One of the oldest and most important elements in such systems is the
conception of justice. Society is impossible unless those who are
associated agree to observe certain rules of conduct towards one
another; its stability depends on the steadiness with which they abide
by that agreement; and, so far as they waver, that mutual trust which is
the bond of society is weakened or destroyed. Wolves could not hunt in
packs except for the real, though unexpressed, understanding that they
should not attack one another during the chase. The most rudimentary
polity is a pack of men living under the like tacit, or expressed,
understanding; and having made the very important advance upon wolf
society, that they agree to use the force of the whole body against
individuals who violate it and in favour of those who observe it. This
observance of a common understanding, with the consequent distribution
of punishments and rewards according to accepted rules, received the
name of justice, while the contrary was called injustice. Early ethics
did not take much note of the animus of the violator of the rules.
But civilization could not advance far without the establishment of a
capital distinction between the case of involuntary and that of wilful
misdeed; between a merely wrong action and a guilty one.
And, with increasing refinement of moral appreciation, the problem of
desert, which arises out of this distinction, acquired more and more
theoretical and practical importance. If life must be given for life,
yet it was recognized that the unintentional slayer did not altogether
deserve death; and, by a sort of compromise between the public and the
private conception of justice, a sanctuary was provided in which he
might take refuge from the avenger of blood.
The idea of justice thus underwent a gradual sublimation from punishment
and reward according to acts, to punishment and reward according to
desert; or, in other words, according to motive. Righteousness, that is,
action from right motive, not only became synonymous with justice, but
the positive constituent of innocence and the very heart of goodness.