observations. It may first be noted that many of

the abuses which are now undergoing the process of sanitation were

the result not so much of corrupt intention as of ignorance and the

relatively unlimited character of the competitive struggle to which

reference has already been made. They emerged long before the era of

consolidation, and are therefore not to be attributed solely to big

business. For many years prior to the Chicago slaughter house exposures

of 1906, for example, unclean meat was sold both by large packers and

by country butchers. Small producers were and are largely responsible

for impure milk and sweatshop clothing. Petty landlords as well as

extensive holders of real estate have built unsanitary tenement houses

and overcrowded them with renters. The neglect of transportation

companies to install safety devices for the protection of passengers

and employees has in the very nature of the case been a corporation

offence. On the other hand small as well as large mining operators

have sinned in this way, and small as well as large manufacturers

have exploited child labour. Betrayal of fiduciary relationships has

naturally occurred most frequently and most disastrously in enterprises

of large capital, although by no means confined exclusively to them.

Indeed there would seem to be reason for believing that in certain

ways consolidation has aided in bringing about the correction of some

of these evils. It centres them in a few large establishments, often

in a single district of no great size, where by their very magnitude

abuses force themselves upon a sluggish public attention. Consolidation

also makes it appear that the interests of a few selfish owners are

being pursued at the cost of the general welfare. This at once enlists

popular support for attacks upon abuses, and is a factor well worth

comparison with the defensive strength of massed capital. For these

reasons the cleaning up of the meat industry probably proceeded far

more rapidly after the Chicago exposures than would have been the case

if the effort had been made some years earlier during the period of

many scattered local abattoirs.

So many factors co-operated in bringing about the business evils under

consideration that the quality of corruption cannot always be ascribed

to them directly. Under a policy of _laisser faire_, of unlimited

competition, of public indifference and apathy, it is not easy to fix

moral responsibility. Even the twentieth mean man at any given time

may be only a little meaner than several of his nineteen competitors.

His offences are dictated by self-interest, of course, but they are

offences against a vague set of business customs or moral principles.

Public interest suffers, it is true, but the public is apathetic; it

has not laid down definite norms of business conduct. On the part of

the offender there is often lacking that conscious and purposeful

subordination of public to private interest which constitutes full

fledged corruption. Whatever degree of extenuation is afforded by

these considerations vanishes, however, when definite regulation is

undertaken by the state. Now that we are fairly launched upon an

era of legislative and administrative control, business offences of

the kind under consideration are frankly corrupt. Public apathy has

vanished, the interest of the public has been sharply defined, and he

who in contravention of these norms places his private gain above the

general welfare does so with full intent, and cannot evade or shift the

accusation of corruption.

A further consequence of the effort to regulate business practice by

law is not only intrinsically important but also serves as the great

connecting link between primarily economic and political corruption

proper. As soon as regulation is undertaken by the state a motive is

supplied to the still unterrified twentieth mean man to break the law

or to bribe its executors. In either case, by the way, the profits are

directly conditioned by the thoroughness with which his competitors

are restrained from following his own malpractices. The scales

employed by tariff officials may be tampered with in the interests of

large importers whose profits are thereby enormously increased. Or

inspectors may be bribed to pass infected carcasses, to approve impure

milk, to permit get-rich-quick concerns to use the mails, to wink at

lead weighted life preservers, to ignore the fact that the exits of

a theatre are entirely inadequate. With cases where state regulation

supplied the motive for the direct commission of fraud we are not

directly concerned here, but in all the cases where the collusion of

inspectors is involved we have to note that government regulation of

business has made easy the transmutation of what before was merely

corrupt and morally offensive into direct bribery. And from the point

of view of a venal official or political machine the extension of state

control means the widening of the opportunities for levying tribute.

Thus a form of corruption which began among, and for a time was limited

to, business relations becomes under regulation a menace to political

integrity. In other words, it takes on the form of political corruption

as well, and must, therefore, become the subject of discussion in that

connection.

However disheartening in other ways, a consideration of the forms of

business corruption yields the comforting reflection that all the

major forms of evil in this field are clearly recognised and severely

criticised. One must guard oneself against too cheerful optimism in

the premises, however. Reform forces armed _cap-a-pie_ do not spring

like unheralded knight errants of old into every breach at which social

integrity is being assailed. Instead they can be developed only by

persistent individual and associated effort and sacrifice. Moreover

the problem of corruption, as we have seen, is a persistent one, the

forms of which are ever changing and ever requiring new ingenuity and

resourcefulness in the methods of social sanitation. Back of reform

effort, also, there remains much that the individual can affect

simply by clearer habits of moral reflection and action even in the

small affairs of life. Public sentiment is built of such individual

fragments. Low opinion, low action in everyday affairs become a part

of the psychological atmosphere befogged by which the outlines even of

the larger evils of the present régime grow indistinct. Professor Ross

has performed a valuable service by exposing the fallacy that “sinners

should be chastised only by their betters.”[53] Social life, indeed,

would be inconceivable if the judgment of disinterested parties were

not superior to that of parties in interest. This is true even if the

former are themselves far from moral perfection. But it is further

true that the judgment of the disinterested will be more worthy and

helpful if in the conduct of their own affairs the disinterested have

habituated themselves to scrupulous honesty of thought and action. Till

this is more generally the case social ostracism, public contempt, and

loathing of the corruptionist, regardless of his looted wealth, will

not prove such effective measures of restraint as one might hope. “The

simplest reform,” said Mr. James B. Dill, “the hardest, but it must

be the first, is to make up our minds not to do those things which

the other man may be doing, but which we know to be wrong.”[54] Of

course the universal acceptance of such higher individual standards

would solve not only the problems of corruption but all our other

social and moral difficulties. We may not hope for the early arrival

of the millennium in this way, but neither may we hope for any large

movement toward better conditions without improvement of personal

character. Under our present circumstances much may be accomplished

by institutional reform, by legislation and the application of the

power of the state, although none of these is possible without the

application of the good will, the clearer intelligence and honesty of

individuals. If not the first or only reform, then, still it is clear

that no movement against corruption is complete which does not demand

frank recognition by the individual that he must deliberately choose

to get along less rapidly at times when the cost of advancement is

personal dishonour.

* * * * *

Corrupt practices may begin in, and at first be limited to, the

business world, but, as we have just seen, they are likely to overstep

economic boundaries and become a menace to the integrity of the state.

As such they must also be recognised and discussed as derivative forms

of political corruption. But in addition to evils of this kind which

originate, as it were, in other fields, various subdivisions of the

forms of corruption which immediately involve government may be marked

out tentatively for subsequent illustration and discussion.

To gain means for its support the state is obliged to impose taxes and

other burdens upon its citizens. The self-interest of the latter leads

them into many evasive practices of a more or less corrupt character.

The state is also a great buyer of materials and services of all sorts,

and hence subject to fraud in innumerable forms. It is further a great

seller and provider of various services, and is equally exposed to

danger in this capacity. Efforts by the state to regulate or suppress

vice and crime necessarily lead to attempts on the part of the vicious

and criminal to protect themselves by corrupt means. Without outside

collusion public officials may endeavour to exploit in their private

interest the powers which were conferred upon them solely for the

public benefit, and the result is auto-corruption, as defined in an

earlier study.[55] Preyed upon by corruption the state also at times

instigates corruption in the pursuit of its own ends, particularly

where international rivalries are concerned.[56] Finally the control of

government by political parties may lead to the purchase or stealing

of elections and the perversion of the functions of all the organs of

government in the interests of the machine. The fundamental importance

of the practices which fall under the last head is apparent. Upon them

ultimately depends the ability to maintain and profit by all the other

forms of political corruption.

* * * * *

Corruption in American politics and life · 第 9 / 18 段