IN THE DEEPENING SHADOW
A little, bent old woman, neat, shrivelled, with clear, healthy eye
and keen intelligence, was collecting acorns in the park outside
the great Schloss, the residence of von Oppen, a relative of the
Police President of Berlin.
I had walked long and was about to eat my picnic lunch, and stopped
and spoke with her. We soon came to the one topic in Germany--the
war. She was eighty-four years of age, she told me, and she worked
for twelve hours a day. Her mother had seen Napoleon pass through
the red-roofed village hard by. She well remembered what she
called "the Bismarck wars." She was of the old generation, for she
spoke of the Kaiser as "the King."
"No," she said, "this war is not going like the Bismarck wars--not
like the three that happened in 1864, 1866, 1870, within seven
years when I was a young woman." She was referring, of course, to
Denmark, Austria, and France. "We have lost many in our
village--food is hard to get." Here she pointed to the two thin
slices of black bread which were to form her mid-day meal. She did
not grumble at her twelve hours' day in the fields, which were in
addition to the work of her little house, but she wished that she
could have half an hour in which to read history.
Her belief was that the war would be terminated by the Zeppelins.
"When our humane King really gives the word, the English ships and
towns will all be destroyed by our Zeppelins. He is holding back
his great secret of destruction out of kindness."
The remark of that simple, but intelligent old woman as to the
restraint imposed by the Kaiser upon the Zeppelins constituted the
universal belief of all Germany until the British doggedly built up
an air service under the stress of necessity, which has brilliantly
checked the aerial carnival of frightfulness. People in Great
Britain seem to have no conception of the great part the Zeppelins
were to play in the war, according to German imagination. That
simple old peasant lady expressed the views that had been uttered
to me by intelligent members of the Reichstag--bankers, merchants,
men and women of all degrees. The first destruction of
Zeppelins--that by Lieutenant Warneford, and the bringing down of
LZ77 at Revigny, did not produce much disappointment. The war was
going well in other directions. But the further destruction of
Zeppelins has had almost as much to do with the desire for peace,
in the popular mind, as the discomfort and illness caused by food
shortage and the perpetual hammerings by the French and British
Armies in the West.
It should be realised that the Zeppelin has been a fetish of the
Germans for the last ten years. The Kaiser started the worship by
publicly kissing Count Zeppelin, and fervently exclaiming that he
was the greatest man of the century. Thousands of pictures have
been imagined of Zeppelins dropping bombs on Buckingham Palace, the
Bank of England, and the Grand Fleet. For a long time, owing to
the hiding of the facts in England of the Zeppelin raids, even high
German officials believed that immense damage had been done. The
French acted more wisely. They allowed full descriptions of the
aeroplane and Zeppelin raids in France to be published, and the
result was discouraging to the Germans. I remember studying the
British Zeppelin communiques with Germans. At that time the London
Authorities were constantly referring to these raids taking place
in the "Eastern counties," when the returned Germans knew exactly
where they had been. The result was great encouragement. Nothing
did more to depress the Germans than the humorous and true accounts
of the Zeppelin raids which were eventually allowed to appear in
the English newspapers.
The Germans have now facts as to the actual damage done in England.
They know that the British public receive the Zeppelins with
excellent aircraft and gun-fire. They know that anti-aircraft
preparations are likely to increase rather than decrease, and
while, for the sake of saving the nation's "face," it will be
necessary that Zeppelins be further used, the people who are
directing the war know that, so far as land warfare is concerned,
they are not a factor.
There have been more mishaps than have been published; more wounded
and damaged Zeppelins than the Germans have ever announced. I was
informed that the overhauling and repair of many Zeppelins after a
successful or unsuccessful raid was a matter, not of days, but of
weeks. There was great difficulty in obtaining crews. Most of
them are sailors, as are the officers. There have been suppressed
mutinies in connection with the manning of the Zeppelins.
Count Zeppelin, who, up to a year ago, was a national hero, is
already regarded by a large section of the population as a failure.
The very house servants who subscribed their pfennigs and marks in
the early days to help conduct his experiments now no longer speak
of him with respect. They have transferred their admiration to
Hindenburg and the submarines.
The majority of Germans of all classes believe what they are
officially instructed to believe, no more, no less. The
overmastering self-hypnotism which leads the present-day German to
believe that black is white, if it adds to his self-satisfaction,
is one of the most startling phenomena of history. But what of
Ballin, Heineken, von Gwinner, Gutmann, Thyssen, Rathenau, and
other captains of industry and finance? Some of them have
expressed opinions in interviews, but what do they _really_ think?
I am not going to indulge in any guesswork on this matter. I am
simply going to disclose some important statements made at a secret
meeting attended by many of the business directors of the German
Empire. The meeting was for the purpose of discussing actual
conditions in a straightforward manner, therefore no member of the
Press, German or foreign, was present.
In striking contrast with custom when the war is discussed, nothing
was said of _Kultur_, of German innocence or enemy guilt, of an
early and victorious peace, of British warships hiding always in
safety, or of the omniscience and infallibility of the Supreme
Military Command.
The little circle of Germans who have displayed such brilliant
organising ability in commerce and industry are practical men, who
look at the war and the days to follow the war in the cold light of
debit and credit. This being the case, the honest opinions
expressed by Arthur von Gwinner, President of the Deutsche Bank,
are worthy of serious consideration. His chief points were:--
1. The belief cherished by the mass of the nation that a Central
Europe Economic Alliance will amply compensate us for any
shortcomings elsewhere, and enable us to sit back and snap our
fingers at the rest of the world is too absurd to be entertained by
serious men. Our trade, import and export, with Austria-Hungary
was as great as it could be for many years to come, and it was only
a small part of our total trade. After the war, as before, the
bulk of our trade must be with countries now neutral or enemy, and
we must seriously consider how to hold and add to this trade in the
future.
2. The solution of the labour problem will be vital in the work of
reconstruction. We must make every provision in order to forge
rapidly ahead immediately after the close of the war.
_No German, except for necessary reasons of State, should be
allowed to leave the country for a number of years after the war_.
3. Before the war 3,000,000 Russians came to us every year at
harvest time. These must continue to come.
4. We have done wonderful work in scientific agriculture, but the
limit of productivity of the soil has undoubtedly been reached.
5. Do not place too much hope in an early war between the United
States and Japan.
6. There is great rejoicing over the sinking of enemy ships. It
should also be remembered, however, that we are not paying any
dividends at present.
In the discussion which followed the statements of Herr von Gwinner
and from various channels of reliable information which I made use
of in Germany, I found a serious view taken of these and other
topics, of which the great body of Germans are quite unaware.
Take the labour problem, for example. For years Germany has
recognised the necessity of a rapid increase of population, if a
nation is to smash rivals in industry and war. Not for a moment
during this struggle has Germany lost sight of this fact. Many
times have I heard in the Fatherland that the assurance of milk to
children is not entirely for sentimental but also for practical
reasons. Official attempts are being made at present to increase
the population in ways which cannot be discussed in this book.
"You get yourself born and the State does all the rest" was an
accurate analysis of Germany before the war; but the State looks
after everything now.
When men go home on leave from the army, married or single, they
are instructed in their duty of doing their part to increase the
population so that Germany will have plenty of colonists for the
Balkans, Turkey and Asia in the great economic development of those
regions. To impress this they argue that Germany and France had
nearly the same number of inhabitants in 1870. "See the difference
to-day," says the German. "This difference is one of the chief
causes of our greatly superior strength."
Working girls in Dresden have not only been encouraged but quietly
advised to serve the State "by enabling Deutschland to achieve the
high place in the world which God marked out for it, which can only
be done if there are a sufficient number of Germans to make their
influence felt in the world." They have been told not to worry,
that the State will provide for the offspring. In fact, societies
of godfathers and godmothers are growing all over Germany. They do
not necessarily have to bring up the child in their own home; they
can pay for its maintenance. Thus the rich woman who does not care
to have many children herself is made to feel in ultra-scientific
Germany that she should help her poorer sister.
The Germans treat the matter very lightly. In Bremen, for example,
where the quartering of Landsturmers (the oldest Germans called to
military service) among the people resulted in a large batch of
illegitimate children, I found it the custom, even in mixed society
of the higher circles, to refer to them jokingly as "young
Landsturmers."
A serious consideration of what Germany, or any other belligerent,
will do _after_ the war is usually of little value, as conditions
after the war depend upon what is done _during_ the war. The
amount of freedom which the German people attain in the next few
years is in direct proportion to the amount of thrashing
administered to their country by the Allies. Perhaps they will
have something to say about the frontier regulations of Germany;
but assuming that the training of centuries will prevent their
hastily casting aside their docility, it is extremely probable that
few, if any, Germans will be allowed to leave Germany during the
first years of reconstruction.
This will disappoint several million Germans. Despite the snarling
rage displayed everywhere in the fatherland, except in diplomatic
circles, against the United States, I heard an ever-increasing
number of malcontents declare that, immediately after the close of
war, they would go to the States to escape the burden of taxation.
One hears two words--_Friede_ (peace) and _Essen_
(food)--constantly. The third word I should add is _Steuern_
(taxes). It is all very well to sit by some neutral fireside
reading Goethe or Schopenhauer, while listening to the
_Meistersinger von Nurnberg_, or the "Melody in F," and lull
yourself into the belief that the Germans are a race of idealists.
This touch is used to a considerable extent in German propaganda.
Any one familiar, however, with conditions in modern Germany knows
that Germans are ultra-materialistic.
I have heard them talk of the cost of the war from the very
beginning. They gloated over the sweeping indemnities they would
exact. After they realised the possibilities of State-organised
scientific burglary in Belgium they were beside themselves in
joyful anticipation of what Paris, London, and a score of other
cities would yield. When the war became a temporary stalemate, I
heard it said, particularly by army officers, that Germany was
taking no chances with the future, but was exacting indemnities now
from the occupied districts. When taxes rose and food shortage
increased, the possibility that the Germans themselves would have
to pay some of their own costs of the war in various forms of
taxation determined a rapidly growing number to seek a way out by
emigrating at the first opportunity.
As Herr Ballin said, "The world will find us as strongly organised
for peace as we were organised for war." The labour problem,
however, not only now, but for the days of reconstruction, is
viewed very seriously, how seriously may be gathered from the fact
that there is so much apprehension that Russia may refuse to allow
her workers to go to Germany for some years after the war, that
nearly everyone at the secret conference mentioned above was in
favour of making concessions at the peace conference, should Russia
insist. Indeed one Rhinelander was of the opinion that it would be
worth while giving up Courland to get an unlimited supply of labour.
In the meantime the Germans have not been idle in other directions.
Until Hindenburg called up his immense levies in the late summer,
Germany exported steel building materials and coal to contiguous
neutral countries, but she can no longer do this. Nevertheless,
she did make elaborate preparations to "dump" into Russia on a
colossal scale immediately after the resumption of intercourse.
Immense supplies of farming implements and other articles of steel
have been stored in the Rhineland, Westphalia, and Silesia, ready
for immediate shipment to Russia, thus enabling Germany to get
ahead of all rivals in this field.
Germans also derive comfort from the fact that their ships will be
ready at once to carry cargoes and passengers, while so many of
those of the Allies will be used for the transport of troops after
the close of the war, and must then rent.
With such plans for "getting the jump" on competitors it is only
natural that I saw more and more irritability on the part of the
financial men with each month of the war after last April.
Von Gwinner's remark about the improbability of war between Japan
and the United States in the near future would, if known to the
German people, cause still another keen disappointment, since one
of their solaces has been the thought that they would soon have an
opportunity of reaping a munition harvest themselves.
When Germany tried to make a separate peace with Russia, Japan was
also approached--how far, I do not know. The Wilhelmstrasse still
maintains a Japanese department, and any possible thread, however
light, which may be twisted from a Tokyo newspaper to show that
perhaps Japan may be won over, is pounced upon most eagerly.
Germany, Japan, and Russia was the combination whispered in Berlin
at the time of the unsuccessful attempt to separate the Allies.
Absolute governments have certain advantages in war. They have
also disadvantages. When things are not running smoothly in
Germany the Germans worry more than do the English when things are
not going well in England. When the German leaders began to
disagree as to the best methods to conduct the war, the effect upon
the people was demoralising. Only their gullibility saved them
from complete dismay, Month after month the great struggle raged,
under the surface for the most part, but occasionally boiling over.
Would it be to the best interests of Germany to go the limit with
the submarines or not? Not once did I hear the subject discussed
on ethical grounds. Some remarks made to me by Doctor Stresemann,
one of the powerful rational Liberals behind the mammoth industrial
trust in Germany, and the most violent apostle of frightfulness in
the Reichstag, aptly express the sentiment in favour of
unrestricted submarine warfare. He and the rest of the men behind
Tirpitz had fought and lost in the three Committee assemblies
called to discuss U-boat policy in 1916.
As the day set for the September meeting of the Reichstag
approached I noticed that Herr Stresemann was growing more and more
excited. "This war is lasting too long," he declared to me in
great agitation. "The Kaiser's most glaring fault is that of
trying to fight Great Britain with one foot in the grave of
chivalry. If the Chancellor continues to sway him, we will wreck
the Chancellor at all costs. The only way to win this war is to
publish again, and this time enforce, the decree of February 4th,
1915, warning all neutrals to keep out of the submarine zone."
"But, according to the '_Sussex_ Ultimatum,' that will cause a
break with the United States," I said.
"We cannot let that deter us," he declared. "Britain is the
keystone of our enemies. If she falls they all fall. We must
attack her where she is vulnerable. _We must starve her out_. As
for America, we have little to fear from her. In the first place,
although she may break off diplomatic relations, she will not enter
the war if we are careful not to sink _her_ ships. As American
ships play a small part in the carrying trade to England, we can
thus refrain from sinking them--although we naturally should not
proclaim this.
"In the second place, if America does declare war upon Germany, it
would have little effect. The war will be over before she can
organise after the manner of Great Britain. Herr Helfferich
(former Minister of Finance and now Vive-Chancellor) feels that we
should do everything possible to keep America out, inasmuch as
thereby we shall be in a better position to conclude commercial
treaties after the war. Herr Helfferich exerted powerful influence
in the meeting at Great Headquarters at the time of the Sussex
Crisis. But our duty to ourselves is to win the war. If we starve
out England we win, no matter how many enemies we have. If we
fail, another enemy, even the United States, would not make our
defeat more thorough. We are justified, for our existence is at
stake. The only way we can escape defeat is by a successful U-boat
war against England. That would change defeat into overwhelming
victory. I am absolutely confident; that is why the slow methods
of the Chancellor make me so angry. It will take at least half a
year to bring England to her knees, and with our increased
privations he may wait too long. But we shall compel him; we shall
compel him."
Herr Stresemann later requested me not to publish these
statements--at least, not until a decision had been reached. I
did, however, lay the matter before the American Embassy in London
as soon as I arrived in England, since my investigations in Germany
left no doubt in my mind that she would play two great cards--one,
to work for peace through negotiation; the other, the last
desperate recourse to the submarine.
As I write (January 21st, 1917) I am convinced that it is only a
question of time until Germany is reduced to this last desperate
resort. The men, who will decide that time will be Hindenburg and
Batocki. The successful siege of Germany is a stupendous though
not impossible task.
On the other hand, the human system is a very elastic piece of
mechanism, and modern man, far from being the degenerate which some
admirers of cave-man hardihood have pictured him, is able to
undergo a tremendous amount of privation. Besieged cities have
nearly always held out longer than the besiegers expected. In the
besieged city the civilian population is for the most part a drag
on the military, but in besieged Germany the civilian population,
reinforced by slave labour from Belgium, France and Poland,
continues working at high pressure in order to enable the military
to keep the field. Fat is the vital factor. The more munitions
Germany heaps up the more fat she must use for this purpose, and
the less she will have for the civil population, with a consequent
diminution of their output of work. Germany simply cannot burn the
candle at both ends. It is my personal opinion that Verdun marks
the supreme culmination of German military offensive in the West,
and the West is the decisive theatre of war. If that is
Hindenburg's opinion, then he realises that another colossal German
offensive in the West would not bring a victorious peace. There
remains only the alternative of building up a defensive against the
coming Allied attacks--an alternative depending for its success
upon sufficient food for the mass of the people. Thus the U-boat
decision clearly rests upon the Chief of Staff and the Food
Dictator, since their advice to the Imperial Chancellor and the All
Highest War Lord must be determinative. When the day comes for
Germany to proclaim to the world that she will sink at sight all
ships going to and from the ports of her enemies, that day will be
one of the great moments of history. Germany's last card will be
on the table. It will be war to the knife. Either she will starve
Great Britain or Great Britain, will starve her.
These are problems for the leaders, who have the further task of
keeping the population hopeful on an alarmingly decreasing diet.
Superficially, or until you want something to eat, or a ride in a
taxicab, Berlin at night is gay. But you somehow feel that the
gaiety is forced. London at first sight is appallingly gloomy is
the evening, and foreigners hardly care to leave their hotels. But
I find that behind the gloom and the darkness there is plenty of
spontaneous merriment at the theatres and other places of
entertainment. There is plenty of food, little peace talk, and
quiet confidence.
Across the North Sea, however, great efforts are made by the German
Government to keep up the spirits of the people. No public
entertainer need go to the war at all, and the opera is carried on
exactly as in peace time, though I confess that my material soul
found it difficult to enjoy Tristan on a long and monotonous diet
of sardines, potatoes, cheese and fresh-water fish--chiefly pike
and carp. A humorous American friend used to laugh at the
situation--the brilliantly dressed house, officers in their
extremely handsome grey uniforms, ladies, some of them with too
many diamonds, and--very little to eat.
At the slightest military gain the bells of victory peal wildly,
and gay flags colour mile after mile of city streets, flags under
which weary, silent women crawl in long lines to the shops where
food is sold. A bewildering spectacle is this crawling through
victory after victory ever nearer to defeat.
Early in the war a Norwegian packer, who had not had much demand
for his sardines in Germany, put the picture of Hindenhurg on the
tins and christened them the "Hindenburg Sardines." When he
changed the trade-mark the Germans bought them as fast as he could
supply them--not because they were short of food at that time, but
through the magic of a name. To-day all that is changed.
Norwegians no longer have to flatter the Germans, who are anxious
to buy anything in the way of food. They flood Germany now with
impunity with sardines whose merits are extolled in the hated
English language, sardines which had originally been intended for
Britain or America, but which are now eagerly snapped up at four
and five times the peace price by people who invariably bid one
another good-bye with "Gott strafe England." I saw the gem of the
collection in a Friedrichstrasse window. It was entitled: "Our
Allies Brand," on a bright label which displayed the flags of Great
Britain, Prance, Russia, Italy, Belgium and Japan.
In Germany you feel that the drama of the battlefield has changed
to the drama of the larder. Hope and despair succeed one another
in the determination to hold out economically while soldier and
sailor convince the world that Germany cannot be beaten. People
laugh at the blockade, sneer at the blockade and curse the blockade
in the same breath. A headline of victory, a mention of the army,
the army they love, and they boast again. Then a place in the food
line, or a seat at table, and they whine at the long war and rage
against "British treachery." Like a cork tossing on the
waves--such is the spirit of Germany.
The majority struggle on in the distorted belief that Germany was
forced to defend herself from attack planned by Great Britain,
while the minority are kept in check by armed patrols and
"preventive arrest."
The spirit of "all for the Fatherland" is yielding to the spirit of
self-preservation of the individual. Everywhere one sees evidence
of this. The cry of a little girl running out of a meat shop in
Friedenau, an excellent quarter of Berlin, brought me in to find a
woman, worn out with grief over the loss of her son and the long
waiting in the _queue_ for food, lying on the floor in a
semi-conscious condition. It is the custom to admit five or six
people at a time. I was at first surprised that nobody in the line
outside had stirred at the appeal of the child, but I need not have
expected individual initiative even under the most extenuating
circumstances from people so slavishly disciplined that they would
stolidly wait their turn. But the four women inside--why did they
not help the woman? The spirit of self-preservation must be the
answer. For them the main event of the day was to secure the
half-pound of meat which would last them for a week. They simply
would not be turned from that one objective until it was reached.
And the soldiers passing through Berlin! I saw some my last
afternoon in Berlin, loaded with their kit, marching silently down
Unter den Linden to the troop trains, where a few relatives would
tearfully bid them good-bye. There was not a sound in their
ranks--only the dull thud of their heavy marching boots. They
didn't sing nor even speak. The passers-by buttoned their coats
more tightly against the chill wind and hurried on their several
ways, with never a thought or a look for the men in field-grey,
moving, many of them for the last time, through the streets of the
capital. The old man who angered the war-mad throng before the
_Schloss_ on August 1st, 1914, with his discordant croak of "War is
a serious business, young man," lives in the spirit of to-day. And
he did not have to go to the mountain!