III

It remains now to turn to another most potent motive which has

affected the fortunes of religion in the nineteenth century. It may

be called Nationalism, meaning by the term that higher conception of

the life of the state or nation, slowly but most effectively asserting

itself throughout the nineteenth century, never apart from religious

convictions, always indeed in their support and furtherance. In

illustration of this point, we turn again to the French Revolution,

as giving the momentum, both directly and by way of reaction, to

the conception of the sacredness of the state, as an ultimate fact

in God’s government of the world. In that fearful outburst of the

French people, their long pent-up indignation was vented no less

against the state than against the Church—the one a device of kings

and lawgivers for holding mankind in subjection, as the other was a

scheme for the same end by a designing priesthood. The humanitarian

sentiment received in consequence at this impressive moment a direction

of antipathy to nationality as an evil to be overcome, or at least

to be kept in subjection to some higher principle, if the rights of

man were to be secured. Something even of this negative mood entered

into the formation of the American Constitution, where there is to

be noted a singular omission of any reference to Deity as the author

and preserver of the national life. On the continent of Europe there

was the phenomenon of Napoleon building on the ruins of the French

Revolution, while yet preserving the destructive motives which inspired

it. Napoleon revived the dream of empire, in whose expansive embrace

the nations of Europe were to be subordinated, if not suppressed

altogether. He proposed to reconstruct the map of Europe, as though

nationalities and crowns were purely human artificial arrangements to

be disposed of at his sovereign pleasure.

The failure of the French nation, its demonstrated inability to do

the proper work of a state, as well as the fact that the career of a

Napoleon was possible, indicates inherent weakness in all the nations

of Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. They existed

either in repose, and even stagnation, after the long turmoil of the

age of the Protestant Reformation, averse to change, distrustful of

enthusiasm, or were content to strive for purely selfish aims. In

accordance with the principle that the people existed for the state,

rulers followed their personal whims, indifferent to moral sanctions,

heedless of the growing evils calling aloud for redress. Such in

particular was the condition in France. It was better in England, but

even there the same tendency existed, manifested in the unnecessary

alienation of the American colonies. However this may be, there has

been a reaction against nationality during the nineteenth century.

The nations have been forced to struggle against this opposition,

and through the struggle they have attained their rebirth, their

purification.

The subject is connected with the fortunes of religion in many ways.

The indifference to nationality, the distrust of the nation as

incompetent for the exigencies of life, the placing of an abstract

humanity as an ideal above nationality, so that to labor directly for

the interests of humanity apart from the well-being of the nation,

and even in its defiance, became the motive of reformers—these

characteristics, when seen in the religious sphere, have led to a

reaction against the various forms of Protestantism, and especially as

represented in the state Churches. The Roman Catholic Church, which in

all its history has subordinated national distinctions to the higher

interests of a common Christendom, had fallen into inefficiency in

the eighteenth century, and was no longer reckoned a force worthy of

consideration, either by religious thinkers or by statesmen. But in the

first third of the nineteenth century there came a change, when the

Roman Church arose from its lethargy to meet the demand imposed upon

it by the timid fears of statesmen and ecclesiastics, as the safeguard

of religion and morality, where national Churches or particular

Churches were thought to have failed. The Napoleonic aspiration after

universal empire and the frantic effort to realize it by rearranging

or suppressing nationalities has its counterpart in the religious

world in the effort to restore a Christian empire with the Papacy at

its head, as in the Middle Ages. The effect of this ambition may be

seen in Germany and other countries, but is most clearly manifest in

England, where the Oxford Movement (1833) appears as an unnational, if

not anti-national, uprising in behalf of some imperfectly conceived

cosmopolitan Church designated as “Catholicity.” The date of the

“Movement,” as Newman fixed it, was Keble’s sermon on the “Apostacy of

the National Church.” This same feeling, that national existence is

inferior in importance to humanitarian reforms or to the expression of

religion in some other shape than in any particular or national Church,

has been shown in the break with the Established Church in Scotland, or

in the difficulties experienced in Germany in consolidating the forms

of Protestantism in a strong state Church, or in the aspirations after

some universal form of religion to be accomplished by a parliament of

religions. Beneath these various schemes there is the common principle

that humanity is a worthier object of devotion than the state, and

constitutes a higher ideal in whose cause to labor. This conviction, it

may be added, has been strengthened vastly by the extraordinary way in

which, during the nineteenth century, the whole world has been brought

together by the material forces of steam and electricity.

That there is here a great truth no one can deny, but the point to

be noticed now is that nationality has been at a disadvantage in the

competition with humanity. Out of the necessities of the situation

there has been born the spirit of a deeper inquiry into the place and

significance of the nation as the indispensable medium by which the

highest result can be secured for the world at large. Thus we have

the studies in this direction of German students, Hegel and Stahl,

Trendelenburg and Bluntschli, Maurice in England, and in America

Mulford in his book _The Nation_, all of them combating the motive of

Comte and setting forth the essential, even the eternal, significance

of nationality. The ancient doctrine is still preserved that the people

exist for the state, but it is justified on the ground that the state

also exists for the people, for the freedom of the individual man, so

that through the state the rights of man are better subserved and more

securely guaranteed than by an exclusive one-sided devotion to the

cause of an abstract humanity.

As the nineteenth century drew to its close, it became increasingly

apparent that the nations had emerged from the depression in which

they were found when the century opened. America may be said to

have attained the consciousness of nationality in its highest form

in consequence of the Civil War, and to have entered from that time

upon a new career. In that awful conflict, whose origin dates back to

the rise of the anti-slavery movement, may be discerned the issue of

the century—humanitarianism, on the one hand, contending for the

rights of man, careless, if need be, for the national unity if only

a great reform could be secured; and on the other hand, the nation,

slowly realizing that slavery was a force hostile to national unity

and integrity, and on this ground demanding its suppression. The two

attitudes in this instance appear organically related, while yet

they spring from distinct and separate motives. In 1870 Germany and

Italy took their places in the family of nations. Nor should there be

omission to mention Greece, which, after its subsidence for hundreds of

years, again attained its national independence.

It has become further apparent that it is to the Protestant nations,

America, England, and Germany, that the leading place must be conceded,

together with the determination of the world’s fortunes. And to

these must be added Russia, which is also outside the pale of Latin

Christianity. Those nations remaining in alliance with the Papacy are,

for the present at least, in an inferior position.

The triumphant assertion of the spiritual significance of nationality

in the latter part of the nineteenth century has made it further

apparent that the forces working for religion, and especially for

its Protestant forms, were stronger than the forces in opposition.

The nation enters the arena of the controversy as a spiritual force,

assuming as a first principle the existence of God and His supernatural

government of the world. Never was this truth more impressively

illustrated than in the experience of Lincoln, who, when he became

President of the United States in the supreme crisis of its history,

ceased to be indifferent to religion and passed into a devout belief

in the mysterious control of the destiny of the nation by a sovereign,

omnipotent hand. As the indifference to nationality was among the

causes of religious doubt and of the weakness in the Churches in the

middle of the century, so the triumphant assertion of nationality has

contributed to turn the tide towards theistic belief and the Christian

faith.

To give a full exposition of the inner relationship of the nation to

religion and the Churches is not possible here, but some remarks may be

offered which will tend to illustrate their organic connection.

(1) In any large historical survey the nation appears as guided by

religious leaders. Religion is seen to have flourished in proportion

as the nation is conscious of its strength and destiny. When the

Roman Empire broke down the nationalities and merged them in a large

composite unity, it broke down also religious faiths, and its own

religion as well, till scepticism was the result and a consequent

immorality. All attempts to build up religion on the basis of empire,

as distinct from nationality, ended in failure.

(2) The Christian religion tended from the first to break up the empire

and to restore nationality. Ultimately it became manifest that the

cause which undermined the Roman Empire and accomplished its downfall

was the Christian Church. In its Eastern half the empire was resolved

into nationalities. In the West a Church, Latin Christendom, rose upon

its ruins, but within this Latin Christendom the spirit of nationality

began at once to work, forcing its way against the opposition of

the Papacy, till, in the age of the Protestant Reformation, when

nationality was felt as a conscious motive, it sundered Latin

Christendom into fragments.

(3) The Old Testament in its form as a whole is simply the history of

a nation from its birth through all its fortunes. Never did religion

rise to a diviner and fuller expression than under the realization of

the conviction that God was protecting the nation and determining its

career. The Hebrew prophets were primarily statesmen, devoted to the

nationality, as the incarnation of the divine will, in whose fortunes

were revealed the divine purpose. Any nation which has not the similar

conviction that it is the chosen people of God, and called to some

important task, cannot maintain its independence and integrity, and has

no future. This conviction to-day inspires the leading nations of the

world.

(4) The nation mediates between humanitarianism and individualism. In

serving its own ends and seeking to accomplish its mission, it works

for the good of all, and also for the freedom of the individual man.

The tendency of humanitarianism as a motive apart from the higher life

of the state, or apart from its impersonation in Christ as its head and

leader, is to weaken individualism and to defeat the very end it wishes

to subserve, the achievement of the rights of man. Humanity as a whole

lacks the visible, tangible embodiment of the nation. It has not yet

the consciousness of itself nor of its unity. It cannot respond to the

needs it awakens. It does not, as a whole, realize its relationship to

God, nor is it placed in such a position as to make it feel the need

of God. It is in danger of becoming an abstraction in so far as it

exists without relationships. But the nation is close at hand, near,

and felt as a moral personality or being, seeking ideal ends which are

also within the bounds of possibility. Humanity as a whole undertakes

no enterprises which make it tremble as it comes to unknown, trackless

seas. But when the nation comes to great crises, where human wisdom

is powerless to direct its course, it falls back instinctively and by

necessity upon the belief in the guidance of God. Thus the nation as a

whole appears in a higher form of personality than individual men can

achieve, even the greatest men, and so prepares the way for the belief

in the still higher, the invisible, infinite personality of God.

(5) The nation as a moral personality and depending upon God becomes

the safeguard of morals. If there has been a decline in morality in the

nineteenth century, as some maintain, shown in the general weakening

of moral sanctions, or by the increase of divorce and indifference to

the sacredness of family life, it must be attributed in some measure

to the indifference to nationality from the time that political

liberalism resting on an abstract humanitarianism, or in combination

with a scientific naturalism, gained the ascendency. So far as this

tendency has in any degree invaded the Christian Church it has been

powerless to effect a change for the better. The great men whom

humanity is directed to worship do not constitute a moral standard,

nor can scientific postulates be made a basis for moral culture; for

nature is at least unmoral, if not, as some assert, immoral, and it is

only as acted upon by man that nature gives response to the increasing

purpose of the world. Religious truths—the personality of God, His

creation and government of the world, immortality, and the freedom

of the will—these are shattered, we are told, “by the great eternal

iron laws of the universe,” or “are in hopeless contradiction with the

most solid truths of empirical science.” And so, it must be added,

are the sanctions of ethics and moral law. It is when we turn to the

state, to the moral personality of the nation, that we encounter other

laws and living forces which restore what an empirical science or a

transcendental humanitarianism has broken down. Here the supreme test

is spiritual—the well-being of the nationality. The state must build

upon the family as its corner-stone; it must enforce those moral laws

which the history of nations, as well as human experience in its best

estate, reveal to be the inmost expression of the normal life of man.

The beginning of a new century may seem like an artificial division

of time, but the self-consciousness with which the nineteenth century

closed, the efforts at introversive estimates of its place in history

and of the work it had accomplished, indicate something more than a

conventional barrier to be passed. Prophecies in regard to the new

age may be futile, for God reserves to Himself the knowledge of the

future. But it is much if we can to any extent read the meaning of the

past and detect the sources of its strength and weakness. And for the

rest, Christian faith and hope are inextinguishable, looking forward to

the fulfilment of the Christian ideal—that higher unity where Christ

appears as the embodiment of humanity and the voice of its yearning for

a perfect brotherhood; where the nation also acknowledges Him as its

overlord, so that, in the words of Christian prophecy, the kingdoms of

this world shall become the kingdom of our God and of His Christ. In

that ideal conception, the _dominium_ belongs to the state, and the

_ministerium_ to the Christian Church.

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