Sallust, who, like Thucydides, had prefixed to his history of the times
after Sylla, which, alas! is lost, a succinct review of the moral and
political history of his nation, preserved to us by St. Augustine,
tells us in it, that no longer than the fear of Tarquin lasted, had
Rome been governed with fairness and justice; but that, as soon as that
fear had been removed, the _Patres_[89] had ventured upon every sort of
arbitrary deeds, and from the severity of the law of usury the _Plebes_
was kept under a yoke of slavery. Livy says likewise, that the Plebes
was oppressed, _cui summa opera inservitum erat_ until the ruin of
the Tarquins. Until then, salt, which belonged to the _publicum_, had
been sold at a low price; customs had been abolished; the demesnes of
the kings had been distributed among the _Plebes_; and the φιλάνθρωπα
δίκαια of Servius Tullius were again enforced. Finally, the old account
states that Brutus had filled up the senate, _qui imminutus erat_,
with plebeians. As he was the _Tribunus Celerum_ of the plebeians,
and afterwards plebeian consul, he may without doubt have admitted
plebeians into the senate, although not in such considerable numbers
as is asserted. But this did not last. Plebeian senators cannot have
continued to the time of the legislation of the decemvirs; but from
what Sallust says, who in the speech of Macer displays an uncommon
acquaintance with the old constitution,--and St. Augustine, one of
the greatest minds, a man endowed with the clearest penetration,
believed him,--that the patricians _soli in imperio habitabant_, it is
evident, that, when tranquillity was restored, they again excluded the
plebeians. There are analogous cases in all states, precisely because
it is in human nature. Without doubt the banished royal family had
left a considerable party behind them, as is wont to happen in all
revolutions; or a new one arose, which attached itself to the cause
of the refugees, as was the case in the Italian towns of the middle
ages. We may think what we like of the battle on the Regillus; we may
deem the cohort of the Roman emigrants in the army of the Latins as
improbable as it really is; yet we may with certainty believe in the
existence of an emigration from Rome in a mass, linked to the royal
fugitives, and always keeping up a connexion with the friendly party
in the city,--like the φυγάδες in Greece, and as in English history,
at the time of the great rebellion when the Stuarts were abroad, the
Irish Papists and the Scotch Presbyterians, who were overpowered,
and partly driven out of the country by Cromwell, joined the old
cavaliers then living away from their homes with the royal family.
The same was the case in the French revolution. As long as Tarquin, a
man of personal eminence, was living abroad, the patricians hesitated
to carry their innovations to extremities; yet they may have annoyed
the plebeians; they may have deprived them of the _imperia_; they may
even have expelled them from the senate;--at least they certainly did
not fill up the places of those who died, with plebeians. Whenever in
Switzerland danger threatened from abroad, the aristocratical cantons
were mild to their country districts; otherwise they were harsh and
cruel. Immediately after the English revolution of 1688, the liberties
of the dissenters were far greater than they were twelve or fifteen
years afterwards. What the plebeians lost, cannot be particularized.
That the Valerian law of appeal to the tribes had been done away with
is not likely; but it was no longer regarded, since it could only be
upheld by impeaching the consul who had infringed it, when his year of
office was expired: this the plebeian magistrates no more dared to do.
Yet the real oppression only began when the fear of the foreigner was
taken away.
Whether the law of debt had been changed by Servius Tullius, and
Tarquin had abrogated the Servian laws, but Valerius had restored them,
is a question with regard to which Dionysius is not to be implicitly
believed. Tarquin is said to have utterly destroyed the tablets on
which it was inscribed, that he might quite blot it out from the memory
of men. This looks very suspicious: they needed only to have been
copied once, and all that was done would be of no avail. We may however
conclude from that statement that they were not contained in the _jus
Papirianum_: the _Plebes_ would have restored them after the Secession,
if they had been deprived of a right so expressly granted. In this
case, therefore, one of the plebeian forgeries seems to lie before us.
The law of debt produced a revolution. Had the senate and the
patricians understood how to act wisely, and divided the opposite
party, a thing so easily done in free states, the patricians were
superior to the plebeians, not indeed in numbers, but in many other
respects. For the patricians had almost exclusively the clientship.
Livy and Dionysius have many passages from which it is evident how
numerous the clients were during the first centuries; that the
patricians distributed the demesne in many little hides of land among
them; and that they kept them entirely in their power. These clients
were not in the tribes; but they were connected through their patrons
with the curies: hereditary landed property they only possessed by
the special permission of their masters, what we would now call a
quit rent. Thus they were absolutely dependent on the patricians. But
the plebeians consisted of altogether different elements, of Latin
knights, rich men, and a host of quite poor people: they were either
proprietors or day-labourers. These different elements might very
easily have been divided; the principal men were ambitious of offices
and of political consideration; the common people, on the contrary,
did not care at all whether their chiefs were admissible to consular
dignity or not, but so much the more did they for other things. In
the absence of patriotism and justice, the patricians must have been
able easily to sever the mass from the principal plebeians. But they
were as covetous as they were ambitious, and thus pressed doubly upon
the people. The whole of the demesne was in their occupation. Had
they assigned small possessions to the poor, or given them a right of
ownership, then they would have gained them over; and separated them
from the rest. Yet as they had the money trade entirely in their own
hands, they deemed themselves sufficiently secure. The money trade
no doubt was so managed, that the banking business was transacted by
foreigners or freedmen under the patronage of a patrician, as in Athens
by Pasion, who was a Metic, and paid an Athenian for lending his name
to the firm.[90] As in Athens the Trapezitæ, in medieval Italy the
Lombards, in our days the Jews, all of whom have no real home, carry on
the money trade. And thus the poor plebeian often applied for loans to
his neighbour, yet more generally he was obliged to go to town, and to
fetch the money from the Trapezitæ.
The expression _persona_ in law is derived from the fact that a
foreigner could not appear in court. It is a mask: another had to
represent him. That the _peregrinus_ afterwards could himself sue and
be sued, and that a special _prætor peregrinus_ was appointed, was
not done on account of the vast amount of business, but for political
reasons. The patricians themselves would not have possessed such great
moneyed resources: yet the foreigners who came to Rome had to commit
themselves to their patronage, the same as the clients, for which, of
course, the patrician was paid a commission. Now and then perhaps the
patricians may have done business on their own account. Taken in this
point of view, it was not after all such a sordid usury as is generally
presumed.
The patricians and plebeians had quite different civil rights, as they
had come together out of different states: the twelve tables, besides
settling the political groundwork, first introduced one uniform civil
law. Among our (German) forefathers also, there was not a geographical,
but a personal distinction of rights. In Italy, the homebred population
down to the twelfth century had Roman, whilst the German had Lombard
and Salic law; but when the old municipalities were abolished and the
elements of society were in the process of amalgamation, people first
began to issue their decrees in common, they weaned themselves more
and more from the old native institutions, and thus by degrees arose
the statute law of the Italian towns, such as every city possesses.
The patricians had a liberal law of debt, the plebeians a strict one;
they had it also among themselves, but to them it only became dangerous
as far as it was between them and the patricians. As soon as it is
possible to run into debt, the number of small proprietors decreases
from century to century. If we compare the division of the land at
Tivoli in the fifteenth century with the present one, we see that at
that time there were fifty times more owners of the soil than there are
now.
The general law of debt, as it is found in the East, among the Greeks,
among the northern nations, as well as among the Romans, is this,
that the borrower could pledge himself and his family for the debt.
According to Plutarch, in his life of Solon, there were at Athens
nearly a thousand bondmen for debt, who, if they were not able to
pay, were sold to the foreigner. Among the Romans personal arrest
existed in its sternest form. People either liquidated their debts
by personal servitude, or else they alienated their property for a
certain time, or in case of severe distress for life, or else they
also sold themselves,--by which likewise the children, who were still
_in patria potestate_, came _per æs et libram_ into the _mancipium_
of the buyer,--yet with the condition that they might be redeemed.
This bondage lasted until they emancipated themselves again _per æs
et libram_. Our personal arrest of insolvent debtors is the still
remaining half of this ancient right, which ceases to have any meaning,
owing to the other half having been done away with by milder manners.
The German also could in olden times give up his freehold and his
person to another, whose bondman he then became. In order to escape
the addiction, the borrower could eventually sell his property as a
security; yet he was bound in conscience to redeem it after a certain
time. The _Fides_ answered for it that the creditor also would not
withhold from the debtor the opportunity of redeeming himself, even
when his person and his family were concerned. For this reason the
_Fides_ was a goddess of such importance among the Romans: as under
such strict forms of law, people would have utterly been ruined without
her. If a debtor did not discharge his debt, he was forfeited to his
creditor, being _fiduciarius_ in his _mancipium_; yet the latter could
not directly _manum injicere_, an addiction of the prætor being wanted
for that purpose. He had to _in jure vindicare_ him with the words,
_Hunc ego hominem meum esse aio ex jure Quiritium_; and without doubt
the five witnesses and the _libripens_, before whom the contract had
been concluded, were to be present. The prætor then gave a respite; and
if after its expiration payment was not made, and the debtor therefore
was not able to prove the _liberatio per æs et libram_, the ὑπερήμενος
was addicted to the creditor. In the old Attic law, it was just the
same; yet Solon had without doubt abolished it, and introduced in its
stead the Attic law of mortgage, from which the later Roman one is
derived. For the _equites_ in their important money transactions tried
to evade the strict debtor’s law, by causing them to be managed by
foreigners who were not subject to the Roman laws. Thence arose the
laws concerning the _chirographa_ and _centesima_, a discount business
for so short a date was not done in Rome at all. The _Addictus_ was
termed _nexus_, because of his being _nexu vinctus_. _Nexus_, or
_nexum_ every transaction was originally called, which by _traditio_
and by weighing out of money was done in the presence of witnesses, a
thing afterwards usual only in fictitious sales, and then significative
of a right of mortgage, by which in case of neglect of payment a
definite right of property was secured to the creditor. Frequently also
people were allowed to discharge their debt by work. An industrious
workman might advantageously dispose of his labour in times when there
was a great demand for it; if, for instance, a man, who had pledged
himself, had a son who was still in his full strength; the father
sold him to the creditor; and when the son had discharged the debt
by his work, he became again free of the _mancipium_ of his master.
Yet the interest accumulated at such a usurious rate, that it became
very difficult for a debtor who was poor to redeem himself; though,
if he worked as a _nexus_, he at least paid the interest. During such
a period of labour the master had full authority over him as over a
slave. That those who thus worked in payment of debts were a numerous
class, is expressly asserted by writers.
But there was yet another way in which bondage for debt arose. One
might also become a debtor without contract; as for instance, by
neglecting to pay a legacy, or should a tradesman work for me, and I
do not pay him; and again, if I commit a crime, I am bound in Roman
law to make amends to the injured party according to a fixed estimate,
_obligatio ex delicto_. All these relations constitute a second class
of liabilities, and in these cases there was addiction without _nexus_,
as was laid down in the twelve tables. The prætor sentences the thief
to give me double what he has stolen; and if the man does not pay it
by the appointed day, he addicts him to me as a bondman for debt. In
the same manner, if I sue any one for a purchase and he cannot deny
the debt (_æs confessum_), I demand his _addictio_ for a certain time.
This was a _vinculum fidei_, an intimidation, so that the debtor, of
course, strained every nerve to pay. To this only did the expression
_vinculum fidei_ refer, not to the _nexum_; as vindication was here
allowed, and there was no question about the fulfilment of a contract.
When a Roman was _in nexu_, having sold himself to another in the event
of his not paying, as the Merchant of Venice did to Shylock, he had to
pay the taxes on his freehold all the same, however heavily incumbered
it might be; for _nexo solutoque idem jus esto_, was the law of the
twelve tables. But quite different is the case of the addictus, who
is the creditor’s own, and has no personal rights. Thus we have the
solution of the enigma in the accounts given in our books, that debtors
who had sold themselves (that is to say, _nexi_) served notwithstanding
in the legions.[91] Livy does not enter into this subject, because he
was not conscious of the difficulty: Dionysius indeed remarks it, but
he is embarrassed by it.
In a certain measure, this system was just as necessary as our strict
rules of exchange; yet its abuse was unavoidable, as the rich man is
not always kind-hearted, but is often harsh, and will abide by the law
in its utmost rigour. This idolizing of mammon reigned in Rome, and the
tyranny of positive law was often very oppressive. Besides which, the
right was all on one side. When a patrician got into difficulties, his
kinsmen or dependants had to get him out of them; the plebeians were
forced in most cases to borrow money from the patricians. Now the fate
of an addicted plebeian was one in which there might be much variety.
He might find a mild master who allowed him to buy his freedom by
work, or else a hard one who would shut him up in the _ergastulum_, put
him in chains, and treat him cruelly, that his friends might be obliged
to pay for his release.
This was the state of these relations about the year 260. All at
once an extraordinary general distress arose, like the one nearly a
hundred years later, after the Gallic calamity. Before that time we
find nothing at all resembling it. The reason for this must have been
the war of Porsena, from which we may draw the inference that it ought
to be placed much later than we find it in Livy. The distress caused
commotions among the people, of the breaking out of which Livy’s
account may be tolerably well founded. An old warrior, covered with
scars, falls into the hands of his creditors, because his house had
been burnt down and his property carried off; he escapes from the
dungeon in which he has been most barbarously treated by his master,
and shows himself in the market-place, starving, clothed in rags, and
disfigured with stripes. This sight gives rise to a general uproar,
and the _Plebes_ renounce the rule of their tyrants. Livy’s account
of the way in which the tumult spreads wider and wider is a model of
beautiful writing, being taken from the very nature of man; yet its
details do not contain any real tradition, but it is to be looked upon
as an historical romance. When the senate and the consuls had now
arrived at the terrible conviction that the commonalty could not be
ruled when once it did not choose to obey, either the report was spread
that the Volscians were at hand, or they actually advanced when they
heard of the dissensions in Rome. The senate resolved upon raising an
army. According to the original law, the senate had no authority by
itself to declare war; but it brought the motion before the curies,
and these had to give it their approval. According to Servius’ laws,
the motion ought to have gone to the centuries also; but this was no
more thought of; the annalists mention only the senate. The latter
decreed that an army should be raised. As the burthen of the service
on foot lay on the Plebes only, its _juniores_ were summoned by
tribes (_nominatim citabantur_); to answer to the summons was termed
_nomen dare_; to refuse, _nomen abnuere_. This conscription remained
unchanged in all essential points to the latest times of the republic.
But when the _Plebes_ refused to serve, it did not answer (_non
respondebat_): such a silence is the most awful that can be. Since this
now happened, the consuls knew not which way to turn. A loud outcry
arose, that people would not be so foolish as to shed their blood for
their tyrant-masters; that the whole gain of the war fell to the lot
of the patricians; that the booty was shared among them, and that it
passed into the _publicum_ (the chest of the patricians), not into the
_ærarium_; that the plebeian became poorer and poorer, and that he was
obliged to pledge himself and his to the patrician, and to serve him
as a bondman. Among the patricians a split began to show itself. Livy
tells us, that the _minores natu_ among the _patres_ were foremost
in the fray;--probably this ought to be the _minores_, who are the
Luceres, as it is impossible to think of young patricians at that time
as members of the senate, which in reality was a γερουσία. The consuls
(A. 259) belonged to opposite parties; Appius Claudius representing the
interest of the most furious oligarchs, Servilius being moderate. In
the danger which was threatening, one could only succeed by mildness:
every attempt to raise an army by force disgracefully failed. Servilius
had himself authorized by the senate to arrange matters. He issued a
proclamation calling upon all those who had been pledged for debt to
present themselves, and he gave them security as long as they should be
in the field, and for their children and dependants as well. Numbers
now crowded to the standards, and with the army thus formed, Servilius
went out to war, and returned victorious. He had promised to do his
utmost with the senate to make them cancel the contracts for debt;
but the senate did not grant any thing, and the army was dismissed.
Appius Claudius undertook the jurisdiction, and, without paying any
regard to the word of the consul, addicted all those who had been in
the field to their creditors, or obliged them to enter into a _nexum_.
The rest of the year was passed in the greatest commotion. The consuls
who came next, A. Virginius and T. Vetusius (A. 260), were both of
them men of moderate views;--a proof that the election lay still
with the centuries, as the curies would have chosen the most violent
oligarchs. Yet they were not able to do any thing either with the
senate or their own order. It was again attempted to raise an army, and
the difficulties were the same as before. The consuls were reproached
with cowardice; others who wanted to strike terror into the people,
had to think of saving their lives instead. Real danger there was only
on market days; the _Plebes_ consisting of peasants who lived in the
country. In Italy tillage requires extraordinary care. The land must be
weeded several times during summer; the Romans plough the fallow ground
five, six, or seven times; they weed the fields, and weed them again,
until the corn is grown about three inches high. It is incredible how
much work this requires; the peasant therefore is busy the whole of the
year, and has no time to go about idle. In the city there were usually
only those plebeians who were townsmen. The patricians were therefore
safe: they had strong men among them, and a great number of clients,
whereas the plebeians in the four _tribus urbanæ_ were certainly the
minority. Thus the fact may also be accounted for, that the patricians
were able to rule the plebeians even without regular troops. The
houses (Geschlechter) also of the German towns had for a long time the
commonalties in their power, although the latter were superior to them
in numbers. Had the plebeians been a rabble, the patricians would all
of them have been soon slain by them.
When the attempt proved again unsuccessful, some proposed to carry out
the concessions of Servilius, and to abide by them; but Appius said,
that the resistance ought to be put down, and a dictator therefore
elected. It had been one of the objects of the institution of the
dictatorship, to be enabled to evade the limitations placed upon the
power of the consuls, not only by the appeal to the curies, but also
by that to the tribes, which Valerius had established. Appius wanted
the dictator to seize every one who refused to serve, and to have him
put to death. This mad project could not but have caused the most
dreadful commotion. The assembly passed an insane resolution, but
the good genius of Rome guided them to choose as dictator the most
moderate man, M. Valerius,--thus he is called by all the authorities,
less correctly by Dionysius alone Manius Valerius, which is a mere
figment, devised because Marcus was said to have been killed at the
Regillus,--a clansman, or, according to our narratives, a brother of P.
Valerius Poplicola. He renews the edict of Servilius, and, whilst the
Volscians, Æquians, and Sabines were in arms, raises an army without
difficulty. That it is stated to have consisted of ten legions, can
only excite our smile. To each consul he gave a part of the army; he
took one likewise himself, and returned victorious. He now demanded of
the senate the fulfilment of his promises; and declared, that the law
should not be departed from. Valerius resigned his dignity. Now there
were still both of the consular armies, or at least one of them under
arms, the return of which the patricians did not wish to allow; for as
long as there was an army in the camp, its services might be commanded.
Dionysius expressly tells us, that the consuls, owing to a Lex Valeria,
held absolute sway, extending from one mile beyond Rome by virtue of
their _imperium_, and that consequently they might punish by martial
law anybody who was _obnoxius_ to them, without needing the decision of
a military tribunal. For this reason the senate did not wish to allow
the army to return. This was an atrocious policy, since the army must
some time or other be dismissed, and the whole safety therefore of
the senate only rested in the conscientiousness of the _Plebes_, the
oath being so sacred to the Romans. But the rebellion actually broke
out in the camp, though with great moderation. It is related, that
the soldiers had wished at first to slay the consul, that they might
be relieved from their oath, which was only sworn to him personally.
Yet they merely renounced their allegiance; made L. Sicinius Bellutus
their leader; passed the Anio in arms; and encamped three or four miles
from thence on a hill which was afterwards consecrated, and therefore
called the _mons sacer_. Thus a whole population withdrew from the
city, and there remained behind the patricians and their slaves,
besides the wives and children of the emigrants. The patricians did
not, however, seize upon these as hostages; whilst, on the other hand,
the plebeians also practised no further hostility, but kept themselves
from all devastation, and foraged in the neighbouring country only
to supply their immediate wants. The patricians now acted like human
beings. As long as their authority was not put in jeopardy, there was
nothing which they dared not do, and so in every instance until the Lex
Hortensia; yet their power once being broken, they became dispirited,
and each new contest ends only in disgrace. They had thought that the
plebeians would have no courage; they ever said among themselves, This
time they will lay down their arms, one has only to overawe them.
One feels giddy at the sight of madness like this; and yet, so long
as the world lasts, it will ever be renewed. When the plebeians had
raised their standard, the scales fell from their eyes. Within the town
the _Plebes_ had only two quarters,[92] the Aventine with the Vallis
Murcia, and the Esquiline, both of them very strong, and provided with
gates, certainly guarded by armed men. The plebeians might therefore
have taken possession of Rome without any resistance, as their friends
would have opened the gates to them. They would, however, have been
obliged to take the other hills, all of which were fortified, and the
forum by storm; which would have been their country’s ruin, since the
other nations would not have kept quiet. The conduct of the _Patres_
therefore appears mad, and it is inconceivable that the _Plebes_,
when once in arms, did not go further: in Florence the Guelphs and
Ghibelines fought against each other in the streets. A key to this
seems to be found in the fact that the Latins were at peace, and that
therefore with their help the senate was able to make head against the
_Plebes_. It ought to be borne in mind that in confederate republics
similarity of constitution has no influence whatever on the mutual
support: democratically governed nations protect the governments of
aristocratical ones. In the great insurrection of Lucerne and Berne, in
the year 1657, the democratical cantons came to the assistance of the
oligarchical governments against the peasants. This explains also how
it was that the senate could hold out under such circumstances. There
are allusions to it from the annals still extant in Dionysius. Appius
says, that the Latins, if isopolity were granted them, would assist
them against the _Plebes_.
According to Dionysius, the secession lasted four months, from August
to December; and this he proves from the circumstance, that the tribune
always entered upon their office on the 10th of December. There was
likewise a tradition that on the Ides of September the dictator had
knocked in the _clavus_, and that consequently about that time there
had been no consuls at Rome. Yet the troubles are said to have broken
out under the consuls Virginius and Vetusius; these consuls then,
so Dionysius concludes, must have resigned their office at the end
of August, and the insurrection have lasted four months. Had the
succession of the tribunes never been interrupted at all, there
would have been no difficulty whatever as to the same rule having
applied to the time of their inauguration from the first, as that
which was afterwards followed; but Dionysius overlooks the fact, that
during the decemvirate the tribunate had ceased to exist, so that the
tribunes hardly entered upon their office on the same day as before,
but rather as soon as they were allowed to meet again. The consuls
were inaugurated on the first of August, and it seems certain that the
peace between the two orders was concluded by the new consuls Vetusius
and Virginius. The secession cannot have lasted longer than about a
fortnight: the city could not have held out in this condition; a famine
would have broken out if the legions had occupied the fields. The
rapidity of Livy’s narrative allows us to suppose a short duration only.
The patricians saw too late that they had driven matters to extremity,
and that they must give way. They had to make very lowering concessions
as to the form, and to send envoys. The list of the ten envoys which
Dionysius gives, is certainly authentic, and taken from the _libri
augurales_: forgery must have been carried on to a great extent if
such statements were not genuine. The end of the secession is only
explicable when we have a clear insight into the relations owing to
which the ruling power could not only defend itself in the city, but
also dispose of the confederates; for, these had sworn fealty to
the Roman state, that is to say, to the senate and the _Populus_;
so that numbers do not by any means turn the scale between the two
orders. A peace was concluded in due form by _fetiales_, as between
two free nations. The patricians sent ambassadors and conducted the
negotiation, with great humiliation as to the formalities, yet with a
prudence which is worthy of admiration. It was their aim to get off as
cheaply as possible after the faults which they had made. They could
only manage to retrieve matters, either by strengthening themselves
from abroad with the aid of the allies, or by dividing the _Plebes_.
For the latter purpose, two ways lay open to them. They might draw to
their own side the chief plebeians, but in that case they would have
lessened their own power; or they might separate the mass of the people
from its leaders. The second was an infallible device. The plebeians
were granted remission of debts for the insolvent debtors; the Addicti
were freed, and the Nexum dissolved, without any general rule being
made with regard to the law of debt: of course an amnesty also was
stipulated. The remission of debts was no great loss for the creditors,
as the interest had long outgrown the capital. A hundred and fifty
years afterwards the rate of interest was lowered to ten per cent.; at
that time it may have been about fifty per cent. A similar course was
pursued by Sully.
A lasting result was the institution of the office of the _Tribuni
Plebis_. These tribunes were no innovation in themselves. At the
restoration of the tribunate after the second secession, the commonalty
had twenty chiefs, viz. one for each tribe; among these two are
invested with the power. The tribes in fact make up two decuries,
and for each of these there is a chief; just as in the senate there
were ten decuries, each of which had a _primus_, all of whom together
constituted the board of the _decem primi_. Symmetrical arrangements
every where recur in the old institutions, wherefore we may by
induction from a known quantity arrive at the unknown. Thus, when we
read that the first tribunes had been two, who made choice of three
more to join them; it is certain that those two were the foremen of
the existing twenty or twenty-one tribunes, who in a new state of
things merely rose to a higher sphere of official functions. The
difference without doubt was this, that the old tribunes were elected
by the several tribes (as the phylarchs in the Greek states were by
each phyle); the new ones, on the contrary, by the whole commonalty.
C. Licinius and L. Albinius are mentioned as the two first tribunes;
Sicinius, the general of the _Plebes_ at the secession, is one of the
three who were chosen in addition. The plebeians were not able to
recover their good right which the Servian constitution had given them;
they had to be content with defending themselves against oppression.
Their magistracy was therefore _auxilii ferendi gratia_; the tribunes
by an oath were declared inviolable (_corpora sacrosancta_), so that
they might step in between the holders of power and those who were
aggrieved and protect the latter. Before that, owing to the spirit
of caste and the pride of office among the patricians, the tribune
who impeached a consul, would have in vain incurred the peril of the
prosecution, as there was another consul with equal pretensions, and
all the patricians sided with him;--indeed the consul would have
caused the tribune who appealed against him to the commonalty, to be
arrested and chastised. Whoever henceforth laid hand on a tribune, was
proscribed as an outlaw; and if the consul did not put the outlawry
in force against him, the tribune might after the expiration of his
period of office, summon him before the tribunal of the curies, or
even perhaps of the tribes. The tribunes were perhaps scarcely a
magistracy in the commonalty, certainly not in the state. Justus
Lipsius, an ingenious and very learned man, with whom as a philologist
I am not worthy to be compared, has by his authority, great as he is
as a grammarian, done much mischief with regard to Roman antiquities.
Whenever a magistracy, or a military arrangement is mentioned, he,
and all those who follow in his wake, never distinguish between the
different ages. A tribune at the end of the third century is by no
means like a tribune of Cicero’s time. It is just the same in Roman
topography; a clear-headed man like Sarti does not put all the
buildings in Rome of the different ages side by side, as the common
herd do. People fancied that the tribunes had the Veto, and likewise
the self-same privilege which they got afterwards, of proposing
resolutions; but the first tribunes are perhaps to be looked upon in
no other light but that of an ambassador in a foreign state, who is
to protect the subjects of his sovereign. The patricians had until
now wielded their power without any check; the plebeians had no share
in the administration: and therefore a magistracy became necessary
which might come forward as protectors against public authorities as
well as against individuals, whenever any members of their order had
to complain of ill usage. Their houses were therefore open by day and
night, and they were not allowed to absent themselves from the city:
like a physician they were always to be in readiness to give help. This
is a grand idea, quite peculiar to Rome; there is nothing analogous
to it in Greek antiquity. Besides this the tribunes had the right of
calling together their commonalty, and of making propositions;--yet
there are very few traces indeed of this in the earlier times. The
resolutions which the tribunes moved among the _Plebes_ were mere
bye-laws, rules at pleasure, _plebiscita_; whilst, on the other hand,
those of the patricians were called _leges_. To this allusion is made
in a passage of Livy, where the Etruscans say, that the Romans were now
two peoples, each of them _suis magistratibus, suis legibus_, a notice
of the importance of which Livy was entirely unconscious. He does not
in general alter the materials which he finds; but he merely drops
part of them. The _plebiscita_ had as yet no authority whatever over
the whole community; after more than twenty years they could only be
considered as an opinion offered by an assembly of states, which might
pass into a law (283). The only real magistracy among the plebeians
were the ædiles, a name which among the Latins also was borne by the
local magistrates. In all likelihood, these were judges in the disputes
of the plebeians among themselves; whereas the tribunes were no judges
in the earlier times, though perhaps there may have been an appeal to
them from the ædiles. No change was probably made at that time in the
civil law.
These prerogatives of the tribunes are still very insignificant and
humble, being either merely negative, or else administrative in a
narrow sphere, and least of all legislative. I do not believe that
they had the right of moving any change of the civil law in favour of
their own order. Strange to say, the election of the tribunes was now
committed to the centuries, although it ought far more naturally to
have remained with the tribes. From this also we see, how small the
advantages were which the _Plebes_ obtained by the first secession;
for the patricians had great influence in the centuries by means of
their clients: about ten years afterwards, they had formed, owing to
this mode of election, a party among the tribunes. The statement that
they were elected by the curies is a palpable falsehood; yet there
is thus much of truth in it, that they were to be confirmed by the
curies in order that no obnoxious people might be chosen; just as the
curule magistrates were by the centuries. It is the same as when the
English government claimed a veto in the election of the Irish [Roman
Catholic] bishops. This relation, according to Livy, ceases already
before the passing of the Publilian law. Piso thinks that before the
Publilian law, by which the election was transferred to the tribes,
there had been only two tribunes. I believe that the number five is
of later date; yet I do not deem it likely that it should have first
come in with the Publilian law: for as this number corresponds to the
five classes, how should it have come into use, when it was no more the
classes, but the tribes which had had to elect? It seems to me highly
probable, that under the pretext of a fair compromise, the patricians
still managed also to gain an advantage for themselves. I explain from
this the perplexing circumstance that ten years later we find the
curies in possession of the consular election instead of the centuries.
The plebeians by concession only get the election to one office for
the centuries; the other remains with the curies until the restoration
of the consulship after the time of the decemvirs. Perhaps a grant of
land was made besides, and very likely the promise was given to restore
the old system of the _ager publicus_. The result of the secession was
therefore by no means such a decided victory of the plebeians over
the patricians, as is stated by our historians. A firm groundwork was
indeed gained, which they afterwards knew how to make use of; yet the
fruits were only to be reaped by dint of hard exertions.
The compromise between the two orders was now concluded in form like a
peace, and also with sacrifice, by a _senatus-consultum_ and a decree
of the curies on the one side and by a resolution of the plebeians
in arms on the other. They called down curses on themselves if they
should do anything to break the vow; and yet the patricians did all
they could to shake off the yoke. The deputies of the _Plebes_, and the
Decem Primi of the senate, made an offering in common; order returned;
things became better; yet, of course, the seeds of new commotions and
agitations were still sown for a long time to come. I have called this
settlement “a peace.” This word is used elsewhere on similar occasions:
the Magna Charta in Lüttich, the union between the burghers and the
commonalty, was likewise called _la paix de Fexhe_. In German there is
for such an agreement the fine expression _eine Richtung_ (a righting).
The Latins were now rewarded for what they had done for the senate, as
Dionysius particularly mentions from the excellent record on which his
narrative is based. They receive isopolity (_jus municipii_) in its
first meaning by the treaty of Sp. Cassius, of which we have spoken
before.