Chapter L. Epiphilosophy.

At the conclusion of my exposition a few reflections concerning my

philosophy itself may find their place. My philosophy does not pretend to

explain the existence of the world in its ultimate grounds: it rather

sticks to the facts of external and internal experience as they are

accessible to every one, and shows the true and deepest connection of them

without really going beyond them to any extra‐mundane things and their

relations to the world. It therefore arrives at no conclusions as to what

lies beyond all possible experience, but affords merely an exposition of

what is given in the external world and in self‐consciousness, thus

contents itself with comprehending the nature of the world in its inner

connection with itself. It is consequently _immanent_, in the Kantian

sense of the word. But just on this account it leaves many questions

untouched; for example, why what is proved as a fact is as it is and not

otherwise, &c. All such questions, however, or rather the answers to them,

are really transcendent, _i.e._, they cannot be thought by the forms and

functions of our intellect, do not enter into these; it is therefore

related to them as our sensibility is related to the possible properties

of bodies for which we have no senses. After all my explanations one may

still ask, for example, whence has sprung this will that is free to assert

itself, the manifestation of which is the world, or to deny itself, the

manifestation of which we do not know. What is the fatality lying beyond

all experience which has placed it in the very doubtful dilemma of either

appearing as a world in which suffering and death reign, or else denying

its very being?—or again, what can have prevailed upon it to forsake the

infinitely preferable peace of blessed nothingness? An individual will,

one may add, can only turn to its own destruction through error in the

choice, thus through the fault of knowledge; but the will in itself,

before all manifestation, consequently still without knowledge, how could

it go astray and fall into the ruin of its present condition? Whence in

general is the great discord that permeates this world? It may, further,

be asked how deep into the true being of the world the roots of

individuality go; to which it may certainly be answered: they go as deep

as the assertion of the will to live; where the denial of the will appears

they cease, for they have arisen with the assertion. But one might indeed

even put the question, “What would I be if I were not will to live?” and

more of the same kind. To all such questions we would first have to reply

that the expression of the most universal and general form of our

intellect is the _principle of sufficient reason_; but that just on this

account that principle finds application only to the phenomenon, not to

the being in itself of things. Yet all whence and why depend upon that

principle alone. As a result of the Kantian philosophy it is no longer an

_æterna veritas_, but merely the form, _i.e._, the function, of our

intellect, which is essentially cerebral, and originally a mere tool in

the service of the will, which it therefore presupposes together with all

its objectifications. But our whole knowing and conceiving is bound to its

forms; accordingly we must conceive everything in time, consequently as a

before and after, then as cause and effect, and also as above and below,

whole and part, &c., and cannot by any means escape from this sphere in

which all possibility of our knowledge lies. Now these forms are utterly

unsuited to the problems raised here, nor are they fit or able to

comprehend their solution even if it were given. Therefore with our

intellect, this mere tool of the will, we are everywhere striking upon

insoluble problems, as against the walls of our prison. But, besides this,

it may at least be assumed as probable that not only _for us_ is knowledge

of all that has been asked about impossible, but no such knowledge is

possible in general, thus never and in no way; that these relations are

not only relatively but absolutely insusceptible of investigation; that

not only does no one know them, but that they are in themselves

unknowable, because they do not enter into the form of knowledge in

general. (This corresponds to what Scotus Erigena says, _de mirabili

divina ignorantia, qua Deus non intelligit quid ipse sit_. Lib. ii.) For

knowableness in general, with its most essential, and therefore constantly

necessary form of subject and object, belongs merely to the phenomenal

appearance, not to the being in itself of things. Where knowledge, and

consequently idea, is, there is also only phenomenon, and we stand there

already in the province of the phenomenal; nay, knowledge in general is

known to us only as a phenomenon of brain, and we are not only unjustified

in conceiving it otherwise, but also incapable of doing so. What the world

is as world may be understood: it is phenomenal manifestation; and we can

know that which manifests itself in it, directly from ourselves, by means

of a thorough analysis of self‐consciousness. Then, however, by means of

this key to the nature of the world, the whole phenomenal manifestation

can be deciphered, as I believe I have succeeded in doing. But if we leave

the world in order to answer the questions indicated above, we have also

left the whole sphere in which, not only connection according to reason

and consequent, but even knowledge itself is possible; then all is

_instabilis tellus, innabilis unda_. The nature of things before or beyond

the world, and consequently beyond the will, is open to no investigation;

because knowledge in general is itself only a phenomenon, and therefore

exists only in the world as the world exists only in it. The inner being

in itself of things is nothing that knows, no intellect, but an

unconscious; knowledge is only added as an accident, a means of assistance

to the phenomenon of that inner being, and can therefore apprehend that

being itself only in proportion to its own nature, which is designed with

reference to quite different ends (those of the individual will),

consequently very imperfectly. Here lies the reason why a perfect

understanding of the existence, nature, and origin of the world, extending

to its ultimate ground and satisfying all demands, is impossible. So much

as to the limits of my philosophy, and indeed of all philosophy.

The ἑν και παν, _i.e._, that the inner nature in all things is absolutely

one and the same, my age had already grasped and understood, after the

Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza had thoroughly

taught, and Schelling had revived this doctrine. But _what_ this one is,

and how it is able to exhibit itself as the many, is a problem the

solution of which is first found in my philosophy. Certainly from the most

ancient times man had been called the microcosm. I have reversed the

proposition, and shown the world as the macranthropos: because will and

idea exhaust its nature as they do that of man. But it is clearly more

correct to learn to understand the world from man than man from the world;

for one has to explain what is indirectly given, thus external perception

from what is directly given, thus self‐consciousness—not conversely.

With the Pantheists, then, I have certainly that ἑν και παν in common, but

not the παν θεος; because I do not go beyond experience (taken in its

widest sense), and still less do I put myself in contradiction with the

data which lie before me. Scotus Erigena, quite consistently with the

spirit of Pantheism, explains every phenomenon as a theophany; but then

this conception must also be applied to the most terrible and abominable

phenomena. Fine theophanies! What further distinguishes me from Pantheism

is principally the following. (1). That their θεος is an _x_, an unknown

quantity; the will, on the other hand, is of all possible things the one

that is known to us most exactly, the only thing given immediately, and

therefore exclusively fitted for the explanation of the rest. For what is

unknown must always be explained by what is better known; not conversely.

(2). That their θεος manifests himself _animi causa_, to unfold his glory,

or, indeed, to let himself be admired. Apart from the vanity here

attributed to him, they are placed in the position of being obliged to

sophisticate away the colossal evil of the world; but the world remains in

glaring and terrible contradiction with that imagined excellence. With me,

on the contrary, the _will_ arrives through its objectification however

this may occur, at self‐knowledge, whereby its abolition, conversion,

salvation becomes possible. And accordingly, with me alone ethics has a

sure foundation and is completely worked out in agreement with the sublime

and profound religions, Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Christianity, not merely

with Judaism and Mohammedanism. The metaphysic of the beautiful also is

first fully cleared up as a result of my fundamental truth, and no longer

requires to take refuge behind empty words. With me alone is the evil of

the world honestly confessed in its whole magnitude: this is rendered

possible by the fact that the answer to the question as to its origin

coincides with the answer to the question as to the origin of the world.

On the other hand, in all other systems, since they are all optimistic,

the question as to the origin of evil is the incurable disease, ever

breaking out anew, with which they are affected, and in consequence of

which they struggle along with palliatives and quack remedies. (3.) That I

start from experience and the natural self‐consciousness given to every

one, and lead to the will as that which alone is metaphysical; thus I

adopt the ascending, analytical method. The Pantheists, again, adopt the

opposite method, the descending or synthetical. They start from their

θεος, which they beg or take by force, although sometimes under the name

_substantia_, or absolute, and this unknown is then supposed to explain

everything that is better known. (4.) That with me the world does not fill

the whole possibility of all being, but in this there still remains much

room for that which we denote only negatively as the denial of the will to

live. Pantheism, on the other hand, is essentially optimism: but if the

world is what is best, then the matter may rest there. (5.) That to the

Pantheists the perceptible world, thus the world of idea, is just the

intentional manifestation of the God indwelling in it, which contains no

real explanation of its appearance, but rather requires to be explained

itself. With me, on the other hand, the world as idea appears merely _per

accidens_, because the intellect, with its external perception, is

primarily only the medium of motives for the more perfect phenomena of

will, which gradually rises to that objectivity of perceptibility, in

which the world exists. In this sense its origin, as an object of

perception, is really accounted for, and not, as with the Pantheists, by

means of untenable fictions.

Since, in consequence of the Kantian criticism of all speculative

theology, the philosophisers of Germany almost all threw themselves back

upon Spinoza, so that the whole series of futile attempts known by the

name of the post‐Kantian philosophy are simply Spinozism tastelessly

dressed up, veiled in all kinds of unintelligible language, and otherwise

distorted, I wish, now that I have explained the relation of my philosophy

to Pantheism in general, to point out its relation to Spinozism in

particular. It stands, then, to Spinozism as the New Testament stands to

the Old. What the Old Testament has in common with the New is the same

God‐Creator. Analogous to this, the world exists, with me as with Spinoza,

by its inner power and through itself. But with Spinoza his _substantia

æterna_, the inner nature of the world, which he himself calls God, is

also, as regards its moral character and worth, Jehovah, the God‐Creator,

who applauds His own creation, and finds that all is very good, παντα καλα

λιαν. Spinoza has deprived Him of nothing but personality. Thus, according

to him also, the world and all in it is wholly excellent and as it ought

to be: therefore man has nothing more to do than _vivere, agere, suum Esse

conservare ex fundamento proprium utile quærendi_ (_Eth._, iv. pr. 67); he

is even to rejoice in his life as long as it lasts; entirely in accordance

with Ecclesiastes ix. 7‐10. In short, it is optimism: therefore its

ethical side is weak, as in the Old Testament; nay, it is even false, and

in part revolting.(54) With me, on the other hand, the will, or the inner

nature of the world, is by no means Jehovah, it is rather, as it were, the

crucified Saviour, or the crucified thief, according as it resolves.

Therefore my ethical teaching agrees with that of Christianity, completely

and in its highest tendencies, and not less with that of Brahmanism and

Buddhism. Spinoza could not get rid of the Jews; _quo semel est imbuta

recens servabit odorem_. His contempt for the brutes, which, as mere

things for our use, he also declares to be without rights, is thoroughly

Jewish, and, in union with Pantheism, is at the same time absurd and

detestable (_Eth._, iv., appendix, c. 27). With all this Spinoza remains a

very great man. But in order to estimate his work correctly we must keep

in view his relation to Descartes. The latter had sharply divided nature

into mind and matter, _i.e._, thinking and extended substance, and had

also placed God and the world in complete opposition to each other;

Spinoza also, so long as he was a Cartesian, taught all that in his

“_Cogitatis Metaphysicis_,” c. 12, i. I., 1665. Only in his later years

did he see the fundamental falseness of that double dualism; and

accordingly his own philosophy principally consists of the indirect

abolition of these two antitheses. Yet partly to avoid injuring his

teacher, partly in order to be less offensive, he gave it a positive

appearance by means of a strictly dogmatic form, although its content is

chiefly negative. His identification of the world with God has also this

negative significance alone. For to call the world God is not to explain

it: it remains a riddle under the one name as under the other. But these

two negative truths had value for their age, as for every age in which

there still are conscious or unconscious Cartesians. He makes the mistake,

common to all philosophers before Locke, of starting from conceptions,

without having previously investigated their origin, such, for example, as

substance, cause, &c., and in such a method of procedure these conceptions

then receive a much too extensive validity. Those who in the most recent

times refused to acknowledge the Neo‐Spinozism which had appeared, for

example, Jacobi, were principally deterred from doing so by the bugbear of

fatalism. By this is to be understood every doctrine which refers the

existence of the world, together with the critical position of mankind in

it, to any absolute necessity, _i.e._, to a necessity that cannot be

further explained. Those who feared fatalism, again, believed that all

that was of importance was to deduce the world from the free act of will

of a being existing outside it; as if it were antecedently certain which

of the two was more correct, or even better merely in relation to us. What

is, however, especially assumed here is the _non datur tertium_, and

accordingly hitherto every philosophy has represented one or the other. I

am the first to depart from this; for I have actually established the

_Tertium_: the act of will from which the world arises is our own. It is

free; for the principle of sufficient reason, from which alone all

necessity derives its significance, is merely the form of its phenomenon.

Just on this account this phenomenon, if it once exists, is absolutely

necessary in its course; in consequence of this alone we can recognise in

it the nature of the act of will, and accordingly _eventualiter_ will

otherwise.

APPENDIX.

Abstract.

SCHOPENHAUER’S ESSAY ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT

REASON (Fourth Edition, Edited by FRAUENSTÄDT. The First Edition appeared

in 1813).

This essay is divided into eight chapters. The first is introductory. The

second contains an historical review of previous philosophical doctrines

on the subject. The third deals with the insufficiency of the previous

treatment of the principle, and prescribes the lines of the new departure.

The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh treat of the four classes of objects

for the subject, and the forms of the principle of sufficient reason which

respectively characterise these classes. The eighth contains general

remarks and results. It will be convenient to summarise these chapters

severally.

Chapter I.

Schopenhauer points out that Plato and Kant agree in recommending, as the

method of all knowledge, obedience to two laws:—that of Homogeneity, and

that of Specification. The former bids us, by attention to the points of

resemblance and agreement in things, get at their kinds, and combine them

into species, and these species again into genera, until we have arrived

at the highest concept of all, that which embraces everything. This law

being transcendental, or an essential in our faculty of reason, assumes

that nature is in harmony with it, an assumption which is expressed in the

old rule: _Entia præter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda._ The law of

Specification, on the other hand, is stated by Kant in these words:

_Entium varietates non temere esse minuendas._ That is to say, we must

carefully distinguish the species which are united under a genus, and the

lower kinds which in their turn are united under these species; taking

care not to make a leap, and subsume the lower kinds and individuals under

the concept of the genus, since this is always capable of division, but

never descends to the object of pure perception. Plato and Kant agree that

these laws are transcendental, and that they presuppose that things are in

harmony with them.

The previous treatment of the principle of sufficient reason, even by

Kant, has been a failure, owing to the neglect of the second of these

laws. It may well be that we shall find that this principle is the common

expression of more than one fundamental principle of knowledge, and that

the necessity, to which it refers, is therefore of different kinds. It may

be stated in these words: _Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam non

sit._ This is the general expression for the different forms of the

assumption which everywhere justifies that question “Why?” which is the

mother of all science.

Chapter II.

Schopenhauer in this chapter traces historically the forms in which the

principle had been stated by his predecessors, and their influence. He

points out that in Greek philosophy it appeared in two aspects—that of the

necessity of a ground for a logical judgment, and that of a cause for

every physical change—and that these two aspects were systematically

confounded. The Aristotelian division, not of the forms of the principle

itself, but of one of its aspects, the causal, exemplified a confusion

which continued throughout the Scholastic period. Descartes succeeds no

better. His proof of the existence of God that the immensity of His nature

is a _cause or reason_ beyond which no cause is needed for His existence,

simply illustrates the gross confusion between cause and ground of

knowledge which underlies every form of this ontological proof. “That a

miserable fellow like Hegel, whose entire philosophy is nothing but a

monstrous amplification of the ontological proof, should dare to defend

this proof against Kant’s criticism of it is an alliance of which the

ontological proof itself, little as it knows of shame, might well feel

ashamed. It is not to be expected I should speak respectfully of people

who have brought philosophy into disrespect.” Spinoza made the same

confusion when he laid it down that the cause of existence was either

contained in the nature and definition of the thing as it existed, or was

to be found outside that thing. It was through this confusion of the

ground of knowledge with the efficient cause that he succeeded in

identifying God with the world. The true picture of Spinoza’s “_Causa

sui_” is Baron Munchhausen encircling his horse with his legs, and raising

himself and the horse upwards by means of his pigtail, with the

inscription “_Causa sui_” written below. Leibnitz was the first to place

the principle of sufficient reason in the position of a first principle,

and to indicate the difference between its two meanings. But it was Wolff

who first completely distinguished them, and divided the doctrine into

three kinds: _principium fiendi_ (cause), _principium essendi_

(possibility), and _principium cognoscendi_. Baumgarten, Reimarus,

Lambert, and Platner added nothing to the work of Wolff, and the next

great step was Hume’s question as to the validity of the principle. Kant’s

distinction of the logical or formal principle of knowledge—Every

_proposition_ must have its ground; from the transcendental or material

principle, Every _thing_ must have its ground—was followed out by his

immediate successors. But when we come to Schelling we find the

proposition that gravitation is the _reason_ and light the _cause_ of

things, a proposition which is quoted simply as a curiosity, for such a

piece of nonsense deserves no place among the opinions of earnest and

honest inquirers. The chapter concludes by pointing out the futility of

the attempts to prove the principle. Every proof is the exhibition of the

ground of a judgment which has been expressed, and of which, just because

that ground is exhibited, we predicate truth. The principle of sufficient

reason is just this expression of the demand for such a ground, and he who

seeks a proof, _i.e._, the exhibition of a ground for this principle

itself, presupposes it as true, and so falls into the circle of seeking a

proof of the justification of the demand for proof.

Chapter III.

In the third chapter Schopenhauer points out that the two applications of

the principle of sufficient reason distinguished by his predecessors, to

judgments, which must have a ground, and to the changes of real objects,

which must have a cause, are not exhaustive. The reason why the three

sides of a certain triangle are equal is that the angles are equal, and

this is neither a logical deduction nor a case of causation. With a view

to stating exhaustively the various kinds into which the application of

the principle falls it is necessary to determine the nature of the

principle itself. All our ideas are objects of the subject, and all

objects of the subject are our ideas. But our ideas stand to one another

as a matter of fact in an orderly connection, which is always determinable

_a priori_ in point of form, and on account of which nothing that is in

itself separate and wholly independent of other things can be the object

of our consciousness. It is this connection which the principle of

sufficient reason in its generality expresses. The relations which

constitute it are what Schopenhauer calls its root, and they fall into

four classes, which are discussed in the four following chapters.

Chapter IV.

In the fourth chapter Schopenhauer deals with the first class of objects

for the subject and the form of the principle of sufficient reason which

obtains in it. This first class is that of those complete ideas of

perception which form part of our experience, and which are referable to

some sensation of our bodies. These ideas are capable of being perceived

only under the forms of Space and Time. If time were the only form there

would be no coexistence, and therefore no persistence. If space were their

only form there would be no succession, and therefore no change. Time may

therefore be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions

of the same thing. But the union of these two forms of existence is the

essential condition of reality, and this union is the work of the

understanding (see “World as Will and Idea,” vol. i. § 4, and the table of

predicables annexed to vol. ii., chap. 4). In this class of objects for

the subject the principle of sufficient reason appears as the law of

causality or the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, and it is

through it that all objects which present themselves in perception are

bound together through the changes of their states. When a new state of

one or more objects makes its appearance it must have been preceded by

another on which it regularly follows. This is causal sequence, and the

first state is the cause, the second the effect. The law has thus to do

exclusively with the _changes_ of objects of external experience, and not

with things themselves, a circumstance which is fatal to the validity of

the cosmological proof of the existence of God. It follows also from the

essential connection of causality with succession that the notion of

reciprocity, with its contemporaneous existence of cause and effect, is a

delusion. The chain of causes and effects does not affect either matter,

which is that in which all changes take place, or the original forces of

nature, through which causation becomes possible, and which exist apart

from all change, and in this sense out of time, but which yet are

everywhere present (_e.g._, chemical forces, see _supra_, vol. i., § 26).

In nature causation assumes three different forms; that of cause in the

narrow sense, of stimulus, and of motive, on which differences depend the

true distinctions between inorganic bodies, plants, and animals. It is

only of cause properly so called that Newton’s third law of the equality

of action and reaction is true, and only here do we find the degree of the

effect proportionate to that of the cause. The absence of this feature

characterises stimulation. Motive demands knowledge as its condition, and

intelligence is therefore the true characteristic of the animal. The three

forms are in principle identical, the difference being due to the degrees

of receptivity in existence. What is called freedom of the will is

therefore an absurdity, as is also Kant’s “Practical Reason.” These

results are followed by an examination of the nature of vision, which

Schopenhauer sums up in these words: “I have examined all these visual

processes in detail in order to show that the understanding is active in

all of them, the understanding which, by apprehending every change as an

effect and referring it to its cause, creates on the basis of the _a

priori_ and fundamental intuitions or perceptions of space and time, the

objective world, that phenomenon of the brain, for which the sensations of

the senses afford only certain data. And this task the understanding

accomplishes only through its proper form, the law of causality, and

accomplishes it directly without the aid of reflection, that is, of

abstract knowledge through concepts and words, which are the material of

secondary knowledge, of thought, thus of the Reason.” “What understanding

knows aright is reality; what reason knows aright is truth, _i.e._, a

judgment which has a ground; the opposite of the former being illusion

(what is falsely perceived), of the latter error (what is falsely

thought).” All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal

relation, and this is the sole function of understanding, and not the

complicated working of the twelve Kantian Categories, the theory of which

is a mistaken one. A consequence of this conclusion is, that arithmetical

processes do not belong to the understanding, concerned as they are with

abstract conceptions. But it must not be forgotten that between volition

and the apparently consequential action of the body there is no causal

relation, for they are the same thing perceived in two different ways.

Section 23 contains a detailed refutation of Kant’s proof of the _a

priori_ nature of the causal relation in the “Second Analogy of

Experience” of the Critique of Pure Reason, the gist of the objection

being that the so‐called subjective succession is as much objective in

reality as what is called objective by Kant: “Phenomena may well follow

one another, without following _from_ one another.”

Chapter V.

The fifth chapter commences with an examination of the distinction between

man and the brutes. Man possesses _reason_, that is to say, he has a class

of ideas of which the brutes are not capable, _abstract_ ideas as

distinguished from those ideas of perception from which the former kind

are yet derived. The consequence is, that the brute neither speaks nor

laughs, and lacks all those qualities which make human life great. The

nature of _motives_, too, is different where abstract ideas are possible.

No doubt the actions of men follow of necessity from their causes, not

less than is the case with the brutes, but the kind of sequence through

thought which renders choice, _i.e._, the conscious conflict of motives,

possible is different. Our abstract ideas, being incapable of being

objects of perception, would be outside consciousness, and the operations

of thought would be impossible, were it not that they are fixed for sense

by arbitrary signs called words, which therefore always indicate _general_

conceptions. It is just because the brutes are incapable of general

conceptions that they have no faculty of speech. But thought does not

consist in the mere presence of abstract ideas in consciousness, but in

the union and separation of two or more of them, subject to the manifold

restrictions and modifications which logic deals with. Such a clearly

expressed conceptual relation is a judgment. In relation to judgments the

principle of sufficient reason is valid in a new form: that of the ground

of knowing. In this form it asserts that if a judgment is to express

knowledge it must have a ground; and it is just because it has a ground

that it has ascribed to it the predicate true. The grounds on which a

judgment may depend are divisible into four kinds. A judgment may have

another judgment as its ground, in which case its truth is formal or

_logical_. There is no truth except in the relation of a judgment to

something outside it, and intrinsic truth, which is sometimes

distinguished from extrinsic logical truth, is therefore an absurdity. A

judgment may also have its ground in sense‐perception, and its truth is

then material truth. Again, those forms of knowledge which lie in the

understanding and in pure sensibility, as the conditions of the

possibility of experience, may be the ground of a judgment which is then

synthetical _a priori_. Finally, those formal conditions of all thinking

which lie in the reason may be the ground of a judgment, which may in that

case be called metalogically true. Of these metalogical judgments there

are four, and they were long ago discovered and called laws of thought.

(1.) A subject is equal to the sum of its predicates. (2.) A subject

cannot at once have a given predicate affirmed and denied of it. (3.) Of

two contradictorily opposed predicates one must belong to every subject.

(4.) Truth is the relation of a judgment to something outside it as its

sufficient reason. Reason, it may be remarked, has no material but only

formal truth.

Chapter VI.

The third class of objects for the subject is constituted by the formal

element in perception, the forms of outer and inner sense, space and time.

This class of ideas, in which time and space appear as pure intuitions, is

distinguished from that other class in which they are objects of

perception by the presence of matter which has been shown to be the

perceptibility of time and space in one aspect, and causality which has

become objective, in another. Space and time have this property, that all

their parts stand to one another in a relation in which each is determined

and conditioned by another. This relation is peculiar, and is intelligible

to us neither through understanding nor through reason, but solely through

pure intuition or perception _a priori_. And the law according to which

the parts of space and time thus determine one another is called the law

of sufficient reason of _being_. In space every position is determined

with reference to every other position, so that the first stands to the

second in the relation of a consequence to its ground. In time every

moment is conditioned by that which precedes it. The ground of being, in

the form of the law of sequence, is here very simple owing to the

circumstance that time has only one dimension. On the nexus of the

position of the parts of space depends the entire science of geometry.

Ground of _knowledge_ produces _conviction_ only, as distinguished from

_insight_ into the ground of being. Thus it is that the attempt, which

even Euclid at times makes, to produce _conviction_, as distinguished from

insight into the ground of being, in geometry, is a mistake, and induces

aversions to mathematics in many an admirable mind.

Chapter VII.

The remaining class of objects for the subject is a very peculiar and

important one. It comprehends only one object, the immediate object of

inner sense, the subject in volition which becomes an object of knowledge,

but only in inner sense, and therefore always in time and never in space;

and in time only under limitations. There can be no knowledge of

knowledge, for that would imply that the subject had separated itself from

knowledge, and yet knew knowledge, which is impossible. The subject is the

condition of the existence of ideas, and can never itself become idea or

object. It knows itself therefore never as _knowing_, but only as

_willing_. Thus what we know in ourselves is never what knows, but what

wills, the will. The identity of the subject of volition with the subject

of knowledge, through which the word “I” includes both, is the insoluble

problem. The identity of the knowing with the known is inexplicable, and

yet is immediately present. The operation of a motive is not, like that of

all other causes, known only from without, and therefore indirectly, but

also from within. Motivation is, in fact, causality viewed from within.

Chapter VIII.

In this, the concluding chapter, Schopenhauer sums up his results.

Necessity has no meaning other than that of the irresistible sequence of

the effect where the cause is given. All necessity is thus conditioned,

and absolute or unconditioned necessity is a contradiction in terms. And

there is a fourfold necessity corresponding to the four forms of the

principle of sufficient reason:—(1.) The logical form, according to the

principle of the ground of knowledge; on account of which, if the

premisses are given, the conclusion follows. (2.) The physical form,

according to the law of causality; on account of which, if the cause is

given, the effect must follow. (3.) The mathematical form, according to

the law of being; on account of which every relation expressed by a true

geometrical proposition is what it is affirmed to be, and every correct

calculation is irrefutable. (4.) The moral form, on account of which every

human being and every brute must, when the motive appears, perform the

only act which accords with the inborn and unalterable character. A

consequence of this is, that every department of science has one or other

of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason as its basis. In

conclusion, Schopenhauer points out that just because the principle of

sufficient reason belongs to the _a priori_ element in intelligence, it

cannot be applied to the entirety of things, to the universe as inclusive

of intelligence. Such a universe is mere phenomenon, and what is only true

because it belongs to the form of intelligence can have no application to

intelligence itself. Thus it is that it cannot be said that the universe

and all things in it exist because of something else. In other words, the

cosmological proof of the existence of God is inadmissible.

INDEX.(55)

Aboriginals, interference with, iii. 411.

Absolute, conception of, has reality only in matter, ii. 94;

how not to be conceived, ii. 94;

misuse of, ii. 94, 215, 216, 393.

Abstract, idea, knowledge, dependent on idea of perception, i. 45, 52, 53,

ii. 258;

insufficiency of, i. 72, ii. 248‐251;

opposite of idea of perception, i. 7;

philosophy must not start from, ii. 261 _seq._;

relation to intuitive knowledge, ii. 54, 55, 91;

use of, ii. 235, 238.

Absurd, sphere of, ii. 242;

supremacy of, i. 418.

Academies, relation of, to great men, ii. 496.

Accident. See _Substance_.

Actors, why madness common among, iii. 168.

Adultery, iii. 351, 364, 365.

Æschylus, iii. 213, 378.

Æsthetic mode of contemplation, i. 253 _seq._, iii. 127 _seq._

Agamemnon, i. 199, iii. 213.

Alemann, Matteo, iii. 363.

Alfieri, i. 247.

Allegory, nature of, use and abuse in art, i. 305‐313.

America, compared with Old World in physical regard, iii. 57, 58.

Ampere, iii. 44.

Anacreon, iii. 377.

Analytical method, ii. 309.

Anatomy, what it teaches, iii. 38;

value of comparative anatomy, i. 187, iii. 84.

Anaxagoras, iii. 2, 34, 73, 390.

Ancients, the, their architecture, iii. 185, 188, 190;

defects in religion, iii. 452;

freedom of thought, ii. 394;

inferiority of tragedy, iii. 213, 214;

historians, i. 317, 318;

philosophy, ii. 400;

sculpture, i. 269, 291.

Angelus Silesius, i. 167, 492, iii. 432.

Anger, evidence of primacy of will, ii. 442;

psychological effect of, ii. 429.

Animals, lower, distinctive characteristics of animal life, i. 25, ii.

228, 232;

essential identity with man, i. 192;

difference from man, i. 45, 47, 112, see _Man_;

do not laugh, ii. 280;

nor weep, i. 486;

naïveté of, i. 204;

no passions proper, iii. 16;

no knowledge of death, iii. 249;

yet fear death, iii. 251;

right of man over, i. 481 n.

Animal magnetism, iii. 76, 418, 419.

Anselm of Canterbury, ii. 125, 126.

Anticipation in art, i. 287, 288;

in nature, iii. 103, 104.

Antinomies, criticism of Kantian, i, 39, ii. 107 _seq._;

the two of natural science, i. 37 _seq._

Antisthenes, i. 115, ii. 357.

Anwari Soheili, ii. 283.

Απαγωγη and επαγωγη, ii. 290.

Apollo Belvedere, i. 230.

Apperception, transcendental unity of, ii. 333.

_A priori_ knowledge, meaning and explanation of, ii. 33;

directness, necessity, and universality of, i. 88;

table of _prædicabilia a priori_, ii. 221;

the basis of ontology, ii. 220.

Apuleius, ii. 352.

Architecture, its problem as a fine art, i. 276;

solution of problem, i. 277 _seq._, iii. 182 _seq._;

beauty and grace in, i. 277, iii. 188, 189;

combines beauty with usefulness, i. 280;

its relation to light, i. 279, 280;

to music, iii. 239 _seq._;

to plastic arts and poetry, i. 280;

its effects dynamical as well as mathematical, i. 279;

comparison of antique and Gothic, iii. 189‐192.

Aristippus, ii. 319, 363.

Aristo of Chios, ii. 319.

Aristocracy of intellect, ii. 342.

Aristotle, his logic, i. 62;

on scientific knowledge, i. 95;

his _forma substantialis_, i. 186;

on essential conflict in nature, i. 192;

his method, i. 239;

on Platonic Ideas, i. 273, iii. 124;

on derivation of ηθη, i. 378;

his style, ii. 21;

denies reciprocity, ii. 66;

on the necessary and contingent, ii. 70;

contented with abstract conceptions, ii. 71;

on quality and quantity, ii. 76;

his categories, ii. 85;

on existence as subject, ii. 101;

on infinity of world in space, ii. 110;

atomism not necessary, ii. 111;

infinity _potentia_ not _actu_, ii. 115;

refutation of ontological proof, ii. 129;

νους πρακτικος of, ii. 133;

the seat of the virtues, ii. 137;

treatment of art, ii. 153;

an infinitely large body immovable, ii. 203;

relation of number and time, ii. 205;

Topi of, ii. 212;

division of causes, ii. 217;

on pure matter, ii. 219;

on origin of things, ii. 220;

real things and conceptions, ii. 244;

meaning of his _nihil est in intellectu nisi quod ante fuerit in sensu_,

ii. 258;

eight spheres of, ii. 265;

rhetorics of, ii. 285;

his επαγωγη and απαγωγη, ii. 290;

his syllogistic figures, ii. 297;

analysis of syllogisms, ii. 303;

on the prudent man, ii. 347;

his ethics eudæmonistic, ii. 349;

wonder the origin of philosophy, ii. 360;

view of the Sophists, ii. 362;

necessity of metaphysics, ii. 379;

on invertebrate animals, ii. 481;

on plants, iii. 34;

difference between efficient and final cause, iii. 82;

his freedom from physico‐theology, iii. 94;

merits of his teaching as to organised and unorganised nature, iii. 95;

nature a demon, iii. 106;

music a cathartic of the feelings, iii. 174;

poetry better than history, iii. 220.

Arithmetic, depends on _a priori_ intuition of time, i. 99, ii. 204.

Arrian, ii. 355 _seq._

Art, source and aim of, i. 238, 239, 286 _seq._, iii. 126, 179;

object of, see _Idea_;

subject of, see _Genius_;

relation to and difference from philosophy, iii. 176, 177, 178;

contrasted with history, i. 298, 315, iii. 224;

inborn and acquired, i. 252;

the two extremes in series of, i. 274 _seq._, 280;

value and importance of, i. 345, 346, iii. 132;

opposition between useful and fine, iii. 181.

Art, works of, tendency of, iii. 177;

relation of conception to execution of, iii. 180;

the abstract concept barren in, i. 303, 304, iii. 179, 180;

why Idea more easily comprehended in than in nature, i. 252, iii. 132;

co‐operation of the beholder required for enjoyment of, iii. 177;

why they do not give all to the senses, iii. 178 _seq._;

superiority of those dashed off in moment of conception, iii. 178, 180.

Asceticism, its source, i, 490 _seq._;

its way of manifesting itself, i. 492, 493, 506, iii. 425;

identity of its spirit in different countries and religions, i. 502,

503, iii. 433;

difference of spirit of cynicism, ii. 352, 353.

Assertion, definition of, ii. 308.

Association of ideas, its root, ii. 324;

kinds of, ii. 324;

apparent exceptions to law of, ii. 327;

the will secretly controls the law of, ii. 328.

Astronomy, what it teaches, iii. 37;

source of its certainty and comprehensibility, i. 86;

its method, i. 87;

Ptolemaic, i. 64.

Athanasius, iii. 439.

Atheism, what strengthens the reproach of, ii. 379;

not necessarily materialism, ii. 131, 132.

Atom, assumption of, not necessary, iii. 44 _seq._;

has no reality, ii. 223;

defence of, from porosity refuted, iii. 47.

Attraction and repulsion, forces of, constitute space‐occupation, ii. 224.

Augustine, recognises identity of all things with will, i. 165;

cause of beauty of vegetable world, i. 260 n.;

on original sin, i. 524;

the will not free, i. 525;

dogmatics of, i. 525 n.;

beginner of Scholasticism, ii. 12;

on moral systems of ancients, ii. 349;

spirit of his anti‐Pelagianism, ii. 368, iii. 421;

on affections of will, ii. 412 n.;

his _de civit. Dei_, iii. 117 n.

Autobiography. See _Biography_.

Avarice, the vice of old age, iii. 465

Avatar, iii. 426.

Axiom, definition, ii. 308.

Bacon, his conception of philosophy, i. 109;

all movement preceded by perception, i. 137 n.;

on atheism, ii. 131;

his philosophical method, ii. 212;

on the intellect, ii. 433;

his moral character, ii. 447;

influence of climate upon intellect, iii. 18;

rejected teleology, iii. 91;

on final causes, iii. 93;

on Democritus, iii. 95;

on rarity of genius, iii. 158.

Basilidians, iii. 305.

Bass. See _Music_.

Baumgarten, his æsthetics, ii. 153.

Beard, its efficient and final cause in man, iii. 88.

Beauty, the beautiful, two elements of, i. 270;

source of pleasure in, i. 253 _seq._;

everything beautiful, i. 271;

why one thing more beautiful than another, i. 272;

distinguished from grace, i. 289;

distinguished from the sublime, i. 270;

effect of natural beauty, i. 255, iii. 173, 174;

beauty in art. See _Painting_, _Sculpture_, &c.

Beccaria, iii. 413.

Being, as the most general conception, ii. 236;

in the professorial philosophy, ii. 288;

relation of thought to. See _Thing in itself_;

limitation of individual being the cause of philosophy, i. 135;

contrast of seeing and being, iii. 392.

Bell, Sir Ch., i. 133, iii. 6.

Benedict, iii. 450.

Berkeley, on rareness of thought, i. 50;

his idealism, ii. 15, 29, 41, 163, 165, 175, iii. 59, 261.

Bhagavad‐gita, i. 366, iii. 75, 262.

Bible, one metaphysical truth in Old Testament, iii. 423;

ascetic spirit of New Testament, iii. 437, 458 _seq._;

opposition of Old and New Testaments, i. 420, iii. 281, 441, 445;

its historical material unsuited for paintings, i. 300.

Bichat, “_Sur la vie et la mort_,” ii. 470, 488;

on circulation of blood, ii. 478;

on organic and animal life, ii. 489;

only animal life can be educated, ii. 491;

Flourens’ attack on, ii. 494 _seq._;

nervous and muscular systems in children, iii. 161;

effect of emotions on organism, iii. 296.

Bio, on relation of science and philosophy, ii. 319.

Biography, superiority to history, i. 319 _seq._;

difficulty of dissimulating in autobiographies, i. 320.

Biot, on colour rings, ii. 338.

Blood, the primitive fluid of organism, ii. 478‐481.

Body, the, an object among objects, i. 5, 14, 23, 25, 129, ii. 167;

its identity with will, i. 129 _seq._; 137‐142, ii. 428, 468, 471‐493;

relation of physiological and metaphysical explanations of, i. 139

_seq._, ii. 492, 493;

its design, i. 140 _seq._;

knowledge of, key to nature of things, i. 136, 141 _seq._;

criticism of antithesis of body and soul as two substances, ii. 101‐104,

378, iii. 11.

Böhm, Jakob, everything half dead, i. 191;

“_De signatura rerum_,” i. 284 n., iii. 432.

Bolingbroke, iii. 397.

Books, not so instructive as reality, ii. 244, 245;

why they cannot take the place of experience, ii. 248, 249.

Boswell, his Life of Johnson, ii. 446.

Boureguon, Antoinette, iii. 435.

Brahmanism, recognises no beginning of world, ii. 94, 95, 108, 109;

teaches metempsychosis, iii. 303.

Brain, metaphysically considered, ii. 468, 485, 486;

physiologically considered, its origin and function, ii. 411, 462, 463,

470, iii. 9;

its share in perception, ii. 185;

its relation to the ganglia, ii. 483;

the seat of motives, ii. 473;

develops with organism, ii. 416, iii. 13, 14;

as necessary for thought as stomach for digestion, ii. 237;

the regulator of the will, ii. 470;

the condition of self‐consciousness, iii. 12 _seq._;

influence of its development upon intellect at different periods of

life, ii. 425, 454 _seq._;

necessity of sleep for, ii. 464;

effect of over‐work on, ii. 255, 256;

its variation in man the cause of individual character, i. 171;

its activity in dreams, ii. 464;

the brain of genius, iii. 159, 160;

influence on agility of limbs, iii. 21;

influence of noise on, ii. 196, 197.

Brandis, Ch. A., ii. 264.

Brandis, J. D., ii. 488.

Bridgewater Treatise Men, iii. 91.

Brougham, Lord, iii. 91.

Brown, Thomas, “On Cause and Effect,” ii. 207, iii. 92.

Bruno, Giordano, started from real in his philosophy, i. 33;

his view of life, i. 366;

lonely position in his age, ii. 13 n.;

on finiteness of world, ii. 110;

infinitely large body immovable, ii. 203;

matter incorporeal, ii. 208, iii. 51, 54;

no space beyond the world, ii. 265;

his death, iii. 106;

his motto, iii. 144.

Buddhism, its pre‐eminence over all religions, ii. 371;

superiority to Brahmanism, i. 460, iii. 430;

compared with Christianity, iii. 445 _seq._;

its pessimism, i. 372, iii. 397;

its mysticism, iii. 435;

teaches that nature expects salvation from man, i. 492;

its doctrine of metempsychosis, iii. 302;

doctrine of Nirvana, iii. 308, 427.

Buffon, on intelligence of animals, i. 29;

on style, ii. 247.

Bunyan, John, iii. 435.

Bundahish, iii. 391.

Burdach, sleep the original state, ii. 463;

formation of muscles from blood, ii. 478;

heart independent of nervous system and sensibility, ii. 479;

reciprocal support of vegetable and insect world, iii. 90;

on bees, iii. 100;

on the burrying beetle, iii. 102;

on _cercaria ephemera_, iii. 269;

on maternal affection of animals, iii. 317.

Bürger, his place in German poetry, iii. 327;

his parents, iii. 327;

on love, iii. 336.

Burke, on the beautiful, ii. 153;

on the apprehension of words, ii. 239.

Byron, an instance of connection of genius and madness, i. 247;

brain weighed 6 lbs., iii. 160;

quoted, i. 234, 324, 258, 342, 432, 458, iii. 379, 398, 400.

Cabanis, on arterial and venous systems, ii. 257;

his materialism, ii. 378;

on passions of children, ii. 424;

“_Des rapports du physique au moral_,” iii. 6.

Cæsar, Jul., on Druids, iii. 304.

Calderon, life a dream, i. 22;

steadfast prince, i. 327;

a crime to be born, i. 328, 458, iii. 420;

his Semiramis, iii. 343;

“Zenobia the Great,” iii. 364.

Camerarius, J., collection of emblems, i. 309.

Cannibalism, most palpable example of wrong, i. 431;

hereditary, iii. 322.

Canisius, iii. 440.

Canova, iii. 195.

Caravaggio, iii. 197.

Caricature, character of species annulled by that of individual, i. 291.

Carové, iii. 440.

Carracci, Hannibal, his allegorical paintings, i. 306, 308.

Casper, on length of human life, iii. 301.

Castration, its significance, iii. 310;

its use as a punishment, iii. 331.

Categories, criticism of the Kantian, ii. 48‐51.

Catholicism, compared with Protestantism in an ethical regard, iii. 448,

449.

Catullus, iii. 318.

Caucasian, an original race, iii. 58.

Cause, Causality, law of, ii. 214;

_a priori_ nature of law of, i. 154 _seq._, ii. 206 _seq._;

corollary from it the permanence of substance, ii. 79;

difference of cause and force, i. 144, 145;

mysteriousness of connection between cause and effect, i. 174;

temporal relation between cause and effect, ii. 209, 210;

three kinds of causes, i. 149, 150;

truth of doctrine of occasional causes, i. 178 _seq._;

falseness of proposition “the effect cannot contain more than the

cause,” ii. 213;

a “first cause” inconceivable, ii. 214;

to determine the cause of an effect, ii. 154.

Celibacy, from Christian and ethical point of view, iii. 425, 437, 438,

449, 450, 451.

Cellini, Benvenuto, his conversion, i. 510.

Celsus, on generation, iii. 310.

Certainty, distinguished from scientific completeness of knowledge, i. 83;

superiority of immediate to indirect, i. 89, 90.

Cervantes, i. 311; ii. 246.

Chamfort, iii., 157, 158, 365.

Champollion, i. 313.

Change, nature of, i. 11;

always conditioned by a cause, i. 170, ii. 211 _seq._

Character, as a force of nature, i. 370;

difference between that of man and brutes, i. 170, 386, 387;

that of man individual, i. 290;

empirical, ii. 407;

constant, i. 378, ii. 441, 491;

inherited from father, iii. 320 _seq._;

relation of intelligible to empirical, i. 203, 207, 373 _seq._;

a false inference from unalterableness of, i. 389;

the acquired, i. 391‐397;

explanation of inharmonious nature of, iii. 330;

abolition of, i. 520 _seq._

Chatham, Lord, iii. 324.

Chateaubriand, iii. 435.

Chemistry, what it teaches, iii. 38;

antinomy of, i. 37 _seq._

Chevreul, experiments on light, iii. 62.

Childhood, character of, iii. 161 _seq._

Chiliasts, ii. 243.

Chinese, philosophy, i. 187, 188, 343;

garden, iii. 157.

Chladni, i. 344.

Choice, man larger sphere of, than brutes, i. 388;

not freedom of individual volition, _loc. cit._

Christianity, different constituent parts of, i. 500, 501, iii. 422;

its connection with Brahmanism and Buddhism, iii. 391, 421, 459;

pessimistic spirit of, ii. 372, iii. 397, 436;

kernel of, i. 424, 523‐524, ii. 149, iii. 421, 452;

symbol of, iii. 462.

Chrysippus, i. 116, 118, 389, ii. 72, 349.

Cicero, i. 116 n., 117, 247, 389, ii. 72, 137, 138, 140, 141, 270, 272,

348, 356, 358, 444, iii. 147, 253 n., 452.

Circle, the symbol of nature, iii. 267.

Classics, advantage of studying, ii. 239.

Classical poetry, distinguished from romantic, iii. 209.

Cleanthes, i. 118, ii. 128.

Clemens Alexandrinus, “Stromata” referred to, i. 425, ii. 98, iii. 427,

438, 442, 443.

Clouds, illustration of opposition between Idea and phenomenon, i. 235.

Colebrooke, i. 491, 494 n., 281, 304, 307, 308 n.

Comedy, distinguished from tragedy, iii. 218.

Composer, musical, i. 336.

Concept, conception, see _Abstract_;

their construction the function of reason, i. 7, 50, ii. 235 _seq._;

content and extent of, ii. 236;

spheres, i. 55, 64;

representatives of, i. 51;

relation to word, i. 51; ii. 234, 238;

relation to Idea, i. 301, 302;

simple, ii. 236;

distinct, ii. 237;

abstract and concrete, i. 53;

pure, ii. 385;

advantages and disadvantages of, i. 45, 47 _seq._, 68‐75, ii. 234‐243,

345 _seq._

Concrete, union of form and matter, ii. 215.

Condillac, his materialism, ii. 175, 187. iii. 45.

Condorcet, ii. 187.

Connections among men, foundation of, ii. 450.

Conscience, presupposes intelligible character, i. 474;

is only affected by deeds, i. 387;

anguish of, i. 471 _seq._;

the good, i. 482.

Consciousness, only a property of animal beings, ii. 336, 337, 414;

origin, aim, and seat of, ii. 475;

what common to all, and what distinguishes one from another, ii. 414,

iii. 17 _seq._;

self‐consciousness and that of other things, ii. 259, 412, 468, iii.

126;

limited to phenomena, i. 358 n., iii. 74, 285 _seq._;

as opposed to unconsciousness, ii. 328;

fragmentary nature of, ii. 330 _seq._;

what gives it unity and connection, iii. 333;

extinguished in death, iii. 255 _seq._

Considering things, ways of, i. 239; 121 _seq._

Contingent, contingency, conception of, ii. 67;

misuse of word by pre‐Kantian dogmatists, ii. 70.

Conversation, ii. 343.

Copula, ii. 287, 288.

Coriolanus, ii. 136.

Corneille, iii. 203.

Correct, distinguished from true, real, &c., ii. 208.

Correggio, i. 300, 306, 307, 531.

Cosmogony, of Laplace, iii. 71, 72.

Cosmological proof, Kant’s refutation of, ii. 130.

Cousin, M., iii. 45.

Cramp, ii. 484.

Crime, chief cause of, iii. 412.

See _Punishment_.

Criticism, the Kantian, ii. 6‐11.

Crystal, its one manifestation of life, i. 202;

its individuality, i. 171;

becomes rigid in the moment of movement, iii. 37.

Culture, cannot make up for want of understanding, ii. 253 _seq._, 343

Cuvier, ii. 204, 318, 479, iii. 98, 160, 165.

Cynicism, spirit and fundamental thought of, ii. 350 _seq._, iii. 388.

_Da Capo_, i. 342.

Daemon, i. 349, iii. 99.

Dante, i. 258, 419, ii. 315.

Davis, iii. 207.

Death, i. 356 _seq._, 506‐509, iii. 249‐308, 312, 389, 463;

sudden death, why prayed against, iii, 428.

Decameron, iii. 365.

Deductive method, ii. 310.

Delamark, ii. 318, 378.

Delirium, distinguished from madness, i. 248.

Democritus, i. 33, 159, 160, ii. 131 140, 177, 378, iii. 61, 62, 64, 95.

Denial. See _Will_.

Descartes, vortex of, i. 159;

identifies will with judgment, 377, 385;

his thought not free, ii. 13;

on repetition, ii. 21, 25;

ontological proof, ii. 126;

made philosophy start from self‐consciousness, ii. 164, 165, 201, 400,

iii. 59;

the quantity of a motion, ii. 226;

opinion of mathematics, ii. 323;

slept a great deal, ii. 465;

criticism of his doctrines, ii. 494‐496;

relation to Spinoza, iii. 475.

Desire, the universal nature of things, i. 165, iii. 34;

in a psychological regard, ii. 429.

Determinism, iii. 67‐69.

Δευτερος πλους, the second way of the denial of the will, i. 506, iii.

454, 465.

Dialectic, definition of, ii. 285.

Diderot, ii. 341, iii. 233, 272.

Diodorus the Megaric, ii. 72.

Diogenes the Cynic, i. 151, ii. 351, 352, iii. 388.

Diogenes, Laertius, i. 118, 151, 169, ii. 319, 351, 355, 363, iii. 255.

Dionysius the Areopagite, ii. 264.

Discovery, the work of understanding, i. 26, 27.

Disease, its nature, ii. 487.

Disgusting, the, i. 269.

Dissimulation, i. 47, iii. 231.

Divisibility, infinite, of time, i. 13, ii. 221;

of matter, iii. 46.

Dog, intelligence of, ii. 230‐232;

wags its tail, ii. 280.

Dogmas, their relation to virtue and morality, i. 475 _seq._

Dogmatism, philosophical, opposed to criticism, ii. 10, 11;

its fundamental error, iii. 27.

Domenichino, iii. 193.

Donatello, iii. 193.

Don Quixote, i. 311.

Drama, the, i. 321‐330, iii. 211‐219.

Drapery in sculpture, i. 296.

Dreams, distinguished from real life, i. 20 _seq._

Duns Scotus, i. 111, ii. 237.

Dutch paintings, i. 269.

Ebionites, iii. 458.

Eckermann, “Conversations of Goethe,” i. 362, iii. 240.

Eckhard, Meister, i. 492, 500, iii. 432, 435, 467.

Edda, the, iii. 304.

Ego, conception of, i. 132, 324, ii. 413, 487, iii. 3, 13, 284, 285;

the logical ego, ii. 333.

Egoism, origin, nature, and scope of, i. 427, iii. 416, 417;

theoretical egoism, i. 135.

Egyptians, gospel of, iii. 436, 444.

Eleatics, i. 33, 61, 93, ii. 85, 113, iii. 271.

Election, doctrine of, i. 378, ii. 149.

Elephant, intelligence of, i. 29, ii. 232, 233.

Eloquence, ii. 305, 306.

Emblems, i. 312, 313.

Emotion, its origin and effect, ii. 346, iii. 407, 408.

Empedocles, i. 192, 288, 530, iii. 8, 34, 95, 271.

Encratites, iii. 438.

English, the, their faults, ii. 131, iii. 92.

ἑν και παν, iii. 65, 471.

Ennui, i. 402, 404, iii. 413.

_Ens realissimum_, ii. 125‐127.

Envy, iii, 389.

επαγωγη and απαγωγη, ii. 290.

Epic poetry, i. 324, 413, iii. 211.

Epicurus, Epicureans, i. 33, 37, ii. 181, 145, 177, 378, iii. 255, 261.

Epictetus, i. 115, 116 n., 386, ii. 354, 356.

Epiphanias, iii. 446.

Equivocation, i. 79.

Erigena, Scotus, ii. 319, iii. 432, 470, 471.

Error, definition of, i. 30, 103‐105;

difference between man and brutes with regard to, ii. 243, _seq._;

pernicious nature of, i. 45, ii. 241 _seq._;

tragic and comic side of, ii. 243;

how perpetuated, ii. 243, 341.

Esquirol, iii. 117, 328.

Essenes, iii. 437, 451.

_Essentia_ and _existentia_, their relation, ii. 129, 130;

their union in pure matter, ii. 218.

Eternity, conception of, i. 228, 360 _seq._, iii. 276.

Ethics, i. 441‐443, 474 _seq._, iii. 402‐409;

criticism of Kantian, ii. 133 _seq._;

of ancients, ii. 348, iii. 213, 214, 452.

Ethiopian, an original race, iii. 58.

Etiology, subject and scope of, i. 124 _seq._;

its relation to the philosophy of nature, i. 182 _seq._

Euchel, Isaak, his “Prayers of the Jews,” ii. 98.

Euclid, criticism of his method, i. 90‐100, ii. 33, 164, 321‐323.

Eudæmonism, ii. 348 _seq._

ευκολος and δυσκολος, i. 407.

Euler, i. 55, 165, ii. 172 n., 187‐189, 192, 341.

Euripides, i. 328, 453, iii. 214, 218, 400, 406, 443.

Evidence, distinction between empirical and _a priori_, i. 85;

the predicate “evident” defined, ii. 308.

Evil, meaning of word, i. 426;

the _punctum pruriens_ of metaphysics, ii. 375.

See _Pessimism_.

Existence, vanity of, iii. 382 _seq._;

the end of, ii. 695.

Experience, ii. 234 _seq._, 388 _seq._

Experiment, ii. 268.

Explanation, i. 105 _seq._, 125.

Extension. See _Matter_.

Eye, i. 301, ii. 194, iii. 162.

Fame, i. 305, iii. 151.

Fanaticism, i. 466 n.

Fate, Fatalism, i. 389, 390, iii. 475.

Fear, effect of, ii. 429 _seq._;

origin of belief in God, ii. 130.

Feeling, as sense of touch, ii. 195;

as opposite of knowing, i. 66‐68.

Fénélon, i. 499.

Fernow, i. 293.

Fichte, i. 16, 33, 40‐43, ii. 22, 31, 176, iii. 13.

Fit Arari, ii. 444.

Flagellants, ii. 243.

Flourens, ii. 133, 416, 417, 479, 494‐496, iii. 165, 326.

Folly, a species of the ludicrous, i. 77 _seq._, ii. 277;

a characteristic of genius, iii. 153.

Force, distinguished from cause, i. 144, 145, 174‐178, ii. 217;

inseparable from matter, iii. 54 _seq._

Form and matter. i. 162, 168, ii. 215, iii. 26, 53‐57.

Forms of thought, 86 _seq._;

their relation to parts of speech, ii. 85, 86.

Francis, St., i. 496, iii. 434, 459.

Frauenstädt, ii. 225.

Frederick the Great, ii. 133.

Freedom, as a metaphysical quality, i. 369 _seq._;

intellectual, iii. 407;

of the will, i. 376 _seq._, 388, 389, 520 _seq._;

criticism of Kant’s doctrine, ii. 117 _seq._

French, national character of, i. 510;

philosophy of, ii. 18, iii. 44, 45;

poetry, iii. 209;

music, iii. 244.

Friendship, i. 485.

Fright, effect of, ii. 429.

Froriep, ii. 209.

Future. See _Present_.

Gall, ii. 469, 494, 495.

Galenus, ii. 297.

Gallows, iii. 456, 457.

Ganglia, their function in organism, ii. 484 _seq._

Gardening, landscape, i. 282;

difference between English and old French, iii. 175.

Garrick, ii. 279, iii. 21.

_Gemüth_, distinguished from mind, ii. 458, 459.

_Generatio æquivoca_, i. 184 _seq._; iii. 54‐56.

Generation, and death essential moments in life of species, i. 365, iii.

270‐273;

instinctive nature of act, iii. 309;

act viewed subjectively and objectively, iii. 292, 293;

inner significance of act, i. 423 _seq._, iii. 379;

reason of shame connected with, i. 423, 378;

existence a paraphrase of, iii. 377.

Genius, i. 238‐247, 251‐253, ii. 245‐249, iii. 138‐166.

Genital organs, the opposite pole of the brain, i. 425, iii. 87, 310;

independence of knowledge, i. 150, 426;

difference of plants, animals, and man in respect of, i. 204, iii. 35;

shame connected with, iii. 379;

symbolical language of, iii. 380.

Genus, distinguished from species, iii. 123 _seq._;

construction of logical genus, ii. 103, 104.

Geometry, content of, i. 9;

method of, i. 90 _seq._; ii. 321 _seq._

Genre painting, i. 298.

Gichtel, iii. 434, 435.

Gilbert, ii. 196.

Giordano, Luca, iii. 198.

Given, the, ii. 23, 84.

Gnostics, iii. 305, 432, 438, 442,

γνωθι σαυτον, ii. 423.

God, origin of the word, iii. 446;

egotistical origin of belief in, ii. 130;

an asserted “consciousness of God,” ii. 129, 141, 142;

criticism of proofs for existence of, ii. 128‐133.

Goethe, his theory of colours, i. 26, 160, 245, ii. 433;

on genius, i. 247, iii. 19, 147, 151, 153, 156;

on effect of human beauty, i. 285;

on Laocoon, i. 293;

on painting of music, i. 295;

on fable of Proserpine and pomegranate, i. 311, 424;

his songs, i. 323, 210;

on indestructibility of human spirit, i. 362 n.;

“Confessions of beautiful soul,” i. 497;

power of sight of suffering, i. 512;

on persistency of error, ii. 4, 8;

unknown to Kant, ii. 152;

sensitive to noise, ii. 198;

metamorphosis of plants, ii. 225, iii. 85;

on skeletons of rodents, ii. 318;

on Kant, ii. 340;

never over‐worked, ii, 427;

example of folly of childhood, ii. 456;

on sleep, ii. 466;

“_Wahlverwandtschaften_,” iii. 37, 151, 164;

his love of natural sciences, iii. 39;

his height, iii. 160;

his childishness, iii. 163;

his mother, iii. 327;

quoted, i. 314, 366, ii. 14, 22, 294, iii. 132, 136, 369.

Good, the conception, i. 464 _seq._;

nature of the good man, 465, 480, iii. 306, 307.

Gorgias, ii. 281, 286.

Gothic architecture compared with antique, iii. 189‐192.

Gozzi, Carlo, i. 237, ii. 276, iii. 169.

Grace, distinguished from beauty, i. 289;

Christian doctrine of, i. 522 _seq._, 528, ii. 149.

Gracian, Balthasar, i. 311, ii. 250, iii. 401.

Grammar, relation to Logic, ii. 85‐87, 89.

_Gravitas_, iii. 152.

Gravitation, i. 13, 26, 195, 212, 213, 398, ii. 225, 226, iii. 52, 394.

Greatness in spiritual sense, iii. 150.

Guicciardini, ii. 447.

Guido Reni, iii. 191.

Guilt, i. 204, 454, iii. 390, 415, 418, 420 _seq._, 448.

Guion, Mme. de, i. 497, 505, iii. 432, 434, 435.

Hall, Marshall, i. 151, ii. 133, 433, 484, iii. 6.

Haller, ii. 479, 488, iii. 328.

Hamilton, Sir W., ii. 323.

Happiness, is negative, i. 411‐413;

from standpoint of higher knowledge, i. 456;

impossible in an existence like ours, iii. 382, 383;

and virtue, i. 466, iii. 420 _seq._

Hardy, Spence, i. 497, iii. 301, 303, 308 n., 434.

Hauz, iii. 45.

Haydn, i. 304.

Head, relation of, to trunk in brutes and man, i. 230;

opposite pole of genitals, i. 425, iii. 87, 310;

and heart, ii. 450 _seq._

Health, i. 190 _seq._, iii. 385.

Hearing, sense of, ii. 195‐199.

Heart, the centre and _primum mobile_ of life, ii. 428, 479‐481;

opposition between head and heart, ii. 450 _seq._;

why love affairs are called affairs of the heart, iii. 373.

Heathen, ii. 97.

Heavens, sublime effect of, i. 266, 267.

Hegel, ii. 8, 22, 31, 171, 243, 261, 266, iii. 45, 224, 225, 394, 404,

436.

Heine, Heinrich, ii. 283.

Hell, i. 419, iii. 387, 388, 392.

Helvetius, i. 288 n., ii. 256, 444 446, iii. 8.

Heraclitus, i. 8, ii. 256, iii. 399.

Herder, i. 52, ii. 153, iii. 163.

Heredity, iii. 318‐335.

Hermaphrodism, iii. 356.

Herodotus, ii. 347, iii. 303, 398.

Hesiod, i. 425.

History and science, i. 82, iii. 220, 221;

and philosophy, iii. 223;

and poetry, i. 315 _seq._, iii. 224;

and biography, i. 319;

the philosophy of, i. 236, 237, iii. 224‐226;

true value of, iii. 227 _seq._

untrustworthiness of, i. 238, 316, 317, iii. 223;

history of world and history of the saints, i. 497, 498.

Hobbes, i. 21, 361 n., 441, 446, 451 ii. 263, 453.

Holberg, ii. 379.

Holiness, inner nature of, i. 494, 495;

its independence of dogmas, i. 495, 509.

Hollbach, ii. 176.

Home, ii. 153, 270.

Homer, i. 236, 295, 311, 314, 324, iii. 400.

Hooke, i. 26, ii. 225, 226.

Hope, ii. 431.

Horace, ii. 139, 140, 274, iii. 181.

Horizon, mental, ii. 338.

Huber, iii. 101.

Human race. See _Man_.

Humboldt, Alex. von, ii. 64, iii. 112.

Hume, David, i. 15, 52, 89, ii. 8, 129, 130, 156, 157, 173, 207, 209 iii.

92, 92 n., 305, 327, 393, 394, 395.

Humour, ii. 282‐284.

Hutcheson, ii. 270.

Hydraulics, science, of iii. 38;

as a fine art, i. 281, 282.

Hypothesis, correct, ii. 309;

effect of, on mind, ii. 432.

I. See _Ego_.

Idea (_Vorstellung_), what it is, ii. 400;

common form of all classes of, i. 3;

form of combination of all classes of, i. 5;

chief distinction among, i. 7;

idea of perception, i. 7‐45, ii. 163‐227;

abstract, i. 45‐120, ii. 228‐395;

subjective correlative of, i. 13 (Cf. _Object_ and _World_);

the Platonic Idea (_Idee_) defined, i. 168, iii. 122;

distinguished from thing in itself, i. 209, 226 _seq._, 232, iii. 122

_seq._;

empirical correlative of, iii. 123.;

relation to individual things, i. 227, 233, iii. 275;

knowledge of, i. 220‐228, 271, ii. 335‐336, iii. 122, 126 _seq._;

grades of, in nature, i. 195‐199, 202;

the object of art, see _Art_;

misuse of word, i. 168, ii. 99, 100;

association of, see _Association_;

Kant’s Ideas of reason, ii. 23 _seq._

Ideal, in art, i. 287, 288;

opposition between ideal and real, ii. 400 _seq._

Idealism, as opposed to realism, i. 3 _seq._, ii. 28 _seq._, 163, 167;

difference between empirical and transcendental, ii. 170, 184;

absolute, i. 134, 135.

Identity, law of, ii. 86‐88;

philosophy of, i. 32, ii. 8, 400.

Idyll, the, why it must be short, i. 413.

Iffland, ii. 426.

Illusion distinguished from error, i. 28, 103, 104.

Imagination, an instrument of thought, ii. 240, 245;

an essential element of genius, i. 241 _seq._, iii. 141, 142.

Imitation, in art, i. 304;

of idiosyncrasies of others, i. 395.

Immanent knowledge, opposed to transcendent and transcendental, i. 224,

ii. 387, iii. 430 n., 468.

Immortality, iii. 75.

See _Indestructibility_.

Impenetrability of matter, i, 13, ii. 103, 223 _seq._, iii. 52.

Inclination, definition, iii. 406.

Indestructibility, of our true nature by death, Ch. 41 _passim_, iii.

249‐308.

Indian, mysticism, 432;

sculpture, i. 309;

philosophy, iii. 281, 282;

caste i. 459, 460

(Cf. _Buddhism_ and _Brahmanism_).

Individuality, as phenomenon rooted in the thing in itself, i. 147, 219,

354, 357, 358, iii. 74, 428, 469;

at the different grades of nature, i. 170‐172;

language of nature with reference to, i. 355, 356, iii. 108 _seq._, 416,

417;

destruction of, by death, iii. 286, 298 _seq._

Induction, ii. 310.

Infinite, true conception of, ii. 115.

Inquisition, i. 466 n.

Innocence, of plants, i. 204.

Insects, fertilisation of plants by, iii. 90;

life of severed parts of, ii. 483;

ephemeral nature of, iii. 267.

See _Instinct_.

Instinct, an act directed to an unknown end, i. 148, 150, 197, iii. 96,

346 _seq._;

relation of, to guidance by motives, iii. 96 _seq._;

relation to somnambulism, iii. 98;

throws light on organising work of nature, iii. 96‐100, 103;

in man, iii. 346 _seq._

Intellect, pure, ii. 179, 180;

empirical, secondary nature of, ii. 411‐467, iii. 3 _seq._, 291;

end of, i. 199, 228, ii. 336, 485, iii. 21 _seq._;

degrees of, in series of animals and in man, iii. 29, 30;

parsimony of nature in imparting, iii. 20;

limitation of, to phenomena, iii. 21‐29;

imperfections of, ii. 330‐344.

Interesting, distinguished from beautiful, i. 229.

Ionic school, i. 33.

Irritability as objectification of will, ii. 472 _seq._;

its connection with blood, ii. 478.

Isaiah ii. 437.

Islamism, iii. 423, 446.

Jacobi, i. 225 n., ii. 169.

Jealousy, iii. 364.

Johnson, Dr. Samuel, i. 328.

Jones, Sir W., i. 8, 501 n.

Joy, i. 410, ii. 429 _seq._

Judaism, i. 300, iii. 305, 446.

Judgment, faculty of, i. 30, 84 _seq._, ii. 152 _seq._, 266 _seq._

Julian, Emperor, ii. 350.

Jung Stilling, ii. 243.

Justinius, 305.

Justice, as a virtue, i. 478, 479, iii. 424;

retributive, i. 452;

eternal, i. 427, 452‐458, 461, iii. 405, 421;

poetical, i. 328.

Kant, abstract and perceptible knowledge, ii. 25, 32, 80, 213;

æsthetic, ii. 32, 33, 189;

amphiboly, ii. 38;

analytic, ii. 33‐89;

antinomy, i. 39, ii. 104‐125, iii. 45;

_a priori_ nature of space and time, i. 6, 8, 154, 155, ii. 169, 201,

202, iii. 276 _seq._;

on the beautiful, iii. 189;

categories, i. 57, ii. 43‐47, 403;

causality, i. 16, ii. 58 _seq._, 173, 208, 209, 217, 385, 386, iii. 469;

character, empirical and intelligible, i. 138, 203, 349, 373;

chief result of Kantian philosophy, ii. 405;

childish in old age, ii. 427;

conceptions, philosophy a science of, ii. 259, 384;

cosmological proof, ii. 130;

cosmology, i. 194, ii. 225, 72;

critical philosophy, ii. 6‐11;

criticism of functions of the brain, ii. 174, 185;

critique of judgment, ii. 152‐159;

critique of practical reason, ii. 133‐150;

critique of pure reason, ii. 3‐133 (fundamental thought of, ii. 18‐20),

237, 377;

dialectic, 89‐133;

“_Die Falsche Spitzfindigkeit_,” ii. 300;

dreams distinguished from reality, i. 20, 21;

editions of Critique, ii. 29;

error, source of, i. 103;

ethics, i. 79, 110, 140, ii. 12, 133‐150;

freedom and necessity, ii. 377;

God, ii. 129, 130;

laws of homogeneity and specification, i. 83;

idealism of, ii. 29, 163, 164, 400 _seq._;

infinity, ii. 115;

judgment, reflective and subsuming, i. 85;

judgments, table of, ii. 56‐78;

philosophy of law, i. 433, ii. 150‐152;

logic, transcendental, ii. 33‐133;

on love, 338;

theory of ludicrous, ii. 270;

influence of Kantian doctrine on mathematics, i. 94, 385;

explanation of matter, i. 12 n., iii. 54;

“Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science,” i. 88, ii. 111, 219,

224, 225;

metaphysics, impossibility of, ii. 386 _seq._;

method of, ii. 53‐55, iii. 5;

Kant’s mother, iii. 327;

negative result of philosophy, ii. 17;

_nihil privativum_, i. 528;

sensitive to noise, ii. 198;

ontological proof, ii. 129, 130;

object of perception, ii. 33‐43;

permanence of substance, ii. 78‐81;

phenomenon and thing in itself, i. 9, 41, 155, 220, 6‐12, 28, 181, 379,

389, 399, 486;

physico‐theological proof, ii. 130;

relation to Plato, i. 223 _seq._;

psychology, refutation of rational, ii. 100‐104;

reason, conception of, i. 49;

ideas of, i. 169, ii. 96‐100;

ideal of, ii. 125‐133;

principle of, ii. 90‐96;

reciprocity, category of, ii. 61 _seq._;

schematism of categories, 48‐51;

Scholastic dogmatism overthrown by, ii. 12‐16, iii. 27;

Schopenhauer gone further than, iii. 28, 59;

his sleep, ii. 465;

speculative theology, refutation of, ii. 128‐133, 473;

spiritualism, refutation of, ii. 177;

style of, ii. 20, 21, 340;

subject, system starts from, i. 42;

theory of, sublime, i. 265;

love of symmetry, ii. 22, 47, 69, 76, 78, 106, 133;

synthetic unity of apperception, ii. 51, 52, 333, 476, iii. 12;

thing in itself, ii. 3, 31, 169, 381, 407;

transcendent, transcendental and immanent, i. 124, ii. 3, 87, iii. 24;

_das Vernünfteln_ ii. 263;

weight an _a priori_ quality of matter, i. 13.

Kemble, i. 295.

Kepler, i. 87, 94, 137 n., iii. 41.

Kerner, Justinus, ii. 481.

Kielmayer, 318.

Kicser, ii. 326, iii. 99.

Kirby, iii. 91, 101, 103.

Kleist, i. 311.

Klettenberg, Fr. von, i. 497.

Knowledge, whence the need of, iii. 7, 8;

physiological and metaphysical view of, ii. 486, iii. 290, 291, 470;

aim of, ii. 475;

kinds of, i. 199, 230;

degrees of, iii. 29, 30;

why no knowledge of knowing, ii. 487;

influence of will upon, iii. 134;

influence of, on degree of sensibility and suffering, i. 400, iii. 16.

Köppen, iii. 301.

Koran, ii. 361.

Körösi, Csoma, ii. 371.

Kosack, i. 96.

Krishna, iii. 262.

Lactantius, ii. 98.

Lalita‐Vistara, iii. 168.

Lamarck, i. 185.

Lambert, i. 55, ii. 303.

Landscape painting, i. 282.

Language, the first production and tool of reason, i. 47, 48, 51;

connection of conception with word, ii. 238;

capacity for, depends on association of ideas, ii. 325;

the acquisition of several an important mental culture, ii. 238, 239;

against the modern habit of curtailing words, ii. 310 _seq._

Laocoon, i. 292, iii. 198.

Laplace, i. 194, ii. 225, iii. 72, 73.

Latin, as universal language of scientific literature, ii. 310 _seq._

La Trappe, i. 510, iii. 455.

Laughter, as a psychical act, i. 76 _seq._, ii. 270;

peculiar to man, ii. 280;

why pleasant, ii. 279;

insulting and bitter, ii. 281;

a test of moral worth, ii. 281.

Lavater, i. 312.

Law, philosophy of, i. 442, 452, ii. 150‐152, iii. 409‐414.

Learning, on the subordinate value of, ii. 253 _seq._

Lee, Anne, iii. 449.

Legislation, i. 446, 447.

Leibnitz, i. 49, 111, 342, ii. 11, 81 _seq._, 141, 237, 391, iii. 91, 394

_seq._

Leibnitz‐Wolfian philosophy, i. 64, ii. 8, 127, 129, 141, iii. 394.

Leopardi, iii. 401.

Lessing, i. 292, ii. 16, 153, 169, iii. 305.

Leszczynski, iii. 203 n.

Leucippus, ii. 177, 378, iii. 61, 64.

Lichtenberg, ii. 113, 172 n., 198, 445. iii. 21, 203 n., 305, 332 n.

Lie, the, origin and end of, i. 434 _seq._

Liebig, iii. 42.

Life, nature of, iii. 36;

conflict with mechanical and chemical forces, i. 190;

opposition between organic and animal, ii. 489‐492;

blind striving, iii. 105‐118;

relation to dreams, i. 20, 415;

tragic and comic side of, i. 415, 416;

misery of, i. 401‐407, 417, iii. 114, 382‐401;

aim of, iii. 376, 384‐391.

Light, mechanical explanations of, iii. 44 _seq._;

relation to heat, i. 262, 263;

explanation of pleasure given by, i. 258, iii. 137;

connection with architecture, i. 279, 280.

Locke, i. 49, ii. 6, 7, 45, 81 _seq._, 141, 173 _seq._, 185 _seq._, 212,

213, 258, 259, 402, iii. 5, 23, 59, 394.

Logic, definition of, i. 58, ii. 285;

value of, i. 57‐59, ii. 286;

on what its certainty depends, ii. 268.

Love, nature of all true and pure, i. 484 _seq._;

root and significance of sexual love, iii, 419, 339‐343, 360;

degrees of it, iii. 344‐361;

the _rôle_ of instinct in it, iii. 345‐349, 350‐360;

independence of friendship, iii. 345;

sublime and comic sides of, iii. 366 _seq._

Lucretius, i. 403, 411, 412, iii. 91, 93, 313.

Lully, Raymond, i. 510, iii. 455.

Lupus, Rutilius, ii. 286.

Luther, i. 500, 525, ii. 145, 368, iii. 392, 421, 448‐451.

Lyric, subjectivity of, i. 321;

nature of the song, i. 322‐324.

Machiavelli, ii. 135, iii. 158.

Macrocosm, i. 212, iii. 404.

Madness, nature of, i. 30, 248 _seq._, iii. 167;

criterion of, iii. 167 _seq._;

relation of knowledge of madman to that of the brutes, i. 249, ii. 243;

relation of, to genius, i. 246, 247;

prevalence among actors, iii. 168;

origin of, i. 249 _seq._, iii. 169, 170;

_mania sine delirio_, iii. 171, 172.

Magnetism, animal, ii. 466, 467, iii. 76, 419.

Maine de Biran, ii. 206, 507, 217.

Malebranche, i. 178, 179, 522, ii. 15.

Man, the human race, connection with rest of nature, i. 200 _seq._, 403,

ii. 377;

identity of essence of man and the brutes, i. 192;

difference between man and brutes, i. 46‐48, 110‐112, 170, 171, 230,

384, 385, ii. 228‐233, 358, iii. 14‐17, 380, 381;

transcendent unity of human race, iii. 75, 76;

turning‐point of will to live, i. 491 _seq._, iii. 381, 426;

origin of, iii. 358;

gradual degradation of, ii. 362.

Manichæans, iii. 305.

Mannerists, i. 304, 305.

Manzoni, ii. 352.

Marcionists, iii. 305, 438, 442, 443.

Marcus Aurelius, ii. 356, iii. 323.

Marriage, iii. 333, 334, 336‐375.

Materialism, i. 34 _seq._, ii. 175 _seq._, iii. 60‐64, 261, 262.

Mathematics, scientific nature of, i. 81, 82;

ground of certainty of, i. 157, ii. 268;

and genius, i. 246, 247;

method of, i. 95 _seq._;

and logic, ii. 202;

value of, ii. 323.

Matter, i. 10‐13, 175, 275, 276, ii. 79, 103, 104, 218‐224, iii. 48‐54.

Maupertius, ii. 225.

Maximus of Tyre, ii. 264.

Maxwell, iii. 450.

Mâyâ, i. 9, 21, 425, 454, 455, 471, 478, 481, 482, 489, 490, 514, 515, ii.

8, 10, 108 n., iii. 69, 418.

Mechanics, iii. 37, 39, 43 _seq._

Medwin, iii. 160 n.

Meister, J. C. F., ii. 152.

Melancholy, i. 512.

Melissus, ii. 264.

Memnon, ii. 198.

Memory, as a function of intellect, ii. 335, iii. 300;

difference between that of men and brutes, ii. 229, 230;

the influences acting upon, i. 30, 248‐251, ii. 200, 334, 438 _seq._

Menenius Agrippa, i. 311.

_Mens_ as opposed to _animus_, ii. 458.

Menu, laws of, i. 433, 501 n., iii. 465.

Merck, ii. 446, iii. 200.

Metaphysics, i. 107, ii. 20, 359‐395 iii. 40.

Metempsychosis, doctrine of, i. 458‐460, iii. 300‐306, 417, 418.

Method, i. 100, 108, ii. 53, 210, 259, 309, 310, 393.

Metre, i. 314, ii. 205‐207.

Mind, presence of, ii. 430.

Minor key, i. 337, iii. 243, 244.

Missionaries, i. 460.

Mnemonics, ii. 325.

Modality, categories of, ii. 66‐75.

Modesty, i. 303, iii. 202, 203.

Mohammedanism, ii. 361, 362, iii. 423, 433, 472.

Molinos, iii. 434, 435, 435 n.

Molock, ii. 243.

Monarchy, i. 443, iii. 410.

Monasticism, i. 499, iii. 448.

Mongolian race, iii. 58.

Montaigne, i. 463 n., ii. 315, 465, iii. 378.

Montalembert, iii. 435.

Montanists, iii. 438.

Monuments, value of historical, iii. 229.

Moon, æsthetic effect of, iii. 136.

Morality, i. 343, 477, iii. 405, 415, 423‐428 (Cf. _Ethics_).

Morphology, i. 124, 125, 183.

Mortality, iii. 301‐302.

Motives, Motivation, what they determine, i. 138, 212, 213, iii. 115;

what imparts power to, iii. 97;

intellectual condition of action of, i. 380, 381;

influence of nearness upon strength of, ii. 346;

influence upon intellect, ii. 436;

distinguished from instinct, iii. 97;

intellect as medium of, i. 199, ii. 336, 485, iii. 21 _seq._

Movement, i. 194, ii. 226, 227, 483, 484, iii. 39.

Mozart, iii. 163.

Müller, ii. 479.

Multiplicity, i. 145, 146, 166, 167, iii. 69 _seq._, 274, 275.

Münchhausen, Baron, i. 34, ii. 278.

Murder, i. 432, iii. 413, 414.

Music, metaphysics of, i. 330‐346, iii. 231‐248.

Mysteries essential to religion, ii. 367, 368, iii. 430.

Mysticism, Mystics, i. 499, 500, iii. 430 n., 430‐434.

Nakedness, i. 296.

Nature, what it means, iii. 1;

works of nature and works of art, iii. 1, 69, 70, 79;

inner nature of, i. 140 _seq._, 148, 152 _seq._, iii. 32, 33, 39;

perfection of works of, iii. 69, 70;

the circle of, iii. 267;

grades of, i. 195 _seq._, 202‐206;

continuity of, ii. 232, iii. 36, 85;

the conflict in, i. 191, 210, 211;

design of, i. 201‐211, 77 _seq._, 95;

relation to species and individual, i. 356, 425, 426, iii. 194, 277,

278, 396;

æsthetic effect of, i. 255, iii. 173, 174;

naïveté of, i. 203, 204, 356, 362, 423, 491, iii. 380;

moral quality of, i. 518, iii. 106;

laws of, i. 126, 172, 175 _seq._., 183;

forces of, i. 126, 162, 169‐182, 202, ii. 217, 218, iii. 73, 259;

investigator of, ii. 318, 319, 383.

Necessity, origin and meaning of conception, i. 97;

relation to the actual and possible, ii. 72 _seq._;

relation to contingent, ii. 67, 68;

as opposed to freedom, iii. 67, 69;

absolute necessity, 70.

Nerves, i. 131, ii. 173, 185, 481‐485.

Newton, Isaac, i. 26, 64, 160, 165, 245, ii. 226, 268, 338.

Nirvana, i. 460, iii. 308 n., 374, 427, 428.

Nitzsch, iii. 269.

Noise, ii. 198, 199, iii. 450.

Nominalism, ii. 85, iii. 125.

νοουμενον and Φαινομενον, i. 93, ii. 85.

Nothing, relativity of conception, i. 528, iii. 272.

Nourishment, i. 357.

Numenius, ii. 98.

νους, ii. 459, iii. 390.

_Nunc stans_, the, i. 227, 361 n., iii. 381.

Object, conditioned by subject, i. 3, 6, 16, _seq._, 123, 124, ii.

166‐169, 170, 173, 179, 381.

Objectification, i. 130, 166‐163, ii. 468.

Objectivity, of genius and in art, i. 240, 321, 324, ii. 417, iii. 144,

210.

Obscurantism, iii. 328, 329.

Obry, iii. 303, 308 n.

Ocelius Lucanus, 113.

Opera, iii. 92, 233, 234.

Optimism, i. 420, ii. 391, iii. 390‐397, 436, 443, 449, 471 _seq._

Organism, ii. 468, iii. 77 _seq._

Original sin, iii. 306, 421 _seq._, 426.

Orpheus, iii. 303, 427, 433, 443.

Osiander, i. 151.

Ossian, i. 324.

Ought, the absolute, i. 350, ii. 144.

Oum, iii. 430, 430 n.

Oupnekhat, i. 459, 501, iii. 425 n. 432, 433.

Ovid, 1. 396, 410.

Owen, R., ii. 131, 203 n., iii. 82, 86, 91.

Pæstum, iii. 185.

Pain, i. 386, 410, 412, 413, iii. 384, 385.

Paine, T., i. 231.

Painting, i. 282‐292, 297‐301, 306‐310, iii. 193, 196‐198.

Palingenesis, iii. 300, 301.

Pander, ii. 318.

Pantheism, iii. 106, 114, 403, 404, 471‐475.

Paracelsus, Theophrastus, iii. 280, 362.

Parmenides, i. 141, 425.

Parody, ii. 275, 276.

Particles, logical, ii. 288, 315.

Pascal, i. 476, iii. 435.

Passions, ii. 216, iii. 406, 407.

Past, the, i. 359, 360.

Pedantry, i. 78, ii. 250 _seq._

Pelagianism, i. 525, ii. 368, 369, iii. 422, 448.

Penitentiary system, i. 404, iii. 412.

Perception, intellectuality of, i. 14‐16, ii. 40, 174, 185, 192;

share of senses and brain in, ii. 185;

object of, i. 7, ii. 40;

relation to thing in itself, ii. 174, 401;

significance for knowledge, science, art, philosophy, and virtue, ii.

244‐269, iii. 131, 141 _seq._

Perfection, ii. 15.

Peripatetics, ii. 137, 145.

Permanence of substance, ii. 78.

Perpetual motion, ii. 65, iii. 395.

Pessimism, can be demonstrated, iii. 395;

the ground of distinction among religions, ii. 372 _seq._;

of the most significant religions, i. 420, iii. 423;

of great men of all ages, iii. 398 _seq._

_Petitio principii_, definition of, ii. 308.

Petit‐Thouars, Admiral, iii. 55.

Petrarch, i. 487, 512, ii. 313, iii. 210, 363, 369, 370, 386.

Petronius, ii. 130.

Pettigrew, i. 178 n.

Phidias, iii. 195.

Philosopher, the, nature of, i. 21, 109, ii. 319, 359, 360, iii. 146, 147;

distinguished from poet, iii. 146, 147;

distinguished from sophist, ii. 362, 363.

Philosophy, source of, 1. 135, ii. 359‐361, 374;

task of, i. 107, 168, 350, 352, 495;

distinguished from science, i. 107, ii. 317;

as opposed to theology, ii. 367, 395, iii. 431, 453;

relation to art, iii. 176, 177;

relation to history, iii. 223;

method of, ii. 53, 210, 259, 393;

division of, i. 349;

cause of small progress of, ii. 395;

limits of, ii. 362, 363, 27, 405;

professors of, ii. 362, 363.

Phlegmatic temperament, iii. 18, 161.

Physics, subject of, ii. 375;

relation to metaphysics, ii. 376‐384, iii. 40.

Physiognomy, i. 74, 74 n.

Physiology, i. 125, ii. 317, iii. 38.

Pico de Mirandula, ii. 240.

Pictet, iii. 304.

Picturesque, iii. 130.

Pindar, i. 21.

Pitt, iii. 324.

Plagiarism, ii. 225, 226.

Plants, chief characteristics of, i. 357, ii. 29;

inner nature of, i. 152, iii. 34‐36;

distinguished from animals, i. 25, 150, iii. 13;

form and physiognomy of, i. 203, 204;

metamorphosis of, iii. 85;

æsthetic effect of, i. 260, 288, 289.

Platner, ii. 270.

Plato, on _a priori_ knowledge, ii. 201;

on being and becoming, i. 9;

relation to Giordano Bruno, ii. 114 n.;

figure of the cave, i. 311, ii. 8;

improper use of conceptions, ii. 211, 261, 264;

his Dæmon, i. 349;

his dialectic, ii. 309;

source of error, i. 103;

errors in syllogistic reasoning, i. 93;

his ethics, i. 114, ii. 145, 149, 348;

ευκολος and δυσκολος, i. 407;

hope the dream of waking, ii. 431;

his Ideas, i. 168, 220, 273, ii. 85, 99, 322, iii. 123, 274, 275;

on love, iii. 338;

on materialism, ii. 176;

on mathematics, 323;

on metempsychosis, 303;

his method, i. 239;

on music, i. 336;

on nature of nothing, i. 529;

on the nature of the philosopher, i. 21, 41, 109, 143; ii. 369, 374;

on plants, iii. 34;

on punishment, i. 451;

on reason, ii. 141;

on science, i. 83;

on sensual pleasure, iii. 349, 369;

his world of shadows, ii. 10;

on existence of soul, ii. 102;

his theism, ii. 98.

Pliny, iii. 378, 400, 451.

Plotinus, ii. 218, iii. 51, 54, 432.

Plouquet, i. 55.

Plutarch, ii. 98, 319, iii. 124, 271 399.

Poaching, a positive, not a moral fault, iii. 411, 412.

Poet, the, grade; of, iii. 202;

marks of genuine, iii. 207;

bad influence of mediocre, i. 317 n.;

distinguished from philosopher, iii. 146, 147.

Poetical justice, i. 328

Poetry, i. 313‐330, iii. 38, 200‐219.

Point, extensionless, ii. 223;

immovable, ii. 219.

Polarity, i. 187.

Polier, Mme. de, i. 492, 501 n., ii 109.

Position, i. 9.

Possibility, ii. 69, 72.

Pouchet, iii. 56.

Poussin, i. 306.

Praxiteles, iii. 195.

Predestination, i. 378, ii. 149.

Pre‐existence, iii. 253, 254.

Prejudice, ii. 268.

Preller, ii. 357.

Present, the, i. 358‐360, iii. 271, 271 n.

Priestley, i. 373, ii. 111, 224, 225, iii. 46.

Priests, i. 466 n., ii. 362.

_Principium individuationis_, i. 145, 146, 166, 454 _seq._, 481, iii. 274,

417, 418.

Principle of sufficient reason, is _a priori_, i. preface xi., 6, iii.

469;

sphere of validity of, i. 7, 16, 17, 41, 106, iii. 405, 469;

importance of, i. 96, 107, ii. 316;

indemonstrable nature of, i. 96, 106;

fourfold root of, i. 7 (Cf. _Appendix_ to vol. iii.)

Property, right of, i. 432, 433 n., iii. 411.

Prose, as distinguished from poetry, i, 313, iii. 204‐206.

Protestantism. See _Catholicism_.

Prudence, i. 27, 245, 456.

Psychology, ii. 412‐467.

Punishment, distinguished from revenge, i. 449;

end of, i. 448‐450, iii. 412, 413;

measure of, iii. 413, 414.

Pyramids, i. 267, iii. 229.

Pythagoras, iii. 303.

Pythagoreans, i. 33, 86, 92, 95, 188, 343, ii. 319, iii. 95, 124, 427,

442, 452.

Quality, of judgments ii. 57, 87;

as determination of matter, iii. 54;

natural forces as _qualitates occultæ_, i. 126, 162, 170, 182, ii. 376.

_Quid pro quo_, i. 79.

Quieter of will, i. 301, 326, 327, 367, 396, 489, 490.

Quietism, iii. 433‐435,

Rabelais, iii. 437.

Radius, Justus, ii. 191.

Rameau, i. 58.

Rancé, Abbé, i. 510, iii. 455.

Raphael, i. 295, 300, 531, iii. 162.

Rationalism in theology, ii. 369.

Reading, disadvantage of much, ii. 253‐255.

Realism, ii. 85, iii. 125.

Reality, definition, i. 30;

the present is the form of, i. 359, 360, iii. 271 n.;

of external world, i. 22, 23, ii. 169, 184.

Reason, the word, i. 48, ii. 141, 241;

function of, i. 50, ii. 137;

theoretical and practical, i. 30, 113, ii. 138, 139, 345; iii. 408;

prerogative of man, i. 46‐48, 110‐112, 384, 385, ii. 228‐233, iii. 380,

381;

relation of language to, i. 47‐51, ii. 238;

advantages and disadvantages, i. 45, 47, 68‐75, ii. 234‐243, 345 _seq._;

compatible with want of understanding and with moral badness, ii. 136;

opposed to revelation, ii. 142;

Kant’s Ideas of, i. 169, ii. 96‐100;

ideal of, ii. 125‐133;

principle of, ii. 90‐96.

Reflection, definition, i. 46;

relation to perceptive knowledge, ii. 54 _seq._

Reflex movements, ii. 483‐484.

Reid, Dr. Thomas, ii. 189, 191, 207, 240.

Reil, i. 140, 159.

Religion, significance of, ii. 367 _seq._;

value of, ii. 370;

fundamental distinction between, ii. 372 _seq._;

mysteries essential to, ii. 367;

demoralising influence of, i. 466 n.;

conflict with culture and science, ii. 370;

philosophy of, ii. 370

(Cf. _Buddhism_, _Brahmanism_, _Christianity_, _Judaism_, and

_Mohammedanism_).

Repentance, i. 382, iii. 406, 407.

Reproduction. See _Generation_.

Republics tend to anarchy, i. 443.

Resignation. See _Will, denial of_.

Resolve, i. 387.

Revenge, distinguished from punishment, i. 449;

relation to wickedness, i. 470;

a characteristic of human nature which is not to be confounded with

revenge, i. 462.

Rhetoric, i. 63, ii. 285, 286, 305, 306.

Rhyme. See _Poetry_.

Rhythm, in music, i. 339 _seq._

See _Poetry_.

Richter, Jean Paul, ii. 22, 198, 270, 283, iii. 141, 143, 145.

Right, negative nature of conception, i. 437, 444;

independent of State, i. 439, iii. 409;

positive i. 444, 446;

of property, i. 432 433 n., iii. 411.

Ritter, ii. 357.

Romantic, distinguished from classical, iii. 209.

Rösch, ii. 478, 480.

Rosenkranz, i. 203 n., ii. 29, 36, 117, 120, 121, 146‐148, 204 n., 212,

217, 225, 377.

Rosini, ii. 447.

Rousseau, i. 247, 343, ii. 136, 353, iii. 106, 325, 338, 397.

Ruins, sublime effect of, i. 267;

analogous to _cadenza_ in music, iii. 241.

Ruisdael, i. 255.

St. Hilaire, August, iii. 55.

St. Hilaire, Geoffroi, ii. 318, iii. 82.

Sakya Muni, iii. 168, 434.

Salvation, the way of, iii. 460‐467.

Sangermano, iii. 301, 308 n.

Sannyasis, i. 496, ii. 352.

Saphir, ii. 274.

Sceptics, i. 123, 124.

Schelling, i. 187, ii. 22, 31, 116, 169, 176, 236, 261, iii. 62, 471.

Schiller, i. 79, 318, ii. 148, 276, 321, iii. 215, 217.

Schleiermacher, i. 67, 262, iii. 394.

Schlegel, iii. 75.

Schmidt, J. J., ii. 371, iii. 308 n.

Schnürrer, iii. 301.

Scholastics, Scholasticism, i. 82, 146, 162, 198 n., ii. 12, 13, 35, 100,

125, 126, iii. 125.

Scholiast, ii. 319.

Schultz, ii. 480.

Schulze, ii. 312.

Science, nature of, i. 36, 58, 80‐90, 105, 106, 229, 238, ii. 53, 252,

267.

Scott, Sir Walter, ii. 427, 457, iii. 328, 386, 399.

Scopas, iii. 195.

Sculpture, as opposed to painting, i. 292, iii. 193;

æsthetic effect of, iii. 200, 201;

significance of drapery in, i. 296;

antique, i. 309, iii. 194, 195;

modern, iii. 195.

Secundus, Johannes, iii. 195.

Selfishness. See _Egoism_.

Self‐knowledge, ii. 423.

Self‐renunciation, meaning of, iii. 423;

the appearance of freedom in the phenomenon, i. 388, 389.

Seneca, i. 75, 246, 379, ii. 149, 234, 347, 350, 355‐358, 458.

Sensation, ii. 186‐191.

Senses, ii. 193‐200.

Sensibility, i. 13.

Sentimentality, i. 512, 513.

Serenity, i. 422, iii. 376.

Seriousness, as the opposite of laughter, ii. 280;

as determining the tendency of life, iii. 149.

Sex, degree of, iii. 356.

Sextus Empiricus, i. 62, 93, 343, ii. 127.

Sexual impulse, difference between man and brute with reference to, i.

171, iii. 309;

significance and power of, i. 423, 425, 310, 312‐314, 376;

physiological correlative of, iii. 314;

its relation to happiness of life, iii. 376;

voluntary renunciation of satisfaction of, i. 430, iii. 376.

Shaftesbury, iii. 397.

Shakers, iii. 449.

Shakspeare, i. 21, 268, 511, ii. 239, 254, 306, 315, iii. 210, 214, 216,

321, 363, 369, 400, 457.

Shame, i. 424, iii. 379.

Shenstone, ii. 275.

Siècle, iii. 112 n.

Sight, sense of, ii. 193 _seq._

Simonists, iii. 305.

Simplicius, ii. 157.

Sirach, Jesus, iii. 352.

Sketches, value of, iii. 178.

Skull, explained from vertebræ iii. 85.

Slavery, as a wrong, i. 432.

Sleep, necessity of, ii. 337, 428, 462, 463, 466;

action of vital force in, ii. 463, 466;

positive character of, ii. 464;

relation to brain life, ii. 465;

relation to death, i. 358, iii. 267 _seq._

Socialists, iii. 250.

Socrates, i. 288, 343, ii. 107, 281, 363, iii. 299, 249, 252, 405.

Somnambulism, ii. 467, iii. 98 _seq._

Sömmering, iii. 21.

Sophist, distinguished from philosopher, ii. 362, 363.

Sophistry, i. 63, ii. 263, 264.

Sophocles, i. 21, 295, 328, iii. 214.

Soul, historical, iii. 2, 3, 13;

opposition between soul and body, ii. 102‐104, 378;

in what sense the word should be used, iii. 105;

a motive which has led to the assumption of, ii. 409;

theoretical and practical results of assumption, ii. 77, 409, 494.

Southey, ii. 427.

Space, ideality of, ii. 201‐204, 221;

opposition between space and time with reference to abstract knowledge,

i. 69, 70;

union of space and time the condition of duration and matter, i. 10‐13,

ii. 78;

the framework of the phenomenal world, i. 187, 188;

whether the world is limited in space, ii. 109

(Cf. _Principium individuationis_).

Spallanzani, ii. 469.

Species, iii. 123.

_Spectator_, ii. 233.

Spinal cord, ii. 483‐484.

Spinoza, on benevolence, i. 486;

biography of, i. 497;

explanation and use of concepts, i. 111, ii. 241, 266;

ethical teaching of, i. 114, 367, iii. 403;

God of, iii. 106;

on knowledge of Ideas, i. 231, 232 n.;

on immortality, iii. 280, 291;

on love, iii. 338;

method of, i. 100 n., 108, ii. 212;

his place in western philosophy, ii. 13 n.;

rejection of spiritualism, ii. 177;

conception of substance, i. 33, ii. 373, 391;

rejection of teleology, iii. 91, 93, 94;

on will, i. 164, 377, 385, ii. 120.

Spiritualism, ii, 177.

Stahl, i. 64.

State, the, i. 442‐448, 451, iii. 409‐411.

Statics, ii. 226.

Stewart, Dugald, ii. 226, 240.

Stobæus, i. 114, 117, 118, 378, 506 n., ii. 137, 319, 350.

Stoics, Stoicism, i. 113‐120, ii. 453.

Strauss, D. F., iii. 437, 457.

Stupidity, i. 30.

Style, ii. 44, 246, 247.

Suarez, i. 146, 162, 198 n., ii. 13, 89, 100.

Subject, the, has two parts, i. 132;

of will, iii. 126;

of knowing, i. 3, 6, 16, 123, 124, ii. 166‐169, 170 _seq._;

pure, will‐less subject of knowing, i. 253 _seq._, iii. 128 _seq._

Sublime, the, i. 259‐268.

Substance, origin and content of concept, ii. 103, 104;

principle of permanence of, ii. 78 _seq._;

and accident, i. 12 _seq._, ii. 79, 80.

Succession, i. 9.

Suetonius, iii. 321.

Suffering, universality of, i. 399 _seq._;

sanctifying power of, i. 511;

of life, i. 401‐407, 417, iii. 114.

Sufism, iii. 423, 432.

Suicide, i. 408, 514‐520, iii. 117.

Suidas, ii. 98.

Sulzer, ii. 141.

Supernaturalism, ii. 369

Swift, iii. 399.

Swoon, the twin‐brother of death, iii. 256.

Sybarites, ii. 199.

Syllogism, ii. 292‐304.

Symbolism, i. 308 _seq._

Symmetry, analogy with rhythm iii. 240, 241.

Sympathy, definition and division, iii. 419.

Systems, philosophical, ground of interest in, ii. 360, 361;

contrast between Schopenhauer’s and others, i. 32, ii. 180, 393;

division of those starting from object, i. 33;

error of those which proceed historically, i. 352;

criteria of truth of, ii. 391.

Tatianites, iii. 439.

Tauler, iii. 434, 435.

Teleology, i. 201‐210, iii. 77‐95.

Tennemann, i. 67, ii. 12.

_Termini technici_, iii. 312.

Tersteegen, i. 496.

Tertullian, ii. 368, iii. 305, 439.

Thales, i. 33.

Theodicy, iii. 394, 404.

Theon of Smyrna, iii. 313.

Thilo, iii. 158.

Thing in itself, as opposed to phenomenon, i. 40, 44, 128, 142 145, 157,

166, ii. 31, 168, 169, 402, 403, iii. 292;

how knowledge of it can be attained, i. 41, 128, ii. 31, 174, 175, 404,

405;

in what sense it is the _will_, i. 142, ii. 407;

why our knowledge of it is not exhaustive, i. 157, ii. 406, iii. 9, 24,

25, 27, 286 _seq._;

in history of philosophy, i. 220, ii. 30, 117, 174, 185, 380, 390, iii.

45.

Tholuk, iii. 432.

Thorwaldsen, iii. 195.

Thracians, iii. 398.

Tiedemann, ii. 470.

Tien, ii. 97.

Time, nature of, i. 9, 44, ii. 205, iii. 12;

ideality of, ii. 201, 204;

_prædicabilia a priori_ of, 121 _seq._ (Cf. _Space_).

_Times_, the, i. 178 n., ii. 459, iii. 304, 450.

Tourtual, ii. 187.

Tragedy, i., 326‐330, iii. 212‐216. 454.

Transcendent, ii. 387.

Transcendental knowledge, i. 224;

philosophy, ii. 11.

Travelling, æsthetic effect of, iii. 131.

Trent, decrees of Council of, iii. 441.

Treviranus, ii. 470, iii. 35.

Truth, definition, i. 30, ii. 308;

foundation of, i. 100‐103;

difference between conceivability and truth, ii. 278;

relation to proof, i. 83, 84;

power of, i. 45, 179.

Understanding, function of, i. 13, 14;

identity of nature at different grades, i. 26, 28, 29;

why sensibility is everywhere accompanied by, i. 30, 31, 228;

misuse of word, ii. 241;

defects and advantages of knowledge of, ii. 253;

keenness of, i. 27, 245.

Ungewitter, iii. 304.

Universal, two kinds of, i. 301‐303, iii. 124, 125;

knowledge of, ii. 335, 336;

universal truths, ii. 308.

Upham, iii. 282.

Utopias, i. 451, iii. 331.

Valentinians, iii. 305, 438.

Vaninus, Jul. Cæsar, iii. 32, 106.

Vauvenarque, ii. 251.

Vedas, 9, 21, 114, 234, 266, 364 n., 458, 501, ii. 108 n., 362, iii. 303,

307, 426, 427, 433, 467.

Velocity, ii. 226, 227.

Virgil, i. 293, 295.

Virtue, source of genuine, i. 475, 477, ii. 149, 252;

cannot be taught, i. 475, ii. 149;

relation to happiness, i. 466, iii. 420;

distinguished from reasonableness, ii. 134;

transition to asceticism, iii. 424, 425.

Voltaire, i. 327, 329, ii. 157, 277, 428, 469, iii. 178, 252, 368, 395.

398, 404.

Vyaso, iii. 282.

Weeping, i. 486‐488, iii. 406.

Weighing, two ways of, ii. 227.

Whewell, ii. 323.

Wieland, i. 246, ii. 427, iii. 200.

Will, subject of, iii. 126;

identity of subject of will and knowledge, 132;

as the thing in itself, i. 142, ii. 407;

contrast between will and its phenomenal appearance, i. 145, 166,

213‐215, iii. 69‐71;

objectification of, i. 130, 166‐168, ii. 468;

assertion of, i. 421‐427, iii. 376‐381;

denial of, i. 488‐514, iii. 420‐459.

Windischmann, iii. 307, 425 n.

Winkelmann, i. 289, 290, 292, 295, 309, 318, ii. 153.

Winkelried, Arnold von, ii. 134.

_Wirklichkeit_, i. 10.

Wit, i. 77, ii. 268, 277.

Wolf, i. 111, ii. 70 n., 90, 97, 102, 127, 225, 479, iii. 85.

Wordsworth, ii. 427.

Wrong, conception of, i. 431‐437.

Xenophanes, ii. 220, iii. 8.

Xenophon, i. 288.

Yama, iii. 258.

Yang, i. 187.

Yin, i. 187.

Y‐King, i. 188, 343.

Youth, i. 324, iii. 304.

Yunghahn, iii. 112.

Zaccaria, Abbé, iii. 441.

Zend Avesta, 111. 391, 446.

Zeno, i. 117 118.

CORRIGENDA AND ADDENDA IN VOL. I.

Page xxxii. _insert_

Preface to the Third Edition.

What is true and genuine would more easily gain room in the world if it

were not that those who are incapable of producing it are also sworn to

prevent it from succeeding. This fact has already hindered and retarded,

when indeed it has not choked, many a work that should have been of

benefit to the world. For me the consequence of this has been, that

although I was only thirty years old when the first edition of this work

appeared, I live to see this third edition not earlier than my seventy‐

second year. Yet for this I find comfort in the words of Petrarch: _Si

quis tota die currens, pervenit ad vesperam satis est_ (_de vera

Sapientia_, p. 140). If I also have at last arrived, and have the

satisfaction at the end of my course of seeing the beginning of my

influence, it is with the hope that, according to an old rule it will

endure long in proportion to the lateness of its beginning.

In this third edition the reader will miss nothing that was contained in

the second, but will receive considerably more, for, on account of the

additions that have been made in it, it has, with the same type, 136 pages

more than the second.

Seven years after the appearance of the second edition I published two

volumes of “Parerga and Paralipomena.” What is included under the latter

name consists of additions to the systematic exposition of my philosophy,

and would have found its right place in these volumes, but I was obliged

to find a place for it then where I could, as it was very doubtful whether

I would live to see this third edition. It will be found in the second

volume of the said “Parerga,” and will be easily recognised from the

headings of the chapters.

FRANKFORT‐ON‐THE‐MAINE,

_September 1859_.

Page xiv. line 9, _for_ “pancorum” _read_ “paucorum.”

" xix. " 17, _for_ “alchemists” _read_ “adepts.”

" xx. " 10, _after_ “there” _insert_ “unanimous.”

" xxi. " 3, _for_ “will appeal to any thinking mind no matter when

it comprehends it” _read_ “will also some time be comprehended

by another thinking mind.”

" xxii. last line, _after_ “not” _insert_ “in this case.”

" xxiii. line 26, _for_ “conceptions” _read_ “conception.”

" " " 32, _for_ “origin” _read_ “stem.”

" xxiv. " 20, _for_ “a chromatic” _read_ “an achromatic.”

" 6, line 15, _for_ “universality” _read_ “common or reciprocal

nature.”

" 21, " 31, _for_ “Σιδωλ” _read_ “Ειδωλ.”

" 31, " 7, _for_ “micrometre” _read_ “micrometer.”

" 41, " 11, _for_ “θαυμαξειν” _read_ “θαυμαζειν.”

" 45, " 22, _after_ “its” _insert_ “iron.”

" 45, " 23, _for_ “extend to” _read_ “quench.”

" 48, " 31, _for_ “λογιμον” _read_ “λογικον.”

" 49, " 22, _after_ “to” _insert_ “abstract”.

" 50, " 14, _after_ “function” _insert_ “the construction of the

concept.”

" 62, " 26, _for_ “Kallisthenes” _read_ “Callisthenes.”

" 75, " 1, _for_ “fictum” _read_ “fictam.”

" 91, " 18, _for_ “latter” _read_ “former.”

" 93, lines 8 and 33, _for_ “νουμενον” _read_ “νοουμενον.”

" 99, line 17, _for_ “42” _read_ “32.”

" 114, " 7, _for_ “ευδαι μονειν” _read_ “ενδαιμονειν.”

" 116 note, _for_ “εφαρμοεξειν” _read_ “εφαρμοζειν.”

" 117, line, 30, _for_ “ψνχης” _read_ “ψυχης.”

" 118, lines 10, 12, _for_ “Kleanthes” _read_ “Cleanthes.”

" 119, line 7, _for_ “philospher” _read_ “philosopher.”

" 141, " 18, _for_ “Σστιν” _read_ “Εστιν.”

" 146, " 23, _for_ “became” _read_ “become.”

" 157, line 4, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.”

" 166, " 3, _insert_ § 25.

" 169, " 5, _for_ “Laertes” _read_ “Laertius.”

" 172, " 32, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.”

" 182, " 8, _for_ “quidities” _read_ “quiddities.”

" 184, " 30, _for_ “this” _read_ “thus.”

" 205, " 35, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.”

" 220, " 32, _for_ “ειδη” _read_ “ειδη.”

" 222, " 24, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.”

" 223, lines 4 and 33, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.”

" 224, line 8, _for_ “casuality” _read_ “causality.”

" 230, " 19, _for_ “Apollo of Belvedere” _read_ “Apollo Belvedere.”

" 231, last line, _for_ “Meus” _read_ “Mens.”

Page 247, line 17, _for_ “Great wits to madness sure are near allied”

_read_ “Great wits are sure to madness near allied.” The lines

are not from Pope, as Schopenhauer says, but from Dryden’s

“Absalom and Achitophel,” Pt. i., l. 163.

" 251, " 15, _for_ “appear” _read_ “appears.”

" 258, " 18, _for_ “Ahrimines” _read_ “Ahriman.”

" 276, lines 9 and 11, _for_ “casuality” and “casual” _read_ “causality”

and “causal;” line 23, _for_ “Timaus” _read_ “Timæus.”

" 382, line 32, _for_ “as” _read_ “but.”

" 396, " 5, _for_ “αναγκη” _read_ “αναγκῃ.”

" 423, " 35, _for_ “principiu mindividuationis” _read_ “principium

individuationis.”

" 425, " 7, _no comma after_ “βασιλειαν.”

" 429, " 25, _after_ “chapter” _insert_ “of his.”

" 445, last line, _for_ “ζην” _read_ “ζῃν.”

" 453, lines 4 and 5, _for_ “παρ” _read_ “πας.”

" 455, line 10, _for_ “prineipium” _read_ “principium.”

" 463, " 27, _for_ “ever” _read_ “every.”

" 467, " 5, _for_ “πρως” _read_ “προς.”

" 496, " 25, _for_ “Wiedergeborennen” _read_ “Wiedergeborenen.”

" 520, " 9, _for_ “though this is hard to find out” _read_ “which is

certainly hard to explain.”

" 531, " 16, _for_ “wish to fruition” _read_ “desire to aversion.”

FOOTNOTES

1 This chapter is connected with the last half of § 27 of the first

volume.

2 _De Augm. Scient._, L. vi. c. 3.

3 This chapter is connected with § 23 of the first volume.

4 This chapter and the following one are connected with § 28 of the

first volume.

5 Let me here remark in passing that, judging from the German

literature since Kant, one would necessarily believe that Hume’s

whole wisdom had consisted in his obviously false scepticism with

regard to the law of causality, for this alone is everywhere

referred to. In order to know Hume one must read his “Natural

History of Religion” and his “Dialogues on Natural Religion.” There

one sees him in his greatness, and these, together with Essay 21 “Of

National Characters,” are the writings on account of which—I know of

nothing that says more for his fame—even to the present day, he is

everywhere hated by the English clergy.

6 This chapter is connected with § 29 of the first volume.

7 In the _Siècle_, 10th April 1859, there appears, very beautifully

written, the story of a squirrel that was magically drawn by a

serpent into its very jaws: “Un voyageur qui vient de parcourir

plusieurs provinces de l’ile de Java cite un exemple remarqueable du

pouvoir facinateur des serpens. Le voyageur dont il est question

commençait à gravir Junjind, un des monts appelés par les Hollandais

Pepergebergte. Après avoir pénétré dans une épaisse forêt, il

aperçut sur les branches d’un kijatile un écureuil de Java à tête

blanche, folâtrant avec la grâce et l’agilité qui distinguent cette

charmante espèce de rongeurs. Un nid sphérique, formé de brins

flexible et de mousse, placé dans les parties les plus élevées de

l’arbre, a l’enfourchure de deux branches, et une cavité dans le

tronc, semblaient les points de mire de ses jeux. A peine s’en

était‐il éloigné qu’il y revenait avec une ardeur extrême. On était

dans le mois de Juillet, et probablement l’écureuil avait en haut

ses petits, et dans le bas le magasin à fruits. Bientôt il fut comme

saisi d’effroi, ces mouvemens devinrent désordonnés, on eut dit

qu’il cherchait toujours à mettre un obstacle entre lui et certaines

parties de l’arbre: puis il se tapit et resta immobile entre deux

branches. Le voyageur eut le sentiment d’un danger pour l’innocente

bête, mais il ne pouvait deviner lequel. Il approcha, et un examen

attentif lui fit découvrir dans un creux du tronc une couleuvre

lieu, dardant ses yeux fixes dans la direction de l’écureuil. Notre

voyageur trembla pour le pauvre écureuil. La couleuvre était si

attentive à sa proie qu’elle ne semblait nullement remarquer la

présence d’un homme. Notre voyageur, qui était armé, aurait donc

prevenir en aide à l’infortuné rongeur en tuant le serpent. Mais la

science l’emporta sur la pitié, et il voulut voir quelle issue

aurait le drame. Le dénoûment fut tragique. L’écureuil ne tarda

point à pousser un cri plaintif qui, pour tous ceux qui le

connaissent, dénote le voisinage d’un serpent. Il avança un peu,

essaya de reculer, revint encore en avant, tâche de retourner en

arrière. Mais s’approcha toujours plus du reptile. La couleuvre,

roulée en spirale, la tête au dessus des anneaux, et immobile comme

un morceau de bois, ne le quittait pas du regard. L’écureuil, de

branche en branche, et descendant toujours plus bas, arriva jusqu’à

la partie nue du tronc. Alors le pauvre animal ne tenta même plus de

fuir le danger. Attiré par une puissance invincible, et comme poussé

par le vertige, il se précipita dans la gueule du serpent, qui

s’ouvrit tout à coup démesurément pour le recevoir. Autant la

couleuvre avait été inerte jusque là autant elle devint active dès

qu’elle fut en possession de sa proie. Déroulant ses anneaux et

prenant sa course de bas en haut avec une agilité inconcevable, sa

reptation la porta en un clin d’œil au sommet de l’arbre, où elle

alla sans doute digérer et dormir.”

In this example we see what spirit animates nature, for it reveals

itself in it, and how very true is the saying of Aristotle quoted

above (p. 106). This story is not only important with regard to

fascination, but also as an argument for pessimism. That an animal

is surprised and attacked by another is bad; still we can console

ourselves for that; but that such a poor innocent squirrel sitting

beside its nest with its young is compelled, step by step,

reluctantly, battling with itself and lamenting, to approach the

wide, open jaws of the serpent and consciously throw itself into

them is revolting and atrocious. What monstrous kind of nature is

this to which we belong!

8 “_Augustini de civit. Dei_,” L. xi. c. 27, deserves to be compared

as an interesting commentary on what is said here.

9 This chapter is connected with §§ 30‐32 of the first volume.

10 This chapter is connected with §§ 33‐34 of the first volume.

11 This chapter is connected with § 36 of the first volume.

12 There is nothing else in the world but the vulgar.

13 In Medwin’s “Conversations of Lord Byron,” p. 333.

14 This chapter is connected with the second half of § 36 of the first

volume.

15 _Rgya Tcher Rol Pa, Hist. de Bouddha Chakya Mouni, trad. du

Tibétain_, p. _Foucaux_, 1848, p. 91 et 99.

16 In German inferiors are sometimes addressed as _Er_ instead of

_Sie_.—_Trs._

17 This chapter is connected with § 38 of the first volume.

18 This chapter is connected with § 49 of the first volume.

19 This chapter is connected with § 43 of the first volume.

20 This chapter is connected with §§ 44‐50 of the first volume.

21 This chapter is connected with § 51 of the first volume.

22 Lichtenberg (“_Vermischte Schriften_,” new edition, Göttingen, 1884,

vol. iii. p. 19) quotes Stanislaus Leszczynski as having said, “_La

modestie devroit être la vertu de ceux, a qui les autres manquent_.”

23 This chapter is connected with § 51 of the first volume.

24 Let me remark in passing that from this opposition of ποιησις and

ἱστορια the origin, and also the peculiar significance, of the first

word comes out with more than ordinary distinctness; it signifies

that which is made, invented, in opposition to what is discovered.

25 This chapter is connected with § 52 of the first volume.

26 It would be a false objection that sculpture and painting are also

merely in space; for their works are connected, not directly, but

yet indirectly, with time, for they represent life, movement,

action. And it would be just as false to say that poetry, as speech,

belongs to time alone: this is also true only indirectly of the

words; its matter is all existent, thus spatial.

27 This chapter is connected with § 54 of the first volume.

28 _In gladiatoriis pugnis timidos et supplices, et, ut vivere liceat,

obsecrantes etiam odisse solemus; fortes et animosos, et se acriter

ipsos morti offerentes servare cupimus_ (_Cic. pro Milone_, c. 34).

29 The suspension of the _animal_ functions is sleep, that of the

_organic_ functions is death.

30 There is only _one present_, and this is always: for it is the sole

form of actual existence. One must attain to the insight that the

_past_ is not _in itself_ different from the present, but only in

our apprehension, which has time as its form, on account of which

alone the present exhibits itself as different from the past. To

assist this insight, imagine all the events and scenes of human

life, bad and good, fortunate and unfortunate, pleasing and

terrible, as they successively present themselves in the course of

time and difference of places, in the most checkered

multifariousness and variety, as _at once and together_, and always

present in the _Nunc stans_, while it is only apparently that now

this and now that is; then what the objectification of the will to

live really means will be understood. Our pleasure also in _genre_

painting depends principally upon the fact that it fixes the

fleeting scenes of life. The dogma of metempsychosis has proceeded

from the feeling of the truth which has just been expressed.

31 This posthumous essay is to be found in the “Essays on Suicide and

the Immortality of the Soul” by the late David Hume, Basil, 1799,

sold by James Decker. By this reprint at Bâle these two works of one

of the greatest thinkers and writers of England were rescued from

destruction, when in their own land, in consequence of the stupid

and utterly contemptible bigotry which prevailed, they had been

suppressed through the influence of a powerful and insolent

priesthood, to the lasting shame of England. They are entirely

passionless, coldly rational investigations of the two subjects

named.

32 Death says: Thou art the product of an act which should not have

been; therefore to expiate it thou must die.

33 _Sancara, s. de theologumenis Vedanticorum_, ed. F. H. H.

Windischmann, p. 37; “_Oupnekhat_,” vol. i. p. 387 _et_ p. 78;

Colebrooke’s “Miscellaneous Essays,” vol. i. p. 363.

34 The etymology of the word Nirvana is variously given. According to

Colebrooke (“Transact. of the Royal Asiat. Soc.,” vol. i. p. 566) it

comes from _va_, “to blow,” like the wind, and the prefixed negative

_nir_, and thus signifies a calm, but as an adjective

“extinguished.” Obry, also, _Du Nirvana Indien_, p. 3, says:

“_Nirvanam en sanscrit signifie à la lettre extinction, telle que

celle d’un feu_.” According to the “Asiatic Journal,” vol. xxiv. p.

735, the word is really Neravana, from _nera_, “without,” and

_vana_, “life,” and the meaning would be _annihilatio_. In “Eastern

Monachism,” by Spence Hardy, p. 295, Nirvana is derived from _vana_,

“sinful desires,” with the negative _nir_. J. J. Schmidt, in his

translation of the history of the Eastern Mongolians, says that the

Sanscrit word Nirvana is translated into Mongolian by a phrase which

signifies “departed from misery,” “escaped from misery.” According

to the learned lectures of the same in the St. Petersburg Academy,

Nirvana is the opposite of Sanfara, which is the world of constant

re‐birth, of longings and desires, of illusion of the senses and

changing forms, of being born, growing old, becoming sick, and

dying. In the Burmese language the word Nirvana, according to the

analogy of other Sanscrit words, becomes transformed into Nieban,

and is translated by “complete vanishing.” See Sangermano’s

“Description of the Burmese Empire,” translated by Tandy, Rome,

1833, § 27. In the first edition of 1819 I also wrote Nieban,

because we then knew Buddhism only from meagre accounts of the

Burmese.

35 “_Disputatio de corporum habitudine, animæ, hujusque virium

indice._” _Harderov._, 1789, § 9.

36 Lichtenberg says in his miscellaneous writings (Göttingen, 1801,

vol. ii. p. 447): “In England it was proposed to castrate thieves.

The proposal is not bad: the punishment is very severe; it makes

persons contemptible, and yet leaves them still fit for trades; and

if stealing is hereditary, in this way it is not propagated.

Moreover, the courage ceases, and since the sexual passion so

frequently leads to thefts, this cause would also disappear. The

remark that women would so much the more eagerly restrain their

husbands from stealing is roguish, for as things are at present they

risk losing them altogether.”

37 I have not ventured to express myself distinctly here: the courteous

reader must therefore translate the phrase into Aristophanic

language.

38 The fuller discussion of this subject will be found in the

“Parerga,” vol. ii. § 92 of the first edition (second edition, pp.

167‐170).

39 [The appendix to this chapter was added only in the third edition of

the German, and is meant to explain, in consistency with

Schopenhauer’s general principles, the wide prevalence of the

practice of pederasty, among different nations and in different

ages. It is omitted.—_Trs._]

40 This chapter is connected with § 60 of the first volume.

41 This chapter is connected with §§ 56‐59 of the first volume. Also

chapters 11 and 12 of the second volume of the “Parerga and

Paralipomena” should be compared with it.

42 All that we lay hold of resists us because it has its own will,

which must be overcome.

43 This chapter is connected with §§ 55, 62, 67 of the first volume.

44 This chapter is connected with § 68 of the first volume. Chapter 14

of the second volume of the Parerga should also be compared with it.

45 If, on the contrary, asceticism is admitted, the list of the

ultimate motives of human action, given in my prize essay on the

foundation of morals, namely: (1) our own good, (2) the ill of

others, and (3) the good of others, must be supplemented by a

fourth, our own ill; which I merely mention here in passing in the

interests of systematic consistency. In the essay referred to this

fourth motive had to be passed over in silence, for the question

asked was stated in the spirit of the philosophical ethics

prevailing in Protestant Europe.

46 _Cf._ F. H. H. Windischmann’s _Sancara, sive de theologumenis

Vedanticorum_, pp. 116, 117, 121; and also _Oupnekhat_, vol. i. pp.

340, 356, 360.

47 Cf. _Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik_, p. 274 (second edition, p.

271).

48 If we keep in view the essential immanence of our knowledge and of

all knowledge, which arises from the fact that it is a secondary

thing which has only appeared for the ends of the will, it then

becomes explicable to us that all mystics of all religions

ultimately attain to a kind of ecstasy, in which all and every

knowledge, with its whole fundamental form, object and subject,

entirely ceases, and only in this sphere, which lies beyond all

knowledge, do they claim to have reached their highest goal, for

they have then attained to the sphere in which there is no longer

any subject and object, and consequently no more knowledge, just

because there is no more will, the service of which is the sole

destiny of knowledge.

Now, whoever has comprehended this will no longer regard it as

beyond all measure extravagant that Fakirs should sit down, and,

contemplating the tip of their nose, seek to banish all thought and

perception, and that in many passages of the Upanischads

instructions are given to sink oneself, silently and inwardly

pronouncing the mysterious Oum, in the depths of one’s own being,

where subject and object and all knowledge disappear.

49 _S. Bonaventuræ vita S. Francisci_, ch. 8. K. Hase, “_Franz von

Assisi_,” ch. 10. “_I cantici di S. Francesco,_” _editi da Schlosser

e Steinle., Francoforto, s.M._, 1842.

50 _Michælis de Molinos manuductio spiritualis; hispanice 1675, italice

1680, latine 1687, gallice in libro non adeo raro, cui titulus:

Recueil de diverses pièces concernant le quiétisme, ou Molinos et

ses disciples. Amstd., 1688._

51 Matt. xix. 11 _seq._; Luke xx. (1 Thess. iv. 3; 1 John iii. 3); Rev.

35‐37; 1 Cor. vii. 1‐11 and 25‐40, xiv. 4.

52 Cf. “_Ueber den Willen in der Natur_,” second edition, p. 124; third

edition, p. 135.

53 For example, John xii. 25, 31, xiv. 30, xv. 18, 19, xvi. 33; Col.

ii. 20; Eph. ii. 1‐3; I John ii. 15‐17, iv. 4, 5. On this

opportunity one may see how certain Protestant theologians, in their

efforts to misinterpret the text of the New Testament in conformity

with their rationalistic, optimistic, and unutterably shallow view

of life, go so far that they actually falsify this text in their

translations. Thus H. A. Schott, in his new version given with the

Griesbach text of 1805, has translated the word κοσμος, John xv. 18,

19, by _Judœi_, 1 John iv. 4, by _profani homines_; and Col. ii. 20,

στοιχεια του κοσμον by _elementa Judaica_; while Luther everywhere

renders the word honestly and correctly by “_Welt_” (world).

54 _Unusquisque tantum juris habet, quantum potentiâ valet_ (_Tract.

pol._, c. 2 § 8). _Fides alicui data tamdiu rata manet, quamdiu

ejus, qui fidem dedit, non mutatur voluntas_ (_Ibid._, § 12).

_Uniuscujusque jus potentiâ ejus definetur_ (_Eth._ iv., _pr._ 37,

_schol._ 1.) Especially chap. 16 of the _Tractatus theologico‐

politicus_ is the true compendium of the immorality of Spinoza’s

philosophy.

55 [In preparing this Index Frauenstädt’s _Schopenhauer‐Lexikon_ has

been freely used.—_Trs._]