GERMANY'S HUMAN RESOURCES
Three factors are of chief importance in estimating German
man-power. First, the number of men of military age; second, the
number of these that are indispensable in civil life; third, the
number of casualties. Concerning the last two there are great
differences of opinion among military critics in Allied and neutral
countries. As regards the first there need be little difference,
although I confess surprise at the number of people I have met who
believe the grotesque myth that Germany has systematically
concealed her increase in population, and that instead of being a
nation of less than seventy millions she has really more than one
hundred millions.
It is safe to say that at the outbreak of war Germany was a nation
of 68,000,000, of whom 33,500,000 were males. Of these nearly
14,000,000 were between 18 and 45; 350,000 men over 45 are also
with the Colours. The boys who were then 16 and 17 can now be
added, giving us a grand total of some 15,000,000.
Normally Germany employed men of between 18 and 45 as
follows:--Mines, 600,000; metals, 800,000; transport, 650,000;
agriculture, 3,000,000; clothing, food preparation, 1,000,000,
making a total of 6,050,000.
Up to this point there can be little difference of opinion. From
this point on, however, I must, like others who deal with the
subject, make estimates upon data obtained. During my last visit
to Germany I systematically employed a rough check on the figures
derived through the usual channels. Concentrated effort to obtain
first-hand information in city, village, and countryside, north,
east, south, and west, with eyes and ears open, and vocal organs
constantly used for purposes of interrogation, naturally yielded
considerable data when carried over a period of ten months. The
changes from my last visit and from peace time were also duly
observed as were the differences between Germany and the other
nations I had visited during the war. Walking, of which I did a
colossal amount, was most instructive, because it afforded me an
opportunity to study conditions in the villages. Discreet
questioning gave me accurate statistics in hundreds of these that I
visited, and of many more hundreds that I asked about from people
whom I met on my travels. For example, in Oberammergau, which had
at the beginning of the war 1,900 inhabitants, about 350 had been
called to the Colours when I was there, and of these thirty-nine
had been killed.
My investigations in the Fatherland convinced me that of the
3,000,000 men between 18 and 45 formerly engaged in agriculture,
considerably fewer than 100,000 continue to be thus occupied. This
work is done by prisoners and women. Mine and metal work have kept
from 60 to 70 per cent. of their men of military age; but
transport, already cut somewhat, lost 25 per cent. of the remainder
when Hindenburg assumed supreme command, which would reduce 650,000
to about 300,000. More than 90 per cent. of those engaged in the
preparation of food and the making of clothing have been called up.
Thus of the 6,050,000 engaged in the occupations given above, about
1,750,000 remain, which means that more than 4,000,000 have been
called to the Colours.
From building and allied trades at least 90 per cent. are in
military uniform. Assuming that some 2,000,000 men of military age
are included in indispensable engineers, fishermen, chemists,
physically unfit, and so forth, we conclude on this basis that
Germany can enrol in her Army and Navy more than 11,000,000 men.
We may approach the subject from a somewhat different angle by
considering what percentage of her total population Germany could
call to the Colours under stress--and she is to-day under stress.
Savage tribes have been known to put one-fifth under arms. An
industrial State such as Germany cannot go to this extreme. Yet by
using every means within her power she makes a very close approach
to it. In practically every village of which I secured figures in
Saxony, Bavaria, Posen, East Prussia, West Prussia, Pomerania,
Mecklenburg, and Oldenburg, a fifth or nearly a fifth have been
called up. In some Silesian and Rhenish-Westphalian districts,
however, not more than from a seventh to a tenth. If we allow for
all Germany a little less than one-sixth, we get 11,000,000.
What are the factors which enable Germany to call this number or a
little more than this number to the Colours? First, the
organisation of the women. I have seen them even in the forges of
Rhineland doing the work of strong men. "The finest women in the
world, these Rhinelanders," as one manager put it. "Just look at
that one lift that weight. Few men could do better." And his eyes
sparkled with enthusiasm.
Second, and of tremendous importance, are the huge numbers of
prisoners in Germany, and her sensible determination to make them
work. She has taken about one and two-third millions on the field
of battle. _There also happen to be in Germany nearly a million
other prisoners, buried alive, whose existence has apparently
escaped the notice of the outside world_. These are the Russian
civilians who were caught in the German trap when it snapped
suddenly tight in the summer of 1914. Before the war 2,000,000
Russians used to go to Germany at harvest time. The war began at
harvest time. The number of these men, which from my own
first-hand investigations in the remote country districts I
estimate at nearly a million, would have escaped my notice also,
had I not walked across Germany.
Another important factor in the labour problem in Germany is the
employment of the Poles. Not only are they employed on the land,
but great colonies of them have grown up in Dusseldorf and other
industrial centres. I saw an order instructing the military
commandants throughout Germany to warn the Poles, whose discontent
with the food conditions in Germany made them desire to return
home, that conditions in Poland were much worse. This, then, is an
official German admission that there is starvation in Poland, for
_much worse_ could mean nothing else. Germany is keeping Poland a
sealed book, although I admit that she occasionally takes tourists
to see the German-fostered university at Warsaw. Just before I
left Germany still another order was issued for the regulation of
neutral correspondents. Under no circumstances were they to be
allowed to talk with the natives in Poland. From unimpeachable
authority I learned that the Poles were intensely discouraged at
the thoroughness with which the Prussians stripped the country
after the last harvest, and that in some sections the people are
actually dying of hunger. Even in Warsaw, the death-rate in some
neighbourhoods has increased from 700 to 800 per cent. I was
witness to German rage when Viscount Grey stipulated that food
could be sent there only if the natives were allowed to have the
produce of their own land. Prussia wanted that produce, and she
got it.
I mention these supplies here because the Poles who worked to
produce them must be included in German labour estimates just as
much as though they had been working in Germany.
Germany also adds to her man-power by utilising her wounded so far
as possible. Her efforts in this direction are praiseworthy, since
they not only contribute to the welfare of the State, but benefit
the individual. I have seen soldiers with one leg gone, or parts
of both legs gone, doing a full day's work mending uniforms. The
blind are taught typewriting, which enables them to earn an
independent living in Government employ. In short, work is found
for everybody who can do anything at all.
In a previous chapter I have spoken of the organisation of the
children, a factor which should not be left out of consideration.
* * * * *
Having considered the assets, let us turn to the debits.
The German casualty lists to the end of 1916 total 4,010,160, of
which 909,665 have been killed or died of wounds. My
investigations in Germany lead me to put the German killed or died
of wounds at 1,200,000, and the total casualties at close to
5,000,000. If we assume that 50 per cent. of all wounded return to
the front and another 25 per cent. to service in the interior, we
must also consider in computation of man-power that the casualty
lists do not include the vast numbers of invalided, and the sick,
which almost balance those that return to the front. This means,
in short, that the net losses are nearly as great at any one time
as the gross losses. Consequently, according to my estimates there
must be at least 4,500,000 Germans out of action at this moment.
In a war of attrition it is the number of men definitely out of
action which counts, for the German lines can be successfully
broken, and only successfully broken, when there are not enough men
to hold them. The Germans now have in the West probably about 130
divisions.
Hindenburg's levies in the late summer were so enormous that I am
convinced from what I saw in Germany that she has now called almost
everything possible to the Colours. One of Hindenburg's
stipulations in taking command was that he should always have a
force of half a million to throw wherever he wished. We have seen
the result in Rumania, and the men skimmed from the training units
then have been replaced by this last great levy from civilian life.
Therefore, with something over 11,000,000 men called up, Germany
has now 6,000,000, or a little more all told, many of whom are not
at all suited for service at the front.
Germany on the defensive at the Somme certainly lost at least
600,000 men. Attrition, to be sure, works both ways, but if the
Germans are out-gunned this year in the West to the extent expected
their position must become untenable. The deadly work of reducing
German man-power continues even though the Allied line does not
advance. I know of a section of the German front opposite the
French last winter which for five months did not have an action of
sufficient importance to be mentioned by either side in the
official reports, yet the Germans lost 10 per cent. of their
effectives in killed.
The more munitions the Allies make Germany use, the more fat she
must use for this purpose, and the less she will have for the civil
population, with a consequent diminution of their output of work.
Germany simply cannot burn the candle at both ends.