true, it is difficult to decide. Substantially no doubt it was so, but
in the reports of the Hansa Diets during these years, we come across
frequent complaints of the prevarication practised by the aldermen of
the London factory.
Perhaps we must not blame either the towns, or the factories too much
for yielding to the all-powerful instinct of self-preservation. When the
Hanseatic towns as a whole recognized that they were impotent to
demolish the rising commerce of England, or to break the firm will of
its lady sovereign, they were almost forced to desert a cause which was
a losing one, and to work each for their own separate advantage.
Hamburg was the first among the confederate cities to recognize whither
matters were tending, and to adjust its policy with a due regard to the
new spirit of the age. It concluded a convention on its own account with
England. Matters came about in this wise. The chief foreign trade of
England was gradually passing into the hands of the Merchant
Adventurers. Now to this company the Netherlands were closed, owing to
the conflict raging between Elizabeth and King Philip of Spain. Hence
these merchants had to seek elsewhere the depot which they had found in
the Low Countries for their English merchandise. Owing to its situation
and its excellent harbour the town of Embden, which did not belong to
the Hanseatic League, seemed to unite in itself all requisite
conditions, and it was indeed towards this place that English commerce
was directed. In consequence Embden, within a brief space, grew most
prosperous.
This prosperity, however, speedily proved noxious to the city of
Hamburg, till then one of the great staple towns for the traffic in
English woollens. Seeing its gains passing thus into the hands of
strangers, the city deliberated whether the situation could not be
changed, and whether it would not be wiser, more lucrative, and
altogether better, to open its own gates to the Merchant Adventurers,
conceding to them a factory, various privileges, and great commercial
liberties. Thus it would secure the double profits arising from their
sojourn, and from the commerce that passed through.
In 1567, Hamburg put this project into execution, concluding a formal
treaty with the Merchant Adventurers for the space of ten years. It was
cautious at first not to name a longer term. The experiment was but
tentative, as it assured those of its burghers, who, clinging to the old
Hanseatic ideas, opposed the scheme.
That the project was also opposed by the Hansa Diet will be easily
inferred. Bitter reproaches were addressed to Hamburg by the Diet held
at Luebeck in 1572. They were told that they had been guilty of treason
to the common cause. Their delegates replied with warmth, rejecting this
reproach. They recalled to the memory of their hearers the treaty of
Utrecht which stipulated reciprocity for England, and they endeavoured
to prove that their townsmen had acted, not only in no spirit of narrow
egoism, but in the interests of the entire League, since in consequence
of their treaty with the Merchant Adventurers, the export of undyed
cloths from England had been permitted in larger quantities, and that
the German waters were freed from British pirates. Further they
contended that every town had a right to think also of its own
interests. Embden had received the Merchant Adventurers, and had
extracted profit from them; why then should such profit be grudged to a
town that was a portion of the Hansa?
The delegates were able to point also to the tangible fact, that in the
short space of the first two years, the factory of the Merchant
Adventurers had turned over in Hamburg, the sum of three and a half
million of dollars.
This was all well and good for Hamburg, but beyond question the treaty
still further disturbed the relations of the cities towards each other,
and helped on the pending catastrophe. And the worst of all was that
Elizabeth could not be induced to reconfer the old Hanseatic privileges,
even after her subjects had been received by Hamburg.
Still, for the moment, nothing was changed with regard to the new
position taken up by Hamburg, though the agitation on the subject within
the League itself continued unabated. When the ten years of treaty were
ended, and the Hansa was desirous of renewing the convention, then the
storm broke forth with fresh fury. Appeal was even made by the Hanseatic
League to the Emperor Maximilian II., who decreed solemnly that no town
might treat with England without the consent of its allies.
Still the Queen of England did not at once break off all relations with
the Hanseatic League. She temporized, not being willing to lose for her
subjects the advantages gained at Hamburg which she hoped to see further
extended. The Hansa, on its part, demanded that the queen should
re-confirm its privileges; then it would accord a factory to the
English. The queen replied that she wished first to see the factory
accorded; then it would be time enough to speak of the privileges.
In this wise the negotiations did not progress. Each of the parties was
rolling the stone of Sisyphus, as Elizabeth herself remarked. It was
quite evident that at that moment the queen was resolved not to resort
to extreme measures, and though she threatened, she did not carry out
her threat of putting the Hanseatics on the same footing with other
strangers. The moment had not yet come. It came later, when she could do
without certain of her imports, such as raw materials for ship-building
and for stores of war, among which latter gunpowder took a great place.
Then, too, before the defeat of the Spanish Armada had occurred, England
did not feel her maritime power great enough to venture a _coup de
force_.
Meanwhile, each new meeting of the Hansa Diet put in a stronger light
the radical difference between the policy pursued respectively by the
towns of Luebeck and Hamburg. This difference may be said to form the
tame epilogue to the great tragedy of Wullenweber's failure and death.
The Luebeckers wanted the old privileges, the whole privileges, nothing
but the privileges. What cared they for the changed condition of the
world's affairs? Syndic Sudermann's ideal was the restoration of the
good old customs in the factories, the continuance of every measure that
in the past had made the Hansa great. But Sudermann was no military
hero, who could win back privileges at the point of the sword, or "hold
down foreign nations under his thumb," as the secretary of the Steelyard
expressed himself. He was a learned, well-nourished, well-paid Hanseatic
Syndic, thorough, pedantic, earnest, long-winded. It is on record that
one of his memoranda destined for the Imperial Diet was so long, that a
hundred and fifty dollars had to be paid in the Imperial Chancery for
having it transcribed--an enormous sum in those days of cheap
labour--and that the imperial councillors roundly declared that they
would not read it at all, if it were not shortened. He it was who on all
occasions represented Luebeck as her spokesman, and the ideas he
expressed were those of the city.
Hamburg, on the other hand, could not refrain at times from remarking
that the kingdom of England, like other kingdoms, no longer presented
the same aspect as two or three hundred years ago, and that hence
account must be taken of modifications, and actions be regulated
accordingly. Its delegates cited the case of Antwerp, pointing out that
that town's prosperity dated from the days it had opened its gates to
the English Merchant Adventurers. Till then the houses had been thatched
with straw, and the inhabitants had subsisted on the profits accruing
from agriculture and fishing. And now what commercial activity, what a
busy life was to be seen in the marts of Antwerp, what wealth was found
among all classes of its burghers! To cite one instance alone:
dwellings that fifty years ago were taxed at a rental of forty to sixty
dollars, now cost eight hundred dollars.
But Luebeck would not recede from its old standpoint, and would not
relinquish its old conservative ideas. It seemed to have none of that
elasticity of mind that can adapt itself to changed conditions, and
profit by them. It could but plead repeatedly--how far it was in earnest
it is hard to tell--that the government of the League might be taken
from off its shoulders, for the burden had grown too heavy. As a
substitute it proposed either Cologne or Bremen. It could not find words
to express the sorrow which Hamburg and other cities had caused by
relinquishing the general weal for their own private good. It said it
would itself retire from the League, in which the old sentiments no
longer lived, were it not held to its duty, or what it deemed its duty,
by the force of old memories. It could not realize that its system was
antiquated, its ideas played out. Like some old people, it could neither
give way gracefully, nor assimilate intelligently the new thoughts that
sway the younger and rising generation. Like the old, too, it overlooked
the fact that the young must win, time being in their favour.
In a great Diet held in 1591 the following resolution was actually put
forward, namely, "that each town present should declare whether it
intended to remain Hanseatic." This question was indeed significant. It
should be mentioned that during the sitting of this Diet Syndic
Sudermann died--a man who deserved well of the League, even if his
opinions were sometimes narrow and mistaken, and not up to the level of
the current ideas. Like Wullenweber, he had reaped nothing but
ingratitude in return for his ardent and patriotic labours.
It is remarkable that Cologne was the first of the cities to reply in
the affirmative, that she wished to remain in the League, Cologne ever
so insubordinate and stubborn. Bremen also acquiesced, provided twenty
more cities sided with Cologne. They stated that they decided thus for
the sake of their posterity, since, having once acted, they must go
through with it at all costs.
While all these dissensions were going on in the heart of the League
itself, England continued in its onward path, evincing that feverish
activity of commercial enterprise that has ever distinguished it.
Elizabeth sent ambassadors in all directions, courted and bribed the
German princelings, distributed her gold everywhere, and by means of her
spies neglected no means of making herself feared or beloved, or both.
The League meanwhile had to look on with impotence, for it lacked
resources to do otherwise. Day by day it was losing its influence. It is
true that both the Hanseatic and the Imperial Diet tried to prevent the
English from settling in Germany; but the towns that saw their profit in
receiving them either openly or secretly disobeyed commands which
neither party could enforce. As a sample of the replies given to the
Diet by the Hanseatic cities may be cited the case of Stade, which, when
called to account, answered "That Almighty God had put the English in
their way, and thus sent them some means of subsistence, in order that
the citizens might get a bit of bread, and keep off the pangs of
hunger."
Thus year by year England's influence increased and that of the Hansa
declined. Then occurred a further cruel blow to the League. In
consequence of the strained relations between England and Spain,
Hanseatic trade in that country and in Portugal had risen to some
importance. The Hansa supplied those countries with grain, munitions of
war, and shipbuilding materials. Queen Elizabeth naturally looked on all
this trade with an evil eye, and regarded it as so much support accorded
to her enemies. She did not fail to make the League acquainted with her
displeasure, even threatening to treat its cargoes as contraband of war.
The Hansa in its turn pleaded that it merely exercised the right of
neutrals, and persisted in not abandoning a lucrative trade.
Then came the defeat of the invincible Armada which left to England the
empire of the seas, and gave her a boldness and self-confidence which
she has happily never since lost. Sixty Hanseatic vessels were
encountered by Norris and Sir Francis Drake about to enter the mouth of
the Tagus. They were laden with grain to provision the Spaniards. These
were seized, and no subsequent negotiations ever succeeded in causing
Elizabeth to release her hold either on the vessels or their cargo.
Needless to say, that this proved the last straw in the load of
Hanseatic grievances against the queen.
Meanwhile the King of Spain, to compensate the League, and to win it to
his side, offered to enter into a firm alliance with it. But they would
not break with the Netherlands, now in full revolt against King Philip.
There remained only the last and almost hopeless resort, to appeal once
more to the empire.
On August 1, 1597, after fifteen years of nearly useless solicitation,
and when it was quite too late to remedy matters, the Emperor Rudolph
caused an imperial mandate to be issued at Prague, which enjoined the
English to quit the Empire within the space of three months. This
mandate was couched in proud and fierce terms against the English queen,
and menaced with severe punishment those Germans who, on German soil,
should put themselves into communication with the hated Merchant
Adventurers of England.
Great was the joy of Luebeck and of several other towns at this order,
and they kept strict watch that the imperial mandate should be obeyed.
They hoped from it the most salutary effects in modifying the
resolutions of Elizabeth.
They had reckoned without their host, or rather they had not duly judged
the character of their opponents. Driven from Germany, the English found
a refuge in the Dutch town of Middleburgh, whence they conducted a
lucrative trade with the empire, awaiting some happy chance that would
be sure to arise from the now ever active discord in the League, and
that might reinstate them on the shores of the Elbe and the Rhine.
Elizabeth meanwhile, in 1598, driven to yet further exasperation by a
Hanseatic attempt to hinder the export of grain to England and Holland,
sent word to the merchants residing at the Steelyard that they must
depart out of these premises and quit England within the space of
fourteen days. The Mayor of London, attended by the Sheriffs, formally
presented to the authorities of the Steelyard this decree, which
authorized them to take possession of the building and all that
pertained to it.
Ten days after this compulsory taking of possession the Germans filed
out of the Steelyard in orderly procession. The authorities wrote to the
Hanseatic Diet, stating that, after duly protesting against this
forcible act, they "marched out of the gate, the alderman at the head,
and we following him, sad in our souls, and the gate was closed behind
us; nor should we have cared to have remained another night within the
walls. God be pitiful."
Thus the last sacrifice was consummated, which had been long demanded by
Sir Thomas Gresham and his friends, and which the now flourishing
condition of English trade required. In order that the English merchant
might thrive unchecked, he had to drive away from his midst his old
masters, the Hansa, the men who had taught him how to trade, a lesson
the pupil had learnt too well. Such was the mournful end of the German
Guildhall on the banks of the Thames; an institution older than the
Hanseatic League itself; the most honourable monument which Germany
could point to abroad of her strength and enterprise. Yet it is,
perhaps, rather the fact that it endured so long, than that it perished,
that should surprise us. It is certainly wonderful, and much to the
credit of the English, that musty parchments sealed with the seals of
the Plantagenets, should have been honoured so late, honoured when
England's commerce and navy could boast men such as Sir Thomas Gresham,
Sir Francis Drake, and Sir Walter Raleigh.
Of course the Hanseatic League did not at once give up all for lost.
They intrigued, they negotiated, they even flattered themselves with
hopes of success. Then suddenly the news of Elizabeth's death broke up a
congress held with this end in view. The Hanseatics at once cast glances
full of hope at her successor. They trusted he might prove less
inexorable. Experience had often shown them that with a change of ruler
came a change of policy.
But they proved greatly mistaken. The reply received by the first
embassy they addressed to James I. rudely shattered all their hopes.
They resumed their intrigues at home, trying to stir up the emperor to
hinder the export of wool from Germany, and to encourage the manufacture
of woollen goods at home.
It was the great De Witt who wisely said that the one weak point in the
German Hansa was that it was not backed by manufacturing interests. They
were merely carriers and intermediaries, and this made itself felt in
the days of their decline.
Negotiations, entreaties leading to nothing, and the Germans being
impotent to hinder, the English soon found their way again into the
empire with their persons and their goods, and once more Hamburg was the
first to receive them formally and to conclude a treaty with them. This
time neither the emperor nor the League protested. It is true the
Steelyard in London was ultimately restored to the Germans, but the old
privileges enjoyed with it were gone for ever. Nor was it, when
restored, regarded any longer as the property of the Hanseatic League
such as we have known it--a compact body, willing and able to defend its
rights. It was rather the property of the Germans living in England, and
this it remained. In 1853 the Steelyard property was sold to an English
company for building purposes for the sum of L72,500, by the cities of
Luebeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, the sole heirs of the once powerful
Hanseatic League. The present Cannon Street Station stands on part of
the site.
With the death of Elizabeth the history of the Hanseatic League as such
practically comes to an end in England. Then followed, quickly
afterwards, the Thirty Years' War, which gave the League a mortal blow,
from which it never recovered.
Even before the last stroke fell, John Wheeler, a secretary of the
association of Merchant Adventurers, had declared regarding the
Hanseatic cities (1601), "Most of their teeth have fallen out, the rest
sit but loosely in their head." His judgment was verified all too soon.
VII.
THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR KILLS THE LEAGUE.
John Wheeler's diagnosis of the condition of the League was too correct.
It is true that an ostensibly official document enumerates fifty towns
as forming part of the Hansa League in 1603, but we know that at the
same time only fourteen had a seat and voice in the Diet and duly paid
their fees. Indeed, the more we examine the internal condition of the
League at this period the more we wonder, not that it fell asunder, but
that it endured so long. It had become utterly disorganized and was
decaying fast.
In 1606, the Emperor Rudolph II. evoked a feeling of alarm among all the
towns by suddenly demanding to see their charters, and to know whence
they derived their privileges and statutes. Thus the results of
appealing to imperial aid, in the English complications, bore their
inevitable and unpleasant fruit. The emperor's ulterior aim was of
course to extract money from the cities, this time in aid of his
Hungarian wars. As in the days of their glory, the cities knew how to
protect themselves, and how to escape undesirable inquiries by means of
subterfuges and evasive answers. Still the first attempt at supervision
had been made, and was to bear fruit later.
While matters were in this uncomfortable state, there broke forth the
long, terrible strife known to history as the Thirty Years' War. Its
causes are to be sought for in those most unhappy differences of
doctrinal opinions, which, being rooted in mutual intolerance, a want of
fairness of spirit, and of dramatic insight into the needs of divergent
mental constitutions, make one man wish forcibly to impose his point of
view upon his neighbour, under the conviction that it is the only point
of view, and hence the true one. This intolerant and narrow spirit,
which more fatally divides individuals and nations than any other form
of human folly, had reached its climax in the century of the
Reformation, when not only were Protestant and Catholic opposed to one
another, but Protestants were also divided among themselves, Calvinist
and Lutheran persecuting each other with an acrimony quite out of
proportion to the gravity of the questions at stake.
The details of this most deplorable war fall outside our province, and
belong to the history of Germany proper. We can but touch on it as it
concerns our League. When hostilities commenced, the Hansa were to
realize what even the shadow of a great name implies. Power after power
made overtures to the League to make common cause with them. Gustavus
Adolphus of Sweden, was the first. As early as 1621, he sought an
alliance with the cities, and he counted the more on an affirmative
reply, that his enmity to Denmark was shared by the League. But they
refused his offer, saying they wished to enter into no unequal bond,
assuring the king however, at the same time, that they desired to remain
good friends with him, and to continue their commercial intercourse.
The fact was that, seeing the agitated and disordered condition of
affairs in Germany, the Hanseatic League hardly felt it wise to take any
definite step at this juncture.
Gustavus Adolphus, however, was the more disappointed at their refusal,
since he had been led to expect different treatment from them. Since the
time he had ascended the throne, his relations with the League had been
friendly. An old chronicler tells us how some time before the king's
marriage, the "honourable Hansa towns" sent ambassadors to Sweden to
conclude a treaty with Gustavus Adolphus about the Protestant religion,
and also to treat with him concerning trade privileges. Indeed, the
latter seems to have been their chief aim. But as they wanted to keep it
secret, says the writer, they professed that they had been sent to
congratulate the king upon his marriage. Gustavus Adolphus received them
in solemn audience, standing and with uncovered head; no small honour to
pay to a confederation of trading towns. Beside him stood his mighty
Chancellor, Oxenstjerna. After the king had accorded them a cordial and
formal reception, he gave them the traditional presents, usually only
awarded to nobles. Further, he accorded them free board at the cost of
the city of Stockholm, as often as they did not eat at his royal table.
In order that no mistake might arise regarding quantity, he informed
them that in the matter of meat alone, they could count on six oxen,
twenty-one fat sheep, one reindeer; and as to drink, on four barrels of
good wine, and three hundred and sixty Swedish dollars to cover their
other expenses. "This royal treatment mightily pleased the honourable
delegates," writes our chronicler, and no wonder, when we remember that
the men of the Hansa were famed for the amount they could eat and drink.
No wonder, too, that Gustavus Adolphus thought to find in them ready
allies, if only in return for his good hospitality.
That the King of Denmark, their old foe, should also have courted their
alliance, seems yet stranger. He too, was refused. So was France, who,
in 1625, sent delegates to the Hanseatic Diet to sound the members as to
her chances of success, in forming an offensive and defensive alliance
with these once so powerful merchants.