Chapter IV--Under what Social Conditions Representative Government is Inapplicable.

We have recognized in representative government the ideal type of the

most perfect polity for which, in consequence, any portion of mankind

are better adapted in proportion to their degree of general

improvement. As they range lower and lower in development, that form

of government will be, generally speaking, less suitable to them,

though this is not true universally; for the adaptation of a people to

representative government does not depend so much upon the place they

occupy in the general scale of humanity as upon the degree in which

they possess certain special requisites; requisites, however, so

closely connected with their degree of general advancement, that any

variation between the two is rather the exception than the rule. Let

us examine at what point in the descending series representative

government ceases altogether to be admissible, either through its own

unfitness or the superior fitness of some other regimen.

First, then, representative, like any other government, must

be unsuitable in any case in which it can not permanently

subsist--_i.e._, in which it does not fulfill the three fundamental

conditions enumerated in the first chapter. These were, 1. That the

people should be willing to receive it. 2. That they should be willing

and able to do what is necessary for its preservation. 3. That they

should be willing and able to fulfill the duties and discharge the

functions which it imposes on them.

The willingness of the people to accept representative government only

becomes a practical question when an enlightened ruler, or a foreign

nation or nations who have gained power over the country, are disposed

to offer it the boon. To individual reformers the question is almost

irrelevant, since, if no other objection can be made to their

enterprise than that the opinion of the nation is not yet on their

side, they have the ready and proper answer, that to bring it over to

their side is the very end they aim at. When opinion is really

adverse, its hostility is usually to the fact of change rather than to

representative government in itself. The contrary case is not indeed

unexampled; there has sometimes been a religious repugnance to any

limitation of the power of a particular line of rulers; but, in

general, the doctrine of passive obedience meant only submission to

the will of the powers that be, whether monarchical or popular. In any

case in which the attempt to introduce representative government is at

all likely to be made, indifference to it, and inability to understand

its processes and requirements, rather than positive opposition, are

the obstacles to be expected. These, however, are as fatal, and may be

as hard to be got rid of as actual aversion; it being easier, in most

cases, to change the direction of an active feeling than to create one

in a state previously passive. When a people have no sufficient value

for, and attachment to, a representative constitution, they have next

to no chance of retaining it. In every country, the executive is the

branch of the government which wields the immediate power, and is in

direct contact with the public; to it, principally, the hopes and

fears of individuals are directed, and by it both the benefits, and

the terrors, and _prestige_ of government are mainly represented to

the public eye. Unless, therefore, the authorities whose office it is

to check the executive are backed by an effective opinion and feeling

in the country, the executive has always the means of setting them

aside or compelling them to subservience, and is sure to be well

supported in doing so. Representative institutions necessarily depend

for permanence upon the readiness of the people to fight for them in

case of their being endangered. If too little valued for this, they

seldom obtain a footing at all, and if they do, are almost sure to be

overthrown as soon as the head of the government, or any party leader

who can muster force for a _coup de main_, is willing to run some

small risk for absolute power.

These considerations relate to the first two causes of failure in a

representative government. The third is when the people want either

the will or the capacity to fulfill the part which belongs to them in

a representative constitution. When nobody, or only some small

fraction, feels the degree of interest in the general affairs of the

state necessary to the formation of a public opinion, the electors

will seldom make any use of the right of suffrage but to serve their

private interest, or the interest of their locality, or of some one

with whom they are connected as adherents or dependents. The small

class who, in this state of public feeling, gain the command of the

representative body, for the most part use it solely as a means of

seeking their fortune. If the executive is weak, the country is

distracted by mere struggles for place; if strong, it makes itself

despotic, at the cheap price of appeasing the representatives, or such

of them as are capable of giving trouble, by a share of the spoil; and

the only fruit produced by national representation is, that in

addition to those who really govern, there is an assembly quartered on

the public, and no abuse in which a portion of the assembly are

interested is at all likely to be removed. When, however, the evil

stops here, the price may be worth paying for the publicity and

discussion which, though not an invariable, are a natural

accompaniment of any, even nominal, representation. In the modern

kingdom of Greece, for example, it can hardly be doubted, that the

place-hunters who chiefly compose the representative assembly, though

they contribute little or nothing directly to good government, nor

even much temper the arbitrary power of the executive, yet keep up the

idea of popular rights, and conduce greatly to the real liberty of the

press which exists in that country. This benefit, however, is entirely

dependent on the coexistence with the popular body of an hereditary

king. If, instead of struggling for the favors of the chief ruler,

these selfish and sordid factions struggled for the chief place

itself, they would certainly, as in Spanish America, keep the country

in a state of chronic revolution and civil war. A despotism, not even

legal, but of illegal violence, would be alternately exercised by a

succession of political adventurers, and the name and forms of

representation would have no effect but to prevent despotism from

attaining the stability and security by which alone its evils can be

mitigated or its few advantages realized.

The preceding are the cases in which representative government can not

permanently exist. There are others in which it possibly might exist,

but in which some other form of government would be preferable. These

are principally when the people, in order to advance in civilization,

have some lesson to learn, some habit not yet acquired, to the

acquisition of which representative government is likely to be an

impediment.

The most obvious of these cases is the one already considered, in

which the people have still to learn the first lesson of civilization,

that of obedience. A race who have been trained in energy and courage

by struggles with Nature and their neighbors, but who have not yet

settled down into permanent obedience to any common superior, would be

little likely to acquire this habit under the collective government of

their own body. A representative assembly drawn from among themselves

would simply reflect their own turbulent insubordination. It would

refuse its authority to all proceedings which would impose, on their

savage independence, any improving restraint. The mode in which such

tribes are usually brought to submit to the primary conditions of

civilized society is through the necessities of warfare, and the

despotic authority indispensable to military command. A military

leader is the only superior to whom they will submit, except

occasionally some prophet supposed to be inspired from above, or

conjurer regarded as possessing miraculous power. These may exercise a

temporary ascendancy, but as it is merely personal, it rarely effects

any change in the general habits of the people, unless the prophet,

like Mohammed, is also a military chief, and goes forth the armed

apostle of a new religion; or unless the military chiefs ally

themselves with his influence, and turn it into a prop for their own

government.

A people are no less unfitted for representative government by the

contrary fault to that last specified--by extreme passiveness, and

ready submission to tyranny. If a people thus prostrated by character

and circumstances could obtain representative institutions, they would

inevitably choose their tyrants as their representatives, and the yoke

would be made heavier on them by the contrivance which _primâ facie_

might be expected to lighten it. On the contrary, many a people has

gradually emerged from this condition by the aid of a central

authority, whose position has made it the rival, and has ended by

making it the master, of the local despots, and which, above all, has

been single. French history, from Hugh Capet to Richelieu and Louis

XIV., is a continued example of this course of things. Even when the

king was scarcely so powerful as many of his chief feudatories, the

great advantage which he derived from being but one has been

recognized by French historians. To him the eyes of _all_ the locally

oppressed were turned; he was the object of hope and reliance

throughout the kingdom, while each local potentate was only powerful

within a more or less confined space. At his hands, refuge and

protection were sought from every part of the country against first

one, then another of the immediate oppressors. His progress to

ascendancy was slow; but it resulted from successively taking

advantage of opportunities which offered themselves only to him. It

was, therefore, sure; and, in proportion as it was accomplished, it

abated, in the oppressed portion of the community, the habit of

submitting to oppression. The king's interest lay in encouraging all

partial attempts on the part of the serfs to emancipate themselves

from their masters, and place themselves in immediate subordination to

himself. Under his protection numerous communities were formed which

knew no one above them but the king. Obedience to a distant monarch is

liberty itself compared with the dominion of the lord of the

neighboring castle; and the monarch was long compelled by necessities

of position to exert his authority as the ally rather than the master

of the classes whom he had aided in affecting their liberation. In

this manner a central power, despotic in principle, though generally

much restricted in practice, was mainly instrumental in carrying the

people through a necessary stage of improvement, which representative

government, if real, would most likely have prevented them from

entering upon. There are parts of Europe where the same work is still

to be done, and no prospect of its being done by any other means.

Nothing short of despotic rule or a general massacre could effect the

emancipation of the serfs in the Russian Empire.

The same passages of history forcibly illustrate another mode in which

unlimited monarchy overcomes obstacles to the progress of civilization

which representative government would have had a decided tendency to

aggravate. One of the strongest hindrances to improvement, up to a

rather advanced stage, is an inveterate spirit of locality. Portions

of mankind, in many other respects capable of, and prepared for

freedom, may be unqualified for amalgamating into even the smallest

nation. Not only may jealousies and antipathies repel them from one

another, and bar all possibility of voluntary union, but they may not

yet have acquired any of the feelings or habits which would make the

union real, supposing it to be nominally accomplished. They may, like

the citizens of an ancient community, or those of an Asiatic village,

have had considerable practice in exercising their faculties on

village or town interests, and have even realized a tolerably

effective popular government on that restricted scale, and may yet

have but slender sympathies with any thing beyond, and no habit or

capacity of dealing with interests common to many such communities. I

am not aware that history furnishes any example in which a number of

these political atoms or corpuscles have coalesced into a body, and

learned to feel themselves one people, except through previous

subjection to a central authority common to all. [2] It is through

the habit of deferring to that authority, entering into its plans and

subserving its purposes, that a people such as we have supposed

receive into their minds the conception of large interests common to a

considerable geographical extent. Such interests, on the contrary, are

necessarily the predominant consideration in the mind of the central

ruler; and through the relations, more or less intimate, which he

progressively establishes with the localities, they become familiar to

the general mind. The most favorable concurrence of circumstances

under which this step in improvement could be made would be one which

should raise up representative institutions without representative

government; a representative body or bodies, drawn from the

localities, making itself the auxiliary and instrument of the central

power, but seldom attempting to thwart or control it. The people being

thus taken, as it were, into council, though not sharing the supreme

power, the political education given by the central authority is

carried home, much more effectually than it could otherwise be, to the

local chiefs and to the population generally, while, at the same time,

a tradition is kept up of government by general consent, or at least,

the sanction of tradition is not given to government without it,

which, when consecrated by custom, has so often put a bad end to a

good beginning, and is one of the most frequent causes of the sad

fatality which in most countries has stopped improvement in so early a

stage, because the work of some one period has been so done as to bar

the needful work of the ages following. Meanwhile, it may be laid down

as a political truth, that by irresponsible monarchy rather than by

representative government can a multitude of insignificant political

units be welded into a people, with common feelings of cohesion, power

enough to protect itself against conquest or foreign aggression, and

affairs sufficiently various and considerable of its own to occupy

worthily and expand to fit proportions the social and political

intelligence of the population.

For these several reasons, kingly government, free from the control

(though perhaps strengthened by the support) of representative

institutions, is the most suitable form of polity for the earliest

stages of any community, not excepting a city community like those of

ancient Greece; where, accordingly, the government of kings, under

some real, but no ostensible or constitutional control by public

opinion, did historically precede by an unknown and probably great

duration all free institutions, and gave place at last, during a

considerable lapse of time, to oligarchies of a few families.

A hundred other infirmities or shortcomings in a people might be

pointed out which _pro tanto_ disqualify them from making the best use

of representative government; but in regard to these it is not equally

obvious that the government of One or a Few would have any tendency to

cure or alleviate the evil. Strong prejudices of any kind; obstinate

adherence to old habits; positive defects of national character, or

mere ignorance, and deficiency of mental cultivation, if prevalent in

a people, will be in general faithfully reflected in their

representative assemblies; and should it happen that the executive

administration, the direct management of public affairs, is in the

hands of persons comparatively free from these defects, more good

would frequently be done by them when not hampered by the necessity of

carrying with them the voluntary assent of such bodies. But the mere

position of the rulers does not in these, as it does in the other

cases which we have examined, of itself invest them with interests and

tendencies operating in the beneficial direction. From the general

weaknesses of the people or of the state of civilization, the One and

his councillors, or the Few, are not likely to be habitually exempt;

except in the case of their being foreigners, belonging to a superior

people or a more advanced state of society. Then, indeed, the rulers

may be, to almost any extent, superior in civilization to those over

whom they rule; and subjection to a foreign government of this

description, notwithstanding its inevitable evils, is often of the

greatest advantage to a people, carrying them rapidly through several

stages of progress, and clearing away obstacles to improvement which

might have lasted indefinitely if the subject population had been left

unassisted to its native tendencies and chances. In a country not

under the dominion of foreigners, the only cause adequate to producing

similar benefits is the rare accident of a monarch of extraordinary

genius. There have been in history a few of these who, happily for

humanity, have reigned long enough to render some of their

improvements permanent, by leaving them under the guardianship of a

generation which had grown up under their influence. Charlemagne may

be cited as one instance; Peter the Great is another. Such examples

however are so unfrequent that they can only be classed with the happy

accidents which have so often decided at a critical moment whether

some leading portion of humanity should make a sudden start, or sink

back towards barbarism--chances like the existence of Themistocles at

the time of the Persian invasion, or of the first or third William of

Orange. It would be absurd to construct institutions for the mere

purpose of taking advantage of such possibilities, especially as men

of this calibre, in any distinguished position, do not require

despotic power to enable them to exert great influence, as is

evidenced by the three last mentioned. The case most requiring

consideration in reference to institutions is the not very uncommon

one in which a small but leading portion of the population, from

difference of race, more civilized origin, or other peculiarities of

circumstance, are markedly superior in civilization and general

character to the remainder. Under those conditions, government by the

representatives of the mass would stand a chance of depriving them of

much of the benefit they might derive from the greater civilization of

the superior ranks, while government by the representatives of those

ranks would probably rivet the degradation of the multitude, and leave

them no hope of decent treatment except by ridding themselves of one

of the most valuable elements of future advancement. The best prospect

of improvement for a people thus composed lies in the existence of a

constitutionally unlimited, or at least a practically preponderant

authority in the chief ruler of the dominant class. He alone has by

his position an interest in raising and improving the mass, of whom he

is not jealous, as a counterpoise to his associates, of whom he is;

and if fortunate circumstances place beside him, not as controllers

but as subordinates, a body representative of the superior caste,

which, by its objections and questionings, and by its occasional

outbreaks of spirit, keeps alive habits of collective resistance, and

may admit of being, in time and by degrees, expanded into a really

national representation (which is in substance the history of the

English Parliament), the nation has then the most favorable prospects

of improvement which can well occur to a community thus circumstanced

and constituted.

Among the tendencies which, without absolutely rendering a people

unfit for representative government, seriously incapacitate them from

reaping the full benefit of it, one deserves particular notice. There

are two states of the inclinations, intrinsically very different, but

which have something in common, by virtue of which they often coincide

in the direction they give to the efforts of individuals and of

nations; one is, the desire to exercise power over others; the other

is disinclination to have power exercised over themselves. The

difference between different portions of mankind in the relative

strength of these two dispositions is one of the most important

elements in their history. There are nations in whom the passion for

governing others is so much stronger than the desire of personal

independence, that for the mere shadow of the one they are found ready

to sacrifice the whole of the other. Each one of their number is

willing, like the private soldier in an army, to abdicate his personal

freedom of action into the hands of his general, provided the army is

triumphant and victorious, and he is able to flatter himself that he

is one of a conquering host, though the notion that he has himself any

share in the domination exercised over the conquered is an illusion. A

government strictly limited in its powers and attributions, required

to hold its hands from overmeddling, and to let most things go on

without its assuming the part of guardian or director, is not to the

taste of such a people; in their eyes the possessors of authority can

hardly take too much upon themselves, provided the authority itself is

open to general competition. An average individual among them prefers

the chance, however distant or improbable, of wielding some share of

power over his fellow-citizens, above the certainty, to himself and

others, of having no unnecessary power exercised over them. These are

the elements of a people of place-hunters, in whom the course of

politics is mainly determined by place-hunting; where equality alone

is cared for, but not liberty; where the contests of political parties

are but struggles to decide whether the power of meddling in every

thing shall belong to one class or another, perhaps merely to one knot

of public men or another; where the idea entertained of democracy is

merely that of opening offices to the competition of all instead of a

few; where, the more popular the institutions, the more innumerable

are the places created, and the more monstrous the overgovernment

exercised by all over each, and by the executive over all. It would be

as unjust as it would be ungenerous to offer this, or any thing

approaching to it, as an unexaggerated picture of the French people;

yet the degree in which they do participate in this type of character

has caused representative government by a limited class to break down

by excess of corruption, and the attempt at representative government

by the whole male population to end in giving one man the power of

consigning any number of the rest, without trial, to Lambessa or

Cayenne, provided he allows all of them to think themselves not

excluded from the possibility of sharing his favors. The point of

character which, beyond any other, fits the people of this country for

representative government, is that they have almost universally the

contrary characteristic. They are very jealous of any attempt to

exercise power over them not sanctioned by long usage and by their own

opinion of right; but they in general care very little for the

exercise of power over others. Not having the smallest sympathy with

the passion for governing, while they are but too well acquainted with

the motives of private interest from which that office is sought, they

prefer that it should be performed by those to whom it comes without

seeking, as a consequence of social position. If foreigners understood

this, it would account to them for some of the apparent contradictions

in the political feelings of Englishmen; their unhesitating readiness

to let themselves be governed by the higher classes, coupled with so

little personal subservience to them, that no people are so fond of

resisting authority when it oversteps certain prescribed limits, or so

determined to make their rulers always remember that they will only be

governed in the way they themselves like best. Place-hunting,

accordingly, is a form of ambition to which the English, considered

nationally, are almost strangers. If we except the few families or

connections of whom official employment lies directly in the way,

Englishmen's views of advancement in life take an altogether different

direction--that of success in business or in a profession. They have

the strongest distaste for any mere struggle for office by political

parties or individuals; and there are few things to which they have a

greater aversion than to the multiplication of public employments; a

thing, on the contrary, always popular with the bureaucracy-ridden

nations of the Continent, who would rather pay higher taxes than

diminish, by the smallest fraction, their individual chances of a

place for themselves or their relatives, and among whom a cry for

retrenchment never means abolition of offices, but the reduction of

the salaries of those which are too considerable for the ordinary

citizen to have any chance of being appointed to them.

Considerations on Representative Government · 第 4 / 17 章