OCCASIONS AND CAUSES OF LAUGHTER.
It seemed desirable to examine the process of laughter itself before
taking up the much-discussed question of its causes. In considering
this side of our subject, we shall, as already hinted, take a
comprehensive view of the occasions and modes of production of the
mirthful outburst, and approach the narrower problem of the nature and
mode of action of the ludicrous by way of this larger inquiry.
According to the common assumption, laughter, in ordinary cases,
is excited by some provocative, to speak more precisely, by some
sense-presentation, or its representative idea, such as a “funny”
sensation, the sight of a droll human figure, or a quaint fancy. Yet we
must not assume that such an initial presentation occurs in all cases.
As is implied in what has been said above about the laughter of “good
spirits,” and as we shall see more clearly presently, there are cases
where laughter takes on the appearance of a spontaneous or “automatic”
group of movements.
1. It may be well, however, to begin our inquiry by touching on those
varieties of laughter in which the action of a sense-stimulus is
apparent. And it will be convenient to select a form of distinctly
provoked laughter in which the intellectual processes play only a
subordinate part. The effect of tickling is clearly of this kind, and
as one of the {51} simplest modes of exciting laughter it seems to
claim our first attention here. Since, moreover, it is the mode of
exciting laughter of which our knowledge has been rendered in a measure
precise by means of experiment, I propose to deal with it at some
length.
The experience of being tickled is best described in its entirety as a
sensational reflex; that is to say, a motor reaction on a process of
sensory stimulation which produces a well-marked variety of sensation.
To speak of titillation as if it were merely the production of a
certain kind of sensation is unscientific. It involves the excitation
of certain movements, and where these are not forthcoming we must
infer, either that the sensory part of the process is defective, or
that the motor impulse is inhibited in some way.
The stimulation in this case is, as we all know, a light tactile one.
The agent commonly applied is the finger or a still softer body, such
as a feather. The mode of contact is light, or at least does not
commonly rise to the point of heavy pressure. The manner of contact is
usually intermittent, the finger or fingers giving a series of short
and staccato impacts. Movements of the fingers from point to point
commonly accompany the series of contacts. In some cases, however, a
single light touch, or even a continuous touch with movement from point
to point, may suffice to induce the proper effect.
The precise nature of the sensations is not yet fully understood.
It is pretty clear that the “minimal stimuli” here employed do not
give rise to purely tactile sensations of low intensity. This seems
to be established by the fact brought out by Dr. Louis Robinson that
the parts of the skin having the most acute tactile sensibility, the
tips of the fingers and the tip of the tongue, are “scarcely at
all sensitive {52} to titillation”.[30] It has been pointed out by
Wundt that the sensations in this case, as in that of some other skin
sensations, tend to spread themselves out, other and even distant
parts of the surface being engaged by means of the mechanism of reflex
sensation.[31] This in itself suggests that the sensations of tickling
are more allied to organic than to purely tactile sensations. It is
supposed that the light stimuli set up in the skin certain organic
changes, more particularly modifications of the circulation of blood in
the small vessels.[32]
It is well known that not all parts of the skin are equally susceptible
of the effect of tickling. Certain areas, for example, the sole of the
foot and the armpit, are commonly said to be “ticklish places”. In the
answers to questions sent out by Dr. Stanley Hall we find the order,
as determined by most frequent naming of the part, to be as follows:
the sole of the foot, the armpit, the neck and part under the chin,
the ribs, and so forth. The inquiries brought out the fact that there
are considerable differences of experience here, some saying that they
were ticklish in all parts, others only in one. The method adopted in
this inquiry clearly affords no accurate measurement of comparative
sensibility.[33] {53}
A more scientific attempt to measure this was made by Dr. Louis
Robinson, who carried out a large number of experiments on children
from two to four years of age with the definite purpose of testing the
degree of responsiveness by way of laughter. According to his results
the order of decreasing sensibility is as follows: (1) the region in
front of the neck; (2) the ribs; (3) axillae; (4) bend of elbow; (5)
junction of ribs and abdominal muscles; (6) flanks; (7) region of the
hip joint; (8) upper anterior part of the thigh.[34]
A glance at these statements shows that the determination of the
scale of ticklish sensibility over the surface is not yet completed.
Dr. L. Robinson, by the way, mentions neither the sole, a highly
ticklish spot in the popular creed, nor the palm, which, as we shall
see, is decidedly a ticklish region.[35] It is highly desirable that
more precise experimental inquiries should be directed to these
local variations of ticklishness, and that, after the seats of the
higher degrees of the sensibility have been ascertained, the question
should be considered whether these are marked off by any definite
peculiarities of structure.
It is probable that the sensations included under the head of
ticklishness are not all of the same quality. It seems safe to say
that in all cases the sensation is complex to this extent, that it
is composed of a tactile and an organic factor. But we may see that
the complexity is often greater than this. An obvious instance is
the addition {54} of a peculiarly irritating effect when the orifice
of the ear or nostril is tickled, an effect due to the action of the
stimulus on the hairs, which are specially abundant here.[36] Some
surfaces, too, which are free from hair, appear to be endowed with a
special modification of the ticklish sensibility. In my own case, at
any rate, light touches on the sole, have, as long as I can remember,
excited sensations which seem to have almost a character of their own.
A further complication probably occurs when the tickling grows rougher
and approaches to a digging of the fingers into the soft parts of the
armpits; for here the nerve-endings lying deeper are pretty certainly
stimulated.
Lastly, it is important to add that prolongation of the tickling seems
to introduce changes in the intensity, if not also in the quality of
the sensations. Hence it would appear that the sensations falling
under the head of ticklishness, though they have certain common
characteristics, may vary considerably.
Since we are here concerned with these sensations as provocatives of
laughter, it behoves us to look rather closely at their feeling-tones.
As largely organic sensations they may be expected to have a strongly
marked element of the agreeable or disagreeable; and this is what we
find. I, at least, cannot conceive of myself as having the proper
sensational experience of tickling, and yet being wholly indifferent.
When, however, we ask what is the precise feeling-tone of one of these
sensations, we find no simple answer forthcoming. Some psychologists
view them as having, in general, an unpleasant character.[37] On the
other hand, children are {55} certainly fond of being tickled, ask for
it, and make a pastime of it. This at once suggests that we have here
to do with a complexity of feeling-tone, as, indeed, our study of the
sensations would lead us to suppose.
It is, I think, a plausible supposition that no sensation coming under
the head of tickling is merely agreeable or disagreeable. It seems
always to be of a mixed feeling-tone: some sensational elements being
pleasant, others unpleasant, though analysis may be unable to attribute
with exactness their respective tones to the several elements.
Adopting this hypothesis, we should expect that the differences in the
composition of the sensations already dealt with would lead to the
result that, whereas some are preponderantly agreeable, others are
rather disagreeable. And this, I believe, accords with the results of
observation. The tickling sensations excited by stimulating the hairy
orifices of the ear and the nostril are said by Dr. Louis Robinson to
be “distinctly distasteful”. The sensations produced by tickling the
sole of the foot are commonly held, at least by older children and
adults, to be disagreeable in all degrees of their intensity. This
certainly accords with my own self-observation. The lightest touch, say
from a shampooer’s hand, is to me distinctly “nasty,” with an uncanny
nastiness which I cannot hope to describe.
An example of a distinctly agreeable sensation of tickling is,
curiously enough, supplied by another hairless surface, closely
analogous to the sole, namely the palm. A lady, who is an excellent
observer of children and endowed with an exceptional memory of her
early experiences, tells me that when a child she loved to have her
hands tickled. Her feeling was a kind of “awful joy,” the awfulness
coming {56} from a vague suspicion that the pastime was not quite
proper. Other preponderantly agreeable varieties appear to be the
sensations produced by the lighter stimulation of those parts which
seem in a special way to be laughter-provoking areas, _e.g._, the
armpits and ribs. This is, at least, suggested by the fact that younger
children love to be tickled in these parts in moderation, and will ask
to have the pastime renewed.
An important characteristic of these feeling-tones is their
unsteadiness or changefulness. Although at a particular moment we may
be able to detect clearly a slight preponderance of the agreeable or of
the disagreeable aspect, it is only for a moment. An increase in the
degree of pressure, a further prolongation of the stimulation, or even
a slight variation in the mode of contact, may suffice to bring up and
render prominent the opposed feeling-phase.
We may now pass to the motor reactions, which are of more especial
interest in the present connection. Overlooking the less conspicuous
elements, such as the contraction of the muscles of the hairs, we find
that there are two easily distinguishable groups of movements: (_a_)
a number of protective or _defensive_ reactions which are adapted to
warding off or escaping from the attack of the tickling stimulus; (_b_)
movements expressive of pleasure and rollicking enjoyment, from the
smile up to uproarious and prolonged laughter.
The defensive movements are such as the following:—retraction of the
foot and leg when the sole is tickled; the bending of the head to the
shoulder when the neck is tickled; the rendering of the body concave
on the side which is attacked; the thrusting away of the hand of the
tickler; wriggling and fencing with the arms when a child is tickled
lying on his back. These movements appear to {57} introduce important
modifications into the sensations excited by tickling. Dr. Louis
Robinson tells us that the flexing of the foot when tickled transforms
an unpleasant sensation into a rather pleasant one.
We may now pass to the point of chief importance for our present study,
the conditions of the laughter-reaction during a process of tickling.
This reaction is clearly the typical form of childish risibility.
It has been already more or less clearly implied, that we cannot mark
off the laughter in this case as an effect determined by any assignable
differences in the characteristics of the sensations involved. Dr.
Louis Robinson thinks that the tickling which provokes laughter is a
special variety involving the stimulation of the deeper-lying nerves.
Dr. Leonard Hill, who has specially tested this point for me, writes,
“There is no difference in response to deep and superficial tickling”;
and again, “I am sure that the most delicate superficial stimulation
can provoke laughter”. This certainly seems to agree with ordinary
observation. One of the most laughter-provoking forms of tickling
consists of a series of pianissimo touches.
Again, in speaking of ticklish areas of the skin, we must be careful
not to restrict the titillation which calls forth laughter to any
assignable region. It is undeniable that there are areas which more
readily respond, in the case of children generally, to the tickling
provocation. The armpits perhaps will occur to most readers; and it
is noticeable that Darwin speaks of the anthropoid apes giving out
“a reiterated sound, corresponding with our laughter, when they are
tickled, especially under the armpits”.[38] This {58} fact, however,
does not imply that the area of sensibility is circumscribed. Dr.
Leonard Hill assures me, as a result of his investigations, that
laughter under favourable conditions may be excited by tickling _any
part_ of the body. Dr. L. Robinson in a letter explains to me that he
agrees with Dr. L. Hill here. He finds that if a child is in a ticklish
mood, the tickling of any part or even the threat of doing so will
suffice to provoke laughter. On the other hand, we cannot speak of any
part of the surface as one, the tickling of which will uniformly call
forth laughter. Here again, as we shall see, the influence of mental
agencies modifies the result.
Now these facts suggest that even those varieties of tickling which
produce a sensation having a well-marked disagreeable tone may excite
the response of laughter. The tickling of the sole of the foot not only
provokes laughter in an infant; it tends to do so, I believe, in an
adult, who may at the same time express his dislike of the sensation by
a grimace.
It seems impossible then to conclude that the laughter which
arises from tickling is a mere expression of the pleasure-tone of
a sensational process. Even if we supposed that in all cases the
sensations were preponderantly agreeable, it would still be impossible
to account for the energy of the reaction by the intensity of the
sensuous enjoyment experienced.
That we have not to do here merely with the effect of agreeable
stimulation is shown by the fact that when a child laughs under, and is
said to enjoy, a process of titillation, _the laughter is accompanied
by defensive movements_. When, for example, a child is tickled on its
back, it will, says Dr. Robinson, “wriggle about, fencing with its
arms and dodging the attacks of its playmate . . . _laughing all the
time_ {59} _with open mouth and teeth fully displayed_”. This surely
suggests that the laughter is not merely the result of an agreeable
sensation, but rather of a complex mental state, in which the agreeable
and disagreeable elements of sensation appear to play only a secondary
_rôle_.
Nor again does it seem as if the mere transition from an agreeable
to a disagreeable sensation, or the reverse process, would account
for the laughter of tickling. A person highly sensitive to the effect
of tickling can imitate the process by movements of his own fingers,
and produce quite similar sensations of varying feeling-tone _without
experiencing the faintest impulse to laugh_. Again we know that other
experiences, such as scratching a sore place when it is healing up,
involve an alternation of moments of agreeable and disagreeable
feeling-tone, and yet are not provocative of laughter.
These and other familiar facts point to the conclusion that the
laughter excited by tickling is not a net effect of the sensory
stimulation. It is no doubt broadly determined by the characteristics
of the sensations. Intensely disagreeable ones would certainly not
call forth the laughing response. But the determining conditions
include, in addition to a sequence of sensations, _a higher psychical
factor_, namely, an apperceptive process or assignment of _meaning_
to the sensations. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the
laughter-reaction occurs first of all (to give the earliest date)
in the second month—presumably in the second half of this month.
The presence of such a psychical factor is more strongly supported
by the fact, already referred to, that the reaction does not occur
in the first three months save when mental agencies co-operate; and
that throughout the ticklish period an exactly similar process of
titillative stimulation applied to the same area of the {60} skin will
now produce laughter, now fail to do so, according to the varying mood
of the child.[39]
That the interpretation of the sensation is the decisive element in
eliciting laughter may, I think, be seen by a simple experiment which
any reader who is ticklish may carry out upon himself. The next time he
happens to have a subjective, creepy skin sensation, he will find that
he can bring on either laughter or a very different state of feeling by
adopting one of two ways of mentally envisaging what is happening. The
merest suggestion of an invading parasite suffices, I believe, to set
up a mental state which completely inhibits the impulse to laugh.
We may now seek to assign with more precision the mental conditions
which induce the mode of apperception favourable to laughter.
Beginning with the “objective” characteristics, those which reside in
the tickling experience itself, we may observe how much apprehension
of meaning has to do with the “funniness” of the experience. It is to
be noticed at the outset that when we are tickled there is _an element
of the unknown_ in the process. This seems to have been recognised by
Darwin when he laid emphasis on the fact that the more ticklish parts
are those rarely touched, at least on small areas, and, one may add,
lightly.[40] The familiar fact that one cannot tickle oneself points to
the same conclusion. A person who tries to do this knows too much about
what is going on. Dr. Ch. Richet observes, however, that one can tickle
oneself _by means of a feather_; and he, as I think {61} rightly,
explains this apparent exception by saying that in the attempt to
tickle oneself with the finger, the double sensation, of the finger
and the part tickled, seems to inhibit the effect, whereas, when the
feather is interposed this obstacle is eliminated.[41]
Other facts, too, seem to point to the importance of an element of the
unknown. The common way of tickling a child is by running the fingers
with discontinuous contact over the skin. Dr. L. Hill describes his
mode of tickling in one case as running the fingers up the child’s
arm _like a mouse_. This evidently brings in an element of _local_
uncertainty as well as of change. The effect is increased when, as
frequently happens, there are pauses between the attacks of the fingers.
The invasion of the skin-territory, like that of larger territories,
is, it would seem, likely to be more effective when it has an element
of unpredictableness. The uncertainty is, I believe, sometimes
increased by half-voluntary variations in the direction and in the
velocity of the tickling movements. Whether the fact communicated by
Dr. L. Robinson, that a child is more ticklish when dressed than when
undressed, is explained by the increased obscurity of the process in
the former case, I am not sure. It is worth noting, however, that some
of the areas said to be most ticklish, _e.g._, the armpits and the
neck, are inaccessible to sight. I believe, too, that when a child
gives himself up to the full excitement of tickling he makes no attempt
to see what is going on.
Now touches of unknown origin at places not closely observable have
something of a disturbing character. A touch is always an attack,
and has, so to speak, to be {62} condoned. This disturbing element
I regard as an essential element in the experience: it goes along
with the faintly disagreeable element of sensation, which, as we have
assumed, is commonly, if not always, more or less clearly recognisable
in the experience.[42] Yet it is certain that the disturbing effect
(like the disagreeableness of the sensation) is limited. If the unknown
bulks too largely and comes near the point of the alarming, the effect
of laughter is wholly counteracted. This is a part of the explanation
of the refusal of a child to be tickled by a stranger: for he knows
here _too little_ of what is going to happen, and consequently is
disposed to fear. Again, Dr. L. Hill informs me that “tickling a child
unexpectedly and from an unseen quarter will not provoke laughter”: the
element of surprise would seem in this case to be too great. Possibly
the comparative difficulty of making a child laugh when naked may
be explained by the increased apprehensiveness which goes with the
defenceless state of nudity. The familiar fact that the readiness to
laugh increases with practice, points to the same need of a certain
comfortable assurance lying safely below the slight superficial
apprehensions which are excited by the stimuli.
All this suggests, that in order to call forth the glad response of
laughter, we must secure a certain adjustment of stimulus to mental
attitude. The tickling must fit in with a particular mood, the state of
mind which makes enjoyment of fun not only possible but welcome.
Now it is clear that non-adjustment may arise, not only from
the presence of unsuitable characteristics in the mode {63} of
stimulation, but from some antagonistic force in the child’s previous
state of mind. The acceptance of the attack in good part depends on the
preceding attitude. The dreadfully serious, “on-the-alarm” attitude
of the child when nursed by a stranger is an effectual bar to playful
overtures. A child when cross will not, says Dr. L. Hill, give genial
response, even if the attacker be his familiar tickler, father or
nurse; and the same is true, he adds, of a child when suffering from
vaccination, or when mentally preoccupied with some hurt for which he
is seeking for sympathy, or with a story which he wants you to tell
him. As Darwin puts it, the great subjective condition of the laughter
of tickling is that the child’s mind be in “a pleasurable condition,”
the state of mind which welcomes fun in all its forms. Possibly the
position of lying on the back, which, according to Dr. L. Robinson,
makes children more responsive to tickling, may, through a relaxation
of the muscles, favour this compliant attitude of self-abandonment to
the tickling fingers.
We may perhaps sum up the special conditions of the laughter-process
under tickling as follows: when a child is tickled he is thrown into
an attitude of indefinite expectancy. He is expecting contact, but
cannot be sure of the exact moment or of the locality. This element
of uncertainty would in itself develop the attitude into one of
uneasiness and apprehensiveness; and this happens save when the child
is happy and disposed to take things lightly and as play. In this case
we may suppose that the half-developed mild form of fear is each time
swiftly dissolved into nothing by a recognition of the unreality of
the cause, of the fact that the touches are harmless and come from the
good-natured mother or nurse by way of play. This recognition becomes
clearer as the process is continued, and so there supervenes a new
attitude, that of play, in which all {64} serious interpretation is
abandoned and the gentle attacks are accepted as fun or make-believe.
If this is a correct analysis of the experience of the tickling which
excites laughter, we seem to have in it at a very early age elements
which are to be found, in a more fully developed form, in the later
and more complex sorts of mirth, namely, relief from a serious and
constrained attitude, a transition from a momentary apprehension
induced by the presentation of the partially unknown, to a joyous
sense of harmless make-believe. That this is so is further evidenced
by the familiar fact that a child, when used to the game, will begin
to laugh vigorously when you only threaten with the advancing fingers.
As a German writer observes, this is a clear case of Lipps’ theory of
annihilated expectation;[43] only he omits to note that the laughter
depends, not on the mere fact of annihilation, but on the peculiar
conditions of it in this case, involving a slight shock at the approach
of something partially unknown to a specially sensitive region of
the organism, and the instant correction of the apprehension by a
recognition of its harmlessness.
Much the same kind of stimulative process seems to be present in
the other and allied cases of reflex or quasi-reflex laughter. It
is well known that certain sense-stimuli which excite sensations of
a disagreeable character, but which, though acute, are not violent,
such as the application of a cold douche, are apt to provoke laughter.
According to the German authority just quoted, the effect depends
here, too, on variation in respect of the intensity and the locality
of the stimulation. He found further, in carrying out psychological
experiments, that whereas the introduction of a stronger stimulus than
was expected is apt to excite apprehension in {65} the subject, that
of a weaker stimulus will excite laughter.[44] Here, too, we seem to
have a sensational reflex in which is present a distinctly mental
element, _viz._, a moment of mild shock and apprehension at the sudden
coming of something disagreeable and partially unknown, instantly
followed by another moment of dissolution of shock in a pleasurable
recognition of the harmlessness of the assault.
2. Laughter is not, however, always of this reflex form. It may arise
without sensory stimulation in an “automatic” manner as the result of
a cerebral rather than of a peripheral process. This is illustrated by
the seemingly causeless laughter which breaks out in certain abnormal
states and has an “uncanny” aspect for the sane observer. A well-known
example of this is the effect of the action on the brain centres of
laughing gas and other substances. Such “automatisms” occur, however,
within the limits of normal experience, as when a person laughs during
a state of high emotional tension. I propose to speak of such seemingly
uncaused reactions as _nervous laughter_.[45]
A common and simple variety of this nervous laughter is the spasmodic
outburst that often succeeds a shock of fear. A child will laugh after
being frightened by a dog; a woman often breaks out into a nervous
laugh after a short but distinctly shaking experience of fear, _e.g._,
in a carriage behind a runaway horse, or in a boat which has nearly
capsized. And it does not seem that such laughter is preceded by a
perception of the absurdity of the fear, or of any similar mode of
consciousness; it looks like a kind of physiological reaction after the
fear. {66}
The same thing will show itself in circumstances which give rise to
a prolonged mental attitude, involving a feeling of apprehensiveness
and of constraint. Thus a shy man, making his first essay as a public
speaker, will sometimes betray his nervousness on the platform by
weird little explosions of laughter as well as by awkward gestures.
I have noted the same thing in strangers to whom I have spoken at a
_table d’hôte_ abroad. The way in which little spasms of laughter are
apt to intrude themselves into situations which, by making us the
object of others’ special attention, bring an awkward consciousness
of insecurity, is further illustrated in the behaviour of many
boys and girls when summoned to an interview with the Head, in the
laughter which often follows the going up to take a prize before a
large assembly, and the like. The strong tendency to laugh which many
persons experience during a solemn ceremony, say a church service,
may sometimes illustrate the same effect. When an enforced attitude,
difficult to maintain for the required length of time, brings on the
impulse, this will gather strength from the growth of a feeling of
apprehension lest we should not be equal to the test imposed.
Another variety, coming under the head of nervous laughter, is the
sudden outburst which now and again occurs in a state of great
emotional strain, having a distinctly painful character, especially
when it includes something in the nature of a shock. The news of
the death of an acquaintance has been known to excite a paroxysm of
laughter in a company of young persons from nineteen to twenty-four
years of age.[46] One may assume here that the {67} outbreak is not
the direct result of the news, but depends on the effect of the shock,
with the abnormal cerebral tension which this involves.
A like spasmodic outburst of laughter occasionally occurs during a
more prolonged state of painful emotional excitement. It sometimes
intrudes itself into a bout of physical suffering. Lange speaks of a
young man who, when treated for ulceration of the tongue by a very
painful caustic, regularly broke out into violent laughter when the
pain reached its maximum.[47] Many persons when thrown into a prolonged
state of grief, accompanied by weeping, exhibit a tendency to break out
into laughter towards the end of the fit. Shakespeare illustrates this
tendency when he makes Titus Andronicus, whose hand has been cut off,
answer the question why he laughed with the exclamation: “Why I have
not another tear to shed”.[48]
Can we find a common element in these different forms of nervous
or apparently unmotived laughter? We appear to have in all of them
a preceding state of consciousness which is exceptionally intense
and concentrated. The situation of fear, of constraint on being made
the object of others’ unusual observation, of suddenly hearing news
of deep import for which the mind is not prepared, of prolonged
emotional agitation, these all involve an intensification of the
psycho-physical processes which immediately condition our states of
consciousness. Looking at these intensified {68} forms of consciousness
more closely, we observe that they include something in the nature
of psychical pressure, of the presence of forces which make for
disorder, whereas the situation calls for severe self-control. This
special strain thrown on the volitional process is illustrated in
the demand for closer observation and calm reflection during a fit
of fear, or other emotional excitement, which tends to bring about a
state of wild movement and of disorderly ideas. It is, I believe, _the
specially severe strain_ belonging to such an attitude which is the
essential pre-condition of the laughter. It makes the attitude a highly
artificial one, and one which it is exceedingly difficult to maintain
for a long period. As such, the attitude is eminently unstable, and
tends, so to say, to break down of itself; and will certainly collapse,
partially at least, if the demand seems, though only for a moment, to
grow less imperative. Hence the readiness with which such a means of
temporary relief as laughter undoubtedly supplies is seized at the
moment.
It remains to determine the character of this sudden relaxation of the
strain of attention more precisely. As a sudden collapse, it is clearly
to be distinguished from the gradual breakdown due to “mental fatigue”
and nervous exhaustion. The psycho-physical energy concentrated
for the special purpose of meeting the strain is by no means used
up, but has to find some way of escape. Here, no doubt, we seem to
come across Mr. Spencer’s ingenious idea that laughter is an escape
of nervous energy which has suddenly been set free. It is no less
evident that the redundant energy follows the direction of the risible
muscles because no other commanding object for the attention presents
itself at the moment. The innervation of these muscles is not a mere
diversion of attention: it is a _dispersion_ of the energies which
for the maintenance of attention ought to {69} be concentrated. We
are never less attentive during our waking life than at the moment of
laughter. Yet even here, I think, the theory of a convenient waste-pipe
arrangement is not adequate. There is, I take it, in the case a relief
of sur-charged nerve-centres, which process would seem to be better
described by the figure of a safety-valve arrangement.
It is not difficult to surmise why the liberated energy should follow
this particular nervous route. There is no doubt that the motor
apparatus, by the disturbances of which all such interruptions of the
smooth flow of respiration are brought about, is very readily acted on
by emotional agencies. Altered respiration, showing itself in altered
vocalisation, is one of the first of the commonly recognised signs
of emotional agitation; and this effect has been rendered more clear
and precise by recent experiments. We should expect, then, that the
collapse of strained attitudes, with the great change in feeling-tone
which this must carry with it, would deeply affect the respiration.
We know, however, more than this. Severe efforts of attention are in
general accompanied by a partial checking of respiration, an effect
which seems to be alluded to in the French expression, an effort “de
longue haleine”. On the other hand, the termination of such an effort
is apt to be announced by the sigh of relief. Now, though the movements
of laughter are not the same as those of sighing, they resemble the
latter in their initial stage, that of deepened inspiration. May
we not conclude, then, that laughter is likely to occur as another
mode of physiological relief from the attitude of mental strain? And
supposing, as seems certain, that laughter in its moderate degrees, by
bringing a new briskness into the circulation, relieves the congested
capillaries of the brain, may we not go farther and say that nature has
{70} probably come to our aid by connecting with the mental upheavals
and the cruel strains here referred to, which pretty certainly involve
a risky condition of the cerebral system of capillaries, a mode of
muscular reaction which is peculiarly well fitted to bring the needed
relief?
More special conditions may favour the movements of laughter in
certain cases. As I have observed above, Darwin suggests that the
rapid alternation of crying and laughing which occur among hysterical
patients may be favoured by “the close similarity of the spasmodic
movements”.[49] In other words, the motor centres engaged, when in the
full swing of one mode of action, may readily pass to the other and
partially similar action. This would help to account for the short
outbursts of laughter during a prolonged state of painful agitation,
and to explain the fact noted by Descartes, that no cause so readily
disposes us to laughter as a feeling of sadness.[50]
Our theory plainly requires that these sudden breakdowns or relaxations
of strained mental attitudes should, even when only momentary
interruptions, be accompanied by an agreeable sense of relief. I
believe that those whose experience best qualifies them to judge will
say that this is so. The dead weight of the fear, the poignancy of the
grief, and the constraining effect of the situation of _gêne_, seem
to yield at the moment when the “awful laugh” is snatched at. This
comforting sense of a lightened load, though in part the direct result
of a cessation of cerebral strain, would, as we have seen, pretty
certainly derive added volume from the returning sense-reports telling
of the ameliorated condition of the bodily organs.
3. We have considered two of the varieties of laughter {71} which lie
outside the region of our everyday mirth. We may now pass into this
region, and inquire, first of all, into the causes of those varieties
which come under the head of joyous laughter.
Here we shall best begin by touching on the simple and early form
which may be called the overflow of good spirits. Darwin, as has been
mentioned, rightly regards the full reaction of the laugh as the
universal expression by our species of good spirits, of a joyous state
of mind. We have now to examine the mode of production of this simple
type.
It is important to note that all experiences of pleasure do not bring
on laughter. There are quiet enjoyments of a soothing character which
are far from generating the powerful impulse needed for the movements
of diaphragm and rib. To lie on a summer day in a hammock in a wood
and indulge in the sweets of _dolce far niente_ is to be out of reach
of the tickling imp. States of enjoyment, too, which, though exciting,
require a measure of close attention, such as those occasioned by
a glorious sunset, or stirring music, do not start the spasmodic
contractions of muscle.
The enjoyment that moves us to laughter must, it is evident, amount to
gladness or joy. And this means, first of all, that the pleasurable
consciousness must come in the form of a large accession, and, for a
moment at least, be ample, filling soul and body. As the expression
“good spirits” suggests, the organic processes during such states of
joyousness are voluminous and well marked. As a part of this heightened
tide of vital activity, we have the characteristic motor expression
of the gladsome mind, the movement of the limbs, the shouting and the
laughing.
Not all risings of the vital tide, however, produce laughter. Gentle
and gradual augmentations of the sense of well-being {72} and
happiness hardly tend to stir the muscles concerned. The joyous
outburst marks a _sudden_ accession of happy consciousness. It has
something of the character of a violent flooding of the spirit and the
corresponding bodily conduits.
There is a negative condition, also, to which it may not be superfluous
to allude. The flood-like rise of the happy mood which is to produce
laughter must not be accompanied by any further demand on the
attention. A girl reading a first love letter from the man whom her
heart has chosen will be glad, and will grow gladder by leaps and
bounds. But the fulness of laughter will not come while unread words
still claim the eye.
The laughter of joy is most noticeable, I think, under two sets of
conditions. Of these the first is the situation of release from
external restraint. The wild jubilant gladness of boys as they rush
out of school, provided that they have the requisite reserve fund
of animal spirits, is the stock example of this sort of laughter.
The explosion seems here to be a way of throwing off the constraint
and the dulness of the classroom, and getting a deep breath of the
delicious sense of restored liberty. So far as the outflow of good
spirits is thus connected with an escape from a serious and difficult
attitude—strenuous application of the energies of mind and body in
work—it is plainly analogous to the nervous laughter already considered.
But the swift accession of joy may come in another way, from the sudden
transformation of one’s world, from the arrival of some good thing
which is at once unexpected and big enough to lift us to a higher level
of happiness. With children and savages the sight of a new and pretty
toy is sometimes enough to effect this. The charming bauble will so
fill sense and soul that the joy of living leaps to a {73} higher
plane and bursts into a peal of mirth. The unexpected sound of the
father’s voice at the end of a long day devoted to the things of the
nursery was, we are told, enough to evoke a shout of laughter in a
small American boy: it sufficed to bring back to the little fellow’s
consciousness another and a glorious world. We older folk have, for the
greater part, lost the capacity of simply greeting delightful things
in this way, a greeting in which there is no thought either of their
meaning or of their interest for us. Yet we may meet the unexpected
coming of friends with something of the child’s simplicity of attitude.
It is hard not to smile on suddenly seeing a friend in a crowded London
street: hard to keep the smile from swelling into a laugh, if the
friend has been supposed at the moment of encounter to be many miles
away. Some of us, indeed, may retain the child’s capacity of laughing
with a joyous wonder at a brilliant explosion of fireworks.
It remains to account for the persistent fit of laughter which
frequently accompanies a prolonged gladness. Does not the fact that
the child and the natural man, when taken with the mood of mirth, go
on venting their good spirits in renewed peals tell against our theory
that the outburst is caused by an accession of joy?
In order to answer this we must look a little more closely at
this so-called persistent laughter. The language of observers of
unsophisticated human nature is sadly wanting in precision here. When,
for example, we are told by travellers that certain savages are always
laughing, we know that we are not to take the statement literally.
It means only what it means when a mother tells her visitor that her
rogue of a boy is for ever laughing and shouting; that under certain
favourable conditions the laughing fit comes readily and persists
longer than usual. In a lasting {74} mood of jollity we are all
strongly inclined to laugh, and need very little to call forth a long
outburst.
This preternaturally large output of laughter during a prolonged
state of high spirits finds its explanation in part in a kind of
physiological inertia, the tendency to go on repeating movements when
once these are started. The protracted iteration of laughter in a
child is closely analogous to that of his half-unconscious singing
to himself. This tendency of movements to perpetuate themselves in a
mechanical way probably accounts for the lengthening of the single
outburst in the case of a child violently seized with mirth. As mothers
know, this reduction of laughter to a mechanical iteration of movement
is apt to continue beyond the limits of fatigue and to bring on such
unpleasant effects as “hiccup”. It is probable, too, that the tendency
during a prolonged state of mirth to recommence laughing after a short
pause is referrible to a like cause: the physiological springs of the
movements being once set going, the explosive fit tends to renew itself.
Discounting this effect of physiological inertia, we seem to find
that in these periods of prolonged high spirits laughter retains its
fundamental character as a comparatively short process which occurs
intermittently. Where the laughing is not merely a trick played off by
the bodily mechanism, but holds a germ of mind in the shape of a happy
consciousness, it has its large and significant pauses.
If this is so, it seems reasonable to suppose that the mental
antecedent which brings on some new explosion is analogous to the sense
of “sudden glory” which accounts for the single joyous peal. Owing to
the exceptionally strong disposition to laugh during such a period,
the antecedent feeling need not be a powerful one, a very slight {75}
momentary increase of the joyous tone sufficing to give a fresh start
to the muscles.
It is not difficult to suggest possible sources of such slight
sudden augmentations of the happy feeling-tone. No prolonged state
of consciousness is, strictly speaking, of one uniform colour; in
the boisterous merriment of an old-fashioned dinner-party there were
alternations of tone, brilliant moments following others of comparative
dulness. The course of the bodily sensations in these prolonged
states of joy is in itself a series of changes, involving a sequence
of exaltations upon relative depressions of the “vital sense”. The
course of the presentations to eye and to ear in such a festive mood
must be subject to like fluctuations in respect of their action upon
the feeling-tone; and the same applies to the flow of ideas which can
find a place in the mind when thus affected. Lastly, it must not be
forgotten that the movements of attention would of themselves always
secure a certain rise and fall of enjoyment. We all know how, when we
are gladdened by some new and unexpected happiness, the mind after a
short digression returns to the delightful theme, and how, as a result
of this return, a new wave of joyous feeling seems to inundate the
spirit.
There seems much, then, to be said for the hypothesis that all
varieties of joyous laughter (when not reduced to a mechanical form)
are excited by something in the nature of _a sudden accession of
pleasurable consciousness_. Where the laugh is a new thing, unprepared
for by a previous mood of hilarity, this rise of the spirits will, as
we shall see later, probably involve a transition from a mental state
which was relatively depressed. Where, on the other hand, a joyous mood
prolongs itself, all that seems needed for re-exciting the movements of
laughter (provided that the muscular {76} energies are equal to the
explosion) is the sudden increase by an appreciable quantity of the
pleasurable tone of the consciousness.
We may further illustrate and verify this generalisation respecting
the causes of joyous laughter by an examination of some of the more
familiar circumstances in which this is wont to occur. Here we shall
of course be dealing with the early and unsophisticated mind. Properly
drilled “grown-ups” but rarely exhibit the phenomenon in its full
intensity.
(_a_) It is a matter of common observation that joyous laughter is a
frequent concomitant of the play-attitude, especially at its first
resumption. We have already found this illustrated in the laughter of
“happy boys” just liberated from school. Here the conditions indicated,
a relief from restraint and a sudden expansion of joyous activity, are
patent to all.
Closely related to this situation of released bodily energies is that
of relieved mental restraint. During a nursery lesson—if only the
teacher is a fond mother or other manageable person—the child is apt
to try modes of escape from the irksomeness by diverting the talk, and
especially by introducing “funny” topics; and the execution of the bold
little manœuvre is frequently announced by a laugh. By such familiar
infantile artifices the pressure is lightened for a moment, and the
laugh announces a moment’s escape into the delicious world of fun and
make-believe.
The impulse to be gay and to laugh runs, moreover, through the
enjoyment of play. No doubt this in its turn may often grow exceedingly
serious, as when the illness of dolly, or the thrilling horrors of a
bear’s cave, or of an attack by scalping Indians, are realistically
lived out. Yet we must remember that this playful tampering with {77}
the serious, even on its genuine side, is a part of the enjoyment. The
momentary terror is desired by healthy young nerves, because the thrill
of it, when the certainty of the nothingness lies securely within
mental reach, is delicious excitement. A fuller examination of the
relation of laughter to play belongs to a later stage of our inquiry.
(_b_) Another situation which is closely related to play is that of
being teased. By “teasing” is here understood those varieties of
attack which have in them an element of pretence, and do not cross the
boundary line of serious intention to annoy. As thus defined, teasing
enters into a good deal of child’s play. Tickling is clearly only a
special modification of the teasing impulse. In some of the earliest
nursery play, the game of bo-peep, for instance, there is an element of
teasing in the pretence to alarm by a feigned disappearance, as also in
the shock of the sudden reappearance. The teaser of a child, whether
he threatens to pinch him or to snatch at his toy, carries out a
menace; but it is a make-believe menace—a thing to be a wee bit afraid
of for just a moment, yet so light and passing as to bring instantly
the delightful rebound of disillusion, if only the subject keeps good
tempered. On the teaser’s side (when it remains pure teasing) it is
prompted by no serious desire to torment, by no motive more serious
than the half-scientific curiosity to see how the subject of the
experiment will take it.
The explosions of a good-humoured subject under such gentle teasing
are closely analogous to those of a tickled child: they spring from
a sudden sense of relief, of elastic rebound, after repression. The
swift alternations of moments of nascent fear and of joyous recognition
of the fun of the thing are eminently fitted to supply the conditions
of a sudden rising of the spirits. The child that likes to be {78}
teased—in the proper way of course—is perfectly willing to pay for
these momentary delights by the momentary trepidations.
On the side of the teaser, the situation is also highly favourable to
outbreaks of hilarity. If successful, he reaps the joy of the superior
person, and glories in the cleverness of his experiments. The swellings
of the sense of power as he watches his victim give just those
experiences of “sudden glory” which a philosopher places at the base
of all enjoyment of the laughable; and, alas, in the less kindly these
risings of the pleasurable consciousness may continue and even increase
after the teasing has ceased to be play and becomes indistinguishable
from the behaviour of a tormentor.[51]
(_c_) Much the same kind of remark applies to practical joking, which,
when it is not weighted with the serious purposes of punishment and
moral correction, is merely an expansion of this playful attack of
the tickler and the teaser. When the victim reaches the moral height
of being able to enjoy the performance, his enjoyment comes under the
head of dissolved apprehension, or disillusion after taking things too
seriously. By far the larger share of the pleasure of the practical
joke certainly falls, however, to the perpetrator, who in this case,
too, realises a “sudden glory,” an increased sense of power.
(_d_) Once more, laughter is a common accompaniment of all varieties of
contest or sharp encounter, both physical and mental. When, as in the
case of the savage, the schoolboy and the civilised soldier, it breaks
out after bodily fight, it {79} has some of the characteristics of
nervous laughter. It is a concomitant of a sudden remission of physical
and mental strain, of a dissolution of the attitude of apprehensive
self-protection. In most cases, since it is “they laugh that win,” the
feeling of relief is reinforced by that of contemptuous exultation at
the first taste of victory.
A prolonged combat, if not too unequal, offers on both sides frequent
openings for these reliefs of tension and upspringings of the exultant
mood. A good fighter in the ring is, I understand, supposed to be able
now and again to relieve the grimness of the situation by a sweet
smile. This is certainly true of all mental contests. Nothing is more
remarkable in the study of popular laughter than the way in which it
seems to penetrate those relations and dealings of social life which
involve sharp contest and crossing of wits. These will be illustrated
more fully by-and-by. It is enough here, to allude to the enormous
influence of contests between the sexes on the development of wit and a
lively sense of the ludicrous.
(_e_) As a last group of situations favourable to the experience of
joyous expansion we have those in which an unusual degree of solemnity
is forced upon us. This has already been touched on. Extremes seem to
meet here. It might be expected that an impulse born of the play-mood
would find its natural dwelling-place in scenes of social gaiety and
conviviality. And in the days when society was gay the festive board
was doubtless the focus of the activity of the mirthful spirit. In our
time it seems almost more natural to associate a laugh with a funeral
ceremony than with a dinner-party. Yet the art of extracting fun from
solemn things is not of to-day, as may be seen by a glance at the jokes
of the church architect and the play writer of the Middle Ages. In such
bizarre intrusions of the droll {80} into the domain of the solemn
we seem to find the struggling of an irrepressible gladness of spirit
against the bonds which threaten to strangle it.
Whether the invasion of the territory of the solemn by the jocose
results in a barely mastered impulse to laugh, depends on variable
conditions. The frivolous mind, hardly touched by the gravity of the
occasion, will, no doubt, often be the first to welcome the delivering
hand. Yet it is an error to suppose that a tendency to laugh on a
solemn occasion shows want of genuine emotion. The sincerest worshipper
in a church may, if he have the requisite sensibility, be moved to
laughter by some grotesque incident, such as the _mal à propos_ remark
of a garrulous child. For the point of our theory is that laughter in
such cases is an escape from pressure; and the man who feels deeply at
such a moment may experience an emotional pressure which equals, if it
does not exceed, that of the external constraint which the non-reverent
“worshipper” is experiencing. It is true, of course, that the deeper
the feeling the greater the inertia that will have to be overcome
before the laughing impulse can make way for itself. Yet here, again,
we must remember that emotional temperaments vary, and that with some
a genuine awe and even an intense grief may yield now and again for a
moment to the challenge of the laughable when its note catches the ear.
The last remarks suggest that in any attempt to deal with the
conditions favourable to laughter reference should be made to those
physiological characteristics which are supposed to determine the
particular temperament of a man: his special bent, say, towards jollity
on the one hand, or towards a brooding melancholy on the other.
Our forefathers had pretty definite ideas about the sort of bodily
constitution which was the foundation of the {81} laughter-loving
temper. A full “habit” tending to obesity, as in Falstaff, was, and
is, I believe, popularly supposed to be a mainstay of the laughing
spirit. The saying “Laugh and grow fat” may imply a vague apprehension
of this relation, as well as a recognition of the benefits of laughter.
Yet the precise organic substrate of this happy endowment is unknown.
Health and all that makes for “good spirits” are no doubt favourable
to a voluble laughter of the elemental kind. On the other hand,
as we shall see, the laughing capacity frequently co-exists with
physiological conditions of quite another kind. Men are to be found
of a lean habit, and with a strong bent to grave reflection, who are
nevertheless able, not merely to provoke laughter from others, like the
“melancholy Jaques,” but themselves to contribute a sonorous laughter
to the higher intellectual domains of mirth. It is conceivable that
the disposition to laugh may have its own restricted physiological
conditions in a special instability of the mechanism concerned. This
again may presumably include some as yet undefinable property of the
nerve-centres which favours rapid change in the mode of brain activity,
and those sudden collapses of tension which seem to be the immediate
physiological antecedent of the motor discharge in laughter. {82}