Chapter XVI--Of Nationality, as connected with Representative Government.

A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they

are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist

between them and any others--which make them co-operate with each

other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the

same government, and desire that it should be government by

themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling of

nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is

the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language and

community of religion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits

are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of

political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and

consequent community of recollections; collective pride and

humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in

the past. None of these circumstances, however, are either

indispensable or necessarily sufficient by themselves. Switzerland has

a strong sentiment of nationality, though the cantons are of different

races, different languages, and different religions. Sicily has

hitherto felt itself quite distinct in nationality from Naples,

notwithstanding identity of religion, almost identity of language, and

a considerable amount of common historical antecedents. The Flemish

and the Walloon provinces of Belgium, notwithstanding diversity of

race and language, have a much greater feeling of common nationality

than the former have with Holland, or the latter with France. Yet in

general the national feeling is proportionally weakened by the failure

of any of the causes which contribute to it. Identity of language,

literature, and, to some extent, of race and recollections, have

maintained the feeling of nationality in considerable strength among

the different portions of the German name, though they have at no time

been really united under the same government; but the feeling has

never reached to making the separate states desire to get rid of their

autonomy. Among Italians, an identity far from complete of language

and literature, combined with a geographical position which separates

them by a distinct line from other countries, and, perhaps more than

every thing else, the possession of a common name, which makes them

all glory in the past achievements in arts, arms, politics, religious

primacy, science, and literature, of any who share the same

designation, give rise to an amount of national feeling in the

population which, though still imperfect, has been sufficient to

produce the great events now passing before us, notwithstanding a

great mixture of races, and although they have never, in either

ancient or modern history, been under the same government, except

while that government extended or was extending itself over the

greater part of the known world.

Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a

_primâ facie_ case for uniting all the members of the nationality

under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This

is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided

by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race

should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various

collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves.

But, when a people are ripe for free institutions, there is a still

more vital consideration. Free institutions are next to impossible in

a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without

fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages,

the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative

government can not exist. The influences which form opinions and

decide political acts are different in the different sections of the

country. An altogether different set of leaders have the confidence of

one part of the country and of another. The same books, newspapers,

pamphlets, speeches, do not reach them. One section does not know what

opinions or what instigations are circulating in another. The same

incidents, the same acts, the same system of government, affect them

in different ways, and each fears more injury to itself from the other

nationalities than from the common arbiter, the state. Their mutual

antipathies are generally much stronger than jealousy of the

government. That any one of them feels aggrieved by the policy of the

common ruler is sufficient to determine another to support that

policy. Even if all are aggrieved, none feel that they can rely on the

others for fidelity in a joint resistance; the strength of none is

sufficient to resist alone, and each may reasonably think that it

consults its own advantage most by bidding for the favor of the

government against the rest. Above all, the grand and only reliable

security in the last resort against the despotism of the government is

in that case wanting--the sympathy of the army with the people. The

military are the part of every community in whom, from the nature of

the case, the distinction between their fellow-countrymen and

foreigners is the deepest and strongest. To the rest of the people

foreigners are merely strangers; to the soldier, they are men against

whom he may be called, at a week's notice, to fight for life or death.

The difference to him is that between friends and enemies--we may

almost say between fellow-men and another kind of animals; for, as

respects the enemy, the only law is that of force, and the only

mitigation the same as in the case of other animals--that of simple

humanity. Soldiers to whose feelings half or three fourths of the

subjects of the same government are foreigners will have no more

scruple in mowing them down, and no more desire to ask the reason why,

than they would have in doing the same thing against declared enemies.

An army composed of various nationalities has no other patriotism than

devotion to the flag. Such armies have been the executioners of

liberty through the whole duration of modern history. The sole bond

which holds them together is their officers and the government which

they serve, and their only idea, if they have any, of public duty, is

obedience to orders. A government thus supported, by keeping its

Hungarian regiments in Italy and its Italian in Hungary, can long

continue to rule in both places with the iron rod of foreign

conquerors.

If it be said that so broadly-marked a distinction between what is due

to a fellow-countryman and what is due merely to a human creature is

more worthy of savages than of civilized beings, and ought, with the

utmost energy, to be contended against, no one holds that opinion more

strongly than myself. But this object, one of the worthiest to which

human endeavour can be directed, can never, in the present state of

civilization, be promoted by keeping different nationalities of any

thing like equivalent strength under the same government. In a

barbarous state of society the case is sometimes different. The

government may then be interested in softening the antipathies of the

races, that peace may be preserved and the country more easily

governed. But when there are either free institutions, or a desire for

them, in any of the peoples artificially tied together, the interest

of the government lies in an exactly opposite direction. It is then

interested in keeping up and envenoming their antipathies, that they

may be prevented from coalescing, and it may be enabled to use some of

them as tools for the enslavement of others. The Austrian court has

now for a whole generation made these tactics its principal means of

government, with what fatal success, at the time of the Vienna

insurrection and the Hungarian contest the world knows too well.

Happily there are now signs that improvement is too far advanced to

permit this policy to be any longer successful.

For the preceding reasons, it is in general a necessary condition of

free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide

in the main with those of nationalities. But several considerations

are liable to conflict in practice with this general principle. In the

first place, its application is often precluded by geographical

hindrances. There are parts even of Europe in which different

nationalities are so locally intermingled that it is not practicable

for them to be under separate governments. The population of Hungary

is composed of Magyars, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Roumans, and in some

districts Germans, so mixed up as to be incapable of local separation;

and there is no course open to them but to make a virtue of necessity,

and reconcile themselves to living together under equal rights and

laws. Their community of servitude, which dates only from the

destruction of Hungarian independence in 1849, seems to be ripening

and disposing them for such an equal union. The German colony of East

Prussia is cut off from Germany by part of the ancient Poland, and

being too weak to maintain separate independence, must, if

geographical continuity is to be maintained, be either under a

non-German government, or the intervening Polish territory must be

under a German one. Another considerable region in which the dominant

element of the population is German, the provinces of Courland,

Esthonia, and Livonia, is condemned by its local situation to form

part of a Slavonian state. In Eastern Germany itself there is a large

Slavonic population; Bohemia is principally Slavonic, Silesia and

other districts partially so. The most united country in Europe,

France, is far from being homogeneous: independently of the fragments

of foreign nationalities at its remote extremities, it consists, as

language and history prove, of two portions, one occupied almost

exclusively by a Gallo-Roman population, while in the other the

Frankish, Burgundian, and other Teutonic races form a considerable

ingredient.

When proper allowance has been made for geographical exigencies,

another more purely moral and social consideration offers itself.

Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and

be absorbed in another; and when it was originally an inferior and

more backward portion of the human race, the absorption is greatly to

its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a

Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current

of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated

people--to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal

terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the

advantages of French protection, and the dignity and _prestige_ of

French power--than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of

past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without

participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The

same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as

members of the British nation.

Whatever really tends to the admixture of nationalities, and the

blending of their attributes and peculiarities in a common union, is a

benefit to the human race. Not by extinguishing types, of which, in

these cases, sufficient examples are sure to remain, but by softening

their extreme forms, and filling up the intervals between them. The

united people, like a crossed breed of animals (but in a still greater

degree, because the influences in operation are moral as well as

physical), inherits the special aptitudes and excellences of all its

progenitors, protected by the admixture from being exaggerated into

the neighboring vices. But, to render this admixture possible, there

must be peculiar conditions. The combinations of circumstances which

occur, and which effect the result, are various.

The nationalities brought together under the same government may be

about equal in numbers and strength, or they may be very unequal. If

unequal, the least numerous of the two may either be the superior in

civilization, or the inferior. Supposing it to be superior, it may

either, through that superiority, be able to acquire ascendancy over

the other, or it may be overcome by brute strength and reduced to

subjection. This last is a sheer mischief to the human race, and one

which civilized humanity with one accord should rise in arms to

prevent. The absorption of Greece by Macedonia was one of the greatest

misfortunes which ever happened to the world; that of any of the

principal countries of Europe by Russia would be a similar one.

If the smaller nationality, supposed to be the more advanced in

improvement, is able to overcome the greater, as the Macedonians,

re-enforced by the Greeks, did Asia, and the English India, there is

often a gain to civilization, but the conquerors and the conquered can

not in this case live together under the same free institutions. The

absorption of the conquerors in the less advanced people would be an

evil: these must be governed as subjects, and the state of things is

either a benefit or a misfortune, according as the subjugated people

have or have not reached the state in which it is an injury not to be

under a free government, and according as the conquerors do or do not

use their superiority in a manner calculated to fit the conquered for

a higher stage of improvement. This topic will be particularly treated

of in a subsequent chapter.

When the nationality which succeeds in overpowering the other is both

the most numerous and the most improved, and especially if the subdued

nationality is small, and has no hope of reasserting its independence,

then, if it is governed with any tolerable justice, and if the members

of the more powerful nationality are not made odious by being invested

with exclusive privileges, the smaller nationality is gradually

reconciled to its position, and becomes amalgamated with the larger.

No Bas-Breton, nor even any Alsatian, has the smallest wish at the

present day to be separated from France. If all Irishmen have not yet

arrived at the same disposition towards England, it is partly because

they are sufficiently numerous to be capable of constituting a

respectable nationality by themselves, but principally because, until

of late years, they had been so atrociously governed that all their

best feelings combined with their bad ones in rousing bitter

resentment against the Saxon rule. This disgrace to England and

calamity to the whole empire has, it may be truly said, completely

ceased for nearly a generation. No Irishman is now less free than an

Anglo-Saxon, nor has a less share of every benefit either to his

country or to his individual fortunes than if he were sprung from any

other portion of the British dominions. The only remaining real

grievance of Ireland, that of the State Church, is one which half, or

nearly half the people of the larger island have in common with them.

There is now next to nothing, except the memory of the past, and the

difference in the predominant religion, to keep apart two races

perhaps the most fitted of any two in the world to be the completing

counterpart of one another. The consciousness of being at last treated

not only with equal justice, but with equal consideration, is making

such rapid way in the Irish nation as to be wearing off all feelings

that could make them insensible to the benefits which the less

numerous and less wealthy people must necessarily derive from being

fellow-citizens instead of foreigners to those who are not only their

nearest neighbors, but the wealthiest, and one of the freest, as well

as most civilized and powerful nations of the earth.

The cases in which the greatest practical obstacles exist to the

blending of nationalities are when the nationalities which have been

bound together are nearly equal in numbers and in the other elements

of power. In such cases, each, confiding in its strength, and feeling

itself capable of maintaining an equal struggle with any of the

others, is unwilling to be merged in it; each cultivates with party

obstinacy its distinctive peculiarities; obsolete customs, and even

declining languages, are revived, to deepen the separation; each deems

itself tyrannized over if any authority is exercised within itself by

functionaries of a rival race; and whatever is given to one of the

conflicting nationalities is considered to be taken from all the rest.

When nations thus divided are under a despotic government which is a

stranger to all of them, or which, though sprung from one, yet feeling

greater interest in its own power than in any sympathies of

nationality, assigns no privilege to either nation, and chooses its

instruments indifferently from all, in the course of a few generations

identity of situation often produces harmony of feeling, and the

different races come to feel towards each other as fellow-countrymen,

particularly if they are dispersed over the same tract of country. But

if the era of aspiration to free government arrives before this fusion

has been effected, the opportunity has gone by for effecting it. From

that time, if the unreconciled nationalities are geographically

separate, and especially if their local position is such that there is

no natural fitness or convenience in their being under the same

government (as in the case of an Italian province under a French or

German yoke), there is not only an obvious propriety, but, if either

freedom or concord is cared for, a necessity for breaking the

connection altogether. There may be cases in which the provinces,

after separation, might usefully remain united by a federal tie; but

it generally happens that if they are willing to forego complete

independence, and become members of a federation, each of them has

other neighbors with whom it would prefer to connect itself, having

more sympathies in common, if not also greater community of interest.

Considerations on Representative Government · 第 15 / 17 章