The northern part of Missouri was made unbearably hot for bridge-burners

and other depredators by the swift execution of a number of "peaceful

citizens" caught red-handed, and the probability that others would be

caught and served in the same way. Gen. John Pope, commanding in Central

Missouri, began at last to show the stuff that was in him, and by a

skillful movement got into the rear of Bains and Steen, compelling them

to hurriedly abandon the line of the Missouri River, and striking them

so sharply in their flight as to capture 300 prisoners, 70 wagons,

with loads of supplies for Price's army, and much other valuable booty.

Another of Pope's columns, under Col. Jeff C. Davis, surprised a camp

at Mil-ford, Dec. 18, and forced its unconditional surrender, capturing

three Colonels (one of whom was a brother of Gov. Magoffin, of

Kentucky), 17 Captains, and over 1,000 prisoners, 1,000 stands of arms,

1,000 horses and mules, and a great amount of supplies, tents, baggage,

and ammunition. In a couple of weeks Gen. Pope, with a loss of about 100

men, captured 2,500 prisoners.

Jan. 2 Gen. Fred Steele, commanding at Sedalia, and a level-minded man,

who kept himself well informed, telegraphed to Gen. Halleck:

Price's whole force not over 16,000. In all 63 pieces of artillery, none

rifled. Horses very poor. Price says he is going to Jefferson City

as soon as they are organized. At present he has no discipline; no

sentinels or picket to prevent passing in and out. Rains drinking all

the time. Price also drinking too much.

Clearly Price had in him none of the startling aggressiveness which

distinguished Lyon and Stonewall Jackson. He made no effort to suddenly

collect his forces and inflict an overwhelming blow upon one after

another of the columns converging upon him and defeat them in detail.

Instead, he lost heart, and, abandoning the strong lines of the Osage

and the Pomme de Terre, fell back to Springfield, where comfortable

quarters were built for his men, and he gathered in an abundance of

supplies from the Union farmers of the surrounding country, expecting

that he would be left undisturbed until Spring.

292

Thus the year 1861 ended with some 61 battles and considerable

skirmishes having been fought on the soil of Missouri, with a loss

to the Union side of between 500 and 600 killed, treble that number

wounded, and about 3,600 prisoners.

The Confederate loss was probably in excess in most of the engagements.

Besides, they had lost fully four-fifths of the State, and were in

imminent danger of being driven from the restricted foothold they still

retained in the southwestern corner.

The Union State Government, with the conservative, able Hamilton R.

Gamble at the head, was running with tolerable smoothness. Courts were

sitting in most of the Counties to administer justice. Under Halleck's

orders Judges, Sheriffs, Clerks, jurors, parties and witnesses had to

take the oath of allegiance. Gen. Schofield was rapidly organizing his

13,000 Missouri Militia to maintain peace in the State, and incidentally

to keep many of the men enrolled out of the rebel army.

293

CHAPTER XVII. PRICE DRIVEN OUT OF THE STATE.

When he abandoned the strong line of the Osage and took up his position

at Springfield, Gen. Sterling Price, like the Russians against Napoleon,

relied upon his powerful allies, Gens. January, February and March. At

that time the roads in Missouri were merely rough trails, running over

hills and deep-soiled valleys of fertile loam, cut every few miles by

rapid streams. The storms of Winter quickly converted the hills into

icy precipices, the valleys into quagmires, and the streams into raging

torrents. The Winters were never severe enough to give steady cold

weather, and allow operations over a firmly-frozen footing. Rain, sleet

and snow, hard frosts and warm thaws alternated with each other so

frequently as to keep the roads in a condition of what the country

people call a "breakup," when travel is very difficult for the

individual and next to impossible for an army.

When, therefore, at the last of December, Gen. Price returned to

Springfield, in the heart of the rich farming district of southwest

Missouri, and 125 miles or more distant from the Union bases--Rolla and

Sedalia, at the ends of the railroads, he had much reason for believing

he would be left undisturbed for at least two months, which rest he

very much needed to prepare for the strenuous campaign that he knew the

industrious Halleck was organizing against him. He wanted the rest for

many reasons. Yielding to the strong pressure of Missourians, Jefferson

Davis had agreed to appoint Price a Major-General, C. S. A., but upon

the condition that he bring in the Confederate service a full division

of Missouri troops.

294

With his towering influence in Misssouri this would not have been a

difficult thing to do with the whole State to draw from. It was quite

otherwise with three-fourths of Missouri held by the Union troops and

Halleck's well-laid nets everywhere to catch parties of recruits trying

to make their way to Price.

Still, Price was justified in his confidence that the Union troops

would be satisfied with holding northern and central Missouri during

the Winter, and would not venture far from their base of supplies on the

Missouri River and the termini of the railroads at Rolla and Sedalia.

Whatever aggressive disposition they might have which the condition

of the roads would not dampen would be quelled by the knowledge that

McCulloch's army of Texans, Louisianians, Arkansans and Indians lay at

Cross Hollow, within easy supporting distance of him.

Therefore, Price settled down at Springfield, and his men built

comfortable cabins in which to pass the time until Spring. The Union

farmers in the country roundabout were stripped of their grain and

cattle for supplies, and Price proceeded with the organization of his

Confederate division.

Jefferson Davis's feelings toward Price and Missouri are in a measure

revealed in the following querulous letter, which also indicates Mr.

Davis's tendencies to pose as a much-enduring, martyr-like man:

295

Hon. W. P. Harris, Confederate States Congress.

My Dear Sir: Language was said by Talleyrand to be useful

for the concealment of one's thoughts; but in our day it

falls to communicate any thought. If it had been otherwise,

the complaint in relation to Gen. Price of which you speak

could not have been made. The Commissioners of Missouri were

informed that when that State offered troops they would be

organized according to our military laws, and Generals would

be appointed for brigades and divisions. Until then I have

no power to appoint Generals for those troops. The same

statements, substantially, were made to the members of

Congress from Missouri who called on me yesterday. They were

also informed that, from conversation with Informed persons

and from correspondence now on file in the War Department, I

was convinced that it was needful to the public interest

that a General should be sent to the Arkansas and Missouri

Division who had not been connected with any of the troops

on that line of operations; and to the statement that the

Missouri troops would not fully enlist under any one except

Gen. Price, I asked if they required their General to be put

in command of the troops of Arkansas, of Texas, and of the

other Southern States. To bring these different forces into

harmonious co-operation is a necessity. I have sought to

effect it by selecting Gen. Heth to command them in

combination. If it is designed, by calling Heth a West Point

Cadet, merely to object to his education in the science of

war, it may pass for what it is worth; but if it be Intended

to assert that he is without experience, his years of active

and distinguished service on the frontier of Missouri and

the territory west of it will, to those who examine before

they censure, be a sufficient answer. The Federal forces are

not hereafter as heretofore to be commanded by pathfinders

and holiday soldiers, but by men of military education and

experience in war. The contest is therefore to be on a scale

of very different proportions than that of the partisan

warfare witnessed during the past Summer and Fall. I have

long since learned to bear hasty censure, in hope that

justice, if tardy, is sure; and in any event to find

consolation in the assurance that all my ends have been my

country's.

With high respect,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

296

Gen. Ben McCulloch thought best to go on to Richmond to explain his

course since Wilson's Creek, and also to look after the very tender

subject of his rank and powers. He left Gen. James S. Mcintosh in

command of his troops. Mcintosh had grievances of his own. He was not

being recognized by the Confederate authorities as he thought a man of

his abilities and soldierly experience should have been, and he seems to

have liked cooperation with Gen. Price very much less even than did Gen.

McCulloch. In no very gentlemanly terms he repelled Price's proposition

to combine their forces and push forward to the Missouri River. The best

that Price could get out of him was the assurance that if the Federals

advanced upon him at Springfield he, Mcintosh, would come forward to his

assistance.

Price had greatly underestimated Gen. Halleck's energy and

aggressiveness. Gen. Halleck was the first of our commanders to really

rise to the level of the occasion and take a comprehensive grasp upon

affairs. Unlike some others, he wasted no time in sounding proclamations

or in lengthy letters of advice to the Administration as to the

political conduct of the war. He was a soldier, proud of his profession,

true to his traditions, and possibly had ambition to be reckoned among

the great commanders. He had been noted for high administrative ability,

and this trait was well illustrated in his grasp of the situation in

Missouri and on the borders of the State. His main communications to the

people were orders, plain, practical, and to the point. Whatever he did

was on the highest plane of the science of warfare as he understood it.

Proper military discipline and subordination were introduced everywhere

and a rigid system of accountability. He had troubles with his own men

to add to his difficulties with the enemy. We find the most note of this

with reference to the Germans.

297

The Missouri Germans were a splendid lot of men, taken as a whole,

and had an unusual number of officers who were trained soldiers of

considerable military experience. At the head of this class was Gen.

Peter J. Osterhaus, who had been a private soldier under Lyon in

securing the Arsenal, and had commanded a battalion with high credit to

himself at Wilson's Creek. He was now a Colonel commanding a brigade.

With this excellent material there was a large per cent that ranged

from worthless to actually criminal. Many adventurers from the European

armies had hastened to this country to sell their swords to the best

advantage, and many black sheep, who had been forced out of their

armies, sought in our troubles and our ignorance of military matters an

opportunity for their own exaltation and profit. Halleck dealt with all

with a firm, unsparing hand. He began to weed out the worthless officers

and to court-martial the rascals. Company, battalion and regimental

organizations which he found too mutinous and disorderly for hopeful

management, he either disarmed and set to hard labor or discharged from

the service.

The raids of the vengeful Kansans across the Missouri borders gave

him excessive annoyance, and he issued orders that all Kansas parties

entering the State should be arrested and disarmed. That he might

have more complete control of them, however, he recommended that the

Department of Kansas be merged with his command, and as this was in

had mony with Gen. Hunter's ideas, it was subsequently done. In the

meanwhile he had to look out for the Mississippi River and the highly

important point of, Cairo. He started to construct a fleet of gunboats

to help control the river and assist the Army in its operations.

298

His next neighbor to the eastward was Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell,

commanding the Department of the Ohio, which extended from the

Cumberland River to the Allegheny Mountains. Gen. Buell's complete

cooperation was necessary to the management of affairs in the

Mississippi Valley, but this seems to have been difficult to secure.

Buell had his own ideas, and they frequently did not harmonize with

those of Gen. Halleck. Halleck recommended that Buell's Department be

put under his own command, which was also done later.

Bridge-burning and other outrages by straggling bands claiming to be

Confederates seriously disturbed the peace, embarrassed operations, and

worried the Commanding General. Halleck reported that within 10 days

prior to Jan. 1, 1862, these bridge-burners had destroyed $150,000

worth of railroad property and that they had concocted a plan to burn,

simultaneously, every railroad bridge in the State, and set fire to

the city of St. Louis in a number of places. In his comprehensive order

advising summary and severe punishment against these marauders he took

careful guards against such being made the pretext for any private

vengeance or official malice, and instituted Military Commissions of not

less than three responsible officers, acting under the solemnity of

an oath, and making written reports of their proceedings. This

order brought down a storm of abuse from the Secessionist and

semi-Secessionist press, which Halleck calmly disregarded.

Gen. Sterling Price on Jan. 12 wrote Gen. Halleck a strong letter

protesting against the order and asking the question whether

"individuals and parties of men specially appointed and instructed by me

to destroy railroads, culverts, bridges, etc." were, if captured, to be

regarded as deserving of death.

299

Gen. Halleck in reply said:

You also complain that "individuals and parties of men

specially appointed and instructed by you to destroy

railroads, culverts and bridges by tearing them up, burning,

etc., have been arrested and subjected to a general court-

martial for alleged crimes." This statement is in the main

correct. Where "individuals and parties of men" violate the

laws of war they will be tried, and if found guilty will

certainly be punished, whether acting by your "special

appointment and instruction" or not. You must be aware,

General, that no orders of yours can save from punishment

spies, marauders, robbers, incendiaries, guerrilla bands,

etc., who violate the laws of war. You cannot give immunity

to crime. But let us fully understand each other on this

point. If you send armed forces wearing the garb of soldiers

and duly organized and enrolled as legitimate belligerents

to destroy railroads, bridges, etc., as a military act, we

shall kill them, if possible, in open warfare, or, if we

capture them, we shall treat them as prisoners of war.

But it is well understood that you have sent numbers of your

adherents in the garb of peaceful citizens, and under false

pretenses, through our lines into northern Missouri, to rob

and destroy the property of Union men and to burn and

destroy railroad bridges, thus endangering the lives of

thousands, and this, too, without any military necessity or

possible military advantage. Moreover, peaceful citizens of

Missouri, quietly working on their farms, have been

instigated by your emissaries to take up arms as insurgents,

to rob and plunder and to commit arson and murder. They do

not even act under the garb of soldiers, but in false

pretenses and in the guise of peaceful citizens. You

certainly will not pretend that men guilty of such crimes,

although "specially appointed and instructed by you," are

entitled to the rights and immunities of ordinary prisoners

of war. If you do, will you refer me to a single authority

on the laws of war which recognizes such a claim?

You may rest assured, General, that all prisoners of war not

guilty of crime will be treated with all proper

consideration and kindness. With the exception of being

properly confined, they will be lodged and fed, and where

necessary clothed, the same as our own troops. I am sorry to

say that our prisoners who have come from your camps do not

report such treatment on your part. They say that you gave

them no rations, no clothing, no blankets, but left them to

perish with want and cold. Moreover, It is believed that you

subsist your troops by robbing and plundering the non-

combatant Union inhabitants of the southwestern Counties of

this State. Thousands of poor families have fled to us for

protection and support They say that your troops robbed them

of their provisions and clothing, carrying away their shoes

and bedding, and even cutting cloth from their looms, and

that you have driven women and children from their homes to

starve and perish in the cold. I have not retaliated such

conduct upon your adherents here, as I have no intention of

waging such a barbarous warfare; but I shall, whenever I

can, punish such crimes, by whomsoever they may be

committed.

300

An examination of the correspondence leads to the conclusion that

Halleck possessed very superior talents as a letter writer.

Contrasted with Fremont, McClellan, Buell and others, Halleck gave great

satisfaction in Washington, and Secretary Stanton telegraphed him as

follows:

Your energy and ability receive the strongest commendation of this

Department You have my perfect confidence, and may rely upon the utmost

support in your undertakings. The pressure of my engagements have

prevented me from writing, but I shall do so fully in a day or two.

Though he made the most of every resource, Halleck was sorely pressed

for money and supplies for his force. His letters and messages mention

the shipment of pantaloons to this one, shoes to another, blankets to a

third, as he could get hold of articles to supply present wants, and of

counsels of patience as to delays in paying off, since the Paymasters

were far behind in their work. Jan. 17 he telegraphed to Gen. Curtis:

General: Yours of yesterday received. I regret to inform you that

neither the Pay nor Quartermaster's Departments have any money. Troops

are sent from here to Cairo without pay. I can do no better for you.

The moment money is received the forces under your command shall be

supplied. They were all paid to the 31st of October. Some here and

in north Missouri are not paid for September and October. I have done

everything in my power for the troops at Rolla, and they have no cause

to complain of me.

The truth is that Congress is so busy discussing the eternal nigger

question that they fail to make any appropriations, and the financial

departments are dead broke. No requisitions for money are filled.

The extra-duty pay will be forthcoming as soon as we get any money.

Assure these men that they will be paid, but they must have patience. I

am doing everything in my power for them.

We must all do the best we can to make the men comfortable and contented

till we get more means. I rely upon you to use all your powers of

conciliation, especially with the German troops. You told me you could

manage them, and I rely upon you to do it At present we have more

difficulties to conquer with our own men than with the enemy.

301

While engaged in these numberless activities Gen. Halleck came down with

a severe attack of measles, and was confined to his room for two weeks,

but there does not appear to have been any intermittence in his energy.

Gen. Halleck's plans contemplated sending forward a column sufficient to

crush Price, if he could be brought to battle, and drive him out of

the State anyway. Another column was to advance from Ironton or

Fredericktown and interpose between Polk at Columbus and Price, to

prevent the former from assisting the latter. In the meanwhile Gen. Polk

would have sufficient to occupy his attention in his "Gibraltar," as

Gen. Grant would make a flank movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland

Rivers. Halleck had come to the conclusion that Columbus would cost too

much in life and blood to be taken by a direct assault, and it would be

better therefore to turn it.

This plan was an excellent one, as Halleck's plans usually were, at that

time, and it was subsequently carried out substantially as conceived.

There were the most conflicting reports as to the number of men Price

had with him at Springfield at that time, but it was supposed all the

way from 25,-000 to 50,000, with rather the stronger emphasis on the

greater number. The Secessionists insisted upon the immensity of the

army which had flocked to Price encouraged by the events untoward to the

Union cause of the last half of 1861 and the indignation aroused by the

invasion and depredations of the Kansas Jayhawkers and the "St. Louis

Dutch."

302

It was reasonable to suppose, from the state of feeling in Missouri,

that Price might have from 40,000 to 50,000 men, but Halleck, who was

unusually well-informed for our Generals at that period of the war,

decided that a column of about 10,000 men would be sufficient for the

work. In this he was at a disagreement with Gen. Curtis and others

in nearer contact with Price, who estimated the Secessionist force at

Springfield in the neighborhood of 20,000 or 25,000. Yielding to their

urgent representations, he increased his force to about 15,000, of which

3,000 were required to guard the lengthening line of communications,

leaving a movable column of 12,000 to move directly against Price. This

force was officially designated the "Army of the Southwest," and there

was assigned to its command our old acquaintance, Brig.-Gen. Samuel R.

Curtis, West Point graduate, lawyer, Mexican veteran, railroad engineer,

and Congressman. This made more or less heart-burning among Brig.-Gens.

Franz Sigel, B. M. Prentiss, S. A. Hurlbut, S. D. Sturgis and others

who had hopes in that direction. Sigel stood no chance for the place,

however, for Halleck had conceived a strong distrust of him growing out

of his action at Wilson's Creek, and also because he was a leader among

the radical Germans who wanted to pull slavery up by the roots. Sturgis

felt that more consideration should have been given to him as commander

of the army at Wilson's Creek after Lyon fell. Curtis, in turn, gave

strong dissatisfaction to some of the brigade commanders by selecting

Jeff C. Davis, a Captain in the Regular Army and Colonel of the 22d

Ind., and Eugene A. Carr, also a Captain in the Regular Army and Colonel

of the 3d Ill. Cav., to command two of his four divisions.

303

In its forward movement the commanders had the benefit of the burning

zeal of the young volunteers. These, who had enlisted to put down the

rebellion, wanted to lose no time in doing their work. They were not

minded to lie around camps, no matter how comfortable, during the long

Winter months. In the Northern homes from which they came the Winter had

always been a season of great activity. They could not understand why it

should not be so in Missouri and they hungered for active employment to

the great end of suppressing the rebellion. Their recent successes had

inspired them with hopes that they might be able to finish up the work

and get back home in time for their Spring duties.

Though the Winter of 1861-'62 was an exceptionally hard, disagreeable

one in Missouri, the volunteers left their camps with alacrity, pressing

forward through the storms and mud with sanguine hopefulness that they

were now about to accomplish their great purpose. Gen. Curtis selected

his first base at Lebanon, 55 miles distant from Springfield, and sent

forward Col. Carr with about 1,700 infantry and cavalry to occupy that

point, gain information as to the condition of things in Price's camp,

and to set on foot preparation for supplying the advancing army from the

surrounding country.

The Union commanders were to learn a lesson from Price, who did not

encumber himself with long trains, but "compelled war to support war" by

drawing his supplies from the country through which he operated. Under

Halleck's orders Gen. Curtis directed that the cavalry should locate

all the mills convenient to the line of march, set them to work grinding

grain, and encourage the Union farmers to bring in their grain, hogs

and cattle, for which the Quartermaster would pay them fair prices. This

work was an admirable education for Halleck's Chief Quartermaster, a

young Captain named Philip H. Sheridan, who was to turn the lessons then

learned to magnificent account afterwards.

304

Lebanon was taken possession of without more resistance than a running

fight in which a notorious Capt. Tom Craig, of the Confederate army, was

killed. Gen. Curtis arrived at Lebanon Jan. 31, leaving Sigel and Asboth

at Rolla to follow as fast as the roads would permit. The recent severe

storms of sleet and snow had been quite trying to the men and animals,

but the columns were pressed forward, and on Feb. 7 Sigel's and Asboth's

men were all in Lebanon, where they were joined by Jeff C. Davis's

Division marching from Otterville by the way of Linn Creek.

Halleck's orders to Curtis were clear, comprehending and purposeful.

Curtis seems to have been not a little apprehensive of the force he

might have to encounter, but Halleck constantly urged him forward, at

the same time enjoining him to keep his troops well in hand, and not

allow Price to attack him in detail. He was to "throw out his cavalry

carefully, like fingers to the hands." Most particularly he was not

to allow Sigel to go off on any independent expedition and serve him as

Sigel had served Lyon at Wilson's Creek. Halleck urged Hunter to advance

his Kansas troops down through his department so as to threaten Price's

left flank, and he told Curtis that if he, Curtis, would take care of

Price, that he himself would look out for Johnson, Polk, Beauregard and

Hardee.

305

The splendid young Missouri, Iowa and Illinois volunteers, welded into

superb regiments by months of service, with the worthless of their

officers removed by Halleck's rigid pruning, pressed forward with

an enthusiasm that no storms could diminish or wretchedness of roads

discourage. They forded swollen, icy streams, pulled their wagons up

steep hills, or pried them out of quagmires, and bore the fury of

the storm with sanguine cheerfulness, believing they were now moving

directly forward to the great end of crushing the enemies of the

Government and closing the war.

Price's outlying detachments were come up with and struck with a

suddenness and vigor that sent them flying in utter rout. It speaks very

ill for Price, with all his means for accurate information, that he

knew nothing of this rapid advance of the Union army until the heads of

Curtis's columns were at his very pickets. He was entirely unready for

battle, and could only hastily gather his men together and make a quick

retreat to the rough hills south of Springfield, leaving all his stores

and his laboriously-constructed cantonments for the Union army. Feb. 13

Curtis had the satisfaction of reporting to Hal-leck as follows:

The Flag of the Union floats over the Court House of Springfield, Mo.

The enemy attacked us with small parties at 10:30 o'clock 12 miles out,

and my front guards had a running Are with them most of the afternoon.

At dusk a regiment of the Confederate cavalry attacked the outer picket,

but did not move it. A few shots from a howitzer killed two and wounded

several. The regiment retreated to this place, and the enemy immediately

commenced the evacuation of the city. I entered the city at 10 a. m.

My cavalry is in full pursuit. They say the enemy is making a stand

at Wilson's Creek. Forage, flour and other stores in large quantities

taken. Shall pursue as fast as the strength of the men will allow.

306

In Gen. Sheridan's "Memoirs" he gives this sidelight on the advance upon

Springfield:

By hard work we soon accumulated a sufficient quantity of

flour and corn meal to justify the resumption of our march

on Springfield, at or near which point the enemy was

believed to be awaiting us, and the order was given to move

forward, the Commanding General cautioning me, in the event

of disaster, to let no salt fall into Gen. Price's hands.

Gen. Curtis made a hobby of this matter of salt, believing

the enemy sadly in need of that article, and he impressed me

deeply with his conviction that our cause would be seriously

injured by a loss which would inure so greatly and

peculiarly to the enemy's benefit; but we discovered

afterward, when Price abandoned his position, that about all

he left behind was salt.

When we were within about eight miles of Springfield Gen.

Curtis decided to put his troops in line of battle for the

advance on the town, and directed me to stretch out my

supply train in a long line of battle, so that in falling

back, in case the troops were repulsed, he could rally the

men on the wagons. I did not like the tactics, but, of

course, obeyed the order.

The line moved on to Springfield, and took the town without resistance,

the enemy having fled southward, in the direction of Pea Ridge, the

preceding day. Of course, our success relieved my anxiety about the

wagons; but fancy has often pictured since the stampede of six-mule

teams that, had we met with any reverse, would have taken place over the

prairies of southwest Missouri.

It was felt almost certain that Price had only abandoned Springfield in

order to offer battle more advantageously in the rough hills south of

the town where Wilson's Creek had been fought. The spirit of the army

was up, and it moved promptly forward to engage him in his chosen

fastness. The Secessionist historians and the admirers of Price,

Marmaduke, Shelby and others give thrillingly sanguinary stories of

the fierce resistance offered in the defiles and passes through the

foothills of the Ozarks, but these statements are not supported by

either the official reports or the regimental histories of the Union

army. These all concur in the statement that while there was a great

deal of noisy cannonading, Price's troops yielded ground quite easily,

and all were surprised that no more effective resistance was made at

places that offered such wonderful opportunities for defense.

307

In his report to Gov. Jackson Gen. Price gives this succinct statement

of his share in the movement:

About the latter part of January my scouts reported that the

enemy were concentrating in force at Rolla, and shortly

thereafter they occupied Lebanon. Believing that this

movement could be for no other purpose than to attack me,

and knowing that my command was inadequate for such

resistance as the Interest of my army and the cause

demanded, I appealed to the commanders of the Confederate

troops In Arkansas to come to my assistance. This from

correspondence I was confidently led to expect, and, relying

upon it, I held my position to the very last moment, and, as

the sequel proved, almost too long, for on Wednesday, Feb.

12, my pickets were driven in, and reported the enemy

advancing upon me in force. No resource was now left me

except retreat, without hazarding all with greatly unequal

numbers upon the result of one engagement. This I deemed it

unwise to do. I commenced retreating at once. I reached

Cassville with loss unworthy of mention in any respect. Here

the enemy in my rear commenced a series of attacks running

through four days. Retreating and fighting all the way to

Cross Hollows, in this State, I am rejoiced to say my

command, under the most exhausting fatigue all that time,

with but little rest for either man or beast and no sleep,

sustained themselves and came through, repulsing the enemy

upon every occasion with great determination and gallantry.

My loss does not exceed four to six killed and some 15 to 18

wounded. That of the enemy we know to be ten times as great.

Gen. Price's estimate of the losses he inflicted is widely divergent

from that of Gen. Curtis, who does not admit any losses in killed in

the noisy engagements while pushing Price back through the rough gorges,

until he arrived at the Sugar Creek Crossing, six miles into Arkansas,

where he lost 13 killed and 15 or 20 wounded in a very spirited little

fight with the combined troops of Price and McCulloch, and camped that

night upon the battlefield from which the enemy had retreated. Here Col.

Cyrus Bussey joined him with five companies of the 3d Iowa Cav., having

made a forward march from Rolla, Mo., in four days.

308

Curtis was so encouraged by his success that he kept on pushing Price

back upon McCulloch, even upon the boasted "Gibraltar" at Cross Hollows,

and then, to the astonishment and delight of himself and the whole army,

forced the evacuation of this stronghold by a flank movement The rebels'

abandonment of it was so complete that they burned all their stores and

the great array of cabins built for quarters, leaving only the chimneys

to mark the long rows.

Thus any expectation of a sanguinary battle fell in disappointment.

So much had been said about Cross Hollows that the Union troops were

certain that they would have to fight a desperate battle at or near it.

It was known that at least 4,000 regularly-organized troops had been

quartered there for months, subjected to thorough drill and discipline.

Gen. McCulloch had boasted that he had prepared a trap in which to catch

and ruin the Federal General if he ventured that far south. McCulloch's

only fear was of being unable to draw the Federal General into the trap.

The Confederates left their sick and wounded behind them in the

hospitals, and the untiring Gen. Asboth, commanding the cavalry, pushed

the rear guard rapidly through to Bentonville. Returning to Curtis's

camp a day or two later, Gen. Asboth was sent with a force of cavalry to

Fayetteville, a most important town in northwestern Arkansas, where he

learned that his enemies had hid themselves in the Boston Mountains.

309

Gen. Curtis had completed his work of driving Price from Missouri and

some distance beyond her borders. He then drew his forces together and

established himself at Cross Hollows, with the ultimate intention of

retiring to the better position of Sugar Creek Crossing, in the event of

the enemy concentrating any force against him. In the meanwhile he would

hope that the turning movements which Halleck had planned would occupy

Price's and McCulloch's attention, and draw them away from him.

310

CHAPTER XVIII. GEN. EARL VAN DORN TAKES COMMAND.

Jefferson Davis carried out his determination to appoint an officer

superior in rank to both Gens. McCulloch and Price. After first

appointing Gen. Harry Heth, and then offering the appointment to Gen.

Braxton Bragg, he selected another of his favorites, Gen. Earl Van Dorn,

who had been a fiery partisan among the officers of the Regular Army

for States Rights and Secession, was a native of Mississippi, and had

graduated from West Point in 1842, 52d in a class of 56. Whatever his

intellectual qualities may have been, he was a man of great force and

energy, and had won two brevets for distinguished gallantry in the

Mexican War. He gained still more distinction by his successful

expeditions against the fierce Comanches, a tribe then in the hight of

its power. In one of these his small command killed 56 Indians. In his

engagements with the Comanches he had received four wounds, two of

which were quite serious. He had been very active in bringing about Gen.

Twiggs's disgraceful surrender of his command in Texas.

When Jefferson Davis, as Secretary of War, organized the additional

regiments for the Regular Army he took particular pains to promote

into them men of his way of thinking on States Rights, and who would be

useful in the coming contest which he foresaw.

311

One of these new regiments,--then called the 2d U. S. Cav., later

changed to the 5th U. S. Cav., was quite remarkable for this selection,

as it showed Mr. Davis's thorough acquaintance with the character of

the Regular officers, and what they could be relied upon to do when

Secession should be brought about. He made Colonel of the regiment

Albert Sidney Johnston, later General, C. S. A.; Lieutenant-Colonels,

Robert E. Lee, afterward General, C. S. A.; W. J. Hardee,

Lieutenant-General, C. S. A., and E. Kirby Smith, General, C. S. A., and

the Majors were George H. Thomas, W. H. Emory, Major-Generals, U. S. A.,

and Earl Van Dorn, Major-General, C. S. A.

Mississippi seceded Jan. 9,1861. Earl Van Dorn promptly tendered his

resignation and became active, if he had not been before, in bringing

about the surrender by Gen. Twiggs of the United States troops, stores

and munitions of war in Texas, by which we lost nearly half of the

entire strength of the Regular Army, besides some $2,000,000 of

supplies, the control of the Mexican frontier, and a large portion

of Indian frontier. Van Dorn had been commissioned Colonel in the

Confederate army, and hoped to add the surrendered troops to the

military establishment of the Southern Confederacy. He put a great deal

of pressure upon the officers and men to induce them to change their

allegiance, but was remarkably unsuccessful in the latter, not a single

enlisted man accepting his offers of promotion and increased pay. Only

those officers went over whose course had been predetermined. None of

previous loyalty wavered for an instant.

312

Gen. Twiggs had made a capitulation with Gen. McCulloch, of Texas, as if

treating with another Nation. The terms were that the troops should be

conveyed to the nearest seaport, and thence sent home. The steamer "Star

of the West," which had come into notoriety as being the object at which

the first gun of the rebellion was aimed, had been sent to Indianola,

Tex., to receive Twiggs's troops. Van Dorn, enraged by his failure

to accomplish his purpose, violated the terms of the capitulation. He

marched his forces upon the unarmed troops gathered near Indianola,

compelled them to surrender, and captured the "Star of the West." The

officers and men were kept prisoners in Texas for months afterwards, and

subjected to much hardship.

Halleck wrote to Curtis: "Beware of Van Dorn. He is an energetic

officer."

Van Dorn was not to justify the high expectations entertained of him,

and after several failures to improve great opportunities he finally

fell, in 1863, at the age of 42, before the pistol of an injured

husband.

Van Dorn promptly repaired to his command, and seems to have been

welcomed with entirely loyal subordination by both Price and McCulloch,

though both were much older than he, and had held higher commands, Gen.

Price having been a Brigadier-General at a time when Van Dorn was only a

First Lieutenant.

313

At first Van Dorn meditated moving into Missouri by the Pocahontas

route, intermediate between the Mississippi route and that by the way

of Springfield. He began assembling troops at Jacksonport, Ark., to move

directly up through the Ozark Mountains. Then the isolated situation

of Gen. Curtis's little army, with scattered detachments thrown out in

every direction, tempted him to concentrate suddenly his forces and make

the effort to cut off the outlying Union detachments and finally crush

the main body. Therefore, he hastened to the Boston Mountains, sending

messages to the scattered Confederates to meet him there, and was

welcomed on a chilly, snowy March 3 with the Major-General's salute of

40 guns, which were heard by Gen. Curtis at Cross Hollow.

After driving Gen. Price off into the Boston Mountains and successfully

flanking Gen. McCulloch out of his "Gibraltar" at Cross Hollow, Gen.

Curtis prudently halted his army there to consider his next move. The

line of Sugar Creek offered fine opportunities for defense, and from

there he could hope to maintain his communications along the great road

leading to Springfield and Holla. Not having been able to force either

McCulloch or Price to a decisive battle in which he might destroy or at

least cripple them, it did not seem discreet to venture further forward

where every step made them stronger and him weaker.

Halleck had relied upon Gen. Hunter sending down a flanking column from

Leavenworth by the way of Fort Scott, but this had not materialized,

owing to the disputes between Gens. Hunter and Jas. H. Lane. Thus 5,000

men who should have been effectively employed, either in menacing

Van Dorn's flank or increasing Curtis's strength, were held idly, at

Leavenworth.

[Transcriber's Note: The print copy has a

two page error in numbering.]

316

Halleck had also relied upon the effect of Gen. Grant's startling

victory at Fort Donelson, which shattered the first Confederate line,

to withdraw a large portion of the forces west of the Mississippi, and

relieve pressure upon Curtis. Nor had this at that time resulted. Though

the general Confederate the roads leading northward crossed Sugar Greek,

and several of them came together some two or three miles north of

a country hostelry known as Elkhorn Tavern on the main road to

Springfield, at the northeastern end of Pea Ridge.

[Illustration: 316-Battle of Pea Ridge]

At 2 p. m., March 4, Gen. Curtis was at Gross Hollow with Col. Carr's

Fourth Division. The extreme left of his army was Col. Wm. Vandever,

of the 9th Iowa, at War Eagle Mills, near White River, 42 miles to the

southeast. The extreme right--the First and Second Divisions, under Gen.

Franz Sigel--was at Cooper's Farm, four miles in front of Bentonville

and 14 miles to the southwest of Sugar Creek. The Third Division, under

Col. Jefferson C. Davis, had moved back to the line selected in rear of

Sugar Creek, where Col. Bussey with his regiment was in camp.

By 2 o'clock scouts and fugitives had convinced Gen. Curtis that Van

Dorn had concentrated his forces, and was in rapid march upon him, only

a few miles away. He sent orders by swift riders to all his outlying

parties to march at once to the designated rendezvous at Sugar Creek,

and started back himself with Carr's Division, arriving on the crest

about 2 a. m. of March 5, and immediately setting his men to work

preparing for the battle. Col. Dodge worked until midnight blockading

with fallen trees the road from Bentonville to Springfield west of

Leetown.

317

In spite of their wide dispersion, Gen. Van Dorn brought McCulloch's,

Pike's and Price's forces together with great rapidity. How many

fighting men he was able to assemble is a question. Gen. Curtis gravely

estimated it at 30,000. Gen. Van Dorn in his reports after the battle,

when he was putting the best face upon matters, stated his force at one

time at 16,000 men, and again at "less than 14,000."

Probably if we follow an old arithmetical device, adding Curtis's

overstatement and Van Dom's understatement together and dividing the sum

by two--the number of statements--we may get somewhat near the truth.

This would give Van Dorn 22,000 men. Students since the war have arrived

at the conclusion that he actually had 26,000 men.

Analysis of the various reports points to this being nearly correct.

Feb. 24--nine days before the battle--Van Dorn reported to Albert Sidney

Johnston that with the combined forces of McCulloch, Pike and Price, he

would "be able to take about 26,000 men into battle."

The best organized and drilled troops west of the Mississippi were

McCulloch's. March 2 he reported his "effective total" to be 8,384 men,

with 18 cannon. He received some accessions after that, raising his

whole force to nearly 10,000 men.

His division was organized as follows:

FIRST BRIGADE.

Col. James Mcintosh commanding:--1st Ark. M. R., Col. T. J. Churchill;

2d Ark. M. R., Col. James Mcintosh; 4th (9th) Tex. Cav., Col. W. B.

Sims; 6th Tex. Cav., Col. B. W. Stone; South Kansas-Texas Regiment, Col.

E. Greer; Lamar Cav., Capt. H. S. Bennett.

SECOND BRIGADE.

Col. Louis Hebert commanding--4th Ark., Col. E. McNair; 14th Ark., Col.

M. C. Mitchell; 16th Ark., Col. Hill, 17th Ark., Col. Frank Rector; 21st

Ark., Col. D. McRae; 1st Ark. Battery, Maj. W. H. Brooks; 3d La.,

Col. Louis Hebert; Tex. Cav., Col. W. C. Young; Tex. M. R., Maj. J. W.

Whitfield; Art. Bat. (four companies), Capt. W. R. Bradfute.

318

Nothing definite can be ascertained as to Albert Pike's force. A short

time before the battle he wrote confidently about having 10,000 men. The

force he actually brought up is generally stated at 6,000, two of the

regiments being white.

The following extract from Gen. Sterling Price's report of March

22--eight days after the battle--gives us the best obtainable idea of

the strength and organization of his force:

My forces consisted of the First Brigade, Missouri Volunteers,

Col. Henry Little commanding; the Second Brigade, Brg.-Gen. Slack

commanding; a battalion of cavalry, under command of Lieut.-Col.

Cearnal, and the State troops, under the command of Brig.-Gens. Rains,

Green, and Frost, Cols. John B. Clark, Jr., and James P. Saunders, and

Maj. Lindsay; numbering in all 6,818 men, with eight batteries of light

artillery.

Price, most probably, did not differ from other beaten commanders in

minimizing his force to the utmost, so that it is entirely reasonable to

assume that he had 2,000 or 3,000 more than he reported. Probably he and

Van Dorn excluded from their fighting strength thousands, like Pike's

In-lians, who proved themselves worthless in the actual shock of battle.

Therefore we have the following aggregate of minimum strength:

McCulloch...................................... 10,000

Pike........................................... 6,000

Price.......................................... 9,000

26,000

It seems, therefore, entirely fair to say that Van Dorn had at least

double Curtis's 10,000 when he left Cove Greek on the morning of March

4, with three days' cooked rations in his men's haversacks, and the

intention of destroying the invaders and recovering the State of

Missouri.

319

Both sides were keenly eager for battle. The Confederates had been

harangued with stories of great victories in the East, which they

were to emulate; the Indians were fierce for scalps and plunder; the

Missourians burning to march back to their homes m triumph.

On the other hand, Curtis's men, weary of interminable marching and

skirmishing, longed to deliver a decisive blow which would end all.

Van Dorn's plan of battle was well-conceived, and if his immense

preponderance of force had been adequately handled it would have won a

crushing victory.

McCulloch, during his long stay at Cross Hollow, had familiarized

himself with the ground, and Price was also well acquainted with it. In

the conference held in Gen. Van Dorn's tent it was decided not to attack

in front, where Gen. Curtis had prepared, and where he had in addition

to his obstructions the advantage of the steep side of the ridge.

Instead, a movement would be made on Bentonville, to the southwest of

Curtis, where it was hoped to catch Sigel and destroy him before he

could receive assistance, then destroy Curtis before Vandever's

Brigade could reach him from Huntsville. Pike's Indians were to follow

McCulloch's Division, and when Curtis was beaten the wild Indian riders

would be let loose to exterminate the fugitives.

320

Sigel, with his usual indifference to orders, did not immediately obey

Curtis's command to abandon his camp four miles west of Bentonville and

move back to Sugar Creek. Instead he deferred starting his troops from

Cooper's Farm until 2 o'clock of the morning of the 6th, and stopped

himself with a small force at Bentonville while his troops and train

were passing through the town, and he was attacked about 11 o'clock. Van

Dorn reports that it was 11 o'clock before he could get the head of his

column to Ben-tonville, and "we had the mortification of seeing Sigel's

Division, 7,000 strong, leaving it as we entered. Had we been an hour

sooner we should have cut him right off with his whole force, and

certainly have beaten the enemy the next day."

Sigel had kept back about 600 men. His troops were part of the 12th

Mo. and seven companies of cavalry, besides five field guns. They were

resting with stacked arms when the rebel cavalry swarmed in upon the

town from various directions. Sigel was able, however, to get his

men together and march out of town to cover of some woods, where his

artillery drove back the Confederates, who charged them, and the retreat

was resumed.

This performance was repeated several times along the road, which ran

around the ridges through a growth of scrubby blackjacks, which broke up

Sigel's men and also the eager Confederates who were trying to cut them

off.

Col. Elijah Gates, 1st Mo. Cav., Price's Division, led the pursuers with

great activity and skill. There were incessant assaults with constant

volleys of artillery, until Col. Osterhaus, who had reached Curtis's

line, was ordered back to his relief, preceded by Col. Bussey with the

3d Iowa Cav. When they met Gen. Sigel he had just broken through the

Confederate cavalry, which was still making efforts to surround him, but

the arrival of the reinforcements caused the Confederates to withdraw,

and the Union troops marched back to the camp which had been formed at

Sugar Creek. The Union loss in this affair was reported as 35 killed and

wounded.

321

After a forced march of 42 miles from Huntsville, Col. Vandever's

Brigade reached Pea Ridge at dusk, and Curtis had his whole army

together. A night attack from the south was confidently expected, and

every preparation was made for it.

When night came on Van Dorn built fires, pretending to go into camp,

but moved forward until he came upon the blocked road, which halted

him until after midnight, when he moved forward much embarrassed by the

obstructions Dodge had placed in the wretched roads. Dodge on his return

from blockading the roads notified Gen. Curtis of Price's movement to

the rear, but Gen. Curtis did not believe it, as other reports were to

the effect that Van Dorn's attack would be on the Sugar Creek front.

Price having been delayed until after midnight, did not reach the

telegraph road, a mile or so north of Elkhorn Tavern, until 7 o'clock on

the morning of the 7th.

McCulloch, in the meanwhile, was forming his men in the fields and woods

near Leetown, west of Pea Ridge, with Albert Pike's Indians behind him.

While, therefore, Curtis's men were straining their eyes southward from

his strongly fortified position on Sugar Creek for the advance of the

enemy, the whole Confederate army had gained their flank and rear,

with Price's Division directly across their line of communication and

retreat.

322

Seeing no enemy in front, Curtis's men had a good, leisurely breakfast,

but about 7 o'clock their commander was startled to learn of McCulloch's

position on his right and Van Dorn and Price in his rear. With great

promptness he faced his men about and swung his line back so that his

new right--formerly his left--rested on Elkhorn Tavern, while his left

rested where his old right had been, on the slope above Sugar Creek.

This reversed the order of the divisions--Col. Carr's being the right at

Elkhorn Tavern and Gen. Asboth's the extreme left, with Col. Osterhaus's

and Col. Davis's in the center.

It was now about 8:80 o'clock, and Gen. Curtis directed Col. Osterhaus

to advance a force of cavalry, artillery and infantry and bring on the

battle.

There was soon after a swelling up of the firing about Elkhorn Tavern,

where Carr was, which disturbed Curtis. He wanted the battle where he

was preparing for it, and hoped that his opening it would stop any flank

movements to his right. While Osterhaus was getting ready to advance,

Curtis rode over to Elkhorn Tavern to see what the trouble was with

Carr.

During the early morning Price's troops getting into position on the

main road had run afoul of the Union pickets about a mile northeast of

Elkhorn Tavern. A little after 7 o'clock two companies of cavalry and

one of infantry were sent out in that direction to investigate. They

found a force of cavalry, which they drove back until they saw the woods

full of Confederates, when they took cover behind trees and rocks and

began a noisy skirmish, with the enemy slowly pressing forward and

extending out on both flanks, as Van Dorn and Price brought their troops

up and put them into line.

323

The affair showed such seriousness that Col. Dodge came up about 9

o'clock with his brigade, and formed in line of battle to the right

of Elkhorn Tavern, with the 85th Ill. on the left, the 4th Iowa in the

center, the 3d Ill. Cav. on the right, and the pieces of the 1st Iowa

Battery distributed along the line, and immediately moved forward and

engaged the enemy.

In the meanwhile Van Dorn and Price were placing their strong force

of eight batteries in advantageous positions to crush out the Union

artillery and pave the way for the advance of the infantry. When the

storm burst the Confederate artillery quickly overwhelmed the Union

guns, but Col. Dodge was able, after a sharp struggle, to beat back

across the open fields the advance of the very much superior forces of

the Missouri divisions, commanded by Gens. Steen, Clark, Frost,

Rains and Green. He was so hard pressed, however, that Col. Carr,

who accompanied Col. Dodge, sent back for his other brigade--Col.

Vandever's--a mile and a half away, which arrived and went into position

near Elkhorn Tavern in time to aid in repelling a fresh assault.

More artillery had been brought up, but not enough to successfully

contend with Van Dorn's massed guns.

The Union infantry lay behind the cover of fences, logs and stumps, and

when the Confederate infantry was pushed forward waited until it was

within 100 paces, and then poured a deadly fire into it which shattered

the ranks and drove it in retreat. Gen. Slack, one of Price's ablest

brigade commanders, was killed and Lieut.-Col. Cearnal severely wounded.

324

There was a lull in the battle about 2 o'clock while Van Dorn and Price

were reforming their men for a fresh and more determined assault. The

brunt of it fell upon Col. Vandever on the crest of a hill about 300

yards north of Elkhorn Tavern. Vandever succeeded in driving back the

enemy, though at a great cost, since the 9th Iowa lost upward of 100 men

and Col. Phelps's 26th Mo. about 75.

Though the enemy was repulsed, Col. Vandever deemed it better to fall

back to Elkhorn Tavern, leaving the battleground in the possession of

the enemy.

Col. Carr sent to Gen. Curtis for reinforcements, but Curtis, still

believing that the main fighting was in front of Leetown, could only

spare him his headquarters guard, with two howitzers. He also sent

urgent counsel to Carr to "persevere" and hold his ground with the

utmost obstinacy.

Another lull in the battle occurred while Van Dorn and Price were

bringing up and forming fresh troops. This time it was Gen. Clark's

Missouri Division, reinforced by other troops. The Union soldiers

received it, as they had the others, lying behind fences and logs and

waiting until the enemy was where every shot would tell.

It was about 3 o'clock when this charge was repulsed.

Again Col. Carr sent to Gen. Curtis for reinforcements, and this time

the General sent him five companies of the 8th Ind., under Lieut.-Col.

Shunk, and three rifled cannon.

325

Van Dorn and Price now brought up everything, and concentrated their

energies for a supreme effort to drive the stubborn Yankees from the

field and achieve a victory before darkness should intervene. Their

artillery speedily overpowered and drove off the Union guns, but when

the infantry advanced it met the same terrific fire. This time the

rebels did not give way, but pressed on around the left flank so that

the Second (Vandever's) Brigade had to fall back. The First Brigade

(Dodge's) held its position until night. The log barricades it had built

enabled it to defeat charge after charge of the enemy, and when they

swung around this flank a part of the 8th Ind. and 3d Ill., in a

countercharge, drove the enemy back, protecting and holding that flank

until dusk. In this bloody melee Lieut.-Col. Herron and Lieut.-Col.

Chandler were wounded and captured, and nearly all the field officers

were more or less severely wounded. Col. Dodge had three horses shot

under him, and was himself wounded, and Col. Carr received the fourth

wound of that day. Three of the Union guns were taken.

The Second Brigade when it fell back took up a new and strong position

a quarter of a mile to the rear, facing open ground, and resumed the

battle.

As evening was coming on, Curtis became at last convinced that the

fighting in his front was over, and started the First and Second

Divisions over to the right to the assistance of the Fourth. Gen. Asboth

hurried forward in person with four companies of the 2d Mo. and four

guns of the 2d Ohio Battery, and assisted in checking and driving back

the last assault.

Gen. Curtis came up, formed a new line along the edge of the timber,

with the fields in front, and the men lay down on their arms for the

night.

Let us return to the left, in front of Leetown, where the main battle

had been expected by both sides.

326

Col. Osterhaus does not seem to have formed any very dear plan when

he went out from the center at 9 o'clock to open the battle with

McCulloch's and Pike's forces. Gen. Curtis sent Col. Bussey out in

advance with five companies of the 3d Iowa Cav., four of the 5th Mo.

Cav., four companies of the 1st Mo. Cav., and two companies of the 4th

Mo. Cav., with three pieces of Capt. Elbert's Battery. Col. Greuset's

Brigade of infantry followed the cavalry at a short distance.

Col. Bussey went out to Leetown and thence to the open fields about half

a mile north. The infantry took position in the fields north of Leetown.

Col. Osterhaus came up to the head of the cavalry column where Col.

Bussey was, and they saw the Confederates in plain view about a quarter

of a mile away. It was Van Dorn's trains and cavalry guards which

they saw moving towards the telegraph road. They did not see, however,

McCulloch's troops, Mcintosh's Brigade of cavalry and Pike's Indians

formed in heavy masses to the right and close to them.

Col. Osterhaus ordered Capt. Welfley to open on the men in front, and

the shells caused a very visible stampede. Osterhaus then ordered Col.

Bussey to send two companies down the road to investigate the position.

Col. Bussey ordered Lieut-Col. Trimble, who commanded the 3d Iowa Cav.,

to execute this order, while he gave his attention to the Fremont and

Benton Hussars, then coming forward and forming line in rear of the

guns.

Lieut-Col. Trimble started with five companies of the 3d Iowa Cav., only

to run into a heavy line of battle at close musket range, receiving a

deadly fire which killed several of his men and was himself severely

wounded in the face.

327

A minute later Mcintosh, at the head of five regiments of cavalry,

and Pike leading three Indian and two Texas regiments, burst upon the

cavalry and over the guns with appalling yells and a tempest of bullets.

The Union cavalry was simply ridden down by overwhelming numbers and

mixed up in a hand-to-hand conflict, but fought their way out and

retreated through the open field to Osterhaus's infantry, where Col.

Bussey rallied them and formed in line.

The yelling Confederates rushed on until they came upon Greusel's line,

where their yells were hushed by a storm of canister and bullets which

stopped their advance. The Union line moved into the timber, where

McCulloch was found working his way towards Curtis's camp. A terrible

battle was fought with varying success until at 11 o'clock Col. Jeff

Davis came to Osterhaus's assistance with the Third Division. The

fighting was obstinate and bloody, generally duels between opposing

regiments which crept slowly toward one another until they got within 60

or 70 yards, when they would open fire, maintaining it until one or the

other gave way. The irregular lines thus surged back and forward for

perhaps an hour, with the Union troops generally gaining ground.

During this fighting Gens. McCulloch and Mcintosh were both shot

through the heart by Union sharpshooters. Gen. McCulloch, who was easily

distinguished by his peculiarly-colored clothes, was killed by Peter

Pelican, of Co. B, 36th Ill. How Gen. Mcintosh was killed does not

appear, further than he was shot through the heart. The shooting that

day was remarkably accurate. The men who held the rifles were perfectly

accustomed to their use.

328

After four hours of constant and desperate fighting there was a

noticeable fading in the vim of the Confederate assaults and diminishing

stubbornness of resistance to the Union blows. When the Union soldiers

pushed on through the woods after their enemies they found them falling

back across the fields beyond in great disorder. A few shells from the

Union guns frustrated all attempts to rally them. Osterhaus and Davis

pushed their skirmishers through the woods for a mile, and the cavalry

went still further, finding the three guns of the flying battery with

the carriages burned off, and reporting back that everything seemed to

be in full retreat for Bentonville.

One squad of cavalry came back with Col. Hebert, the next in command to

Gen. Mcintosh; Col. Mitchell and Maj. W. F. Tunnard, of the 3d La., of

the same division; a Major, two Captains and 33 privates, all having

been separated from their commands in the rush through the woods, and

unable to regain them.

After the fall of Gens. McCulloch and Mcintosh the command in that part

of the field devolved upon Gen. Albert Pike, and it is rare that so

great a responsibility falls upon one so unfit. Something of a poet Pike

certainly was; much more of a successful politician and place-hunter,

but nothing of a leader of men upon the battlefield. His soldiership

became sicklied o'er when he went beyond the parade ground. Apparently

he did not know what to do, nor, if he did, how to do it.

Regimental commanders reported that they were unable to find him.

329

His own verbose report, made six days after the battle, is quite full of

unintentional humor. He says that after the first charge the field was

"a mass of the utmost confusion, all talking, riding this way and that,

and listening to no orders from any one." He could get no one to pay any

attention to what he said. His Indians, who had stopped in the charge to

scalp the dead and wounded, would at once stampede whenever a shell was

thrown in their direction. He devoted himself for a couple of hours to

what has been described as "heavy standing around."

Then he fell back with some of the troops a short distance and did some

more standing around, until a Union artillerist noticed him and threw a

shell in his direction, when he fell back out of range, and again stood

around until some one informed him that a body of 7,000 Federals was

moving around the left flank. He quickly decided that the "position was

not tenable," and fell back still more, "when the officers assured me

that the men were in such condition that it would be worse than useless

to bring them into acton again that day." Such is the demoralization of

"standing around."

Finally, it occurred to him to take what troops he could gather and join

Gen. Van Dorn, whose cannon had been thundering two or three miles

away all this time. First, however, he decided to march them back some

distance to a creek, "where they could all get a drink, and join Gen.

Van Dorn in the morning."

Col. E. Greer, 3d Tex. Cav., who became the senior officer of

McCulloch's Division, reported that he gathered up fragments of

regiments to the number of 3,000 after the casualties to his superiors,

and being informed that Gen. Pike had left the field with the remainder

of the command, retired some distance, sending word to Gen. Van Dorn

that, unless he ordered otherwise, he would march to join him at 1:30 in

the morning. Van Dorn approved of this.

330

The night of March 7 closed down with a tumult of widely-varying

emotions in the 33,000 men who joined battle in the morning. All of

Gen. Pike's Indians, except a portion of Col. Standwaitie's regiment

of Cherokee half-breeds, and several thousand whites were rushing off

toward the Arkansas River at full speed. The remnant of McCulloch's

Division, which Col. Greer had rallied, and which had some fight left

in it, unutterably weary, hungry and depressed, bivouacked near the

battlefield, awaiting Van Dora's orders. Price's Missourians, who were

no less weary and hungry than their comrades, from a night of severest

marching and a day of sharp fighting, camped on the ground which they

had wrung from Carr's Division by seven hours of bitter struggling and

the cost of a number of prominent officers and several hundred men.

Their success, though dearly bought, was sufficient to encourage them.

They had captured several hundred prisoners and two pieces of artillery.

They had driven Carr's Division back a quarter of a mile, were across

the Union line of retreat, and Van Dorn had his headquarters at Elkhorn

Tavern.

331

Price had greatly endeared himself to his troops by his conduct during

the day. He was everywhere at the front, leading and encouraging his

men, and though wounded in the arm had refused to quit the field. His

generalship was not so conspicuous as his soldiership. With him and Van

Dorn it was the story of Wilson's Creek over again. Instead of lining up

their superior force and sending all forward with a crushing solidarity,

they had personally led detachments, and when these had been fought out,

gone back and brought up fresh forces, Van Dorn had shown generalship

only in the concentration of his artillery. He had been so engrossed

in this, and in pushing forward detachments he had better left to the

Missouri leadership that he neglected his powerful right wing, which had

gone to pieces, as there was no one left to take the place of McCulloch

and Mcintosh. He hoped, though, with the aid of 3,000 men whom Greer was

bringing to him, to complete his victory in the morning.

There was much to depress Curtis's men in their tireless bivouac south

of Elkhorn Tavern. Dodge's and Vandever's Brigades had been very roughly

handled in the long struggle. Rebel bullets had made sad havoc in their

ranks. They had lost two guns and over a quarter of their force in

killed and wounded. Osterhaus's and Davis's Divisions, in the center,

had had costly encounters with the enemy, and had lost five pieces

of artillery. They did not then know that in reality the victory was

theirs, but believed that most of the enemy had merely left their front

to augment the mass which was formed across their line of retreat They

therefore looked forward to the morrow with well-grounded apprehension.

They had no rations in their haversacks, and their animals had been

without forage for two or three days. Unless the enemy could be driven

from their "cracker line" the very next day, starvation for man and

beast stared them in the face.

332

CHAPTER XIX. THE VICTORY IS WON.

Gen. Curtis's army was far from realizing as the night closed down on

that exciting March 7 how completely it had whipped the overwhelming

numbers of Van Dorn, Price, McCulloch, Mcintosh and Pike. Those of Jeff

C. Davis's and Osterhaus's Divisions, who had done the heavy fighting on

the Leetown front, knew that they had driven away the mass of the enemy

in their front until there was no longer any show of opposition. They

of Carr's Division, on the extreme right, the brigades of Dodge and

Vandever, realized that they had had a terrible fight, in which they had

generally defeated the enemy, inflicting great slaughter, though they

had suffered heavily themselves. Still, the enemy had gained a little

ground. The men of Carr's Division felt that now, since the rest of the

army was coming to their help, they would undoubtedly win a victory

in the morning, and clear the rebels from the road leading back to

Springfield. This confidence was shared by the men of Jeff C. Davis's

and Osterhaus's Divisions, who had come to their assistance, and they

all felt more hopeful than did Sigel and Asboth's Division, which had

taken little or no part in the fighting. The following remarkable letter

from Gen. Asboth to Gen. Curtis, written at 2 o'clock in the morning of

March 8, reveals the general belief of that portion of the army that the

condition was desperate and it would require extraordinary efforts to

release the army from a very hazardous situation:

333

Headquarters Second Division, Camp Near Sugar Creek, Ark.,

March 8, 1862; 2 a. m. General: As Oen. Sigel, under whose

command you have placed me, with my division, has not yet

returned to our camp, I beg to address you, General,

directly, reporting that all the troops of the Second

Division were yesterday, as well as now, in the night,

entirely without forage; and as we are cut off from all

supplies by the enemy, outnumbering our forces several

times, and as one more day without forage will make our

horses unserviceable, consequently the cavalry and artillery

as well as the teams, of no use at all, I would respectfully

solicit a decided concentrated movement, with the view of

cutting our way through the enemy where you may deem it more

advisable, and save by this, if not the whole, at least the

larger part of our surrounded army.

Gen. Curtis seems to have realized quite early in the afternoon the

condition of affairs on his left in front of Leetown, and that the fight

there was over. He therefore directed the cavalry under Col. Bussey to

take up the best positions, holding the ground. All the infantry and

artillery were ordered over toward the Springfield road to form a new

line of battle, substantially a prolongation of that established at

the close of the fighting by the stubborn resistance of Dodge's and

Vandever's Brigades, which had so decisively repulsed the last attacks

upon them the previous evening.

384

Sigel, who had a remarkable faculty for incurring criticism in every

battle, had not made use of Gen. Asboth's Division at any time to

relieve the pressure upon Davis and Osterhaus, so that it had hardly

fired a shot. He now had trouble about getting his troops into line, and

it was 8 o'clock in the morning before he finally took his place on the

left, notwithstanding the fact that he was ordered to have his divisions

in line before daylight. Curtis had now all his artillery up, and though

it was not so numerous as that opposed to him, it was better equipped

and drilled, and promptly opened the battle with a fire to which the

Confederate guns could make no adequate reply. The whole line then

moved forward with blazing rifles, sweeping unchecked up the hillsides,

straight for the enemy's front. In a few minutes the Confederate line

parted in the center and disappeared. Most of the Missourians fell back

toward Keetsville, directly north. Greer and his remnants ran around our

left toward Bentonville, pursued by Col. Bussey's cavalry. Van Dorn

and Price with another remnant broke around our right, going through

an obscure hollow and taking the road to Huntsville. Like most men of

impetuous initiative, Van Dorn when he was whipped was badly whipped. He

sent riders post haste to order his trains burned, but Gen. Green,

who commanded the train guard, was of cooler mettle, and succeeded in

getting the trains away safely.

Gen. Sigel pursued the central portion through Keetsville, seven miles

to the north, capturing nearly 200 prisoners and a great quantity of

arms and stores. He believed Curtis would retreat, and was well on his

way to Springfield when ordered back by Curtis to make his camp on the

battlefield with the rest. Gen. Curtis officially reported his loss as

follows:

335

UNION LOSSES.

Command.

Killed.

Wounded

It will be noticed by the above figures that Davis's Division lost

four officers and 42 men killed, 18 officers and 256 men wounded, while

Sigel's two divisions lost only three officers and 28 men killed, seven

officers and 149 men wounded.

The heaviest loss fell upon the 9th Iowa, which had 39 killed, 176

wounded and four missing. The next heaviest was upon the 4th Iowa, which

had 18 killed, 139 wounded and three missing.

Gen. Van Dorn estimated his loss at 1,000 killed and wounded and 300

missing. This is known to be inaccurate, because more Confederate than

Union dead were buried on the battlefield, and Gen. Curtis sent 500

prisoners to the rear.

The question naturally occurs: Why did Van Dorn relinquish such a

supreme effort with such a small loss?

336

Our amusing acquaintance, Gen. Pike, does not conceal the fact that he

and those around him were very badly whipped. After joining Van Dorn

he resumed his old habit of standing around "observing the enemy." He

reports that he did this for two hours at a stretch when Curtis was

delivering the final crushing blows upon Van Dorn. He then moved

with much promptness toward the rear, for an officer came up with the

stunning intelligence, "You are not safe here, for the enemy's

cavalry are within 150 yards of you." This seemed to have escaped his

"observation" up to that time. He rode on, and his pace was accelerated

by hearing another officer cry out "Close up; close up; or you will all

be cut to pieces."

He halted presently, but had to start again, for a shell was sent by the

enemy up the road from the point of the hill around which he had just

passed. The cry of "The cavalry are coming was raised, and everything

became confusion." He escaped the "enemy's cavalry by rapid riding,"

but was unable to get ahead of his fastgoing troops and stop them,

until they reached Elm Spring, many miles away. He came to this sage

conclusion:

The enemy, I learn, had been encamped at Pea Vine Ridge for

three weeks, and Sigel's advance was but a ruse to induce

our forces to march northward and give them battle in

positions selected by themselves.

There were others who shared his feelings; for he says:

Just before night, Saturday afternoon, I had met Col. Rector

in the hills, who told me he had about 500 men with him;

that they were in such condition that they could not go more

than six or eight miles a day, and that he thought he would

take them into the mountains, hide their arms in a secure

place, and, as he could not keep them together and feed

them, let them disperse. He asked my opinion as to this, and

I told him that no one knew where the rest of the army was;

that Gens. Van Dorn and Price were supposed to be captured

and the train taken; that if his men dispersed with their

arms they would throw them away, and that I thought the

course he proposed was the wisest one under the

circumstances. The enemy were pursuing on all the roads, and

as it was almost impossible for even a dozen men in a body

to procure food, I still do not see what better he could

have done.

337

Curtis's cavalry found these guns and brought them into camp; also, all

the artillery that was captured the day before from Davis's and Carr's

Divisions.

Gen. Van Dorn made several reports which are strangely inconsistent

with one another, and seem the natural efforts of a man to find the best

excuses that will present themselves from day to day for his failure

in a great effort. His first report, which was to Gen. Albert Sidney

Johnston and the Confederate War Department, and sent two days after the

battle, reads as follows:

Headquarters Trans-Mississippi District, March 9, via Hog

Eye; March 10, 1862.

Fought the enemy, about 20,000 strong, 7th and 8th, at

Elkhorn, Ark. Battle first day from 10 a. m. until after

dark; loss heavy on both sides. Gens. McCulloch and Mcintosh

and Col. Hebert were killed; Gens. Price and Slack were

wounded (Gen. Price flesh wound in the arm); the others

badly wounded, if not mortally; many officers killed and

wounded; but as there are some doubts in regard to several I

cannot yet report their names. Slept on the battlefield

first night, having driven the enemy from their position.

The death of Gens. McCulloch and Mcintosh and Col. Hebert

early in the action threw the troops on the right under

their commands in confusion. The enemy took a second and

strong position. Being without provisions and the right wing

somewhat disorganized, determined to give battle on the

right on their front for the purpose only of getting off the

field without the danger of a panic, which I did with

success, but with some losses.

I am now encamped with my whole army 14 miles west of

Fayetteville, having gone entirely around the enemy. I am

separated from my train, but think it safe on the Elm

Springs road to Boston Mountains. The reason why I

determined to give battle at once upon my arrival to assume

command of the army I will give in report at an early day.

338

In this it will be seen that he disclaimed any intention on the second

day of making more than a fight to cover his retreat. This is clearly an

afterthought to excuse the poor battle that he put up. There is no

doubt that he had still hoped to whip Curtis's army, and that he had men

enough to do it, if they had been handled properly and had fought with

the same determination and aggressiveness that the Union troops did. For

some weeks he continued to send in reports, explanatory and partially

contradictory of his first.

Gen. Sterling Price's report, made March 22, gives no idea that the

retreat was determined on after the events of the first day, but says

with relation to the close of the struggle on the evening of March 7:

The fiercest struggle of the day now ensued; but the

impetuosity of my troops was Irresistible, and the enemy was

driven back and completely routed. My right had engaged the

enemy's center at the same time with equal daring and equal

success, and had already driven them from their position at

Elkhorn Tavern. Night alone prevented us from achieving a

complete victory of which we had already gathered some of

the fruits, having taken two pieces of artillery and a

quantity of stores.

My troops bivouacked upon the ground which they had so nobly

won, almost exhausted and without food, but fearlessly and

anxiously awaiting the renewal of the battle in the morning.

The morning disclosed the enemy strengthened in position and

numbers and encouraged by the reverses which had unhappily

befallen the other wing of the army when the brave Texan

chieftain, Ben McCulloch, and his gallant comrade, Gen.

Mcintosh, had fallen, fearlessly and triumphantly lead-. ing

their devoted soldiers against the Invaders of their native

land. They knew, too, that Hebert--the accomplished leader

of that veteran regiment, the Louisiana Third, which won so

many laurels on the bloody field of the Oak Hills, and which

then as well as now sustained the proud reputation of

Louisiana--was a prisoner in their hands. They were not slow

to renew the attack; they opened upon us vigorously, but my

trusty men faltered not. They held their position unmoved

until (after several of the batteries not under my command

had left the field) they were ordered to retire. My troops

obeyed it unwillingly, with faces turned defiantly against

the foe.

339

It will be noticed that Price is not as frank as usual in giving reasons

for his rapid retirement at the moment when, he claims, he was in the

full flush of victory. "The retirement of several batteries not under my

command" is a conspicuously inadequate excuse.

In the course of a month or so Van Dorn managed to gather himself

together again so as to begin voluminous communications with Richmond,

explaining that "I was not defeated, but only foiled in my intentions."

He proposed to return to his old Pocahontas plan, "relieve Gen.

Beauregard by marching my army upon the Federals at New Madrid or Cape

Girardeau, and thence on to St. Louis." He would turn his cavalry loose

on Gen. Curtis's long line of communications, and send Gen. Pike with

his Indians to harry southwestern Missouri and Kansas.

The Confederate War Department did not think highly of this, but shortly

transferred him and his troops east of the Mississippi.

Gen. Price was also transferred east of the Mississippi, with the

Missouri troops he had taken into the Confederate army, and his farewell

to the Missouri State troops is worth reproducing as a specimen of the

heated rhetoric customary in those days:

Headquarters Missouri State Guard,

Des Arc, Ark., April 8, 1862. (General Orders No. 79.)

Soldiers of the State Guard: I command you no longer. I have

this day resigned the commission which your patient

endurance, your devoted patriotism and your dauntless

bravery have made so honorable. I have done this that I may

the better serve you, our State and our country--that I may

the sooner lead you back to the fertile prairies, the rich

woodlands and majestic streams of our beloved Missouri--that

I may the more certainly restore you to your once happy

homes and to the loved ones there.

Five thousand of those who have fought side by side with us

under the Grizzly Bears of Missouri have followed me into

the Confederate camp. They appeal to you, as I do, by all

the tender memories of the past, not to leave us now, but to

go with us wherever the path of duty may lead, till we shall

have conquered a peace and won our independence by brilliant

deeds upon new fields of battle.

340

Soldiers of the State Guards! Veterans of six pitched

battles and nearly 20 skirmishes! Conquerors in them all!

Tour country, with Its "ruined hearths and shrines," calls

upon you to rally once more In her defense, and rescue her

forever from the terrible thraldom which threatens her. I

know that she will not call In vain. The Insolent and

barbarous hordes which have dared to Invade our soil and to

desecrate our homes have Just met with a signal overthrow

beyond the Mississippi Now Is the time to end this unhappy

war. If every man will but do his duty, his own roof will

shelter him In peace from the storms of the coming; Winter.

Let not history record that the men who bore with patience

the privations of Cowskln Prairie, who endured

uncomplainingly the burning heat of a Missouri Summer and

the frosts and snows of a Missouri Winter; that the men who

met the enemy at Carthage, at Oak Hills, at Fort Scott, at

Lexington and on numberless lesser battlefields In Missouri,

and met them but to conquer them; that the men who fought so

bravely and so well at Blkhorn; that the unpaid soldiery of

Missouri were, after so many victories and after so much

suffering, unequal to the great task of achieving the

Independence of their magnificent State.

Soldiers, I go but to mark a pathway to our homes. Follow

me!

Very few but those who had already been cajoled into the Confederate

service followed.

A great deal of bitterness was developed from the discovery upon the

battlefield of a number of Union dead who had been scalped by

Pike's Indians. Many of these belonged to the 3d Iowa Cav., and the

investigation of the matter was conducted by order of Col. Bussey, by

his Adjutant, John W. Noble, afterwards Secretary of the Interior. Col.

Bussey became Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

341

The bodies of at least eight of the 3d Iowa Cav. were exhumed and found

to have been scalped and the bodies otherwise maltreated after their

deaths by the scalping knives and tomahawks of merciless Indians. The

matter was made subject of a strong communication from Gen. Curtis

to Gen. Van Dorn, and the latter's Adjutant-General, Dabney H. Maury,

replied, cordially condemning any such deeds, but claiming that, on

the other hand, many prisoners of war had been killed in cold blood by

Curtis's men, who were alleged to be Germans. The letter said:

The General commanding feels sure that you will do your part as he will

in preventing such atrocities in the future, and that the perpetrators

of them will be brought to justice, whether Germans or Choctaws.

Gen. Curtis was promoted to Major-General for his victory, and well

deserved that honor, in spite of some bitter critics. Sigd was also

made a Major-General, with much less reason. Asboth had his withheld

Brigadier-Generalcy confirmed to him. Cols. Carr, Davis and Dodge were

made Brigadier-Generals, but Cols. Osterhaus, White and Bussey, who had

done conspicuous fighting, had to wait some months for their promotion,

and Cols. Greusel and Pattison never received it.

Among those who received praise for their gallantry that day was

Maj. John Charles Black, of the 37th Ill., later a Colonel and

Brigadier-General, Commissioner of Pensions under President Cleveland,

Representative-at-large from Illinois, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand

Army of the Republic, and now President of the United States Civil

Service Commission. Maj. Black was severely wounded in the sword arm in

the fight, but refused to leave the field until Gen. White ordered him

to do so.

Another was Maj. Phillip Sidney Post, of the 59th Ill. He later became

Colonel and Brigadier-General; was left for dead on the field at

Nashville, but recovered, to be Consul-General at Vienna and represent

Illinois for many years in Congress. He was also wounded in the sword

arm, and also refused to leave the field until he was peremptorily

ordered to do so.

342

The moral effect of the victory was prodigious and far-reaching. High

expectations had been raised by Van Dora, McCulloch, Mcintosh, Price

and Albert Pike, which were abjectly prostrated. The mass of fugitives,

white and red, who scattered over Missouri, Arkansas and the Indian

Territory, each with his tale of awful slaughter and disheartened

defeat, had a blighting effect upon the Secessionists, and greatly

strengthened the Union sentiment.

It was a desperate two-days' wrestle between the very best that the

Southern Confederacy could produce west of the Mississippi River--the

ablest commanders and the finest troops--and a small Union army. It was

breaking, test, under the fairest conditions, of the fighting qualities

of the two combatants.

Though bitter, merciless, sanguinary fighting was to perturb the State

for three years longer, it was no longer war, but guerilla raiding and

bandittism, robbery and murder under a pretext of war. Price, indeed,

made an invasion of the State two years later, but it was a hurried

raid, without hope of permanent results.

At the conclusion of the battle Missouri was as firmly anchored to the

Union as her neighbors, Illinois, Iowa and Kansas.

The battle for Missouri had been fought and won.

End of Project Gutenberg's The Struggle for Missouri, by John McElroy