Should a member of the legislature be bound by the instructions of his
constituents? Should he be the organ of their sentiments, or of his
own? their ambassador to a congress, or their professional agent,
empowered not only to act for them, but to judge for them what ought
to be done? These two theories of the duty of a legislator in a
representative government have each its supporters, and each is the
recognized doctrine of some representative governments. In the Dutch
United Provinces, the members of the States-General were mere
delegates; and to such a length was the doctrine carried, that when
any important question arose which had not been provided for in their
instructions, they had to refer back to their constituents, exactly as
an ambassador does to the government from which he is accredited. In
this and most other countries which possess representative
constitutions, law and custom warrant a member of Parliament in voting
according to his opinion of right, however different from that of his
constituents; but there is a floating notion of the opposite kind,
which has considerable practical operation on many minds, even of
members of Parliament, and often makes them, independently of desire
for popularity or concern for their re-election, feel bound in
conscience to let their conduct on questions on which their
constituents have a decided opinion be the expression of that opinion
rather than of their own. Abstractedly from positive law, and from the
historical traditions of any particular people, which of these notions
of the duty of a representative is the true one?
Unlike the questions which we have hitherto treated, this is not a
question of constitutional legislation, but of what may more properly
be called constitutional morality--the ethics of representative
government. It does not so much concern institutions as the temper of
mind which the electors ought to bring to the discharge of their
functions, the ideas which should prevail as to the moral duties of an
elector; for, let the system of representation be what it may, it will
be converted into one of mere delegation if the electors so choose. As
long as they are free not to vote, and free to vote as they like, they
can not be prevented from making their vote depend on any condition
they think fit to annex to it. By refusing to elect any one who will
not pledge himself to all their opinions, and even, if they please, to
consult with them before voting on any important subject not foreseen,
they can reduce their representative to their mere mouthpiece, or
compel him in honor, when no longer willing to act in that capacity,
to resign his seat. And since they have the power of doing this, the
theory of the Constitution ought to suppose that they will wish to do
it, since the very principle of constitutional government requires it
to be assumed that political power will be abused to promote the
particular purposes of the holder; not because it always is so, but
because such is the natural tendency of things, to guard against which
is the especial use of free institutions. However wrong, therefore, or
however foolish, we may think it in the electors to convert their
representative into a delegate, that stretch of the electoral
privilege being a natural and not improbable one, the same precautions
ought to be taken as if it were certain. We may hope that the electors
will not act on this notion of the use of the suffrage; but a
representative government needs to be so framed that even if they do,
they shall not be able to effect what ought not to be in the power of
any body of persons--class legislation for their own benefit.
When it is said that the question is only one of political morality,
this does not extenuate its importance. Questions of constitutional
morality are of no less practical moment than those relating to the
constitution itself. The very existence of some governments, and all
that renders others endurable, rests on the practical observance of
doctrines of constitutional morality; traditional notions in the minds
of the several constituted authorities, which modify the use
that might otherwise be made of their powers. In unbalanced
governments--pure monarchy, pure aristocracy, pure democracy--such
maxims are the only barrier which restrains the government from the
utmost excesses in the direction of its characteristic tendency. In
imperfectly balanced governments, where some attempt is made to set
constitutional limits to the impulses of the strongest power, but
where that power is strong enough to overstep them with at least
temporary impunity, it is only by doctrines of constitutional
morality, recognized and sustained by opinion, that any regard at all
is preserved for the checks and limitations of the constitution. In
well-balanced governments, in which the supreme power is divided, and
each sharer is protected against the usurpations of the others in the
only manner possible, namely, by being armed for defense with weapons
as strong as the others can wield for attack, the government can only
be carried on by forbearance on all sides to exercise those extreme
powers, unless provoked by conduct equally extreme on the part of some
other sharer of power; and in this case we may truly say that only by
the regard paid to maxims of constitutional morality is the
constitution kept in existence. The question of pledges is not one of
those which vitally concern the existence of representative
governments, but it is very material to their beneficial operation.
The laws can not prescribe to the electors the principles by which
they shall direct their choice, but it makes a great practical
difference by what principles they think they ought to direct it; and
the whole of that great question is involved in the inquiry whether
they should make it a condition that the representative shall adhere
to certain opinions laid down for him by his constituents.
No reader of this treatise can doubt what conclusion, as to this
matter, results from the general principles which it professes.
We have from the first affirmed, and unvaryingly kept in
view, the coequal importance of two great requisites of
government--responsibility to those for whose benefit political power
ought to be, and always professes to be, employed; and jointly
therewith, to obtain, in the greatest measure possible, for the
function of government, the benefits of superior intellect, trained by
long meditation and practical discipline to that special task. If this
second purpose is worth attaining, it is worth the necessary price.
Superior powers of mind and profound study are of no use, if they do
not sometimes lead a person to different conclusions from those which
are formed by ordinary powers of mind without study; and if it be an
object to possess representatives in any intellectual respect superior
to average electors, it must be counted upon that the representative
will sometimes differ in opinion from the majority of his
constituents, and that when he does, his opinion will be the oftenest
right of the two. It follows that the electors will not do wisely if
they insist on absolute conformity to their opinions as the condition
of his retaining his seat.
The principle is thus far obvious; but there are real difficulties in
its application, and we will begin by stating them in their greatest
force. If it is important that the electors should choose a
representative more highly instructed than themselves, it is no less
necessary that this wiser man should be responsible to them; in other
words, they are the judges of the manner in which he fulfils his
trust; and how are they to judge, except by the standard of their own
opinions? How are they even to select him in the first instance but by
the same standard? It will not do to choose by mere brilliancy--by
superiority of showy talent. The tests by which an ordinary man can
judge beforehand of mere ability are very imperfect; such as they are,
they have almost exclusive reference to the arts of expression, and
little or none to the worth of what is expressed. The latter can not
be inferred from the former; and if the electors are to put their own
opinions in abeyance, what criterion remains to them of the ability to
govern well? Neither, if they could ascertain, even infallibly, the
ablest man, ought they to allow him altogether to judge for them,
without any reference to their own opinions. The ablest candidate may
be a Tory, and the electors Liberals; or a Liberal, and they may be
Tories. The political questions of the day may be Church questions,
and he may be a High-Churchman or a Rationalist, while they may be
Dissenters or Evangelicals, and _vice versâ_. His abilities, in these
cases, might only enable him to go greater lengths, and act with
greater effect, in what they may conscientiously believe to be a wrong
course; and they may be bound, by their sincere convictions, to think
it more important that their representative should be kept, on these
points, to what they deem the dictate of duty, than that they should
be represented by a person of more than average abilities. They may
also have to consider, not solely how they can be most ably
represented, but how their particular moral position and mental point
of view shall be represented at all. The influence of every mode of
thinking which is shared by numbers ought to be felt in the
Legislature; and the Constitution being supposed to have made due
provision that other and conflicting modes of thinking shall be
represented likewise, to secure the proper representation for their
own mode may be the most important matter which the electors on the
particular occasion have to attend to. In some cases, too, it may be
necessary that the representative should have his hands tied to keep
him true to their interest, or rather to the public interest as they
conceive it. This would not be needful under a political system which
assured them an indefinite choice of honest and unprejudiced
candidates; but under the existing system, in which the electors are
almost always obliged, by the expenses of election and the general
circumstances of society, to select their representative from persons
of a station in life widely different from theirs, and having a
different class interest, who will affirm that they ought to abandon
themselves to his discretion? Can we blame an elector of the poorer
classes, who has only the choice among two or three rich men, for
requiring from the one he votes for a pledge to those measures which
he considers as a test of emancipation from the class interests of the
rich? It will, moreover, always happens to some members of the
electoral body to be obliged to accept the representative selected by
a majority of their own side. But, though a candidate of their own
choosing would have no chance, their votes may be necessary to the
success of the one chosen for them, and their only means of exerting
their share of influence on his subsequent conduct may be to make
their support of him dependent on his pledging himself to certain
conditions.
These considerations and counter-considerations are so intimately
interwoven with one another; it is so important that the electors
should choose as their representatives wiser men than themselves, and
should consent to be governed according to that superior wisdom, while
it is impossible that conformity to their own opinions, when they have
opinions, should not enter largely into their judgment as to who
possesses the wisdom, and how far its presumed possessor has verified
the presumption by his conduct, that it seems quite impracticable to
lay down for the elector any positive rule of duty; and the result
will depend less on any exact prescription or authoritative doctrine
of political morality than on the general tone of mind of the
electoral body in respect to the important requisite of deference to
mental superiority. Individuals and peoples who are acutely sensible
of the value of superior wisdom are likely to recognize it, where it
exists, by other signs than thinking exactly as they do, and even in
spite of considerable differences of opinion; and when they have
recognized it they will be far too desirous to secure it, at any
admissible cost, to be prone to impose their own opinion as a law upon
persons whom they look up to as wiser than themselves. On the other
hand, there is a character of mind which does not look up to any one;
which thinks no other person's opinion much better than its own, or
nearly so good as that of a hundred or a thousand persons like itself.
Where this is the turn of mind of the electors, they will elect no one
who is not, or at least who does not profess to be, the image of their
own sentiments, and will continue him no longer than while he reflects
those sentiments in his conduct; and all aspirants to political honors
will endeavour, as Plato says in the Gorgias, to fashion themselves
after the model of the Demos, and make themselves as like to it as
possible. It can not be denied that a complete democracy has a strong
tendency to cast the sentiments of the electors in this mould.
Democracy is not favorable to the reverential spirit. That it destroys
reverence for mere social position must be counted among the good, not
the bad part of its influences, though by doing this it closes the
principal _school_ of reverence (as to merely human relations) which
exists in society. But also democracy, in its very essence, insists so
much more forcibly on the things in which all are entitled to be
considered equally than on those in which one person is entitled to
more consideration than another, that respect for even personal
superiority is likely to be below the mark. It is for this, among
other reasons, I hold it of so much importance that the institutions
of the country should stamp the opinions of persons of a more educated
class as entitled to greater weight than those of the less educated;
and I should still contend for assigning plurality of votes to
authenticated superiority of education were it only to give the tone
to public feeling, irrespective of any direct political consequences.
When there does exist in the electoral body an adequate sense of the
extraordinary difference in value between one person and another, they
will not lack signs by which to distinguish the persons whose worth
for their purposes is the greatest. Actual public services will
naturally be the foremost indication: to have filled posts of
magnitude, and done important things in them, of which the wisdom has
been justified by the results; to have been the author of measures
which appear from their effects to have been wisely planned; to have
made predictions which have been of verified by the event, seldom or
never falsified by it; to have given advice, which when taken has been
followed by good consequences--when neglected, by bad. There is
doubtless a large portion of uncertainty in these signs of wisdom; but
we are seeking for such as can be applied by persons of ordinary
discernment. They will do well not to rely much on any one indication,
unless corroborated by the rest, and, in their estimation of the
success or merit of any practical effort, to lay great stress on the
general opinion of disinterested persons conversant with the subject
matter. The tests which I have spoken of are only applicable to tried
men, among whom must be reckoned those who, though untried
practically, have been tried speculatively; who, in public speech or
in print, have discussed public affairs in a manner which proves that
they have given serious study to them. Such persons may, in the mere
character of political thinkers, have exhibited a considerable amount
of the same titles to confidence as those who have been proved in the
position of practical statesmen. When it is necessary to choose
persons wholly untried, the best criteria are, reputation for ability
among those who personally know them, and the confidence placed and
recommendations given by persons already looked up to. By tests like
these, constituencies who sufficiently value mental ability, and
eagerly seek for it, will generally succeed in obtaining men beyond
mediocrity, and often men whom they can trust to carry on public
affairs according to their unfettered judgment; to whom it would be an
affront to require that they should give up that judgment at the
behest of their inferiors in knowledge. If such persons, honestly
sought, are not to be found, then indeed the electors are justified in
taking other precautions, for they can not be expected to postpone
their particular opinions, unless in order that they may be served by
a person of superior knowledge to their own. They would do well,
indeed, even then, to remember that when once chosen, the
representative, if he devotes himself to his duty, has greater
opportunities of correcting an original false judgment than fall to
the lot of most of his constituents; a consideration which generally
ought to prevent them (unless compelled by necessity to choose some
one whose impartiality they do not fully trust) from exacting a pledge
not to change his opinion, or, if he does, to resign his seat. But
when an unknown person, not certified in unmistakable terms by some
high authority, is elected for the first time, the elector can not be
expected not to make conformity to his own sentiments the primary
requisite. It is enough if he does not regard a subsequent change of
those sentiments, honestly avowed, with its grounds undisguisedly
stated, as a peremptory reason for withdrawing his confidence.
Even supposing the most tried ability and acknowledged eminence of
character in the representative, the private opinions of the electors
are not to be placed entirely in abeyance. Deference to mental
superiority is not to go the length of self-annihilation--abnegation
of any personal opinion. But when the difference does not relate to
the fundamentals of politics, however decided the elector may be in
his own sentiments, he ought to consider that when an able man differs
from him there is at least a considerable chance of his being in the
wrong, and that even if otherwise, it is worth while to give up his
opinion in things not absolutely essential, for the sake of the
inestimable advantage of having an able man to act for him in the many
matters in which he himself is not qualified to form a judgment. In
such cases he often endeavours to reconcile both wishes by inducing
the able man to sacrifice his own opinion on the points of difference;
but for the able man to lend himself to this compromise is treason
against his especial office--abdication of the peculiar duties of
mental supremacy, of which it is one of the most sacred not to desert
the cause which has the clamor against it, nor to deprive of his
services those of his opinions which need them the most. A man of
conscience and known ability should insist on full freedom to act as
he in his own judgment deems best, and should not consent to serve on
any other terms. But the electors are entitled to know how he means to
act; what opinions, on all things which concern his public duty, he
intends should guide his conduct. If some of these are unacceptable to
them, it is for him to satisfy them that he nevertheless deserves to
be their representative; and if they are wise, they will overlook, in
favor of his general value, many and great differences between his
opinions and their own. There are some differences, however, which
they can not be expected to overlook. Whoever feels the amount of
interest in the government of his country which befits a freeman, has
some convictions on national affairs which are like his life-blood;
which the strength of his belief in their truth, together with the
importance he attaches to them, forbid him to make a subject of
compromise, or postpone to the judgment of any person, however greatly
his superior. Such convictions, when they exist in a people, or in any
appreciable portion of one, are entitled to influence in virtue of
their mere existence, and not solely in that of the probability of
their being grounded in truth. A people can not be well governed in
opposition to their primary notions of right, even though these may be
in some points erroneous. A correct estimate of the relation which
should subsist between governors and governed does not require the
electors to consent to be represented by one who intends to govern
them in opposition to their fundamental convictions. If they avail
themselves of his capacities of useful service in other respects at a
time when the points on which he is vitally at issue with them are not
likely to be mooted, they are justified in dismissing him at the first
moment when a question arises involving these, and on which there is
not so assured a majority for what they deem right as to make the
dissenting voice of that particular individual unimportant. Thus (I
mention names to illustrate my meaning, not for any personal
application) the opinions supposed to be entertained by Mr. Cobden and
Mr. Bright on resistance to foreign aggression might be overlooked
during the Crimean war, when there was an overwhelming national
feeling on the contrary side, and might yet very properly lead to
their rejection by the electors at the time of the Chinese quarrel
(though in itself a more doubtful question), because it was then for
some time a moot point whether their view of the case might not
prevail.
As the general result of what precedes, we may affirm that actual
pledges should not be required unless, from unfavorable social
circumstances or family institutions, the electors are so narrowed in
their choice as to be compelled to fix it on a person presumptively
under the influence of partialities hostile to their interest: That
they are entitled to a full knowledge of the political opinions and
sentiments of the candidate; and not only entitled, but often bound to
reject one who differs from themselves on the few articles which are
the foundation of their political belief: that, in proportion to the
opinion they entertain of the mental superiority of a candidate, they
ought to put up with his expressing and acting on opinions different
from theirs on any number of things not included in their fundamental
articles of belief: that they ought to be unremitting in their search
for a representative of such calibre as to be intrusted with full
power of obeying the dictates of his own judgment: that they should
consider it a duty which they owe to their fellow-countrymen, to do
their utmost toward placing men of this quality in the Legislature,
and that it is of much greater importance to themselves to be
represented by such a man than by one who professes agreement in a
greater number of their opinions; for the benefits of his ability are
certain, while the hypothesis of his being wrong and their being right
on the points of difference is a very doubtful one.
I have discussed this question on the assumption that the electoral
system, in all that depends on positive institution, conforms to the
principles laid down in the preceding chapters. Even on this
hypothesis, the delegation theory of representation seems to me false,
and its practical operation hurtful, though the mischief would in that
case be confined within certain bounds. But if the securities by which
I have endeavoured to guard the representative principle are not
recognized by the Constitution; if provision is not made for the
representation of minorities, nor any difference admitted in the
numerical value of votes, according to some criterion of the amount of
education possessed by the voters--in that case, no words can
exaggerate the importance in principle of leaving an unfettered
discretion to the representative; for it would then be the only
chance, under universal suffrage, for any other opinions than those of
the majority to be heard in Parliament. In that falsely called
democracy which is really the exclusive rule of the operative classes,
all others being unrepresented and unheard, the only escape from class
legislation in its narrowest, and political ignorance in its most
dangerous form, would lie in such disposition as the uneducated might
have to choose educated representatives, and to defer to their
opinions. Some willingness to do this might reasonably be expected,
and every thing would depend upon cultivating it to the highest point.
But, once invested with political omnipotence, if the operative
classes voluntarily concurred in imposing in this or any other manner
any considerable limitation upon their self-opinion and self-will,
they would prove themselves wiser than any class possessed of absolute
power has shown itself, or, we may venture to say, is ever likely to
show itself under that corrupting influence.