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CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS AND LIFE
CORRUPTION _in_ AMERICAN
POLITICS AND LIFE
By
ROBERT C. BROOKS
Professor of Political Science in the University of Cincinnati
[Illustration: Decoration]
NEW YORK
DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY
1910
COPYRIGHT, 1910, BY
DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY
Published October, 1910
THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS
RAHWAY, N. J.
TO
THE MEMORY OF
James Eugene Brooks
FATHER FRIEND
FIRST TEACHER OF CIVIC DUTY
PREFACE
Corruption is repulsive. It deserves the scorn and hatred which all
straightforward men feel for it and which nearly all writers on the
subject have expressed. Conviction of its vileness is the first step
toward better things. Yet there is more than a possibility that the
feeling of repugnance which corrupt practices inspire may interfere
with our clearness of vision, may cloud our conception of the work
before us, may even in some cases lead to misrepresentation—which is
misrepresentation still although designed to aid in virtue’s cause.
Fighting the devil with fire is evidence of a true militant spirit, yet
one may doubt the wisdom of meeting an adversary in that adversary’s
own element, of arming oneself for the battle with that adversary’s
favorite weapon. Whatever views are held regarding the tactics of
reform there must always be room for cool, systematic studies of social
evils. These need not be lacking in sympathy for the good cause any
more than the studies of the pathologist are devoid of sympathy for
the sufferers from the disease which he is investigating. Nor need
social studies conceived in the spirit of detachment, of objectivity,
be lacking in practical helpfulness. We recognise the immense utility
of the investigations of the pathologist although he works apart from
hospital wards with microscope and culture tubes. In an effort to
realise something of this spirit and purpose the following studies have
been conceived.
Of the several studies making up the present work the first and second
only have been published elsewhere. The writer desires to acknowledge
the courtesy of the _International Journal of Ethics_ in permitting the
reprint, without material alterations, of the “Apologies for Political
Corruption,” and of the _Political Science Quarterly_ for a similar
favour with regard to “The Nature of Political Corruption.” Objection
will perhaps be made to the precedence given the “Apologies” over “The
Nature of Political Corruption” in the present volume. Weak as it may
be in logic this arrangement would seem to be the better one in ethics;
hence the decision in its favour. Definition could wait, it was felt,
until every opportunity had been given to the apologists for corruption
to present their case.
The extent of the author’s obligations to the very rich but scattered
literature of the subject will appear partly from the references in
text and footnotes. For many criticisms and suggestions of value on
portions of the work falling within their fields of interest, cordial
acknowledgment is made to Dr. Albert C. Muhse of the Bureau of
Corporations, Washington; Mr. Burton Alva Konkle of the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Professor John L. Lowes,
Washington University, St. Louis; Mr. Perry Belmont, Washington; Mr.
Frank Parker Stockbridge, of the _Times-Star_, Cincinnati; and finally
to Professor Frederick Charles Hicks, the writer’s friend and colleague
in the faculty of the University of Cincinnati. Credit must also be
given for many novel points of view developed in class room discussion
by students of Swarthmore College and the University of Cincinnati.
The members of the graduate seminar in political science at the latter
institution have been particularly helpful in this way. To one of them,
Mr. Nathan Tovio Isaacs, of Cincinnati, the author is indebted for a
most painstaking reading of the whole MS., on the basis of which many
valuable criticisms of major as well as minor importance were made.
To the members of the City Clubs of Philadelphia and Cincinnati, the
writer also returns most cordial thanks for the various pleasant
occasions which they afforded him of presenting his views in papers
read before these bodies. While there was some smoke and at times
a little heat in the resulting discussions, there were also many
flashes of inspiration emanating from the political experience
and the high unselfish ideals of the membership of the clubs. In
appropriating valuable suggestions from so many sources and with such
scant recognition, the writer trusts that his treatment of political
corruption may nevertheless escape the charge of literary corruption.
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI,
Cincinnati, Ohio,
April 1, 1910.
CONTENTS
I. APOLOGIES FOR POLITICAL CORRUPTION
PAGE
Introduction:—Corruption not defensible on the ground
of the strength and prevalence of temptation 3
Four main lines of apology 4
That corruption makes business good 4
Protection of vice 5
Corrupt concessions to legitimate business 10
That corruption may be more than compensated for
by the high efficiency otherwise of those who engage
in it 14
That corruption saves us from mob rule 17
That corruption is part of an evolutionary process the
ends of which are presumed to be so beneficent as
to more than atone for the existing evils attributable
to it 22
Conclusion: The probable future development of corruption
in politics, the failure of the apologies for
political corruption 37
II. THE NATURE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Introduction, definition, etc. 41
Frequent use of the word corruption 41
Legal definitions contrasted with definitions from the
point of view of ethics, political science, etc. 42
Verbal difficulties 42
Levity in the use of the word 42
Metaphor implied by the word 43
Distinction between bribery and corruption; between
corruption and auto-corruption 45
Tentative definition of corruption 46
Analysis of the concept of corruption 46
Corruption not limited to politics. Exists in business,
church, schools, etc. 46
Intentional character of corruption. Distinguished
from inefficiency 48
Various degrees of clearness of political duties 51
Consequences of wide extension of political duties 52
Recognition of political duty 55
Legal and other standards 55
The radical view 57
Advantages sought by corrupt action 59
Various degrees and kinds of advantages 60
Rewards and threats 63
Degree of personal interest involved 65
Corruption for the benefit of party 71
Summary 74
III. CORRUPTION: A PERSISTENT PROBLEM
OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE
Extreme consequences of corruption 81
Less extreme consequences of corruption: recovery from
corrupt conditions 82
The continuing character of the problem of corruption 85
Disappearance of certain forms of corruption; changes
of form of corruption 88
Subsidies from foreign monarchs 89
Influence of royal mistresses 90
Lord Bacon’s case 90
Pepys and the acceptance of presents 93
Corruption and the administrative service appointments 95
Recent changes in the forms of municipal corruption 98
Limitation of corruption to certain branches or spheres
of government 100
In local government only, in central government only 100
Middle grade of Japanese officials 102
Limitation of corruption in amount 105
Contractual character of most corruption 106
Prudential considerations restraining corruptionists 107
Summary 109
IV. CORRUPTION IN THE PROFESSIONS,
JOURNALISM, AND THE HIGHER
EDUCATION
Forms of corruption not commonly recognised as such;
their significance 113
General classification of recognised forms of corruption 116
Defilement of the sources of public instruction 117
Difficulty of defining and regulating corruption in this
sphere 118
Professional codes of ethics 119
Corruption in journalism: an extreme view; limitations 121
Corruption in higher education 132
Growing influence of colleges and universities 133
Higher education and public opinion 134
Personal responsibility of the teacher 136
The struggle for endowments and resulting bad practices 137
The teaching of economic, political, and social doctrines
in colleges and universities 139
Summary 156
V. CORRUPTION IN BUSINESS AND
POLITICS
Corruption in business 161
Effect of consolidation in business 163
Effect of state regulation in transforming character of
business corruption 165
Necessity of further reform efforts 167
Classification of forms of political corruption 169
Political corruption resulting from state regulation of
business 171
New forms of state regulation; other means of
strengthening the position of government 174
The state as seller; difficulties and safeguards 179
Work of the Bureau of Municipal Research 184
Vice and crime in their relation to corrupt politics 186
Methods of repression 188
Tax dodging as a form of political corruption; _quasi_-justification
of the practice 192
Methods of overcoming tax dodging 195
Auto-corruption, and its effects upon party prestige 199
Corruption in relation to political control the basis of
all other forms of political corruption 201
Summary 208
VI. CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND
THE THEORY OF PARTY SUPPORT
Party functions in the United States 213
Neglect of the sources of party support 217
Campaign contributions as a part of the problem 220
Payment of campaign expenses by the state 221
Publicity of campaign contributions 229
State laws requiring publicity 229
Congressional publicity bill of 1908 230
Voluntary publicity in the presidential campaign of
1908; results 233
Publicity before or after election 236
Special information of candidates before election 239
Publicity as applied to political organisations other
than campaign committees 241
Prohibition or limitation of campaign contributions from
certain sources 244
Prohibition of corporate contributions 244
Partnerships, labour unions, clubs, etc. 247
Contributions by candidates 248
Contributions by civil service employees 256
Limiting the amount of individual contributions 258
Effect of smaller campaign funds on political affairs 259
Time limits of large contributions 262
Geographical limits upon the use of campaign funds 263
Effect of campaign fund reform on business interests
in their relation to government 264
Limitation of campaign gifts of services 267
Extension of campaign contribution reforms to state
and local elections 268
To primary and convention campaigns 270
Administration of the reform measures 271
Possibilities of campaign fund reform 273
VII. CORRUPTION AND NOTORIETY:
THE MEASURE OF OUR OFFENDING
Our damaged political reputation; how acquired 277
The garrulity of politicians, its explanation 278
Sensationalism of the press 281
Reform movements, to what extent are they evidence of
moral improvement 287
Special privilege in England and Germany 290
Significance of the American attitude toward special
privilege 291
Special privilege not always corrupt, but may come to
be considered such 292
American criticism of special privilege as corrupt not
proof of our inferiority to Europe in political
morality 294
Consequences of the wide diffusion of political power in
the United States 296
Conclusion: Corruption decreasing in the more progressive
countries of the world 299
APOLOGIES FOR POLITICAL CORRUPTION
I
APOLOGIES FOR POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Nearly all current contributions on the subject of political corruption
belong frankly to the literature of exposure and denunciation. The ends
pursued by social reformers are notoriously divergent and antagonistic,
but there is general agreement among them and, for that matter, among
Philistines as well, that corruption is wholly perverse and dangerous.
How then may one have the temerity to speak of apologies in the
premises?
Certainly not, as one writer has recently done, by presenting a
detailed and striking picture of the force with which the temptation
to corrupt action operates upon individuals exposed to its malevolent
influence. No doubt such studies are of great value in laying bare
to us the hidden springs of part of our political life, the great
resources, material and social, of those who are selfishly assailing
the honesty of government, and the difficulties in the way of those
who are sincerely struggling for better things. In the last analysis,
however, all this is nothing more than a species of explanation and
extenuation, which if slightly exaggerated may easily degenerate into
maudlin sympathy. That men’s votes or influence are cheap or dear,
that their political honour can be bought for $20 or $20,000—doubtless
these facts are significant as to the calibre of the men concerned
and the morals of the times, but they do not amount to an apology for
either.[1] If, however, it can be shown that in spite of the evil
involved political corruption nevertheless has certain resultants which
are advantageous, not simply to those who profit directly by crooked
devices, but to society in general, the use of the term would be
justified.
Four main lines of argument have been gathered from various sources
as constituting the principal, if not the entire equipment of the
_advocatus diaboli_ to this end. These are, first, that political
corruption makes business good; second, that it may be more than
compensated for by the high efficiency otherwise of those who engage in
it; third, that it saves us from mob rule; and fourth, that corruption
is part of an evolutionary process the ends of which are presumed to be
so beneficent as to more than outweigh existing evils.
I. Of these four arguments the first is most frequently presented. Few
of our reputable business men would assent to it if stated baldly,
or indeed in any form, but in certain lines of business the tacit
acceptance of this doctrine would seem to be implied by the political
attitude of those concerned. In slightly disguised form the same
consideration appeals to the whole electorate, as shown by the potency
of the “full dinner-pail” slogan, and the pause which is always given
to reforms demanded in the name of justice when commercial depression
occurs. But while we are often told that corruption makes business
good, we are seldom informed in just what ways this desirable result is
brought about. One quite astounding point occasionally brought up in
this connection is the favour with which a portion of the mercantile
community looks upon the illegal protection of vice and gambling. A
police force must sternly repress major crimes and violence. Certain
sections of the city must be kept free from offence. These things
understood, a “wide-open” town is held to have the advantage over
“slower” neighbouring places. A great city, we are told, is not a
kindergarten. Its population is composed both of the just and the
unjust, and this is equally true of the many who resort to it from the
surrounding country for purposes of pleasure or profit. The slow city
may still continue to hold and attract the better element which seeks
only legitimate business and recreation, but the wide-open town will
hold and attract both the better and the worse elements. Of course,
individuals of the latter class may be somewhat mulcted in dives and
gambling rooms, but they will still have considerable sums left to
spend in thoroughly respectable stores, and such patronage is not to be
sniffed at.[2]
Ordinarily this argument stops with the consideration of spending
alone. It may be strengthened somewhat by bringing in the reaction
of consumption upon production. A great city prides itself upon its
ceaseless rush and gaiety, its bright lights and crowded streets,
its numerous places of amusement and all the evidences of material
prosperity and pleasure. These may be held to be enhanced when both
licit and illicit pursuits and diversions are open to its people; and
further, the people themselves, under the attraction of such varied
allurements, may strive to produce more that they may enjoy more. In
the Philippines, it is said that the only labourers who can be relied
upon to stick to their work any considerable length of time are those
who have caught the gambling and cock-fighting mania. Under tropical
conditions a little intermittent labour easily supplies the few needs
of others, whereas the devotee of chance, driven by a consuming
passion, works steadily. In the present state of a fallen humanity
there are presumably many persons of similar character living under
our own higher civilisation.
Strong as is the hold which the foregoing considerations have obtained
upon certain limited sections of the business community it is not
difficult to criticise them upon purely economic grounds. Of two
neighbouring towns, one “wide-open” and the other law-abiding, the
former might, indeed, prove more successful in a business way. But
we have to consider not simply the material advantage in the case of
two rival cities. The material welfare of the state as a whole is of
greater importance, and it would be impossible to show that this was
enhanced by corruptly tolerating gambling and vice anywhere within
its territory. On the contrary, economists have abundantly shown the
harmful effects of such practices, even when no taint of illegality
attaches to them. What the “wide-open” community gains over its rival
is much more than offset by what the state as a whole loses. Moreover,
it may well be doubted whether the purely economic advantage of the
“wide-open” city is solid and permanent. Even those of its business men
who are engaged in legitimate pursuits are constant sufferers from the
general neglect of administrative duty, and sometimes even from the
extortionate practices, of its corrupt government. They may consider it
to their advantage to have gambling and vice tolerated, but only within
limits. If such abuses become too open and rampant legitimate business
is certain to suffer, both because of the losses and distractions
suffered by the worse element in the community and because of the fear
and avoidance which the prevalence of vicious conditions inspires in
the better classes. Indeed cases are by no means uncommon where the
better business element has risen in protest against lax and presumably
corrupt police methods which permitted vice to flaunt itself so boldly
on retail thoroughfares that respectable women became afraid to venture
upon them. There remain, of course, the expedients of confining illicit
practices to certain districts of the city, or of nicely restraining
them so that, while permitting indulgence to those who desire it, they
do not unduly offend the moral element in the community. But such
delicate adjustments are difficult to maintain, since vice and gambling
naturally seek to extend their field and their profits and, within
pretty generous limits, can readily afford to make it worth while for a
corrupt city administration to permit them to do so. And even if they
are kept satisfactorily within bounds, the state as a whole, if not
the particular community, must suffer from their pernicious economic
consequences.
It has been thought worth while to go at some length into the criticism
on purely economic grounds of the argument that corruption makes
business good; first, because the argument itself is primarily economic
in character, and secondly, because its tacit acceptance by certain
hard-headed business men might lead to the belief that its refutation
on material grounds was impossible. A broad view of the economic
welfare of the state as a whole and business in all its forms leads,
as we have seen, to the opposite conviction. And this conviction that
corruption does _not_ make business good in any solid and permanent way
is greatly strengthened when moral and political, as well as financial,
values are thrown into the scale. It is not necessary to recite in
detail the ethical argument against gambling and vice in order to
strengthen this point. The general duty of the state to protect the
lives and health and morals of its people, even at great financial
sacrifice if necessary, is beyond question. There is a possibility,
as Professor Goodnow maintains,[3] that in the United States we have
gone too far in attempting to suppress by police power things that are
simply vicious, as distinguished from crimes; but however this may
be, some regulation or repression of vice is always necessary. The
real point here is that, having once drawn the line, the bribery of
officials shall not be resorted to in order that vice may be permitted
to flourish in certain localities. In such cases the state suffers not
only from the effects of the vice but also from the disregard into
which the whole fabric of law falls because of the failure to enforce
it in part.
With regard to the particular plea that the life and animation and
pleasures of a wide-open town stimulate its citizens to greater
activity in producing wealth, it should be observed that this amounts
virtually to the advocacy of the purchase of a dubious economic
benefit at a high and certain moral cost. In the long run most, if
not all, the vicious practices which thus find a quasi-justification
directly cripple productive efficiency much more than they can possibly
stimulate it indirectly. “A short life and a merry one” may serve well
as a motto for a criminal career, but not as an economic maxim for a
community of sane people. It may be admitted that the world is not to
grow perfect in a day. Vice will persist, corruption will persist,
although doubtless in less noxious forms, and business will persist
with periods of greater or less prosperity under such conditions. It
would be arrant folly, however, to expect business to reach its highest
development with vice rampant under a corrupt police administration.
A policy of repression, firmly enforced, will be best in the long run
both for morals and for business. But even if honesty and prosperity
were incompatible, it would still be true that it is a higher duty of
the state to make men good than to make them rich. Ordinarily, however,
both ends may be pursued at the same time and without conflict.
Up to this point the discussion of the argument that corruption makes
business good has been confined to the forms of corruption under which
vice is illegally tolerated. A dishonest government, however, is also
frequently appealed to by businesses perfectly legitimate in their
general character for concessions of one sort or another, ranging
from the privilege to obstruct sidewalks by show windows up to the
granting of public service franchises worth millions of dollars. With
an open-handed distribution of such favours business is thought to
flourish. Of course, all these concessions must be paid for, but only
part of the money goes into the public purse, the rest falling into the
hands of boodlers, contractors, and politicians. As the latter could
not establish the most perfect title to the rights and franchises they
sell they are often inclined to fix prices much below real values.
Hence a chance for extraordinary profits to those less scrupulous
business men who know the political ropes. A still more important
feature of such a situation is that almost anything can be bought. In
the lingo of those who are willing to engage in corrupt transactions,
business men know “where they are at”; the politicians are men with
whom “they can do business.” With reformers in power “favours” are
not to be expected. Moreover reformers differ widely among themselves
with regard to the proper method of dealing with public franchises and
privileges of various sorts. Under “good government” these concessions
may not be attainable at all, or, if so, only at such excessive
prices and under such onerous conditions designed to safeguard the
public interest, that the margin of profit left is extremely small. No
wonder that contributions are made by certain kinds of business men to
political organisations which the contributors well know to be corrupt,
and refused by the same men to reform parties. The argument is, of
course, that if the rascals win it is a good stroke of policy to secure
their favour in advance, whereas if the reform party wins everybody
will be treated alike anyway.
From a business point of view that considers immediate profits and
nothing more, this reasoning is of great significance. Several
deductions must be made from it, however, before the final balance is
struck. It sometimes happens that corrupt organisations fix a regular
tariff for privileges of all sorts. So long as the rates are low
business appears to boom. But with the wide distribution of privileges
the purchasers may lose any monopoly advantage which they enjoyed when
the number of concessions was limited. Worse still, a corrupt gang that
feels firmly entrenched in power is apt to develop a pretty fair sense
of values itself, and to raise the rates for concessions to figures
that prove well-nigh prohibitive. The very willingness of business
interests to pay and keep quiet encourages the politicians to increase
their demands and to devise new methods of levying tribute. In the end
the gang may determine to assume the profits in certain lines by the
formation of inside contracting rings which make all competition from
the outside futile. Of course, while this process is going on the worst
and most unscrupulous competitors in the businesses affected by it have
a decided advantage over their fellows. Business men who complain of
railroad rebates should certainly be able to recognise the destructive
character of corrupt and unfair political conditions of the kind
described above. Even those who most profit by alliance with the gang
are apt to repent it in the end. They may have succeeded in securing
all the favours which they need, and yet stand in constant terror of
blackmail and strike legislation by their former political confederates
or of exposure by reformers. Finally, although they may be so fortunate
as to escape indictment for particular misdeeds, the general belief
that a business has been corruptly managed is likely to bring about
a demand for legislation affecting its conduct which, temporarily at
least, may reduce its profits and the value of its securities very
materially. The agitation for municipal ownership is a case in point.
Quite apart from the logical weight of the arguments advanced in
support of this policy, there can be no doubt that many people favour
it largely because of the corrupt methods believed, although in most
cases not legally proved, to have been practised by public service
corporations.
II. The second argument to be considered is that corruption may be
more than compensated for by the high efficiency otherwise of those
who engage in it. Such a plea may be offered either for an individual
or for an organisation, such as the machine. Many historical cases
could be cited of statesmanlike ability of a high order and undoubted
honesty on great issues coupled with a shrewd eye for the main chance
whenever minor opportunities presented themselves. Even for men who
are currently credited with having possessed a much larger share of
guile than of ability, admiration is sometimes expressed. There are
those who think that New York owes a statue to Tweed, and Pennsylvania
already has a statue of Quay—if not a place for the statue.[4] The same
manner of thinking prevails in other fields than politics, especially
whenever graft can be made to appear as a sort of tribute levied upon
a supposedly hostile social class. For example, a labour leader who
extorted checks from employers by threatening and even calling strikes
was defended by many of his followers on the ground that he had shown
wonderful ability in organising the union and securing higher wage
scales.[5]
The question is sometimes raised as to whether or not some purely
personal moral obliquity should be held against a candidate for
office whose qualifications otherwise are unimpeachable. A practical
answer would, of course, depend largely upon the kind of evil charged
against the man and the probability that it would interfere with
the performance of his public duties. Even an extremist upon such
an issue would have to admit that certain statesmen who have given
most distinguished service to their countries have been, for example,
intemperate in the use of liquor or unfaithful in the marriage
relation. If in such cases we excuse and forget, why not also excuse
and forget corrupt transactions that have been more than repaid by
general brilliant conduct of affairs of state? No answer to this
second question, however, can avoid the distinction that while certain
kinds of personal immorality may affect the value of a man’s public
service to an infinitesimal degree only, corruption in any part of his
political career strikes directly at whatever efficiency he may possess
as a public servant. In the former case his sins are in a different
category from his virtues, whereas in the latter case they belong to
the same category. Moreover a corrupt record even on a minor point
in a man’s official career is apt to prove a great stumblingblock
forever after. Usually designing persons can more readily employ their
knowledge of it to force him to the commission of further and worse
corrupt actions than they could hope to do had his earlier offences
been of the same degree but of a purely personal character.
There is, of course, no quantitative measure whereby we can reckon
exactly the efficiency and honesty of men, and, striking a joint
average, definitely appraise their value for a given position in the
service of the state. If there were such a measure assuredly it would
seldom, if ever, register both perfect efficiency and perfect honesty.
The work of government, like that of all social institutions, must be
performed by relatively weak and incapable human instruments. At best
we can only seek to secure the greatest attainable honesty and the
greatest attainable efficiency. There may be cases where a degree of
the latter amounting to positive genius may offset a serious defect
in the former. Distinguished ability, however, ought to be relatively
free from moral weakness. Men of more than average capacity, to say
nothing of genius, should find it less necessary than others to stoop
to equivocal practices in order to succeed. If no higher motives
swayed such men, then at least an intelligent appreciation on their
part of the risks they ran in pursuing crooked courses would serve
as sufficient deterrent. It is your stupid and incapable official
ordinarily who, because of moral insensibility or in order to keep
pace with his abler fellows, is most easily tempted to employ shifty
devices. The weakness of the second apology for corruption is thus
apparent. Normally corruption and efficiency are not found together.
On the contrary honesty and efficiency are common yokemates. A public
sentiment which weakly excuses corruption on the ground of alleged
efficiency will be deceived much more often than a public sentiment
which insists upon the highest attainable standard of both.
III. The third apology for corruption is that it saves us from
mob rule. In Professor Ford’s felicitous phrase the appearance
of corruption “instead of being the betrayal of democracy may be
the diplomatic treatment of ochlocracy, restraining its dangerous
tendencies and minimising its mischiefs.”[6] According to this view
the machine, dominated by the boss or gang, is the defender of society
itself against the attacks of our internal barbarians. Tammany Hall
had the brazen effrontery to assume this attitude during the New York
mayoralty campaign of 1886, when it nominated Mr. Hewitt in opposition
to Henry George. “Yet it would be difficult to name a time in recent
years when frauds so glaring and so tremendous in the aggregate have
been employed in behalf of any candidate as were committed in behalf of
Mr. Hewitt in 1886.”[7] Society would seem to be in desperate straits,
indeed, if it needed such defenders and such methods of defence. In
favour of their employment it is sometimes said that our propertied
and educated classes have grown away from the great democratic
mass. Of themselves they would be quite incapable of protecting the
goods, material and ideal, which are intrusted to them. The corrupt
machine, seeking its own interest, it is true, nevertheless performs
the invaluable social service of keeping the restless proletariat in
subjection. In order to obtain the votes of ignorant and venal citizens
the unscrupulous political leader is obliged to perform innumerable
petty services for them, as, for example, securing jobs, both in the
public service and outside, supplying or obtaining charitable relief in
times of need, speaking a friendly word to the police magistrate after
a neighbourhood brawl, providing recreation in the form of tickets
to chowder excursions during the summer and to “pleasure club” balls
during the winter. Bread and circuses being thus supplied, our higher
civilisation is presumably secure. If the corrupt machine did not
perform these services, it is assumed by some timorous persons that the
mob would break forth, gut our shops, rob our tills, burn, and kill in
unrestrained fury.
If catastrophes so great and terrible were actually impending the
situation would seem not only to justify our present corrupt rulers,
but might also be held sufficiently grave to induce us to establish
new bosses and gangs, giving them license to graft to their heart’s
content, provided only that they continue their beneficent mission of
saving civilisation. Dictatorship would be cheap at the price. The
whole argument, however, rests primarily upon a shockingly unjust
view of the real character of our proletariat class. Even if this
very indefinite term be interpreted to mean only the poorest and most
ignorant of our people, whether of native American or of foreign
stock, the view that they need to be constantly cajoled by the corrupt
politician in order to prevent them from resorting to the violent
seizure of the property of others is a grotesque misconception. In
the great majority of cases such persons desire nothing more than the
opportunity to earn an honest and frugal living in peace. We must
admit, of course, that lynching and labour riots occur with appalling
frequency in the United States. No one should attempt to minimise the
danger and disgrace of such outbreaks. Let us not, on the other hand,
fall into the gross error of regarding them as deliberate revolutionary
attacks upon the existing social order.
With such circumstances confronting us, what shall be said of the
alleged utility of the corrupt machine as prime defender of social
peace? If we should conclude to recognise the gang frankly in this
capacity any materials for the formation of revolutionary mobs that we
may possess would certainly be encouraged to increase the demands made
as the price of continued quiet, and even to furnish a few sample riots
from time to time as a means of enforcing their demands. In reality,
however, corrupt political machines care very little for social
welfare. The very essence of corruption is self-interest regardless of
public interest. Familiarity with the favours bestowed by politicians
is hardly the best means of encouraging quiescence among poor and
ignorant recipients. It may become the first step toward idleness and
crime. But besides the distribution of favours the corrupt politician
has many other means of procuring power. Hired thugs, and sometimes
members of the regular police force, are employed to drive honest
voters from the polls, and every manner of tricky device is resorted
to in order to deceive them in casting their ballots or to falsify the
election returns. Do such things allay social discontent? Even the rank
favouritism shown by the corrupt organisation to its servile adherents
must make enemies of those who feel themselves slighted. Few forms of
political evil are more dangerous than the fear sometimes displayed
by mayors or governors that the vigorous employment of the police to
suppress rioting may cost them votes when they come up for re-election.
And there are many other consequences of corrupt rule which indirectly
but none the less surely inflame the sufferers against the injustice of
the existing order: insufficient and inferior school accommodations,
the absence of parks and other means of rational recreation, dirty
streets, impure water supply, neglect of housing reforms, poor and
high-priced public utility services and so on. All things considered,
the corrupt machine is the sorriest saviour of society imaginable.
Assuming, finally, for the sake of argument, that there is real danger
of class war in the near future, the best defence would obviously lie
in strong police, militia, and army forces. The life of the state
itself would require the destruction of every vestige of corruption
in these branches of its service at least. If the danger of class war
were real but not imminent a thoroughgoing policy directed to the
establishment of social justice and the elimination of public abuses
would be imperative. Among other things, better education, sanitation,
poor relief, and public services, would have to be supplied, and to
get these we would have to get rid of the corrupt machine as far as
possible. Under either assumption, therefore, the state threatened
with social disturbance would find safety not in corruption but in
honesty and efficiency. However, in exposing the hollowness of the
pretence that society needs to be saved by crooked means, we should not
fall into the error of assuming that the corrupt politician alone is
responsible for all our social ills. We who not only tolerate his works
but who tolerate many other abuses with which he has no connection
whatever, should remember our own responsibility for the improvement
and continued stability of society. It is the custom to castigate
the rich in this connection, but the indifference, snobbishness, and
narrowness of large sections of our middle classes are also very
gravely at fault.[8]
IV. The fourth apology offered for corruption is that it is part of
an evolutionary process, the ends of which are presumed to be so
beneficent as to more than atone for existing evils attributable to it.
Complaint might justly be made that this is a highly general statement,
but its formulation in the broad terms used above seems necessary
in order to include the various details of the argument. A similar
sweeping defence might be set up for any conceivable abuse or evil—for
tyranny as well as for corruption, for immorality or for crime. In all
such cases, however, it would be necessary to prove—although it seems
quite impossible to do so—that the ultimate beneficent end would more
than repay the evil involved; and further, that no better way existed
of attaining the promised goal. It must be freely conceded that we know
little or nothing of the remote ends of the evolutionary process as
it exhibits itself in society. Repulsive as are many of its details,
there seem to be sufficient grounds for believing in wonderful ultimate
achievement. An apology for contemporary corruption based on such
considerations may therefore be worthy of attention, provided, however,
that it does not attempt to bind us to a purely _laissez faire_
attitude in the presence of admitted and immediate political evils.
From the latter point of view political corruption may be regarded as a
symptom, bad in itself but valuable because it indicates the need, and
in some degree the method, of cure. Like pain in the physical economy
it is one of the danger signals of the social economy. Thus, as we
have seen, the neglect of proper facilities for education, sanitation,
poor relief and so on, particularly in our large cities, is both a
resultant in part of corruption and a cause of further corruption.
By providing better facilities along these lines we may, therefore,
hope ultimately to improve the whole tone of our citizenship and the
life of the state. A still more concrete illustration is supplied by
Professor Goodnow’s masterly discussion of the boss in his “Politics
and Administration.”[9] According to his view certain defects in
our governmental organisation, notably the decentralisation and
irresponsibility of much of our administrative machinery, the futile
attempt to secure by popular vote the election of a large number of
efficient administrative officials and the lack of a close relationship
between legislation and administration, all combine to produce a
situation which only a strong party organisation dominated by a boss
can keep from degenerating into chaos. From this aspect it might be
maintained that the evil political practices commonly associated
with the boss are only incidental and in part excusable after all.
Fundamentally he exists because of defects in the organisation of
our government, and his activities go far to correct these defects.
Even accepting this argument fully, however, some choice in bosses
as Professor Goodnow points out,[10] would still be left open to
the electorate. By the progressive overthrow of the worse and the
selection of better aspirants for political power the boss may evolve
into the leader, who will retain many of the great functions of his
predecessor but will exercise them in a responsible manner and free
from corruption. The practical significance of Professor Goodnow’s
argument, however, lies far less in the explanation it gives of the
temporary ascendency of the boss and the system which he presides over
than in the conviction it enforces of the necessity of certain reforms
in the organisation of our government that will bring its functions
into harmony with each other, and ultimately, it is hoped, make corrupt
and irresponsible bosses Impossible.[11] In no proper sense of the
word, however, can this line of argument be considered an apology for
corruption such as is usually alleged to be associated with bossism. It
makes clear only that the power of the boss, under present conditions,
has its uses as well as its abuses. But these uses do not justify
the abuses. On the contrary the corruption associated with the great
powers of the boss is a menace so great as to make necessary the most
far-reaching reforms.
Whether we are soon to get rid of the boss or not we are therefore
bound to fight against any corruption that may develop as a result of
his rule. Our present system is manifestly unstable in the long run.
Individual bosses seldom retain power any great number of years. The
position of the boss may remain, but “spasms” of reform usually succeed
at least in introducing a new incumbent who brings with him new methods
and new groups of favourites. The net result is far from guaranteeing
that certainty and stability which both business and public interests
demand. Even assuming that in some way security against popular
upheaval could be conferred upon the boss, other difficulties would
still have to be met. The large financial interests, which need the
favours of government or seek release from its burdens, sometimes go
to war among themselves, and in these contests control of the powers
of the boss gives valuable strategic advantages. Hence many ambitious
aspirants among the principal heads of the gang, each awaiting a
possible palace insurrection. It is conceivable, however, that a boss
might secure himself both against factional and popular disturbances,
and at the same time be supported by consolidated business interests
powerful beyond the possibility of successful attack by other financial
groups. With further growth of corporations and the adoption of the
community of interest policy among them, the latter condition might
indeed be pretty thoroughly established. In this case we would have
a boss as impregnable as the conception allows. True he would still
operate through democratic forms, but this pseudo-democracy of his
would be nothing more than a mask for oligarchy. The system might
conceivably work out into a highly efficient and stable government.
Both the boss and the financial interests behind him might prudently
decide to content themselves with small percentages of profit, and
otherwise insist on solid merit in both the men and the materials they
employed. The disturbances due to popular uprisings on the part of an
untrammeled voting mass would be reduced to a vanishing minimum.
In this successful combination, however, the oligarchy and not the boss
would be the dominating factor. Indeed even under existing conditions
the title of boss is a singularly inappropriate one in most instances.
Unless the bearer is possessed of financial ability of a high order
himself he must remain a lieutenant rather than a leader. Usually he
does not possess this ability. Nor is the reason hard to perceive. The
boss is, and probably will continue to be, a specialist in one line
only, namely, political manipulation; and in his extremely exposed
position this work is quite sufficient in detail and variety to absorb
all the time and talents even of an extraordinarily gifted person.
Under the financial oligarchy, therefore, the boss will probably be
nothing more than an agent, a departmental head charged with the duty
of securing the necessary majority of the popular vote at all elections
and of retaining control of office holders. From this point of view the
absurdity of the conception of the boss as the saviour of democracy is
again apparent. At bottom his function is to secure power through his
knowledge and subtle bribery of the people and to sell or lease this
power to financial interests which recoup themselves out of the pockets
of the people. Instead of being the saviour of democracy the net effect
of his work, little perhaps as he realises it, is the selling out of
democracy to oligarchy.