As the might of the League increased at Bruges they insisted that every

vessel sailing the seas must make an enforced halt at the port of

Bruges, and thus give the traders a first chance of buying their wares

or, in any case, of exacting from them a staple toll. Exception was made

only in the case of ships sailing to England or to the Baltic seaboard.

The possession of this privilege naturally proved a source of great

wealth and power to the League, who grew proud and haughty as they

increased in strength, and even ventured to oppose themselves to the

Flemings, if they considered that these had in any way offended against

"the majesty of the Hanseatic nation in the person of any of its members

or officers." They would then threaten to transport their factory into

some other city, and once actually carried out the threat. They

suspended all trade with Flanders, blocked its ports, and refused to buy

its goods. At the last the murmurs of the artizans thus thrown out of

work, and the general distress among the people, forced the rulers to

crave grace and to beg for the return of these masterful strangers, even

according them new privileges, that is to say, new weapons of

oppression. For the League, on these occasions of proud resentment, took

the most menacing of tones and exacted a heavy satisfaction. Thus once,

because one of its members had been, as it considered, gravely insulted,

and others murdered, it demanded that a chapel should be built and

masses founded to pray for the repose of the souls of those who had

perished; and that a large indemnity should be paid to the relations of

the dead and to the division of the League to which they belonged. And,

further, in order to induce this division to return to Bruges, it was

requisite that one hundred of the chief burghers should come in

procession to the Carmelite convent and ask public pardon from the

Hanseatics, and that sixteen of these should go in pilgrimage to

Santiago de Compastello and four to the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem.

Only after such expiation would the division allow itself to be

re-established.

The dissensions and revolutions which, in the fourteenth century,

convulsed Flanders and caused the sovereignty of the provinces to pass

into the hands of the Dukes of Burgundy, did not, for a long time, touch

the commerce of the Hanseatics. Their trade seemed able to cope with the

subversive influences of tumults, seditions, and civil wars; their

activity was not discouraged; their great credit enabled them to repair

all losses, and even to draw profit from these very disturbing influences

themselves. Each new ruler, guided by the same motives of interest,

awarded the same favour to this association of strangers, who, in coming

to their country, nourished its industries and profitably exchanged

products. Even Charles the Bold--proud and warlike though he was, a

declared foe to all liberty, attacking at that very time the Swiss

people, who were striving to gain their national independence--openly

protected the Hanseatic towns, and interested himself warmly in aiding

them to overcome the English, with whom they had been at strife.

This good understanding, it is true, was impaired under Maximilian of

Austria, his son-in-law and successor. This prince was a stranger to the

Flemings, a German by birth, accustomed to exact blind obedience, the

son of an emperor and his heir. On all these accounts he was distasteful

to the Flemings, who rose up in revolt against him, and imprisoned him

in the Castle of Bruges. It was on this occasion that there happened an

event made famous in legend. Maximilian's Court jester, who loved his

master, had formed a plan for his liberation. Horses, rope ladders--all

were in readiness. The jester himself sprang into the canal that

separated the castle from the mainland, in order to swim across and aid

his sovereign. But it happened that his night raid alarmed the swans

which were kept by the town on this canal. They raised a great noise,

flapped their wings in anger, and threatened to kill the poor fellow,

who was obliged to beat a hasty retreat, while his scheme, thus

discovered, was rendered futile. For four months Maximilian was kept in

confinement. No sooner was he liberated and master of the empire than he

took his revenge. This audacity was punished severely, and ended in a

loss to Flanders of its opulence and a great part of its industry. Above

all, the town of Bruges had to submit to hard treatment, and ceased from

that time forwards to be the most flourishing and important market of

Europe.

The wily Hanseatics had, meanwhile, acted like the proverbial rats that

abandon the sinking ship. Seeing the course that things were taking,

they sought to establish themselves elsewhere, and Antwerp, long jealous

of Bruges, obtained the reversion of its rival's trade: the fruits of

which it enjoyed until the murderous hordes of Philip II., in their

turn, crushed Antwerp as Maximilian had crushed Bruges.

[Illustration: THE PIED PIPER'S HOUSE, HAMELIN.]

No doubt, by means of the Flemish market, the League also treated with

France, but our knowledge concerning this trade is very scanty. It seems

certain that they had no regular factory in that country, though for a

short time they held a depot at Bordeaux. Probably their trade with

France was chiefly indirect and by means of Flanders. The fact that for

so long the greater part of the French seaboard was in the hands of the

English may have had something to do with this matter. We know,

however, that successive French kings accorded to them various

privileges. Louis XI., on one occasion, speaks of them as a "Power," and

proposed to make an alliance with them against England. Charles VIII.

yet further enlarged the concessions granted by his father. It is even

recorded that in case any difficulties arose because of obscurities of

phrase in a contract made between the League and Frenchmen, these should

always be interpreted to the advantage of the Hanseatics. They were

further promised impartial justice, reduced custom dues, and a civil

standing equal in all respects to that of the natives. The kingdom was

open to them for trading purposes, and in case of a war breaking out

between France and a foreign nation, the Hanseatics were allowed to

continue their commercial connection with that nation without being

regarded as violating the peace and friendship promised. France, on the

other hand, reserved to itself the same privileges. But why France was

willing to concede so much to these strangers does not appear. The

commerce can in no case have been considerable. The manufactures of

France in those days were few and limited. Their small navy did not

require much wood, iron, or hemp. It is true they had their wines and

their salt, and that in exchange they bought herrings and smoked fish,

but there was no such lively and profitable intercourse as we encounter

elsewhere. The land was still too poor, too distracted with wars and

dissensions to be able to utilize its native riches. Besides this, her

own direct commerce with the Mediterranean and Latin East, and the

Crusaders and Italian traders, rendered her more independent of Hansa

help.

Very scanty are the records that have come down to us concerning the

trade of the League with Spain. This nation, incessantly occupied in

wars with the Moors and in chivalrous exploits, neglected and disdained

trade. They even went so far at times as to interdict it also to others.

But all that has come down to us concerning the intercourse of the

Hanseatics with this country is so vague, and borders so much on the

fabulous, that it cannot be accepted as history. What does seem certain

is that in 1383 King John of Castile forbade the Hanseatics to have any

intercourse with his kingdom, that he confiscated eighty-four of their

vessels, and that in 1441 the factory of Bruges received orders to

practise reprisals upon the Spaniards and to close to them all the ports

of the Netherlands. All details, however, are lacking. We only know,

again, for certain that in 1472 the Spaniards raised the interdict

against the League. No doubt they had suffered pecuniarily from the

absence of these active traders. In 1551 Philip II. even went so far as

to sign a treaty of commerce with the League, in which this prince

favoured them as much as his predecessors tried to harm them. And this

treaty, strange to say, was not quite a nullity even at the beginning of

our own century. On the strength of certain clauses contained in it were

founded various privileges enjoyed up to that date, in their commercial

intercourse with Spain, by the cities that were then all that remained

of the once mighty League--namely, Luebeck, Hamburg, and Bremen.

In Portugal the League was more fortunate than in Spain, and early

established a factory at Lisbon. From this port they traded with the

Mediterranean, and came in contact with the flourishing Italian

commercial republics, as well as with the products of the Levant and

India, for which Italy was the sole market. But the Italian trade was

chiefly in the hands of the South German cities, such as Augsburg, Ulm,

and Nueremberg, and the wares were transported by land. These cities

formed a counter league among themselves, which, though in a measure

affiliated to the Hansa, was never quite an integral part. Their sole

object was the Levant and Italian trade. Already in the thirteenth

century they had a depot at Venice, the far-famed Fontego de' Tedeschi,

which visitors to Venice behold to this day as one of the most lovely

palaces abutting on the Grand Canal. This factory, however, was very

differently constituted from that of other cities. The League never

obtained a monopoly or special privileges in Italy. The Fontego at

Venice was merely the warehouse or dwelling-house of the German traders,

without any internal jurisdiction or president.

[Illustration: FONTEGO DEI TEDESCHI, VENICE.]

They were permitted to sojourn with their wares at stated times in

Venice, received on their arrival the keys of the fifty-six rooms of the

building, which on their departure they had to re-deliver to the

Venetian authorities. In course of time the Germans, gaining refinement

and acquiring a love of art from their Italian intercourse, spent large

sums in decorating and adorning this palace, which, however, never

passed into their real possession. Three Venetian citizens, under the

title of Visdomini de' Tedeschi, and native secretaries, and a

"fontegaro," always inhabited the building and kept strict watch over

the traders, whose commerce was subjected to all manner of tedious

restrictions. The house, as we have said, was only open to them at

stated times of the year. They were only permitted to sell to and buy

from Venetians; all wares exported or imported had to be weighed in the

public balances, and only this weight was accepted as just. The Italian

secretaries, one of whom always slept in the Fontego, kept strict

account of all goods that came to hand or were sent away, and the

control over these wares was in the power of the Visdomini. Nothing

might be unladen in the warehouse without permission from one of these

local officials. But in spite of all these restrictions, which the

Germans would not have tolerated for a moment at Bergen or Bruges, their

depot at Venice was a favourite sojourn, and remained the centre of a

pleasant, easy, and refined intercourse between Germany and Italy until

the time of the Reformation. The influence of the Rialto made itself

felt in Prague, Dresden, Frankfort, and the other South German cities,

and has placed its imprint upon their literature and art. From Italy

these cities brought the models to adorn their streets, markets,

guildhalls, and churches. From Italy they brought the tales and fables

that delighted listeners long before the days of printing, and awoke the

native mediaeval poetic art, so that the stories of Boccaccio became as

familiar to the Germans as to the Italians themselves. In spite of all

the restrictions they placed on their freedom, the foreigners were not

unwelcome to the proud Venetian signoria. They even spoke of the German

nation as their "cuorisino" (little heart), and in their sore need,

during the time of the League of Cambray, formed by the Pope, the

Emperor and the kings of France and Spain against the Republic of Venice

(1508), they called upon their German friends for sympathy, and did not

call in vain. The bond of a common interest, that of trade, bound

together the proud rich city of the Lagoons and the less powerful, less

wealthy, but by no means poor or insignificant, cities of Southern

Germany.

[Decoration Tail-Piece]

VII.

THE STEELYARD IN LONDON.

Nowhere was the Hanseatic power so great as in England. Of none of its

connections do we possess more ample records. As already stated, England

was one of the first depots of the "common German merchant," long before

these combined under the generic name of Hanseatic. From early days the

English kings had protected these rich foreigners, who helped them out

of many a pecuniary difficulty. Indeed they accorded them such

privileges and monopolies as could not fail to rouse the jealousy of

their own people. We therefore find in the history of the Steelyard in

London a mingled record of all passions and interests, hate and favours,

honour and national prosperity, envy and violence, greed and poverty,

pride and fear, in a word, a most motley record of which it is not easy

to frame the contradictory elements into one harmonious picture.

During the long reign of Henry II., and under his sons, Richard Coeur

de Lion and John, there was an active intercourse between Germany and

England, encouraged by the marriage of Matilda, daughter of Henry II.

with Duke Henry the Lion.

[Illustration: THE STEELYARD, LONDON. (_From an old Print._)]

The rich merchants of Cologne were the earliest to obtain special

favours. These were accorded by Richard Coeur de Lion, who, halting in

that city to attend high mass in the cathedral after his release from

Austrian imprisonment, received there such ample supplies towards the

heavy ransom money required for his person, that, to show his gratitude,

he gave to his "beloved burghers of Cologne" a letter of freedom, in

which he released them from their annual rent of two shillings for their

guildhall in London, and from all other taxes due to the king upon their

persons or their merchandise. It was long ere King John, his successor,

could make up his mind to renew these privileges, but his own

difficulties with his turbulent barons, and the pressure which the

merchants could bring to bear by their riches, at last overcame his

hesitation. Edward I. and his followers further extended these

prerogatives, for the Plantagenets found the Hanseatic Rothschilds even

more useful in aiding their war schemes than the skilful alchymists whom

they had summoned to their Court, and who knew how to shape the Rose

noble (the money of the period) out of artificial gold. Then, too, the

Hanseatics were considerate creditors, who did not press unduly, and

even overlooked a debt if some favour were extended in default of

payment.

Edward the Third's crown and most costly jewels were long retained at

Cologne in pawn for a heavy sum of money. The details concerning this

transaction are preserved to this day in a correspondence deposited in

the State Paper Office of London. It seems that when the time for

redemption came the king had not the money. He was in special straits

just then, for the celebrated commercial firm of the Bardi, at Florence,

which constituted the very focus of the Italian money business, had

failed, and the King of England appeared in their books as a debtor for

the sum of one million golden gulden. The merchants of the Steelyard

were not slow adroitly to turn the royal perplexity to their profit.

They undertook to redeem the pawned jewels and offered the king loans of

more money, although he already owed them much. Edward was in sore need,

for the wars with France strained his resources to the utmost. He drew

upon them for thirty thousand pounds, a sum worth fifteen times more

then than to-day. Thus it came about that the great victories of the

Black Prince at Crecy and Poitiers were gained in no small degree by the

help of German capital. Needless to add that the Hanseatic merchants

showed no diffidence in accepting for their factory important privileges

in return for these services.

[Illustration: BARDI PALACE, FLORENCE.]

It was to a German merchant prince that the king let the tin mines

belonging to the Black Prince in the Duchy of Cornwall. To the same firm

he ceded a large number of farms situated in different shires for the

space of a thousand years.

The Easterlings are spoken of in records as the allies of the English

kings, and there seemed at last no limit to the royal favours.

That the people did not look upon them with the same friendly eye is

easy to understand. The English, full of a just sentiment of what they

could do by themselves, and of what they were hindered from doing by

these foreign monopolists, bore their presence with extreme impatience.

Feuds and riots were not infrequent, and no royal favours, no Hanseatic

ships of war could save them from occasional brutal attacks at the hands

of the mob. Thus during the Wat Tyler rebellion the people pursued the

hated foreigners even into the sanctuary of the church, murdering

mercilessly all those who could not pronounce the words "bread and

cheese" with the pure English accent. But these rebellions were quelled

by the royal commands, or extinguished themselves by the fact that the

Hanseatics were also useful to the English people, oppressed by the

feudal system and engaged in constant wars, whose trade industries were

thus unable to develop quickly. Nor did such passing storms shake the

power or the resistance of the Hanseatics. Bloody encounters, rude

tumults were entirely in keeping with the license and roughness of those

earlier ages, and were met by the League, more or less, in all their

foreign stations.

With their usual astuteness they utilized wisely all periods of calm,

and reckoned with the love of gain to help them in less peaceful

moments. When the English made things uncomfortable for them at home,

they revenged themselves upon them at Bruges or at Bergen, paralysing

their commerce, and harassing their vessels, even forbidding them to

enter the ports of Norway, Iceland, and Greenland. For verily in those

days whosoever tried to outwit the Hansa was likely to prove the victim

of his own plots. Circumstances aided the Germans, enabling them to make

their power felt just when England had to betray weakness. The feeble

and stormy period of Henry VI., often deposed and made prisoner, the

Wars of the Roses, the long and continual hostilities waged with France,

all favoured the League, and made the English submit to its demands

rather than attract to themselves yet more enemies.

In no place, not even in Bergen, did the Hanseatics succeed in enjoying

greater independence. Their factory was privileged, and while benefiting

by English law, they were quite independent of it. Everything,

therefore, was favourable to their commerce, and they were hampered by

no such restrictions as weighed, not only upon other foreigners, but

upon the English themselves. To give a just idea of the degree of power

to which their privileges and trade had raised the League, let us cite

one example. It will serve in lieu of many, and it places in full light

the almost incredible ascendency which a company of merchant cities,

isolated and distant from each other, had gained over a great kingdom

and a proud and valiant nation.

The English Government having been unable or unwilling to repress the

frequent acts of piracy which its subjects practised against members of

the League, these also took to piracy, and mutual recriminations ensued.

The Luebeckers in particular revenged themselves fiercely. They also

wrote a letter of complaint to the English king, "a letter full of pride

and audacity," says Henry IV. It then happened that the Danes, at strife

with the English for other causes, joined themselves to the Hanseatics,

and united they harassed the English by sea and by land. These, in their

turn, took possession of the Hanseatic depot in London, and put in

prison or killed all who lodged there. The League hearing this broke off

commercial connection with England, closed their ports and the entrances

of the Baltic, and seized English vessels on all seas and on all coasts.

The Hanseatics even landed in England itself, and pitilessly ravaged

many of the maritime provinces, hanging on the masts of their ships all

the men they took prisoners. This war at last grew so ruinous for the

English that they applied to the Duke of Burgundy, Charles the Bold, to

mediate between them and their foes. A congress was assembled at Utrecht

to put an end to this dire quarrel and to assure peace upon a solid

basis. The mediator and his counsellors thought it but just to accord to

the English a part of what they had desired so long, namely, liberty to

trade in the Baltic and with the Hanseatic ports of Dantzig and Russia.

This concession greatly favoured the commerce which their merchants were

ambitious to carry on, or already carried on, notwithstanding all

obstacles. But for their part the Hanseatics insisted on recovering all

the privileges they had lost, and on recovering them with usury. In

fact, by this treaty of Utrecht Edward IV. not only reconfirmed all

their ancient monopolies, but accorded to them new and important

favours, proving to what extent the English were still in the power of

these foreigners. Such was the effect of the fear which the League

inspired in the English; such, too, was the ignorance of their

Government, which, being in possession of a power not less great and,

had they desired, even greater than that of their rivals, allowed

strangers to deprive them of the most useful of all independent rights,

that of utilizing for their own profit the resources of their own labour

and their own soil.

In reading this chapter of the annals of England, it is hard to believe

that we are dealing with the nation whose ships now scour all the seas,

whose tonnage exceeds that of all other countries combined, which is the

greatest trader of the earth, and which trades not only freely, but also

in that spirit of domination with which its ancestors reproached the

Hanseatics, and which they endured with so much impatience.

This treaty of Utrecht served for a long while as basis for all

subsequent treaties between the Hanseatics and the English, and well or

ill observed, it survived until the reign of Edward VI.

The position held by the Hanseatics in England certainly has no

counterpart in the international intercourse of the Middle Ages. The

only exception, perhaps, is the position of Genoa, Venice, and Pisa in

the Byzantine and Latin empires.

[Illustration: STEELYARD WHARF, LONDON.]

The chief depot of the Hanseatics in England was in London, and was

known first as the Guildhall of the Germans, then as the Easterlings'

Hall, and finally, as its dimensions grew, as the Steelyard. It was

situated in Thames Street, on the left bank of the river, close to

Dowgate, just above London Bridge, in earlier times the only city gate

that commanded the water. The whole length of this street leading to the

post gate was lined with the wharves, warehouses, and dwelling-houses of

the Germans. It is therefore easy to comprehend how they held, by their

position alone, the key to the whole commerce of the City of London in

days when goods were almost entirely transported by water-ways. As at

Bergen, so here, they dominated the whole commercial situation.

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