whom they wish to make their tools. What if the same end is compassed
by means of threats or injuries? Obviously the latter may be far more
potent in a given case than the most alluring promises. Sometimes
the two are employed together, enormous bribes being offered for
compliance, and political, social, or financial ruin threatened for
recalcitrance. Coercion of the latter sort may be used either to
procure corrupt action or to check honest action. It is related of
Governor Folk that shortly after he embarked upon his relentless
prosecution of the St. Louis boodlers, the latter combined and employed
detectives to delve into every act of his life from the time of his
boyhood in Tennessee up to his election as Circuit Attorney. Absolutely
nothing was developed that could be used against him. The incident is
suggestive, however, of what may have happened in the case of other
men who desired to be honest politically but were handicapped by the
fear of some forgotten scandal, perhaps of a purely personal character,
in their past lives. Thus the strength of the moral condemnation
visited by our society upon offences of a certain sort may become the
most potent weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous boss or clique.
The question remains whether the neglect or misperformance of duty
procured by threats or injuries comes properly under the definition of
corruption. The case is similar to admitted corruption in that both
involve the idea of personal advantage. Morally, however, it would
seem more reprehensible to seek or accept something desirable as the
price of disregarding public duty than to disregard it under the threat
of deprivation of some advantage already secured by honest effort.
In the latter case the individual who is coerced may deserve some
sympathy, but the individual who uses coercion adds a very ugly form
of blackmail to the general guilt of his act. Whatever answer be given
to the question of definition raised above, it is worth noting that
in speaking of corresponding virtues a distinction is made. Honesty in
politics is insisted upon, but so also is courage. “It is, of course,
not enough,” writes President Roosevelt, “that a public official should
be honest. No amount of honesty will avail if he is not also brave....
The weakling and the coward cannot be saved by honesty alone.”[20] To
this it might be added that under existing conditions courage in the
sense of power to attack or withstand, must be coupled with an almost
perfectly clean record in every way to be available as a political
asset of any value in the fight against corruption.
* * * * *
V. Just as the advantages sought by corrupt action may shade off from
the more to the less material, so also the _personal interest_ involved
is susceptible of numerous gradations from egoism to altruism. It may
be entirely selfish, as in the case of a bribe credited directly to
the bank account of the bribe-taker. It may be extended to include
the welfare of relatives—a form of corruption so common as to have
acquired a name of its own. It may be broader still, appearing as
favouritism to friends. Finally, it may be so extended that the
individual interest is merged in the interest of certain groups, such
as the party, the church, the labour union, the secret society, and so
on. The state is by no means the only sufferer by this process, any
more than it is the only social group afflicted by corrupt practices.
An official sentimentally mindful of the needs of Mother Church may
cheerfully consent to burden the public treasury with a large part of
the cost of maintaining an orphan asylum mismanaged by ecclesiastical
officials. Political influence may be brought to bear upon Rome to
secure the creation of a new American cardinal acceptable to certain
influential classes in this country. Desire to placate the labour vote
has paralysed the employment of the police power by governors or mayors
to put down violence during strikes. And labour leaders, seduced by
promises of office, have consented to misrepresent and betray their
followers. Complementary illustrations of this sort might be cited
indefinitely.
It is not maintained that the larger part of the interrelations of
social groups is tinged with corruption. Directly the contrary is more
nearly true. Thus the interests of the state and of the family are so
largely coincident that the latter is frequently spoken of as the unit
of the former. Nevertheless family interests may be cultivated very
greatly to the detriment of political life. Many flagrant examples of
nepotism and the all too prevalent neglect of the duties of citizenship
to cultivate those of the family circle are cases in point. It is no
mere coincidence that one of the most soddenly corrupt municipalities
in the United States is peculiarly distinguished as the “City of
Homes.” Again, a business man may be vastly more efficient as citizen
or public official because of his experience in business, but, on the
other hand, he may make use of this experience to plunder the state, or
he may allow himself to become so thoroughly engrossed in money-making
that others plunder it with impunity. Knowledge gained by social
intercourse with parents may enable the teacher to perform his work
with far greater discrimination as to the individual peculiarities and
needs of the children under his tuition, but it may also tempt him to
gross favouritism and toadyism.
In discussing cases of corrupt action procured by inducements not
directly material in character it was pointed out that current moral
opinion does not clearly recognise the evil involved. Similarly it
may be indicated that many of the less somber _nuances_ of corruption
resulting from the selfish interrelations of social groups hardly
deserve condemnation, because they are not commonly recognised as
deflections from duty. This may be conceded so far as the present
conditions of morals is concerned; but under any sharper analysis than
is currently employed the element of corruption contained in such
actions is manifest. The difficulty of the situation is enhanced by
the fact that it is extremely hard to separate and define duty and
self-interest in many of the relations of social and individual life.
Nevertheless the effort must be made. We must distinguish and define
economic interest, family interest, public interest. We have for our
guidance the great general principle: “Render to Cæsar the things that
are Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” It is no valid plea
in avoidance that it is hard to distinguish the things that are Cæsar’s
and the things that are God’s. Rather would it seem to be enjoined upon
a robust morality incessantly to search the heart regarding all the
details that arise in following the commandment.
The most perplexing questions that arise in this interrogation of duty
spring from the conflict between fundamental and general moral ideas
and the customs of various social groups. It is considered entirely
allowable and laudable, for instance, that a father should encourage
his son to succeed him in business, even if the business be not his
but that of a corporation in which he is simply an official. Many of
the means employed to this end—education, travel, apprenticeship,
and so on—are beyond reproach. Others involve gross favouritism and
disregard of the merits of employees not connected with the family.
The most noteworthy point involved in this illustration is that a
procedure which passes without question in business and family circles
is recognised as reprehensible in politics. From this discrepance in
social judgments it follows, however, that the man who has made a
success in politics may find it very difficult to see anything but
the far-fetched morality of the “unco-guid” in the proposition that
he may not provide places in the public service for his relatives and
dependents, just as the man who has been successful as a merchant or
manufacturer is in the habit of doing in his store or factory.
It would be possible to point out many similar divergences between
the fatherly and motherly indulgence of family life, the charity,
long-suffering, and forgiveness of Christian faith, the easy tolerance
of social life on the one hand, and, on the other, the ideal of
justice, cold and impassive, which we associate with the state. In
her admirable discussion of “Friendship and Politics,”[21] Mrs.
Simkhovitch has given us what is, on the whole, a very sympathetic
picture of the poor man who would scorn to sell his vote outright but
who delivers it blindly to the “big hearted” ward leader, whose kindly
interest and protection he so constantly needs to secure work and avoid
oppression. It is hardly fair to characterise his attitude in slightly
ironic phrase as dominated by the principle of the “sacredness of the
job.” Hard, continuous labour and the support of a family under such
conditions are virtues of no small proportions. In large part, as Mrs.
Simkhovitch has pointed out, devotion to the ward leader may be much
less the expression of selfishness than of the traditional loyalty
of a race, class, or neighbourhood. Such loyalty, within limits, must
also be accounted a virtue. Finally, in attempting to judge the case,
we must inquire into the opportunities which voters of this sort have
had for acquiring high ideals of civic conduct. Are the best attainable
results secured by our systems of education, poor relief, correction,
and taxation? Need nothing further be done to prevent child labour, to
furnish better housing conditions and to safeguard the public health?
If we concede the necessity of social reform in these or any other
directions, we impliedly recognise either the failure of society to
live up to its own ideals or the necessity of new and higher ideals of
social conduct. And this recognition involves the assumption of part
of the moral guilt of existing corruption by society itself. Mr. G.
W. Alger has noted the current dissatisfaction with the ideal of pure
cold justice.[22] He also insists, correctly enough, that justice is
the rock upon which alone generosity can safely build. The two ideals
should not, however, be dealt with as fundamentally incompatible. Not
since the time when Thomas Aquinas first recognised the caritative
function of the state has such a view been tenable. More and more
the state has endeavoured in modern times to live up to this duty of
protecting the poor and weak. Its fuller realisation will mean the
disappearance of many of the existing causes of corruption.
One aspect of corruption for motives not entirely personal must be
dealt with separately, both because of the moral casuistry involved
and because of its practical importance. This is the acceptance and
use for party purposes of money paid to bosses or other leaders for
the corrupt use of their political power. While the personal interest
of the politician as a member of the party organisation is usually
involved to some extent in such transactions, the purely selfish
element may be extremely attenuated. Thus Floquet, accused of having
accepted money for his favourable vote as member of the French Chamber
of Deputies on the Panama canal scheme, defended himself on the ground
that every _centime_ of the sum paid him had been used for the benefit,
not of himself, but of the party to which he belonged.[23] Thurlow
Weed is alleged to have used his political control of the New York
state legislature in 1860 to secure the granting of several franchises
for street railways in New York city to a gang of lobbyists, and to
have spent the four to six hundred thousand dollars of “campaign
contributions” obtained in this manner to back the candidacy of Seward
for the presidential nomination at the Chicago convention of the
Republican party. In such cases not a cent of the corruption fund may
stick to the hand of the party chief receiving it. Indeed it is not
inconceivable that his devotion to party ends or to a party leader
might induce him to pursue a corrupt course of conduct even though he
foresaw his own ruin, politically or otherwise, as the certain result
of his action.
Cases of the foregoing sort force us to a recognition of the fact that
when political passion has reached its climax, as at the end of a hard
fought campaign involving great principles, all considerations besides
party success are apt to sink into nothingness. Properly considered,
of course, the party organisation is a social institution subordinate
to the state, but it differs materially in one way from other social
groups of the same rank, such as business associations, the church,
the family, _etc_. The latter accept their subordination more or
less passively, but the party avowedly seeks to gain control of the
government. Of course it professes its intention to conduct public
business honestly and for the benefit of the whole people, but fine
distinctions such as these are apt, in the heat of the conflict, to be
lost sight of by practical politicians. Not unnaturally they identify
the interests of the state with the interests of their party, and the
acceptance of dishonest money, with the possible danger which such an
act involves, may easily seem to them a patriotic duty rather than a
heinous offence. In all their corrupt bargaining they are conscious
of a certain devotion to ideal ends. They may sell franchises, but
they would refuse to betray a candidate. They may allow a local gang
whose support is essential to loot a city government, but they would
not abandon a fundamental party principle. On the contrary they would
defend their conduct as designed to secure the triumph of a great right
by the commission of a small wrong.
This argument is perhaps the most subtle that can be offered, and
the form of corruption for which it finds a quasi-justification is
assuredly the most dangerous with which we are confronted to-day. It
will be observed, however, that the foregoing illustrations involve a
higher range of motives than can be ascribed to our ordinary political
bosses. Doubtless there have been exceptional cases of party leaders
who, for minor but corrupt governmental favours, have accepted money
and turned every cent of it into the party treasury for honest
propaganda work. But once admit this conduct to be justifiable and
the day of such leaders will soon be over. Inevitably they must be
succeeded by less scrupulous politicians who will sell public property
and betray public interests right and left, and, after deducting large
sums to feather their own nests, still be in a position to contribute
to the support of the party more largely than any conscientious leader.
Under these conditions the political influence of wealthy corporations
or wealthy men will be limited solely by the amount of money they are
willing to spend. No matter with what reservations and good intentions
such practices are entered upon, they will mean in the end nothing
more and nothing less than that government is on hire or on sale
to the highest bidders. There is no easier road by which democracy
may pass over into plutocracy; and it is indeed fortunate that the
American people in its recent attitude toward the question of campaign
contributions has begun to show an adequate realisation of the danger
confronting it.
* * * * *
To sum up the argument presented in the foregoing pages, it should be
noted that while it is comparatively easy to formulate a definition
of corruption, to point out the difference between the legal and
ethical conceptions of the matter, to distinguish between bribery and
auto-corruption and, in general, to mark out the logical boundaries
of the field, the application of these definitions and distinctions
is made immensely difficult by the variety of political institutions,
the divergence of political practices and the conflict between general
opinion and class opinions. A number of conclusions would nevertheless
seem to deserve at least tentative expression.
(1) The prevalence of charges of corruption and of actual corruption
in American politics is not of itself proof of our inferiority in
political morality to the other great nations of the world.
(2) Considering opportunities and temptations, our current political
morality is at least not yet proven to be inferior to our business and
social morality in general.
(3) Unsupported charges of corruption are too frequently indulged in
by practical politicians, reformers, and conservatives, the results
being a popular moral callousness and a loss of social confidence which
render all constructive work more difficult.
(4) Acts involving corrupt motives range in current social estimation
all the way from heinous felonies to minor foibles. The view that
there are only a few “corruptionists,” all of whom richly deserve
criminal sentences and might receive them without unduly crowding
our penitentiaries, is a grotesque misconception. Instead of this we
must recognise frankly that self-interest and social interests are
inextricably bound up as motive forces of our social machinery, often
working in harmony and reinforcing each other, but sometimes colliding
and presenting new questions for moral determination and social
protective action.
(5) From among such cases of collision between social and self-interest
we must endeavour to single out those most obviously harmful to society
and the state, and, not content with branding them as morally bad, we
must formulate legal prohibitions supported by penalties severe enough
to check the evil. Particularly important in this field of work is a
thorough solution of the whole problem of campaign contributions.
(6) Certain cases in which political action is determined by corrupt
considerations may be more effectively combated with moral than with
legal sanctions. These are cases which threaten no very serious
consequences, cases in which the corrupt considerations are not
directly material in character, cases in which personal advantage is
not so much sought as the advantage of some social group, and all other
cases of so subtle or undecided a character that definite legal action,
at least under existing conditions, is impossible. In the presence of
many such difficulties we can only plead for a clearer recognition by
the individual of duty to the state and to society as a whole. On the
other hand, society and the state as now constituted fall short of a
full and humane ideal of justice and hence are partly responsible for
existing corruption.
Finally it should be said that all effective work against corruption
must be two-fold. On the one hand we must endeavour to raise moral
and legal standards to a higher level. On the other hand we must
unrelentingly prosecute actual offences to the full extent of existing
law. Work of the first sort must be either impersonal or based upon
well authenticated facts. Work of the second sort must above all
things be subjected to a wise restraint; sweeping charges resting
merely upon suspicion must be scrupulously avoided; direct and
well-founded charges must be put into legal form and fought to the last
resort. Reformers should learn to bring down all direct and personal
accusations to the level of existing law, until they have succeeded in
bringing the level of the law up to their ideal standard.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] Other illustrations of auto-corruption may be found in speculation
by inside officials on the basis of crop reports not yet made public,
and in real-estate deals based on a knowledge of projected public
improvements.
[16] Misperformance and neglect of duty do not clearly include cases of
usurpation with corrupt motives; hence the addition of this clause to
the definition. Some usurpations may of course be defended as involving
high and unselfish motives, and hence free from corruption.
[17] Mr. Seeley has shown, of course, that no actual despotism,
so-called, really conforms to this conception, but for purposes of
argument, at least, the assumption may be permitted to stand.
[18] _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. xix (1904), p. 673.
[19] _Cf._ C. Howard, “The Spirit of Graft,” _Outlook_, vol. lxxxi
(1905), p. 365.
[20] _Outlook_, 65:115 (May 12, 1905).
[21] _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. xviii (1902), p. 188.
[22] _Atlantic_, vol. xcv (1905), p. 781.
[23] J. E. C. Bodley, France, bk. iii, ch. vi, p. 306.
CORRUPTION: A PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE
III
CORRUPTION: A PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE
In its broadest significance, corruption has been defined as “the
intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognised duty, or the
unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some
advantage more or less directly personal.” Evil of this sort may occur
not only in the state, but also in the church, the family, in business
associations, and every other kind of social body. One may infer from
the nature of corruption itself that if developed to an extreme degree
it will cause the dissolution of any organisation affected by it.
Every social body requires as a prime condition of its existence a
certain subordination of individual interest to the general interest.
Corruption essentially means the preference of the former to the
latter. If self-interest continuously grows more potent while group
interest _pari passu_ declines, evidently the social organisation
so affected will weaken and finally die. “The king by judgment
establisheth the land: but he that receiveth gifts overthroweth it.”
Universally triumphant corruption, therefore, would destroy the body
from which it had drawn the sustenance for its own parasitic life.
Anarchy would be far preferable to the extreme logical consequences of
corruption. For anarchy seeks to destroy only the compulsory political
forms of human society, leaving men free to associate voluntarily in
all other ways, whereas ultimate corruption would loosen every social
bond and reduce humanity to the state of nature as Hobbes conceived
it:—_bellum omnium contra omnes_.
Corruption, then, is a social disease that may terminate fatally.
Social death does not always occur because of it, but from the social
point of view it is always a pathological condition. Few of the great
tragedies of history involving the fall of nations or of mighty
institutions can be explained fully without reference to the antecedent
corroding influence of corruption. It had a part in the decline of
Greece and Rome, in the Protestant Reformation, the overthrow of
the Stuart dynasty in England, the partition of Poland, and the
French Revolution. Other causes contributed to these events and were
perhaps more largely instrumental in bringing them about,—ignorance,
inefficiency, tyranny, immorality, extravagance, and obstinacy,—but in
each instance corruption was also present on a large scale. Even in
cases of historical catastrophes where the crushing force was applied
from the outside it is usually possible to discern how the victor’s
path was smoothed by the disintegrating effect of corruption upon the
social structure of the vanquished.[24] For this reason Europe fell
more easily before Napoleon from 1796 to 1812, imperial France before
Germany in 1870-’71, and Russia before Japan in 1904-’05.
While the disastrous consequences of widespread corruption as shown
by such instances are not to be lightly underestimated, it is
evident, on the other hand, that corrupt conditions may exist even on
a considerable scale without bringing about the extreme penalty of
disintegration or conquest. Recoveries little short of the miraculous
are sometimes noted in this field of social pathology. It would be
difficult to conceive a lower stage of degradation than that reached by
the English ministry and parliament during and immediately following
the time of Walpole, yet to-day England enjoys the reputation of
possessing one of the most honest and efficient governments in
the world. American municipal reformers sometimes despair of any
efficacious remedy for the corruption which prevails in our cities.
They should take heart upon observing the degraded conditions which
prevailed in Prussian municipalities prior to Stein’s _Städteordnung_
of 1808, and in England prior to the Municipal Reform Act of 1835.
In both instances formerly corrupt conditions have been succeeded by
honest and efficient municipal systems which are observed with envy and
commented upon with admiration the world over.