On the Saltkahatchie. February, 1865.
When we reached our destination on the Saltkahatchie, we were met by
our old commander of Virginia and Tennessee, Major General McLaws,
from whom we had been separated for more than a year. The soldiers
were glad to see him, and met him with a rousing cheer, while the old
veteran was equally delighted to see us. It was like the meeting of
father and absent children, for General McLaws was kind and indulgent
to his men, even if not a very successful General. After being
relieved of his command in East Tennessee and succeeded by General
Kershaw, he had commanded the post at Augusta, Ga., to which place he
returned after the close of hostilities and remained until his death.
He was the greater part of the time postmaster of the city of Augusta.
There being few occupations that the old West Pointers of the South
could fill, they generally accepted any office in the gift of the
government that would insure them an honest livelihood.
General McLaws was facing two corps of Sherman's Army at this place
with some few veterans, State troops, and reserves. Sherman had been
quiet for some time, recruiting his army with negroes from the great
plantations along the coast, and resting up his army for his march
through the State. Negroes flocked to his army by the thousands, and
were formed into regiments and brigades, officered by white men. Even
our own Generals and some of our statesmen at this time and before
were urging Congress to enlist the negroes, but the majority were
opposed to the movement. To show how confident were our leaders even
at this late day of the Confederacy, I will quote from Wm. Porcher
Miles, then in the Confederate Congress, in reply to General
Beauregard urging the enlistment of the slaves. It must be understood
that at this time Lee had all he could do to hold his own against
Grant, growing weaker and weaker as the days rolled by, while Grant
was being reinforced from all over the United States. Lee had the
solitary railroad by which to subsist his army. Sherman had laid waste
Georgia and was now on the eve of marching; through South Carolina.
The Army of the Trans-Mississippi was hopelessly cut off from the
rest of the Confederacy. The Mississippi River was impassable, to say
nothing of the Federal pickets that lined its banks and the gunboats
that patrolled its waters, so much so that one of our Generals is said
to have made the report "that if a bird was dressed up in Confederate
gray, it could not cross the Mississippi." Hood's Army was a mere
skeleton of its former self--his men, some furloughed, others returned
to their home without leave, so disheartened were they after the
disastrous defeat in Tennessee. Still all these conditions being known
and understood by the authorities, they were yet hopeful. Says Mr.
Miles in Congress:
"I cannot bring my mind to the conviction that arming our slaves will
add to our military strength, while the prospective and inevitable
evils resulting from such measures make me shrink back from such a
step. This can be when only on the very brink of the brink of the
precipice of ruin."
From such language from a Confederate Congressman, dark as the day
looked on February 4th, 1865, the date of the letter, the people
did not seem to feel that they were on the "brink of the precipice."
Continuing, Mr. Miles goes on in a hopeful strain:
"But I do not estimate him [speaking of Grant] as a soldier likely
to decide the fate of battle. We have on our rolls this side of
the Mississippi four hundred and one thousand men, one hundred and
seventy-five thousand effective and present. We can easily keep in
the field an effective force of two hundred thousand. These are as
many as we can well feed and clothe, and these are sufficient to
prevent subjugation or the overrunning of our territory."
How a man so well informed and familiar with the foregoing facts could
hope for ultimate results, is hard to comprehend by people of this day
and generation. It was the plan of General Beauregard to concentrate
all the available troops in North and South Carolina on the
Saltkahatchie, to keep Sherman at bay until Dick Taylor, with the
remnant of Hood's Army, could come up, then fall back to the Edisto,
where swamps are wide and difficult of passage, allow Sherman to cross
over two of his corps, fall upon them with all the force possible,
destroy or beat them back upon the center, then assail his flanks,
and so double him up as to make extrication next to impossible. But in
case of failure here, to retire upon Branchville or Columbia, put up
the strongest fortifications possible, withdraw all the troops from
Charleston, Wilmington, and in the other cities, put in all the State
troops that were available from the three States, push forward as
many veterans as Lee could temporarily spare from the trenches,
barely leaving a skirmish line behind the works around Richmond and
Petersburg, then as Sherman approached, fall upon him with all the
concentrated force and crush him in the very heart of the State, or
to so cripple him as to make a forward movement for a length of time
impossible; while the railroads in his rear being all destroyed, his
means of supplies would be cut off, and nothing left but retreat.
Then, in that event, the whole of Beauregard's troops to be rushed on
to Lee, and with the combined army assault, the left flank of Grant
and drive him back on the James. That the soldiers in the ranks and
the subaltern officers felt that some kind of movement like this was
contemplated, there can be no doubt. It was this feeling that gave
them the confidence in the face of overwhelming numbers, and nerved
them to greater efforts in time of battle. It was this sense of
confidence the soldiers had in the heads of departments and in the
commanding Generals that gave the inspiration to the beaten army of
Hood that induced these barefoot men to march half way across the
continent to place themselves in battle lines across the pathway
of Sherman. It was this confidence in the wisdom of our rulers, the
genius of the commanders, the stoicism of the soldiers, and above all,
the justness of our cause and the helping hand of the Omnipotent, that
influenced the women of the South to bear and endure the insults of
the Federal soldiers, and view with unconcern the ruin of their homes
and the desecration of their country. From the standpoint of the
present, this would have been the only possible plan whereby any hopes
of ultimate success were possible. But to the people of this day and
time, the accomplishment of such an undertaking with the forces and
obstacles to be overcome looks rather far-fetched, especially when we
reflect that Johnston, with fifty or sixty thousand of the best troops
in the service, had failed to check Sherman among the mountain passes
of North Georgia, or even to prevent his successful advance to the
very walls of Atlanta. That General Beauregard, with his handful of
regular troops and a contingent of boys and old men, could accomplish
what General Johnston, with a well equipped army of veterans, failed
in, was simply a blind faith in the occult influence of Providence.
But it seems as if the department at Richmond had lost its head, and
had no settled policy. Telegrams were being continually sent to the
Generals in the field to "Crush the enemy," "You must fight a great
battle," "Either destroy him or so cripple his efforts to reach Grant,
that reinforcements would be taken from Lee's front," "Why don't you
fight?" etc. These were the encouraging messages Generals Beauregard
and Hardee were receiving, but where were the troops to accomplish
such work? Generals from every direction were calling for aid--to be
reinforced, or that the enemy was making advances, without means to
stop him. The answer to all these calls were the same, in substance
at least, as that given by Napoleon to the request of Ney of Waterloo,
when that marshal called upon the Emperor for reinforcements, "Where
does he expect me to get them? Make them?" It seems that the people,
with the exception of the privates in the field and the women and
children at home, had become panic stricken.
On the 3rd of February General Sherman began crossing the
Saltkahatchie at places between Broxton's and Rivers' Bridges (and
above the latter), and was moving by easy stages in the direction
of Branchville. It was not conclusively known whether Sherman, on
reaching that place, would turn towards Augusta or in the direction of
Charleston, or continue his march to Columbia. President Davis having
declined the proposition of General Beauregard to evacuate all the
cities on the coast and make a stand on the Edisto, declined also a
like proposition to fight the great battle at either Branchville
or Columbia, without offering any better policy himself. The only
alternative the latter had was to keep out of Sherman's way as well as
possible and to allow him to continue laying waste the entire center
of the State. His only encouragements were dispatches from the
President to "Turn and Crash Sherman," "Call on the Governors," "Bring
out the militia," etc.
Sherman's columns of advance consisted of four great patrolled lines,
with a corps on each. His extreme right was made up of the Seventeenth
Corps, under General Frank P. Blair, the Fifteenth next, under General
Jno. A. Logan, the two being the right wing of the army, commanded by
General Howard. The left wing, under General Slocum, consisted of the
Fourteenth Corps, on extreme left, General Jeff. C. Davis commanding;
the next, the Twentieth, under General A.S. Williams, the whole
numbering sixty thousand. The cavalry, numbering four thousand
additional, was on either flank.
To meet this formidable array, Beauregard had under his immediate
command Hardee, with thirteen thousand seven hundred (three thousand
being State militia); around Augusta and on the march in Georgia and
upper South Carolina was the remnant of Hood's Army--Steven D. Lee,
with three thousand three hundred and fifty; Dick Cheatham, with two
thousand five hundred.
Stewart's Corps was far back in Georgia, and too far away to give any
hopes of meeting Beauregard in this State. It consisted of Loring's
Division, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven; Wathals'
Division, one thousand and thirty-six; French's Division, one thousand
five hundred and nineteen.
It must not be forgotten that the number under Hardee included the
troops in and around Charleston, and all the cities and towns in the
State where soldiers were stationed.
General Wheeler, in command of several brigades of cavalry, now
reduced to a mere skeleton organization, was hovering around the
enemy's flanks and in front between Branchville and Augusta.
Just prior to the evacuation of Columbia, General Beauregard applied
to the war department for the promotion of General Wade Hampton to
Lieutenant General, to take precedence over Major General Wheeler, now
in command of all the cavalry in this army. He further asked that he
be assigned to the command of the cavalry of his department, all of
which was granted. Generals Hampton and Butler were both at home at
the time, the former on furlough, the latter recruiting and mounting
his troops. These two Generals being natives of the State, and General
Hampton so familiar with the topography of the country through which
the army had to pass, General Beauregard thought him a desirable
officer for the post. Furthermore, Wheeler's Cavalry had become
thoroughly demoralized and undisciplined. From their long, continual
retreats the cavalry had become to look upon "retreat" as the regular
and national order. Acting on the principle that all which was left
in their wake of private property would be appropriated by the enemy,
they fell with ruthless hands upon whatsoever property their eyes took
a fancy to, consoling themselves with the reasoning "that if we
don't take it, the enemy will." So audacious had become the raids
of Wheeler's command that citizens had little choice between the two
evils, "Wheeler's Cavalry or the Federals." The name of "Wheeler's
men" became a reproach and a by-word, and remains so to this day with
the descendants of those who felt the scourge of these moving armies.
These are matters that are foreign to the subject or to the "History
of Kershaw's Brigade," but as the greater part of the soldiers of
South Carolina were away during the march through their State
and ignorant of the movements of the armies, I write for their
information, and the concluding part of this work will be rather a
history of the whole army than of one brigade.
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