SPIES AND SEMI-SPIES
A comprehensive account of the German system of espionage would
need something resembling the dimensions of a general
encyclopaedia, but for the present I must endeavour to summarise
the subject in the course of a chapter.
Spying is just as essential an ingredient of Prussian character as
conceit, indifference to the feelings of others, jealousy, envy,
self-satisfaction, conceit, industry, inquisitiveness, veneration
for officialdom, imitativeness, materialism, and the other national
attributes that will occur to those who know Prussia, as distinct
from the other German States.
Prussian men and women hardly know the meaning of the word
"private," and, as they have Prussianised to a great or less degree
all the other States of the Empire, they have inured the German to
publicity from childhood upwards.
In the enforcement of food regulations the hands of the Government
in Germany are strengthened by certain elements in the German
character, one of which is the tendency of people to spy upon each
other. Here is a case. Last Easter the customary baking of
cakes--a time-honoured ceremony in Germany---was forbidden all over
Prussia from April 1 to 26. A certain good woman of Stettin, whose
husband was coming home from the trenches, thought that she would
welcome her soldier with one of the cakes of which German men and
women are so fond. She foolishly displayed her treasure to a
neighbour, who had dropped in for gossip. The neighbour cut short
the interview, went home to her telephone, called up the police
and, as she put it, did her duty. I suppose from the German point
of view it is the duty of people to spy in each other's houses.
From an Anglo-Saxon point of view it is something rather like
sneaking at school.
With these elements in their character, it is natural that the
Germans should be past masters in the art of espionage. It does
not follow that they are equally successful in the deductions
formed from their investigations in foreign matters, but they are
so egoistical and so literal, so fond of making reports, so fond of
seeing things only from their own point of view, that, while they
may be successful in obtaining possession by spying, purchase, or
theft, of the plans, say, of a new battleship, they are not able to
form an accurate estimate of the character and intentions of the
people among whom they may be spying.
Their military spying is believed to be as perfect as such work can
be, marred occasionally by the contempt they feel for other nations
in military matters. I presume that there is not much difference
in the systems of various nations except that the German military
spying is probably more thorough.
It is also true that Germans of social distinction will often take
positions far beneath their rank in order to gather valuable
information for their Government. The case of the hall porter in
the _Hotel des Indes_, the most fashionable hotel in The Hague, is
a notorious example. He is of gentle birth, a brother of Baron von
Wangenheim, late German Ambassador to Constantinople.
In one of the most luxurious dining-saloons on one of the most
luxurious of the great German liners--I promised my trustworthy
informant not to be more definite--the man who was head-waiter
during the year preceding the war impressed those under him with
being much more interested in some mysterious business ashore than
in his duties aboard ship. He threw most of his work on
subordinates, who complained, though unsuccessfully, to the
management. Unlike other head-waiters and chief stewards, he was
never aboard the ship when it was in port. He was the only German
in the dining-saloon, and he seemed to have great influence. He
conversed freely with influential passengers of various
nationalities.
The liner was in the English Channel eastward bound, when news came
that Germany had declared war upon Russia. What little interest he
had previously displayed in his duties now vanished completely, and
he paced the deck more and more impatiently as the vessel neared
Cuxhaven. He was one of the first to go ashore, but before leaving
he turned to two of the stewards and exclaimed, "Good-bye. I am
going to Wilhelmshaven to take command of my cruiser."
In general, the work of military attaches of all countries is added
to by more or less formal reports by officers who may be travelling
on leave. But German military spying goes much farther than this,
for inasmuch as most Germans have been soldiers, the majority of
Germans travelling or resident in a foreign country are trained
observers of military matters and, often act as semi-spies.
The system of "sowing" Germans in foreign countries, as I have
heard it called in Germany, and getting them naturalised, was begun
by Prussia before the war of 1866 against Austria. It was so
successful under the indirect auspices of the Triumvirate--Moltke,
Roon, and Bismarck--that it was developed in other countries. Thus
it is that, while there are comparatively few Frenchmen, for
example, naturalised in England, many German residents go through
this more or less meaningless form just as suits their particular
business or the German Government, double nationality being
regarded as a patriotic duty to the Fatherland.
There are, as a rule, three schools of German espionage in other
countries--the Embassy, the Consulates, and the individual spies,
who have no connection with either and who forward their reports
direct to Germany.
There is a fourth class of fairly well-paid professional spies, men
and women, of all classes, who visit foreign countries with letters
of introduction, who attend working-men's conventions, scientific,
military, and other industrial congresses, receiving from 40 pounds
to 100 pounds monthly by way of pay. The case of Lody, whom the
British caught and executed, was a type of the patriotic officer
spy. But his execution caused no real regret in Germany, for he
was regarded as a clumsy fellow, who roused the vigilance of the
British authorities, with the result, I was informed in Germany, of
the arrest and execution of several others, mostly, it is said,
Dutch, South American, and other neutrals.
The atmosphere of spying in business is a subtle and comparatively
modern form of German espionage, and has developed with the
remarkable rise of German industry in the last quarter of a
century. It fits in admirably with the Consular spy system, and
links up Germans, naturalised and otherwise, in a chain which binds
them together in a solidarity of workers for the cause. The
Deutsche Bank and the Hamburg-Amerika Line were very potent engines
of espionage.
Nor does the "Viktoria Insurance Company of Berlin" limit its
activities to the kind of business suggested by the sign over the
door. A "Special Bureau" in the Avenue de l'Opera, Paris,
consisted of German Reserve officers who spent a half-year or more
in France. As soon as one of these "finished his education" he was
replaced by another Reserve officer. Their duties took them on
long motor-trips through eastern France, strangely enough to
localities which might be of strategic importance in the event of
war. It is not without significance that all the clerks of the
"Special Bureau" left for Germany the day of mobilisation.
Many of the semi-spies of the German commercial, musical, and
theatrical world are, from their point of view, honest workers and
enthusiastic for German _Kultur_. They recently fastened upon
England, because the Germans for many years have been taught to
regard this country as their next opponent.
They are now as industrious in the United States as they were in
England before the war, because those Germans who think they have
won the war believe that the United States is their next enemy.
How active they have been in my country may be gathered from the
revelations concerning Bernstorff, von Papen, Boyed, Dumba, the
officials of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, and many others, whose
machinations have been revealed by the _New York World_ and other
journals.
It is the duty of the German Minister and his staff in any foreign
country, and particularly in countries likely to become hostile, to
get as close as possible to members of Governments, members of
Legislatures, leaders of thought and society, and members of the
Press, especially the first and the last in this category. Count
Bernstorff in the United States did exactly what Prince Lichnowsky
did in Britain before the war, and, if I may say so, did it a great
deal more successfully, though it is the plea of the Prince's
defenders that he succeeded in making very powerful and permanent
connections in Great Britain,
Our American Ambassadors, on the other hand, confine their
attention to strictly ambassadorial work, attend to the needs of
travelling Americans, and communicate with their Government on
matters vital to American interests.
The excellent German Consular system, which has done so much to
help German trade invaders in foreign countries, is openly a spy
bureau, and is provided in almost every important centre with its
own secret service fund. Attached to it are spies and semi-spies,
hotel-keepers, hairdressers, tutors, governesses, and employees in
Government establishments, such as shipbuilding yards and armament
factories. It is a mistake to suppose that all these are Germans.
Some, I regret to say, are natives of the laud in which the Germans
are spying, mostly people who have got into trouble and with whom
the German agents have got into touch. Such men, especially those
who have suffered imprisonment, have often a grudge against their
own country and are easily caught in the spy net.
Part of the system in England before the war was a commercial
information bureau resembling the American Bradstreets and the
English Stubbs, by which, on payment of a small sum, the commercial
standing of any firm or individual can be obtained. This bureau,
which had its branches also in France and Belgium, closed its
activities immediately prior to the war, the whole of the
card-indexes being removed to Berlin.
It is the German boast, and I believe a legitimate one, that they
know England better than do the English. _Their error is in
believing that in knowing England they know the English themselves_.
At the outset of the war, when the Germans were winning, Herr
Albert Ulrich, of the Deutsche Bank, and chief of their Oil
Development Department, speaking in perfect English, told me in a
rather heated altercation we had in regard to my country that he
knew the United States and Great Britain very thoroughly indeed,
and boasted that the American submarines, building at Fore River,
of which the Germans had secured the designs, would be of little
value in the case of hostilities between Germany and the United
States, which he then thought imminent.
It is typical of German mentality that when I met him in Berlin,
fifteen months later, he had completely altered his time as to the
war, and his tone was, "When is this dreadful war going to end?"
This, however, is by the way. Herr Ulrich is only an instance of
the solidarity of Pan-Germanism. An English or American banker
visiting a foreign country attends to his affairs and departs. A
German in a similar position is a sort of human ferret. An hotel
with us is a place of residence for transient strangers. The
Hotel Adlon and others in Berlin are excellent hotels as such, but
mixed up with spying upon strangers; Herr Adlon, senior, a friend
of the Kaiser's, assists the Government spies when any important or
suspicious visitor registers. The hotel telephones or any other
telephones are systematically tapped. German soldiers are granted
special leave for hotel service--that is to say, hotel spying.
When Belgium and France were invaded, German officers led their men
through particular districts to particular houses with certainty,
with knowledge gained by previous residence and spying. I know an
officer with von Kluck's army who received the Iron Cross, First
Class, for special information he had given to von Kluck which
facilitated his progress through Belgium.
Any German spies who may be working in England to-day have no great
difficulty in communicating with Germany, though communication is
slow and expensive. They can do so by many routes and many means.
As it is impossible to isolate Great Britain from Europe, it is
equally impossible to prevent the conveyance of information to the
enemy with more or less rapidity. Agents of the various
belligerent Powers are plentiful in Switzerland, Holland, Denmark,
Norway and Sweden, and the United States. So far as the maritime
countries are concerned, ships leave and enter daily. It is quite
impossible to control the movements of neutral sailors and others
engaged in these vessels. To watch all the movements of all those
men would require a detective force of impossible dimensions. That
information comes and goes freely by these channels is notorious.
That all the sailors are legitimate sailors I do not believe, and
as a matter of fact I know that they are not.
The transmission of documents via Switzerland, Holland, Denmark,
Sweden, and Norway has been rendered difficult, but not always
impossible. Cabling and telegraphing have been made very risky.
Judging by the impatience manifested in certain quarters in Berlin
at delay in getting news of Zeppelin raids, for example, I believe
that the steps taken to delay communication between England and
Germany have been effective, and delay in spy work is very often
fatal to its efficiency. The various tentacles of the German spy
system, its checks and counter-checks, whereby one spy watches
another; whereby the naval spy system has no connection with the
military spy system, and the political with neither, greatly mars
its utility.
Take one great question--the question that was all-important to
Germany as to whether Great Britain would or would not enter the
war in the event of an invasion of Belgium or declaration of war
against France. I was informed on good Berlin authority that from
every part of Great Britain and Ireland came different reports.
So far as London was concerned, Prince Lichnowsky said "No." Baron
von Kuhlmann was non-committal. As a result Lichnowsky was
disgraced and von Kuhlmann continued in favour.
It is common knowledge in Berlin, and may be elsewhere, that the
most surprised person in Germany at Great Britain's action was the
Kaiser, whose violent and continual denunciations of Great
Britain's Government, of King Edward, and King George, are repeated
from mouth to mouth in official circles with a sameness that
indicates accuracy.
All the ignorance of Great Britain's intentions in 1914 is to me
the best proof that the German minute system of working does not
always produce the result desired.
As one with Irish blood in my veins, I found that Germany's Irish
spy system (largely conducted by hotel waiters and active for more
than five and twenty years) had resulted in hopeless
misunderstanding of Irish affairs and Irish character, North and
South.
German spies are as a rule badly paid. The semi-spies, such as
waiters, were usually "helped" by the German Government through
waiters' friendly societies. It was the duty of these men to
communicate either in writing or verbally with the Consul, or with
certain headquarters either in Brussels or Berlin, and it is only
in accordance with human nature that spies of that class, in order
to gain a reputation for acumen and consequent increase of pay,
provided the kind of information that pleased the paymaster. That,
indeed, was one of the causes of the breakdown of the German
political spy system. A spy waiter or governess in the County of
Cork, for instance, who assiduously reported that a revolution
throughout the whole of Ireland would immediately follow Great
Britain's entry into the war, received much more attention than the
spy waiter in Belfast who told the authorities that if Germany went
to war many Irishmen would join England. Ireland, I admit, is very
difficult and puzzling ground for spy work, but it was ground
thoroughly covered by the Germans according to their methods.
The military party in Germany, who are flaying von Bethmann-Hollweg
for his ignorance of the intentions of Britain's Dominions and of
Ireland, never cease to throw in his teeth the fact that he had
millions of pounds (not marks) at his hack to make the necessary
investigations, and that he failed. That and his lack of the use
of ruthlessness, his alleged three days' delay to mobilise in 1914,
are the principal charges against him--charges which, in my
opinion, may eventually result in his downfall.
The great mob of semi-spies do not derive their whole income from
Germany, nor are they, I believe, all actually paid at regular
intervals. The struggling German shopkeeper in England was helped,
and I have no doubt is still helped, by occasional sums received
for business development--sums nominally in the nature of donations
or loans from other Germans. The army of German clerks, who came
to England and worked without salary between 1875 and 1900,
received, as a rule, their travelling money and an allowance paid
direct from Germany, or, when in urgent need, from the Consul in
London or elsewhere. Their spying was largely commercial, although
many of them formed connections here which became valuable as
Germany began to prepare directly for war with Britain. They also
helped to spread the knowledge of the English language which has
enabled Germany to analyse the country by means of its books,
Blue-books, statistical publications, and newspapers. They also
brought back with them topographical and local knowledge that
supplemented the military spy work later achieved by the German
officers who came to live here for spying purposes, and the great
army of _trained_ spy waiters, who are not to be confused with the
semi-spies in hotels, who drew small sums from Consuls.
One of the finest pieces of spy work achieved by Germany was the
obtaining by a German professor of a unique set of photographs of
the whole of the Scottish coast, from north to south. Those
photographs showing every inlet and harbour, are now at the
Reichs-Marine-Amt (Admiralty) in the Leipsigerplatz. They have
been reproduced for the use of the Navy. I do not know how they
were obtained. I _know_ they are in existence, and they were taken
for geological purposes.
Thefts of documents from British Government Departments are not
always successfully accomplished by German agents, I was told.
Some of the more astute officials are alleged, especially by the
Naval Department, to have laid traps and supplied the spies with
purposely misleading designs and codes.
Assiduous fishing in the troubled waters around the
Wilhelmstrasse--waters that will become more and more troubled as
the siege of Germany proceeds--renders the gathering of information
not so difficult as it might appear.
By sympathising with the critics of the German Foreign Office in
the violent attacks upon the Government by the non-official Social
Democrats, a sympathetic listener can learn a great deal.
One thing I learned is that, beyond question, the German spy
system, in that misty period called "after the war," will he very
completely revised. The huge sums of money mentioned in the
Reichstag as having been expended on secret service have, so far as
England is concerned, proved of no political value, and the
topographical and personal knowledge gained would only be of
service in case of actual invasion and the consequent exactions of
ransoms from individuals, cities, and districts.