CHAPTER XV.

A brief Exposition of the Jewish Religion, from its Origin down to the

most recent Times.

To render intelligible that part of the story of my life, which refers

to my sentiments regarding religion, I must first give in advance a

short practical _history of the Jewish religion_, and at the outset say

something of the idea of _religion in general_, as well as of the

difference between _natural_ and _positive_ religion.

_Religion in general_ is the expression of gratitude, reverence and the

other feelings, which arise from the dependence of our weal and woe on

one or more powers to us unknown. If we look to the _expression of these

feelings in general_, without regard to the _particular mode of the

expression_, religion is certainly natural to man. He observes many

effects which are of interest to him, but whose causes are to him

unknown; and he finds himself compelled, by the universally recognised

_Principle of Sufficient Reason_, to suppose these causes, and to

express towards them the feelings mentioned.

This expression may be of two kinds, in conformity either with the

_imagination_ or with _reason_. For either man imagines the causes to

be analogous to the effects, and ascribes to them in themselves such

attributes as are revealed through the effects, or he thinks them merely

as causes of certain effects, without seeking thereby to determine their

attributes in themselves. These two modes are both natural to man, the

former being in accordance with his earlier condition, the latter with

that of his perfection.

The difference between these two modes of representation has as its

consequence another difference of religions. The first mode of

representation, in accordance with which the causes are supposed to be

_similar_ to the effects, is the mother of _polytheism_ or _heathenism_.

But the second is the basis of _true_ religion. For as the kinds of

effects are different, the causes also, if held to be like them, must be

represented as different from one another. On the other hand, if, in

accordance with truth, we conceive the idea of _cause in general_ for

these effects, without seeking to determine this cause, either _in

itself_ (since it is wholly unknown), or _analogically_ by help of the

imagination, then we have no ground for supposing several causes, but

require to assume merely a single subject, wholly unknown, as cause of

all these effects.

The different philosophical systems of theology are nothing but

_detailed developments_ of these different modes of representation. The

_atheistic_ system of theology, if so it may be called, rejects

altogether this idea of a _first cause_, (as, according to the

_critical_ system at least, it is merely of _regulative use_ as a

necessary _idea of reason_). All effects are referred to particular

known or unknown causes. In this there cannot be assumed even a

_connection_ between the various effects, else the _reason_ of this

connection would require to be sought beyond the connection itself.

The _Spinozistic_ system, on the contrary, supposes one and the same

substance as immediate cause of all various effects, which must be

regarded as predicates of one and the same subject. _Matter_ and _mind_

are, with Spinoza, one and the same substance, which appears, now under

the former, now under the latter attribute. This single substance is,

according to him, not only the sole being that can be _self-dependent_,

that is, independent of any external cause, but also the sole

_self-subsistent_ being, all so-called beings besides it being merely

its _modes_, that is, particular limitations of its attributes. Every

particular effect in nature is referred by him, not to its proximate

cause (which is merely a _mode_), but immediately to this first cause,

which is the common substance of all beings.

In this system _unity is real_, but _multiplicity_ is merely _ideal_. In

the atheistic system it is the opposite. _Multiplicity_ is _real_, being

founded on the _nature of things themselves_. On the other hand, the

_unity_, which is observed in the order and regularity of nature, is

merely an _accident_, by which we are accustomed to determine our

_arbitrary_ system _for the sake of knowledge_. It is inconceivable

therefore how any one can make out the Spinozistic system to be

atheistic, since the two systems are diametrically opposed to one

another. In the latter the existence of _God_ is denied, but in the

former the existence of the _world_. Spinoza's ought therefore to be

called rather the _acosmic_ system.

The _Leibnitzian_ system holds the mean between the two preceding. In it

all _particular effects_ are referred immediately to _particular

causes_; but these various effects are thought as _connected_ in a

single system, and the cause of this connection is sought in a being

beyond itself.

_Positive_ religion is distinguished from _natural_ in the very same way

as the positive laws of a state from natural laws. The latter are those

which rest on a self-acquired, indistinct knowledge, and are not duly

defined in regard to their application, while the former rest on a

distinct knowledge received from others, and are completely defined in

regard to their application.

A _positive_ religion however must be carefully distinguished from a

_political_ religion. The former has for its end merely the correction

and accurate definition of knowledge, that is, _instruction_ regarding

the first cause: and the knowledge is communicated to another, according

to the measure of his capacity, just as it has been received. But the

latter has for its end mainly the welfare of the state. Knowledge is

therefore communicated, not just as it has been received, but only in so

far as it is found serviceable to this end. Politics, merely as

politics, requires to concern itself about _true religion_ as little as

about _true morality_. The injury, that might arise from this, can be

prevented by other means which influence men at the same time, and thus

all can be kept in equilibrium. Every political religion is therefore at

the same time positive, but every positive religion is not also

political.

Natural religion has no _mysteries_ any more than merely positive

religion. For there is no mystery implied in one man being unable to

communicate his knowledge to another of defective capacity with the same

degree of completeness which he himself has attained; otherwise

mysteries might be attributed to all the sciences, and there would then

be _mysteries of mathematics_ as well as _mysteries of religion_. Only

_political religion_ can have mysteries, in order to lead men in an

indirect way to the attainment of the _political end_, inasmuch as they

are made to believe that thereby they can best attain their _private

ends_, though this is not always in reality the case. There are _lesser_

and _greater_ mysteries in the political religions. The former consist

in the _material_ knowledge of all particular operations and their

connection with one another. The latter, on the contrary, consist in the

knowledge of the _form_, that is, of the end by which the former are

determined. The former constitute the totality of the _laws of

religion_, but the latter contains the _spirit of the laws_.

The _Jewish religion_, even at its earliest origin among the nomadic

patriarchs, is already distinguished from the _heathen_ as _natural

religion_, inasmuch as, instead of the _many comprehensible_ gods of

heathenism, the _unity of an incomprehensible_ God lies at its

foundation. For as the particular causes of the effects, which in

general give rise to a religion, are in themselves unknown, and we do

not feel justified in transferring to the causes the attributes of the

particular effects, in order thereby to characterise them, there remains

nothing but the idea of cause in general, which must be related to all

effects without distinction. This cause cannot even be _analogically_

determined by the effects. For the effects are opposed to one another,

and neutralise each other even in the same object. If therefore we

ascribed them all to one and the same cause, the cause could not be

analogically determined by any.

The _heathen_ religion, on the other hand, refers every kind of effect

to a special cause, which can of course be characterised by its effect.

As a _positive_ religion the Jewish is distinguished from the heathen by

the fact, that it is not a merely political religion, that is, a

religion which has for its end the social interest (in opposition to

true knowledge and private interest); but in accordance with the spirit

of its founder, it is adapted to the theocratic form of the national

Government, which rests on the principle, that only the true religion,

based on rational knowledge, can harmonise with the interest of the

state as well as of the individual. Considered in its _purity_,

therefore, it has no mysteries in the proper sense of the word; that is

to say, it has no doctrines which, in order to reach their end, men

_will_ not disclose, but merely such as _can_ not be disclosed to all.

After the fall of the Jewish state the religion was separated from the

state which no longer existed. The religious authorities were no longer,

as they had been before, concerned about adapting the particular

institutions of religion to the state; but their care went merely to

_preserve_ the religion, on which the existence of the _nation_ now

depended. Moved by hatred towards those nations who had annihilated the

state, and from anxiety lest with the fall of the state the religion

also might fall, they hit upon the following means for the preservation

and extension of their religion.

1. The fiction of a method, handed down from Moses, of expanding the

laws, and applying them to particular cases. This method is not that

which reason enjoins, of modifying laws according to their intention, in

adaptation to time and circumstances, but that which rests upon certain

rules concerning their literary expression.

2. The legislative force ascribed to the new decisions and opinions

obtained by this method, giving to them an equal rank with the ancient

laws. The subtle dialectic, with which this has been carried on down to

our times, and the vast number of laws, customs and useless ceremonies

of all sorts, which it has occasioned, may be easily imagined.

The history of the Jewish religion can, in consequence of this, be

appropriately divided into five great epochs. The first epoch embraces

the _natural religion_, from the times of the patriarchs down to Moses

at the exodus from Egypt. The second comprehends the _positive_ or

_revealed_ religion, from Moses to the time of the _Great Synagogue_

(_Keneseth Haggedolah_). This council must not be conceived as an

assembly of theologians at a definite time; the name applies to the

theologians of a whole epoch from the destruction of the first temple to

the composition of the Mishnah. Of these the first were the _minor

prophets_ (Haggai, Zachariah, Malachi, etc., of whom 120 are counted

altogether), and the last was _Simon the Just_.[32] These, as well as

their forerunners from the time of Joshua, took as their basis the

Mosaic laws, and added new laws according to time and circumstances, but

in conformity with the traditional method, every dispute on the subject

being decided by the _majority of voices_.

The third epoch extends from the composition of the Mishnah by Jehudah

the Saint[33] to the composition of the Talmud by Rabina and

Rabassi.[34] Down to this epoch it was forbidden to commit the laws to

writing, in order that they might not fall into the hands of those who

could make no use of them. But as Rabbi Jehudah Hanassi, or, as he is

otherwise called, Rabbenu Hakades observed, that, in consequence of

their great multiplicity, the laws may easily fall into oblivion, he

gave himself a licence to transgress a single one of the laws in order

to preserve the whole. The law transgressed was that against committing

the laws to writing; and in this licence he defended himself by a

passage in the Psalms, "There are times, when a man shows himself

well-pleasing to God by transgressing the laws."[35] He lived in the

time of Antoninus Pius, was rich, and possessed all the faculties for

such an undertaking. He therefore composed the Mishnah, in which he

delivers the Mosaic laws in accordance either with a traditional or with

a rational method of exposition. It contains also some laws which form

the subject of dispute.

This work is divided into six parts. The first contains the laws

relating to agriculture and horticulture; the second, those which refer

to feasts and holidays. The third part comprehends the laws which define

the mutual relations of the two sexes (marriage, divorce, and such

subjects). The fourth part is devoted to the laws which deal with the

teachers of the law; the fifth, to those which treat of the

temple-service and sacrifices; and the sixth, to the laws of

purification.

As the Mishnah is composed with the greatest precision, and cannot be

understood without a commentary, it was natural, that in course of time

doubts and disputes should arise, regarding the exposition of the

Mishnah itself, as well as the mode of its application to cases which it

does not sufficiently determine. All these doubts and their manifold

solutions, controversies and decisions, were finally collected in the

Talmud by the above-mentioned Rabina and Rabassi; and this forms the

fourth epoch of Jewish legislation.

The fifth epoch begins with the conclusion of the Talmud, and extends

down to our time, and so on for ever (_si diis placet_) till the advent

of the Messiah. Since the conclusion of the Talmud the rabbis have been

by no means idle. 'Tis true, they dare not alter anything in the Mishnah

or the Talmud; but they still have plenty of work to do. Their business

is to explain those two works, so that they shall harmonise; and this is

no small matter, for one rabbi, with a superfine dialectic, is always

finding contradictions in the explanations of another. They must also

disentangle, from the labyrinth of various opinions, expositions,

controversies and decisions, the laws which are applicable to every

case; and finally for new cases, by inferences from those already known,

they must bring out new laws, hitherto left indeterminate in spite of

all previous labours, and thus prepare a complete code of laws.

It is thus that a religion, in its origin _natural_ and _conformable to

reason_, has been abused. A Jew dare not eat or drink, lie with his wife

or attend to the wants of nature, without observing an enormous number

of laws. With the books on the _slaughter_ of animals alone (the

condition of the knife and the examination of the entrails) a whole

library could be filled, which certainly would come near to the

Alexandrian in extent. And what shall I say of the enormous number of

books treating of those laws which are no longer in use, such as the

laws of sacrifice, of purification, etc.? The pen falls from my hand,

when I remember that I and others like me were obliged to spend in this

soul-killing business the best days of our lives when the powers are in

their full vigour, and to sit up many a night, to try and bring out some

sense where there was none, to exercise our wits in the discovery of

contradictions where none were to be found, to display acuteness in

removing them where they were obviously to be met, to hunt after a

shadow through a long series of arguments, and to build castles in the

air.

The abuse of Rabbinism has, as will be seen, a twofold source.

1. The first is an _artificial method_ of expounding the Holy

Scriptures, which distinguishes itself from the _natural_ method by the

fact, that, while the latter rests on a thorough _knowledge of the

language_ and the true _spirit of the legislator_ in view of the

circumstances of the time, as these are known from history, the former

has been devised rather for the sake of the laws passed to meet existing

emergencies. The rabbis look upon the Holy Scriptures, not only as the

source of the fundamental laws of Moses, and of those which are

deducible from these by a rational method, but also as a vehicle of the

laws to be drawn up by themselves according to the wants of the time.

The artificial method here, like every other of the same kind, is merely

a means of bringing the new laws at least into an _external connection_

with the old, in order that they may thereby find a better introduction

among the people, be reduced to principles, divided into classes, and

therefore more easily impressed on the memory. No reasonable rabbi will

hold, that the laws, which are referred in this way to passages of the

Holy Scriptures, render the true sense of these passages; but if

questioned on this point, he will reply, "These laws are necessities of

the time, and are referred to those passages merely for this reason."

2. The second source of the abuse of Rabbinism is to be found in the

manners and customs of other nations, in whose neighbourhood the Jews

have lived, or among whom they have been gradually scattered since the

fall of the Jewish state. These manners and customs they were obliged

to adopt in order to avoid becoming objects of abhorrence. Of this sort

are the laws, _not to uncover the head_ (at least in holy places and at

holy ceremonies), _to wash the hands_ (before meals and prayers), to

fast the whole day till sunset, to say a number of daily prayers, to

make pilgrimages, to walk round the altar, etc.,--all manifestly of

_Arabian_ origin.

From hatred also towards those nations that destroyed the Jewish state,

and afterwards made the Jews undergo manifold oppressions, they have

adopted various customs, and among others many religious usages which

are opposite to those of the _Greeks_ and _Romans_.

In all this the rabbis had the Mosaic laws themselves for a model, these

being sometimes in agreement, sometimes in hostility, with the Egyptian

laws which lie at their root, as has been shown in the most thorough

manner by the celebrated Maimonides in his work, _Moreh Nebhochim_.

It is remarkable, that, with all rabbinical extravagancies in the

_practical_ department, namely the laws and customs, the _theoretical_

department of the Jewish theology has still always preserved itself in

its purity. Eisenmenger may say what he will, it may be shown by

unanswerable arguments, that all the limited figurative representations

of God and His attributes have their source merely in an endeavour to

adapt the ideas of theology to the common understanding. The rabbis

followed in this the principle which they had established in reference

to the Holy Scriptures themselves, namely, that _the Holy Scriptures use

the language of the common people_, inasmuch as religious and moral

sentiments and actions, which form the immediate aim of theology may in

this manner be most easily extended. They therefore represent God to the

common understanding as an earthly King, who with His ministers and the

advisers of His cabinet, the angels, takes counsel concerning the

government of the world. But for the educated mind they seek to take

away all anthropomorphic representations of God, when they say, "It was

an act of high daring on the part of the prophets, to represent the

Creator as like His creature, as when, for example, it is said in

Ezekiel (i., 26), 'And upon the throne was an appearance like man.'"

I have disclosed the abuses of the rabbis in regard to religion without

any partiality. At the same time however I must not be silent about

their good qualities, but do them justice as impartially. Compare then

Mahomed's description of the reward of the pious with the rabbinical

representation. The former runs:--"Here (in paradise) there are as many

dishes as there are stars in heaven. Maidens and boys fill the cups, and

wait on the table. The beauty of the maidens surpasses all imagination.

If one of these maidens were to appear in the sky or in the air by

night, the world would become as bright as when the sun is shining; and

if she were to spit into the sea, its salt water would be turned into

honey, and its bitter into sweet. Milk, honey, white wine will be the

rivers which water this delicious abode. The slime of these rivers will

be made of sweet-smelling nutmegs, and their pebbles of pearls and

hyacinths. The angel Gabriel will open the gates of paradise to faithful

Musselmans. The first thing to meet their eyes will be a table of

diamonds of such enormous length, that it would require 70,000 days to

run round it. The chairs, which stand around the table, will be of gold

and silver, the tablecloths of silk and gold. When the guests have sat

down, they will eat the choicest dishes of paradise, and drink its

water. When they are satisfied, beautiful boys will bring them _green_

garments of costly stuff, and necklaces and earrings of gold. To every

one will then be given a citron; and when he has brought it to his nose

to feel its odour, a maiden of enchanting beauty will come out. Every

one will embrace his own with rapture, and this intoxication of love

will last fifty years without interruption. Each couple will obtain an

enchanting palace for a dwelling, where they will eat and drink and

enjoy all sorts of pleasure for ever and ever.[36]" This description is

beautiful; but how sensuous! The rabbis, on the other hand, say, "Above

(in the blessed abode of the pious) there is neither eating nor

drinking, but the pious sit crowned, and delight themselves with the

vision of the Godhead."

Eisenmenger seeks, in his _Entdecktes Judenthum_ (Theil 1., Kap. 8), by

a crass exposition to throw ridicule on the Platonic doctrine of

reminiscence, which the rabbis maintain; but what may not be made

ridiculous in the same way? He also makes sport, with equal injustice,

of other rabbinical teachings. With the Stoics, for example, the rabbis

call wise men _Kings_; they say, that God does nothing without

previously taking counsel with his angels, that is, Omnipotence works

upon nature not immediately, but by means of the natural forces; they

teach, that everything is predestined by God, except the practice of

virtue. These are the subjects of Eisenmenger's mockery; but does any

reasonable theologian find in these anything ridiculous or impious? I

should be obliged to write a whole book, if I were to answer all the

unjust charges and jeers which have been brought against the Talmudists,

not by Christian writers alone, but even by Jews who wished to pass for

_illuminati_.

To be just to the rabbis it is necessary to penetrate into the true

spirit of the Talmud, to become thoroughly familiar with the manner in

which the ancients generally, but especially the Orientals, deliver

theological, moral, and even physical truths in fables and allegories,

to become familiar also with the style of Oriental hyperbole in

reference to everything that can be of interest to man. Moreover, the

rabbis should be treated in the spirit in which they themselves excused

Rabbi Meïr who had a heretic for his teacher,--the spirit expressed in a

passage already quoted. If justice is thus dealt to the rabbis, the

Talmud will certainly not show all the absurdities which its opponents

are disposed too readily to find.

The rabbinical method of referring theoretical or practical truths, even

by the oddest exegesis, to passages in the Holy Scriptures or any other

book in general esteem, as if they were truths brought out of such

passages by a rational exegesis,--this method, besides procuring an

introduction for the truths among common men, who are not capable of

grasping them on their own merits, and accept them merely on authority,

is also to be regarded as an excellent aid to the memory; for since, as

presumed, these passages are in everybody's mouth, the truths drawn from

them are also retained by their means. Consequently it very often occurs

in the Talmud, when the question concerns the deduction of a new law

from the Holy Scriptures, that one rabbi derives the law from this or

that passage, while another brings the objection, that this cannot be

the true meaning of the passage, inasmuch as the true meaning is this or

that. To such an objection every one is wont to reply, that it is a new

law of the rabbis, who merely refer it to the passage mentioned.

As it is therefore universally presupposed that this method is familiar,

the Talmudists regard it as unnecessary to inculcate it anew on every

occasion. A single example will suffice to illustrate this. One

Talmudist asked another the meaning of the following passage in the

Book of Joshua (xv., 22), _Kinah Vedimonah Veadadah_.[37] The latter

replied, "Here are enumerated the then familiar places of the Holy

Land." "Of course!" rejoined the other. "I know very well that these are

names of places. But, Rabbi ---- knows how to bring out of these,

besides the proper meaning, something _useful_, namely this:--'(Kinah)

He to whom his neighbour gives occasion for revenge, (Vedimonah) and who

yet, out of generosity, keeps silence, taking no revenge, (Veadadah) to

him will the Eternal execute justice.'" What a fine opportunity this

would be for laughing at the poor Talmudist, who derives a moral

sentence from particular names of places, and besides makes in an

extraordinary manner a compound out of the last name, _Sansannah_,[38]

if he had not himself explained that he is seeking to know, not the

_true meaning_ of the passage, but merely a _doctrine_ which may be

referred to it.

Again, the Talmudists have referred to a passage in Isaiah the important

doctrine, that in morals the principal object is, not theory, but

practice, by which theory receives its true value. The passage runs as

follows:--"The expectation of thy happiness"--that is, the happiness

promised by the prophet--"will have for its consequence strength, help,

wisdom, knowledge, and the fear of God."[39] Here they refer the first

six subjects to the six _Sedarim_ or divisions of the Mishnah, which are

the foundation of all Jewish learning. _Emunath_ (Expectation) is Seder

Seraim; _Etecho_ (Happiness) is Seder Moad, and so on. That is to say,

you may be ever so well versed in all these six _sedarim_; yet the main

point is the last, the fear of God.

As far as rabbinical morals in other respects are concerned, I know in

truth nothing that can be urged against them, except perhaps their

excessive strictness in many cases. They form in fact genuine Stoicism,

but without excluding other serviceable principles, such as perfection,

universal benevolence, and the like. Holiness with them extends even to

the thoughts. This principle is, in the usual fashion, referred to the

following passage in the Psalms, "Thou shalt have no strange God in

thee";[40] for in the human heart, it is argued, no strange God can

dwell, except evil desires. It is not allowed to deceive even a heathen

either by deeds or by words--not even in cases where he could lose

nothing by the deceit. For example, the common form of courtesy, "I am

glad to see you well," is not to be used, if it does not express the

real sentiments of the heart. The examples of Jews who cheat Christians

and heathens, which are commonly adduced against this statement, prove

nothing, inasmuch as these Jews do not act in accordance with the

principles of their own morals.

The commandment, "Thou shalt not covet anything that is thy

neighbour's," is so expounded by the Talmudists, that we must guard

against even the wish to possess any such thing. In short, I should

require to write a whole book, if I were to adduce all the excellent

doctrines of rabbinical morals.

The influence of these doctrines in practical life also is unmistakable.

The Polish Jews, who have always been allowed to adopt any means of

gain, and have not, like the Jews of other countries, been restricted to

the pitiful occupation of _Schacher_ or usurer, seldom hear the reproach

of cheating. They remain loyal to the country in which they live, and

support themselves in an honourable way.

Their charity and care for the poor, their institutions for nursing the

sick, their special societies for burial of the dead, are well enough

known. It is not nurses and grave-diggers _hired for money_, but the

_elders of the people_, who are eager to perform these acts. The Polish

Jews are indeed for the most part not yet enlightened by science, their

manners and way of life are still rude; but they are loyal to the

religion of their fathers and the laws of their country. They do not

come before you with courtesies, but their promise is sacred. They are

not gallants, but your women are safe from any snares with them. Woman,

indeed, after the manner of the Orientals in general, is by them not

particularly esteemed; but all the more on that account are they

resolved on fulfilling their duties towards her. Their children do not

learn by heart any _forms_ for expressing love and respect for their

parents--for they do not keep French _demoiselles_;--but they show that

love and respect all the more heartily.

The sacredness of their marriages, and the ever fresh tenderness which

arises from this, deserve especially to be mentioned. Every month the

husband is wholly separated from his wife for a fortnight (the period of

monthly purification in accordance with the rabbinical laws); they may

not so much as touch one another, or eat out of the same dish or drink

out of the same cup. By this means satiety is avoided; the wife

continues to be in the eyes of her husband all that she was as maiden in

the eyes of her lover.

Finally, what innocence rules among unmarried persons! It often happens

that a young man or woman of sixteen or eighteen years is married

without knowing the least about the object of marriage. Among other

nations this is certainly very seldom the case.

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