MISCELLANEOUS.
Germany agrees to recognize the full validity of the treaties of peace
and additional conventions to be concluded by the Allied and
Associated Powers with the powers allied with Germany, to agree to the
decisions to be taken as to the territories of Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey, and to recognize the new states in the frontiers
to be fixed for them. Germany agrees not to put forward any pecuniary
claims against Allied or Associated Powers signing the present treaty
based on events previous to the coming into force of the treaty.
THE STORY OF CANADA IN THE GREAT WAR
EDITED AND COMPILED
BY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A. COOPER
Late Commander of the 198th Battalion, Canadian Buffs
INTRODUCTION
By LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A. COOPER
Late Commander of the 198th Battalion, Canadian Buffs
When the dark cloud broke on August 4, 1914, Canada was not wholly
unprepared. While not a militaristic people, Canadians had always
recognized that it was the duty of every able-bodied citizen to be
prepared to defend his country in case of need. That principle had
underlain the military policy of the nineteenth century both before
and after Confederation. Every citizen of fighting age was
theoretically a soldier, more or less prepared to take his share in
national defense.
To this was added, in later years, a feeling that some day Canadians
might be called upon to take a part in the defense of the British
Empire should it become engaged in a supreme struggle. This feeling
developed during the South African War when Canada took over the last
garrison duties from the Imperial forces as well as the naval stations
at Halifax and Esquimalt. The obligation of contributing men to
Imperial defense was admitted and discussed at the various Imperial
Conferences between 1900 and 1914. Assisted by British experts,
certain military and naval preparations had been made with the
intention of meeting any national emergency and any imperial necessity
which might arise.
While these grave obligations may have rested lightly on the majority
of the people engaged in agriculture, commerce, and railway building,
the country was not mentally unprepared for the great call of August,
1914. This explains in part why the recruiting of her early battalions
and the prompt dispatch of her first contingent of 33,000 men was so
enthusiastically accomplished. Division followed division until in
about fifteen months Canada had a fighting army corps in France. This
accomplishment surprised herself not more than it surprised the Allies
and the enemy. Canada's enlistment during the five years of activity
totaled one-thirteenth of her population. Over four hundred thousand
men, out of a population of about eight millions, actually crossed the
ocean. Four divisions fought as such in France. Railway troops worked
with every British Army, and forestry battalions did almost all the
work of that nature required to supply the needs of both French and
British forces on the western front. The casualties among Canadian
troops were quite equal to those sustained by the more numerous armies
of the United States, because of the greater duration of Canadian
service.
Such success as the Canadians had in fighting was due largely to
inheritance and environment. Many of those who fought were of British
birth or were English, Scotch, Irish, or Welsh once or twice removed.
The military instincts of the British and French races had been
preserved to a remarkable degree in the Dominion. Added to this was
the energy, adaptability, and initiative developed in a people living
in small communities scattered through the vast open spaces of a
country almost equal in area to the whole of Europe. The pluck of the
pioneer, the tenacity of the settler, the self-reliance of the rider
of the plains, the initiative of the woodsman, the skill of the
shantyman and the prospector--all these combined to give the Canadian
army a quality second to none among those engaged in the Great World
War.
Remarkable also was the development of officer ability. The Canadian
army, after the first two years, was officered entirely by Canadians.
The business man, with his experience in organization and executive,
became a military administrator in a wonderfully short space of time.
The corps commander had never been in any military school except the
Canadian militia. Of the seven or eight men who served as divisional
commanders, not more than three could qualify as professional soldiers
before the war. Of the brigadiers and battalion commanders probably 90
per cent had never attended a military school for more than a month.
Canada's army was a citizen army, commanded and administered by men
without business training. Such professional soldiers as Canada had
before the war became administrators rather than leaders in battle.
The war developed so much that was new in tactics and technique that
the militia officer had almost an equal chance with the so-called
military expert.
If the individual soldier ranked high in initiative and valor, he also
must be credited with a loyalty to discipline and to his national
traditions. He quickly acquired steadiness and obedience to his
officers. He respected himself and his superiors. While never servile
nor obsequious, he rendered such service as made the fighting units
effective because of their cohesion and compactness. That was
remarkably exhibited in the first great engagement in which Canadians
took part, the Second Battle of Ypres. It was equally in evidence at
Amiens, Arras, Cambrai, and Mons during the final period of the war.
The Canadian never forgot he was a Canadian. He had such a sublime
faith in himself and in his army as a whole, that his ambition was
only fully realized when he was asked to do more than was usually
asked of a soldier in this titanic struggle. He never despised the
enemy, but he never lost the feeling that he was physically and
mentally the enemy's superior. Excepting, perhaps, the Guards
Division, the Fifty-first Division, and the Australians, the Canadian
army yielded the palm to no portion of the British fighting forces.
Finally, Canadian success in the field of war was but a reflection of
the determination of those who remained at home and who with wonderful
fortitude, self-sacrifice, and determination backed the army to the
limit. There were few tears and less mawkishness when the battalions
moved out from their home towns on the long trail. The sentiment of
the time was stern because of the prevailing spirit of duty and
responsibility. But no nation has paid more honor to those who served
nor has done more toward reestablishing the warrior in citizen life
than have the Canadian people. If the pay of the soldier was good and
the allowance to his dependents adequate, the effort and money
expended on his reestablishment have been most generous. In raising
Red Cross gratuities and other patriotic funds, the motto of Canadians
was "Give till it hurts." In the production of food and of war
material, the nation accomplished the seemingly impossible. In
subscriptions to the national loans, patriotism reached heights
undreamed of by bankers and financial experts. Nearly seventy million
shells, made and exported by a country that never before made an
explosive instrument of this kind; the purchase of over two thousand
million dollars worth of Dominion Government bonds by a people who had
never bought a million of such in their history--these are the
tangible results by which one may measure the depth of Canadian
loyalty and determination.
When the war broke out, the Hon. (afterward Sir) Sam Hughes was
Minister of Militia and Defense. He possessed militia experience
extending over many years and had seen active service in South Africa.
The possibility of war in Europe in which the Empire troops would be
engaged had long been in his mind, and he had studied in advance the
possibilities of such a situation. Consequently when the first
contingent was authorized he proceeded to discharge both the civil
duties of Minister of Militia and the military duties of Chief of
Staff. He it was who recruited, organized, administered, and commanded
this first Canadian army. He was the driving power which brought
success in the speedy dispatch of the first contingent and the raising
and the training of subsequent divisions.
This very success in the end brought a change. General Hughes
centralized too much power in himself to please all those with whom he
was associated. The purchasing of supplies for the army was taken from
his department and put in charge of a purchasing board. A Shell
Committee was formed at his suggestion and this later grew into the
Imperial Munitions Board. The administration of the troops in England
was gradually organized and eventually placed under General (afterward
Sir Richard) Turner at Argyll House, London. The control of the army
in the field passed as a matter of course to the British authorities,
who were responsible for food, clothing, transport, and
administration from the moment the troops crossed the Channel.
Sir Sam Hughes resigned his post as Minister of Militia in the autumn
of 1916. He was succeeded by Sir Edward Kemp, who later went to
England as Minister of the Overseas Forces of Canada. His place in
Canada was taken by General The Hon. S. C. Mewburn, who remained
Minister for some time after the war closed.
In the field the first commanding officer of the little Canadian army
was General Alderson, an English officer of experience. He was in
charge when the First Division made its unique reputation at the
Second Battle of Ypres. Later on General Byng, a younger English
officer, was selected to command the corps, which he did with complete
success. In process of time a Canadian was selected in the person of
General (afterward Sir) Arthur W. Currie. He took over in 1917 and
commanded with general satisfaction for the remainder of the war. On
his return to Canada he was made Inspector General, the highest purely
military office in the Canadian army next to that of the Governor
General who is Commander in Chief.
After the Fifth Division was filled up, the unsystematic practice of
sending reenforcements overseas by battalions and batteries was
discontinued. In January, 1917, a new method of furnishing drafts was
outlined. This necessitated the reorganizing of the whole army on a
territorial basis. There was created in each military district in
Canada a home battalion, with corresponding battalions in England and
in France. The scheme was as follows:
M. D. No. 1--Western Ontario Regiment (one depot battalion in Canada,
two reserve battalions in England, and 1st, 18th, 160th, 161st, and 2d
Pioneers in the field).
M. D. No. 2--1st Central Ontario Regiment (3d, 4th, 5th, 15th, 20th,
75th, 123d, 124th, 134th, 198th, and 208th Bus.).--2d Central Ontario
Regiment (4th C. M. R., 54th, 58th, 102d, 116th, 119th, 125th, and
164th).
M. D. No. 3--Eastern Ontario Regiment (P. P. C. L. I., 2d, 21st, 38th,
156th).
M. D. No. 4--1st Quebec Regiment (5th C. M. R., 13th, 14th, 24th, 42d,
87th).
M. D. No. 5--2d Quebec Regiment (22d and 159th).
M. D. No. 6--Nova Scotia Regiment (R. C. R., 25th, 85th, 185th).
M. D. No. 7--New Brunswick Regiment (26th, 100th).
M. D. No. 10--Manitoba Regiment (8th, 16th, 27th, 43d, 52d, 78th, and
107th Regt).
M. D. No. 11--British Columbia Regiment (2d C. M. R., 7th, 29th, 47th,
and 72d).
M. D. No. 12--Saskatchewan Regiment (3d C. M. R., 5th, 28th. and
46th).
M. D. No. 13--Alberta Regiment (10th, 31st, 49th, and 50th).
The idea behind this scheme was to effect a closer connection between
the military patriotism and pride of the home distinct with the
battalions serving overseas. The hope was distinctly expressed that
"the Canadian militia should inherit the honors and distinctions won
in battle by the Canadian Expeditionary Force."
There is no question that this measure was founded in wisdom and that
it worked tolerably well. It was not always possible to maintain it
exactly, since the smaller provinces had too many battalions for their
resources in men. Consequently Ontario, which produced most men
proportionately, was called upon to reenforce units credited to other
provinces. For example, the 2d C. M. R. ceased to be a British
Columbian unit early in 1918, although its commanding officer was a
British Columbian who continued to give British Columbia officers the
preference. This, however, was quite on a par with the selection of
generals in France; for, when the war closed, Ontario which
contributed half the men in the ranks, did not have a single brigadier
or divisional commander on active duty.
It is also interesting to note that the hope of the originators of the
scheme with regard to the old militia inheriting the "Honors and
distinctions" of the C. E. F. has been negatived by the action of the
militia authorities of 1919 in disbanding all militia units which
existed previous to the war. This action seems to have been based on
a mistaken conception of the important part played by the Canadian
militia from 1860 to 1914.
[Illustration: General Sir Arthur William Currie, who commanded the
Canadian Army Corps in France from 1917 to 1919. He was later made
Canadian Inspector General and Principal of McGill University.]
Early in 1918 came one of the greatest discussions of policy that ever
engaged the Canadian army leaders. The British had decided to reduce
their brigades from four battalions to three to conform to the German
changes and for other good and sufficient reasons. The Canadians were
requested to conform to the new organization, and the chiefs of Argyll
House decided that this should be done by creating two corps of three
divisions each instead of one corps of four divisions. Thus, instead
of five divisions with 12 battalions of infantry each, there would be
six divisions of 9 battalions each, and the number of infantry
battalions would be reduced from 60 to 54. This was to be accomplished
by breaking up four battalions of the Fifth Division, the infantry of
which was still in Witley Camp, England, and turning the other two
into pioneer battalions for the Fifth and Sixth Divisions.
The scheme was so far planned and executed that the two battalions of
the Fifth, chosen to be pioneers, had already commenced their training
as such, and the four battalions to be eliminated had already been
decided upon. Argyll House had even chosen, unofficially, the new
staffs required.
The proposal was negatived eventually by the influence of the corps
commander. Quite naturally, he did not take kindly to the reduction of
his corps from four to three divisions. His four divisional commanders
did not relish having their commands reduced from twelve battalions of
infantry to nine. A protest was lodged with Sir Edward Kemp, who had
recently arrived in England as Minister of Militia Overseas. After
consultation with Ottawa, Sir Edward Kemp decided that General Currie
was right and the request of the British authorities was refused. The
logical consequence of that refusal was the break-up of the infantry
of the Fifth Division, since four divisions were sufficient for the
one corps which it was decided to maintain. Its artillery and
engineers were already in France, and its machine-gun companies also
passed over intact. The artillery retained its identity until the end
of the war.
After the break-up of the Fifth Division, and because reenforcements
for some months had exceeded casualties, the corps commander found
himself with an abundance of troops. He therefore decided to enlarge
his establishment, increasing the number of men in each infantry
battalion, to change his pioneer battalions into engineer brigades
with greatly increased strength, and to create machine-gun battalions
instead of machine-gun companies. Even these changes left him with
surplus men, and so came the creation of The Hughes Brigade (4,234),
The McPhail Brigade (4,776), and Brutinel's Brigade, afterward known
as the "Independent Force." The latter was composed largely of motor
machine-gun units, cyclists, and cavalry, and was used as emergency
corps troops. There was also an engineer motor-transport company, a
tramway company, a field-survey company, several searchlight companies
and various other corps accessories.
Here is seen one of the difficulties of coordinating the military
forces of the Empire, a problem which tried the patience of the higher
command. The overseas troops were magnificent in their fighting
qualities, but the overseas officers were not always as sympathetic
with the higher military control as might have been expected. The
overseas business man makes a good soldier and a good general, but in
either case he is prone to exhibit those elemental qualities which
make him a trenchant and resourceful warrior.
Another of the outstanding problems which faced the Canadian army was
the question of the supply of officers. Canada had an oversupply of
officers from the start, and the army never quite recovered from the
malady. This surplus was continually seeking to be absorbed while the
officers in the field were quite as assiduous in trying to keep it
from fulfilling its desires. Most officers who went over with the
First and Second Divisions had friends of equal civilian rank with
themselves in their commands and they desired to see these men
rewarded with commissions earned in the field. As all four divisions
were controlled largely by those who arrived in France in 1915, the
surplus officer in the Canadian camps in England was usually forced to
return home without fighting; to seek imperial service as town
major--the lowliest employment in the army; or to serve as
supernumerary without recognition. When the infantry of the Fifth
Division was broken up, the surplus officer question became even more
acute. As an example of the injustice which necessarily resulted, it
may be cited that one former commanding officer from the Fifth
Division was killed when acting as platoon commander in a battalion in
the Second Division.
Another unfortunate result of the surplus officer was the creation of
new posts for those who had to be absorbed. Many young officers were
given unnecessary jobs in brigade, divisional and corps staffs who but
made extra work for those who had already enough to do. In other
words, the heads of the staff were overburdened with a multiplicity of
juniors. The Canadian corps had, it is said, nearly as many staff
officers as any other two corps in France. The primary causes, it must
be remembered, were the free creation of officers in Canada and the
lack of coordination between those in control of this function in the
field and at home.
After the United States came into the war a British Canadian
Recruiting Commission was established in that country to enable
Britishers of military age to join either the British or Canadian
armies. This was done with the approval and consent of the United
States Congress. Twenty-seven recruiting depots and three divisional
headquarters were established and by the end of the war 60,000
volunteers had been dealt with, of whom 42,000 were accepted. Of these
about 30,000 went to the Canadian army.
The official report (Memo. No. 5) regarding the later phases of this
work says: "Effective stimulus was given to the recruiting operations
of the Mission by the announcement and conclusion of negotiations for
satisfactory conventions between the United States and Great Britain
and Canada, providing for mutual compulsory military service, whereby
those of military age were compelled within a limited period to elect
between military service in their country of residence or of origin."
When the war was concluded and the work of disbanding and
repatriating the army was begun, there was again some conflict of
opinion between the authorities at home and those in the field. The
plan proposed by the officials in Canada provided for sending home the
men in the order of enlistment. The corps authorities opposed this and
asked that the units be sent home intact, disregarding the date of
enlistment. Either scheme had its difficulties, but as usual the corps
authorities had their way. The Third Division units came home first,
followed by those of the First, Second, Fourth, and details. The
various units returned to their territorial headquarters in Canada
practically intact.
Thus ended Canada's greatest war achievement--a chapter full of
conflicting theories and methods, redolent of minor errors and clash
of ambitions, but on the whole creditable and glorious. Above
everything else the patriotism, courage, gallantry, and self-sacrifice
of all classes of people in the greatest of the British dominions
overseas shines conspicuously and brilliantly.
The deeds of the Canadian army in this World War will vitalize the
pages of the nation's history in all the years-to-be. The monuments in
France and Canada, the sacred colors in cathedrals and public
buildings, the bronze tablets which will be erected everywhere, will
gather up and preserve the memories of those who died that others
might live. Meantime those who served know that in all that was done
they but followed the simple path of duty.
PART I--PREPARATION FOR WAR
CHAPTER I
CANADA BEFORE THE WAR
Canada was no more prepared than any other nation for the outbreak of
the Great War. Because of their geographical isolation from the
turmoil of international politics the Canadians were even more
incredulous of war, in their mental attitude, than their kin across
the waters. It is against this important fact as a background that one
must consider the achievements of the Canadians during the war--and
marvel.
Theodore Roosevelt once suggested that to maintain a "fighting edge"
men should do continuous battle, but the Canadians have demonstrated
the fallacy of this precept, in a military sense at least.
For over a hundred years Canada had known only an atmosphere of peace
and almost continuous prosperity. Truly, during that period the mother
country had frequently waged warfare along the outskirts of the
Empire, and had even engaged in one or two wars of considerable
magnitude, but never had she felt the danger so pressing as to send a
call for help across the Atlantic.
Canadian help was, indeed, offered during the Crimean campaign, but
before this impulse could materialize on the field of battle the need
had ceased to exist. Again, during the South African struggle, the
same impulse had been manifested, and nearly eight thousand Canadian
volunteers did eventually reach the fighting front against the Boers.
But these had been inspired by a spirit of adventure, rather than by
any sense of patriotic duty.
There was everything in their environment to develop peaceful
instincts in the Canadians. To the east and west were limitless
expanses of sea; northward was the frozen Arctic; and to the southward
was another people who, though thirteen times greater in population,
was equally isolated from the political jealousies and rivalries of
Europe, and their kinsmen in speech, customs, and, to a large extent,
in blood also. From this direction no danger had threatened during the
century, and danger from across the seas had been of too intangible a
quality to reach the imagination.
Under these conditions the Canadians had devoted themselves
exclusively to the labors and arts of peace: of agriculture,
manufacturing, and trade and commerce. Vast natural resources lay
before them awaiting exploitation and development. The psychology of
the Canadian was entirely constructive.
There remained, of course, the sense of responsibility involved in the
ties binding the people to the British Empire, a subconscious
realization that when Great Britain was at war, Canada, too, would be
at war. Yet here again environment and local conditions tended to
reduce this consciousness to the quality of abstract theory, a mere
convention. The native Canadian, though of British ancestry, knew
England only through hearsay or the written word. And a considerable
portion of Canada's population felt not even the tie of a common
speech and literature. In so far as they recognized this bond, the
temperamental self-reliance of the Canadian people was inclined to
reduce it to a sentiment, rather than any deep feeling of dependence
on the power of the British navy. A keen sense of economic
independence and strength served still further to intensify this
feeling. Whatever allegiance the average Canadian owed to the Empire
must have been, and undoubtedly was, of the nature of an
ideal--something far more abstract than the ordinary sentiment of
patriotism--love of country.
In a people in this state of mind the first threat of a great war
involving themselves could only have roused varying degrees of
skepticism--while the first actual confirmation must have struck them
with the impact of a thunderbolt.
Canadians were shocked--unutterably, outrageously shocked.
Casual observers, basing their judgment on the mental attitude of the
people, as briefly outlined above, might reasonably have expected a
quick return to the previous state of mind, at most a strong sympathy
for the mother country, which might manifest itself in substantial
contributions of funds, supplies, and perhaps a few battalions of
enthusiastic adventurers. For, whatever might have been said at the
time as a recruiting argument, Canadians felt no danger of immediate,
or even future, invasion by European armies. When it came to that they
had every reason to believe that the hundred million population of the
United States would stand solidly with them, quite aside from the
Monroe Doctrine. There was, of course, the possibility that Canada's
trade with Great Britain, totaling half a billion dollars a year,
would be destroyed in case of naval disaster to the British navy, but
that would be only temporary. Whoever conquered would be willing to
pay a stiff price for a portion of Canada's tremendous wheat crops,
nearly 140,000,000 bushels in 1913. Economically Canada was in no way
dependent on European countries.
But such a chain of deductions would have ignored the chief
premise--the spirit of the people who made up the Canadian nation. For
a hundred years, indeed, the people of Canada had pursued the paths of
peace; for three generations they had known no stronger passion than
that involved in ordinary political partisan strife.
Vice and idleness, not the pursuits of peace, render men soft and
flabby in spirit. A pioneer stock does not require the continuous
excitement of military warfare to maintain its combativeness; it needs
only a just cause to rouse it to furnace heat. And that just cause the
Canadians found in the attitude of England that Germany and Austria
should not dominate the political destinies of peoples outside their
frontiers. Within twenty-four hours all Canada was aflame with the
war passion, but it was a passion thoroughly controlled by the reason
behind it.
"When Great Britain is at war, Canada is at war!" became a popular
slogan. Intermingling with that supreme indignation, with the fervent
loyalty to the empire, was the sinking dread of the tremendous
sacrifices, not only in material interests, but in blood, which would
have to be made, and that dread was terrible because of the profound
sincerity and determination of the people to enter into the struggle,
to stay until the bitter end. There was nothing jubilant in the wave
of enthusiasm which swept over Canada in favor of the war during that
first week in August; that note would have been out of harmony with
the grim determination which was the dominating element in the popular
emotion which swept over the land. It was not the sort of emotion
which would naturally manifest itself in noisy street demonstrations,
especially among people of Anglo-Saxon blood.
Such demonstrations did, indeed, occur, especially in those districts
where the population was predominantly of Latin blood. In Montreal and
Quebec vast throngs paraded the streets during the first few days of
August, 1914, carrying Belgian, French, and British flags, singing the
"Marseillaise" and "Rule Britannia," and cheering the orators who
addressed the crowds. But in Toronto and in other cities in the
English-speaking districts the crowds, though they filled the streets
before the bulletin boards of the principal newspapers, maintained a
silence which was even more impressive.
Whatever undercurrents of opinion there might have been against a
whole-hearted support of the Empire in the struggle, such as
manifested itself openly in practically all the belligerent European
countries, found little expression in Canada. Political party issue
sank for the time being out of sight, and the popular voice, as
expressed through the newspapers of diverse shades of opinion, and
through the popular political leaders, was practically unanimous. And
that voice demanded that Canada should strain every resource, should
offer every available man, in Britain's support.
The Toronto "Globe," chief organ of the Liberals, was one of the
first to enunciate the main issue of the great struggle
impending--that it was a gigantic contest between the forces of
autocracy and democracy, and that, in supporting England, Canada was
not alone fulfilling her obligations to the mother country, but she
was championing the cause of human liberty the world over.
"Because it is the world's fight for freedom," spoke that journal on
August 4, 1914, "Britain, reluctantly but resolutely, speaks the word,
and Canada also answers aye."
"There can be no question as to Canada's duty if the European War goes
on," said the Toronto "Star" on August 4, 1914. "This country must do
all it can to support the arms of Britain."
The Toronto "World," representing the Conservatives, urged the
immediate organization of a fighting force of 50,000 men, to be sent
across as soon as they could be trained. The Montreal "Star," having
invited expressions of opinion from some hundreds of prominent
political and industrial leaders and municipal officials, published
them in full. Of the many pages of telegrams printed, only two failed
to emphasize the need of an immediate contribution of money and men.
The mayor of Quebec, the center of French Canada, was in favor of "all
we can do to help the Empire in money, arms, and men." Alphonse
Verville, representing French-Canadian labor elements in Parliament,
believed that "we should be prepared to give Great Britain all the
assistance she needs." Turning to his fellow citizens, the
French-Canadian mayor of Montreal said: "The war is as much in defense
of Canada as of Great Britain."
Sir Wilfrid Laurier, representing the opposition in Parliament, made a
statement on August 4, 1914, of which the following is a part:
"I have often declared that if the mother country were ever in danger,
or if danger ever threatened, Canada should render assistance to the
fullest extent in her power. In view of the critical nature of the
situation I have canceled all my meetings. Pending such great
questions there should be a truce to party strife."
Even in the French provinces demonstrations of enthusiasm soon passed,
giving place to intense energy in preparation. With a silent
determination the people faced the gigantic task before them,
unappalled. And a gigantic task it was, apparently, to a people so
unprepared materially for the prosecution of warfare on so tremendous
a scale as was now demanded of them, if their aid was to count. But if
the spirit was there, so were the material resources, the raw
material--and the men.
CHAPTER II
BUILDING A WAR MACHINE
Some few words should be devoted to the personnel of the Government
which immediately took supreme charge of the almost superhuman
preparations which Canada undertook as her share in the gigantic
struggle, and which were so successfully carried to a conclusion. Not
only was this task which the Government faced a tremendous one, but it
was of a nature extremely foreign to its supposed qualifications. To
practically all of these men the science of waging war, or preparing
for war, was as strange as it was to the majority of Canada's peaceful
citizens.
Sir Robert Borden and his ministers had only been in office three
years, and of their number only one had ever had previous experience
as a Cabinet minister. It was essentially a Government for the
handling of peace problems, so that there is little to be wondered at
if minor mistakes were committed and occasional criticism did manifest
itself.
The premier and his colleagues met the crisis and assumed their new
responsibilities with a calm efficiency. There was nothing in the
personality of the premier to make him a popular or a picturesque
figure, but the fact remains that he so far fulfilled his
responsibilities that at the end of the war he was one of the two
premiers of the belligerent governments who had not passed from
power--who still held the confidence of their people.
Associated with Sir Robert Borden was Thomas White (later Sir Thomas),
Minister of Finance, whose experience in big-scale finance had been
gained in Toronto business circles. To no small degree was the
financial equilibrium which Canada maintained during the first few
months of the war due to his ability.
Lieutenant General Sir Sam Hughes, as Minister of Militia, assumed an
order importance in the Cabinet which his position had not warranted
in times of peace. Bluff, frank, independent of public opinion almost
to an unpleasant degree where his own convictions were concerned, he
was the object of more criticism and censure than any of his
colleagues. As an advocate of extensive military preparedness he had
not been popular before the war and had often been denounced as a
militarist and a jingo. Under his direction came the preparation for
and the organization of the military forces which Canada was to send
across seas to fight in France. In the main, what he accomplished
speaks for him.
On the shoulders of these three men fell the main responsibilities of
preparing Canada for assuming her share in the Great War.
The work of the other members of the Government brought them less into
the public eye. These were Sir George E. Foster, Minister of Trade and
Commerce, the one member who had experience in a previous
administration; Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works; J. Douglas
Hazen, Minister of Marine, Fisheries, and Naval Affairs, under whose
jurisdiction came the defense of the coast and harbors; Martin Burrel,
Minister of Agriculture, who popularized the slogan "Patriotism and
Production"; the Hon. C. J. Doherty, Minister of Justice; the Hon.
Frank Cochrane, Minister of Railways; the Hon. W. J. Roche, Minister
of the Interior; the Hon. T. W. Crothers, Minister of Labor; the Hon.
J. D. Reid, Minister of Customs; and the Hon. A. E. Kemp and the Hon.
J. A. Lougheed, ministers without portfolios. The interests of the two
million French-speaking population of the Dominion were indirectly
represented in the Government by the Hon. L. P. Pelletier, Postmaster
General; the Hon. W. B. Nantel, Minister of Inland Revenue, and the
Hon. Louis Coderre, Secretary of State.
Many and varied were the special war problems which the Government had
to handle, but first and foremost was that of organizing and equipping
a military force. With characteristic energy General Hughes hurried to
this, his special task. On the last day of July, 1914, he had already
hurried to Ottawa and there called an emergency meeting of the Militia
Council, comprising Colonel E. Fiset, D. S. O., Deputy Minister;
Colonel W. G. Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff; Colonel V. A. S.
Williams, A. D. C, Adjutant General; and Major General D. A.
Macdonald, C. M. G., I. S. O., Quartermaster General. At this
conference it was decided, subject to the approval of the governor
general and the premier, that an initial force of 20,000 should be
organized, equipped, and sent across if war was declared.
By the time that all doubt on that point was past General Hughes and
his staff of assistants had already formulated their plan of action.
From all parts of the country came offers of aid from men who had had
military training.
Practically there was very little to build upon; Canada had barely a
nucleus around which to create that big and efficient military
organization which afterward became so powerful a factor in the
military situation in France. The Royal Military College at Kingston
had, indeed, turned out hundreds of young military officers, but most
of them had accepted commissions in the British army and were now
scattered all over the world in the British possessions as officers in
British regiments.
Everything must be created anew. But the crude material, the man
power, was there. According to the census taken in 1911 there were a
little over a million and a half men between the ages of twenty and
forty-four, of which a trifle over half were married, with families
dependent on them. Allowing for a normal increase in the population,
and for the fact that the military age was from eighteen to
forty-five, and eliminating the physically unfit, Canada had available
about a million and a half for active military service.
On August 6, 1914, the Government issued a call for volunteers for the
formation of the First Army Division, to number about 21,000 men. The
responses came immediately and in a volume greater than could be
handled. To this first quota Ontario and the West contributed most
generously. No more men were needed for the time being, though
probably a hundred thousand men could have been obtained within those
first few weeks, had they been needed. It was not till this first
contingent had gone through its preliminary training and had been
equipped and sent to training camp in England that the second call was
issued, for another 21,000 men, in November, 1914.
CHAPTER III
DEPARTURE OF FIRST CONTINGENT
The calling together of the men, during the earlier period of the war
at least, was the easiest part of the work in hand. The training and
equipment of these first two contingents required all of the rest of
the first war year. Eight thousand horses had to be purchased and
shipped from all parts of the country to the training camps.
Provisions to feed men and horses had also to be gathered in from all
the Provinces and shipped across after the first contingent had
sailed. Over a hundred special trains were needed to accomplish this
before the end of the year, after which, as the Canadian forces on the
other side increased, they were augmented in proportion. With the
first contingent there was shipped a consignment of war material
including seventy field guns alone. The total value of this first
shipment approached close to $14,000,000.
Nor were these supplies confined to the use of Canadian troops
exclusively. On August 6, 1914, when war had become a definite
certainty, the governor general sent the following message to the
British colonial secretary:
"My advisers request me to inform you that the people of Canada,
through their Government, desire to offer one million bags of flour,
of ninety-eight pounds each, as a gift to the people of the United
Kingdom, to be placed at the disposal of his Majesty's Government, and
to be used for such purposes as they may deem expedient."
This munificent gift was accepted with deepest expressions of
gratitude, and with the assurance that "we can never forget the
generosity and promptitude of this gift and the patriotism from which
it springs." Two hundred trains, of thirty cars each, were required to
transport this flour, valued at $3,000,000, to the port whence it was
shipped.
Meanwhile, during the first few weeks after the call for men had been
issued, hurried preparations were made to establish the training camps
in which they were to be received and trained. Most notable of these
mobilization centers was Valcartier Camp, ideally situated outside of
Quebec. Under the direction of Captain William Price, Lieutenant
Colonel E. H. Burstall, and Lieutenant Colonel W. McBain, extensive
housing accommodations were erected, roads constructed, and all the
improvements of a modern city were installed. One prominent feature
was three miles of rifle butts for rifle practice. Here 33,000
recruits were gathered and housed before three months had passed.
The training of the recruits in the Canadian mobilization camps was,
for obvious reasons, only of the most elementary sort. First of all
there was a dearth of competent instructors, which could be more
plentifully supplied in England. And then there was the psychological
factor; it was difficult to make the men realize the seriousness of
military discipline on native soil, so distant as it was from the seat
of war. Therefore the men were taught little more than how to march in
proper formation before they were shipped to England, where they were
to be more fully "licked into shape" in the Canadian training camps
established there.
Once on the other side, immersed in the tense war feeling which
permeated the English people, almost within sound of the big guns
which were already thundering close to the gates of Paris, the
Canadian recruit came to a profound realization of the full
significance of the situation and his responsibilities. Under these
conditions he quickly relinquished the last vestige of that intense
individualism so characteristic of the sons of pioneers, an excellent
quality in a guerrilla fighter, but not so desirable in the units of a
large fighting organization.
During the last week of September, 1914, the first contingent of
recruits at Valcartier Camp began embarking for its overseas journey.
On the 21st the premier and several of his Cabinet members formally
delivered a farewell address to these men about to leave their native
country for war service. At Quebec a great fleet of transports,
thirty-two in number, were anchored in readiness, and as each received
its assignment of troops, it lifted anchor and sailed quietly and
secretly down the river, toward the open sea, there to meet a convoy
of warships, under the command of Rear Admiral Rosslyn E. Wemyss, C.
M. G., D. S. Q. As each regiment embarked there was read to it the
farewell message of the governor general:
"On the eve of your departure from Canada I wish to congratulate you
on having the privilege of taking part, with the other forces of the
crown, in fighting for the honor of the king and the Empire. You have
nobly responded to the call of duty, and Canada will know how to
appreciate the patriotic spirit that animates you. I have complete
confidence that you will do your duty, and that Canada will have every
reason to be proud of you. You leave these shores with the knowledge
that all Canadian hearts beat for you, and that our prayers and best
wishes will ever attend you. May God bless you and bring you back
victorious."
CHAPTER IV
THE STEADY STREAM OF RECRUITS
The departure of the first contingent, which became known to the
public through an announcement made to the press by General (then
Colonel) Hughes on September 24, brought all Canada to a first
profound realization of the tragic aspects of the war. The first big
sacrifice had been made.
Meanwhile recruiting continued at a steady pace. But it was now
becoming more obvious that a sense of patriotic duty, rather than
enthusiasm, was to be the impelling motive henceforward. The youth of
the country came forward more deliberately, thoughtfully.
During 1915 180,000 men responded to this call of duty, or at the
average rate of 3,400 a week. A large proportion of these, especially
in the second half of the year, undoubtedly had been moved by the
campaign of education which was carried on by the newspapers. "The
country requires," said the Toronto "Globe," in its issue of January
23, 1915, "information as to the causes of the war, the issues
involved, and the pressing need for men."
The difference between the first volunteers and those who only came
forward during the later periods was one which certainly reflected no
discredit on the latter. If they came more slowly it was only that
they were, on the whole, older men, more inclined to be guided by
reason than by youthful enthusiasm. These were the men who had given
the issues of the war close study, and by the process of deliberate
judgment came to the conclusion that their duty, not to Canada, or to
the Empire, alone, required them to offer themselves, but a duty to
the cause of world democracy and civilization itself. From these came
some of the best soldiers who later distinguished themselves and won
promotion on the bloody fields of battle in France.
At the end of the year 212,000 Canadians were in uniform. At that
time the Government called for a total contribution of half a million
men. In the middle of February a mere handful short of a quarter of a
million men had enlisted. Of these 30 per cent were native-born
Canadians, 62 per cent were British-born settlers, and 8 per cent were
foreign born.
On November 2, 1915, an official announcement indicated in what
proportion the various provinces had contributed to the total number
of enlistments. The figures were as follows:
Ontario, 42,300; Quebec, 14,000; the Maritime Provinces, 15,000;
Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 28,000; British Columbia and the Yukon,
17,000; Alberta, 14,200.
At this time recruiting was now averaging 2,000 a day.
The call for half a million men which the premier issued at the first
of the year, 1916, stimulated recruiting perceptibly. During the month
of January 30,000 men responded from all parts of Canada; in February
almost 27,000 enlisted; and in March nearly 33,000 presented
themselves. The grand total during these three months was not far
short of 90,000. By the following June 335,000 of the half million men
called for had been obtained.
During the summer and the fall of 1916 the stream of recruits began to
diminish very perceptibly. During this period the daily average
dropped down to three hundred.
By this time the volunteer system was beginning to reach its limits.
But the record was, nevertheless, a splendid one, especially when it
is remembered how abstract the issues of the war must have been to the
minds of a large portion of the masses. At the end of 1916 434,529 men
from Canada were on war duty of some kind, not counting over 70,000
casualties at the front.
During 1917 the slackening of recruiting became so apparent that the
Government had now to consider extraordinary means to stimulating it,
if Canada was to raise her full quota of half a million men. Chief of
these means was the creation of the National Service Board, by an
Order in Council, on October 5, 1916. This body was empowered to order
a registration of the remaining man power of the nation, for the
purpose of bringing about a coordination of the various industries
with a view to army requirements.
The census taken by the board during the following few months showed a
total enumeration of 1,549,360 able-bodied workers, 286,976 of which
were engaged in nonessential occupations, and 183,727 in agriculture.
Included there were 4,660 skilled workers in the mining industry,
shipbuilding, and the manufacture of munitions. The work of the board
brought this information, but no increase in enlistments.
Splendid as had been the response of Canada's youth, the fact had now
to be faced, in the beginning of the fourth year of the war, that the
need for men at the front exceeded the supply available through the
volunteer system. Needs considered, there remained only the last
resort--conscription.
This was a decision which the Government faced with extreme
reluctance. Already conscription had become the subject of a great
deal of heated discussion, in legislative halls as well as in the
daily press. Temperamentally the Canadian people could accept the idea
only with the greatest of reluctance. It was contrary to the
individualistic sentiment of the nation. But it was the only remaining
alternative to a still greater evil--a German victory.
CHAPTER V
THE CONSCRIPTION ACT
The question of conscription came to a final issue on May 18, 1917,
when the premier returned from England, where he had been in
conference with his colleagues on the Imperial War Board. It was then
that he announced that it would be necessary to introduce a
conscription measure in the near future.
"A great struggle lies before us," he said, "and I cannot put that
before you more forcibly than by stating that at the commencement of
this spring's campaign Germany put in the field one million more men
than she put in the field last spring.... Hitherto we have depended on
voluntary enlistment. I, myself, stated to Parliament that nothing but
voluntary enlistment was proposed by the Government. But I return to
Canada impressed at once with the extreme gravity of the situation and
with a sense of responsibility for our further effort at the most
critical period of the war. It is apparent to me that the voluntary
system will not yield further substantial results."
Only a little over fifty thousand men more were needed to supply the
need at the front, and to complete Canada's full quota, but they were
needed most imperatively. That this need was strongly impressed on the
public mind became apparent during the month which intervened between
these utterances by the premier and the first presentation of the
Conscription Bill in Parliament. As a matter of fact, Australia and
South Africa were the only belligerent countries besides Canada, at
this time, which had not been compelled to adopt the principle of
forcible enlistment.
On June 11 the bill was presented to Parliament, with a speech by the
premier explaining all its provisions. Administration was placed under
the Department of Justice, and the term was for the duration of the
war, including demobilization. All male British subjects in Canada
were included, from the ages of twenty to forty-five. Those eligible
were divided into six classes, according to their marital conditions
and ages, and each class was to be called in succession. An amendment
presented by the leader of the opposition would have submitted the
bill to a referendum vote of the electorate, but this was rejected by
a vote of 111 against 62. The bill finally passed the third reading by
a vote of 102 against 44.
At the end of the year 404,395 eligible men had registered. The number
of men eventually drafted under this law amounted to 83,000, making
the total number of enlistments up to the end of the war 611,741.
The army thus raised was eventually represented in infantry and
cavalry battalions, exclusive of engineers, forestry, railway
construction, pioneer, and cyclist corps, or the Siberian
expeditionary force of 4,000 men. The following list was issued by
the Government at the close of the war:
ORIGINAL OFFICERS OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS[TN1]
---------+------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------
BATTALION| ORIGINAL OFFICER | MOBILIZED | SAILED
| IN COMMAND | |
---------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------
1st | Lt. Col. F. W. Hill |Valcartier |Oct. 3, 1914
2nd | " D. Watson | " | " 3, 1914
3rd | " R. Rennie | " | " 3, 1914
4th | " R. H. Labatt | " | " 3, 1914
5th | " G. S. Tuxford | " | " 3, 1914
6th | " R. W. Paterson | " | " 3, 1914
7th | " W. Hart-McHarg | " | " 3, 1914
8th | " L. J. Lipsett | " | " 3, 1914
9th | " S. M. Rogers | " | " 3, 1914
10th | " R. L. Boyle | " | " 3, 1914
11th | " R. Burritt | " | " 3, 1914
12th | " H. F. McLeod | " | " 3, 1914
13th | " F. O. W. Loomis | " | " 3, 1914
14th | " F. S. Meighen | " | " 3, 1914
15th | " J. A. Currie | " | " 3, 1914
16th | " R. G. E. Leckie | " | " 3, 1914
17th | " S. G. Robertson | " | " 3, 1914
18th | " E. S. Wigle |London, Ont. |Apr. 18, 1915
19th | " J. J. McLaren |Toronto |May 13, 1915
20th | " J. A. W. Allen | " | " 15, 1915
21st | " W. St. P. Hughes |Kingston | " 6, 1915
22nd | " F. M. Gaudet |St. Jean, P.Q. | " 20, 1915
23rd | " F. W. Fisher |Quebec |Feb. 23, 1915
24th | " J. A. Gunn |Montreal |May 11, 1915
25th | " G. A. LeCain |Halifax | " 20, 1915
26th | " J. L. McAvity |St. John, N.B. |June 13, 1915
27th | " I. R. Snider |Winnipeg |May 17, 1915
28th | " J. F. L. Embury | " | " 29, 1915
29th | " H. S. Tobin |Vancouver | " 20, 1915
30th | " J. A. Hall | " |Feb. 23, 1915
31st | " A. B. Bell |Calgary |May 17, 1915
32nd | " H. J. Cowan |Winnipeg |Feb. 23, 1915
33rd | " A. Wilson |London, Ont |Mar. 13, 1916
34th | " A. J. Oliver |Guelph, Ont |Oct. 23, 1915
35th | " F. C. McCordick |Toronto | " 16, 1915
36th | " E. C. Ashton |Hamilton |June 19, 1915
37th | " C. F. Beck |Sault Ste. Marie |Nov. 27, 1915
38th | " C. W. Edwards |Ottawa |May 30, 1916
39th | " J. A. V. Preston |Belleville |June 24, 1915
40th | " A. Vincent |Halifax |Oct. 8, 1915
41st | " L. A. Archambault |Quebec | " 18, 1915
42nd | " G. S. Cantlie |Montreal |June 10, 1915
43rd | " R. M. Thomson |Winnipeg | " 1, 1915
44th | " E. R. Wayland | " |Oct. 23, 1915
45th | " F. J. Clark |Brandon |Mar. 13, 1916
46th | " H. Snell |Regina |Oct. 23, 1915
47th | " W. R. Winsby |New Westminster |Nov. 13, 1915
48th | " W. J. H. Holmes |Victoria |July 1, 1915
49th | " W. A. Griesbach |Edmonton |June 4, 1915
50th | " E. G. Mason |Calgary |Oct. 27, 1915
51st | " R. Del. Harwood |Edmonton |Apr. 18, 1916
52nd | " J. A. D. Hulme |Port Arthur |Nov. 23, 1916
53rd | " R. M. Dennistoun |Winnipeg |Mar. 29, 1916
54th | " W. M. Davis |Nelson, B. C |Nov. 22, 1915
55th | " J. R. Kirkpatrick |Sussex, N. B |Oct. 30, 1915
56th | " W. C. G. Armstrong |Calgary |Mar. 23, 1916
57th | " E. T. Paquette |Quebec |June 2, 1916
58th | " H. A. Genet |Toronto |Nov. 22, 1915
59th | " H. J. Dawson |Brockville |Apr. 21, 1916
60th | " F. A. Gascoigne |Valcartier |Nov. 6, 1915
61st | " F. J. Murray |Winnipeg |Apr. 21, 1916
62nd | " J. Hulme |Vancouver |Mar. 23, 1916
63rd | " G. B. McLeod |Edmonton |Apr. 22, 1916
64th | " H. M. Campbell |Halifax |Mar. 31, 1916
65th | " N. Lang |Saskatoon |June 18, 1916
66th | " J. W. McKinery |Edmonton |Apr. 28, 1916
67th | " Lorne Ross |Victoria | " 21, 1916
68th | " P. E. Perrett |Regina | " 28, 1916
69th | " J. A. Dansereau |Montreal | " 17, 1916
70th | " R. I. Towers |London, Ont. | " 24, 1916
71st | " D. M. Sutherland |Woodstock, Ont. | " 21, 1916
72nd | " J. A. Clark |Vancouver | " 23, 1916
73rd | " P. Davidson |Montreal |Mar. 31, 1916
74th | " J. M. McCausland |Toronto | " 29, 1916
75th | " S. G. Beckett | " | " 29, 1916
76th | " J. Ballantine |Barrie, Ont. |Apr. 23, 1916
77th | " D. R. Street |Ottawa |June 19, 1916
78th | " J. Kirkcaldy |Winnipeg |May 20, 1916
79th | " G. Clinglan |Brandon, Man |Apr. 24, 1916
80th | " W. G. Ketcheson |Belleville |May 16, 1916
81st | " B. H. Belson |Toronto |Apr. 28, 1916
82nd | " W. A. Lowry |Calgary |May 20, 1916
83rd | " R. Pellatt |Toronto |Apr. 28, 1916
84th | " W. D. Stewart | " |June 18, 1916
85th | " E. C. Phinney |Halifax |Oct. 12, 1916
86th | " W. W. Stewart |Hamilton |May 19, 1916
87th | " I. P. Rexford |St. Jean, P. Q. |Apr. 23, 1916
88th | " J. R. Cullin |Victoria |May 31, 1916
89th | " W. W. Nasmyth |Calgary | " 31, 1916
90th | " W. A. Monroe |Winnipeg | " 31, 1916
91st | " W. J. Green |St. Thomas |June 28, 1916
92nd | " G. G. Chisholm |Toronto |May 20, 1916
93rd | " I. J. Johnston |Peterborough |July 15, 1916
94th | " H. A. C. Machin |Port Arthur |June 28, 1916
95th | " R. K. Barker |Toronto |May 31, 1916
96th | " J. Glenn |Saskatoon |Sep. 26, 1916
97th | " A. B. Clark |Toronto | " 18, 1916
98th | " H. A. Rose |Welland, Ont. |July 8, 1916
99th | " T. B. Welch |Windsor, Ont. |May 31, 1916
100th | " J. B. Mitchell |Winnipeg |Sep. 18, 1916
101st | " D. MacLean | " |June 28, 1916
102nd | " J. W. Warden |Victoria | " 18, 1916
103rd | " E. C. J. L. Henniker| " |July 23, 1916
104th | " G. W. Fowler |Sussex, N. B. |June 28, 1916
105th | " A. E. Ings |Charlottetown |July 15, 1916
106th | " R. Innes |Truro, N. S | " 15, 1916
107th | " R. Glenn Campbell |Winnipeg |Sep. 18, 1916
108th | " G. H. Bradbury |Selkirk, Man. | " 18, 1916
109th | " J. J. H. Fee |Lindsay, Ont. |July 23, 1916
110th | " J. B. Youngs |Stratford, Ont. |Oct. 31, 1916
111th | " J. D. Clark |Galt, Ont. |Sep. 25, 1916
112th | " H. B. Tremaine |Windsor. N. S. |July 23, 1916
113th | " W. A. Pryce Jones |Lethbridge, Alberta |Sep. 25, 1916
114th | " A. T. Thompson |Cayuga, Ont. |Oct. 31, 1916
115th | " F. V. Wedderburn |St. John, N. B. |July 23, 1916
116th | " S. Sharpe. |Uxbridge, Ont. | " 23, 1916
117th | " L. J. Gilbert |Sherbrooke, P.Q. |Aug. 14, 1916
118th | " W. M. O. Lochead |Kitchener |Jan. 23, 1917
119th | " T. P. T. Rowland |Sault Ste. Marie |Aug. 8, 1916
120th | " D. G. Fearman |Hamilton | " 14, 1916
121st | " A. W. McLelan |New Westminster, B.C. | " 14, 1916
122nd | " D. M. Grant |Huntersville & Galt, Ont.|June 2, 1917
123rd | " W. B. Kingsmill |Toronto |Aug. 7, 1916
124th | " W. C. V. Chadwick | " | " 7, 1916
125th | " M. E. B. Cutcliffe |Brantford | " 7, 1916
126th | " S. J. Hamilton |Toronto | " 14, 1916
127th | " T. Clark | " | " 22, 1916
128th | " F. Pawlett |Moosejaw, Sask. | " 15, 1916
129th | " W. Knowles |Dundas, Ont. | " 22, 1916
130th | " J. F. De Hertel |Perth, Ont. |Sep. 23, 1916
131st | " J. D. Taylor |New Westminster |Oct. 31, 1918
132nd | " G. W. Mesereau |Chatham, N. B. | " 25, 1917
133rd | " A. C. Pratt |Simcoe, Ont. | " 30, 1916
134th | " A. A. Miller |Toronto |Sep. 6, 1916
135th | " B. Robson |London, Ont. |Aug. 22, 1916
136th | " R. W. Smart |Port Hope, Ont. |Sep. 25, 1916
137th | " G. W. Morfitt |Calgary |Aug. 22, 1916
138th | " R. Belcher |Edmonton | " 22, 1916
139th | " W. H. Floyd |Cobourg |Sep. 25, 1916
140th | " L. H. Beer |St. Johns, N. B. | " 25, 1916
141st | " D. C. McKenzie |Fort Francis |Apr. 29, 1917
142nd | " C. M. R. Graham |London, Ont. |Oct. 31, 1916
143rd | " A. B. Powley |Victoria |Feb. 17, 1917
144th | " A. W. Morley |Winnipeg |Sep. 18, 1916
145th | " W. E. Forbes |Moncton, N. B. | " 25, 1916
146th |Major C. A. Lowe |Kingston, Ont. | " 25, 1916
147th |Lt. Col. G. F. McFarland |Owen Sound |Nov. 18, 1916
148th | " A. Magee |Montreal, P.Q. |Sep. 26, 1916
149th | " R. G. C. Kelley |Watford, Ont. |Mar. 28, 1917
150th | " H. Barre |Montreal |Sep. 23, 1916
151st | " J. W. Arnott |Strathcona |Oct. 3, 1916
152nd | " S. Nells |Wayburn, Sask. | " 3, 1916
153rd | " R. T. Pritchard |Guelph, Ont. |Apr. 29, 1917
154th | " A. G. F. McDonald |Cornwall |Oct. 25, 1916
155th | " M. K. Adams |Belleville | " 17, 1916
156th | " T. C. D. Bedell |Brockville | " 17, 1916
157th | " D. H. McLaren |Barrie, Ont. | " 17, 1916
158th | " C. Milne |Vancouver |Nov. 13, 1916
159th | " E. F. Armstrong |Haileybury |Oct. 31, 1916
160th | " A. Weir |Walkerton, Ont. | " 17, 1916
161st | " H. B. Combe |Clinton, Ont. | " 30, 1916
162nd | " J. Arthurs |Parry Sound | " 30, 1916
163rd | " H. Desrosiers |Montreal |Nov. 27, 1916
164th | " P. Domville |Milton, Ont. |Apr. 11, 1916
165th | " L. C. D'Aigle |Moncton |Mar. 28, 1916
166th | " W. G. Mitchell |Toronto |Oct. 12, 1916
167th | " O. Readman |Quebec | [1]
168th | " W. T. McMullin |Woodstock |Oct. 3, 1916
169th | " J. G. Wright |Toronto | " 17, 1916
170th | " L. Reed | " | " 25, 1916
171st | " Sir W. Price |Quebec |Nov. 23, 1916
172nd | " J. R. Vickers |Kamloops, B. C. |Oct. 25, 1916
173rd | " W. H. Bruce |Hamilton, Ont |Nov. 13, 1916
174th | " H. F. Osler |Winnipeg |Apr. 29, 1917
175th | " N. Spencer |Medicine Hat |Oct. 3, 1916
176th | " D. Sharpe |St. Catherines |Apr. 29, 1917
177th | " J. B. McFee |Simcoe, Ont |May 3, 1917
178th | " L. de la B. Girouard|Victoriaville |Mar. 3, 1917
179th | " J. Y. Reid |Winnipeg |Oct. 3, 1916
180th | " R. H. Green |Toronto |Nov. 13, 1916
181st | " H. B. Combe |Brandon, Man |Apr. 18, 1917
182nd | " A. A. Cockburn |Whitby |May 3, 1917
183rd | " W. T. Edgecomb |Winnipeg |Oct. 3, 1916
184th | " W. H. Sharpe |Lisgar, Man | " 31, 1916
185th | " F. P. Day |Halifax | " 12, 1916
186th |Major Neil Smith |Chatham, Ont |Mar. 28, 1917
187th |Lt. Col. G. W. Robinson |Red Deer |Dec. 15, 1916
188th | " C. J. Donaldson |Prince Albert |Oct. 12, 1916
189th | " A. Piuze |Frazerville |Sep. 9, 1916
190th | " G. K. Watson |Winnipeg |May 3, 1917
191st | " W. G. Bryan |McLeod, Alta |Mar. 28, 1917
192nd |Captain H. E. Lyon |Blairmore, Alta |Oct. 31, 1916
193rd |Lt. Col. J. Stanfield |Truro, N. S | " 12, 1916
194th | " W. C. Craig |Edmonton |Nov. 13, 1916
195th | " A. C. Gomer |Regina |Oct. 31, 1916
196th | " D. S. Mackay |Camp Hughes | " 31, 1916
197th | " H. G. Fonseca |Winnipeg |Jan. 23, 1917
198th | " J. A. Cooper |Toronto |Mar. 28, 1917
199th | " P. J. Trihey |Montreal |Dec. 15, 1916
200th | " A. L. Bonnycastle |Winnipeg |May 3, 1917
201st | " E. W. Hagarty | |Disbanded
202nd | " T. E. Bowen |Edmonton |Nov. 23, 1916
203rd | " J. E. Hansford |Winnipeg |Oct. 26, 1916
204th | " W. H. Price |Toronto |Mar. 23, 1917
205th | " R. R. Moodie |Hamilton | [2]
206th | " T. Pagnuelo |Montreal | [3]
207th | " C. W. McLean |Ottawa |June 2, 1917
208th | " T. H. Lennox |Toronto |Mar. 21, 1917
209th | " W. O. Smyth |Swift Current |Oct. 31, 1917
210th | " W. E. Seaborn |Moosejaw. Sask |Apr. 11, 1917
211th | " W. M. Sage |Vancouver |Dec. 15, 1916
212th | " E. C. Pitman |Winnipeg | [4]
213th | " B. J. McCormick |St. Catherines | [4]
214th | " J. H. Hearn |Wadena, Sask |Apr. 18, 1917
215th | " H. E. Snider |Brantford | " 29, 1917
216th | " F. L. Burton |Toronto | " 18, 1917
217th | " A. B. Gillis |Moosomin, Sask |June 2, 1917
218th | " J. K. Cornwall |Victoria |Feb. 17, 1917
219th | " W. H. Muirhead |Halifax |Oct. 12, 1916
220th | " B. H. Brown |Toronto |Apr. 29, 1917
221st | " M. McMeans |Winnipeg | " 18, 1917
222nd | " J. Lightfoot | " |Nov. 13, 1916
223rd | " H. Albrechsten | " |May 3, 1917
224th | " A. McDougall |Ottawa | " 19, 1916
225th | " J. Mackay |Fernie, B. C |Jan. 25, 1917
226th | " R. A. G. Gillespie |Dauphin, Man |Dec. 15, 1916
227th | " C. H. Le P. Jones |Hamilton |Apr. 11, 1917
228th | " A. Earchman |North Bay |Feb. 16, 1917
229th | " H. D. Pickett |Moosejaw |Apr. 18, 1917
230th | " R. de Salaberry |Brockville |Jan. 23, 1917
231st | " F. E. Leach |Vancouver |Apr. 11, 1917
232nd | " R. P. Laurie |Battleford | " 18, 1917
233rd | " E. Leprohon |Winnipeg | [5]
234th | " W. Wallace |Toronto |Apr. 18, 1917
235th | " S. B. Scobel |Belleville |May 3, 1917
236th | " P. A. Guthrie |Fredericton |Nov. 9, 1917
237th | " Rev. C. S. Bullock |Sussex | [6]
238th | " W. R. Smith |Valcartier |Sep. 11, 1916
239th |Major V. L. MacDonald | " |Dec. 15, 1916
240th |Lt. Col. E. J. Watt |Renfrew |May 3, 1917
241st | " W. L. McGregor |Windsor |Apr. 29, 1917
242nd | " J. B. White |Montreal |Nov. 23, 1916
243rd | " J. E. Bradshaw |Prince Albert |June 2, 1917
244th | " E. M. McRobie |Montreal |Mar. 28, 1917
245th | " C. C. Ballantyne | " |May 3, 1917
246th | " N. H. Parson |Halifax |June 2, 1917
247th | " C. H. Ackerman |Peterboro | [7]
248th | " J. H. Rorke |Owen Sound |June 2, 1917
249th | " C. B. Keenlyside |Regina |Feb. 21, 1918
250th | " W. H. Hastings |Winnipeg | [8]
251st | " G. H. Nicholson | " |Oct. 6, 1917
252nd | " J. J. Glass |Lindsay |June 2, 1917
253rd | " P. G. C. Campbell |Kingston |Apr. 29, 1917
254th | " A. P. Allen |Belleville |June 2, 1917
255th | " G. C. Royce |Toronto | " 2, 1917
256th | " W. A. McConnell | " |Mar. 28, 1917
257th | " L. T. Martin |Ottawa |Feb. 16, 1917
258th | " P. E. Blondin |Quebec |Oct. 6, 1917
| | |
Universit. | |
Inf. Co | | |
No. 1 " |Captain P. Molson |Montreal |May 29, 1915
No. 2 " | " G. C. MacDonald | " |June 29, 1917
No. 3 " |Lieut. F. L. Turnbull | " |Sep. 4, 1915
No. 4 " | " J. R. Mitchener | " |Nov. 27, 1915
No. 5 " | " O. S. Tyndale | " |Apr. 2, 1916
| | |
Yukon Inf. | |
Co |Comm. Black |Dawson City |Jan. 24, 1917
| | |
No. 1 Jewish | |Mar. 28, 1917
Inf. Co |Captain I. Friedman |Montreal |Mar. 28, 1917
| | |
No. 1 Independent | |Oct. 6, 1917
Inf. Co |Major T.J. Langford |Winnipeg |Oct. 6, 1917
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Footnote TN1: In this file, the battalion numbers have been changed
from words to numbers to reduce the size of the table.]
[Footnote 1: Converted into Quebec recruiting battalion.]
[Footnote 2: Converted into C. M. C. Corps.]
[Footnote 3: Sent to Bermuda.]
[Footnote 4: Disbanded; unable to obtain recruits.]
[Footnote 5: Absorbed by 178th Battalion.]
[Footnote 6: Disbanded.]
[Footnote 7: Absorbed by 236th Battalion.]
[Footnote 8: Amalgamated with 249th Battalion.]
--------------------+----------------------------+-------------------------+-------------
UNIT | ORIGINAL OFFICER | MOBILIZED | SAILED
| IN COMMAND | |
--------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------
R. C. D |Lt. Col. C. M. Nelles |Toronto |Oct. 3, 1914
L. S. H | " A. C. MacDonald |Winnipeg | " 3, 1914
R. N. W. M. P |Major C. L. Jennings |Regina |June 4, 1918
C. M. R. Depot |Lt. Col. W. C. Brooks |Hamilton |Oct. 22, 1917
First C. M. R. Bde | " F. O. Sissons |Winnipeg |June 12, 1915
First Regt. C. M. R | " H. J. Stevenson } { " 12, 1915
Second " " | " J. C. L. Bott }Included in First Brigade{ " 12, 1915
Third " " | " L. J. Whittaker } { " 12, 1915
Second C. M. R. Bde |Col. C. A. Smart |Sherbrooke |July 18, 1915
Fourth Regt. C. M. R|Lt. Col. S. F. Smith } { " 18, 1915
Fifth " " | " G. H. Baker }Included in Second { " 18, 1915
Sixth " " | " R. H. Ryan } Brigade { " 18, 1915
Seventh " " |Major E. I. Leonard |London, Ont |June 29, 1915
Eighth " " |Lt. Col J. R. Munro |Ottawa |Oct. 9, 1915
Ninth " " | " G. C. Hodson |Lloydminster, Sask |Nov. 23, 1915
Tenth " " |Major F. C Washington |Portage la Prairie |Apr. 28, 1916
Eleventh " " |Lt. Col. G. H. Kirkpatrick |Vancouver |July 8, 1916
Twelfth " " | " G. MacDonald |Calgary |Oct. 9, 1915
Thirteenth Regt. | | |
C. M. R | " V. H. Holmes |Medicine Hat |June 28, 1916
First Can. Div. | | |
Cav. Sq. | " F. C. Jamieson |Valcartier |Oct. 3, 1914
Second " " |Major H. J. Leonard |London, Ont. |June 9, 1915
Third " " | " T. W. Wright |Winnipeg |Jan. 22, 1916
Fourth " " |Lt. Col. R. A. Carman |Portage la Prairie |Apr. 28, 1916
A digest of the foregoing tables will indicate the proportionate
enlistments in the various sections of the country. Population
considered, the West did better than the East.
As to the proportional representation of the various occupations in
the enlistments, some light is thrown on that by figures presented by
Mr. N. W. Rowell, K. C., in the Ontario Legislature, covering the
period of heaviest voluntary enlistment, up to March 1, 1916. Out of a
total of 263,111 recruits, 6 per cent, or 16,153 were professional
men; 2 per cent, or 6,530, were merchants or men in the employing
class; 18 per cent, or 48,777, were clerical workers; 64 per cent, or
170,369, were manual workers; 6 per cent, or 17,044, were farmers; and
1 per cent, or 4,238, were students.
The latter item deserves special mention, in the unusual enthusiasm
shown by the students of the Canadian universities. At the end of 1914
McGill University had nearly a hundred of its student body in training
on Salisbury Plain, many more were at Exhibition Park, preparing
themselves for active service at the front, while others were in
different camps throughout the country; 1,800 men were in the
Officers' Training Corps, with 80 members of the faculty acting as
officers. On March 1, 1915, 307 undergraduates had enlisted. Out of
4,000 registered students there were, at the end of 1915, 811 enlisted
men, together with 1,003 graduates and 83 members of the staff.
The University of Toronto, by the end of 1918, was represented by
5,308 men, from its staff, graduates, undergraduates, and its faculty
of education, of which 531 were killed. Other Ontario universities
were represented by 900 men on active service. At the close of the war
it was estimated that about 17,000 college students, or graduates,
had enlisted, of which about 1,200 were reported as casualties.
CHAPTER VI
THE "PRINCESS PAT" REGIMENT
No consideration of the activity of the university graduates, or
undergraduates, in the war can be made without reference to that
famous regiment whose personnel was very largely made up of university
men--the Princess Patricia Regiment, the first Canadian body of
fighting men to reach the front, and the one that suffered most
heavily.
The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Regiment was recruited
in Montreal, though its members were from all parts of the Dominion.
This body was formed on the initiative of A. Hamilton Gault of
Montreal. The regiment was first commanded by Lieutenant Colonel F. D.
Farquhar, D. S. O., of the Coldstream Guards, and military secretary
to the governor general. The other original officers were Major A.
Hamilton Gault; Adjutant, Captain H. C. Buller; Quartermaster, the
Hon. Lieutenant C. A. Wake; Paymaster, the Hon. Captain D. H.
MacDougall; Medical Officer, Major C. B. Keenan. The heroic career of
this body of men at the front will be followed in a later part of this
volume.
Those brigades which embarked from Quebec during the fall of 1914 were
those which were later to become famous as the First Canadian
Division, which was the first large body of Canadian troops to arrive
in France.
The First Division was constituted as follows: First Artillery
Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel E. W. B. Morrison; Second
Artillery Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Creelman;
Third Artillery Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J. H.
Mitchell; First Infantry Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel M.
S. Mercer; Second Infantry Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.
W. Currie; Third Infantry Brigade, commanded by Colonel R. E. W.
Turner; Royal Canadian Dragoons, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel C.
M. Nelles; Lord Strathcona's Horse, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.
H. Macdonnell; Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel H. A. Panet; Fourth Infantry Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel J. E. Cohoe; First to Ninth Field Batteries, commanded
respectively by Major C. H. L. Sharman, Lieutenant Colonel C. H.
MacLaren, Major A. G. L. McNaughton, Major E. G. Hanson, Lieutenant
Colonel H. G. McLeod, Major W. B. M. King, Major H. G. Carscallon, and
Major E. A. McDougall. The General Staff officers were: Colonel E. H.
Hard, Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Macdonnell, Lieutenant Colonel G. C. W.
Gordon-Hall, Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Mitchell, and Lieutenant Colonel
H. J. Lamb. Besides the above units there were also the Automobile and
Machine Gun Brigade, various line of communication units, a clearing
hospital, two stationary hospitals, and two general hospitals and
remount department.
The Second Canadian Division was composed of those units which arrived
in England during March, April, and May, 1915. It was in command of
Major General S. B. Steele, who was afterward succeeded by Brigadier
General R. E. W. Turner. As finally constituted the infantry included
the Fourth Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Lord Brooke; the
Fifth Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David Watson; and the
Sixth Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel H. D. B. Ketchen.
A fifth division was later organized in England, but was there held as
a reserve, most of its constituent elements being sent to France as
reenforcements to the first four divisions.
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade was not organized until early in 1915, in
England, but its constituent parts had come over from Canada with the
first contingent. From the time of its formation until May, 1918, it
was under the command of Brigadier General (later Major General) J. E.
B. Seeley, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O., M. P., a veteran of the South
African War, where he served under Sir John French, and later
Secretary of State for War in the Asquith Cabinet.
The brigade was originally formed from the Royal Canadian Dragoons,
Lord Strathcona's Horse, King Edward's Horse, an Imperial unit, and
the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. In 1916 the King Edward's Horse
left the brigade and its place was taken by the Fort Garry Horse,
previously known as the Canadian Reserve Cavalry Regiment. Later the
brigade had added to it the Machine Gun Squadron, the Canadian Cavalry
Field Ambulance, and the Mobile Veterinary Section. During the early
part of its services in France the brigade operated as infantry, and
it was not till the early part of 1916 that it was finally
reconstituted as a cavalry force. The cavalry brigade ranged in
numbers from two to three thousand throughout the war.
CHAPTER VII
CANADA'S HUGE FORESTRY CORPS
Of the special corps, outside the regular classifications into which
all armies are subdivided--infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc., special
emphasis and more detailed description should be accorded the Canadian
Forestry and the Canadian Railway Corps. The extraordinary dimensions
which these arms of the service acquired must be considered when the
number of Canadian troops on the actual field of battle is compared
with those who did not reach the front. No general history of the war
can ever be written without devoting considerable space to these two
corps as factors which assumed much importance in the defeat of
Germany.
In the production of lumber, and in the building of railways, to keep
up with the rapid westward progress of the Canadian population, Canada
stands forth preeminent. It was only natural that the special skill
and knowledge acquired in these industries should be in strong demand
by the Allied forces in general, and it was Canada which could supply
it in the greatest measure. Hence the unusual number of Canadian
recruits who were diverted to these particular branches of military
service.
The formation of the Forestry Corps came about through the growing
shortage of shipping. In February, 1916, the British Government issued
a proclamation restricting certain imports, for the sake of economy in
shipping. One of the chief commodities affected was timber, of which
six million tons was being brought into the country annually.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies called on the Governor General
of Canada for assistance in the production of timber for military
purposes from the home forests in England and Scotland. A special
force of Canadian lumbermen was asked for.
The result was the formation of the 224th Canadian Forestry Battalion,
which was sent over to England in the early part of the year. The
first unit to arrive in England carried with it all the machinery
necessary and immediately established a lumber camp and saw mill in
Surrey. Within three months after the first call for this special
assistance the battalion had been organized, transported across the
waters, and had sawn and delivered its first lot of sawn English
lumber. The battalion eventually reached a working force of over
1,500, detachments from which were distributed over various parts of
England and Scotland.
So big a success was the work of the 224th Lumber Battalion that
further and continuous demands were made on the Canadians for
lumbermen to cut the trees of Britain into lumber for the allied
armies on the western front. From this battalion gradually developed
the Canadian Forestry Corps, which later came to supply cut lumber to
the military forces of all the nations participating in the operations
against the Germans in France and Belgium.
Not long after the first contingent of Canadian lumbermen had arrived
in England, another cablegram was sent by the British authorities to
the Governor General of Canada, asking for more lumbermen. "His
Majesty's Government again turns to Canada for assistance," the
cablegram concluded.
This was the occasion for the formation of the 238th Canadian Forestry
Battalion, which arrived in England a few months later, in September,
1916. But even before it had arrived the French Government's grant of
extensive forests to the British forces had brought about the
necessity of putting the timber-cutting activities of the British
Government on a much broader basis, and some of the Canadian lumber
detachments were sent across to France.
In October, 1916, authority was granted for the formation of the
Canadian Forestry Corps, under the command of Major General Alexander
McDougal, who was then a Lieutenant Colonel, commanding the 224th
Battalion. By the British Government he was appointed director of the
timber operations for France and Great Britain. The two battalions
already in France and England thus became the nucleus of the corps.
Meanwhile enough machinery and other equipment was being prepared and
shipped from Canada to afford employment to 10,000 men. For by this
time it had been decided that timber imports would have to bear 60 per
cent of the total reductions decided upon, as three and a half million
tons of shipping could thereby be saved.
The first detachment of the Forestry Corps to arrive in France began
work in the Bois Normand. Later three other centers were established:
one in the Jura Mountains, one near Bordeaux, and another in the Marne
district. But the work of the corps spread over a wide area, reaching
out to the frontiers of Switzerland, Spain, and Germany.
The corps headquarters was established at Paris-Plage, in the
neighborhood of Boulogne, the supply department for equipment being at
Havre.
In so far as it was possible the methods of the Canadian lumber camps
were employed in cutting lumber in the corps' camps, but certain
differences in physical conditions caused many obstacles to present
themselves. In the absence of the waterways facilities, so common in
the Canadian forests, a great many miles of railways had to be built
for the transportation of the logs to the sawmills.
In the mountainous districts, however, conditions, especially during
winter, more closely representing those to which the men were used in
their native forests, and Canadian methods could therefore be more
closely applied.
The officers and men of the corps were recruited from all parts of
Canada, from the Atlantic to the Pacific seaboards. Special effort was
made to allot men to forests more nearly resembling those they were
used to at home. As an instance, the men from eastern Canada, not used
to the giant logs of the West, were assigned to the medium-sized
timber in the level portions of France, while the Westerners were sent
to the Jura and the Vosges Mountains, where logging engines, heavy
steel cables, and modern railway construction were involved in the
work of getting the logs out.
Most of the detachments worked in stationary camps, but there were
also a great number of mobile camps which, together with their
equipment, moved about from place to place, supplying timber to those
points at the front where a demand happened to develop to an acute
degree. Often detachments would be working within range of the enemy
artillery fire and at considerable risk to men and equipment. The
degree of efficiency which some of these detachments acquired in their
movements is illustrated by the following extract from an official
report:
"This, the record transfer, was in the case of a sawmill where the
last log was sawn at nine o'clock on the day the move was to take
place. By seven o'clock the next day the mill had been moved to a wood
three miles away and was in full operation. The following day the
product of this mill exceeded 18,000 board feet, and the day after the
total output was 23,000 board feet, much more than the guaranteed
capacity of the mill."
The largest output by any one stationary camp, according to the
official report, was registered by the group operating in the Jura
Mountains. Here a total of 156,000 board feet was cut in ten hours in
a mill which was only registered to turn out 30,000 feet in that time.
Across the Channel, in Great Britain, the operations of the Forestry
Corps extended over six districts--four in England and two in
Scotland. Forty-three detachments were spread over these areas,
totaling 12,533 men at the end of the war, though of this number about
3,000 were attached labor or prisoners of war. In England the corps
did especially noteworthy service in supplying the Royal Air Force,
more specially for the defense wing. In a letter of appreciation
written by Lord Derby, Secretary of State for War, it was indicated
that on several occasions the men of the Forestry Corps had worked at
the rate of ninety hours a week to supply timber needed in the
construction of aerodromes for the aeroplanes used to repel hostile
air raids.
In November, 1918, at the conclusion of hostilities, the total
strength of the Canadian Forestry Corps stood at 31,447, divided as
follows: In France, regular officers, 425; attached officers, 53;
other ranks, 11,702; attached, 1,039; prisoners of war, 5,021; giving
a total of 18,240. In Great Britain there were: Regular officers, 343;
attached officers, 49; other ranks, 9,624; attached labor, 1,926;
prisoners of war, 1,265; making a total of 13,207.
When hostilities ceased over 70 per cent of the timber in use on the
western front by all the Allied armies had been supplied by the
Forestry Corps. Up to December, 1918, the corps had supplied nearly
814,000,000 board feet of sawn lumber.
"It is largely due," wrote Lord Derby, in the spring of 1918, "to the
operations of the units of this corps in France that we have
practically stopped the shipment of British-grown timber to France,
thus saving cross-channel tonnage, while we are also able to save the
shipment of foreign timber by having the production of the corps in
England to meet the various national demands."
CHAPTER VIII
THE CANADIAN RAILWAY CORPS
Never did railways as a means of transportation play so important a
part in warfare as during the recent World War, in spite of the
remarkable development of motor vehicles. It was her superior railway
systems which gave Germany her principal advantage over the Russians
on the eastern front, and as the great struggle developed, it became
daily more obvious that the Allies would have to draw on their
resources in railway construction to the uttermost to offset the
initial advantage which Germany had in this respect on the western
front.
At first the French undertook to direct what railway construction it
was thought would be necessary, but it was not long before the French
Government was forced to call on the British for help. Finally the
British found themselves unable to keep pace with the demand, and what
was more natural than that Canada, the land of marvelous railway
construction, should in her turn be appealed to?
It was in the spring of 1915 that the British Government asked for two
railway construction companies. The Canadian Government turned the
request over to the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, with the result
that from the employees of that corporation were recruited the first
five hundred members of the Canadian Overseas Railway Construction
Corps, which landed in France in the following August.
In May, 1916, the situation in France had become so pressing that the
British War Office was compelled to ask for another unit, of about one
thousand men, for railway construction behind the lines in France.
The task of organizing this body of men was assigned by the Canadian
Government to Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Stewart, who combed the railway
workers of the whole country for technical experts and efficient
workers. These men were then formed into the 239th Overseas Railway
Construction Corps.
Meanwhile Sir Eric Geddes had been assigned the task, as director
general of transportation, to reorganize the transportation service
behind the lines on the western front. He immediately called General
Stewart over to England for a special conference, the outcome of which
was a further demand on Canada for railway men.
It was agreed that Canada should furnish five battalions of railway
construction men, which were to be known as the Canadian Railway
Troops. General Stewart was then instructed to proceed to France to
act as deputy director of light railways, as well as chief in command
of the Canadian Railway Troops.
In January, 1917, General Stewart became Deputy Director General of
Transportation, which gave him jurisdiction over the Royal Engineers'
Railway Construction companies as well as over his own Canadians. By
this time it had been decided to increase the number of battalions to
ten.
The 127th Infantry Battalion was reorganized as the 2d Battalion of
Canadian Railway Troops, and proceeded to France in January, 1917. The
239th was renamed the 3d Battalion of Canadian Railway Troops, and
followed the 2d two months later. The 4th and 5th Battalions were
organized at Purfleet, and proceeded to France at about the same time.
By the following April still another battalion had arrived in France,
and by June all ten were behind the lines. Henceforward they carried
on practically all the light railway construction along the whole
western front, especially such lines as had to be laid in quick time,
over ground evacuated by the enemy in their retreat.
Upon their first arrival the Canadian Railway Troops rendered notable
service, just before the attack on and capture of Vimy Ridge. For some
weeks before the weather had been unusually rainy, and the ground was
so deep with mud as to be almost impassable for any kind of vehicle.
In spite of these conditions the Canadian railway men laid their roads
to within rifle range of the front lines, ready to serve as supply
lines when the advance should begin.
The attack begun, and the advance progressing, the railway detachment
followed the front line closely, laying their tracks almost as fast as
the infantry could push ahead. In this way supplies of provisions and
ammunition were carried forward, while the wounded were carried back
to the clearing hospitals.
Within a week before the Arras offensive tracks had been laid to the
top of Vimy Ridge, and by the end of April, 1917, when the British
lines were pushed across the level plain beyond the Ridge, the light
railways had followed them so closely that food supplies were dumped
almost by the field kitchens. Such similar service was rendered by the
Canadian Railway Construction Troops at Messines as well.
It was at Ypres, however, that they especially distinguished
themselves. During two months of the summer of 1917, says the
official report, the average daily number of breaks in the light
railway lines behind the front, due to German artillery fire, was
about a hundred exclusively within the area occupied by the Second and
Fifth British Armies alone. Here the Canadians pursued their
construction work exposed to the full fire of the enemy guns, without
even the moral satisfaction of being able to return the fire.
On one occasion, however, they were to have this satisfaction in full.
It was during the last four days of March, 1918, while the Germans
were advancing on Amiens, that a break suddenly developed in the
British lines. No reserves were available at the time. On the spur of
the moment the railway men organized sixteen Lewis-gun teams and held
the ground in the break until finally they were relieved by regular
troops.
Early in 1918 the Canadian Overseas Railway Construction Corps, the
58th Broad Gauge Operating Company, the 13th Light Railway Operating
Company, the 69th Wagon Erecting Company, and the 85th Engine Crew
Company were brought under headquarters, and the whole were formed
into the Corps of Canadian Railway Troops.
In the summer of 1918, General Allenby, in command of the
expeditionary force in Palestine, called for a company of expert
bridge builders. The War Office immediately called for volunteers from
among the Canadian Railway Troops, and 6 officers and 250 men were
sent to Palestine. The following table, taken from the report of the
Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada, shows the relative
strength of the Canadian and the Imperial Railway Construction Corps
at different periods of the war:
Nominal Strength Nominal Strength
Imperial Railway Canadian Railway
Construction Construction
Troops Troops
December 31, 1914 1,476 ---
December 31, 1915 2,440 512
December 31, 1916 4,900 1,617
January 30, 1917 7,340 11,562
December 31, 1917 7,340 13,772
November 11, 1918 7,340 14,877
Besides the foregoing, there were four Canadian Railway Troops
Operating Companies, with a total strength of 1,087 when the armistice
was signed. The total number of Canadian railway troops in England
when hostilities ceased was 3,364.
During the period of their work at the front members of the railway
troops were awarded 489 honors and decorations.
CHAPTER IX
OTHER BRANCHES OF THE SERVICE
That Canada should have had no flying branch of her military
establishment at the outbreak of the war is hardly a matter of
surprise when her lack of military preparedness in other branches is
also considered.
Nevertheless, though it was not considered advisable to organize
specially a Canadian flying force until only a short time before the
close of the war, over 8,000 Canadians became proficient flyers and
aerial fighters, that number having enlisted and held commissions in
the Royal Flying Corps. This number, it will be noted, is quite above
the logical proportion that could ordinarily have been expected from
Canada, population considered.
Those Canadians who entered the Royal Flying Corps were exceptionally
well adapted to this branch of the service. Apparently conditions of
life and open-air training in the Dominion tend to endow men with
those faculties which are essential to the successful flyer.
During the latter part of the war the question of forming a separate
Canadian flying corps began to receive consideration, and finally, in
the early part of 1918, steps were taken to bring this idea to a point
of materialization. The matter now formed the subject of discussion
between the Canadian Ministry and the Secretary of State for the
Royal Air Force. A memorandum setting forth tentative arrangements was
then drawn up. On July 8, 1918, it was definitely settled that the
Canadian Flying Corps should be organized.
The memorandum provided specifically for two air squadrons. These were
to be organized in England by the overseas military forces of Canada,
in conjunction with the Royal Air Force. For the carrying out of this
provision a Canadian Air Force Section of the Canadian General Staff
was created. The types of squadrons decided upon were a single-seater
scout squadron and a day bombing squadron. These were actually
organized and went into quarters at Upper Heyford, near Oxford.
Training was in progress when the armistice was signed, so that the
Canadian flying force never went into action.
Training continued, however, but was adapted to future postwar flying,
special attention being paid to wireless operations, photographic
training, aerial geographical training, and cross-country flying.
To provide for a flying force on a peace basis, for the future
Canadian military service, the following establishment was then
authorized:
A director of air service, assisted by a staff captain and a staff
lieutenant, along with four other ranks; a wing headquarters,
consisting of a lieutenant colonel, who will have command of the two
squadrons, assisted by a captain for administration, a captain for
technical duties, and a lieutenant for armament, along with five other
ranks; No. 1 Squadron (scout), consisting of 18 aeroplanes, commanded
by a major with three captains, flight commanders, and 18 flying
officers of the rank of lieutenant, the total personnel being 159; No.
2 Squadron (day bombing), also consisting of 18 aeroplanes, manned
like Squadron No. 1; and a technical and supply branch, consisting of
a headquarters, technical branch, and a supply depot.
At the end of 1918 the equipment of the Canadian Air Corps consisted
of 3 aeroplanes, presented by the Imperial Air Fleet Committee; 16
presented by the Overseas Club and Patriotic League; and 40 German
aeroplanes allotted by the Air Ministry. In addition to the above 50
Curtiss machines were presented to the Canadian Government by the
Imperial Munitions Board, making a total of 109 machines available for
service on the return to Canada of the Canadian Air Force.
Like the aeroplane, the tank became a military weapon only during the
Great War, and tank battalions were entirely unknown as a branch of
any army service before hostilities began. At about the same time that
the matter of forming a Canadian air force came up for consideration,
the organization of a separate Canadian tank battalion was also
discussed. It was in March, 1918, that the British War Office
requested the Canadian Government to supply the men for one tank
battalion. By the middle of summer the battalion had been formed and
had arrived in England, comprising 92 officers and 716 men.
What made this battalion especially noteworthy was the fact that the
entire body had been recruited from among the students of Canadian
universities. One company came from McGill University, another from
Toronto University, while the third came from the others.
While the battalion was in training, two months later, the British
Government again requested the Canadian Governor General to provide a
tank battalion. This request was immediately complied with, and in the
middle of October, 1918, the 2d Canadian Tank Battalion arrived in
England from Canada, consisting of 44 officers and 960 other ranks.
Meanwhile the 1st Battalion had completed the training course and was
preparing to embark for France when the armistice was signed. At that
time, however, Canada had been requested to recruit a third tank
battalion.
At the time that hostilities ceased, says the official report of the
Overseas Ministry, the Medical Corps of the Canadian overseas forces
exceeded in numbers the entire British Royal Army Medical Corps during
the South African War. In November, 1918, the bed capacity of the
hospitals overseas amounted to 40,000, as compared to 3,000 in June,
1915.
In the matter of a military medical service Canada had been prepared
to a certain degree. Back in 1904 the first nucleus of the Army
Medical Corps had been formed, and in 1911 the equipment of a military
medical branch had been authorized, including a complete scheme for
quick mobilization in case of hostilities. Thus there was a basis for
the high degree of efficiency which characterized the Canadian Medical
Corps, and won for it the highest recommendations as early as the
Second Battle of Ypres. This efficiency was largely due to the
director of the corps, Major General G. L. Foster, C. B.
This, however, was merely a nucleus, and the later tremendous
development of the corps was entirely due to the spirit of
self-sacrifice and patriotism of the great number of Canadian doctors
and surgeons who flocked to the colors during the early months of the
war and freely offered their professional services.
The work of the corps was divided into two distinct sections, each
with a character peculiar to itself yet harmonizing and cooperating
closely. There was, first of all, the professional side, comprising
scientific medical work and investigation, and the military side,
which provides for the physical organization on which the professional
work must be based.
One of the first tasks undertaken was the creation of a consultant
staff, with officers of rich experience to superintend at hospitals,
sanitary formations, laboratories, etc. It was organized on an
effective and systematic basis, and its big success was largely due to
the invaluable services which were rendered by some of Canada's most
brilliant medical men, in cooperation with those of England and
France. The Canadian consultants and specialists attended the various
important Allied medical conferences and made tours of observation and
instruction in the hospitals of the various countries, and it was by
these and other means that the Canadian soldiers in hospitals
benefited by the latest medical and surgical discoveries in every land
which was at war with the country responsible for the horrors which
had to be faced. This knowledge was passed on and diffused among the
staffs of all the Canadian hospitals. In the remarkable development of
reconstructive surgery which took place during the war the Canadian
surgeons had their full share.
In the defensive warfare with epidemic diseases the Canadian Medical
Corps attained a degree of efficiency that contrasted well with the
medical corps of any of the Allied armies. The results in regard to
enteric were perhaps the most remarkable of all. Of 100,000 Canadian
patients only one man was found to have typhoid, and he, for some
reason or other, had not been inoculated.
The military organization of the corps was in all respect equal to the
professional qualities of its members. In one division there were
about twenty regimental medical officers and three field ambulances,
with nine medical officers each--about 750 men to the three
ambulances. For transport each ambulance had fifty horses, and seven
motor and three horse ambulances, with general service wagons and
carts in addition.
The following represented a few of the specific achievements of the
corps:
A school of massage and Swedish remedial drill was organized for
training nurse sisters and soldiers for this service in hospitals.
A laboratory service was organized on an economical and efficient
basis. Four grades of laboratories were adopted, with standard
equipment and an established personnel for each; and each of the two
laboratory units and twenty-two hospital laboratories were organized.
The X-Ray laboratory service was similarly organized and systematized.
A central medical stores was established, through which all medical
supplies and technical equipment were received and distributed.
The sanitary service was also completely reorganized and measures for
the prevention and control of infectious diseases placed on an
effective basis.
Among the units organized were: Ten general hospitals; 8 special
hospitals; 6 convalescent hospitals; 3 ship hospitals (one of which,
the _Llandovery Castle_, was sunk by a German submarine); 2 laboratory
units; 4 sanitary sections; 1 medical stores; 1 regimental depot and
training school; 7 administrative units for training areas.
The following table, taken from the official report of the Ministry,
shows the strength of the Canadian Army Medical Corps on June 1 of
successive years and on November 30, 1918:
June 1 June 1 June 1 June 1 Nov. 30
1915 1916 1917 1918 1918
Officers 378 817 1,319 1,386 1,451
Nursing Sisters 535 915 1,486 1,829 1,886
Other Ranks 3,620 6,913 11,327 12,304 12,243
Total Personnel 4,533 8,645 14,132 15,519 15,580
In connection with the medical service, and yet comprising a separate
and certainly a new feature of military organization, was the Canadian
Army Dental Corps, which was developed to extraordinary dimensions.
Undoubtedly thousands of young Canadians had never had their teeth
troubles properly attended to until they entered the army.
The Dental Corps was organized within a few months after the first
contingent had gone overseas, early in 1915, in fact. The organization
was under the direction of the Director of Dental Services, Colonel J.
A. Armstrong, C. M. G. In France the corps members carried on their
work principally at field ambulances, casualty clearing stations,
general and stationary hospitals, and at base camps.
On arriving in England every Canadian soldier was obliged to submit to
mouth inspection, and, if time permitted, his requirements were
attended to there. If the time did not permit, his teeth record
followed him over to France, and there, as soon as he found a
permanent station, the work was continued and completed. In addition
to the general clinics, which handled the bulk of the work, there were
special clinics, where dental surgery was practiced and wounds
affecting the region around the mouth and jaws were attended to. Here
was performed some of the remarkable facial surgery whose development
was a special feature of the war.
To combat an epidemic of infectious stomatitis, commonly known as
"trench mouth," which at one time affected 10,000 men, the Dental
Corps established the Department of Oral Pathology, and as a result
of microscopic diagnosis and persistent treatment the disease was
finally brought under control.
Summed up, the total number of dental operations from July 15, 1915,
till December 31, 1918, amounted to 2,225,442, including 96,713
operations performed on soldiers of Imperial units who chanced to come
within the jurisdiction of the Canadian Dental Corps.
On first coming overseas the strength of the Dental Corps was 30
officers, 34 noncommissioned officers, and 40 privates. When the
armistice was signed this number had increased to 223 officers, 221
noncommissioned officers, and 238 privates.
No consideration of Canada's war establishment, as developed during
the great world struggle, can be complete without a few words devoted
to Canada's naval service.
At the outbreak of the war Canada's naval strength was represented by
two vessels, the _Niobe_, a cruiser of 11,000 tons displacement, with
a main armament of sixteen 6-inch guns, stationed at Halifax, and the
_Rainbow_, a small cruiser of 3,600 tons, armed with two 6-inch, six
4.7-inch, and four 12-pounder guns, stationed at Esquimalt.
The latter vessel performed patrol service along the Pacific Coast
during the war, cruising as far south as Panama, and captured several
ships carrying contraband of war.
The _Niobe_ performed similar duty on the Atlantic Coast for over a
year, and afterward became a depot ship at Halifax.
When the war began the Canadian Government immediately took over a
number of small craft from the Departments of Marine and Customs,
which were fitted out for patrol duty. To this fleet were added two
submarines, which had been purchased just before war was declared.
Later more vessels were taken over from private owners and utilized
for coast patrol.
The officers and men of the Royal Canadian Navy numbered 749, and the
officers and men of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve
amounted to 4,374. In addition to these over 1,700 Canadians went
into the Imperial navy and saw service in the war area.
CHAPTER X
ADMINISTRATION OF CANADA'S WAR ESTABLISHMENT
Although the Canadian forces operating in the field were under the
British High Command, Canada retained control of the vast army she had
sent overseas in so far as military operations were not concerned. For
this purpose an extensive and a somewhat complicated administrative
machinery was required.
Up until the close of 1916 Sir George H. Perley acted as High
Commissioner for Canada in England. At the end of that period,
however, Sir George became the Minister of the Overseas Military
Forces of Canada with enlarged powers, and a Military Council composed
of Brigadier General P. E. Thacker, as Adjutant General; Brigadier
General A. D. McRae, as Acting Quartermaster and Chief Executive
Officer, and Major General R. E. W. Turner, as Commander of the
Canadian troops in England.
During the summer of 1917 still further changes were made, through
which the administration of the Canadian military establishment in
England was divided into four branches, under the supervision of the
Military Secretary, Major F. F. Montague, the General Staff, in charge
of Lieutenant Colonel H. F. McDonald, the Adjutant General, Brigadier
General P. E. Thacker, and the Quartermaster General, Brigadier
General A. D. McRae.
In May, 1918, the Canadian Headquarters Staff in England was created,
with Lieutenant General Sir R. E. W. Turner as Chief of Staff.
Over in France, in the war zone, by agreement with the British War
Office, a Canadian section of General Headquarters of the British
armies in France was formed in July, 1918. This section was in no way
supposed to interfere in purely fighting operations, but through it
the Canadian Government obtained control over matters of organization
and administration within its own forces.
[Illustration: Lieutenant General Sir Ernest William Turner, V. C. He
commanded a Canadian Division in France in 1915 and was Commander of
Canadian Troops in England from 1916 on.]
PART II--CANADA AT THE FRONT
CHAPTER XI
THE CANADIANS IN FLANDERS--NEUVE CHAPELLE--THEIR BRAVE PART IN THE
SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES--THE PRINCESS PATRICIAS
The fleet with the Canadian Expeditionary Force, after a long but
uneventful voyage, arrived in Plymouth Sound in the evening of October
14, 1914. The British censorship had maintained such secrecy regarding
their movements that the people of Plymouth and Devonport first
learned that they had crossed the seas when the transports were in
harbor. When the news spread through the neighborhood the townsfolk
flocked to the waterside and with cheers and song welcomed the
soldiers of the Dominion. This demonstration was repeated on a greater
and more enthusiastic scale when the troops later disembarked and
marched through the streets.
Lieutenant General E. A. H. Alderson, C. B., was appointed to the
command of the contingent, which soon after landing encamped on
Salisbury Plain. Here the Canadians spent four miserable months of one
of the rainiest seasons on record. They were most of the time under
canvas, the roads became quagmires, they were miles from any
considerable town, yet despite their discomforts they maintained a
brave and cheerful spirit.
King George, accompanied by Field Marshals Roberts and Kitchener, Sir
George Perley, member of the Canadian Cabinet, and Sir Richard
McBride, Prime Minister of British Columbia, visited the troops in
November, 1914.
The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, composed largely of
soldiers who had seen war service, left for the front early in
December, 1914, and joined the Twenty-seventh British Division.
On February 4, 1915, a division composed of three infantry brigades,
three artillery brigades, ammunition column, divisional engineers,
divisional mounted troops, and divisional train left Salisbury Plain
and sailed from Avonmouth, the last transport reaching St.-Nazaire, on
the Bay of Biscay, in the second week of February, 1915.
The 6th, 9th, 11th, 12th, and 17th Battalions remained in England as
the base brigade of the division. Later these battalions were formed
into the Canadian Training Depot, and afterward, with the coming of
reenforcements, into the Canadian Training Division, under the command
of Brigadier General J. C. MacDougall.
The Canadians had a long journey of 350 miles after landing in France
before they arrived at the front within the triangle of country
between St.-Omer on the west, Ypres on the east, and Bethune to the
south. At this time the entire British army in Europe was contained in
this territory.
When the Canadians arrived in England the British held a front between
twenty and thirty miles long running from Ypres on the north, where
the Seventh Division made its historic stand against the Prussian
Guards, to Givenchy on the south near the scene of the battle that was
afterward fought at Neuve Chapelle. This front the British had
continued to maintain through the long winter when it may be truly
said that they lived, ate, slept in mud. Mud they were never free from
until the welcome spring brought a cessation of the almost continuous
rain and the winds dried up the mire.
When the Canadians took their turn as a division in the trenches there
were no sensational happenings. They were not called upon to attack,
nor was their bravery tested in holding a trench against a determined
assault by the enemy. But the weeks spent in trench work were not
wasted, and they learned much that was to serve them well in after
days when they were in the thick of the hardest fighting of the war.
There were casualties from snipers and sufficient excitement to keep
them keyed up to the proper fighting spirit.
Here we must leave for a time the Canadian Division and follow the
fortunes of Princess Patricia's Light Infantry Regiment, which was the
first to carry the badge of Canada on the battle fields of Flanders.
As previously noted, the "Princess Pats" arrived in France December,
1914. The regiment was hurried north to strengthen the Eightieth
Brigade of the Twenty-seventh British Division holding a thin line
which the Germans continually assailed. For several months the
regiment was engaged in hard winter trench work. Later a section of
trench in front of the village of St.-Eloi was occupied by them. This
was a dangerous position where it was impossible to raise the hand
without attracting the bullet of a sniper. The Germans seemed to know
the position of every dugout in the Princess Patricia's lines. It was
said that they had rifles so fixed as to cover them exactly, and it
was only necessary to pull the trigger without aiming. The regiment
lost some valuable officers at this time.
It was while they held the trenches before St.-Eloi that the Patricias
were engaged in an important action. On February 28, 1915, the Germans
had completed a sap which became a source of danger and loss. The
battalion commander decided to sweep away this menace. Major Hamilton
Gault and Lieutenant Colquhoun went out after dark and made a careful
reconnoissance of the German position, returning to the line with much
valuable information. But more was needed, and Lieutenant Colquhoun
went out again and alone and fell into the hands of the enemy.
It was decided to attack on the strength of information that had been
obtained and an assault was organized by Lieutenant Crabbe, the bomb
throwers being commanded by Lieutenant Papineau, the last a lineal
descendant of the rebel of 1837. Corporal Ross was in command of the
snipers. A body of troops were organized in support with picks and
shovels to destroy the parapet of the enemy trench, which at the
nearest point was only about fifteen yards away. Corporal Ross, who
was in the lead when the party ran forward and flung themselves into
the sap, was killed. Lieutenant Papineau with his bombers ran along
the outside of the parapet bombing the occupants of the trench, while
Lieutenant Crabbe followed up with his detachment through the trench
to "clean up" until a barricade which the Germans had built barred
farther progress.
While troops held the rear of the sap to beat off counterattacks,
Sergeant Major Lloyd led a platoon which demolished the German's
parapet. In the course of this operation the gallant Lloyd was killed.
Just as the day was breaking, the party completed the job and were
ordered back to their trenches. There were casualties, among the
wounded being Major Gault, but the work had been carried out so
successfully that none regretted the cost.
On March 1, 1915, the Germans made a fierce attack with bombs and
shells to recover the site of the sap, which had been demolished by
the battalion, and the struggle continued until the 6th. On this date,
after the men had withdrawn from the trenches, which were only twenty
or thirty yards from the Germans, British artillery wiped out the sap
and the trench which the enemy had used in making it, the enemy being
blown high in the air by the explosive shells.
Here, for a time, we leave the Princess Patricias and return to the
Canadian Division on the eve of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. The
Canadian infantry was not especially engaged in this contest, but
Canadian artillery played an important part in the bombardment that
preceded the British attack. The Canadians were ready waiting during
the struggle for an order to join the fight, but they were not called
upon. The main purpose of the British offensive was to break the
German lines and occupy Aubers Ridge, which dominates Lille. Had they
succeeded, the enemy would probably have been forced out of this part
of France.
The Battle of Neuve Chapelle was the first great effort made by the
British to pierce the German lines since the fighting around the
Marne and the Aisne. All the British gained in this costly operation
was about a mile of territory on a three-mile front.
After Neuve Chapelle quiet reigned in the trenches of the Canadian
Division. In the last days of March the troops were withdrawn and went
into rest camps.
The Princess Patricias were in billets when the Germans made a
powerful attack on the intrenchments around St.-Eloi on March 13,
1915. It became necessary to organize a counterattack to relieve the
pressure, and hurried orders were sent to the battalion at Westoutre
to proceed at once to St.-Eloi. The Princess Patricias marched off at
7 p. m. and joining a battalion of the King's Royal Rifle Corps
proceeded by way of Dickebush to Voormanzeele. While the troops were
drawn up along the road, news came in that Germans in large numbers
were moving toward the eastern end of the village. The battalion
commander detailed Number 4 Company to occupy a position on the east
as a precaution against surprise. The St.-Eloi mound and trenches to
the west of it had been captured by the Germans, and the battalion was
ordered to cooperate with the rifle brigade in an endeavor to recover
the lost positions.
At St.-Eloi it was learned that trench A, as it was known to the
Intelligence Staff, had been retaken by the British. The battalion
occupied a breastwork to the west of a farm building, which was to be
their first objective. It was just before daybreak when the battalion
arrived, and an attack was at once organized by Number 2 Company
against trench P, the approach being made in three parties from the
back of trench A.
The Germans had possession of the mound from which their guns could
sweep the approaches. To have attempted to cross that fire-swept field
would have been a useless sacrifice of men. Three platoons therefore
were detailed to hold the right of the breastwork near the mound while
the remainder of the battalion was withdrawn to Voormanzeele.
The troops left at the breastwork held fast during the long and trying
night, which was all that could have been expected of them. At
daybreak they withdrew and joined the battalion then at Dickebush.
On March 20, 1915, Colonel Francis Farquhar, commanding officer of
the battalion, was killed by a stray bullet. This fine officer had
been military secretary to the Duke of Connaught and had done more for
the battalion than it is possible to record here. Though a strict
disciplinarian, Colonel Farquhar was greatly loved by the soldiers for
his patience and good humor and his readiness to hear their complaints
and improve their condition whenever possible. Lieutenant Colonel H.
C. Buller succeeded to the command of the regiment.
After the death of Colonel Farquhar the battalion retired to rest,
occupying a line on the Polygon Wood in the Ypres salient. Near by
they constructed log cabins of such skillful workmanship as to excite
the admiration of the French, British, and Belgian officers who
visited the camp. The regiment was also busy improving and
strengthening the trenches and in erecting breastworks before them
under cover of the wood. When enemy guns were bombarding Ypres again
the battalion, then in billets in the neighborhood of that stricken
town, were ordered once more to the trenches.
The Second Battle of Ypres began on April 21, 1915, and during the
first days of the struggle the Patricias occupied trenches some
distance south and west of those held by the Canadian Division. Though
doomed to inaction they were constantly shelled by the enemy. They
were eager to join in the battle raging in the north and where their
kinsmen were desperately engaged, but the order to move to the firing
line never came. On May 3, 1915, the battalion was withdrawn to a
subsidiary line a considerable distance to the rear.
In the meantime the Canadian Division won enduring fame at Ypres.
Their achievements were all the more remarkable because the division
was in the main made up of raw material, and until the outbreak of war
untrained and undisciplined in warfare. The officers, too, had mostly
learned military science from study rather than from experience; yet
these former lawyers, professors, and business men, with rare
exceptions, displayed valor and resource at the most trying moments in
the battle.
It was on April 22, 1915, that the Germans brought into action a new
form of "frightfulness," which was so far successful that a gap was
created in the Allies' line, which might have led to disastrous
results but for the dauntless courage displayed by the Canadians.
It was a calm, sunny, and peaceful day when the enemy sprang their
surprise. The Canadian Division held a line of about five thousand
yards extending in a northwesterly direction from the Ypres-Roulers
railway to the Ypres-Poelcappelle road where at the terminus it joined
the French. The division comprised three infantry brigades, the first
in reserve, the second on the right, and the third in contact with the
French, as previously noted. In addition to the infantry there were
the artillery brigades.
About 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 22d, the Germans projected
asphyxiating gas of great intensity over the French line on the left.
Aided by the favorable wind, the gas penetrated the trenches,
poisoning and disabling great numbers of troops who were wholly
unprepared to combat this new horror of warfare. The French troops,
principally Turcos and Zouaves, became panic-stricken and fled back
over the canal and through the village of Vlamertinghe just at
twilight. The Canadian reserve battalions of the First Brigade were
amazed as the French soldiers surged into the town, their faces
contorted with pain, and gasping for breath. It was some time before
order could be restored and the staff officers could learn from the
fugitives that they had left thousands of their comrades dead, or
dying, that a four-mile gap had been created in the French line
through which the Germans were advancing in the wake of their gas
attack.
The withdrawal of the French created a serious situation as the
Canadian Third Brigade was now without any left. It was imperative
under the circumstances that the Canadian lines should be at once
greatly extended to the left rear. The first reserve could not be
moved from reserve at short notice, and the line increased from 5,000
to 9,000 yards was not the same line which the Allies had held at the
time of the gas attack. A gap still remained on the left.