A great deal of care was given to the distribution of the artillery in

relation to the policy of defense. Three systems of battery positions

were built so as to distribute the guns in depth and sited so as to

cover the ground to the northeast, east, and south, in case the flanks

of the corps should be turned. These batteries were protected with

barbed-wire entanglements and machine-gun positions against a sudden

penetration of the enemy, and they were designed to become the natural

rallying points of infantry in this eventuality.

Successive lines of retirement were also prepared, battery positions

were selected, organized, and marked, cross-country tracks were opened

up, and observation posts, echeloned in depth, were located and wired

in.

On Vimy Ridge alone seventy-two new battery positions were built and

stacked with ammunition; these positions could be used either for the

distribution of the corps artillery in depth, or as positions which

reenforcing artillery could immediately take up in the event of a

heavy attack.

The weather being much finer during the months of January, February,

and March, 1918, than is generally the case, very good progress was

made, and the following defensive works were completed in rear of the

main front-line defensive system:

250 miles of trench;

300 miles of barbed-wire entanglements;

200 tunneled machine-gun emplacements.

In addition to the above, existing trench systems, dugouts, gun

positions, and machine-gun emplacements were strengthened and

repaired. Each trench system was plentifully marked with signboards

and many open machine-gun positions were sited and marked.

Machine-gun positions, defended localities, and certain portions of

trenches were stored with several days' supply of ammunition, food,

and water for the use of the garrisons.

The front held remained comparatively quiet during January, 1918, and,

except for minor patrolling encounters and occasional shoots, nothing

beyond the usual activity ever prevailing on a front held by this

corps occurred.

In the months of February and March, 1918, little or no work was being

done by the enemy on his actual defenses, but roads and disused trench

railways were being repaired. In the rear areas his ammunition and

engineer supply dumps were increasing in number and in size, while

fresh battery positions were appearing almost daily. Furthermore,

hostile aircraft and anti-aircraft guns were very active in preventing

reconnoissance by British aeroplanes.

Early in March, 1918, it was considered that the enemy's front was

ready for offensive operations. No concentration of troops had been

observed, but the numerous towns and villages in close proximity to

the front provided extensive accommodation and made it possible for

him to conceal such concentrations. Conditions so favorable to the

Germans required relentless vigilance on the part of the Corps

Intelligence Organization, as the Canadians were dependent on the

efficiency of this branch of the service for timely warning against

surprise attacks.

In addition to the preparation above mentioned the enemy assumed early

in February, 1918, a very aggressive attitude, raiding the Canadian

lines very frequently, using for the purpose specially trained storm

troops. His destructive shoots and intense gas shelling were also of

frequent occurrence. To quell this activity, numerous counter-raids,

retaliation shoots, and gas projections were carried out, and

especially in the Lens sector soon had the desired effect.

Prisoners captured in Canadian raids stated that all their divisions

had been brought up to strength and were undergoing hard training in

the tactics of semiopen warfare. They stated, or left it to be

understood, that the forthcoming German attacks were based on a very

deep initial penetration and the rapid exploitation of success. No

indications were given as to the points at which attacks would be

launched, but they stated that every one of their sectors was prepared

and practically ready. It was also definitely established that the

enemy reserve divisions were kept near railways, ready to be moved

quickly to the parts of the front selected for the coming drive.

CHAPTER XVI

HOLDING LENS AND ARRAS

On March 21, 1918, the Germans launched a violent attack against the

Fifth and Third British Armies. The battle resulting from this attack,

known as the Battle of Amiens, did not involve directly the majority

of the Canadian Corps. The latter on that date was disposed as

follows: Third Canadian Division (Major General L. J. Lipsett), in the

line, Mericourt-Avion sections; Fourth Canadian Division (Major

General Sir D. Watson), in the line, Lens-St.-Emile sections; First

Canadian Division (Major General Sir A. C. Macdonell), in the line,

Hill 70 section; Second Canadian Division (Major General Sir H. E.

Burstall), resting, Auchel area.

In the afternoon orders were received to take over the front of the

Sixty-second Division (Thirteenth Corps) in the Acheville sector. The

Second Canadian Division, then in reserve, was at first chosen to

execute this order. But when, somewhat later, the Canadian Corps was

instructed to keep one complete division in reserve, this order was

canceled, and instead the Third Canadian Division was ordered to

execute its frontage by relieving the Sixty-second Division in the

Acheville-Arleux sector, making the total Canadian front 17,000 yards.

In the evening of March 22, 1918, the Hill 70 sector, then held by the

First Canadian Division, was taken over by the Fourth, extending the

latter's frontage, while the former was placed in reserve.

Late that night General Headquarters ordered the withdrawal of the

First Canadian Motor Machine-Gun Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel W. K.

Walker) from the Vimy sector. This unit, the next morning, moved south

to the support of the Fifth Army, and by midnight of March 23, 1918,

having traveled over 100 miles during the day, all batteries were in

action on a thirty-five-mile front east of Amiens.

Under orders of the Fifth and later of the Fourth Army, it was ordered

to fight a rear-guard action to delay the advance of the enemy and to

fill dangerous gaps on the army fronts. For nineteen days this unit

was continuously in action north and south of the Somme, fighting

against overwhelming odds. Using to the utmost its great mobility, it

fought over 200 square miles of territory. It is difficult to appraise

in its correct extent the influence--material and moral--that the

forty machine guns of this unit had in the events which were then

taking place. The losses suffered amounted to about 75 per cent of the

trench strength of the unit, and to keep it in being throughout that

fighting, reenforcements by personnel of the infantry branch of the

Canadian Machine-Gun Corps were authorized.

On the 23d, at 10.50 a. m., the Second Canadian Division was ordered

to concentrate at once west of Arras in the Mont St.-Eloi area, and

having carried this out, passed into General Headquarters reserve.

The First Canadian Division was moved by busses to Couturelle area,

embussing at about midnight, March 27, 1918. At dawn, March 28, 1918,

the enemy struck heavily astride the river Scarpe, and the First

Canadian Division was ordered at 10.30 a. m. to retain the busses by

which they had moved south and to move back to the Arras-Bainville

area at once, coming there under orders of the Seventeenth Corps.

This move was very difficult, because some busses had already been

sent back to the Park, many units were still en route to the

Couturelle area, and the mounted units and transport were in column on

the road Hauteville-Saulty-Couturelle. The division, however,

extricated itself, and on the night of the 28th, under orders of the

Seventeenth Corps, placed two battalions in the forward area in

support of the Forty-sixth Infantry Brigade, Fifteenth Division. At

daybreak on the 29th the Third Canadian Infantry Brigade moved to

support the Fifteenth Division, and during the night of the 29th and

30th the First Canadian Brigade relieved the Forty-sixth Infantry

Brigade in the Telegraph Hill sector, that brigade front being

transferred from the Fifteenth Division to the First Canadian Division

on March 30, 1918.

The Second Canadian Division passed under orders of the Sixth Corps on

March 28, 1918, and moved forward in support of the Third British

Division in the Neuville-Vitasse sector. On the night of March 29-30,

1918, it relieved the Third British Division in the line, and on the

night of March 31-April 1, 1918, extended its front southward by

relieving the left battalion of the Guards Division.

The front held by the Second Canadian Division extended from south of

the Cojeul River, east of Boisleux St.-Marc, to the southern slopes of

Telegraph Hill (where it joined with the First Canadian Division), a

total length of about 6,000 yards. The Second Canadian Division held

this front for an uninterrupted period of ninety-two days, during

which time it repulsed a series of local attacks and carried out no

less than 27 raids, capturing 3 officers, 101 other ranks, 22 machine

guns, 2 trench mortars, and inflicting severe casualties on the enemy.

The aggressive attitude adopted by this division at such a critical

time and under adverse conditions had a most excellent effect and it

certainly reduced to the lowest point the fighting value of two German

divisions, namely, the Twenty-sixth Reserve Division and the One

Hundred and Eighty-fifth Division. The Second Canadian Division

returned under the orders of the Canadian corps on July 1, 1918.

The Third Canadian Division had been attached on March 27, 1918, to

the Thirteenth Corps. Thus, under pressure of circumstances, the unity

of command of the Canadian divisions had been destroyed. They were now

attached to two different armies (First and Third) and under command

of three different corps (Sixth, Seventeenth, and Thirteenth).

On March 28, 1918, the Germans launched a very heavy attack in the

Arras sector from Gavrelle to Puisieux. The Third, Fifteenth, Fourth,

and Fifty-sixth British Divisions successfully repulsed this

offensive.

The attack was renewed in the afternoon, north of the Scarpe, on the

front of the Fifty-sixth Division, but did not there meet with greater

success. A certain amount of ground had, however, been captured by the

enemy.

The renewed attack on the Fifty-sixth Division had considerably

lowered its power of resistance. German prisoners captured in the

morning were insistent that the attack would be renewed again on the

29th, by storm troops which had been held in reserve for the purpose

of capturing the Vimy Ridge by attacking it from the south. It was

most urgent that the Fifty-sixth Division should be supported without

delay.

On March 28, 1918, the Fourth Canadian Division, then holding the

Lens-St.-Emile-Hill 70 sector, was relieved by the Forty-sixth British

Division, First Corps, and in turn relieved the Fifty-sixth British

Division in the Oppy-Gavrelle sector.

On the completion of this relief the Canadian Corps was to relieve

the Thirteenth Corps, and General Sir Currie again assumed command of

the Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions.

In the meantime all the battalions which the Fourth Canadian Divisions

could spare were to be sent at once by the quickest way to the support

of the Fifty-sixth Division.

The Fourth Canadian Division, therefore, immediately organized a

Composite Brigade, under Brigadier General V. W. Odlum, consisting of

the three reserve battalions of the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth

Brigades, and the support battalions of the Eleventh and Twelfth

Brigades. This Composite Brigade was moved in haste by light railway

and lorry to the vicinity of Mont St.-Eloi, from whence it marched

into reserve positions during daylight on the 28th.

On the night of the 28th-29th the units of the Fifty-sixth Division

which had been most heavily engaged were relieved by these five

Canadian battalions, which came under orders of the Third Canadian

Division.

It was not until about 10.00 p. m., on the night of the 28th-29th,

that the leading troops of the Forty-sixth Division arrived and began

to relieve the Fourth Canadian Division.

In view of the seriousness of the situation, units of the Fourth

Canadian Division were moved, as the relief progressed, by lorry and

light railway to Neuville St.-Vaast, and marched quickly into the line

to relieve the elements of the Fifty-sixth Division.

The situation of the Canadian divisions at noon, March 30, 1918, after

some other readjustments had been carried into effect, was as follows:

Third Army. Under Sixth Corps--Second Canadian Division:

Neuville-Vitasse sector. Under Seventeenth Corps--First Canadian

Division: Telegraph Hill sector.

First Army. Under Canadian Corps--Third Canadian Division:

Acheville-Mericourt-Avion sector. Under Canadian Corps--Fourth

Canadian Division: Gavrelle-Oppy sector.

On April 7, 1918, the First Canadian Division relieved the Fourth

British Division astride the Scarpe and came under orders of Canadian

Corps; the army boundaries being altered so as to include the sector

taken over by the First Canadian Division in the First Army front.

In the meantime, on the night of March 28th-29th, 1918, owing to

operations astride the river Scarpe, the front-line system had been

abandoned under orders of the Thirteenth Corps and the troops withdrawn

to the Blue line in front of the Bailleul-Willer-val-Chaudiere-Hirondelle

line, as far north as the Mericourt sector.

This Blue line was originally sited and constructed as an intermediate

position, and consisted in most parts of a single trench none too

plentifully supplied with dugouts. This meant that until a support

line was dug and made continuous the troops had to be kept in strength

in the front line, subject to heavy casualties from hostile shelling

and to probable annihilation in case of an organized attack.

Any advance beyond the Blue line on the Fourth Canadian Division front

would have brought the Germans within assaulting distance of the

weakest part of the Vimy Ridge, and the severity of the shelling

seemed to indicate that a renewal of their attacks was probable.

Every effort was made to give more depth to the new front-line system

by pushing forward a line of outposts and by digging a continuous

support line, as well as by constructing reserve lines at certain

points of greater tactical importance. Switch lines facing south were

also sited and dug or improved.

To increase the depth of the defenses, machine-gun detachments were

extemporized by borrowing men from the machine-gun battalions, who had

then completed their organization on an eight-battery basis. Some

fifty extra machine guns were secured from ordnance and other sources,

and also a number of extra Lewis guns.

Personnel from the Canadian Light Horse and the Canadian Corps Cyclist

Battalion were organized in Lewis and Hotchkiss gun detachments and

sent forward to man the defenses in Vimy and Willerval localities,

under orders of the Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions.

The machine-gun companies of the Fifth Canadian Division had arrived

in France on March 25, 1918, and in view of the extreme urgency of the

situation the personnel and armament had been moved by lorries, sent

specially by Canadian Corps, from Le Havre to Verdrel, where they were

in corps reserve.

Their horse transport having now arrived, these machine-gun companies

(Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth) were moved to the Vimy Ridge

and allotted definite positions of defense on March 30, 1918.

The front held by the Canadian Corps on April 8, 1918, was

approximately 16,000 yards in length. It will be remembered that the

Second Canadian Division under the Sixth Corps (Third Army) was

holding 6,000 yards of front, making a total of 22,000 yards of front

held by Canadian troops.

On April 9, 1918, the Germans attacked on the Lys front between La

Bassee and Armentieres. Making rapid progress, they crossed the Lys

River on the 10th, and on the following days advanced west of

Merville-Bailleul. They were well held at Givenchy by the Fifty-fifth

Division and their attack made no progress southward.

The Canadian Corps was not involved in this fighting, but it now found

itself in a deep salient, following with anxiety the development of

the Battle of the Lys.

The Battle of the Lys added a new burden to the already sorely tried

British Army, and it was imperative that troops should at once be made

available to stop the German advance.

On the 10th, the Canadian front was extended by taking over from

the First Corps the line held by the Forty-sixth Division

(Lens-St.-Emile-Hill 70 sector). This relief was commenced on April

11, 1918, and completed on the night of the 12th-13th by the Third

Canadian Division; concurrently with it, the inter-divisional

boundaries were readjusted and the artillery redistributed to meet

as well as possible the new conditions.

The front held by the three divisions then in the Canadian Corps had a

length of approximately 29,000 yards, and of necessity the line was

held very thinly and without much depth.

To deceive the enemy regarding their dispositions and intentions, the

Canadians adopted a very aggressive attitude. The artillery constantly

harassed the enemy's forward and rear areas and the infantry

penetrated his line at many points with strong fighting patrols and

bold raiding parties. Gas was also projected on numerous occasions.

This activity on the immediate flank of the Lys salient greatly

perturbed the enemy, who gave many indications of nervous uncertainty.

The situation was critical, and extensive steps were taken at once to

increase the ability of the Canadian Corps to withstand hostile

attacks.

The success of the German offensive emphasized the need of greater

depth for defensive dispositions, which depend very largely on the

stopping power of the machine gun. Unfortunately the number of machine

guns with a division was inadequate to give the required depth of

defense on a front exceeding 4,000 yards in length. Each Canadian

division was now holding a front approximately 10,000 yards in length,

and the extemporized machine-gun detachments formed previously, added

to the machine-gun companies of the Fifth Canadian Division, were far

from sufficient for the task.

General Sir Currie therefore decided to add a third company of four

batteries to each battalion of the Canadian Machine-Gun Corps, thus

bringing up to ninety-six the number of machine guns in each Canadian

division. This entailed an increase in personnel of approximately 50

per cent of the strength of each machine-gun battalion.

These companies were formed provisionally on April 12, 1918, by

withdrawing fifty men from each infantry battalion. Of these men a

portion was sent to the Machine-Gun Battalion to be combined with the

trained personnel, so that each machine-gun crew would include at

least four trained gunners. The remainder of the infantry personnel

withdrawn as above stated was sent to a special machine-gun depot

formed for the purpose, and there underwent an abridged but intensive

course of training. Thus an immediate supply of reenforcements was

insured. Twenty-three-ton lorries had been borrowed from General

Headquarters to supply a modicum of transport to the new units, and on

April 13, 1918, some of the new machine-gun batteries were already in

the line at critical points.

Sufficient troops were not now available to garrison the local

defenses of Vimy Ridge, or to reenforce parts of the front if the

enemy was successful in effecting a deep penetration.

Two special brigades were therefore organized:

The Hughes Brigade--Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hughes.

Approximate strength, officers, 184; other ranks, 4,050.

McPhail's Brigade--Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. McPhail.

Approximate strength, officers, 148; other ranks, 4,628.

Two companies of the Eleventh Tank Battalion (twenty-four tanks) were

placed at the disposal of the Canadian Corps on April 13, 1918. These

tanks had officers, drivers, and armament, but no other personnel. A

sufficient number of trained Lewis gunners were found from the First,

Third, and Fourth Canadian Divisional wings and the Canadian Field

Artillery supplied the required number of gunners.

The tanks were then distributed at the critical points in the corps

area, namely: Behind the St. Catherine switch at intervals of about

300 yards, facing south--18 tanks. In the gap between the Souchez

River and Bois-en-Hache, facing east--three tanks. On the ridge line

behind Angres, facing east--three tanks.

It was intended that these tanks should form points of resistance to

check any forward flow of hostile forces and so give time to the

Canadian infantry to re-form in case they should be forced back. In

any event the tanks were to remain in action for twelve hours after

coming in contact with the enemy and thus gain the time so essential

in a crisis.

The First Canadian Motor Machine-Gun Brigade, now returned from the

Amiens Battle, was held as a mobile reserve at one hour's notice.

Bridges, railways, roads, and pumping stations were prepared for

demolition, to be blown up as a last resort.

Extended almost to the breaking point, in danger of being annihilated

by overwhelming attacks, the corps confidently awaited the assault.

All ranks of the corps were unanimous in their ardent resolve to hold

to the last every inch of the ground intrusted to their keeping.

It was for them a matter of great pride that their front was

substantially the only part of the British line which had not budged,

and one and all felt that it could not budge so long as they were

alive.

Eventually, the First, Third, and Fourth Canadian Divisions were

relieved in their sectors by the Fifteenth, Fifty-first, Fifty-second,

Twentieth, and Twenty-fourth British Divisions. The relief started on

May 1 and was completed on May 7, 1918.

As the relief progressed, the Canadian Corps handed over command of

the Avion-Lens-St.-Emile-Hill 70 sectors to the Eighteenth Corps and

the balance of the front to the Seventeenth Corps.

The length of front held by the Canadian Corps at the various stages

of the German offensive has been given previously, but it is here

recalled that from April 10, 1918, until relieved the corps held a

line exceeding 29,000 yards in length; the Second Canadian Division,

then with the Sixth Corps, was holding 6,000 yards of front, making a

total length of 35,000 yards of front held by the four Canadian

divisions. The total length of the line held by the British army

between the Oise and the sea was approximately 100 miles, therefore

the Canadian troops were holding approximately one-fifth of the total

front.

Thus, although the Canadian Corps did not, during this period, have to

repulse any German attacks on its front, it nevertheless played a part

worthy of its strength during that period.

On completion of the relief on May 7, 1918, with the exception of the

Second Canadian Division, which was still in the line in the Third

Army area, the Canadian Corps was placed in the General Headquarters

reserve in the First Army area (Arras sector), and disposed as

follows:

Headquarters--Pernes, and later Bryas. First Canadian Division--Le

Cauroy area. Third Canadian Division--St. Hilaire area. Fourth

Canadian Division--Monchy-Breton area.

One infantry brigade and one machine-gun company from each Canadian

division were billeted well forward in support of the corps in the

line as follows:

(a) One infantry brigade, one machine-gun company--Anzin area.

Support, Seventeenth Corps.

(b) One infantry brigade, one machine-gun company--Chateau de la Haie

area. Support, Eighteenth Corps.

(c) One infantry brigade, one machine-gun company--Ham en Artois area.

Support, Eleventh Corps.

These brigades were kept under one hour's notice from 5.00 a. m. to

7.00 a. m. daily and under four hours' notice during the remainder of

the day. The remainder of the Canadian Corps was under four hours'

notice.

Reconnoissances of the front which the corps would have to support in

case of an attack were ordered and carried out by staff and regimental

officers. The brigades billeted forward were relieved from time to

time under divisional arrangements.

On May 23, 1918, the Seventy-fourth British Division, newly arrived in

France from Palestine, came under Canadian Corps for administration

and training. It was necessary to rearrange the areas among the

divisions in the corps to make room for the Seventy-fourth Division

and to equalize the training facilities. With the exception of these

moves, the disposition of the Canadian Corps remained substantially

the same until June 25, 1918.

On that date the Second Canadian Division, which had been in the line

since March 30, 1918, was relieved by the Third Canadian Division,

which came then under the Sixth Corps, Third Army area, with

headquarters at Basseux. Readjustments were also made in the locations

of all the Canadian troops then in reserve.

[Illustration: Canadian Official Photo.

At the left is Major General David Watson, who commanded the Fourth

Canadian Division from 1916 on; at the right is Major General Louis

James Lipsett, who commanded the Third Canadian Division from 1916 to

1918. He was killed in action.]

Though the principal reason for placing the Canadians into reserve, of

course, was to give them a much-needed and well-deserved rest, their

entire time was by no means devoted to this purpose. Throughout this

period there went forward a steady process of reorganization and

training. Reinforcements were received and gradually absorbed. The

most intensive kind of tactical and individual training was carried on

throughout May, June, and July, 1918. At the same time preparations

were being made to recapture Merville and part of the Lys salient,

operations which for purposes of maintaining secrecy were then known

as the "Delta attack."

One memorable event of this period was the celebration of Dominion

Day. Ever since the Canadians had arrived in France, July 1 had been

set aside for this purpose, but never before had the "sports" been as

brilliant as on July 1, 1918.

Finally, on July 6, 1918, the Canadian Corps was warned to be prepared

to relieve the Seventeenth Corps in the line. This operation was begun

on July 10 and completed on July 15, 1918, when Lieutenant General Sir

A. W. Currie assumed command of the Seventeenth Corps front

(Arras-Lens sector), disposing his forces as follows:

Headquarters Canadian Corps--Duisans (First Army area). Second

Canadian Division, in the line--Telegraph Hill section. First Canadian

Division, in the line--Feuchy-Fampoux section. Fourth Canadian

Division, in the line--Gavrelle-Oppy section. Under Sixth Corps--Third

Army area. Third Canadian Division, in the line--Neuville-Vitasse

section.

CHAPTER XVII

THE AMIENS BATTLE OF AUGUST, 1918

The relief of the Seventeenth Corps by the Canadian Corps on July 15,

1918, after the corps' long period of rest and training, with the

attendant movement and activity, made the enemy alert and anxious as

to the British intentions on this front. He was successful in securing

identifications at various points of the line, which he penetrated by

raiding.

As it was desired to keep him fully occupied on this front, the

artillery activity was increased and our infantry engaged in vigorous

patrolling and raiding.

By the latter part of July, 1918, the Allied High Command had decided

to enlarge the scope of the operations east of Amiens. Originally

conceived as of a purely local character, they were now intended to

reduce the entire salient of the Somme created by the successful

German offensive of March 21, 1918, and the days following.

During the last few days of July, 1918, and the first few days of

August, 1918, the Canadian Corps was relieved by the Seventeenth Corps

and was transferred from the First to the Fourth Army area. On July

30, 1918, Canadian Headquarters moved to Molliens Vidarne, in the

Amiens sector.

The attack against the Somme salient eventually was set for August 8,

1918.

The front of attack was to extend from Moreuil to Ville-sur-Ancre on a

front of approximately 20,000 yards. The dispositions of the troops

participating in the attack were as follows:

(a) On the right from Moreuil to Thennes (inclusive)--the First French

Army under order of commander in chief British army.

(b) In the center from Thennes (exclusive) to the Amiens-Chaulnes

Railway--the Canadian Corps.

(c) On the left from the Amiens-Chaulnes Railway to the Somme--the

Australian Corps.

(d) The left flank of the Australian Corps was covered by the Third

(British) Corps attacking in the direction of Merlancourt.

The object of the attack was to push forward in the direction of the

line Roye-Chaulnes with the least possible delay, thrusting the enemy

back in the general direction of Ham, and so facilitating the

operations of the French on the front between Montdidier and Noyon.

The battle front of the Canadian Corps extended from a point about 800

yards south of Hourges to the Amiens-Chaulnes Railway. It crossed the

river Luce about 800 yards northeast of Hourges, and remaining well

west of Hangard passed through the western portion of Hangard Wood.

The total length exceeded 8,500 yards in a straight line.

In addition to the four Canadian divisions, the following troops were

placed under Canadian Corps for the operation: Fifth Squadron. R. A.

F.; Fourth Tank Brigade; Third Cavalry Division.

A mobile force was organized consisting of the First and Second

Canadian Motor Machine-Gun Brigades, the Canadian Corps Cyclist

Battalion, and a section of 6-in. Newton Mortars mounted on motor

lorries. This force was named the Canadian Independent Force, placed

under the command of Brigadier General R. Brutinel, and given the task

of cooperating with the cavalry in the neighborhood of the Amiens-Roye

road, covering the right flank of the right division and maintaining

liaison with the French.

Two British divisions were held in army reserve, and were available in

the event of certain situations developing.

The total artillery amounted to seventeen brigades of field artillery

and nine brigades of heavy artillery, plus four additional batteries

of long-range guns.

At 10.00 a. m. on the morning of August 5, 1918, General Sir A. W.

Currie took over command of the battle front, then held by the Fourth

Australian Division. During the hours of darkness on the 4th, 5th,

6th, and 7th the attacking Canadian troops relieved the Australian

troops, with the exception of those holding the outpost line, who

remained in position until the night of August 7-8, 1918.

The dispositions of the Canadian Corps on the morning of the 8th at

zero hour were as follows: On the right, the Third Canadian Division,

in liaison with the French; in the center, the First Canadian

Division; on the left, the Second Canadian Division, in liaison with

the Australians; in reserve, behind the Third Canadian Division, the

Fourth Canadian Division.

Each of these divisions had their allotment of tanks. East of the Noye

River, the Third Cavalry Division. Behind Gentelle Wood, the Canadian

Independent Force.

At 4.20 a. m., August 8, 1918, the initial assault was delivered on

the entire army front of attack, and the First French Army opened

their bombardment.

The attack made satisfactory progress from the outset on the whole

front.

East of Hourges, opposite the Third Canadian Division, the high

ground which dominated the Canadian front and a portion of the French

front had been seized quickly by the Ninth Canadian Infantry Brigade

(Brigadier General D. M. Ormond), and the way was opened for the

Canadian Independent Force and the Fourth Canadian Division.

By the afternoon the Canadian Corps had gained all its objectives,

with the exception of a few hundred yards on the right in the vicinity

of Le Quesnel, where stiff resistance was offered by unexpected

reserves, but this was made good the following morning. The day's

operations in which the four Canadian divisions took part represented

a maximum penetration of the enemy's defenses of over eight miles, and

included the capture of the following villages: Hangard, Demuin,

Beaucourt, Aubercourt, Courcelles, Ignaucourt, Cayeux, Caix,

Marcelcave, Wiencourt, l'Equipee, and Guillaucourt. In addition to

these, the Canadian Independent Forces assisted the French in the

capture of Mezieres, which was holding up their advance.

On the following day, August 9, 1918, the advance was continued, with

the Third, First, and Second Canadian Divisions in the line, the

Fourth Canadian Division being held in corps reserve. Substantial

progress was made, and by evening the average depth of advance was

about four miles, with a maximum of six and one half miles at some

points. The following additional villages were captured: Le Quesnel,

Folies, Bouchoir, Beaufort, Warvillers, Rouvroy, Vrely, Meharicourt,

and Rosieres.

The infantry and tanks of the Third Canadian Division and the Canadian

Independent Force cooperated with the French in the capture of

Arvillers.

During the day the enemy's resistance stiffened considerably, and

whatever gains were made resulted from heavy infantry fighting against

fresh troops, with only a few tanks available for support.

The attack was continued on the morning of the 10th, with the Third

Canadian Division on the right and the Fourth Canadian Division on the

left, the First and Second Canadian Divisions being held in corps

reserve. After the Third Canadian Division had taken the village of

Le Quesnoy-en-Santerre, the Thirty-second Division, which had come

under the Canadian Corps on the night of the 9th-10th, and had been

ordered to relieve the Third Canadian Division, passed through it and

advanced the line somewhat farther through the old British trenches

west of Parvillers and Damery. The Fourth Canadian Division during the

day succeeded, after very hard fighting, in occupying Fouquescourt,

Maucourt, Chilly, and Hallu.

During the night 10th-11th a strong enemy counterattack developed

against a part of the front of the Fourth Canadian Division east of

Hallu. This counterattack was beaten off, but owing to general

conditions the line at that point was slightly withdrawn to the

railway embankment immediately to the west of Hallu. Subsequent upon

this slight withdrawal, and with a view to reducing the existing

salient forward of Chilly, the line was further withdrawn to the

eastern outskirts of that village.

On August 11, 1918, at 9.30 a. m., the Thirty-second Division launched

an attack against Damery, but was not successful. The Fourth Canadian

Division improved their line by advancing it locally to reduce the

Chilly salient, which was still very pronounced.

During the night of August 12, 1918, the Thirty-second Division and

Fourth Canadian Division were relieved by the Third and Second

Canadian Divisions respectively.

It now became increasingly apparent that strong enemy reserves had

been sent forward to stem the Canadian advance. Six fresh divisions

and a large number of light and heavy batteries had been brought in,

and were fighting hard in a strongly intrenched defensive position.

August 12, 13, 14, 1918, were characterized chiefly by patrol

encounters and local trench fighting. The Third Canadian Division

cleared the network of trenches between Fouquescourt and Parvillers,

and advanced the line as far as the northern and western edge of

Parvillers and Damery. These two villages were captured in the evening

of August 15, 1918, and were held in spite of heavy counterattacks.

Bois de Damery was also taken, and this enabled the French to capture

the important position known as Bois-en-Z.

On the nights of August 15, 16, and 17, 1918, the First Canadian

Division relieved the Third Canadian Division, the latter being

withdrawn to corps reserve.

Progress was made during August 16-17, 1918, the enemy being driven

out of Fransart by the Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier

General R. Rennie) of the Second Canadian Division, and out of La

Chavatte by the First Canadian Division, the Canadian line on the

right being advanced in cooperation with the French.

The relief of the Second Canadian Division by the Fourth Canadian

Division was carried out on the nights of August 15-16 and 16-17,

1918, the former being withdrawn to corps reserve on the 17th.

August 18, 1918, was quiet along the front, but on the 19th the Fourth

Canadian Division carried out a minor operation near Chilly, which

greatly improved the line in that neighborhood. Four hostile

counterattacks to recover the newly won ground were beaten off during

the night.

In the meantime it had been decided to transfer the Canadian Corps

back to the First Army. On the 19th, the Second and Third Canadian

Divisions started their move to the First Army, and on the night of

the 19th-20th the relief of the First Canadian Division by the French

commenced. This relief was completed on the 22d, and the First

Canadian Division was placed in corps reserve.

On August 22, 1918, General Currie handed over command of the Canadian

Corps front, and of the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions, Second

Canadian Motor Machine-Gun Brigade, the Eighth Army Brigade, C. F. A.,

and the C. C. H. A., to the G. O. C. Australian Corps, and Canadian

Headquarters moved north to Hautecloque (Arras-Lens sector).

Between August 8 and 22, 1918, the Canadian Corps fought against

fifteen German divisions; of these, ten were directly engaged and

thoroughly defeated, prisoners being captured from almost every one

of their battalions; the five other divisions, fighting astride the

Canadian flanks, were only partially engaged.

In the same period the Canadian Corps captured 9,131 prisoners, 190

guns of all calibers, and more than 1,000 machine guns and trench

mortars.

The greatest depth penetrated approximated to fourteen miles, and an

area of over sixty-seven square miles containing twenty-seven towns

and villages had been liberated.

The casualties suffered by the Canadian Corps in the fourteen days'

heavy fighting amounted to--

Officers Other Ranks

Killed 126 1,688

Missing 9 436

Wounded 444 8,659

------ -------

Total 579 10,783

Considering the number of German divisions engaged, and the results

achieved, the casualties were very light.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ATTACK AGAINST THE HINDENBURG LINE

Canadian Headquarters were moved from Hautecloque to Noyelle Vion on

August 23, 1918, and at noon General Currie assumed command of the

front then held by the Seventeenth (British) Corps, extending from

Neuville-Vitasse to Gavrelle in the Arras-Lens sector. The First and

Fourth Canadian Divisions returned to the corps from the Amiens front

on August 25 and 28, 1918, respectively. The corps thus was again with

the First Army.

The general military situation at this time on the Amiens-Arras front

is described by General Currie in his official report of these

operations as follows:

"In sympathy with the severe reverses suffered on the Marne, and

consequent upon the actions now fully developed in the Somme salient,

signs were not wanting that the enemy was preparing to evacuate the

salient of the Lys. This evacuation began under pressure of the First

Army on August 25, 1918.

"All these attacks and their results, direct or indirect, enabled the

Allies to recover the ground they had lost in the course of the German

offensive operations.

"The recapture of that ground was, however, of secondary importance as

compared to the moral results of these successive victories.

"The German armies had been impressed in the course of these

operations by the superiority of our generalship and of our

organization, and by the great determination of our troops and

subordinate commanders.

"The Hindenburg system, however, was intact, and the enemy Higher

Command hoped and believed that behind this powerfully organized area

the German armies might be collected and reorganized.

"Fighting the most determined rear-guard action in the Somme salient,

they expected that our armies would be tired and depleted by the time

they reached the forward area of the Hindenburg system.

"The Battle of Cambrai, now about to be begun, shattered their hopes.

By breaking through the Drocourt-Queant line, itself but a part of the

Hindenburg system, the Canadian Corps carried the operations forward

to ground that had been in the hands of the Germans since 1914.

"This advance constituted a direct threat on the rear of the German

armies north and south of Cambrai.

"Dominated at all times, paralyzed by the swift and bold strokes on

vital points of their line and by the relentless pressure applied

everywhere, the German Higher Command was unable to take adequate

steps to localize and stop our advance. After the Drocourt-Queant line

was broken, the retreat of the enemy became more accelerated, and our

attacks met everywhere with less organized and determined resistance.

"The moral effect of the most bitter and relentless fighting which led

to the capture of Cambrai was tremendous. The Germans had at last

learned and understood that they were beaten."

The Canadian Corps, on the right of the First Army, was to attack

eastward astride the Arras-Cambrai road, and by forcing its way

through the Drocourt-Queant line south of the Scarpe to break the

hinge of the Hindenburg system and prevent the possibility of the

enemy rallying behind this powerfully organized defended area.

The ground to be attacked lent itself peculiarly to defense, being

composed of a succession of ridges, rivers, and canals, which formed

natural lines of defense of very great strength. These natural

positions, often mutually supporting, had been abundantly fortified.

Their organization was the last work in military engineering, and

represented years of intensive and systematic labor. Barbed-wire

entanglements were formidable, machine-gun positions innumerable, and

large tunnels had been provided for the protection of the garrison.

The four main system of defense consisted of the following lines: The

old German front system east of Monchy-le-Preux, the Fresnes-Rouvroy

line, the Drocourt-Queant line, and the Canal du Nord line. These,

with their subsidiary switches and strong points, as well as the less

organized, but by no means weak intermediate lines of trenches, made

the series of positions to be attacked without doubt one of the

strongest defensively on the western front.

Broad glacis, studded with machine-gun nests, defended the immediate

approaches to these lines, and this necessitated in each case heavy

fighting to gain a suitable jumping-off line before assaulting the

main position.

In addition to these systems, and as a preliminary to the attack on

the old German system east of Monchy-le-Preux, it was necessary to

capture the very well organized British defenses which had been lost

in the fighting of March, 1918.

These defenses were intact to a depth of about 5,500 yards, and were

dominated by the heights of Monchy-le-Preux, from which the Germans

were enjoying superior observation.

Throughout these operations there could not be any element of

surprise, other than that afforded by the selection of the actual hour

of the assaults. The positions to be attacked formed the pivot of the

movements of the German army to the south, and the security of the

armies to the north depended also on these positions being retained.

There was consequently little doubt that the enemy was alert, and had

made every disposition to repulse the expected attacks. Therefore, the

plans necessitated provision for very hard and continuous fighting,

the main stress being laid on the continuity of the operations.

On August 26, 1918, at 3.00 a. m., the attack was launched under the

usual artillery and machine-gun barrages. It made good progress, the

village of Monchy-le-Preux being entered early in the day, after a

very brilliant encircling attack carried out by the Eighth Infantry

Brigade (Brigadier General D. C. Draper). The trenches immediately to

the east of Monchy-le-Preux were found to be heavily held, and were

not cleared until about 11 a. m. by the Seventh Canadian Infantry

Brigade (Brigadier General H. Dyer).

Guemappe was captured by 4 p. m. and Wancourt Tower and the top of

Heninel Ridge were in Canadian hands at 10.40 p. m. The defenders of

the latter feature fought hard but eventually succumbed to a

determined attack delivered by the Sixth Canadian Infantry Brigade

(Brigadier General A. H. Bell), under cover of an extemporized barrage

fired by the Second Canadian Divisional Artillery (Brigadier General

H. A. Panet). During the night this brigade captured, in addition,

Egret Trench, thus securing a good jumping-off place for the

operations of the following day.

The attack was renewed at 4.55 a. m. on August 27, 1918, by the Second

and Third Canadian Divisions, in the face of increased opposition,

under a uniformly good initial barrage.

The Second Canadian Division pushed doggedly forward through the old

German trench system, where very stiff hand-to-hand fighting took

place, and crossed the Sensee River, after capturing the villages of

Cherisy and Vis-en-Artois.

The Third Canadian Division encountered very heavy opposition, but

succeeded in capturing Bois-du-Vert, Bois-du-Sart, and reaching the

western outskirts of Haucourt, Remy, Boiry-Notre-Dame, and Pelves.

The enemy throughout the day pushed a large number of reenforcements

forward, bringing up machine-gun units in motor lorries in the face of

our accurate field and heavy artillery fire. Hostile field batteries

in the open, firing over open sights, showed remarkable tenacity,

several remaining in action until the personnel had been destroyed by

our machine-gun fire.

At 9.00 a. m. on August 28, 1918, the Third Canadian Division resumed

the attack, followed at 12.30 by the Second Canadian Division. The

objective for the day was the capture of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, the

possession of which was vital to the success of further operations.

On the left, the Third Canadian Division had pushed forward, captured

the Fresnes-Rouvroy line from the Sensee River to north of

Boiry-Notre-Dame, and had secured that village, Jigsaw Wood, and

entered Pelves. They had, however, been unable to clear the village of

Haucourt.

On the front of the Second Canadian Division the fighting was most

severe. The wire in front of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line was found to be

almost intact, and although at some points the Fifth Canadian Infantry

Brigade (Brigadier General T. L. Tremblay) had succeeded in

penetrating the line, the first objective could not be secured, except

one short length on the extreme right. Subjected to heavy machine-gun

fire from both flanks as well as frontally, the attacking troops had

suffered heavy casualties, which they had borne with the utmost

fortitude.

At nightfall the general line of the Second Canadian Division was

little in advance of the line held the night before, although a few

small parties of stubborn men were still as far forward as the wire of

the Fresnes-Rouvroy line.

Enemy reenforcements were seen dribbling forward all day long.

The Second and Third Canadian Divisions were now exhausted, and during

the night of August 28-29, 1918, they were relieved by the First

Canadian Division on the right, the Fourth (British) Division on the

left, and Brutinel's Brigade (formerly the Canadian Independent Force)

on the extreme left flank.

The heavy artillery from now on concentrated on the cutting of the

broad belts of wire in front of the Drocourt-Queant line, and the

engineers prepared the bridging material required for the crossings of

the Sensee River and the Canal du Nord.

During the day (August 29, 1918) the Canadian line had been

considerably improved by minor operations.

On August 30, 1918, the First Canadian Division attacked the

Vis-en-Artois Switch, Upton Wood, and the Fresnes-Rouvroy line south

of the Vis-en-Artois Switch. The attack, a daring maneuver, organized

and carried out by the First Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier

General W. A. Griesbach), under cover of very ingenious barrages

arranged by the C. R. A., First Canadian Division (Brigadier General

H. C. Thacker), was eminently successful, all objectives being

captured and the entire garrison either killed or taken prisoner.

Heavy counterattacks by fresh troops were repulsed during the

afternoon and following night.

On August 31, 1918, the remainder of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line south of

the Arras-Cambrai road, including Ocean Work, was captured by the

Second Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General F. O. W. Loomis).

In the meantime, the Fourth (British) Division had doggedly pushed

ahead, crossing the valley of the Sensee River and capturing the

villages of Haucourt, Remy, and Eterpigny. This advance was over very

difficult, thickly wooded country, and the fighting was very heavy,

particularly in the vicinity of St.-Servin's Farm, which, after

changing hands several times, remained in possession of the enemy

until September 2, 1918.

On the night of August 31-September 1 the Fourth Canadian Division

came into the line on a one-brigade front between the First Canadian

Division and Fourth (British) Division.

The important strong point known as the Crow's Nest was captured by

the Third Canadian Infantry Brigade on September 1, 1918.

During the afternoon and evening of September 1, 1918, the enemy

delivered violent counterattacks, directed against the junction of the

First and Fourth Canadian Divisions. Two fresh divisions and two

divisions already in the line were identified in the course of this

heavy fighting. The Canadian troops were forced back slightly twice,

but the ground was each time regained and finally held. The

hand-to-hand fighting for the possession of the crest of the spur at

this point really continued until zero hour the next day, the troops

attacking the Drocourt-Queant line, as they moved forward, taking over

the fight from the troops then holding the line.

At 5.00 a. m. September 2, 1918, the major operation against the

Drocourt-Queant line was launched. Preceded by a dense barrage, and

assisted by tanks, the infantry pushed forward rapidly, and the

Drocourt-Queant line (the first objective) and its support line (the

second objective), including the village of Dury, were captured

according to program. With the capture of the second objective the

field artillery barrage was shot out, and the attack farther east had

to be carried forward without its assistance. The enemy's resistance,

free of the demoralizing effect of the barrage, stiffened

considerably, the open country being swept continually by intense

machine-gun fire. In addition, the tanks soon became casualties from

enemy guns firing point-blank, and the advance on the left and center

was held up.

Brutinel's Brigade, reenforced by a regiment of cavalry (Tenth Royal

Hussars) and armored cars, endeavored to pass through to capture the

Marquion Bridge on the Canal du Nord. Wire, trenches, and sunken

roads, however, confined the movements of the force to the

Arras-Cambrai road; and this was rendered impassable by enemy

machine-gun fire and by batteries firing over open sights.

On the right, however, the First Canadian Division pushed forward

despite very heavy machine-gun and direct artillery fire, and captured

the villages of Cagnicourt and Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, the Bois de

Bouche and Bois de Loison to the east of Cagnicourt.

Further progress made by the First Canadian Division in the afternoon

resulted in the capture of the heavily wired Buissy Switch line as far

south as the outskirts of Buissy; this largely outflanked the enemy

still holding out in front of the Fourth Canadian Division, and

compelled their retirement during the night behind the Canal du Nord.

By now the number of unwounded prisoners captured exceeded 5,000, and

Canadian infantry had penetrated the enemy's defenses to a depth

exceeding 6,000 yards.

In the night of September 3-4, 1918, the Second and Third Canadian

Divisions relieved the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions

respectively, and the Fourth (British) Division was relieved by the

First (British) Division, which had come under the Canadian Corps on

September 1, 1918, and had been concentrated after that date in the

Monchy-le-Preux, Vis-en-Artois, Guemappe area.

The next objective on the Canadian front was now the Canal du Nord.

This position, however, was so strongly held and the natural

difficulties of the terrain involved were so great that it was decided

to make further preparations before attempting this operation which,

from its very nature, would have to form part of a larger scheme.

The Canadians now held positions which were defensively very strong.

The line, therefore, was held very thinly in order to gain an

opportunity to rest and refit the divisions. Until September 27, 1918,

no changes developed on the Canadian front. Night patrolling and

sniping, of course, were kept up. There was also continuous night

firing by artillery and machine guns, while the heavy artillery

(Brigadier General R. H. Massie) carried out daily wire cutting,

counterbattery shoots, and gas concentrations.

CHAPTER XIX

CAPTURE OF BOURLON WOOD AND CAMBRAI

The share of the Canadian Corps in the operations in the direction of

Cambrai, toward the preparations of which the best part of September,

1918, was devoted, was at first to be the crossing of the Canal du

Nord and the capture of Bourlon Wood and of the high ground to the

northeast of it. Later during the month the task of the corps was

enlarged to include the capture of the bridges over the

Canal-de-l'Escaut, north of Cambrai, and of the high ground

overlooking the Sensee Valley. The strength of the corps was increased

by attaching to it the Eleventh Division and the Seventh Tank

Battalion.

At 5.20 a. m., September 27, 1918, the attack was successfully

launched, and in spite of all obstacles went well from the first.

The barrage was uniformly good, and the Third and Fourth Canadian

Divisional Artilleries, commanded respectively by Brigadier General J.

S. Stewart and Brigadier General W. B. M. King, were successful in

advancing into captured ground, and continued the barrage as planned.

Early in the afternoon the first phase of the attack was substantially

over, and the readjustments of the fronts preparatory to the second

phase were under way.

On the extreme right, however, the Seventeenth Corps had failed to

keep pace with the Canadian advance, and the latter's right flank,

submitted to severe enfilade machine-gun fire from the vicinity of

Anneux, had to be refused for a considerable distance to retain touch

with the left of the Seventeenth Corps; therefore the encircling

movement which was to have given the Canadians Bourlon Wood could not

be developed.

Fully alive to the gravity of the situation which would be created on

the flank of the Third Army by the failure to capture and hold Bourlon

Wood, the Fourth Canadian Division attacked from the north side of the

wood and captured all the high ground, pushing patrols as far as

Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Bourlon Wood, which is 110 meters high, dominates

the ground as far south as Flequieres and Havrincourt; its loss after

very heavy fighting in November, 1917, during the first battle of

Cambrai, caused eventually the withdrawal of the Third Army from a

large portion of the ground they had won by their surprise attack.

A severe counterattack, launched from the direction of Raillencourt

against the left of the Fourth Canadian Division, was repulsed in the

afternoon with heavy losses to the enemy.

The First Canadian Division and the Eleventh (British) Division made

substantial gains, the former capturing Haynecourt and crossing the

Douai-Cambrai road, and the latter pushing on and taking Epinoy and

Oisy-le-Verger by evening.

The attack was continued on September 28, 1918. The Third Canadian

Division captured Fontaine-Notre-Dame (one of the Seventeenth Corps'

objectives) and, penetrating the Marcoing line, reached the western

outskirts of St.-Olle. The Fourth Canadian Division captured

Raillencourt and Sailly, and the Eleventh (British) Division

established posts in Aubencheul-au-Bac and occupied the

Bois-de-Quesnoy. The First Canadian Division, in view of their advance

of the previous day which had produced a considerable salient, did not

push forward.

Heavy fighting characterized September 29, 1918. The Third Canadian

Division, the Fourth Canadian Division, and the First Canadian

Division all made progress in the face of severe opposition. The Third

Canadian Division pushed the line forward to the junction of the Arras

and Bapaume road, the western outskirts of Neuville St.-Remy and the

Douai-Cambrai road. They also cleared the Marquion line from the

Bapaume-Cambrai road southward toward the Canal-de-l'Escaut. The

Fourth Canadian Division captured Sancourt, crossed the Douai-Cambrai

railway and entered Blecourt, but later withdrew to the line of the

railway in the face of a heavy counterattack.

The operation of September 30, 1918, was planned in two phases. In the

first, the Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions were to push forward

across the high ground between the Canal-de-l'Escaut and the

Blecourt-Bantigny Ravine, when Brutinel's Brigade was to pass through

them and secure bridgeheads at Ramillies and Eswars. The second phase,

to take place on the success of the first, provided for the seizing of

the high ground overlooking the Sensee River by the First Canadian

Division and the Eleventh (British) Division. The attack was commenced

well, and the villages of Tilloy and Blecourt were captured by the

Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions respectively. A heavy

counterattack, however, against the Fourth Canadian Division and the

left flank of the Third Canadian Division, assisted by exceptionally

severe enfilade fire from the high ground to the north of the

Blecourt-Bantigny Ravine, forced the line on the left back to the

eastern outskirts of Sancourt. The second phase of the attack was not

carried out, and the net gains for the day were the capture of Tilloy

and some progress made on the right of the Third Canadian Division

from Neuville St.-Remy south. Prisoners taken during the day testified

to the supreme importance, in the eyes of the enemy, of the positions

held by him and the necessity that they be held at all costs.

The tremendous exertions and considerable casualties consequent upon

the four days' almost continuous fighting had made heavy inroads on

the freshness and efficiency of all arms, and it was questionable

whether an immediate decision could be forced in the face of the heavy

concentration of troops which the successful and, from the enemy's

standpoint, dangerous advance had drawn. On the other hand, it was

known that the enemy had suffered severely, and it was quite possible

that matters had reached a stage where he no longer considered the

retention of this position worth the severe losses both in men and

morale consequent upon a continuance of the defense. It was therefore

decided that the assault would be continued on October 1, 1918, the

four divisions in line attacking simultaneously under a heavy barrage,

coordinated by the G. O. C, R. A. During the night the Twenty-second

Corps took over a portion of the front held by the Eleventh Division,

the Fifty-sixth Division becoming responsible for the defense of the

relieved front at 6.00 a. m., October 1, 1918.

The attack made excellent progress in the early stages, and the troops

reached the general line, Canal-de-l'Escaut (east of Neuville

St.-Remy), Morenchies Wood, Cuvillers, Bantigny (all inclusive).

The decision of the enemy to resist to the last quickly manifested

itself. About 10.00 a. m. heavy counterattacks developed up the

Bantigny Ravine from the direction of Paillencourt. These,

supplemented by enfilade fire from the high ground just south of

Abancourt, which still remained in the enemy's hands, due to a certain

extent to the inability of the Eleventh Division on the left to make

progress, were sufficient to press back the more advanced troops.

Pockets of the enemy in Blecourt and Bantigny continued to give

trouble, and the Canadian line was ultimately forced by greatly

superior numbers out of Cuvillers, Bantigny, and Blecourt.

To continue to throw tired troops against such opposition, without

giving them an opportunity to refit and recuperate, was obviously

inviting a serious failure, and the Canadian commander in chief

accordingly decided to break off the engagement. The five days'

fighting had yielded practical gains of a very valuable nature, as

well as 7,059 prisoners and 205 guns.

The Second Canadian Division had been in close support throughout the

day, and during the night of October 1-2, 1918, relieved the Fourth

Canadian Division and parts of the Third and First Canadian Divisions

in the line from the railway south of Tilloy to Blecourt inclusive. On

relief, the Fourth Canadian Division came into corps reserve in

bivouacs in the Inchy-Queant area.

The relief considerably thinned out the infantry and in anticipation

of possible counterattacks a large number of machine-gun batteries

were placed in the line.

October 2, 1918, passed without any substantial change in the

situation. The enemy's artillery was very active throughout the day,

and at 6.15 p. m. he delivered a determined counterattack, with a

force estimated at about a battalion strong, against the ridge

northeast of Tilloy, on the Second Canadian Division front. This

counterattack was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.

During the night of October 2-3, 1918, the Eleventh Division extended

its frontage to the right as far as Blecourt (inclusive), relieving

the remainder of the First Canadian Division, who came into corps

reserve west of the Canal on completion of the relief.

The dispositions of the Canadian Corps at noon, October 3, 1918, were

as follows:

In the line--the Third Canadian Division on the right on a one-brigade

front, from the Arras-Cambrai railway to the Cambrai-Douai railway

south of Tilloy; the Second Canadian Division in the center, on a

two-brigade front, extending to the northern outskirts of Blecourt,

and the Eleventh Division on the left continuing the line to a point

1,000 yards south of Aubencheul-au-Bac.

In corps reserve--the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions. The latter

was moved to billets in the Haute Avesnes-Arras area on the night of

October 7-8, 1918, to give more opportunity to rest and refit.

The period from October 3 to 8, 1918, passed without any material

changes on the corps front. An enemy counterattack was beaten off by

the Second Canadian Division, opposite Bantigny, on the morning of

October 4, 1918, and the Eleventh Division considerably improved the

line on the northern flank by successful minor operations on October 5

and 6, 1918.

Many patrol encounters took place, in which some prisoners were

captured, and our artillery and machine guns kept the enemy under

continual harassing fire day and night. In addition, our heavy

artillery carried out a daily program of gas concentrations and

counterbattery shoots.

Orders were received on October 3, 1918, for the relief of the corps

by the Twenty-second Corps. Concurrently with this relief, and as it

progressed, the Canadian Corps was to take over the front of the

Twenty-second Corps.

Plans for further operations having been formulated to take place on

the Third Army front, the Canadian Corps was ordered on October 5,

1918, to cooperate by forcing the crossings of the Canal-de-l'Escaut,

north of Cambrai, and the relief contemplated was, therefore,

postponed.

The Third Army had been successful in crossing the Canal-de-l'Escaut

south of Cambrai between Crevecoeur and Proville. The operation now

contemplated had for its object the capture of Cambrai by envelopment.

This was to be carried out in two phases.

In the first phase the Seventeenth Corps was to capture Awoignt by

attacking from the south, the Canadian Corps was to cooperate by an

artillery demonstration. In the second phase the Canadian Corps was to

cross the Canal-de-l'Escaut and, advancing rapidly, capture

Escaudoeuvres, joining hands with the Seventeenth Corps northeast of

Cambrai.

The positions occupied by the Third and Second Canadian Divisions were

not favorable for an attack by day; the Third Canadian Division was in

front of Cambrai, and house-to-house fighting was out of the question;

the Second Canadian Division was separated from the Canal by

glacislike slopes, devoid of cover, and on which the enemy had good

observation from the numerous houses on the east side of the Canal as

well as from the high ground east of Escaudoeuvres. In addition,

Morenchies, Pont d'Aire, Ramillies, and the villages to the north were

strongly held by the enemy.

In spite of the difficulties of a night operation it was decided that

the Second Canadian Division would attack by night, and attempt to

seize the bridges before they were blown up by the enemy.

The Third Canadian Division was to cover the right of the Second

Canadian Division by capturing the railway embankment, and entering

Cambrai as soon as possible to prevent any action of the enemy against

the right flank of the Second Canadian Division, which, under the best

circumstances, was bound to be in the air for some time after the

crossing of the Canal.

Brutinel's Brigade was to cross the Canal as soon as possible and

extend the gains of the Second Canadian Division by seizing the high

ground east of Thun St.-Martin. Ten brigades of field artillery were

available for the operation.

At 4.30 a. m., October 8, 1918, the Third Army attacked, and at the

same hour an artillery demonstration was carried out on the Canadian

Corps front.

The Seventeenth Corps on the right did not reach Awoignt, but in the

evening they were ordered to continue their advance on the morning

of October 9, 1918, to capture the town; concurrently with this

advance the Canadian Corps was to secure the crossings of the

Canal-de-l'Escaut.

In spite of the darkness of a rainy night the assembly was completed

and the attack was launched successfully at 1.30 a. m., October 9,

1918. Rapid progress was made, and at 2.25 a. m., the Second Canadian

Division had captured Ramillies and established posts on the Canal

there, and patrols were pushing out to the northeast. On the right the

infantry, assisted by a party of engineers, rushed the crossings at

Pont d'Aire, and, after sharp fighting, captured the bridge intact

with the exception of the western spillway, which had been partially

destroyed. Two cork bridges were thrown across, and by 3.35 a. m. the

infantry were well established on the eastern side of the Canal. The

Third Canadian Division had cleared the railway, and their patrols

were pushing into Cambrai, while the engineers were commencing work on

the bridges.

By 8.00 a. m. the Second Canadian Division had captured Escaudoeuvres,

and had established a line on the high ground immediately to the north

and east. Detachments of the Third Canadian Division had by this time

completely cleared Cambrai of the enemy, and troops of the Third Army

could be seen coming up toward it from the south.

Cambrai was to be deliberately set on fire by the enemy. Huge fires

were burning in the Square when Canadian patrols went through, and

many others broke out in all parts of the city. Piles of inflammable

material were found ready for the torch, but the enemy was unable to

carry out his intention owing to the Canadians' unexpected attack and

rapid progress. A party of one officer and a few men, which had been

left with instructions to set fire to Cambrai, was discovered and

dealt with before it could do any further damage. The fires were

successfully checked by a large detachment of Canadian engineers, who

entered the city with the patrols. A considerable number of road

mines, "booby traps," etc., were also located and removed.

An air reconnoissance at dawn indicated that the enemy had withdrawn

from the area between the Canal-de-l'Escaut and the Canal-de-la

Sensee, and that all bridges over the latter had been destroyed.

Brutinel's Brigade, passing through the infantry of the Second

Canadian Division, seized the high ground at Croix St.-Hubert and

pushed cavalry patrols into Thun Levecque.

The Second Canadian Division east of the Canal progressed toward the

north and occupied Thun Levecque, Thun St.-Martin, Blecourt,

Cuvillers, and Bantigny, and the Eleventh Division occupied Abancourt

and reached the outskirts of Paillencourt.

The Third Canadian Division was withdrawn at 7.10 p. m. when the

Twenty-fourth Division (Seventeenth Corps) passed through and joined

up with the Second Canadian Division, and Cambrai and the positions to

the east were taken over or occupied by the Seventeenth Corps.

The Third Canadian Division was moved on the following day to bivouacs

in the Inchy-Queant area to rest and refit after twelve days of

battle.

The attack was continued at 6.00 a. m., October 10, 1918, by the

Second Canadian and Eleventh (British) Divisions, and good progress

was made. The Second Canadian Division captured Naves, and by

nightfall reached a point one and a half miles northeast on the

Cambrai-Salzoir road. From there the line ran westward to the

Canal-de-l'Escaut, exclusive of Iwuy, where the Canadians had been

held up by machine-gun fire.

In this attack Brutinel's Brigade operated along the Cambrai-Salzoir

road, but finding the bridge over the Erclin River destroyed could not

get their cars farther forward. This bridge, although on the outpost

line under heavy fire, was immediately replaced by the engineers, a

covering party being supplied by Brutinel's Brigade. Machine-gun crews

from the cars went forward on foot, however, and materially assisted

the infantry advancing at this point, and the corps cavalry, by a

brilliant charge, helped in the capture of the ground east of the

Rieux-Iwuy road.

On the left the Eleventh Division cleared the enemy from the area

between the Canal-de-l'Escaut and the Sensee Canal, captured

Paillencourt and Estrun, and reached the outskirts of Hem-Lenglet,

which they occupied during the night.

The Forty-ninth and Fifty-first Divisions were released from army

reserve and transferred to the Canadian Corps on October 10, 1918.

During the night of October 10-11, 1918, the former believed that part

of the Second Canadian Division east of Iwuy, and the Fifty-first

(Highland) Division moved to the Escaudoeuvres area.

At 9.00 a. m., October 11, 1918, the Canadian Corps resumed the attack

with the Forty-ninth Division on the right and the Second Canadian

Division on the left. The enemy laid down a heavy artillery barrage

and both divisions encountered stiff opposition. After fierce

fighting, however, the attack made good progress, the Forty-ninth

Division gaining the high ground east of Iwuy, and the Second Canadian

Division capturing Iwuy and the high ground to the north.

About 10.30 a. m. the enemy delivered a heavy counterattack under an

artillery barrage and supported by seven tanks, from the direction of

Avesnes-le-Sec, against the Forty-ninth and Second Canadian Divisions.

The Canadian line was forced back slightly at first, but six of the

tanks were knocked out by the artillery, the assaulting infantry

dispersed by machine-gun and rifle fire, and the attack repulsed.

Meanwhile, on October 7 and 8, 1918, the First Canadian Division had

relieved the Fourth (British) Division (Twenty-second Corps) on the

frontage between Palluel and the Scarpe River, and passed under the

command of the G. O. C., Twenty-second Corps.

On October 11, 1918, General Sir A. W. Currie handed over command of

the corps front (less the Eleventh Divisional sector) to the G. O. C.,

Twenty-second Corps, and the Second Canadian and the Forty-ninth and

Fifty-first Divisions were transferred to the Twenty-second Corps. At

the same time he assumed command of the former Twenty-second Corps

front, and the Fifty-sixth and the First Canadian Divisions were

transferred in the line to the Canadian Corps. During the night of

October 11-12, 1918, the Second Canadian Division was relieved in the

line east of the Iwuy-Denain railway by the Fifty-first (Highland)

Division, and on completion of the relief, the Canadian commander in

chief assumed command of the remainder of the Second Canadian

Divisional front, extending from the Iwuy-Denain railway exclusive to

the Canal-de-l'Escaut.

The battle of Arras-Cambrai, so fruitful in results, was now closed.

Since August 26, 1918, the Canadian Corps had advanced twenty-three

miles, fighting for every foot of ground and overcoming bitter

resistance. In that period the Canadian Corps engaged and defeated

decisively thirty-one German divisions, reenforced by numerous

marksmen machine-gun companies. These divisions were met in strongly

fortified positions and under conditions most favorable to the

defense.

In the battle 18,585 prisoners were captured by the Canadians,

together with 371 guns, 1,923 machine guns and many trench mortars.

Over 116 square miles of French soil, containing fifty-four towns and

villages and including the city of Cambrai, were liberated.

The severity of the fighting and the heroism of the Canadian troops

may be gathered from the casualties suffered between August 22 and

October 11, 1918, and which are as follows:

Officers Other Ranks

Killed 296 4,071

Missing 18 1,912

Wounded 1,230 23,279

------ -------

Total 1,544 29,262

CHAPTER XX

CAPTURE OF VALENCIENNES AND MONS

The new front of the Canadian Corps on October 11, 1918, extended from

Iwuy-Denain railway, north of Iwuy, to the Canal-de-l'Escaut at

Estrun, thence following the southern bank of the Canal-de-la-Sensee

to Palluel, thence crossing the Sensee River at Hamel to the Scarpe

River east of Vitry. The front was held by the Second Canadian

Division from the right to the Canal-de-l'Escaut; the Eleventh

Division from Estrun (inclusive) to Aubencheul-au-Bac (exclusive); the

Fifty-sixth Division from Aubencheul-au-Bac (inclusive) to Palluel

(inclusive), and the First Canadian Division from Palluel (exclusive)

to the western boundary.

The fronts of the Eleventh and Fifty-sixth Divisions were then

stationary, but on the front of the First Canadian Division crossings

had been forced over the Sensee and Trinquis Rivers that morning, and

the enemy was retiring, closely followed by battle patrols of the

First Canadian Division.

The First Canadian Division had relieved the Fourth British Division

in the line along the south side of the valleys of the Sensee and

Trinquis Rivers, from Palluel exclusive to the Scarpe, during the

nights of October 5-6 and 6-7, 1918, coming under orders of the

Twenty-second Corps. The front had been a quiet one, the river valleys

having been flooded by the enemy to an average width of from 300 to

400 yards, and the bridges destroyed.

On the morning of October 8, 1918, the division carried out a "Chinese

attack" with a view to ascertaining the enemy's probable action if

attacked. Under cover of the barrage, patrols succeeded in enlarging

the small bridgehead across the river at Sailly-en-Ostrevent,

capturing twenty-four prisoners and two machine guns.

The enemy was expected to withdraw shortly, and this barrage was

repeated daily at dawn with the object of harassing the enemy and

testing his strength. At 3.00 a. m., October 10, 1918, battle patrols

were pushed out by the Third Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier

General G. S. Tuxford) from the bridgehead at Sailly, and after

capturing the village they entered the Drocourt-Queant line to the

northeast. Thirty prisoners and six machine guns were sent back from

Sailly at daylight; a strong enemy counterattack (estimated at two

battalions) overran the force in the Drocourt-Queant line and

recaptured Sailly, driving the Canadian line back to the line

previously held.

On October 11, 1918, in conjunction with an attack on the left by the

Eighth Division, Canadian troops forced their way over the narrow

crossings of the Sensee and Trinquis Rivers in the face of

considerable machine-gun fire and pushed northward and eastward,

meeting only resistance from isolated machine-gun nests. The

performance of the first patrols in forcing their way across the

narrow causeways, all stoutly defended by machine guns, was a splendid

achievement.

By the night of October 11, 1918, the First Canadian Division, on the

left, had reached the line Hamel-Estrees-Noyelles (all inclusive), and

at dawn, October 12, 1918, pushed forward, clearing Arleux and

reaching the west bank of the Canal from Palluel to the Scarpe.

On October 12, 1918, the line remained stationary between the Canal du

Nord and the Canal-de-l'Escaut. East of the Canal-de-l'Escaut the

Second Canadian Division attacked at noon in conjunction with the

Twenty-second Corps on the right and captured Hordain. Attempts to

push forward to Basseville were, however, stopped by machine-gun fire.

The restricted area and the inundated conditions of the ground

prevented further progress on this front until the troops on the right

could get forward.

On the Canadian Corps' front, the divisions in the line were

confronted by the Canal-de-la-Sensee, and this in its flooded

condition was a serious obstacle, the few crossings possible being

narrow and easily defended. Orders were issued, however, that a policy

of aggressive patrolling should be adopted to detect at the earliest

possible moment any retirement, and that all preparations should be

made for an immediate and rapid pursuit.

The Canadian patrols were most daring during the next few days, but no

weak spot was to be found along the enemy front, all attempts at

crossing the Canal being stopped by heavy machine-gun and rifle fire.

During the night of October 12-13, 1918, the Second Canadian Division

extended its left to Aubencheul-au-Bac (exclusive), relieving the

Eleventh Division in the line, with the Fourth Canadian Infantry

Brigade (Brigadier General G. E. McCuaig) on the right, and the Sixth

Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General A. Ross) on the left. At

this stage the G. O. C. Fifty-sixth Division represented that his

troops were too weak and tired to carry out the vigorous pursuit

required in case of an enemy withdrawal. The Fourth Canadian Division

was, therefore, ordered to relieve the Fifty-sixth Division by the

morning of October 16, 1918, and in the meantime to place one brigade

at the disposal of the G. O. C. Fifty-sixth Division to be used in

following up the enemy. On October 13, 1918, the Tenth Canadian

Infantry Brigade, which had been resting in Arras, was accordingly

moved up to Marquion, and came into reserve under the Fifty-sixth

Division.

During the early morning of October 13, 1918, the Fifty-sixth Division

crossed the Canal and succeeded in establishing a bridgehead at

Aubigny-au-Bac, capturing the village with 201 prisoners. At 10.00 p.

m. the following night, however, an enemy counterattack in strength

caused their withdrawal from the village, but the bridgehead was

retained. The relief of the Fifty-sixth Division by the Fourth

Canadian Division was carried out on the nights of October 14-15 and

15-16, 1918, without incident, and the former moved back to rest in

the Arras-Haute Avesnes-Maroeuil area, coming into army reserve.

Patrols of the First Canadian Division succeeded in crossing the Canal

near Ferin, on its left brigade front, during the early morning of

October 14, 1918, but, meeting strong resistance, the parties

withdrew, taking with them some prisoners and machine guns.

Test barrages were carried out on the corps' front each morning to

ascertain the enemy's strength and attitude, and on October 17, 1918,

the enemy was found extremely quiet and did not retaliate to the

artillery fire on the front of the First Canadian Division. Patrols

were, therefore, sent out on that front and succeeded in crossing the

Canal in several places, meeting only slight opposition. Stronger

patrols followed and made good progress.

On the front of the Fourth Canadian Division, however, all attempts to

cross the Canal were still met by machine-gun fire. After the First

Canadian Division had secured crossings, a battalion of the Fourth

Canadian Division was sent up to take advantage of these crossings,

and, working down the east side of the Canal, cleared the enemy on

the Fourth Canadian Division front, and enabled the advance to

commence there.

Farther to the right, at Hem Lenglet, the Second Canadian Division

succeeded in crossing the Canal later in the day, and patrols were

pushed on in the direction of Wasnes-au-Bac. Only enemy rear guards

were encountered during the day, and the opposition was nowhere heavy,

although more organized and stubborn on the right opposite the Second

Canadian Division.

By 6.00 a. m., October 18, 1918, practically all of the infantry of

the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions and several battalions of the

Second Canadian Division were across the Canal, and the following

towns were liberated: Ferin, Courchelettes, Goeulzin, Le Racquet,

Villers-au-Tertre, Cantin, Roucourt, Brunemont, Aubigny-au-Bac,

Fechain, Fressain, Bugnicourt, and Hem Lenglet.

During that day two armored cars, one squadron of the Canadian Light

Horse, and one company of Canadian Corps Cyclists from Brutinel's

Brigade, were attached to each of the First and Fourth Canadian

Divisions to assist in the pursuit of the enemy. These troops rendered

valuable service to the divisions to which they were attached,

although the enemy's very complete road destruction prevented the

armored cars from operating to their full extent.

Throughout the advance now begun a great amount of work was thrown

upon the engineers, and their resources in man and material were taxed

to the utmost. The enemy's demolition had been very well planned and

thoroughly carried out, all bridges over the canals and streams being

destroyed, every crossroad and road junction rendered impassable by

the blowing up of large mines, and the railways--light and

standard--blown up at frequent intervals. The enemy also considerably

impeded the Canadians' progress by his clever manipulation of the

water levels in the canals which he controlled.

Footbridges were first thrown across the Canal, and these were quickly

followed by the heavier types of bridges to carry battalion transport

and artillery, and in addition eight heavy traffic bridges, ranging in

length from 90 to 160 feet, were at once put under way. On the front

of the First Canadian Division on the left the enemy drained the

Canal, and it was found impossible to complete and use the pontoon

bridges first commenced.

The engineers in the forward area concentrated their efforts on road

repair, craters being quickly filled in, for the most part with

material gathered on the spot and found in enemy dumps. In addition,

the whole areas were searched immediately after their occupation, many

"booby traps" and delayed action mines being discovered and rendered

harmless, and all water supply sources being tested.

It was clear from the wholesale destruction of roads and railways that

the reconstruction of communications would be very slow and that it

would be difficult to keep the troops supplied. Canadian railway

troops were brought up, and as soon as the enemy had been cleared away

from the Canal, work was commenced on the repairing of the

standard-gauge railway forward from Sauchy Lestree. The construction

of a railway bridge over the Canal at Aubencheul-au-Bac was

immediately commenced.

The enemy retirement now extended considerably north of the Canadian

front, and the Eighth Corps on the left began to move forward. During

October 18, 1918, rapid and fairly easy progress was made, and the

following towns and villages were liberated from the enemy: Dechy,

Sin-le-Noble, Guesnain, Montigny, Pecquencourt, Loffre, Lewarde,

Erchin, Masny, Ecaillon, Marquette, Wasnes-au-Bac and the western

portions of Auberchicourt and Monchecourt.

During the day the advance had carried the Canadians into a large

industrial area, and well-built towns became more frequent. It also

liberated the first of a host of civilians, 2,000 being found in

Pecquencourt and a few in Auberchicourt. These people had been left by

the retiring enemy without food, and faced, as the Canadians were, by

an ever-lengthening line of communication, and with only one bridge

yet available for anything but horse transport, the work of the supply

services was greatly increased. This additional burden was, however,

cheerfully accepted, and the liberated civilians, whose numbers

exceeded 70,000 before Valenciennes was reached, as well as the

rapidly advancing troops, were at no time without a regular supply of

food.

On October 19, 1918, the advance was continued on the whole corps'

front, nearly 40 towns and villages being wrested from the enemy,

including the large town of Denain.

The Twenty-second Corps, advancing on the right from the south, gained

touch with the Fourth Canadian Division just east of Denain on the

evening of October 19, 1918, pinching out the Second Canadian

Division, which was then concentrated in the Auberchicourt area, where

good billets were available.

In spite of bad weather and increased resistance more ground was

gained on the 20th, and the villages of Hasnon, Les Faux, Wallers, and

Haveluy, with a large population, were freed.

During the day resistance had stiffened all along the line. The ground

over which the Canadians were advancing was very flat, and there was

no tactical advantage to be gained by pushing forward, and a farther

advance would also increase the difficulties of supply. In addition,

on the left, the Eighth Corps had not been able to cope with the

supply question and had not advanced in conformity with the Canadian

progress. In view of these considerations, orders were issued that

divisions were to maintain touch with the enemy without becoming

involved in heavy fighting.

For a time on October 20, 1918, the Fourth Canadian Division was held

up just east of Denain by machine-gun and artillery fire, and it was

not until late in the afternoon that the troops could make progress

there.

Continuing the advance on October 21, 1918, a footing was gained in

the Foret-de-Vicoigne, and the following villages were captured:

Aremberg, Oisy, Herin, Rouvignes, Aubry, Petite Foret, Anzin, Prouvy,

Bellaing, and Wavrechain. As on the previous day, all these villages

contained civilians who subsequently suffered considerably from

deliberate hostile shelling.

The First Canadian Division had now been in the line for two weeks

without having had an opportunity to rest and refit since the

hard-fought battle of the Canal du Nord, and orders were issued for

its relief by the Third Canadian Division. At dawn on October 22,

1918, in order that touch with the enemy be maintained, the First

Canadian Division pushed forward. Following closely, the Third

Canadian Division passed through the First Canadian Division during

the forenoon, on the left brigade front, about 9.00 a. m. on the line

of the St.-Amand-Raismes road, and on the right about 12 noon on the

line of the St.-Amand-Raismes railway, the Foret-de-Vicoigne having

been cleared of the enemy. On relief the First Canadian Division came

into rest billets in the Somain-Pecquencourt-Masny area.

The Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions pushed on during October 22,

1918, and by nightfall Trith St.-Leger, La Vignoble, La Sentinelle,

Waast-le-Haut, Beauvrages, Bruay, and practically the whole of the

large forest of Raismes, were in their hands. On the left brigade

front of the Fourth Canadian Division the Canal-de-l'Escaut had been

reached in places. A very large area northeast of Valenciennes and a

smaller area to the southwest had been flooded, and to the west of the

city the Canal itself provided a serious obstacle. To the southwest,

beyond the flooded area, Mont Houy and the Famars Ridge made a natural

line of defense.

The divisions continued to push forward in the face of steadily

increasing opposition, and by October 25, 1918, had reached the Canal

and the western edge of the inundated area along the whole corps

front.

The Canadian troops had had a very arduous pursuit and the railhead

for supplies and ammunition was still very far to the rear. It was

therefore decided that they should make good the west bank of the

Canal and stand fast until the flanking corps had made progress.

Attempts to cross the Canal proved that the enemy was holding in

strength a naturally strong position, and it was ordered that no

crossing in force would be attempted without reference to corps

headquarters. The engineers established dumps of material well forward

on selected sites so that the bridges necessary to cross the Canal on

the resumption of the advance could be constructed without delay.

It had become apparent that, unless the enemy withdrew, Valenciennes

could only be taken from the south. The Twenty-second Corps, on the

right, had meanwhile succeeded in crossing the Ecaillon River after a

hard fight and captured the Famars Ridge. They had, however, been

unable to take Mont Houy, which commanded Valenciennes from the south.

On October 27, 1918, the First Army commander outlined the plans for

operations to be carried out in conjunction with attacks on a large

scale by the Third and Fourth Armies to the south, as follows:

The First Army was to capture Valenciennes; the operation to be

carried out in three phases, as follows:

(a) The capture of Mont Houy and Aulnoy--to be carried out by the

Twenty-second Corps on the morning of October 28, 1918.

(b) The capture of the high ground overlooking Valenciennes from the

south--to be carried out by the Canadian Corps on a subsequent date,

probably October 30, 1918.

(c) The capture of high ground east of Valenciennes--to be carried out

after (b) above, probably on November 1.

Valenciennes would thus be outflanked from the south. The Canadian

Corps would take over, probably on the night of October 28-29, 1918,

the left brigade frontage of the Twenty-second Corps (approximately

2,500 yards) in order to carry out phases (b) and (c) of this

operation. The above attacks were to be carried out simultaneously

with the attacks of the Third and Fourth Armies.

In accordance with the above, instructions were issued to the Third

Canadian Division to take over the frontage of the left brigade of the

Fourth Canadian Division. The Fourth Canadian Division was, in turn,

ordered to relieve the left brigade of the Twenty-second Corps

(Fifty-first Division), both side slips to take place on the night of

October 28-29, 1918, subsequent to the capture of Mont Houy by the

Twenty-second Corps.

[Illustration: At the left is Major General Sir Frederick Oscar Warren

Loomis, who commanded the Third Canadian Division in the latter half

of 1918; at the right is Brigadier General Raymond Brutinel, who

commanded the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Corps.]

The attack of the Fifty-first Division on Mont Houy on October 28,

1918, was not successful. In the first rush the troops succeeded in

gaining a foothold on the objective, but were subsequently driven out

by repeated counterattacks. In view of this, the relief of the left

brigade of that division by the Fourth Canadian Division was

postponed. During the night of October 28-29, 1918, however, the Third

Canadian Division relieved the left brigade of the Fourth Canadian

Division.

Orders were received that the Canadian Corps was to carry out all

three phases of the operations against Valenciennes in conjunction

with attacks of the Twenty-second Corps. Accordingly, the Fourth

Canadian Division was ordered to relieve the left brigade of the

Fifty-first Division during the night of October 29-30, 1918, on the

line then held, and to be prepared to carry out the attack on the

morning of November 1, 1918.

In conjunction with the attack the Third Canadian Division was ordered

to cross the Canal and the inundated area on its front, and establish

a bridgehead to enable the engineers to reconstruct the bridges

leading into the city.

In the short period available, elaborate preparations were made for

the support of the attack. The position was eminently suitable for the

use of enfilade as well as frontal fire, the general direction of the

attack on Mont Houy being parallel to our front, and full advantage of

this was taken in arranging the artillery and machine-gun barrages.

The application of heavy artillery fire was restricted because the

enemy had retained many civilians in Valenciennes and the adjoining

villages. Strict orders were issued that the city and villages were

not to be bombarded, with the exception of a row of houses on the

eastern side of the Canal which were occupied by a large number of

machine guns. To hinder the good observation which the enemy would

otherwise have been able to enjoy from the city and villages, very

elaborate arrangements were made to place heavy smoke screens along

certain areas.

Despite great difficulties of transport, the supplies of ammunition,

bridging material, etc., moved forward were sufficient, and before

dawn on November 1, 1918, all preparations were completed.

At 5.15 a. m., November 1, 1918, the attack was launched, and from the

first went entirely according to plan on the Canadian Corps front. The

enemy barrage dropped quickly and was very heavy, but shortly

afterward slackened down under the influence of efficient

counterbattery fire. In the meantime the attacking infantry got well

away, advancing under a most excellent barrage and reaching their

objective, the line of the Valenciennes-Maubeuge railway, on time

right behind the barrage.

The fighting during the advance was heavy, especially around the

houses along the Famars-Valenciennes road and in Aulnoy.

The thoroughness of the preparations made for this small but important

battle is better illustrated by the following striking figures:

Number of enemy dead buried, over 800

Prisoners captured, over 1,300

(Exceeding the number of assaulting troops.)

Canadian casualties (approximate), 80 killed and 300 wounded.

On the left, the left brigade of the Fourth Canadian Division and the

Third Canadian Division had, in the meantime, succeeded in crossing

the Canal. Bridgeheads were established north of the city, the station

and railway yards were seized, and the engineers commenced the

construction of bridges.

The enemy did not counterattack against the Canadian Corps during the

day, but continued to hold out strongly in the southern outskirts of

Valenciennes and Marly, and in the steel works to the southeast until

dark. Two counterattacks against the Twenty-second Corps front on the

right caused some anxiety, but that flank was strengthened and no

trouble developed.

During the night the Fourth Canadian Division took over an additional

brigade frontage from the Forty-ninth Division (Twenty-second Corps)

on the right preparatory to the capture of the high ground east of

Marly.

Patrols of the Fourth Canadian Division pushed forward during the

night and ascertained that the enemy was withdrawing. In the early

morning the Canadian troops had completely cleared Valenciennes and

Marly, and patrols had entered St.-Saulve.

The advance was continued in the face of stubborn resistance from

enemy rear guards throughout November 2, 1918, on the whole corps

front, and by nightfall had reached the line Marly-St.-Saulve-Bas

Amarais-Raucourt Chateau, all inclusive. On the front of the Third

Canadian Division the advance was particularly difficult, the country

being under water except where railway embankments, slag heaps, and

houses stood up out of the flood and afforded excellent cover for

enemy machine gunners and riflemen.

Some stiff fighting took place when the advance was continued on

November 3, 1918, but in spite of this good progress was made,

especially on the right on the front of the Eleventh Canadian Infantry

Brigade (Brigadier General V. W. Odlum), where the line was advanced

3,000 yards and the village of Estreux captured. Progress on the left

was necessarily slower owing to the flooded nature of the ground.

The front of the Third Canadian Division had now become very extended,

and on the night of November 3-4 a portion of it, from Odomez to

Fresnes--about a mile in extent--was handed over to the Fifty-second

Division of the Eighth Corps.

On November 4, 1918, the line was carried forward about two miles on

the front of the Fourth Canadian Division. The Third Canadian Division

was still forcing its way through marsh and water, and made good the

Vicq-Thiers railway. On the extreme left of the Third Canadian

Division a strong point east of the Canal-de-l'Escaut was captured and

the Escaupont-Quievrechain railway bridge was taken. The village of

Onnaing and the western part of Rombies fell into their hands during

the day.

During the early hours of November 5, 1918, the Third Canadian

Division entered the town of Vicq, following the capture of two points

of local tactical importance west of the town. A large portion of the

line of the Escaupont-Quievrechain railway was also made good, and the

northern part of Quarouble captured during the day.

The Fourth Canadian Division attacked on November 5, 1918, and

clearing Rombies and the southern part of Quarouble, crossed the river

Aunelle between Rombies and Marchipont, the enemy fighting very

stubbornly to prevent their crossing. By this advance the first troops

of the Canadian Corps crossed into Belgian territory, the Aunelle

River being the boundary at that point.

The advance was resumed on November 6, 1918, and important progress

was made. The villages of Marchipont, Baisieux, and the southern

portion of Quievrechain were taken by the Fourth Canadian Division

while the Third Canadian Division took the railway station and

glassworks at Quievrechain and the northern part of the village, and

also captured Crespin farther north.

The enemy's resistance was very stubborn. The Twenty-second Corps on

the right were forced to give up a portion of the ground gained and to

withdraw to the west bank of Honelle River at Angre, in the face of

severe counterattacks.

The Second Canadian Division relieved the Canadian Division during the

night of 6-7, and the latter was withdrawn to rest in the Anzin-Aubry

area, just west of Valenciennes.

On their right the Canadians were now getting into the heart of the

Belgian coal district--a thickly populated area--where the numerous

towns and villages, the coal mines, and the commanding slag heaps

complicated the task.

The Second and Third Canadian Divisions attacked on the morning of

November 7, 1918, and, although by this time the weather had broken

and the country was rapidly becoming thoroughly water-logged, good

progress was made during the day, the enemy showing increasing signs

of demoralization.

The Second Canadian Division, on the right, cleared the remainder of

Baisieux, captured the sugar refinery northeast of that town, the town

of Elouges, and the many small settlements that surrounded it. In

conjunction with the Third Canadian Division Quievrain was taken, and

an advance of about two and a half miles was made. On the left the

Third Canadian Division, in addition to cooperating with the Second

Canadian Division in the capture of Quievrain, pushed along the Mons

road for about 4,000 yards and took La Croix and Hensies, north of the

road.

When the advance was continued on November 8, 1918, the Third Canadian

Division pushed troops to the north, and by noon had secured the

villages of Thievencelle and St.-Aybert. Later in the day a footbridge

was constructed across the Conde-Mons Canal, and under cover of

darkness patrols crossed and a bridgehead was established.

Farther south the Third Canadian Division had surprised the enemy in

the village of Montreuil-sur-Haine and Thulin at an early hour, and

these towns were quickly captured. Pushing on from here the village of

Hamin was taken, and by nightfall the troops were on the western

outskirts of Boussu.

The Second Canadian Division met with strong opposition. Good progress

was, however, made, and by midnight the important village of Dour and

the smaller villages of Bois-de-Boussu, Petit Hornu, Bois-de-Epinois,

and a portion of the Bois-de-Leveque was cleared.

Resuming the advance on November 9, 1918, the Second Canadian Division

captured Warquignies, Champ-des-Sait, Petit Wasmes, Wasmes-Paturages,

La Bouverie, Lugies, Frameries, and Genly with little opposition. The

advance made by this division was over four miles through densely

populated areas, the twin towns of Wasmes-Paturages combined having a

population of about 30,000. By nightfall the Second Canadian Division

was clear of the main mining district.

The Third Canadian Division had on its left front crossed the river

Haine during the night, north of Montreuil-sur-Haine, and later

secured a further hold on the north bank of the Conde-Mons Canal near

Le Petit Crepin. During the afternoon, further troops were sent across

the Canal, and the villages of Petit Crepin, Ville Pommereuil,

Hautrage, and Terte were taken. Farther west the patrols which had

crossed the Canal on the previous day entered Pommereuil and

Bernissart.

The Third Canadian Division had also occupied Boussu, on its right,

before daylight on the 9th, and rapid progress eastward was made

during the day toward Mons, the villages of Cuesmes, Jemappes, Flenu,

Hornu, Wasmes, Quaregnon, Wasmuel, and St.-Ghislain all being

captured. The rapidity of this advance had evidently surprised and

disorganized the enemy, although some opposition was met.

By the morning of November 10, 1918, the Fifty-second Division (Eighth

Corps) had advanced and relieved that part of the Third Canadian

Division operating north of the left boundary of the Canadian Corps.

The Third Canadian Division's advance on November 10, 1918, brought

the Canadian troops to the southwestern outskirts of Mons, while the

Second Canadian Division had reached the Mons-Givry road, outflanking

the city from the south, but, owing to the large number of civilians

still in the city, it was not possible for us to bombard the town. To

the north of the Conde-Mons Canal, a further advance was made and the

village of Ghlin secured.

During the night of November 10-11, 1918, the divisions resumed their

advance, and immediately after dark the troops of the Seventh Canadian

Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General J. A. Clark) commenced to close

in. The villages of Nimy and Petit Nimy were quickly captured and an

entry into Mons by way of the railway station was effected before

midnight. By 6.00 a. m. on November 11, 1918, the stubborn machine-gun

resistance had been broken and the town cleared of the enemy.

The Second Canadian Division had, during the night, taken the

Bois-le-Haut, a wood crowning a large hill on the southeastern

outskirts of Mons, thus securing the right flank of the Third Canadian

Division. The capture of this high ground forced upon the enemy a

further retirement, and the Canadian troops, still pressing on,

reached and captured St.-Symphorien and Fbg. Barthelmy by 8.00 a. m.

In the meantime, word had been received through the First Army that

hostilities would cease at 11.00 a. m. on November 11, 1918, the

armistice having been signed in acceptance of the Allied terms.

To secure a satisfactory line for the defense of Mons, the Canadian

line was further advanced, and the Bois-d'Havre, Bois-du-Rapois and

the town and villages of Havre, Bon Vouloir, La Bruyere, Maisieres,

St.-Denis, and Obourg were captured before hostilities ceased.

Between October 11 and November 11, 1918, the Canadian Corps had

advanced to a total depth exceeding ninety-one thousand yards (91,000

yards) through a country in which the enemy had destroyed railways,

bridges, and roads, and flooded large areas to further impede our

progress.

To the normal difficulties of moving and supplying a large number of

men in a comparatively restricted area were added the necessity of

feeding several hundred thousand people, chiefly women and children,

left in a starving condition by the enemy. Several deaths by

starvation, or through suffering consequent to privation, were

experienced in villages or towns which, being kept under hostile shell

fire and defended by machine guns, could not be captured rapidly by

our troops.

The fighting was light up to the Canal-de-l'Escaut, but stiffened

perceptibly from there on until the capture of Mons, and added a great

deal to the physical exertion caused by such a long advance in adverse

weather. The following table shows the average daily advances made by

the Canadian Corps in that period:

Yards

From October 11 to October 12 4,000

" " 12 " 17 7,000

" " 17 " 18 5,000

" " 18 " 19 12,000

" " 19 " 20 2,500

" " 20 " 21 5,000

" " 21 " 22 6,000

" " 22 " 23 3,000

" " 23 " 24 1,000

" " 24 to November 1 3,500[9]

From November 1 " 2 3,000

" " 2 " 3 2,000

" " 3 " 4 3,000

" " 4 " 5 1,500

" " 5 " 6 4,000

" " 6 " 7 4,000

" " 7 " 8 3,500

" " 8 " 9 11,000

" " 9 " 10 1,500

" " 10 " 11 9,000

------

Total 91,500

Between August 8 and November 11, 1918, the following had been

captured:

Prisoners 31,537

Guns (heavy and field) 623

Machine guns 2,842

Trench mortars (heavy and light) 336

Over 500 square miles of territory and 228 cities, towns, and villages

had been liberated, including the cities of Cambrai, Denain,

Valenciennes, and Mons.

[Footnote 9: Held up in front of Valenciennes till after the

capture of Mont Houy.]

When it is recalled that since August 8, 1918, the Canadian Corps had

fought battles of the first magnitude, having a direct bearing on the

general situation, and contributing to an extent difficult to realize

to the defeat of the German armies in the field, this advance under

most difficult conditions constitutes a decisive test of their

superior energy and power of endurance.

It was befitting that the capture of Mons should close the fighting

records of the Canadian troops, in which every battle they fought is a

resplendent page of glory.

The Canadian Corps was deeply appreciative of the honor of having been

selected among the first for the task of establishing and occupying

the bridgeheads east of the Rhine.

A long march of 170 miles under difficult conditions was ahead of

them, but they ungrudgingly looked forward to what had always been

their ultimate objective--the occupation of German soil.

CANADA'S TOTAL CASUALTIES IN THE GREAT WAR

Officers Other Ranks Total

Killed in action and died of wounds 2,559 48,557 51,116

Accidentally killed 5 8 13

Died of disease 292 4,613 4,905

Wounded 5,349 143,510 148,859

Presumed dead 187 4,915 5,102

Missing -- 57 57

Deaths in Canada -- 2,633 2,633

----- ------- ------

8,392 204,293 212,685[10]

Total prisoners of war 236 3,493 3,729

Repatriated 204 3,086 3,290

C. E. F.--Siberian force--

Accidentally killed 4

Died of disease 13

Wounded 1

Enlistments up to November 15, 1918 595,441[11]

Sailings to England 418,052

Sailings to Siberia 4,214

-------

422,266[12]

[Footnote 10: Represents nearly 3 per cent of Canada's total

population of 8,000,000.]

[Footnote 11: Over 7 per cent of population.]

[Footnote 12: Five per cent of population.]

PART III--CANADA AT HOME

CHAPTER XXI

SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THE EMPIRE

While the enlistment and equipment of the first contingent proceeded

apace, all political ranks united for the war. Militarists and

pacifists, fathoms apart in times of peace on the question of a

Dominion navy, joined hands. Party lines, as in Great Britain, were

instantly obliterated. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, former Prime Minister, and

leader of the opposition in the Canadian Parliament, who, at the

Imperial Conference of 1911, advocated the doctrine of colonial

neutrality, declaring that Canada would not necessarily consider

herself bound to take part in wars in which Great Britain might become

involved, immediately threw the weight of his influence behind the

Government. When the Dominion Parliament met August 19, 1914, to

indorse Great Britain's participation in the war, Sir Wilfrid, after

announcing that for the present all party lines had been abolished,

said:

"So long as there is danger at the front it is our duty, more pressing

than all other duties on this first day of debate, to let Great

Britain, to let all the friends and foes of Great Britain, know that

there is in Canada but one mind and one heart, and that all Canadians

stand behind the mother country, conscious and proud that she did not

engage in war from selfish motives or for aggrandizement, but to

maintain untarnished the honor of her name, to fulfill her obligations

to her allies, to maintain her treaty obligations, and to save

civilization from the unbridled lust of conquest and power."

Of the Canadian contingent he said it was the opinion of the British

Government that the assistance of Canadian troops, humble though it

might be, would be appreciated for their material and moral help, and

would show the world that Canada, daughter of England, intended to

stand by her in the conflict.

Canada's Governor General, the Duke of Connaught, had opened

Parliament wearing a general's field uniform in khaki, and reminded

the legislators that England was asking for their help. Sir Wilfrid

Laurier, in the speech he made, presented a motion proposing that the

Dominion be prepared to carry out the duke's suggestion. The motion's

seconder was the Premier, Sir Robert Borden, who said:

"We stand shoulder to shoulder with the mother country. With firm

hearts we abide the issue. The men who are going to the front from

Canada are going as freemen from a free country to serve this Dominion

and the Empire. We are giving our best to our country, and we are

proud to do it." The press of Canada ardently indorsed the decision.

The Canadian Parliament immediately voted a war credit of $50,000,000,

the minister of finance declaring that Canada was prepared to spend

her last drop of blood and her last dollar in the defense of the

country. This measure, the first contribution from Canada's war chest

on behalf of the Empire, signalized an outpouring of gifts in kind,

official or private, in rich profusion. From its storehouses the

Government presented Great Britain with 98,000 bags of flour; the

Provinces thereupon followed with individual gifts of supplies.

Ontario gave 250,000 bags of flour; Manitoba, 50,000 bags; Quebec,

4,000,000 pounds of cheese; New Brunswick, 100,000 bushels of

potatoes; Saskatchewan, 1,500 horses, valued at $250,000; Alberta,

500,000 bushels of oats; Prince Edward Island, 100,000 bushels of

oats; British Columbia, 25,000 cases of salmon; while Nova Scotia at

first offered 100,000 tons of coal, a cumbrous contribution, which was

later converted to its cash equivalent. These governmental offerings

evoked no less handsome responses to the call of the mother country

from many cities and towns, corporations, and individuals. Great

Britain's sinews of war were further reenforced by $100,000 from the

Bank of Montreal; $500,000 from Mr. J. K. L. Ross of Montreal; a

battery of machine guns from Mr. J. C. Eaton of Toronto; while Mr.

Hamilton Gault of Montreal equipped and raised at his own expense a

crack regiment composed entirely of men possessing war medals, and

known as the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, or more

properly as "Princess Pat's Pets." Having outfitted this force at a

cost of $1,500,000, Mr. Gault did not take command, but joined it as

one of its officers, while Mrs. Gault closed her home and left for the

front as a nurse. Corporations also contributed funds for the war, and

many employees gave a percentage of their salaries.

The women of Canada raised a fund of $285,960, one hundred thousand of

which was for military hospital purposes, and the remainder for a

naval hospital. The Canadian Red Cross sent a fully equipped field

hospital and $50,000 to the British Red Cross Society. The Dominion

Government provided $100,000 for a Canadian hospital in France.

Farmers in different districts gathered vast stocks of flour and

farming produce and sent them to England. The Canadians also raised

their own Patriotic Relief Fund, devoted to caring for dependents of

Canadians fighting at the front and providing a subsistence for their

future. Eighteen cities raised considerably over $5,000,000 for this

fund within ten weeks of the outbreak of the war. Montreal leading

with $2,000,000, and Toronto with nearly $1,000,000.

In the wake of this munificence came an increased depression. Before

the war a temporary check had come to a long and unexampled era of

prosperity in Canada. An industrial crisis had set in, and the war

brought it to an acute point. There had been an overstimulation of

industrial enterprises; land values had been artificially inflated in

the Northwest; and capital had been too easily raised. Capital now

became scarce; Canadian promotions were viewed with suspicion; and

some foreign investments were withdrawn. With the war many Canadians,

who were working and giving whole-heartedly for the Empire, saw their

enterprises facing ruin for want of capital they could not obtain.

The stock exchanges were closed. Shares in some of the soundest

industrial concerns were almost unsalable; others were offered for

little more than half their market price of a few months before.

Canadian Pacific shares, as an example, fell to $157-1/2; a little

over a year previous to the war they had reached $254. Government and

municipal undertakings found difficulty in obtaining funds to continue

public works, and in consequence had to discharge hundreds of men. A

number of establishments closed altogether; others continued on

curtailed time and staffs.

Montreal felt an immediate depressing tendency on the outbreak of the

war. In Toronto the financial stringency caused by the war brought a

more serious phase to the labor situation in that city than had ever

before been encountered. All lines of industry were affected, and

thousands of men and women paid off. The enlistment of several

thousands of Canadians did not appreciably relieve the congestion in

the labor market. The building trade was suddenly paralyzed owing to

the inability of contractors to obtain advances from banks and loan

companies. The same check to all manner of business enterprises and

construction work was felt in Port Arthur, Fort William, Sault Ste.

Marie, Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary, Edmonton, Prince Rupert, and

Victoria. In all these cities the numbers of unemployed grew to

extraordinary proportions. So, while military preparations were

proceeding without pause, the Dominion, Provincial, and municipal

authorities and business interests had to wrestle with the industrial

situation. In due time distress was relieved, new enterprises were

initiated, wholesale economies instituted, and vigorous efforts made

to restore financial stability.

Canada looked suspiciously at the migratory Germans within her gates

when the war broke out, but more assuringly at her settlers of German

descent, who were not only domiciled but rooted on her soil. Of these

Sir Wilfrid Laurier spoke thus in the Canadian House of Parliament:

"They have shown more than once their devotion to British

institutions, but they would not be men if they did not in their

hearts have a deep feeling for the land of their ancestry. Nobody

blames them for that. There is nothing, perhaps, so painful as a

situation in which the mind and heart are driven in opposite

directions. Let me tell my fellow countrymen of German origin that

Great Britain has no antagonism to the German people. We respect and

admire them, but in the struggle for constitutional liberty which has

been universal in Europe the German people have not made the same

advances as some other nations. I am sure they will agree with me that

if the institutions of the land of their ancestors were as free as

those of the land of their adoption, this cruel war would never have

taken place."

This sentiment brought a ready echo from Berlin, Ontario, which at

least showed that that German colony shared the common aspirations of

the Dominion. In a cablegram sent to Lord Kitchener the citizens of

this Ontario German settlement said:

"Berlin, Ontario, a city of 18,000, of which 12,000 are German or of

German descent, proposes to raise $75,000 or more for the National

(Canadian) Patriotic Fund. The German people want to see militarism in

Germany smashed for good, and the people set free to shape a greater

and better Germany."

The Story of the Great War, Volume 8 Victory with the Allies; Armistice; Peace Congress; Canada's War Organizations and vast War Industries; Canadian Battles Overseas · 第 16 / 18 章