the whole view of the subject I have been compelled to believe that it
is a hasty, unadvised measure, calculated to involve us in difficulties,
perhaps war, without receiving in return any real benefit. The maxim
that it is easier to avoid difficulties than to remove them when they
have reached us, is too old not to be true; but perhaps this and many
other good sayings, are becoming inapplicable in the present stage of
our public measures, which seem to be so far removed from our
(_illegible_) that even the language of Washington must be transposed in
order to be reconciled to the councils of wisdom. I hope I may be
wrong—it is my sincere wish that this Panama movement may advance the
happiness and glory of the country—but if it be not a commitment of our
neutrality with Spain, and indirectly with other powers, as, for
example, Brazil, I have misconstrued very much the signification of the
anathemas which have been pronounced upon the Assembly at Verona, as
well as the true sense of the principles which form international law.
Let the primary interests of Europe be what they may, or let our
situation vary as far as you please from that which we occupied when the
immortal Washington retired from the councils of his country, I cannot
see, for my part, how it follows that the primary interests of the
United States will be safer in the hands of others than in her own; or,
in other words, that it can ever become necessary to form treaties,
alliances, or any connections with the governments of South America,
which may infringe upon the principles of equality among nations which
is the basis of their independence, as well as all their international
rights. The doctrine of Washington is as applicable to the present, as
to the then primary interests of Europe, so far as our own peace and
happiness are concerned, and I have no hesitation in saying, so far as
the true interests of South America are concerned—maugre the discovery
of Mr. Adams, that if Washington was now with us, he would unite with
him in sending this mission to Panama. No one feels more for the cause
of the South Americans than I do, and if the proper time had arrived, I
trust that none would more willingly march to their defence. But there
is a wide difference between relieving them from a combination of league
powers, and aiding them in forming a confederation which can do no good,
as far as I am apprised of its objects, and which we all know, let its
objects be the best, will contain evil tendencies.
Believe me to be, with great respect,
Your obedient servant,
ANDREW JACKSON.
[GENERAL JACKSON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
HERMITAGE, Oct. 15, 1826.
MR DEAR SIR:—
I was very much gratified on the receipt of your letter of the 21st
ult., which reached me yesterday, and thank you for the information it
contains. I want language to express the gratitude I feel for the
unsolicited, but generous support of the great Republican State of
Pennsylvania—did I lack a stimulus to exert all my faculties to promote
the best interests of my country, this alone would be sufficient. Who
could abandon the path of Republican virtue when thus supported by the
voluntary approbation of the enlightened and virtuous citizens of such a
State as Pennsylvania? I answer, none whose minds have been matured in
the schools of virtue, religion and morality.
I am happy to learn that Mr. Cheves has become your neighbor and a
citizen—he is a great blessing to any society—he has a well-stored mind
of useful information, which he will employ to the benefit of his
country and the happiness of the society to which he belongs. Please
present me to him respectfully.
I regret to learn that the drought has visited your section of country,
and your crops are not abundant; still, so long as we have a supply of
breadstuffs and other substantials, we ought to be thankful and happy.
When we contrast our situation with Ireland and England, we ought to
view ourselves as the chosen people of God, who has given us such a
happy government of laws and placed us in such a climate and fertile
soil. We ought not only to be thankful, but we ought to cherish and
foster this heavenly boon with vestal vigilance.
Mrs. J. joins me in kind salutations and respects to you.
I am, very respectfully, your friend,
ANDREW JACKSON.
[GENERAL JACKSON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
HERMITAGE, Jan. 29, 1827.
DEAR SIR:—
Your favor of the 19th has been before me for some time, but observing
in the papers the obituary notice of your brother, whose illness took
you from the city, I have delayed acknowledging its receipt until
advised of your return. I pray you to accept my sincere condolence for
the serious loss you have sustained in the death of your brother.
I suspect the Administration begins to perceive the necessity of public
confidence, without which it is an arduous undertaking to execute the
solemn duties confided by the Constitution to the Chief Magistrate. The
Panama “bubble” and the loss of the trade with the British West Indies
are the result of this defect in the Cabinet, for it cannot be supposed
that such reputed diplomatists would have committed errors so obvious,
had not some influence stronger than the public good operated upon their
minds. My hope, however, is that the wisdom of Congress may remedy these
blunders, and that my friends the “factious opposition” may, in your own
language, never forget the support due to the country.
I had predicted, from the movements of (_illegible_) and Rochester, that
the Panama subject was done with, and that the charge of “factious
opposition” would be hushed, but it appears I was mistaken. —— is to be
the theatre on which these mighty projects are to be unfolded. Alas!
what folly and weakness!
Present me to my friend Mr. Kremer, and believe me,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ANDREW JACKSON.
In the spring of 1827, Mr. Carter Beverley, of Virginia, was on a visit
to General Jackson at the “Hermitage.” The conversation turned on the
incidents which preceded the election of Mr. Adams, and General Jackson
gave some account of his interview with Mr. Buchanan in December, 1824,
speaking of Mr. Buchanan, however, not by name, but as “a leading member
of Congress.” Mr. Beverley wrote an account of this conversation to a
friend in North Carolina, who published his letter. Mr. Beverley
afterward wrote to General Jackson, saying that his letter was not
intended for publication, but asking if its statements were correct.
General Jackson, without seeing Mr. Beverley’s published letter, then
wrote an answer to Mr. Beverley, which was published, and in which he
stated that “a leading member of Congress” had, as the agent or
confidential friend of Mr. Clay, proposed to him to engage to make Mr.
Clay Secretary of State, and that he emphatically declined to do so.
Subsequently, in another publication, General Jackson gave the name of
Mr. Buchanan as the member who had thus approached him. The public was
thus (in 1827) electrified by a statement, coming from General Jackson
himself, that Mr. Clay, who had been charged with purchasing his
appointment by Mr. Adams as Secretary of State, by his promise to make
Mr. Adams President, had attempted, through Mr. Buchanan, to negotiate
the same kind of corrupt bargain with General Jackson, on the like
promise to make General Jackson President. It is very easy to see how
this mistake first arose in the General’s mind. Recollecting the
information which Mr. Buchanan had given him of the over-zealous and
imprudent conversation of Mr. Markley, who was a known partisan of Mr.
Clay,—information which Mr. Buchanan assigned as a reason why the
General should disavow the rumor that he had promised to appoint Mr.
Adams Secretary,—General Jackson had evidently come to misunderstand the
object of Mr. Buchanan in mentioning what Mr. Markley had said. It must
be remembered that at this time (1827) there was an angry and excited
controversy going on, respecting the supposed bargain between Mr. Clay
and Mr. Adams; that Mr. Clay was publishing, and that General Jackson
was publishing; that General Jackson undoubtedly believed that there had
been an improper understanding between Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay, and it
was very natural for him to take up the idea that Mr. Buchanan, by
mentioning what Mr. Markley had said, stood ready, as a friend of Mr.
Clay, to propose and carry out a similar bargain with himself. Apart
from Mr. Buchanan’s denial, there seems to be an intrinsic improbability
that one who had been an earnest supporter of General Jackson in the
popular election, and who feared that even a rumor of his intended
appointment of Mr. Adams would injure the General in the House of
Representatives, and who knew that it would greatly injure him in
Pennsylvania, if it were not contradicted, should have exerted himself
to get from the General a promise to make Mr. Clay Secretary of State.
Promises, or rumors of promises, in regard to this appointment, were the
very things which Mr. Buchanan was interested to prevent. It was very
unfortunate that General Jackson did not afterwards and always see, that
the mention by Mr. Buchanan of Mr. Markley’s wishes, was intended to
present to his (the General’s) mind the importance of his denial of the
rumor that he had said he would appoint Mr. Adams. In all that scene of
intrigue—and apart from any thing said or done by the principal persons
concerned in that great struggle, there was intrigue—General Jackson
acted with the rigid integrity that belonged to his character. Mr.
Buchanan acted with no less integrity. He wished to prevent General
Jackson’s cause from being injured in the House and in the country, by
unfounded rumors with which the heated atmosphere of Washington was
filled; and he could have had no motive for seeking to make Mr. Clay
Secretary of State, at the expense of exposing General Jackson to the
same kind of rumor in regard to Mr. Clay which he was anxious to
counteract in regard to Mr. Adams.
After the publication of General Jackson’s letter to Mr. Beverley, Mr.
Buchanan wrote to a friend as follows:
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. INGHAM.]
LANCASTER, July 12, 1827.
DEAR SIR:—
I received yours yesterday evening, and hasten to give it an immediate
answer. With you, I regret the publication of General Jackson’s letter
to Mr. Beverley. It may do harm, but cannot do good. The conversation
which I held with the General will not sustain his letter, although it
may furnish a sufficient reason for his apprehensions. My single purpose
was to ascertain from him whether he had ever declared he would appoint
Mr. Adams Secretary of State in case he were elected President. As to
the propriety and policy of propounding this question to him, I had
reflected much, and had taken the advice of a distinguished Jackson man,
then high in office in Pennsylvania. I had no doubt at the time that my
question, if answered at all, would be answered in the negative; but I
wished it to come from himself that he stood uncommitted upon this
subject.
In my interview with the General (which, by the way, was in the street),
I stated the particulars of a conversation between Philip S. Markley and
myself, as one reason why he should answer the question which I had
propounded. Out of my repetition of this conversation the mistake must
have arisen. This conversation would be one link in the chain of
testimony, but of itself it is altogether incomplete.
How General Jackson could have believed I came to him as an emissary
from Mr. Clay or his friends to make a corrupt bargain with him in their
behalf, I am at a loss to determine. He could not have received the
impression until after Mr. Clay and his friends had actually elected Mr.
Adams, and Adams had appointed Clay Secretary of State. Although I
continued to be upon terms of the strictest intimacy with General
Jackson whilst he continued at Washington, and have corresponded with
him occasionally since, he has never adverted to the subject. From the
terms of his letters to me, I never could have suspected that he for a
moment supposed me capable of becoming the agent in such a negotiation.
The idea that such was his impression never once flitted across my mind.
When regularly called upon, I need not tell you that I shall speak the
truth. If the matter be properly managed, it will not injure General
Jackson; but I can readily conceive that such a course may be taken in
relation to it by some of our friends, as will materially injure his
prospects.
From your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
At about this time, Mr. Clay publicly disclaimed all knowledge
respecting the interview between Mr. Buchanan and General Jackson, and
the latter then wrote to Mr. Buchanan the following explanatory letter:
[GENERAL JACKSON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]
HERMITAGE, July 15, 1827.
DEAR SIR:—
You will see from the enclosed publication of Mr. Clay repelling the
statement made by me respecting the propositions said to have been made
by his friends to mine and to me, and intended to operate upon the last
election for President, that it becomes necessary for the public to be
put in possession of the facts. In doing this you are aware of the
position which you occupy, and which, I trust, you will sustain when
properly called on. Ever since the publication, and the inquiry before
the House of Representatives in January and February, 1825, questions
have been propounded from various sources calculated to draw from me the
information I had upon that unpleasant subject. Many, no doubt with
sinister views, placing me in selfish connection with the facts from my
accustomed silence, have sought to fortify the character of Mr. Clay.
But in a number of cases, where inquiry seemed to be prompted by a frank
and generous desire to obtain the truth, I felt myself bound to answer
in a corresponding spirit, and accordingly the statement made by you to
me has been on several occasions repeated, as it was to Mr. Beverley,
who visited me at my house, where he found a number of his friends and
relatives.
Having remained all night, in the morning, conversing on politics, the
question so often put to me before was asked by Mr. Beverley. It was
answered. Mr. Beverley went to Nashville and wrote to his friend in
North Carolina, who it appears published his letter. On the 15th of May
last, he wrote me from Louisville, requesting to be informed whether the
statement made by him was correct, and observing that his letter was not
intended for publication. Not having seen the letter, as published,
there was no safe alternative for me but that adopted, of making the
statement, as you will see in the enclosed paper.
I shall now, in reply to Mr. Clay’s appeal, give my authority,
accompanied by the statement you made to Major John H. Eaton and to Mr.
Kremer, and leave Mr. Clay to his further inquiries. He cannot be
indulged by me in a paper war, or newspaper discussion. Had his friends
not voted out Mr. McDuffie’s resolutions when Mr. Clay threw himself
upon the House, the truth or falsehood of these statements would have
been made manifest, and the public mind now at rest upon the subject.
That they did, will appear, reference being had to the _National
Journal_ of the 5th of February, 1825. You will recollect that Mr.
McDuffie moved to instruct the Committee to inquire whether the friends
of Mr. Clay had hinted that they would fight for those who paid best,
and whether overtures were said to have been made by the friends of Mr.
Clay, offering him the appointment of Secretary of State for his
influence, and to elect Mr. Adams, and whether his friends gave this
information to the friends of General Jackson and hinted that if the
friends of Jackson would close with them, &c., &c., giving the Committee
the power to examine on oath.
I have no doubt, when properly called on, you will come forth and offer
me the statement made to Major Eaton, then to Mr. Kremer, and then to
me, and give the names of the friends of Mr. Clay who made it to you.
I will thank you to acknowledge the receipt of this letter on its
reaching you.
I have the honor to be, with great respect,
Your obedient servant,
ANDREW JACKSON.
Early in August, 1827, Mr. Buchanan published a card in the Lancaster
_Journal_, embodying the recollections which I have given, but which it
is not necessary to reproduce; and after a brief but inconclusive reply
from Mr. Markley, the matter passed out of the public mind. Later in the
same year (1827) Mr. Clay published an elaborate vindication of his
conduct, in the course of which he thus refers to Mr. Buchanan:
“In General Jackson’s letter to Mr. Beverley, of the 6th of June last,
he admits that in inferring my privity to the proposition which he
describes as borne by Mr. Buchanan, he may have done me injustice; and,
in his address to the public of the 18th of July last, giving up the
name of this gentleman as his only witness, he repeats that he possibly
may have done me injustice, in assuming my authority for that
proposition. He even deigns to honor me with a declaration of the
pleasure which he will experience if I should be able to acquit myself!
Mr. Buchanan has been heard by the public; and I feel justified in
asserting that the first impression of the whole nation was, as it is
yet that of every intelligent mind unbiased by party prejudice, that his
testimony fully exonerated me, and demonstrated that General Jackson, to
say no more, had greatly misconceived the purport of the interview
between them. And further: that so far as any thing improper was
disclosed by Mr. Buchanan touching the late Presidential election, it
affected General Jackson and his friends exclusively. He having
manifestly injured me, speculation was busy, when Mr. Buchanan’s
statement appeared, as to the course which the General would pursue,
after his gratuitous expression of sympathy with me. There were not
wanting many persons who believed that his magnanimity would prompt him
publicly to retract his charge, and to repair the wrong which he had
done me. I did not participate in that just expectation, and therefore
felt no disappointment that it was not realized. Whatever other merits
he may possess, I have not found among them, in the course of my
relations with him, that of forbearing to indulge vindictive passions.
His silent contemplation of, if not his positive acquiescence in, the
most extraordinary interpretation of Mr. Buchanan’s statement that ever
was given to human language, has not surprised me. If it had been
possible for him to render me an act of spontaneous justice by a frank
and manly avowal of his error, the testimony now submitted to the public
might have been unnecessary.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO MR. INGHAM.]
LANCASTER, August 9, 1827.
DEAR SIR:—
Ere this can reach you, you will have seen General Jackson’s letter to
the public, in which he has given up my name. It will at once strike you
to be a most extraordinary production as far as I am concerned. My
statement will appear in the Lancaster _Journal_ to-morrow, which I
shall send you. I have not suffered my feelings to get the better of my
judgment, but have stated the truth in a calm and temperate manner. If
General Jackson and our editors shall act with discretion, the storm may
blow over without injuring [any one]. Should they, on the contrary,
force me to the wall and make it absolutely necessary for the
preservation of my own character to defend myself, I know not what may
be the consequence.
I have stated the conversation between Markley and myself in as strong
terms as the truth would justify, but no stronger. It is in your power
to do much to give this matter a proper direction. Indeed I would
suggest to you the propriety of an immediate visit to Philadelphia for
that purpose. My friends are very indignant, but I believe I can keep
them right.
You will perceive that General Jackson has cited Mr. Eaton as a witness.
I have treated this part of his letter with great mildness. In a letter
to me, which I received day before yesterday, the General intimates that
George Kremer would confirm his statement. This letter is imprudent,
and, in my opinion, an improper one. It is well it has fallen into the
hands of a political friend.
You will discover that your knowledge concerning my conversation with
General Jackson was nearly correct. The friend who wrote me the letter
of the 27th December, 1824, referred to in my communication, was Judge
Rogers, then Secretary of State [of Pennsylvania].
From your sincere friend,
MR. INGHAM. JAMES BUCHANAN.
[MR. BUCHANAN TO GENERAL JACKSON.]
LANCASTER, August 10, 1827.
DEAR SIR:—
I received your letter of the 15th ultimo on Tuesday last. Your address
to the public also reached me upon the same day, in the Cincinnati
_Advertiser_. This communication made it necessary for me to publish in
detail the conversation which I held with you concerning the
Presidential election on the 30th December, 1824. I shall enclose to you
in this letter that part of the Lancaster _Journal_ containing it. I
regret, beyond expression, that you believed me to be an emissary from
Mr. Clay, since some time before the first Harrisburg convention which
nominated you, I have ever been your ardent, decided, and, perhaps
without vanity I may say, your efficient friend. Every person in this
part of the State of Pennsylvania is well acquainted with the fact. It
is, therefore, to me a matter of the deepest regret that you should have
supposed me to be the “friend of Mr. Clay.” Had I ever entertained a
suspicion that such was your belief, I should have immediately corrected
your impression.
I shall annex to this letter a copy of that which I wrote to Duff Green,
on the 16th of October last. The person whom I consulted in Pennsylvania
was the present Judge Rogers of the Supreme Court—then the Secretary of
State of this Commonwealth.
The friends of the Administration are making great efforts in
Pennsylvania. We have been busily engaged during the summer in
counteracting them. Success has, I think, hitherto attended our efforts.
I do not fear the vote of the State, although it is believed every
member of the State administration, except General Bernard, is hostile
to your election. Your security will be in the gratitude and in the
hearts of the people.
Please to present my best respects to Mrs. Jackson, and believe me to
be, very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
This subject of Mr. Buchanan’s connection with the Presidential election
of 1824–5, and its incidents, passed out of the public mind, after the
publication of the letters which I have quoted. But it was again revived
when Mr. Buchanan became a candidate for the Presidency in 1856. All
that it is needful to say here is, that for nearly three years after the
election of 1824–5, no impression seems to have existed in the mind of
General Jackson that Mr. Buchanan’s interview with him in December,
1824, had any purpose but that which Mr. Buchanan has described; but
that in 1827, General Jackson, in the heat of the renewed controversies
about the supposed bargain between Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay, took up the
erroneous idea that Mr. Buchanan could, if he were to declare the truth,
make it apparent that Mr. Clay or his friends had attempted to effect
the same kind of bargain with General Jackson, which attempt was
indignantly repelled. A candid examination of the facts is all that is
needful to convince any one that the General was in error in 1827, and
that he was equally in error at a much later period. When he became
President, and for a long time thereafter, his confidence in Mr.
Buchanan was manifested in so many ways that one is led to believe that
his view in 1827 of Mr. Buchanan’s conduct in the matter of the
Presidential election of 1824–5 was an exceptional idiosyncrasy,
resulting from the excitement which his mind always felt in regard to
that event, and which was strongly renewed in him in 1827.
It will be necessary to advert to this subject again, because, when Mr.
Buchanan was a candidate for the Presidency in 1856, the whole story was
revived by persons who were unfriendly to him, and who then made use of
a private letter which was extracted from General Jackson in 1845, in a
somewhat artful manner, when he was laboring under a mortal illness. But
an account of this political intrigue belongs to the period when it was
set on foot.
-----
Footnote 14:
The phrase “Presidential Election” is an awkward and incorrect one.
But it has been sanctioned by long usage, and I adopt it because of
its convenience.
Footnote 15:
Mr. Crawford was regarded as out of the question, both because he had
less than one-half of the electoral votes, and because a recent
paralytic affection was supposed to have rendered him incapable of
performing the duties of the office.
Footnote 16:
The person here alluded to was the Hon. Molton C. Rogers, Chairman of
the State Central Committee at Harrisburg, and Secretary of the State
of Pennsylvania. He was afterwards a Judge of the Supreme Court of
that State.
-----
CHAPTER IV.
1825–1826.
BITTER OPPOSITION TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS—BILL FOR
THE RELIEF OF THE REVOLUTIONARY OFFICERS—THE PANAMA
MISSION—INCIDENTAL REFERENCE TO SLAVERY.
The circumstances attending the election of Mr. Adams led to the
formation of a most powerful opposition to his administration, as soon
as he was inaugurated. The friends of General Jackson, a numerous and
compact body of public men, representing a much larger number of the
people of the Union than the friends of Mr. Adams could be said to
represent, felt that he had been unfairly deprived of the votes of
States in the House of Representatives which should have been given to
him. Especially was this the case, they said, in regard to the State of
Kentucky, whose Legislature had plainly indicated the wish of a majority
of her people that her vote in the House should be given to General
Jackson; and when it was announced that Mr. Adams, who had received the
unanimous electoral vote of only six States, had obtained the votes of
thirteen States in the House, while General Jackson had obtained but
seven, and when Mr. Clay had been appointed by Mr. Adams Secretary of
State, there was a bitterness of feeling among the supporters of General
Jackson, which evinced at once a fixed determination to elect him
President at the end of the ensuing four years.
In regard to the state of parties, viewed apart from the merely personal
element of leadership and following, there was not much, in the
beginning of Mr. Adams’s administration, to distinguish its supporters
from its opponents. In the course, however, of that administration,
those who defended it from the fierce assaults of the opposition, began
to take the name of National Republicans, while the opponents of the
administration began to call themselves Democrats. Included in the
opposition were the political friends and followers of Mr. Calhoun, and
the political friends and followers of General Jackson; the latter being
distinctly known and classified as “Jackson men.” In the Senate there
was a number of older men, who were not likely to form an active element
of parliamentary opposition or defence; such as Mr. Silsbee of
Massachusetts, Mr. Dickerson of New Jersey, Mr. Samuel Smith of
Maryland, Mr. William Smith of South Carolina, Mr. Macon of Georgia, Mr.
Rowan of Kentucky, and Mr. Hugh L. White of Tennessee. The opposition in
the Senate was led by a younger class of men: Mr. Van Buren of New York,
Mr. Woodbury of New Hampshire, Mr. Tazewell of Virginia, Mr. Hayne of
South Carolina, Mr. Berrien of Georgia, and Mr. Benton of Missouri.[17]
But it was not in the Senate that the great arena of debate between the
assailants and the defenders of this administration was to be found
during the first year or two of its term. In the House, at the opening
of the 19th Congress, which began its session in December, 1825, there
was an array of combatants—ardent, active and able debaters. Of these,
composing the leaders of the opposition, were Mr. Buchanan, Samuel D.
Ingham, William C. Rives, James K. Polk, John Forsyth, George McDuffie,
Edward Livingston, William Drayton, William S. Archer, Andrew Stevenson,
Mangum, Cambreleng, and Louis McLane. The eccentric John Randolph was
also one of the leaders of the opposition. The leading friends of the
administration were Webster, Sprague, Bartlett, John Davis, Edward
Everett, Burgess, Taylor, Letcher, Wright, Vinton, and Henry L. Storrs.
Before the opposition had marshalled their forces for an attack upon the
administration, a debate occurred in the House of Representatives upon a
subject that did not involve party divisions. A bill was introduced by a
Pennsylvania member for the relief of the surviving officers of the
Revolution. It proposed an appropriation of only one million of dollars,
and it was confined strictly to the cases of the Revolutionary officers
to whom half-pay for life had been granted by Congress in 1780, who had
afterwards accepted a commutation of five years’ full pay, in lieu of
half-pay for life, and who were paid in certificates that were never
worth more than one-fifth of their nominal value, and which were soon
depreciated to about one-eighth. The passage of this measure depended
upon the prudence and skill of those who favored it. The mover, Mr.
Hemphill of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Dayton, had advocated the bill in
speeches of much discretion, and there was a good prospect of its
adoption. In this state of things, an untoward amendment was offered by
a member from Massachusetts, which proposed to increase the
appropriation. This had a manifest tendency to defeat the bill; and at
this crisis Mr. Buchanan came forward to restate the case of the
officers, and to replace the measure on its true footing. He said:
“It is with extreme reluctance I rise at this time to address you. I
have made no preparation to speak, except that of carefully reading the
documents which have been laid upon our tables; but a crisis seems to
have arrived in this debate, when the friends of the bill, if ever, must
come forward in its support. I do not consider that the claim of the
officers of the Revolution rests upon gratitude alone. It is not an
appeal to your generosity only, but to your justice. You owe them a
debt, in the strictest sense of the word; and of a nature so
meritorious, that, if you shall refuse to pay it, the nation will be
disgraced. Formerly, when their claim was presented to Congress, we had,
at least, an apology for rejecting it. The country was not then in a
condition to discharge this debt without inconvenience. But now, after
forty years have elapsed since its creation, with a treasury
overflowing, and a national debt so diminished, that, with ordinary
economy, it must, in a very few years, be discharged, these officers,
the relics of that band which achieved your independence, again present
themselves before you, and again ask you for justice. They do not ask
you to be generous—they do not ask you to be grateful—but they ask you
to pay the debt which was the price of your independence. I term it a
debt; and it is one founded upon a most solemn contract, with which
these officers have complied, both in its letter and in its spirit,
whilst you have violated all its obligations.
“Let us spend a few moments in tracing the history of this claim. It
arose out of the distresses of the Continental Army, during the
Revolutionary War; and the utter inability of the government, at that
time, to relieve them. What, sir, was the situation of that army, when
it lay encamped at the Valley Forge? They were naked, and hungry, and
barefoot. Pestilence and famine stalked abroad throughout the camp. The
first blaze of patriotism which had animated the country, and furnished
the army with its officers, had begun to die away. These officers
perceived that the contest would be long, and bloody, and doubtful. They
had felt, by sad experience, that the depreciated pay which they
received, so far from enabling them to impart assistance to their wives
and children, or hoard up anything for futurity, was not sufficient to
supply their own absolute and immediate wants. Placed in this situation,
they were daily sending in their resignations, and abandoning the cause
of their country. In this alarming crisis, Washington earnestly
recommended to Congress to grant the officers half-pay, to commence
after the close of the contest, as the only remedy for these evils,
within their power. The country was not then able to remunerate the
officers for the immense and unequal sacrifices which they were making
in its cause. All that it could then do was to present them a prospect
of happier days to come, on which hope might rest. With this view,
Congress, in May, 1778, adopted a resolution allowing the officers who
should continue in service until the end of the war, half-pay for seven
years. This resolution produced but a partial effect upon the army. The
time of its continuance was to be but short; and there were conditions
annexed to it, which, in many cases, would have rendered it entirely
inoperative.
“In August, 1779, Congress again acted upon this subject, and resolved,
‘That it be recommended to the several States to grant half-pay for life
to the officers who should continue in the service to the end of the
war.’ This recommendation was disregarded by every State in the Union,
with one exception; and I feel proud that Pennsylvania was that State.
She not only granted half-pay for life to the officers of her own line,
but she furnished them with clothing and with provisions. Thus, when the
General Government became unable to discharge its duty to her officers
and soldiers, she voluntarily interposed and relieved their distresses.
General Washington, when urging upon Congress the necessity of granting
to the officers half-pay for life, pointed to those of the Pennsylvania
line as an example of the beneficial consequences which had resulted
from that measure.[18]
“Congress at length became convinced of the necessity of granting to the
Continental officers half-pay for life. Without pay and without
clothing, they had become disheartened and were about abandoning the
service. The darkest period of the Revolution had arrived, and there was
but one ray of hope left to penetrate the impending gloom which hung
over the army. The officers were willing still to endure privations and
sufferings, if they could obtain an assurance that they would be
remembered by their country, after it should be blessed with peace and
independence. They well knew Congress could not relieve their present
wants; all, therefore, they asked was the promise of a future provision.
Congress, at length, in October, 1780, resolved, ‘That half-pay for life
be granted to the officers in the army of the United States who shall
continue in service to the end of the war.’
“Before the adoption of this resolution, so desperate had been our
condition, that even Washington apprehended a dissolution of the army,
and had begun to despair of the success of our cause. We have his
authority for declaring that, immediately after its adoption, our
prospects brightened and it produced the most happy effects. The state
of the army was instantly changed. The officers became satisfied with
their condition, and, under their command, the army marched to victory
and independence. They faithfully and patriotically performed every
obligation imposed upon them by the solemn contract into which they had
entered with their country.
“How did you perform this contract on your part? No sooner had the
dangers of war ceased to threaten our existence—no sooner had peace
returned to bless our shores, than we forgot those benefactors to whom,
under Providence, we owed our independence. We then began to discover
that it was contrary to the genius of our Republican institutions to
grant pensions for life. The jealousy of the people was roused, and
their fears excited. They dreaded the creation of a privileged order. I
do not mean to censure them for this feeling of ill-directed jealousy,
because jealousy is the natural guardian of liberty.
“In this emergency, how did the Continental officers act? In such a
manner as no other officers of a victorious army had ever acted before.
For the purpose of allaying the apprehensions of their fellow-citizens,
and complying with the wishes of Congress, they consented to accept five
years’ full-pay in commutation for their half-pay for life. This
commutation was to be paid in money, or securities were to be given on
interest at six per cent., as Congress should find most convenient.
“Did the government ever perform this their second stipulation to the
officers? I answer, no. The gentleman from Tennessee was entirely
mistaken in the history of the times, when he asserted that the
commutation certificates of the officers enabled them to purchase farms,
or commence trade, upon leaving the army. Congress had not any funds to
pledge for their redemption. They made requisitions upon the States,
which shared the same fate with many others, and were entirely
disregarded. The faith and the honor of the country, whilst they were
intrusted to thirteen independent and jealous State sovereignties, were
almost always forfeited. We then had a General Government which had not
the power of enforcing its own edicts. The consequence was that, when
the officers received their certificates, they were not worth more than
about one-fifth of their nominal value, and they very soon fell to
one-eighth of that amount.
“Let gentlemen for a moment realize what must then have been the
situation and the feelings of these officers. They had spent their best
days in the service of their country. They had endured hardships and
privations without an example in history. Destitute of everything but
patriotism, they had lived for years upon the mere promise of Congress.
At the call of their country, they had relinquished half-pay for life,
and accepted a new promise of five years’ full-pay. When they had
confidently expected to receive this recompense, it vanished from their
grasp. Instead of money, or securities equal to money, which would have
enabled them to embark with advantage in civil employments, they
obtained certificates which necessity compelled most of them to sell at
the rate of eight for one. The government proved faithless, but they
had, what we have not, the plea of necessity, to justify their conduct.
“In 1790, the provision which was made by law for the payment of the
public debt, embraced these commutation certificates. They were funded,
and the owner of each of them received three certificates; the first for
two-thirds of the original amount, bearing an interest immediately of
six per cent.; the second for the remaining third, but without interest
for ten years; and the third for the interest which had accumulated,
bearing an interest of only three per cent.
“What does this bill propose? Not to indemnify the officers of the
Revolution for the loss which they sustained in consequence of the
inability of the government, at the close of the war, to comply with its
solemn contract. Not, after a lapse of more than forty years, to place
them in the situation in which they would have been placed had the
government been able to do them justice. It proposes to allow them even
less than the difference between what the owners of the commutation
certificates received under the funding system, and what these
certificates when funded were worth upon their face. My colleague has
clearly shown, by a fair calculation, that the allowance will fall
considerably short of this difference. If the question now before the
committee were to be decided by the people of the United States instead
of their Representatives, could any man, for a moment, doubt what would
be their determination?
“I hope my friend from Massachusetts will not urge the amendment he has
proposed. Judging from past experience, I fear, if it should prevail,
the bill will be defeated. Let other classes of persons who think
themselves entitled to the bounty of their country present their claims
to this House, and they will be fairly investigated. This is what the
surviving officers of the Revolution have done. Their case has been
thoroughly examined by a committee, who have reported in its favor; and
all the information necessary to enable us to decide correctly is now in
our possession. I trust their claim will be permitted to rest upon its
own foundation. They are old, and for the most part in poverty; it is
necessary, if we act at all, that we act speedily, and do them justice
without delay. In my opinion, they have a better claim to what this bill
contemplates giving them, than any of us have to our eight dollars per
day. Gentlemen need apprehend no danger from the precedent; we shall
never have another Revolutionary war for independence. We have no reason
to apprehend we shall ever again be unable to pay our just debts. Even
if that should again be our unfortunate condition, we shall never have
another army so patient and so devoted as to sacrifice every selfish
consideration for the glory, the happiness, and the independence of
their country. I shall vote against the proposed amendment because I
will do no act which may have a tendency to defeat this bill.”
Mr. Buchanan used to relate, in after years, that at this juncture, the
friends of the bill were dismayed by the course of Mr. Everett, who was
then a young member from Massachusetts, and who wished to make and
insisted upon making a rhetorical speech. The friends of the bill
remonstrated with him, that all had been said that needed to be said;
and that the only thing to be done was to vote down the amendment, after
which the bill was almost certain to be passed. But Mr. Everett
persisted, and made his speech while the amendment was pending.[19] He
“demanded” of the House to pass the bill, and by passing it as proposed
to be amended by his colleague to give the survivors of the Revolution
“all they ask and _more_ than they ask.” The consequence was that the
appropriation was increased. Then a member from New York moved to extend
its provisions to every militia-man who had served for a certain time.
Then other amendments embraced widows and orphans, artificers and
musicians, the troops who fought at Bunker Hill, the troops raised in
Vermont, those of the battles of Saratoga and Bennington, and of the
Southern battles. The enemies of the original measure promoted this
method of dealing with it, and finally, when thus loaded down with
provisions not at all germane to its real principle, it was recommitted
to the Committee and was therefore lost.
The first important subject of contention on which the opposition put
forth their strength against the administration of Mr. Adams related to
what was called “The Panama Mission.” In his Message of December, 1825,
the President made the following announcement:
“Among the measures which have been suggested to the Spanish-American
Republics by the new relations with one another resulting from the
recent changes of their condition, is that of assembling at the Isthmus
of Panama, a Congress at which each of them should be represented, to
deliberate upon objects important to the welfare of all. The republics
of Colombia, of Mexico, and of Central America, have already deputed
plenipotentiaries to such a meeting, and they have invited the United
States to be also represented there by their ministers. The invitation
has been accepted, and ministers on the part of the United States will
be commissioned to attend at those deliberations, and to take part in
them, so far as may be compatible with that neutrality from which it is
neither our intention nor the desire of the other American States that
we should depart.”
It was, beyond controversy, the constitutional prerogative of the
President, as the organ of all intercourse with foreign nations, to
accept this invitation, and to name Ministers to the proposed Congress.
The Senate might or might not concur with him in this step, and might or
might not confirm the nominations of the proposed Ministers. He sent to
the Senate the names of John Sergeant of Philadelphia, and Richard C.
Anderson of Kentucky, as the Ministers of the United States to the
proposed Congress at Panama. The Senatorial opposition, led by Mr.
Benton and Mr. Tazewell, after a long discussion in secret session, took
a vote upon a resolution that it was inexpedient to send Ministers to
Panama. This was rejected by a vote of 24 to 19; and the nominations
were then confirmed by a vote of 27 to 17 in the case of Mr. Anderson,
and by a vote of 26 to 18 in the case of Mr. Sergeant. The diplomatic
department having thus fully acted upon and confirmed the proposed
measure, it remained for the House of Representatives to initiate and
pass the necessary appropriation. The turn that was given to the subject
in the House gave rise to an animated debate on a very important
constitutional topic, in which Mr. Buchanan, although opposed to the
Mission, asserted it to be the duty of the House to make the
appropriation, now that the Senate had confirmed the appointment of the
Ministers. This debate began upon a resolution reported by the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, that “in the opinion of the House it is expedient to
appropriate the funds necessary to enable the President of the United
States to send Ministers to the Congress of Panama.” To this resolution,
Mr. McLane of Delaware had moved an amendment, which, if it had been
adopted, would have placed the House of Representatives in the anomalous
attitude of annexing, as a condition of its grant, instructions as to
the mode in which the diplomatic agents of the United States were to act
in carrying out a foreign mission. Mr. Buchanan, who was in favor of the
amendments, was also in favor of making the appropriation necessary to
enable the President to send the Mission; and in support of this
constitutional duty of the House, he made an argument on the 11th of
April (1826) which drew from Mr. Webster the compliment that he had
placed this part of the subject in a point of view which could not be
improved.[20] Mr. Buchanan said:
“I know there are several gentlemen on this floor, who approve of the
policy of the amendments proposed, and wish to express an opinion in
their favor; and who yet feel reluctant to vote for them, because it is
their intention finally to support the appropriation bill. They think,
if the amendments should be rejected, consistency would require them to
refuse any grant of money to carry this mission into effect. I shall,
therefore, ask the attention of the committee, whilst I endeavor to
prove that there would not, in any event, be the slightest inconsistency
in this course.
“I assert it to be a position susceptible of the clearest proof, that
the House of Representatives is morally bound, unless in extreme cases,
to vote the salaries of Ministers who have been constitutionally created
by the President and Senate. The expediency of establishing the mission
was one question, which has already been decided by the competent
authority; when the appropriation bill shall come before us, we will be
called upon to decide another and a very different question. Richard C.
Anderson and John Sergeant have been regularly nominated by the
President of United States to be Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers
Plenipotentiary ‘to the Assembly of American nations at Panama.’ The
Senate, after long and solemn deliberation, have advised and consented
to their appointment. These Ministers have been created—they have been
called into existence under the authority of the Constitution of the
United States. That venerated instrument declares, that the President
‘shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur: and
he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United
States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law.’ What, then, will be the question
upon the appropriation bill? In order to enable our Ministers to proceed
upon their mission, the President has asked us to grant the necessary
appropriation. Shall we incur the responsibility of refusing? Shall we
thus defeat the mission which has already been established by the only
competent constitutional authorities? This House has, without doubt, the
physical power to refuse the appropriation, and it possesses the same
power to withhold his salary from the President of the United States.
The true question is, what is the nature of our constitutional
obligation? Are we not morally bound to pay the salaries given by
existing laws to every officer of the Government? By the act of the
first May, 1810, the outfit and salary to be allowed by the President to
Foreign Ministers are established. Such Ministers have been regularly
appointed to attend the Congress at Panama. What right then have we to
refuse to appropriate the salaries which they have a right to receive,
under the existing laws of the land?
“I admit there may be extreme cases, in which this House would be
justified in withholding such an appropriation. ‘The safety of the
people is the supreme law.’ If, therefore, we should believe any mission
to be dangerous, either to the existence or to the liberties of this
country, necessity would justify us in breaking the letter to preserve
the spirit of the Constitution. The same necessity would equally justify
us in refusing to grant to the President his salary, in certain extreme
cases, which might easily be imagined.
“But how far would your utmost power extend? Can you re-judge the
determination of the President and Senate, and destroy the officers
which they have created? Might not the President immediately send these
Ministers to Panama; and, if he did, would not their acts be valid? It
is certain, if they should go, they run the risk of never receiving a
salary; but still they might act as Plenipotentiaries. By withholding
the salary of the President, you cannot withhold from him the power;
neither can you, by refusing to appropriate for this mission, deprive
the Ministers of their authority. It is beyond your control to make them
cease to be Ministers.
“The constitutional obligation to provide for a Minister, is equally
strong as that to carry into effect a treaty. It is true, the evils
which may flow from your refusal may be greater in the one case than the
other. If you refuse to appropriate for a treaty, you violate the faith
of the country to a foreign nation. You do no more, however, than omit
to provide for the execution of an instrument which is declared by the
Constitution to be the supreme law of the land. In the case which will
be presented to you by the appropriation bill, is the nature of your
obligation different? I think not. The power to create the Minister is
contained in the same clause of the Constitution with that to make the
treaty. They are powers of the same nature. The one is absolutely
necessary to carry the other into effect. You cannot negotiate treaties
without Ministers. They are the means by which the treaty-making power
is brought into action. You are, therefore, under the same moral
obligation to appropriate money to discharge the salary of a Minister,
that you would be to carry a treaty into effect.
“If you ask me for authority to establish these principles, I can refer
you to the opinion of the first President of the United States—the
immortal Father of his Country—who, in my humble judgment, possessed
more practical wisdom, more political foresight, and more useful
constitutional knowledge, than all his successors.
“I have thus, I think, established the position, that gentlemen who vote
for the amendments now before the committee, even if they should not
prevail, may, without inconsistency, give their support to the
appropriation bill.”
Sound as this was, it is a little remarkable that Mr. Buchanan should
not have considered that the duty of voting the necessary appropriation
precluded the House of Representatives from dictating what subjects the
Ministers were to discuss or not to discuss. Those who favored the
proposed amendments founded themselves on the legal maxim that he who
has the power to give may annex to the gift whatever condition he
chooses. This was well answered by Mr. Webster, that in making
appropriations for such purposes the House did not make gifts, but
performed a duty. The amendments were rejected on the 21st of April, and
on the following day the Panama Appropriation Bill was passed, Mr.
Buchanan voting with the majority.[21]
Some of the topics incidentally touched upon in the discursive debate on
this Panama Mission are of little interest now. But one may be referred
to, because it related to the dangerous topic of slavery. An
apprehension was felt by those who were opposed to this measure, and by
Mr. Buchanan, among others, that the Spanish-American Republics, more
particularly Mexico and Colombia, might concert measures at this
proposed Congress to seize the West India Islands, and raise there the
standard of emancipation and social revolution. Those who entertained
this apprehension, therefore, did not wish to see the moral and
political influence of this proposed Congress increased by the
participation of the United States in its proceedings. It may have been
an unfounded fear; but in truth, excepting in so far as the objects of
this assembly were understood and explained by the American
Administration itself, very little was known of the purposes entertained
by its original projectors. It was certainly not unnatural, in the then
condition of our own country, and of the West Indies, in regard to the
matter of slavery, that public men in the United States should have been
cautious in regard to this exciting topic. At all events, it was
introduced incidentally, in the discussion on the proposed Mission, and
Mr. Buchanan thus expressed himself upon it:
“Permit me here, for a moment, to speak upon a subject to which I have
never before adverted upon this floor, and to which, I trust, I may
never again have occasion to advert. I mean the subject of slavery. I
believe it to be a great political and a great moral evil. I thank God,
my lot has been cast in a State where it does not exist. But, while I
entertain these opinions, I know it is an evil at present without a
remedy. It has been a curse entailed upon us by that nation which now
makes it a subject of reproach to our institutions. It is, however, one
of those moral evils, from which it is impossible for us to escape,
without the introduction of evils infinitely greater. There are portions
of this Union, in which, if you emancipate your slaves, they will become
masters. There can be no middle course. Is there any man in this Union
who could, for a moment, indulge in the horrible idea of abolishing
slavery by the massacre of the high-minded, and the chivalrous race of
men in the South. I trust there is not one. For my own part I would,
without hesitation, buckle on my knapsack, and march in company with my
friend from Massachusetts (Mr. Everett) in defence of their cause.”[22]
-----
Footnote 17:
At a little later period, Mr. Webster was transferred from the House
to the Senate, and became there one of the strongest and most
conspicuous of the friends of the administration.
Footnote 18:
Joint Resolutions of 13th and 24th March, 1779. See Journals, pages
335, 336, 342. 1 Smith’s Laws, 487. Life of Joseph Reed, President of
the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, p. 65.
Footnote 19:
The peroration of Mr. Everett’s speech was as follows:
“The present year completes the half century since the Declaration of
Independence; and most devoutly do I hope, that, when the silver
trumpet of our political jubilee sounds, it may be with a note of
comfort and joy to the withered heart of the war-worn veteran of the
Revolution. Our tardy provision will, indeed, come too late to help
him through the hard journey of life; it will not come too late to
alleviate the sorrows of age, and smooth the pillow of decline. It is
the fiftieth year of our Independence. How much shall we read, how
much shall we hear, how much, perhaps, we shall say this year, about
the glorious exploits of our fathers, and the debt of gratitude we owe
them. I do not wish this to be all talk. I want to do something. I
want a substantial tribute to be paid them. Praise is sweet music,
both to old and young; but I honestly confess that my mind relucts and
revolts, by anticipation, at the thought of the compliments with which
we are going to fill the ears of these poor veterans, while we leave
their pockets empty, and their backs cold. If we cast out this bill, I
do hope that some member of this House, possessing an influence to
which I cannot aspire, will introduce another, to make it penal to say
a word on the fourth of July, about the debt of gratitude which we owe
to the heroes of the Revolution. Let the day and the topic pass in
decent silence. I hate all gag-laws; but there is one thing I am
willing to gag—the vaporing tongue of a bankrupt, who has grown rich,
and talks sentiment, about the obligation he feels to his needy
creditor, whom he paid off at 2s. 6d. in the pound.”
Footnote 20:
In the course of his speech on the 14th of April, Mr. Webster said:
“The gentleman from Pennsylvania, with whom I have great pleasure in
concurring on this part of the case, while I regret that I differ with
him on others, has placed this question in a point of view which can
not be improved. These officers do indeed already exist. They are
public ministers. If they were to negotiate a treaty, and the Senate
should ratify it, it would become a law of the land, whether we voted
their salaries or not. This shows that the Constitution never
contemplated that the House of Representatives should act a part in
originating negotiations or concluding treaties.” Mr. Webster made
further observations, in confirmation of the views expressed by Mr.
Buchanan on the duty of making the appropriation. (_Works of Daniel
Webster_, Vol. III, p. 181.)
Footnote 21:
The subsequent fate of this measure can be related very briefly. Mr.
Anderson died at Carthagena, on his way to the isthmus of Panama. The
“Congress” adjourned to meet at Tacuboya, a village near the city of
Mexico. Mr. Poinsett was appointed in the place of Mr. Anderson, and
Mr. Sargeant sailed for Vera Cruz on the 2d of December, 1826. He
arrived in Mexico in January, 1827, and found a few fragments of the
“Congress” floating about, without action or organization. Bolivar,
who was supposed to have originated the project, had changed his mind.
Mr. Sargeant remained for six months in Mexico, and in the summer of
1827 returned home.
Footnote 22:
This allusion to Mr. Everett requires some explanation. On the 9th of
March, 1826, he made a speech on the proposed Constitutional
Amendment, in the course of which he said:
“I am not one of those citizens of the North who think it immoral and
irreligious to join in putting down a servile insurrection at the
South. I am no soldier, my habits and education are very un-military;
but there is no cause in which I would sooner buckle a knapsack to my
back, and put a musket on my shoulder, than that. I would cede the
whole continent to any one who would take it—to England, to France, to
Spain; I would see it sunk in the bottom of the ocean, before I would
see any part of this fair America converted into a Continental Hayti,
by that awful process of bloodshed and desolation, by which alone such
a catastrophe could be brought on. The great relation of servitude, in
some form or other, with greater or less departures from the theoretic
equality of man, is inseparable from our nature. I know no way by
which the form of this servitude shall be fixed, but by political
institution. Domestic slavery, though, I confess, not that form of
servitude which seems to be most beneficial to the master—certainly
not that which is most beneficial to the servant—is not, in my
judgment, to be set down as an immoral and irreligious relation. I
cannot admit that Religion has but one voice to the slave, and that
this voice is, ‘Rise against your master.’ No, Sir, the New Testament
says, ‘Slaves obey your masters,’ and though I know full well that, in
the benignant operations of Christianity, which gathered master and
slave around the same communion table, this unfortunate institution
disappeared in Europe, yet I cannot admit that, while it subsists, and
where it subsists, its duties are not pre-supposed and sanctioned by
religion. I certainly am not called upon to meet the charges brought
against this institution, yet truth obliges me to say a word more on
the subject. I know the condition of the working classes in other
countries, and I have no hesitation in saying that I believe the
slaves of this country are better clothed and fed, and less hardly
worked, than the peasantry of some of the most prosperous States of
the continent of Europe.”
-----
CHAPTER V.
1827–1829.
GREAT INCREASE OF GENERAL JACKSON’S POPULARITY—“RETRENCHMENT” MADE A
POLITICAL CRY—DEBATE ON THE TARIFF—BUCHANAN ON INTERNAL
IMPROVEMENTS—THE INTERESTS OF NAVIGATION—THE CUMBERLAND ROAD AGAIN
DISCUSSED—INELIGIBILITY OF A PRESIDENT.
The 20th Congress, which assembled in December, 1827, opened with a
great increase in the forces of the opposition. The elections in the
autumn of 1826 evinced an extraordinary growth of General Jackson’s
popularity. Mr. Adams found himself in a minority in both branches of
Congress. In the House, the opponents of his administration numbered 111
members, its friends 94. It is quite probable, however, that but for the
indiscretion of certain members who have ranked as friends of the
administration, the angry and criminating discussion of the subject of
“retrenchment,” which was deprecated by the wisest men of the
opposition, but into which they were forced, would not have occurred. It
was precipitated by the defiant attitude of two or three members who
should have allowed the cool leaders of the opposition to strangle it,
as they were at first disposed to do. But once commenced, it drew into
bitter strife the excited elements of party and personal warfare, and
went on through nearly a whole session with little credit to some who
participated in it, but in the end to the great and not altogether just
damage of the administration.
It happened that on the 22d of January (1828) a member from Kentucky,
Mr. Chilton, an earnest “Jackson man,” who had formerly been a clergyman
but was now a politician, introduced in the House certain resolutions
instructing the Committee of Ways and Means to report what offices could
be abolished, what salaries reduced, and other modes of curtailing the
expenses of the government. It is apparent that this could not have been
a step taken by concert with the leaders of the opposition. A party that
was daily growing in strength, and that was almost morally certain to
overthrow the party of the administration, and to elect the next
President, could have had no motive for shackling themselves with a
legislative measure reducing the number of offices or the salaries of
the officers that must be retained. They could not know in advance how
they could carry on the government, and it would be mere folly for them
to put laws on the statute-book framed while they were not charged with
the duties of administration, and suggested only as a topic for exciting
popular discontent against those who were responsible neither for the
existing number of offices nor for the salaries paid to them.
“Retrenchment,” as a popular cry, was not a movement which the leading
men of the opposition in the House of Representatives either needed or
desired to initiate. Mr. McDuffie, the chairman of the Committee of Ways
and Means, and a vehement opponent of the administration, objected to
Mr. Chilton’s resolutions at the outset. So did Mr. Buchanan; and the
latter often said, in subsequent years, that they would have been
crushed out of all consideration, if the friends of the administration
had left them in the hands of its opponents. They were moved by an
inconsiderable member, who was one of the stragglers of the opposition
forces, and they were met by administration members who were about
equally inconsiderable, in a tone of challenge and defiance. In vain did
Mr. McDuffie and Mr. Buchanan contend that the present was no time to
discuss the expenditures of the government. In vain did the most
considerable and important friends of the administration deprecate an
unprofitable, intolerant, and useless debate. The mover of the
resolutions would not be silenced, and the few indiscreet supporters of
the administration, who demanded that their discussion should go on,
would not permit them to receive their proper quietus by the application
of “the previous question.” Never was a deliberative body drawn, in
spite of the unwillingness of its best members on both sides, into a
more unseemly and profitless discussion.
Among the friends of General Jackson who deprecated and endeavored to
put a stop to this discussion was Mr. Edward Livingston of Louisiana,
the oldest member of the House, and a person of great distinction. He
made an earnest appeal to the House to end the whole matter by referring
the resolutions to a committee without further debate. This was not
acceded to by the friends of the administration, who wished to continue
the discussion. Mr. Edward Everett, then a young member from
Massachusetts, moved an adjournment after Mr. Livingston’s effort to
terminate the whole discussion, in order to make a speech, which he
delivered on the 1st of February. Mr. Buchanan said in reply to him:
“This debate would have ended on Thursday last, after the solemn appeal
for that purpose, which was made to the House by the venerable gentleman
from Louisiana, had not the gentleman from Massachusetts himself
prevented it by moving an adjournment. That gentleman ought to know that
he can never throw himself into any debate without giving it fresh vigor
and importance.”
In the course of this speech, Mr. Buchanan made some allusion to the
alleged “bargain and corruption” by which Mr. Adams had been made
President; and he thus touched upon the only important consideration
that could be said to belong to the circumstances of that election:
“Before, however, I commence my reply to that gentleman, I beg leave to
make a few observations on the last Presidential election. I shall
purposely pass over every charge which has been made, that it was
accomplished by bargain and sale or by actual corruption. If that were
the case, I have no knowledge of the fact, and shall therefore say
nothing about it. I shall argue this question as though no such charges
had ever been made. So far as it regards the conduct which the people of
the United States ought to pursue, at the approaching election, I agree
entirely with the eloquent gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Randolph] (I
cannot with propriety call him my friend), that it can make no
difference whether a bargain existed or not. Nay, in some aspects in
which the subject may be viewed, the danger to the people would be the
greater, if no corruption had existed. It is true, that this
circumstance ought greatly to influence our individual opinions of the
men who now wield the destinies of the Republic; but yet the precedent
would be at least equally dangerous in the one case as in the other. If
flagrant and gross corruption had existed, every honest man would start
from it with instinctive horror, and the people would indignantly hurl
those men from the seats of power, who had thus betrayed their dearest
interests. If the election were pure, there is, therefore, the greater
danger in the precedent. I believe, in my soul, that the precedent which
was established at the last Presidential election, ought to be reversed
by the people, and this is one of my principal reasons for opposing the
re-election of the present Chief Magistrate.
“Let us examine this subject more closely. General Jackson was returned
by the people of this country to the House of Representatives, with a
plurality of electoral votes. The distinguished individual who is now
the Secretary of State, was then the Speaker of this House. It is
perfectly well known, that, without his vote and influence, Mr. Adams
could not have been elected President. After the election, we beheld
that distinguished individual, and no man in the United States witnessed
the spectacle with more regret than I did, descending—yes, Sir, I say
descending—from the elevated station which you now occupy, into the
cabinet of the President whom he had elected.
“‘Quantum mutatus ab illo.’
“In the midnight of danger, during the darkest period of the late war,
‘his thrilling trump had cheered the land.’ Although among the great men
of that day there was no acknowledged leader upon this floor, yet I have
been informed, upon the best authority, that he was ‘primus inter
pares.’ I did wish, at a future time, to see him elevated still higher.
I am one of the last men in the country who could triumph over his
fallen fortunes. Should he ever return to what I believe to be correct
political principles, I shall willingly fight in the same ranks with him
as a companion—nay, after a short probation, I should willingly
acknowledge him as a leader. What brilliant prospects has that man not
sacrificed!
“This precedent, should it be confirmed by the people at the next
election, will be one of most dangerous character to the Republic. The
election of President must, I fear, often devolve upon this House. We
have but little reason to expect that any amendment, in relation to this
subject, will be made to the Constitution in our day. There are so many
conflicting interests to reconcile, so many powers to balance, that,
when we consider the large majority in each branch of Congress, and the
still larger majority of States, required to amend the Constitution, the
prospect of any change is almost hopeless. I believe it will long remain
just as it is. What an example, then, will this precedent, in the pure
age of the Republic, present to future times! The people owe it to
themselves, if the election must devolve upon this House, never to
sanction the principle that one of its members may accept, from the
person whom he has elected, any high office, much less the highest in
his gift. Such a principle, if once established, must, in the end,
destroy the purity of this House, and convert it into a corrupt
electoral vote. If the individual to whom I have alluded, could elect a
President and receive from him the office of Secretary of State from the
purest motives, other men may, and hereafter will, pursue the same
policy from the most corrupt. ‘If they do these things in the green
tree, what shall be done in the dry?’
“This precedent will become a cover under which future bargains and
corrupt combinations will be sanctioned, under which the spirit of the
Constitution will be sacrificed to its letter.”
It is not needful to describe the topics of this discussion. Mr.
Chilton’s resolutions, after being somewhat amended, were sent to a
Select Committee on Retrenchment. The result was a majority and a
minority report, of which six thousand copies were printed and
circulated through the country. I turn from this subject to matters of
more importance.
Mr. Buchanan’s position in this Congress required him to exert his
powers as a debater more than ever before. The House of Representatives
was at this time a body in which real debate was carried on upon some
subjects, however the discussion on “retrenchment” may be characterized.
Its discussions on the tariff, commencing on the 4th of March and
terminating on the 15th of May, were conducted with great ability. Among
the best speeches on the tariff bill of this session, there is one by
Mr. Peleg Sprague of Maine, and one by Mr. Buchanan. Both exhibit a
great deal of research. Mr. Buchanan’s speech, begun in Committee of the
Whole on the 2d of April, in answer to Mr. Sprague, is an excellent
specimen of business debate. The details on which these two gentlemen
differed, and on which the debate between them and others chiefly
turned, are of little interest now; nor does any tariff debate afford
much development of permanent principles. So varying are the
circumstances which from time to time give rise to an application of the
doctrines that are indicated by the terms “free-trade” and “protection.”
Still there may be found in this tariff speech of Mr. Buchanan, matter
which is of some interest in his personal history as an American
statesman, because it shows that he had now risen to the rank of a
statesman, and because it gives his general views of what had at this
time become known as “the American System.”
Mr. Buchanan, on this occasion, felt that he was combating a disposition
to favor certain interests at the expense of others. In the debate on
the tariff of 1824, when Mr. Clay developed his views on the subject of
protection, and Mr. Webster found fault with the details of a measure
which he said could not be properly characterized as an American System,
Mr. Buchanan had shown that while he was ready to accede to a tariff for
the incidental protection of our own manufactures, he was not disposed
to carry the doctrines of protection so far as to injure the
agricultural classes; but that in imposing the duties necessary to
defray the expenses of the government, he should take care to benefit
indirectly both the manufacturing and the producing interests. In 1828
the proposed alterations of the tariff aimed at a more uniform operation
of the customs duties upon all the great interests of the country. A
motion made by Mr. Sprague, to strike from the bill an additional duty
of five cents per gallon on molasses, and twenty-five dollars per ton on
hemp, led to a discussion on the navigating interests, as affected by
such an amendment, and the whole subject of what was meant by protection
and “the American system” came up afresh. The following extracts from
Mr. Buchanan’s speech afford fair specimens of his manner of dealing
with this subject:
I shall cheerfully submit to the public judgment whether the bill,
although I dislike the minimum principle which it contains, does not
afford sufficient protection to the manufacturers of woolens. I think it
does; but I wish to be distinctly understood, in relation to myself,
that I always stand ready, in a fair spirit, to do everything in my
power to promote the passage of a just and judicious tariff, which shall
be adequate for their protection; and that, for the sake of
conciliation, and to effect this purpose, I am willing to sacrifice
individual opinion to a considerable extent.
What, Sir, is the American System? Is it the system advocated by the
gentleman from Maine, which would build up one species of domestic
industry at the expense of all the rest, which would establish a
prohibition and consequent monopoly in favor of the woolen manufacturer
whilst it denied all protection to the farmer? Certainly not. The
American System consists in affording equal and just legislative
protection to all the great interests of the country. It is no respecter
of persons. It does not distinguish between the farmer who plows the
soil in Pennsylvania and the manufacturer of wool in New England. Being
impartial, it embraces all. There is, in one respect, a striking
difference between the farmer, the merchant, and the manufacturer. The
farmer eating the bread of toil, but of independence, scarcely ever
complains. If he suffers, he suffers in silence; you rarely hear him,
upon this floor, asking redress for his grievances. He relies with that
confidence which belongs to his character upon the justice of his
country, and does not come here with importunate demands. The case is
different in regard to the manufacturer and the merchant. When they feel
themselves aggrieved—when they require the aid of your legislation, then
complaints ring throughout the country, from Georgia to Maine. They
never cease to ask, until they obtain. And shall this contented and
uncomplaining disposition of the great agricultural interest, be used as
an argument upon this floor against affording it relief? I trust not.
The gentleman from Maine has shown himself to be a true disciple of the
Harrisburg Convention School. Even that convention, although the chief
objects of their regard appeared to be wool and woolens, recommended
further protection to iron, hemp, flax, and the articles manufactured
from them, and to domestic distilled spirits. The gentleman from Maine
has moved to strike from the bill additional duties which it proposes
upon the importation of foreign hemp and molasses; and in his speech, he
has argued against any additional duties either upon iron, or steel, or
flax, or foreign spirits. In his opinion, therefore, the American System
can embrace no other interest except that of the growers and
manufacturers of wool.
[Here Mr. Sprague explained. He said his observations upon the other
items, besides those he had moved to strike from the bill, were only
intended to illustrate what would be their effect on the navigating
interest.]
Mr. Buchanan resumed. I perceive, from the gentleman’s explanation, I
did not misunderstand his argument. If this be the American System, I
should like to know it as soon as possible; for then I shall be opposed
to it. I venture to assert that, if those with whom the gentleman from
Maine usually acts upon this floor have embraced the opinions which he
has avowed, it is a vain, a culpable waste of time to proceed further
with this discussion. Let the bill at once go to the tomb of all the
Capulets. If the New England manufacturer must be protected, whilst the
Pennsylvania farmer is abandoned—if this be the American System, instead
of being a mourner at its funeral, I shall rejoice that it has met the
fate which it deserved, and has been consigned to an early grave.
The Legislature of Pennsylvania has given us what, in my opinion, is the
correct version of the American System. They have declared that “the
best interests of our country demand that every possible exertion should
be made to procure the passage of an act of Congress imposing such
duties as will enable our manufacturers to enter into fair competition
with foreign manufacturers, and protect the farmer, the growers of hemp
and wool, and the distiller of spirits from domestic materials, against
foreign competition. The people of Pennsylvania do not ask for such a
tariff as would secure to any one class, or to any section of the
country, a monopoly. They want a system of protection which will extend
its blessings, as well as its burdens, as equally as possible over every
part of the Union; to be uniform in its operation upon the rich as well
as the poor.” They have therefore instructed their Senators, and
requested their Representatives, “to procure, if practicable, the
establishment of such a tariff as will afford additional protection to
our domestic manufactures, especially of woolen and fine cotton goods,
glass, and such other articles as, in their opinion, require the
attention of Congress, so as to enable our citizens fairly to compete
with foreign enterprise, capital, and experience, and give encouragement
to the citizens of the grain-growing States, by laying an additional
duty upon the importation of foreign spirits, flax, china ware, hemp,
wool, and bar iron.”
This resolution speaks a language which I am proud to hear from the
Legislature of my native State.
If it be the disposition of a majority of the members of this committee
to strike out of the bill iron, hemp, foreign spirits and molasses, no
Representative from the State of Pennsylvania, who regards either the
interest or the wishes of his constituents, will dare to vote for what
would then remain. The time has forever past when such a measure could
have received our sanction. We shall have no more exclusive tariffs for
the benefit of any one portion of the Union. The tariff of 1824 partook
much of this character; it contained no additional duty on foreign
spirits or molasses, and only added five dollars per ton to the duty on
foreign hemp. So far as the grain-growing States expected to derive
peculiar benefits from that measure, they have been, in a great degree,
disappointed.
What was the course which gentlemen pursued in relation to the woolen
bill of the last session? I endeavored to introduce into it a small
protection for our hemp and domestic spirits. We were then told that my
attempt would endanger the fate of the bill; that the period of the
session was too late to introduce amendments; and that if we would then
extend protection to the manufacturers of wool, a similar protection
should, at a future time, be extended to the agricultural interest of
the grain-growing States. My respectable colleague [Mr. Forward] has
informed the committee that he voted for the bill of the last session
under that delusion. How sadly the picture is now reversed! When an
interest in New England, which has been estimated at 40,000,000 of
dollars, is at stake, and is now about to sink, as has been alleged, for
want of adequate protection, it seems that gentlemen from that portion
of the Union would rather consign it to inevitable destruction than
yield the protection which the present bill will afford to the
productions of the Middle and Western States. If they are prepared to
act upon a policy so selfish, let them at once declare it, and not waste
weeks upon a bill which can never become a law.
The gentleman from Maine endeavored to sustain his motives by attempting
to prove that, if the duties proposed by the bill should be imposed upon
hemp and molasses, it would injure, nay, probably destroy the navigation
of the country. Indeed he pronounced its epitaph. It is gone! Five cents
per gallon upon molasses, and twenty-five dollars per ton upon hemp will
sink our navigating interest; will sweep our vessels from the ocean!
When I compare the storm of eloquence and of argument which the
gentleman has employed to strike out hemp and molasses from this bill,
with the object to be attained, he reminded me—
“Of ocean into tempest tost
To waft a feather or to drown a fly.”
An additional duty of five cents per gallon on molasses and twenty-five
dollars per ton upon hemp will consign the navigation of the country to
inevitable and almost immediate destruction! This is the kind of
argument which the gentleman has thought proper to address to the
committee.
The gentleman from Maine has said that our navigation goes abroad
unprotected to struggle against the world; and he has expatiated at
length upon this part of the subject. I trust I shall be able to prove,
without fatiguing the committee, that no interest belonging to this or
any other country ever received a more continued or a more efficient
protection than the navigation of the United States. I heartily approve
this policy. I would not, if I could, withdraw from it an atom of the
protection which it now enjoys. I shall never attempt to array the great
and leading interests of the country against each other. I am neither
the exclusive advocate of commerce, of manufactures, or of agriculture.
The American System embraces them all. I am the advocate of all. When,
therefore, I attempt to show to the committee the protection which has
been extended by this government to its navigation, I do it in reply to
the argument of the gentleman from Maine, and not in a spirit of
hostility to that important interest.
Mr. Buchanan then entered upon an elaborate historical examination of
the care for the interests of our navigation that had been exerted by
Congress from 1789 to the time when he was speaking.[23] On the subject
of the navy, as likely to be affected by measures that were complained
of for a tendency to depress the commercial marine, he said:
“The gentleman from Maine has used a most astonishing argument against
any further protection to hemp and flax and iron. We ought not further
to encourage our farmers to grow flax and hemp, nor our manufacturers to
produce iron. And why? Because you will thus deprive the navigating
interest of the freight which they earn, by carrying these articles from
Russia to this country. Can the gentleman be serious in contending that,
for the sake of affording freight to the ship-owners, we ought to depend
upon a foreign country for a supply of these articles? This argument
strikes at the root of the whole American System. Upon the same
principle we ought not to manufacture any article whatever at home,
because this will deprive our ships of the carriage of it from abroad.
This principle, had it been adopted in practice, would have left us
where we were at the close of the American Revolution. We should still
have been dependent upon foreign nations for articles of the first
necessity. This argument amounts to a proclamation of war, by our
navigation, against the agriculture and manufactures of the country. You
must not produce, because we will then lose the carriage, is the sum and
substance of the argument. Am I then to be seriously told, that for the
purpose of encouraging our ship-owners, our farmers ought to be deprived
of the markets of their own country, for those agricultural productions
which they can supply in abundance? I did not expect to have heard such
an argument upon this floor.
“By encouraging domestic industry, whether it be applied to agriculture
or manufactures, you promote the best interests of your navigation. You
furnish it with domestic exports to scatter over the world. This is the
true American System. It protects all interests; it abandons none. It
never arrays one against another. Upon the principles of the gentleman,
we ought to sacrifice all the other interests of the country to promote
our navigation. This is asking too much.
“The gentleman from Maine seems to apprehend great danger to the navy
from the passage of this bill. He appears to think it will fall with so
much oppression upon our navigation and fisheries, that these nurseries
of seamen for the navy may be greatly injured, if not altogether
destroyed.
“In regard to the value and importance of a navy to this country, I
cordially agree with the gentleman from Maine. Every prejudice of my
youth was enlisted in its favor, and the judgment of riper years has
strengthened and confirmed those early impressions. It is the surest
bond of our Union. The Western States have a right to demand from this
government that the mouth of the Mississippi shall be kept open, both in
war and in peace. If you should not afford them a free passage to the
ocean, you cannot expect to retain them in the Union; they are,
therefore, as much, if not more, interested in cherishing the navy than
any other portion of the Republic. The feeling in its favor contains in
it nothing sectional—it is general. We are all interested in its
preservation and extension. Unlike standing armies, a navy never did,
nor ever will, destroy the liberties of any country. It is our most
efficient and least dangerous arm of defence.
“To what, then, does the argument of the gentleman lead? Although iron,
and hemp, and flax, and their manufactures, are essential to the very
existence of a navy, yet he would make us dependent for them upon the
will of the Emperor of Russia, or the King of Sweden. A statesman would
as soon think of being dependent on a foreign nation for gunpowder, or
cannon, or cannon-balls, or muskets, as he would for the supply of iron,
or flax, or hemp, for our navy. Even if these articles could not be
produced as cheaply in this as in other countries, upon great national
principles, then domestic production ought to be encouraged, even if it
did tax the community. They are absolutely necessary for our defence.
Without them, what would become of you, if engaged in war with a great
naval power? You would then be as helpless as if you were deprived of
gunpowder or of cannon. Without them, your navy would be perfectly
useless. Shall we, then, in a country calculated by nature above all
others for their production, refuse to lend them a helping hand? I trust
not.
“The gentleman from Maine has said much about our fisheries, and the
injurious effects which the present bill will have upon them. From this
argument, I was induced again to read the bill, supposing that it might
possibly contain some latent provision, hostile to the fisheries, which
I had not been able to detect. Indeed, one might have supposed, judging
merely from the remarks of the gentleman, without a reference to the
bill, that it aimed a deadly blow against this valuable branch of our
national industry. I could find nothing in it, which even touched the
fisheries. They have ever been special favorites of our legislation. I
shall not pretend to enumerate, because the task might seem invidious,
the different acts of Congress affording them protection. They are
numerous. The gentleman has, in my opinion, been very unfortunate in his
complaints that they have not been sufficiently protected. From the
origin of this government, they have been cherished, in every possible
manner, by our legislation. For their benefit we have adopted a system
of prohibitions, of drawbacks, and of bounties, unknown to our laws in
relation to any other subject. They have grown into national importance,
and have become a great interest of the country. They should continue to
be cherished, because they are the best nurseries of our seamen. I would
not withdraw from them an atom of the protection which they have
received; on the contrary, I should cheerfully vote them new bounties,
if new bounties were necessary to sustain them. They are the very last
interest in the country which ought to complain.
“The gentleman, whilst he strenuously opposed any additional protection
to domestic iron, and domestic hemp, surely could not have remembered,
that the productions of the fisheries enjoy a monopoly of the home
market. The duties in their favor are so high as to exclude foreign
competition. We do not ask such prohibitory duties upon foreign iron,
flax, or hemp. We demand but a moderate increase; and yet the fisheries,
which are protected by prohibitory duties, meet us and deny to us this
reasonable request.”
That Mr. Buchanan’s opposition to the administration of Mr. John Quincy
Adams was not carried on in the spirit of a partisan is evinced by his
action on an appropriation asked for to enable the Executive to continue
and complete a system of surveys, preparatory to a general plan of
internal improvements. There was much opposition to this appropriation,
especially on the part of those who denied the power of the General
Government to make such public works as were then classed as “internal
improvements.” Mr. Buchanan met their objections as follows:
Mr. Buchanan expressed his dissent from the opinions avowed by the two
gentlemen who had preceded him. The true question ought to be distinctly
stated. The act of 1824 sanctioned the policy, not of immediately
entering upon a plan of internal improvement, but of preparing for it,
by obtaining surveys, plans, and estimates in relation to the various
roads and canals that were required throughout the country. The sum of
$30,000 had been appropriated, not for a single year, but for a specific
purpose, which purpose had not yet been accomplished. Many surveys were
now in progress, which were not more than half completed, and the
question was whether the House would withdraw the means of completing
them. A discussion of the general policy of the plan was out of place on
an appropriation bill. Whatever might be decided as to carrying such a
system of internal improvement into effect, these surveys were of great
advantage to the American people. Should that system never be adopted,
this mass of information could not fail to be useful. The constitutional
question of power did not fairly arise on a proposal to employ the
engineers already at the disposal of the War Department, in a particular
manner.
Should the time ever arrive when we have more in the Treasury than we
know what to do with, the argument of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Barbour] might have some force. But the question now was, whether the
House would arrest these surveys? Mr. B., for one, would not do it. He
would give the administration the sum now asked, and would hold them
responsible for its application.
There is no more interesting part of Mr. Buchanan’s early Congressional
career than his course on the subject of the Cumberland Road. We have
seen that when he first had occasion to act on this subject as a member
of Congress, he was inclined to accept the doctrine that Congress had
power to establish this road, and to levy tolls for its support. But he
had not then closely examined this subject. Mr. Monroe’s message vetoing
the Cumberland Road bill of 1822 produced in Mr. Buchanan’s mind a
decided change. At a subsequent session, he endeavored, but without
success, to have the road retroceded to the States through which it
passed, on condition that they would support it by levying tolls.[24] In
1828–29 he renewed this effort, and on the 29th of January, 1829, he
made an elaborate speech upon the whole subject, which is of sufficient
interest and importance to warrant its reproduction entire. As a
constitutional argument it is valuable; and for its independent attitude
towards the people of his own State, it is exceedingly creditable to him
as a public man.
Mr. Buchanan said that the bill and the amendment now before the
committee presented a subject for discussion of the deepest interest to
the American people. It is not a question (said Mr. B.) whether we shall
keep the road in repair by appropriations; nor whether we shall expend
other millions in constructing other Cumberland roads—these would be
comparatively unimportant; but it is a question upon the determination
of which, in my humble judgment, depend the continued existence of the
Federal Constitution in anything like its native purity. Let it once be
established that the Federal Government can enter the dominion of the
States; interfere with their domestic concerns; erect toll-gates over
all the military, commercial, and post-roads within their territories,
and define and punish, by laws of Congress, in the courts of the United
States, offences committed upon these roads,—and the barriers which were
erected by our ancestors with so much care, between Federal and State
power, are entirely prostrated. This single act would, in itself, be a
longer stride towards consolidation than the Federal Government have
ever made; and it would be a precedent for establishing a construction
for the Federal Constitution so vague and so indefinite, that it might
be made to mean anything or nothing.
It is not my purpose, upon the present occasion, again to agitate the
questions which have so often been discussed in this House, as to the
powers of Congress in regard to internal improvements. For my own part,
I cheerfully accord to the Federal Government the power of subscribing
stock, in companies incorporated by the State, for the purpose of making
roads and canals; and I entertain no doubt whatever but that we can,
under the Constitution, appropriate the money of our constituents
directly to the construction of internal improvements, with the consent
of the States through which they may pass. These powers I shall ever be
willing to exercise, upon all proper occasions. But I shall never be
driven to support any road, or any canal, which my judgment disapproves,
by a fear of the senseless clamor which is always attempted to be raised
against members upon this floor, as enemies to internal improvement, who
dare to vote against any measure which the Committee on Roads and Canals
think proper to bring before this House. It was my intention to discuss
the power of Congress to pass the bill, and its policy, separately. Upon
reflection I find these subjects are so intimately blended, they cannot
be separated. I shall therefore consider them together.
“Before, however, I enter upon the subject, it will be necessary to
present a short historical sketch of the Cumberland Road. It owes its
origin to a compact between the State of Ohio and the United States. In
1802, Congress proposed to the convention which formed the constitution
of Ohio, that they would grant to that State one section of land to each
township, for the use of schools; that they would also grant to it
several tracts of land on which there were salt springs; and that five
per cent. of the net proceeds of the future sale of public lands within
its territory should be applied to the purpose of making public roads,
‘leading from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic to the
Ohio, to the said State, and through the same.’ The act, however,
distinctly declares that such roads shall be laid out under the
authority of Congress, ‘with the consent of the several States through
which the road shall pass.’ These terms were offered by Congress, to the
State of Ohio, provided she would exempt, by an irrevocable ordinance,
all the land which should be sold by the United States within her
territory, from every species of taxation, for the space of five years,
after the day of sale. This proposition of Congress was accepted by the
State of Ohio, and it thus became a compact, the terms of which could
not be changed without the consent of both the contracting parties. By
the terms of the compact, this five per cent. of the net proceeds of the
sales of the public land was applicable to two objects; the first, the
construction of roads leading from the Atlantic to the State of Ohio;
and the second, the construction of roads within that State. In 1803,
Congress, at the request of Ohio, apportioned this fund between these
two objects. Three of the five per cent. was appropriated to the
construction of roads within the State, leaving only two per cent.
applicable to roads leading from the navigable waters of the Atlantic to
it.
“In March, 1806, Congress determined to apply this two per cent. fund to
the object for which it was destined, and passed ‘an act to regulate the
laying out and making of a road from Cumberland, in the State of
Maryland, to the State of Ohio.’ Under the provisions of this act,
before the President could proceed to cut a single tree upon the route
of the road, it was made necessary to obtain the consent of the States
through which it passed. The Federal Government asked Maryland,
Pennsylvania and Virginia for permission to make it, and each of them
granted this privilege in the same manner that they would have done to a
private individual, or to a corporation created by their own laws.
Congress, at that day, asserted no other right than a mere power to
appropriate the money of their constituents to the construction of this
road, after the consent of these States should be obtained. The idea of
a sovereign power in this government to make the road, and to exercise
jurisdiction over it, for the purpose of keeping it in repair, does not,
then, appear to have ever entered the imagination of the warmest
advocate for Federal power. The federalism of that day would have shrunk
with horror from such a spectre. There is a circumstance worthy of
remark in the act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, which was passed
in April, 1807, authorizing the President of the United States to open
this road. It grants this power upon condition that the road should pass
through Uniontown and Washington, if practicable. The grant was accepted
upon this condition, and the road was constructed. Its length is one
hundred and thirty miles, and its construction and repairs have cost the
United States one million seven hundred and sixty-six thousand one
hundred and sixty-six dollars and thirty-eight cents; whilst the two per
cent. fund which we had bound ourselves to apply to this purpose,
amounted, on the 30th of June, 1822, the date of the last official
statement within my knowledge, only to the sum of one hundred and
eighty-seven thousand seven hundred and eighty-six dollars and
thirty-one cents, less than one-ninth of the cost of the road. This road
has cost the United States more than thirteen thousand five hundred
dollars per mile. This extravagant expenditure shows conclusively that
it is much more politic for us to enlist individual interest in the
cause of Internal Improvement, by subscribing stock, than to become
ourselves sole proprietors. Any government, unless under extraordinary
circumstances, will pay one-third more for constructing a road or canal,
than would be expended by individuals in accomplishing the same object.
“I shall now proceed to the argument. Upon a review of this brief
history, what is the conclusion at which we must arrive? That this road
was made by the United States, as a mere proprietor, to carry into
effect a contract with the State of Ohio, and not as a sovereign. In its
construction, the Federal Government proceeded as any corporation or
private individual would have done. We asked the States for permission
to make the road through the territories over which their sovereign
authority extended. After that permission had been obtained, we
appropriated the money and constructed the road. The State of
Pennsylvania even annexed a condition to her grant, with which the
United States complied. She also conferred upon the agents of the United
States the power of taking materials for the construction and repair of
this road, without the consent of the owner, making a just compensation
therefor. This compensation was to be ascertained under the laws of the
State, and not under those of the United States. The mode of proceeding
to assess damages in such cases against the United States was precisely
the same as it is against corporations, created by her own laws, for the
purpose of constructing roads.
“What, then, does this precedent establish? Simply, that the United
States may appropriate money for the construction of a road through the
territories of a State, with its consent; and I do not entertain the
least doubt but that we possess this power. What does the present bill
propose? To change the character which the United States has hitherto
sustained, in relation to this road, from that of a simple proprietor to
a sovereign. To declare to the nation, that, although they had to ask
the States of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia, for permission to
make the road, now, after it is completed, they will exercise
jurisdiction over it, and collect tolls upon it, under the authority of
their own laws, for the purpose of keeping it in repair. We will not ask
the States to erect toll-gates for us. We are determined to exercise
that power ourselves. The Federal Government first introduced itself
into the States as a friend, by permission; it now wishes to hold
possession as a sovereign, by power. This road was made in the manner
that one independent sovereign would construct a road through the
territories of another. Had Virginia been a party to the compact with
Ohio, instead of the United States, she would have asked the permission
of Maryland and Pennsylvania to construct the Cumberland Road through
their territories, and it would have been granted. But what would have
been our astonishment, after this permission, had Virginia attempted to
assume jurisdiction over the road in Pennsylvania, to erect toll-gates
upon it under the authority of her own laws, and to punish offenders
against these laws in her own courts. Yet the two cases are nearly
parallel.
The right to demand toll, and to stop and punish passengers for refusing
to pay it, is emphatically a sovereign right, and has ever been so
considered amongst civilized nations. The power to erect toll-gates
necessarily implies, 1st, The stoppage of the passenger until he shall
pay the toll; 2d, His trial and punishment, if he should, either by
force or by fraud, evade, or attempt to evade, its payment; 3d, A
discretionary power as to the amount of toll; 4th, The trial and
punishment of persons who may wilfully injure the road, or violate the
police established upon it. These powers are necessarily implied.
Without the exercise of them, you could not proceed with safety to
collect the toll for a single day. Other powers will soon be exercised.
If you compel passengers to pay toll, the power of protecting them
whilst travelling along your road is almost a necessary incident. The
sovereign, who receives the toll, ought naturally to possess the power
of protecting him who pays it. To vest the power of demanding toll in
one sovereign, and the protection of the traveller’s person in another,
would be almost an absurdity. The Federal Government would probably, ere
long, exercise the power of trying and punishing murders and robberies,
and all other offences committed upon the road. To what jurisdiction
would the trial and punishment of these offences necessarily belong? To
the courts of the United States, and to them alone. In Ohio, in New
York, in Virginia, and in Maryland, it has been determined that State
courts, even if Congress should confer it, have no jurisdiction over any
penal action, or criminal offence, against the laws of the United
States. Even if these decisions were incorrect, still it has never been
seriously contended that State courts were bound to take jurisdiction in
such cases. It must be admitted, by all, that Congress have not the
power to compel an execution of their criminal or penal laws by the
courts of the States. This is sufficient for my argument. Even if the
power existed, in State courts, they never ought, unless upon
extraordinary occasions, to try and to punish offences committed against
the United States. The peace and the harmony of the people of this
country require that the powers of the two governments should never be
blended. The dividing line between their separate jurisdictions should
be clearly marked; otherwise dangerous collisions between them must be
the inevitable consequence. In two of the States through which this road
passes, it has already been determined that their courts cannot take
jurisdiction over offences committed against the laws of Congress. What,
then, is the inevitable consequence? All the penal enactments of this
bill, or of the future bills which it will become necessary to pass to
supply its defects, must be carried into execution by the Federal
courts. Any citizen of the United States, charged with the most trifling
offence against the police of this road, must be dragged for trial to
the Federal court of that State within whose jurisdiction it is alleged
to have been committed. If committed in Maryland, the trial must take
place in Baltimore; if in Pennsylvania, at Clarksburg.
The distance of one hundred or two hundred miles, which he would be
compelled to travel to take his trial, and the expenses which he must
necessarily incur, would, in themselves, be a severe punishment for a
more aggravated offence. Besides, the people of the neighborhood would
be harassed in attending as witnesses at such a great distance from
their places of abode. These, and many other inconveniences, which I
shall not enumerate, would soon compel Congress to authorize the
appointment of justices of the peace, or some other inferior tribunals,
along the whole extent of the Cumberland Road.
Can any man lay his hand upon his heart and say that, in his conscience,
he believes the Federal Constitution ever intended to bestow such powers
on Congress? The great divisions of power, distinctly marked in that
instrument, are external and internal. The first are conferred upon the
General Government—the last, with but few exceptions, and those
distinctly defined, remain in possession of the States. It never—never
was intended that the vast and mighty machinery of this Government
should be introduced into the domestic, the local, the interior concerns
of the States, or that it should spend its power in collecting toll at a
turnpike gate. I have not been presenting possible cases to the
committee. I have confined myself to what must be the necessary effects
of the passage of the bill now before us. By what authority is such a
tremendous power claimed? That it is not expressly given by the
Constitution, is certain. If it exists at all, it must, therefore, be
incidental to some express power; and in the language of the
Constitution, “be necessary and proper for carrying that power into
execution.” From the very nature of incidental power, it cannot
transcend the specific power which calls it into existence. The stream
cannot flow higher than its fountain. This principle applies, with
peculiar force, to the construction of the Constitution. For the purpose
of carrying into effect any of its specific powers, it would be absurd
to contend that you might exercise another power, greater and more
dangerous than that expressly given. The means must be subordinate to
the end. Were any other construction to prevail, this Government would
no longer be one of limited powers.
The present case affords a striking and forcible illustration of this
principle. Let it be granted that you have a right, as proprietor, by
the permission of the States, to make a road through their territories,
can it ever follow, as an incident to this mere power of appropriating
the public money, that you may exercise jurisdiction over this very
road, as a sovereign? If you could, the incident is as much greater than
the principal, as sovereign is superior to individual power. It does
follow that you can keep the road in repair, by appropriations, in the
same manner that you have made it; but this is the utmost limit of your
power. What, Sir? Exclusive jurisdiction over the road, for its
preservation, and for the punishment of all offenders who travel upon
it, and that as an incident to the mere power of expending your money
upon its construction! The idea is absurd.
Under the power given to Congress “to establish post offices and post
roads,” the Federal Government possess the undoubted right of converting
any road already constructed, within any State of this Union, into a
post road.
Let it also be granted, for the sake of the argument, that they possess
the power, independently of the will of the States, to construct as many
post roads throughout the Union as they think proper, and to keep them
in repair; does it follow that they can establish toll-gates upon such
roads? Certainly not. What is the nature of the powder conferred upon
Congress? It is a mere right to carry and to protect the mails. It is
confined to a single purpose—to the transportation of the mail, and the
punishment of offences which violate that right. This is the sole object
of the power—the sole purpose for which it was called into existence.
Over some post roads, the mail is carried once per day, and over others
once per week. With what justice can it be contended that this right of
passage for a single purpose—this occasional use of the roads within the
different States for post roads—vests in Congress the power of closing
up these roads against all the citizens of those States, at all times,
until they have paid such a toll as we think proper to impose. Let me
present the naked argument of gentlemen before their own eyes. Congress
have the right, under the Constitution, “to establish post offices and
post roads.” As an incident they possess the power of constructing post
roads. As another incident to this right of passage for a single purpose
they possess the power to assume jurisdiction over all post roads in the
different States, and prevent any person from passing over them, unless
upon such terms as they may prescribe. This would, indeed, be
construction construed. I would like the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
Mercer) to furnish the committee with an answer to this argument. If I
were to grant to that gentleman a right of passage, for a particular
purpose only, over a road which belonged to me, what would be my
surprise and my indignation, were he to shut it up, by the erection of
toll-gates, and prohibited me from passing unless I paid him toll.
Should Congress act upon the precedent which the passage of this bill
would establish, it is impossible to foresee the dangers which must
follow, to the States and to the people of this country. Upon this
branch of the question, permit me to quote the language of Mr. Monroe,
in his celebrated message of May, 1822, denying the constitutional power
of Congress to erect toll-gates on the Cumberland Road. “If,” said he,
“the United States possessed the power contended for under this grant,
might they not, on adopting the roads of the individual States for the
carriage of the mail, as has been done, assume jurisdiction over them,
and preclude a right to interfere with, or alter them? Might they not
establish turnpikes, and exercise all the other acts of sovereignty
above stated, over such roads, necessary to protect them from injury,
and defray the expense of repairing them? Surely, if the right exists,
these consequences necessarily followed, as soon as the road was
established. The absurdity of such a pretension must be apparent to all
who examine it. In this way, a large portion of the territory of every
State might be taken from it; for there is scarcely a road in any State
which will not be used for the transportation of the mail. A new field
for legislation and internal government would thus be opened.” Arguments
of the same nature would apply with equal, if not greater force, to
those roads which might be used by the United States for the
transportation of military stores, or as the medium of commerce between
the different States. I shall not now enlarge upon this branch of the
subject, believing it, as I do, to be wholly unnecessary.
There is another view of this subject, which I deem to be conclusive.
The Constitution of the United States provides that “Congress shall have
power to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over
such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of
particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of
the Government of the United States, and to exercise the like authority
over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State
in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings.” This is the only
clause in the Constitution which authorizes the Federal Government to
acquire jurisdiction over any portion of the territory of the States;
and this power is expressly confined to such forts, magazines, arsenals,
dockyards, and other needful buildings, as the States may consider
necessary for the defence of the country. You will thus, Sir, perceive
with what jealousy our ancestors conferred jurisdiction upon this
Government—even over such places as were absolutely necessary for the
exercise of the power of war. This power,—which is the power of
self-defence—of self-preservation—the power given to this Government of
wielding the whole physical force of the country for the preservation of
its existence and its liberties—does not confer any implied jurisdiction
over the smallest portion of territory. An express authority is given to
acquire jurisdiction, for military and for naval purposes, and for them
alone, with the consent of the States. Unless that consent has been
first obtained, the vast power of war confers no incidental
jurisdiction, even over the cannon in your national fortifications. How,
then, can it be contended, with the least hope of success, that the same
Constitution, which thus expressly limits our power of acquiring
jurisdiction, to particular spots, necessary for the purpose of national
defence, should, by implication, as an incident to the power to
establish post offices and post roads, authorize us to assume
jurisdiction over a road one hundred and thirty miles in length, and
over all the other post roads in the country. If this construction be
correct, all the limitations upon Federal power, contained in the
Constitution, are idle and vain. There is no power which this Government
shall ever wish to usurp, which cannot, by ingenuity, be found lurking
in some of the express powers granted by the Constitution. In my humble
judgment, the argument in favor of the constructive power to pass the
sedition law is much more plausible than any that can be urged by the
advocates of this bill, in favor of its passage. I beg gentlemen to
reflect, before they vote in its favor.
I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Vance) for having reminded me of
the resolution passed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, at their last
session, which authorizes the Federal Government to erect toll-gates
upon this road, within that Commonwealth; to “enforce the collection of
tolls, and, generally, to do and perform any and every other act and
thing which may be deemed necessary, to ensure the permanent repair and
preservation of the said road.”
I feel the most unfeigned respect for the Legislature of my native
State. Their deliberate opinion, upon any subject, will always have a
powerful influence over my judgment. It is fairly entitled to as much
consideration as the opinion of this or any other legislative body in
the Union. This resolution, however, was adopted, as I have been
informed, without much deliberation and without debate. It owes its
passage to the anxious desire which that body feel to preserve the
Cumberland Road from ruin. The constitutional question was not brought
into discussion. Had it been fairly submitted to that Republican
Legislature, I most solemnly believe they would have been the last in
this Union to sanction the assumption, by this Government, of a
jurisdiction so ultra-Federal in its nature, and so well calculated to
destroy the rights of the States.
But this resolution can have no influence upon the present discussion.
The people of the State of Pennsylvania never conferred upon their
Legislature the power to cede jurisdiction over any portion of their
territory to the United States, or to any other sovereign. If the
Legislatures of the different States could exercise such a power, the
road to consolidation would be direct. If they can cede jurisdiction to
this Government over any portion of their territories, they can cede the
whole, and thus altogether destroy the Federal system.
Even if the States possessed the power to cede, the United States have
no power to accept such cessions. Their authority to accept cessions of
jurisdiction is confined to places “for the erection of forts,
magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings.” Mr. Monroe,
in the message to which I have already referred, declares his opinion
“that Congress do not possess this power; that the States, individually,
cannot grant it; for, although they may assent to the appropriation of
money, within their limits, for such purposes, they can grant no power
of jurisdiction, or sovereignty, by special compacts with the United
States.”
I think it is thus rendered abundantly clear that, if Congress do not
possess the power, under the Federal Constitution, to pass this bill,
the States through which the road passes cannot confer it upon them. I
feel convinced that even the gentleman who reported this bill (Mr.
Mercer) will not contend that the resolution of the Legislature of
Pennsylvania could bestow any jurisdiction upon the Government. I am
justified in this reference, because that resolution is, in its nature,
conditional, and requires that the amount of tolls collected in
Pennsylvania shall be applied, exclusively, to the repair of the road
within that State; and the present bill contains no provision to carry
this condition into effect. The gentleman cannot, therefore, derive his
authority to pass this bill from a grant the provisions of which he has
disregarded.
This question has already been settled, so far as a solemn legislative
precedent can settle any question. During the session of 1821–2, a bill,
similar in its provisions to the one now before the committee, passed
both Houses of Congress. The vote, on its passage in this House, was
eighty-seven in the affirmative, and sixty-eight in the negative. Mr.
Monroe, then President of the United States, returned this bill to the
House of Representatives, with his objections. So powerful, and so
convincing, were his arguments, that, upon its reconsideration, but
sixty-eight members voted in the affirmative, whilst seventy-two voted
in the negative. Thus, Sir, you perceive, that this House have already
solemnly declared, in accordance with the deliberate opinion of the late
President of the United States, that Congress do not possess the power
to erect toll-gates upon the Cumberland Road. That distinguished
individual was the last of the race of Revolutionary Presidents, and,
from the soundness of his judgment and the elevated stations which he
has occupied, his opinion is entitled to the utmost respect. He was an
actor in many of the political scenes of that day when the Constitution
was framed, and when it went into operation, under the auspices of
Washington—“all which he saw, and part of which he was.” He is,
therefore, one of the few surviving statesmen who, from actual
knowledge, can inform the present generation what were the opinions of
the past. The solemnity and the ability with which he has resisted the
exercise of the power of Congress to pass this bill prove, conclusively,
the great importance which he attached to the subject.
During that session, I first had the honor of a seat in this House; I
voted for the passage of that bill. I had not reflected upon the
constitutional question, and I was an advocate of the policy of keeping
the road in repair by collecting tolls from those who travelled upon it.
After I read the constitutional objections of Mr. Monroe my opinion was
changed, and I have ever since been endeavoring, upon all proper
occasions, to atone for my vote, by advocating a cession of the road to
the respective States through which it passes, that they may erect
toll-gates upon it and keep it in repair.