THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION
OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON
1801–1805
HISTORY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DURING THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON
BY HENRY ADAMS
VOL. II.
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS
1889
_Copyright, 1889_,
BY CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS.
University Press:
JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE.
CONTENTS OF VOL. II.
CHAPTER PAGE
I. RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS 1
II. THE LOUISIANA TREATY 25
III. CLAIM TO WEST FLORIDA 51
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES 74
V. THE LOUISIANA DEBATE 94
VI. LOUISIANA LEGISLATION 116
VII. IMPEACHMENTS 135
VIII. CONSPIRACY 160
IX. THE YAZOO CLAIMS 192
X. TRIAL OF JUSTICE CHASE 218
XI. QUARREL WITH YRUJO 245
XII. PINCKNEY’S DIPLOMACY 264
XIII. MONROE AND TALLEYRAND 288
XIV. RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND 316
XV. CORDIALITY WITH ENGLAND 342
XVI. ANTHONY MERRY 360
XVII. JEFFERSON’S ENEMIES 389
XVIII. ENGLAND AND TRIPOLI 410
INDEX TO VOLS. I. AND II. 439
[Illustration:
THE COAST OF
WEST FLORIDA
AND
LOUISIANA
(From Jeffery’s American Atlas. London, 1800.)]
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.
CHAPTER I.
CONGRESS expired; Monroe set sail March 8, 1803; Washington
relapsed into silence; and the President and his Cabinet waited
alone in the empty village, triumphing for the moment over their
difficulties. Although a French prefect was actually in New Orleans,
and the delivery of Louisiana to Bonaparte might from day to day
be expected, not an additional soldier stood on the banks of the
Mississippi, and the States of Kentucky and Tennessee were as quiet
as though their flat-boats still floated down to New Orleans. A month
passed before Madison or Jefferson again moved. Then the President
asked his Cabinet[1] what Monroe should do in case France, as he
expressed it, “refused our rights.” He proposed an alliance with
England, and suggested three inducements which might be offered to
Great Britain: “1. Not to make a separate peace. 2. To let her take
Louisiana. 3. Commercial privileges.” The Cabinet unanimously rejected
the second and third concessions, but Dearborn and Lincoln were alone
in opposing the first; and a majority agreed to instruct Monroe and
Livingston, “as soon as they find that no arrangements can be made with
France, to use all possible procrastination with them, and in the mean
time enter into conferences with the British government, through their
ambassador at Paris, to fix principles of alliance, and leave us in
peace till Congress meets; and prevent war till next spring.”
Madison wrote the instructions. If the French government, he said,[2]
should meditate hostilities against the United States, or force a war
by closing the Mississippi, the two envoys were to invite England to an
alliance, and were to negotiate a treaty stipulating that neither party
should make peace or truce without consent of the other. Should France
deny the right of deposit without disputing the navigation, the envoys
were to make no positive engagement, but should let Congress decide
between immediate war or further procrastination.
At no time in Talleyrand’s negotiations had the idea of war against
the United States been suggested. Of his intentions in this respect
alone he had given positive assurances.[3] Above all things both he
and the First Consul feared a war with the United States. They had
nothing to gain by it. Madison’s instructions therefore rested on an
idea which had no foundation, and which in face of the latest news from
Europe was not worth considering; yet even if intended only for use
at home, the instructions were startling enough to warrant Virginians
in doubting their authenticity. The late Administration, British in
feeling as it was supposed to be, had never thought an alliance with
England necessary even during actual hostilities with France, and had
not hesitated to risk the chances of independent action. Had either of
Jefferson’s predecessors instructed American ministers abroad, in case
of war with France, to bind the United States to make no peace without
England’s consent, the consequence would have been an impeachment
of the President, or direct steps by Virginia, Kentucky, and North
Carolina, as in 1798, tending to a dissolution of the Union. Such an
alliance, offensive and defensive, with England contradicted every
principle established by President Washington in power or professed by
Jefferson in opposition. If it was not finesse, it was an act such as
the Republicans of 1798 would have charged as a crime.
While Madison was writing these instructions, he was interrupted by
the Marquis of Casa Yrujo,[4] who came in triumph to say that his
Government had sent out a brigantine especially to tell the President
that the right of deposit would be restored and continued till
another agreement or equivalent place could be fixed upon.[5] Yrujo
was instructed to thank the President for his friendly, prudent, and
moderate conduct during the excitement. He sent to New Orleans the
positive order of King Charles IV. to the Intendant Morales, that the
right of deposit should be immediately restored; the western people
were told that their produce might go down the river as before, and
thus the last vestige of anxiety was removed. In face of this action by
Godoy, and of the war evidently at hand between France and England, the
success of the peace policy was assured. These events in some degree
explained the extraordinary nature of the new instructions of April,
1803.
Monroe was then already at Paris. In order to make clear the situation
in which he found himself, the sequence of events in Europe needs to be
understood.
Bonaparte’s expedition to Louisiana was to have sailed at the end of
September, 1802.[6] A general of division, three generals of brigade,
five battalions of infantry, two companies of artillery, sixteen
pieces of cannon, and three thousand muskets were to be collected at
Dunkirk for shipment; but as fast as regiments could be named they
were consumed by the fiery furnace of St. Domingo. Nevertheless, all
the orders and arrangements were gradually made. Victor was to command
the forces in Louisiana; Laussat was to be prefect, charged with the
civil administration. Both received elaborate written instructions; and
although Victor could not sail without ships or troops, Laussat was
sent on his way.
These instructions, which were never published, had extreme value for
the decision of disputes which were to perturb American politics for
the next twenty years. Although Victor was forced to wait in Holland
for the expedition he commanded, a copy of his instructions was given
to Laussat, and served to regulate his conduct as long as he remained
in office. Decrès, the Minister of Marine, was the author of this
paper, which unfolded the purpose that had guided France in recovering,
and was to control her in administering, this vast possession. Nothing
could be simpler, clearer, or more consistent with French policy than
this document, which embodied so large a part of Talleyrand’s political
system.
The instructions began, as was natural, by a careful definition of the
new province. After reciting the terms of the retrocession according to
the Third Article of Berthier’s Treaty, Decrès fixed the boundaries of
the territory which Victor, on the part of the French republic, was to
receive from the Marquis of Somoruelos, the Captain-General of Cuba.[7]
“The extent of Louisiana,” he said, “is well determined on the
south by the Gulf of Mexico. But bounded on the west by the
river called Rio Bravo from its mouth to about the 30° parallel,
the line of demarcation stops after reaching this point, and
there seems never to have been any agreement in regard to
this part of the frontier. The farther we go northward, the
more undecided is the boundary. This part of America contains
little more than uninhabited forests or Indian tribes, and the
necessity of fixing a boundary has never yet been felt there.
There also exists none between Louisiana and Canada.”
In this state of things the captain-general would have to relieve
the most remote Spanish garrisons, in order to establish possession;
in other respects he would be guided only by political and military
interests. The western and northern boundary was of less consequence
than the little strip which separated New Orleans from Mobile; and
to this point the instructions specially called Victor’s attention.
Quoting the treaty of 1763 between Spain, Great Britain, and France,
when Florida was to become a British possession, Decrès fixed its terms
as still binding upon all the interested parties.
“‘It is agreed,’” said the seventh article of this treaty,
“‘that in future the boundaries between the States of his Most
Christian Majesty and those of his Britannic Majesty shall
be irrevocably fixed by a line drawn down the middle of the
Mississippi River from its source to the River Iberville, and
from there by a line down the middle of that river and of the
lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea. New Orleans and
the island on which it stands shall belong to France.’ Such is
still to-day the eastern limit of Louisiana. All to the east and
north of this limit makes part of the United States or of West
Florida.”
Nothing could be clearer. Louisiana stretched from the Iberville to the
Rio Bravo; West Florida from the Iberville to the Appalachicola. The
retrocession of Louisiana by Spain to France could restore only what
France had ceded to Spain in 1762. West Florida had nothing to do with
the cession of 1762 or the retrocession of 1800, and being Spanish by
a wholly different title could not even be brought in question by the
First Consul, much as he wanted Baton Rouge, Mobile, and Pensacola.
Victor’s orders were emphatic:--
“There is therefore no obscurity as to our boundary on this side
any more than as to that of our allies; and although Florida
belongs to Spain, Spain’s right of property in this quarter will
have as much interest for the Captain-General of Louisiana as
though Florida were a French possession.”
After thus establishing the boundary, as far as possible, in every
direction, the minister treated at some length of the English claim to
navigation on the Mississippi, and at last reached the general subject
of the relation between Louisiana and the world about it,--the subject
in which Jefferson would have found acute interest:--
“The system of this, as of all our other colonies, should be to
concentrate its commerce in the national commerce; it should
have in particular the aim of establishing its relations with
our Antilles, so as to take the place, in these colonies, of the
American commerce for all the objects whose import and export
is permitted to them. The captain-general should especially
abstain from every innovation favorable to strangers, who
should be restricted to such communications as are absolutely
indispensable to the prosperity of Louisiana and to such as are
explicitly determined by the treaties.”
Commercial relations with the Spanish colonies were to be encouraged
and extended as much as possible, while the utmost caution was to be
observed toward the United States:--
“From what has been said of Louisiana and the adjacent States,
it is clear that the republic of France, being master of
both banks at the mouth of the Mississippi, holds the key to
its navigation. This navigation is nevertheless a matter of
the highest importance for the western States of the Federal
Government.... This is enough to show with what jealousy the
Federal Government will see us take possession of Louisiana.
Whatever may be the events which this new part of the continent
has to expect, the arrival of the French forces should be marked
there by the expression of sentiments of great benevolence for
these new neighbors.”
Expression of benevolent sentiments was a pleasing duty; but it was not
to interfere with practical measures, both defensive and offensive:--
“The greatest circumspection will be required in directing the
colonial administration. A little local experience will soon
enable you to discern the sentiments of the western provinces
of the Federal Government. It will be well to maintain sources
of intelligence in that country, whose numerous, warlike, and
sober population may present you a redoubtable enemy. The
inhabitants of Kentucky especially should fix the attention of
the captain-general.... He must also fortify himself against
them by alliance with the Indian nations scattered to the east
of the river. The Chibackas, Choctaws, Alabamas, Creeks, etc.,
are represented as being entirely devoted to us.... He will not
forget that the French government wishes peace; but that if war
takes place, Louisiana will certainly become the theatre of
hostilities.... The intention of the First Consul is to raise
Louisiana to a degree of strength which will allow him in time
of war to abandon it to its own resources without anxiety; so
that enemies may be forced to the greatest sacrifices merely in
attempting to attack it.”
In these instructions not a word could be found which clashed with
Jefferson’s pacific views; and partly for that reason they were more
dangerous to the United States than if they had ordered Victor to seize
American property on the Mississippi and occupy Natchez with his three
thousand men. Victor was instructed, in effect, to tamper with every
adventurer from Pittsburg to Natchez; buy up every Indian tribe in the
Georgia and Northwestern Territory; fortify every bluff on the western
bank from St. Louis to New Orleans; and in a few years create a series
of French settlements which would realize Madison’s “sound policy” of
discouraging the United States from colonizing the west bank.
Fortified by these instructions, the Citizen Laussat set sail Jan. 12,
1803, and in due time arrived at New Orleans. Victor labored in Holland
to put his ships and supplies in a condition to follow. As Laussat
sailed, another step was taken by the French government. General
Bernadotte, a very distinguished republican officer, brother-in-law
of Joseph Bonaparte, was appointed minister at Washington.[8] The
First Consul had his own reasons for wishing to remove Bernadotte,
as he meant to remove Moreau; and Washington was a place of indirect
banishment for a kinsman whose character was to be feared. Bernadotte’s
instructions[9] were signed by Talleyrand Jan. 14, 1803, the day after
Monroe was confirmed as special envoy to France by the Senate at
Washington, and while Laussat was still on the French coast. Although
Bonaparte had been obliged to withdraw a part of Victor’s force, he
still intended that the expedition should start at once with two
thousand men;[10] and its departure was to be so timed that Bernadotte
should reach Washington as Victor and his troops reached New Orleans.
Their instructions were on one point identical. News of the closure
of the Mississippi by Morales had reached Paris, and had already
caused an official protest by Livingston, when Talleyrand drew up the
instructions to Bernadotte:--
“Louisiana being soon to pass into our hands, with all the
rights which have belonged to Spain, we can only with pleasure
see that a special circumstance has obliged the Spanish
Administration to declare formally [_constater_] its right
to grant or to refuse at will to the Americans the privilege
of a commercial _entrepôt_ at New Orleans; the difficulty
of maintaining this position will be less for us than that of
establishing it.... Yet in any discussion that may arise on
this subject, and in every discussion you may have to sustain,
the First Consul wishes you to be informed of his most positive
and pronounced desire to live in good understanding with the
American government, to cultivate and to improve for the
advantage of American commerce the relations of friendship which
unite the two peoples. No one in Europe wishes the prosperity of
that people more than he. In accrediting you to its Government
he has given it a peculiar mark of his good disposition; he
doubts not that you will make every effort to bind closer the
ties which exist between the two nations. In consequence of the
firm intention which the First Consul has shown on this subject,
I must recommend you to take every care to avoid whatever might
alter our relations with that nation and its Government. The
agents of the French republic in the United States should forbid
themselves whatever might even remotely lead to a rupture. In
ordinary communication, every step should show the benevolent
disposition and mutual friendship which animate the chiefs and
all the members of the two Governments; and when any unforeseen
difficulty rises which may in any degree whatever compromise
their good understanding, the simplest and most effectual means
of preventing all danger is to refer its solution to the inquiry
and direct judgment of the two Governments.”
Talleyrand’s language was more elaborate, but not clearer, than that
which Bonaparte himself used to Victor.[11]
“I have no need to tell you,” the First Consul wrote, “with
what impatience the Government will wait for news from you in
order to settle its ideas in regard to the pretensions of the
United States and their usurpations over the Spaniards. What the
Government may think proper to do must not be judged in advance
until you have rendered an account of the state of things.
Every time you perceive that the United States are raising
pretensions, answer that no one has an idea of this at Paris
(_que l’on n’a aucune idée de cela à Paris_); but that you
have written, and that you are expecting orders.”
These were the ideas held by the government of France at the moment
when Jefferson nominated Monroe as a special envoy to buy New Orleans
and West Florida. Jefferson’s hopes of his success were small; and
Livingston, although on the spot and eager to try the experiment,
could only write:[12] “Do not absolutely despair.” Whatever chance
existed of obtaining New Orleans seemed to lie in the possibility
that Addington’s peaceful administration in England might be driven
into some act contrary to its vital interests; and even this chance
was worth little, for so long as Bonaparte wanted peace, he could
always keep it. England was thoroughly weary of war; and proved it by
patiently looking on while Bonaparte, during the year, committed one
arbitrary act after another, which at any previous time would have been
followed by an instant withdrawal of the British minister from Paris.
On the other hand, the world could see that Bonaparte was already tired
of peace; his _rôle_ of beneficent shopkeeper disgusted him, and
a new war in Europe was only a question of months. In such a case the
blow might fall on the east bank of the Rhine, on Spain, or on England.
Yet Bonaparte was in any case bound to keep Louisiana, or return it to
Spain. Florida was not his to sell. The chance that Jefferson could
buy either of these countries, even in case of a European war, seemed
so small as hardly to be worth considering; but it existed, because
Bonaparte was not a man like other men, and his action could never be
calculated in advance.
The news that Leclerc was dead, that his army was annihilated, St.
Domingo ruined, and the negroes more than ever beyond control, reached
Paris and was printed in the “Moniteur” Jan. 7, 1803, in the same
active week when Bernadette, Laussat, and Victor were ordered from
France to America, and Monroe was ordered from America to France. Of
all the events of the time, Leclerc’s death was the most decisive.
The colonial system of France centred in St. Domingo. Without that
island the system had hands, feet, and even a head, but no body. Of
what use was Louisiana, when France had clearly lost the main colony
which Louisiana was meant to feed and fortify? The new ruler of France
was not unused to failure. More than once he had suddenly given up his
dearest plans and deserted his oldest companions when their success
was hopeless. He had abandoned Paoli and Corsica with as little
compunction as afterward he abandoned the army and the officers whom
he led to Egypt. Obstinate in pursuing any object which led to his
own advancement, he was quick to see the moment when pursuit became
useless; and the difficulties that rose in his path toward colonial
empire were quite as great as those which had driven him to abandon
Corsica and Egypt. Not only had the island of St. Domingo been ruined
by the war, its plantations destroyed, its labor paralyzed, and its
population reduced to barbarism, so that the task of restoring its
commercial value had become extremely difficult; but other and greater
objections existed to a renewal of the struggle. The army dreaded
service in St. Domingo, where certain death awaited every soldier; the
expense was frightful; a year of war had consumed fifty thousand men
and money in vast amounts, with no other result than to prove that at
least as many men and as much money would be still needed before any
return could be expected for so lavish an expenditure. In Europe war
could be made to support war; in St. Domingo peace alone could but
slowly repair some part of this frightful waste.
Leclerc was succeeded at St. Domingo by General Rochambeau, a son
of the Comte de Rochambeau, who twenty years before had commanded
the French corps which enabled Washington to capture Cornwallis
at Yorktown. A brave officer, but known to be little fit for
administration, Rochambeau was incompetent for the task that fell
on him. Leclerc had warned the Government that in case of his own
retirement he had no officer fit to replace him,--least of all
Rochambeau, who was next in rank. Rochambeau wrote to inform the
First Consul that thirty-five thousand men must be sent to save the
island.[13] Without a new commander-in-chief of the highest ability, a
new army was useless; and meanwhile Rochambeau was certain to waste the
few thousand acclimated soldiers who should form its nucleus.
The First Consul found himself in a difficult and even dangerous
situation. Probably the colonial scheme had never suited his tastes,
and perhaps he had waited only until he should be firm in power in
order to throw off the tutelage of Talleyrand; but the moment had
arrived when his tastes coincided with policy. A second failure at
St. Domingo would destroy his own credit, and disgust both the army
and the public. Abandonment of the island was equally hazardous; for
it required the abandonment of French traditions and a confession of
failure. Retirement from St. Domingo was impossible, except under
cover of some new enterprise; and as Europe stood, no other enterprise
remained for France to undertake which would not lead her armies across
the Rhine or the Pyrenees. For this undertaking Bonaparte was not yet
ready; but even had he been so, it would have offered no excuse for
abandoning the colonies. The ocean would still have been open, and St.
Domingo within easy reach.
Only one resource remained. Bonaparte told no one his plans; but he was
not a man to hesitate when decision was needed. From the day when news
of Leclerc’s death arrived, during the first week of January, 1803, the
First Consul brooded over the means of abandoning St. Domingo without
appearing to desert intentionally a policy dear to France. Talleyrand
and Decrès were allowed to go on as before; they gave instructions to
Bernadotte, and hurried the preparations of Victor, whom the ice and
snow of Holland and the slowness of the workmen held motionless; they
prepared a reinforcement of fifteen thousand men for Rochambeau, and
Bonaparte gave all the necessary orders for hastening the departure
of both expeditions. As late as February 5, he wrote to Decrès that
fifteen thousand men had been, or were about to be, sent to St.
Domingo, and that fifteen thousand more must be ready to sail by the
middle of August.[14] Yet his policy of abandoning the colonial system
had been already decided; for on January 30 the “Moniteur” produced
Sebastiani’s famous Report on the military condition of the East,--a
publication which could have no other object than to alarm England.[15]
Livingston was quick to see the change of policy; but although he
understood as much as was known to any one, he could not count with
certainty on the result.[16] Not even Joseph and Lucien knew what was
in their brother’s mind. Talleyrand seems to have been elaborately
deceived; even as late as February 19 he was allowed to instruct
General Beurnonville, the French ambassador at Madrid, to express “the
warm satisfaction which the last acts of sovereignty exercised by the
King of Spain in Louisiana have given to the First Consul.”[17] The
last act of sovereignty exercised by Spain in Louisiana had been the
closure of the Mississippi. Before Beurnonville could obey this order,
Godoy, hastening to anticipate possible interference from France,
promised Pinckney, February 28, that the _entrepôt_ should be
restored. King Charles’s order of restitution bore date March 1,
1803; Beurnonville’s note, urging the King to sustain Morales, bore
date March 4, and March 10 Don Pedro Cevallos replied to Talleyrand’s
congratulation in a tone so evasive as to show that Godoy was again
deceiving the First Consul.[18] Cevallos did not say that the right of
deposit had ten days before been restored; he contented himself with
mentioning the reasons alleged by Morales for his act, adding at the
close the empty assurance that “in every way his Majesty prizes highly
the applause of the French government.” In January, only a few weeks
before, Godoy had told Beurnonville, with unconcealed satisfaction,
that Bonaparte should not have Florida,--although without Florida the
town of New Orleans was supposed to be of little value. In February he
snatched away what he could of New Orleans by replacing the Americans
in all their privileges there.
Livingston plied the French officials with arguments and memorials;
but he might have spared himself the trouble, for Bonaparte’s policy
was already fixed. The First Consul acted with the rapidity which
marked all his great measures. England at once took Sebastiani’s
Report as a warning, and began to arm. February 20 Bonaparte sent to
the Corps Législatif his Annual Report, or Message, which spoke of
Great Britain in language that could not be disregarded; finally,
March 12, Livingston saw a melodramatic spectacle which transfixed him
with surprise and excitement.[19] The scene was at Madame Bonaparte’s
drawing-room; the actors were Bonaparte and Lord Whitworth, the British
ambassador. “I find, my Lord, your nation want war again!” said the
First Consul. “No, sir,” replied Whitworth; “we are very desirous of
peace.” “_I must either have Malta or war!_” rejoined Bonaparte.
Livingston received these words from Lord Whitworth himself on the
spot; and returning at once to his cabinet, wrote to warn Madison.
Within a few days the alarm spread through Europe, and the affairs of
St. Domingo were forgotten.
Bonaparte loved long-prepared transformation-scenes. Such a scene he
was preparing, and the early days of April, 1803, found the actors
eagerly waiting it. All the struggles and passions of the last two
years were crowded into the explosion of April. At St. Domingo, horror
followed fast on horror. Rochambeau, shut in Port au Prince,--drunken,
reckless, surrounded by worthless men and by women more abandoned
still, wallowing in the dregs of the former English occupation and of
a half-civilized negro empire,--waged as he best could a guerrilla
war, hanging, shooting, drowning, burning all the negroes he could
catch; hunting them with fifteen hundred bloodhounds bought in Jamaica
for something more than one hundred dollars each; wasting money,
squandering men; while Dessalines and Christophe massacred every white
being within their reach. To complete Bonaparte’s work, from which he
wished to turn the world’s attention, high among the Jura Mountains,
where the ice and snow had not yet relaxed their grip upon the desolate
little Fortress and its sunless casemate, in which for months nothing
but Toussaint’s cough had been heard, Commander Amiot wrote a brief
military Report to the Minister of Marine:[20] “On the 17th [April 7],
at half-past eleven o’clock of the morning, on taking him his food,
I found him dead, seated on his chair near his fire.” According to
Tavernier, doctor of medicine and _chirurgien_ of Pontarlier, who
performed the autopsy, pleuro-pneumonia was the cause of Toussaint’s
death.
Toussaint never knew that St. Domingo had successfully resisted the
whole power of France, and that had he been truer to himself and
his color he might have worn the crown that became the plaything of
Christophe and Dessalines; but even when shivering in the frosts of the
Jura, his last moments would have glowed with gratified revenge, had
he known that at the same instant Bonaparte was turning into a path
which the negroes of St. Domingo had driven him to take, and which was
to lead him to parallel at St. Helena the fate of Toussaint himself at
the Château de Joux. In these days of passion, men had little time for
thought; and the last subject on which Bonaparte thereafter cared to
fix his mind was the fate of Toussaint and Leclerc. That the “miserable
negro,” as Bonaparte called him, should have been forgotten so soon was
not surprising; but the prejudice of race alone blinded the American
people to the debt they owed to the desperate courage of five hundred
thousand Haytian negroes who would not be enslaved.
If this debt was due chiefly to the negroes, it was also in a degree
due to Godoy and to Spain. In the new shifting of scenes, Godoy
suddenly found himself, like Toussaint eighteen months before, face
to face with Bonaparte bent on revenge. No one knew better than Godoy
the dangers that hung over him and his country. Aware of his perils,
he tried, as in 1795, to conciliate the United States by a course
offensive to France. Not only did he restore the _entrepôt_ at
New Orleans, but he also admitted the claims for damages sustained by
American citizens from Spanish subjects in the late war, and through
Don Pedro Cevallos negotiated with Pinckney a convention which provided
for a settlement of these claims.[21] Although he refused to recognize
in this convention the spoliations made by Frenchmen within Spanish
jurisdiction, and insisted that these were in their nature claims
against France which Spain was not morally bound to admit, he consented
to insert an article copied from the expunged Article II. of the
treaty of Morfontaine, reserving to the United States the right to
press these demands at a future time.
So well pleased was Jefferson with the conduct of Spain and the
Spanish ministers, that not a complaint was made of ill treatment;
and even the conduct of Morales did not shake the President’s faith
in the friendliness of King Charles. No doubt he mistook the motives
of this friendliness, for Spain had no other object than to protect
her colonies and commerce on the Gulf of Mexico, and hoped to prevent
attack by conciliation; while Madison imagined that Spain might be
induced by money to part with her colonies and admit the United States
to the Gulf. In this hope he instructed Pinckney,[22] in case he should
find that Louisiana had not been retroceded to France, to offer a
guaranty of Spanish territory west of the Mississippi as part of the
consideration for New Orleans and the Floridas. The offer was made with
a degree of cordiality very unlike the similar offer to France, and
was pressed by Pinckney so zealously that at last Cevallos evaded his
earnestness by a civil equivocation.
“The system adopted by his Majesty,” said he,[23] “not to
dispossess himself of any portion of his States, deprives him
of the pleasure of assenting to the cessions which the United
States wish to obtain by purchase.... The United States can
address themselves to the French government to negotiate the
acquisition of territories which may suit their interest.”
Cevallos knew that Bonaparte had bound himself formally never to
alienate Louisiana, and in referring Pinckney to France he supposed
himself safe. Pinckney, on the other hand, prided himself on having
helped to prevent France from gaining Florida as well as Louisiana, and
was anxious to secure West Florida for his own credit; while he had no
idea that Louisiana could be obtained at all.
Yet nearly a week before this note was written Louisiana had become
American property. So completely was Godoy deceived, that when April
arrived and he saw Spain again about to be dragged into unknown perils,
he never divined that he was to be struck in America; his anxieties
rose from fear that Spain might be dragged into a new war in Europe,
in subservience to France. He could expect to escape such a war only
by a quarrel with Napoleon, and he knew that a war with Napoleon was a
desperate resource.
In London statesmanship had an easier game, and played it at first
simply and coolly. Rufus King watched it with anxious eyes. He wished
to escape from the duty of expressing a diplomatic policy which
he might not approve, to a Government which had other and heavier
tasks than that of listening to his advice or warnings. The British
Ministry behaved well to America; for their advices from Thornton led
them to hope that the United States would, if properly supported,
seize Louisiana and accept war with Bonaparte. “If you can obtain
Louisiana,--well!” said Addington to Rufus King;[24] “if not, we ought
to prevent its going into the hands of France.”