THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI
First phase, November 20--Tanks _en masse_--Attack on the Tunnel
Trench--Byng's great advance--Fine work of Braithwaite's Sixty-second
Division--Hard fighting of Pulteney's Third Corps--Exploit of Fort
Garry Horse--Second day of battle--Rally of Germans--Capture of
Bourlon Wood by Fortieth Division--Attack by the Guards on La
Fontaine.
The year 1917 had begun with high hopes for the Allies since they had
planned a common offensive which could hardly have failed to break
the German resistance. Both France and England had honourably
carried out their share in the common contract. It was the sudden
and absolute break down of Russia which caused the year to set in
gloom rather than in glory. The phenomenon of that great fermenting
putrefying country was more like some huge cataclysm of nature, some
monstrous convulsion of the elements, than any ordinary political
movement, so that anger and contempt were softened into pure
amazement as the gradual dissolution of the vast organism took place
from week to week before a wondering world. It was as though a
robust man had suddenly softened into liquid putrescence before one's
eyes. But from a military standpoint it was a disaster of the first
order for the Allies and checked their victorious career in the West,
where the failing {236} German line could always be buttressed up by
fresh guns and fresh divisions from the East. Now on the top of this
misfortune another unforeseen and almost incredible occurrence placed
them at a further disadvantage. The Italian army had done so
splendidly well and had won such unfailing ascendancy over the
Austrians that their stability seemed as firm as the mountains amid
which they fought. It seems, however, that insidious and treasonable
propaganda of the familiar type had spread disaffection in the ranks,
and the Second Army, which held the very centre of the Gorizian line,
collapsed suddenly. The result was a very great success for the
Austrian and German forces, who pushed through the breach, and with
little loss to themselves captured more than 200,000 prisoners and
nearly 2000 guns. It was a very severe blow for the Allies, and
never was their fine spirit better shown than by the instant steps
which they took to hold Italy up in the moment of her extreme need.
By road and by rail reinforcements poured through the passes of the
Alps and along the shores of the Mediterranean. Whilst the flanking
armies of the Italians fell back upon new lines French and British
divisions were hastening forward to share their pressing danger. The
Isonzo and the Tagliamento had been in succession abandoned, for a
severe flanking attack from the north threatened to break through the
passes and debouch upon the Friulian Plain. Finally the line of the
Piave was reached which still covered Venice. Here the steadier
troops were halted. In the First Army upon the right there had been
little disorganisation, and their retreat along the coast under
constant pressure was a fine bit of work. Ten batteries of British
heavies were {237} among the artillery of this army, and every one of
them was man-handled to the new positions. By mid-winter two French
and two British Corps, veterans of many battles, were lined up on or
near the Piave, waiting eagerly to try conclusions with these new
adversaries. This detached British army was commanded by General
Plumer, with Generals Lord Cavan and Haking as his Corps commanders.
The two Corps, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth, were made up of the
Fifth, Seventh, Twenty-third, Forty-first, and Forty-eighth
Divisions, grand units all. It was a sore loss to the battle-line of
Flanders--a loss which in the case of two of them was but temporary.
We shall now descend the line to the section which extends from
Bullecourt in the north to Villers-Ghislain in the south, opposite to
the important town of Cambrai, some seven miles behind the Hindenburg
Line. It was here that the Field-Marshal had determined to strike
his surprise blow, an enterprise which he has described in so lucid
and detailed a despatch that the weary chronicler has the rare
experience of finding history adequately recorded by the same brain
which planned it. The plan was a very daring one, for the spot
attacked was barred by the full unbroken strength of the Hindenburg
main and support lines, a work so huge and solid that it seems to
take us back from these superficial days to the era of the Cyclopean
builder or the founder of the great monuments of antiquity. These
enormous excavations of prodigious length, depth, and finish are
object lessons both of the strength of the Germans, the skill of
their engineers, and the ruthlessness with which they exploited the
slave and captive labour with which so much of it was built. Besides
this {238} terrific barricade there was the further difficulty that
the whole method of attack was experimental, and that to advance
without artillery fire against such a position would appear to be a
most desperate venture. On the other hand it was known that the
German line was thin and that their man-power had been attracted
northwards by the long epic of the Paschendaale attack. There was a
well-founded belief that the tanks would prove equal to the task of
breaking the front, and sufficient infantry had been assembled to
take advantage of any opening which might be made. The prize, too,
was worth a risk, for apart from the possibility of capturing the
important centre of Cambrai, the possession of the high ground at
Bourlon would be of great strategic value. The enterprise was placed
in the hands of General Byng, the famous leader of the Third Cavalry
Division and afterwards of the Canadian Corps, who had taken
Allenby's place at the head of the Third Army. Under him were from
the north, the Sixth, Fourth, Third, and Seventh Corps under Haldane,
Woolcombe, Pulteney, and Snow, containing some of the most seasoned
fighting material in the army. The troops were brought up stealthily
by night, and the tanks which were crawling from every direction
towards the trysting-place were carefully camouflaged. The French
had been apprised of the attack, and had made arrangements by which,
if there were an opening made to the south some of their divisions
should be available to take advantage of it.
[Illustration: Fighting Line, November 20, 1917]
The tanks were about four hundred in number and were under the
separate command of General Elles, a dashing soldier who inspired the
utmost enthusiasm in his command. It had always been {239} the
contention of the tank designers in England that their special weapon
needed, what it had never yet found, virgin ground which was neither
a morass nor wilderness of shell-holes. The leading lines of tanks
had been furnished with enormous faggots of wood which they carried
across their bows and which would be released so as to fall forward
into any ditch or trench and to form a rude bridge. These ready-made
weight-bearers were found to act admirably.
One difficulty with which the operations were confronted was that it
was impossible for the guns to register properly without arousing
suspicion. It was left to the gunners, therefore, to pick up their
range as best they might after the action began, and this they did
with a speed and accuracy which showed their high technical
efficiency.
Taking the description of the operations upon November 20th from the
north end of the line we shall first deal with the subsidiary but
very important and successful attacks carried out by Haldaae's Sixth
Corps in the neighbourhood of Bullecourt. The Hindenburg Line at
this point consisted of a front trench with a second or support
trench 300 yards behind it, and many scattered Mebus or concrete
machine-gun forts. The British had already a lodgement in part of
the front trench, and the main objective now was the support trench
which was called "Tunnel Trench" because it had a tunnel 30 or 40
feet down along its whole length with staircase entrances every 25
yards. The units to whom the attack was entrusted were the Third
Division upon the right, and the Sixteenth Irish Division upon the
left.
The morning of November 20 was overcast but not actually raining,
with low visibility, which may {240} account for the fact that the
German barrage was feeble, slow, and inaccurate.
The advance of the Sixteenth Division was by three brigades, the 47th
on the right, the 48th in the centre, and the 49th upon the left.
Every up-to-date infantry-saving device, the artillery barrage, the
machine-gun barrage, and the Stokes-mortar smoke-screen was used to
the full. The guns had been reinforced by a portion of the artillery
of the Thirty-fourth Division, and the support which they gave was
admirably effective. We will trace the attack from the right.
The flank battalion was the 6th Connaughts with the 1st Munsters upon
their left. Their objective was taken with a spring. The Munsters
were able to consolidate at once. The Connaughts had more trouble as
a rush of German bombers came down upon their right, driving the
flank company in and forcing it back down the sap. For several hours
there was hard fighting at this point, which was often hand-to-hand
when the Irish bayonet men rushed at the German bomb-throwers.
Finally a block and a defensive flank were formed, and two big Mebus,
Mars and Jove, were left in the hands of the stormers.
In the centre the advance of the 10th Dublin Fusiliers and of the 2nd
Dublin Fusiliers was entirely successful. So sudden was the attack
that many of the enemy were found wearing their gas masks. Two large
Mebus, Juno and Minerva, with a good stretch of tunnel trench
remained, together with many prisoners, in the hands of the stormers.
The position was rapidly wired with concertina wire and new trenches
dug for defence and communication by the {241} 155th Field Co. R.E.
and the 11th Hants Pioneer battalion.
On the left the storming battalions were the 2nd Royal Irish and the
7/8th Irish Fusiliers. The Royal Irish carried both tunnel and
support trenches with the Flora Mebus, taking 200 prisoners. Many
Germans retreated into the tunnel, but were pelted out again by Mills
grenades. The Fusiliers were equally successful, but had one short
hold-up owing to the determined resistance of a single officer and
ten men. This little party made a brave fight, and were so situated
that they commanded two lines of trench. Eventually they were all
killed. The support trench was occupied, the tunnel cleared by the
174th Tunnelling Company, and the whole position made good in a most
workmanlike way. A series of counter-attacks were stamped out by the
barrage before they could get properly going.
The tunnel, as explained, was a continuous gallery opening into the
trench and extending eastwards. It had numerous chambers leading
off, fitted with wire bunks, tables, etc. This section was
elaborately mined, but the position of the leads had been accurately
disclosed by a deserter, and they were soon cut by the sappers.
In this swift and successful operation some 635 prisoners of the
470th and 471st Regiments were taken, with many minor trophies. Many
Germans had been killed, 330 bodies being counted in the trenches
alone. Altogether it was a remarkably smooth-running operation, and
the model of an attack with limited objective, upon which General
Haldane and all concerned might be congratulated. It was the more
remarkable as it was carried out without {242} preliminary
bombardment, and no help from the tanks.
While the Irish had attacked upon the left a single brigade of the
Third Division, the 9th, advanced upon their right, and keeping pace
with their comrades carried out a most successful attack, securing a
further length of the tunnel trench. There was no further fighting
of consequence in this area of the battle, save for some movement
forward on the part of the Irish division and one short
counter-attack by the Germans.
It will be understood that this attack was some miles to the north of
the main battle, and that a long section of unbroken Hindenburg Line
intervened between the two. Along this line the Fifty-sixth Division
kept up a spirited Chinese attack all day. The real advance was upon
a frontage of six miles which covered the front from Hermies in the
north to Gonnelieu in the south. Every company of the advancing
units had been instructed to fall in behind its own marked tank. At
6.20, just after dawn, in a favouring haze, General Elles gave the
signal, his iron-clad fleet flowed forward, the field of wire went
down with a long splintering rending crash, the huge faggots were
rolled forward into the gaping ditches, and the eager infantry
crowded forward down the clear swathes which the monsters had cut.
At the same moment the guns roared out, and an effective
smoke-barrage screened the whole strange spectacle from the German
observers.
The long line of tanks, magnified to monstrous size in the dim light
of early dawn, the columns of infantry with fixed bayonets who
followed them, all advancing in silent order, formed a spectacle
which none who took part in it could ever forget. Everything went
{243} without a hitch, and in a few minutes the whole Hindenburg Line
with its amazed occupants was in the hands of the assailants. Still
following their iron guides they pushed on to their further
objectives. As these differed, and as the fortunes of the units
varied, it will be well to take them in turn, always working from the
left of the line.
The British front was cut across diagonally by a considerable canal
with deep sides, the Canal du Nord. Upon the north side of this was
one division. This flank unit was the famous Thirty-sixth Ulsters,
who behaved this day with their usual magnificent gallantry.
Advancing with deliberate determination, they carried all before
them, though exposed to that extra strain to which a flank unit must
always submit. Their left was always enfiladed by the enemy and they
had continually to build up a defensive line, which naturally
subtracted from their numbers and made a long advance impossible.
None the less, after rushing a high bank bristling with machine-guns
they secured the second Hindenburg Line, where they were firmly
established by 10.30 after a sharp contest with the garrison. They
then swept forward, keeping the canal upon their right, until by
evening they had established themselves upon the Bapaume-Cambrai
Road. It was the brigade moving parallel to the Sixty-second
Division upon which the heavier work fell.
Upon the immediate right of the Irishmen was Braithwaite's
Sixty-second Division of West Riding Yorkshire Territorials--one of
those second line units whose solid excellence has been one of the
surprises of the war. Six of them had already come to the front, and
not one of the six which had not made its {244} mark. On this
occasion the men of the West Riding made an advance which was the
admiration of the army, and which the Field-Marshal, who weighs his
words carefully, described as "a brilliant achievement." The first
obstacle in front of the 185th West Yorkshire Brigade upon the right
was the village of Havrincourt, which, with the aid of the tanks,
they carried in dashing style, though the resistance from the Château
was very fierce. Behind it lay the reserve German line, which also
was taken at the point of the bayonet. Upon the left the 187th
Brigade, containing two Yorks and Lancaster and two Yorkshire Light
Infantry battalions, swept gloriously forward and got every
objective, including the northern half of Havrincourt. The 2/5th
Yorkshire Light Infantry was particularly fine, as it charged without
tanks and yet kept up with the line. The 186th Brigade, consisting
of four battalions of the West Riding Regiment, then passed through
in a splendid rush which carried them up to and through the village
of Graincourt, regardless of the fact that Flesquières on the right
was untaken. Surging on the 188th Reserve Brigade reached and
captured the important village of Graincourt, much aided by two
audacious tanks. With an energy which was still unabated they pushed
on to Anneux, where they reached the fringe of the houses. It was a
truly splendid day's work, in which four and a half miles of every
devilry which German sappers could build or German infantry defend
was inexorably beaten down. In all these operations they were aided
and supported, not only by the tanks, but by the 11th Hussars, and
also by a body of King Edward's Horse. Thirty-seven guns and 2000
prisoners were the fine trophies of this one division.
{245}
Upon the right of Braithwaite's Yorkshiremen was the Fifty-first
Highland Territorial Division. They also made a fine advance, but
were held up by the strongly organised village of Flesquières. The
approach to it was a long slope swept by machine-gun fire, and the
co-operation of the tanks was made difficult by a number of advanced
field-guns which destroyed the slow-moving machines as they
approached up the hill. If the passage of the Hindenburg Line showed
the strength of these machines, the check at Flesquières showed their
weakness, for in their present state of development they were
helpless before a well-served field-gun, and a shell striking them
meant the destruction of the tank, and often the death of the crew.
It is said that a single Prussian artillery officer, who stood by his
gun to the death and is chivalrously immortalised in the British
bulletin, destroyed no less than sixteen tanks by direct hits. At
the same time the long and solid wall of the Château formed an
obstacle to the infantry, as did the tangle of wire which surrounded
the village. The fighting was very severe and the losses
considerable, but before evening the Highlanders had secured the
ground round the village and were close up to the village itself.
The delay had, however, a sinister effect upon the British plans, as
the defiant village, spitting out flames and lead from every cranny
and window, swept the ground around and created a broad zone on
either side, across which progress was difficult and dangerous. It
was the resistance of this village, and the subsequent breaking of
the bridges upon the canal, which prevented the cavalry from
fulfilling their full rôle upon this first day of battle. {246} None
the less as dismounted units they did sterling work, and one small
mounted body of Canadian Cavalry, the Fort Garry Horse from Winnipeg,
particularly distinguished itself, getting over every obstacle,
taking a German battery, dispersing a considerable body of infantry,
and returning after a day of desperate adventure without their
horses, but with a sample of the forces which they had encountered.
It was a splendid deed of arms, for which Lieutenant Henry Strachan,
who led the charge after the early fall of the squadron leader,
received the coveted Cross.
Upon the right of the Fifty-first Division was the Sixth, which was
faced by the village of Ribecourt. Into this it stormed, and after
some heavy street and house fighting it cleared it of its German
garrison. The advance was carried out with the 71st Brigade upon the
right and the 18th upon the left. The village was carried by storm
by the 9th Norfolks of the 71st Brigade passing through the 1st
Leicesters, who, together with the 2nd Sherwood Foresters, had
stormed the Hindenburg Line, following close upon the tanks, upon
whose iron flanks they could hear the rifle bullets patter like
hailstones. The losses of the division were light, as their
instructions were to dig in upon the further side of the village and
act as a connecting link. The Foresters, however, had at least one
sharp tussle before they gained their full objective. A shock
battalion charged them, and there was a period of desperate fighting
during which the Germans displayed a valour which sometimes was
almost that of fanatics. "One of their companies was cut off. We
offered them quarter, but they would not hear of {247} it. The last
to go was a young sub. When he saw that all was up he drew his
revolver and shot himself. As he fell I ran forward in the hope to
save him, for he was a brave lad. When I got to his side he looked
at me with a look of intense hate and tried to take aim with his
pistol. It fell from his hand and he fell dead with that look of
hate still on his face."
In connection with this advance of the Sixth Division it should be
stated that the 2nd Durham Light Infantry upon the left charged a
battery and captured the guns, a fine feat of arms.
Upon the right of the Sixth Division was the Twenty-ninth Regular
Division which was held back from the advance until its flank was
secured upon the right. When this had been accomplished by the
Twelfth Division it dashed swiftly forward upon a three-brigade
front; the 87th and 86th Brigades seizing respectively Marcoing and
Neuf Wood which is immediately beyond it. Here they found themselves
in very close collaboration with the Sixth Division, through whom
they passed in their advance. On the right the 88th Brigade, after
hard fighting in the Hindenburg support line, captured Les Rues
Vertes and part of Mesnières. The taking of these two villages was
really of great importance in the general scheme of operations, and
the advances of the divisions upon either flank may be looked upon as
simply a screen to cover the Twenty-ninth while it sped forward upon
its venture. The reason of this was that the Canal de l'Escaut, a
very formidable obstacle, covered the whole German front south of
Cambrai, and that unless it were taken all advance in this direction
was impossible. There were bridges at Mesnières and Marcoing, and
these were the nearest {248} points to the British line. Hence it
was that the flanks of the Twenty-ninth were carefully covered and a
clear opening made for it, that with one tiger-spring it might seize
this vital position. The bridge at Marcoing was captured intact, the
leading tank shooting down the party who were engaged in its
demolition. At Mesnières, which is the more important point, the
advancing troops were less fortunate, as the bridge had already been
injured and an attempt by a tank to cross it led to both bridge and
tank crashing down into the canal. This proved to be a serious
misfortune, and coupled with the hold-up at Flesquières, was the one
untoward event in a grand day's work. Both the tanks and the cavalry
were stopped by the broken bridge, and though the infantry still
pushed on their advance was slower, as it was necessary to clear that
part of the village which lay north of the canal and then to go
forward without support over open country. Thus the Germans had time
to organise resistance upon the low hills from Rumilly to Crevecoeur
and to prevent the advance reaching its full limits. A footbridge
was secured by the Newfoundlanders at Mesnières, and it may be
mentioned as a curious example of the wide sweep of the British
Empire that the first man to get across it, and to lose his life in
the gallant deed, was an Esquimaux from Labrador. The centre brigade
got about 1500 yards beyond Marcoing, but there the Germans from
Cambrai had formed a new line which could not be forced. The enemy
recognised this advance as being for the moment the most menacing
part of the British line, and at once adopted the very strongest
measures to push it back and secure the bridgeheads of the {249}
canal. Several times upon November 21 they raged against this point
of the line and made desperate attempts to gain the two villages.
Noyelle, which was held by the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, was also
strongly attacked upon that day, but with the aid of the 2nd Royal
Fusiliers and 16th Middlesex the village was held against a series of
onslaughts, one position changing hands seven times. Some of these
counter-attacks were delivered by Prussian Guards, hastily brought
from Lens, and the fighting was as severe as it usually is when the
Kaiser's own men put in an appearance. These events, however, were
on the 21st, and we must return to the first day of the battle.
On the right of the Twenty-ninth was the Twentieth Division. In
front of them, upon the farther side of the line, had lain the
powerfully fortified farm of La Vacquerie, and this they had taken
with their first rush. Beyond lay a long slope, strongly held by the
Germans, called the Welsh Ridge. This also was stormed by the
Twentieth, who kept pace with the right flank of the Twenty-ninth,
and pushed their advance forward as far as the canal. At the same
time the 59th Brigade was thrown out upon the right to make a
prolongation of the defensive flank built up by the Twelfth Division
and so screen the main attack. All went well with the right of this
advance, but the left, consisting of the 10th K.R.R., was held for a
time by a strong point which eventually surrendered and yielded 200
prisoners. Some of this battalion saw the enemy running towards
Mesnières and pursued them to the main bridge. The troops received a
most affectionate welcome from the inhabitants of the houses along
{250} the Cambrai Road. The attack upon the left was carried out by
the 12th K.R.R. and 6th Oxfords of the 60th Brigade, which swept with
little resistance over the Hindenburg Line, but had some trouble with
strong points beyond. One of these points of resistance which was
carried by the 12th K.R.R. accounted for all the officers of the
party and 62 out of 96 men, before it was put out of action by the
survivors. Captain Hoare, a veteran Rifleman who had risen from the
ranks, was killed at this point, and his orderly, a lad of twenty
named Shepherd, took over the direction of the party and carried the
operation through with such dash and valour that he was awarded the
Victoria Cross.
We now come to the Twelfth Division upon the flank, the first English
division of the New Army, a unit which had greatly distinguished
itself at Ovillers and elsewhere. Its task was in some ways the most
difficult of any, as it had not only to advance upon important
objectives but to build up a flank line of resistance as it went,
since the whole attack might have been checked and brought to ruin by
an enemy assault from the south. The 36th Brigade upon the left
advanced with the 9th Royal Fusiliers and 7th Sussex in their front
line, while two companies of the 8th Fusiliers were thrown out upon
the left to aid in the attack upon La Vacquerie. On the right by the
Banteaux Spur was the 35th Brigade with the 9th Essex and 5th
Berkshires in the front. The latter battalion lost heavily from the
fire of guns on their right. When on the line of Bleak House the
supporting battalions, two companies of Fusiliers and the 11th
Middlesex upon the left, the 7th Suffolks and part of the 7th
Norfolks upon the right, passed {251} on to the objective. The 37th
Brigade then passed through upon the right and settled in an echelon
of battalions along the flank, the 7th East Surreys and 6th Buffs
starting the line, while the 6th West Kent and 6th West Surrey
prolonged it. While executing this delicate and complicated movement
the battalions were under heavy fire and had to clear Lateau Wood of
the enemy, so that it was a fine bit of work on the part both of the
leaders and of the men. The two chief points of German resistance
outside the wood were the forts of Pam-Pam and Bonavis, both of which
were attacked by tanks and then carried by storm by the Kentish
infantry. By 11 o'clock the whole advance, covering a front of 2000
with a depth of 5500 yards, had reached its full objectives at every
point. The total losses of the division were about 1300 men. Major
Alderman, commanding the West Kents, was among those who fell. It
may be added that from this day until the fateful 30th the division
was out of the battle and made no move, save that on November 24 the
35th and 36th Brigades pushed a short way down the slope eastwards to
the St. Quentin Canal.
Some allusion has already been made to the dispositions of the
cavalry. The original plan was that the First and Fifth Cavalry
Divisions, closely supported by the Second, should, the instant that
the way was clear, push forward to surround and isolate Cambrai, and
also to isolate and threaten Bourlon Wood from the north and east.
The situation was never such, however, as to allow any large body of
cavalry to get through. At dawn on the morning of the 21st a patrol
of 5th Lancers ascertained that the Germans still held the
Marcoing-Beaurevoir line in {252} force. On the left, however, the
success of the fifty-first Division had made more open space, and on
this side the Bays and the 4th Dragoon Guards penetrated upon the
21st as far as Fontaine and did some useful work.
The Twelfth Division formed the flank of Pulteney's Third Corps.
Upon its right was Snow's Seventh Corps, the left-hand unit of which
was the Fifty-fifth Division of Lancashire Territorials, which had
not been involved in the advance, and indeed was nominally resting
after its supreme exertions at Ypres where it had taken a notable
part in battle after battle. It had been planned, however, that some
demonstration should be made upon this front in order to divert the
enemy's forces and to correspond with the attack at Bullecourt upon
the north. This was carried out by the 164th Brigade and may have
had the desired effect although it gave no permanent gain. A point
called the Knoll, with an adjacent farm, was carried by the stormers
and was held for most of the day, but they were forced back to their
own old lines in the evening, after a long day of battle in which
they incurred such heavy losses that the brigade was seriously
crippled at a later date when the full strength of the division was
urgently needed.
This ended the first day of the battle, which represented a
considerable victory, and one which vindicated the enterprise and
brain-power of the British inventor and engineer as much as the
valour of the soldier. The German line was deeply indented over a
front of 6 miles and to a depth of 4½ miles. More than 5000
prisoners with many guns had been taken. The famous Hindenburg Line
had been severed. The villages of Havrincourt, Graincourt, {253}
Ribecourt, Marcoing, Noyelle, and Mesnières were all in British
hands. It was a good beginning, so good that it was determined not
to suspend the operations, but to try the results of a second day and
see what could be attained before the arrival of the full German
supports. Even with their excellent rear organisation and their
great junction at Cambrai, it was hoped that a clear forty-eight
hours must pass from the opening of the battle before they could
build up a really formidable line.
There were no operations of any importance during the night of the
20th, but early upon November 21 the British line began to move
forward once more, the same divisions being engaged in the advance.
In the north the Ulstermen, who had attained the line of the
Cambrai-Bapaume Road, crossed that boundary and pushed onwards up the
slope for about a mile until they reached the outskirts of the
village of Mœuvres which they were unable to retain. It was soon
apparent, both here and at other points along the line, that the
Germans with their usual military efficiency had brought up their
reserves even more rapidly than had been expected, and the resistance
at Mœuvres was so determined that the tired division was unable to
overcome it. The 169th Brigade of the Fifty-sixth Division pushed up
on the left of the Ulstermen and occupied the German outpost line,
from which they were able later to attack the main Hindenburg Line.
The Sixty-second Division upon the right of the Ulstermen had got to
the edge of Anneux upon the night before, and now the 2/4th West
Ridings were able to complete their conquest. The 186th Brigade then
drove across the Cambrai Road and reached the {254} edge of the
considerable plantation called Bourlon Wood which rises upon a
swelling hill, the summit being so marked in that gently undulating
country that it becomes a landmark in the distance. Here there was
very strong opposition, with so murderous a machine-gun fire that all
progress was arrested, though a number of tanks drove their way in
among the trees in an effort to break down the resistance. In the
meantime the flank of the Yorkshiremen had been protected by the
capture of the village of Cantaing with several hundred more
prisoners.
Early in the day the Fifty-first had got round the northern edge of
Flesquières, the village which had held up the centre of the advance
upon the first day. As a consequence it fell and the front was
cleared for a further advance. The Scotch infantry was then able to
make a rapid advance of nearly three miles, taking Cantaing with 500
prisoners upon the way, and winding up in front of the village of
Fontaine-Notre-Dame, which they stormed in a very brilliant fashion
with the aid of tanks and of some squadrons of the First Cavalry
Division as already noted.
Farther south the Sixth and Twenty-ninth Divisions acting in close
co-operation had pushed their way through Mesnières, where they met
and defeated a counter-attack from the direction of Rumilly. It was
clear that every hour the German line was thickening in this quarter.
Whilst the Sixth cleared the ground upon the left, the Twenty-ninth
pushed forward and reached Noyelle, where with the aid of those
useful allies, the dismounted troopers of the First and Fifth Cavalry
Divisions, including the Umballa Brigade of Indians, they made good
the village as already described.
{255}
In the meantime the 10th Rifle Brigade of the Twentieth Division upon
the right had first taken and then lost Les Rues des Vignes, an
important position upon the British side of the canal. In the
afternoon the 11th Rifle Brigade managed to cross the canal and
endeavoured to push up towards Crevecoeur, but at this point the
river Scheldt ran on the farther side and offered an impediment which
could not be crossed. Orders were issued by General Byng that a
fresh attempt should be made next morning, but the troops were weary
and the losses heavy so the instructions were cancelled and the line
remained unaltered at this point.
The end of the second day of battle found the British Command faced
with a difficult problem, and we have the Field-Marshal's own lucid
analysis of the alternative courses open, and as to the reasons which
prompted his decision. The capture of Cambrai had never been the
goal of the operations, though a cavalry raid which would have
disorganised the communications through that town had at one time
seemed possible. A turning of the line to the south with the
co-operation of some French divisions which were ready upon the spot,
was part of the original conception, and was baulked by the
insufficient hold established upon the farther side of the Canal de
l'Escaut. But the central idea had been the capture of the high
ground of Bourlon Hill and Wood for with this in British possession a
considerable stretch of the defensive German line would lie open to
observed artillery fire, and its retention would probably mean a
fresh withdrawal to the east. It had been hoped that the goal would
have been attained within forty-eight hours, but this time had
elapsed and the {256} assailants were at the bottom instead of the
summit of the hill, with a resistance in front which was continually
growing more obstinate. What was to be done? The troops could not
remain where they were, for the Bourlon Hill overlooked their
position. They must carry it or retire. There was something to be
said for the latter policy, as the Flesquières Ridge could be held
and the capture of 10,000 prisoners and over 100 guns had already
made the victory a notable one, while the casualties in two days were
only 9000. On the other hand, while there is a chance of achieving a
full decision it is hard to abandon an effort; reinforcements were
coming up, and the situation in Italy demanded a supreme effort upon
the Western front. With all these considerations in his mind the
Field-Marshal determined to carry on.
November 22 was spent in consolidating the ground gained, in bringing
up reinforcements, and in resting the battle-weary divisions. There
was no advance upon the part of the British during the day, but about
one o'clock in the afternoon the Germans, by a sudden impetuous
attack, regained the village of Fontaine and pushed back the
Fifty-first Division in this quarter. No immediate effort was made
to regain it, as this would be part of the general operations when
the new line of attack was ready to advance. Earlier in the day the
Germans had thrown themselves upon the front of the Sixty-second,
driving back its front line, the 2/6th and 2/8th West Yorkshires, to
the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, but the Yorkshiremen shook themselves
together, advanced once more, and regained the lost ground with the
help of the 2/4th York and Lancasters. The Germans spent this day in
building up their line, and with their better railway facilities
{257} had probably the best of the bargain, although the British air
service worked with their usual utter self-abnegation to make the
operation difficult.
The new advance began upon the night November 22, when the 56th
Londoners reinforced the Ulsters upon the left of the line on the
out-skirts of the village of Mœuvres. To the west of the village,
between it and the Hindenburg Line, was an important position,
Tadpole Copse, which formed a flank for any further advance. This
was carried by a surprise attack in splendid style by the 1st
Westminsters of the 169th Brigade. During the day both the Londoners
and the Ulstermen tried hard, though with limited success, to enlarge
the gains in this part of the field.
The attack was now pointing more and more to the north, where the
wooded height of Bourlon marked the objective. In the southern part
the movements of the troops were rather holding demonstrations than
serious attacks. The real front of battle was marked by the reverse
side of the Hindenburg Line upon the left, the hill, wood, and
village of Bourlon in the centre, and the flanking village of
Fontaine upon the right. All of these were more or less
interdependent, for if one did not take Bourlon it was impossible to
hold Fontaine which lay beneath it, while on the other hand any
attack upon Bourlon was difficult while the flanking fire of Fontaine
was unquenched. From Mœuvres to Fontaine was a good six miles of
most difficult ground, so that it was no easy task which a thin line
of divisions was asked. to undertake--indeed only four divisions
were really engaged, the Thirty-sixth and Fifty-sixth on the left,
the Fortieth in the centre, and the Fifty-first on the right.
{258}
The operations of November 23 began by an attack by the enduring
Fifty-first Division, who had now been four days in the fighting line
against Fontaine Village--an attempt in which they were aided by a
squadron of tanks. Defeated in the first effort, they none the less
renewed their attack in the afternoon with twelve more tanks, and
established themselves close to the village but had not sufficient
momentum to break their way through it. There they hung on in most
desperate and difficult fighting, screening their comrades in the
main Bourlon attack, but at most grievous cost to themselves.
Meanwhile the Thirty-sixth Division had again attacked Mœuvres,
and at one time had captured it all, save the north-west corner, but
heavy pressure from the enemy prevented them retaining their grasp of
it. The two brigades of this division upon the east of the canal
were unable, unfortunately, to make progress, and this fact greatly
isolated and exposed the Fortieth Division during and after its
attack.
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{259}
[Illustration: BATTLE LINE OF THE THIRD ARMY, November 20, 1917]
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This main attack was entrusted to the Fortieth Division, a unit which
had never yet found itself in the full lurid light of this great
stage, but which played its first part very admirably none the less.
It was a terrible obstacle which lay in front of it, for the sloping
wood was no less than 600 acres in extent, a thick forest with autumn
foliage, hardly touched by shell-fire, while the village upon its
north-western flank came also within the area of their attack. The
men, however, had been specially exercised in wood fighting, a
precaution which all agree to have been of the greatest possible
value in the day of battle. When at 10.30 A.M. the signal was given
to advance the 121st Brigade went {260} forward with alacrity upon
the left, while on the right the 119th Brigade plunged into the wood,
the brigadier, a dare-devil little warrior, setting an example to his
men which none who followed him will forget. About thirty tanks
lumbered forward in front of the advancing lines. The west edge of
the wood formed the dividing line between the right and left attack.
It was arranged that the tanks should, so far as possible, go down
those rides which are so conspicuous a feature of every French
forest, while the infantry should move up between them. The 119th
Brigade moved forward with the 19th Welsh Fusiliers upon the right,
the 12th South Wales Borderers on the left, while the 17th Welsh were
in close reserve. It was the second occasion in the war when a
splendid piece of woodland fighting was carried through by the men of
the Principality, and even Mametz was not a finer performance than
Bourlon. They rapidly broke through the German front line, capturing
numerous prisoners and machine-guns. The Colonel of the Fusiliers
pushed his way forward to the north edge where he established posts,
while the flank of the Welsh Borderers brushed the village of Bourlon
and got north of that point. The 17th Welsh meanwhile formed
defensive flanks upon either side, while the 18th Welsh came up to
reinforce, and pushed ahead of their comrades with the result that
they were driven in by a violent counter-attack. The line was
re-established, however, and before one o'clock the 119th Brigade
were dug in along the whole northern edge of the forest. It was a
fine attack and was not marred by excessive losses, though Colonel
Kennedy of the 17th Welsh was killed. Among {261} many notable deeds
of valour was that of Sergeant-Major Davies of the 18th Welsh, who
knelt down in the open and allowed his shoulder to be used as the
rest for a Lewis gun, until a bullet struck him down.
It was clear that the Germans would make every effort to regain the
wood, and immediate steps were taken to strengthen the defence, which
was already firmly established. The 14th Argyll and Sutherlands were
sent up to thicken the line, as were the 15th Hussars, who were doing
great service as a mobile foot battalion. More machine-guns were
also pushed to the front. The result of these measures, all taken
before nightfall, was that the inevitable counter-attacks, which
materialised before dawn, were shot back by a blaze of fire from the
fringe of brushwood. Early in the morning of November 24, a resolute
endeavour of the German stormers gained a lodgment for them to the
right of the British line, where they captured some of the
machine-guns. During the whole of this day the enemy pressed hardly
upon the weakening line, and at three in the afternoon had pushed
them back from the whole of the right half of the wood, but Welshmen,
Highlanders, and Hussars gathered themselves for a supreme effort,
and dashing at the Germans swept them back once more to their old
position. We shall leave the 119th Brigade still holding fast upon
the evening of the 24th to their advanced position, while we follow
the fortunes of the 121st Brigade from the time of the original
attack upon November 23.
This Brigade had, as already stated, advanced upon the village of
Bourlon with the 20th Middlesex upon the right and the 13th
Yorkshires upon the left, the latter in close touch with the 107th
Brigade {262} of Ulstermen upon the west of their front, the whole
line to swing round and attack the western edge of the village. The
21st Middlesex were in close support to give weight to the left of
the line, while the 12th Suffolks were in reserve. The Ulstermen had
been held up by heavy machine-gun fire which exposed the left flank
of the Yorkshires, who in turn could not get forward. This in turn
brought the two Middlesex battalions to a halt, who were already well
up to the village. Three out of six tanks upon this flank were put
out of action by armour-piercing bullets. After a pause both the
Yorkshires and some of the Middlesex got into the village, but their
flank was always bare, and the best they could do was to hold on to
the southern edge. None the less the line was firm and formidable,
as was found by a German attack carried out by the 9th Grenadier
Regiment in the late afternoon, which was swept back by the British
fire. All day the enemy strove hard to clear the village, and all
day the 121st Brigade held splendidly to its gains. Where all were
fine the non-commissioned officers were particularly splendid.
Sergeant-Major Hall of the 21st Middlesex, three times wounded and
still rallying his company, was but one of many. Some critic has
finely said that if the Day of Judgment were to come a British
non-commissioned officer would still be found imploring his
neighbours not to get the wind up. It is an interesting fact that
the attack by the 121st Brigade had been countermanded, but the wires
were broken and the message miscarried, so that the whole fine
episode was strictly unofficial.
During the night the hard-pressed line was thickened by the arrival
of the 19th Hussars and {263} Bedford Yeomanry, who took over the
left of the position. The 14th H.L.I, were also brought up from the
reserve brigade, and twelve more tanks came into line. The 12th
Suffolks had formed upon the left of the Highlanders, and these two
battalions with the cavalry and tanks made a united attack upon the
remaining portion of the village of Bourlon on the morning of the
24th, which was countered by the Germans in the afternoon. In the
confusion of house-to-house combat the two battalions were separated,
the Suffolks getting penned in at the south corner of the village,
while the Highlanders, who had made a splendid advance, were isolated
in the north-east. The situation was serious, and two reserve
battalions, the 13th Surreys and 12th Royal Lancasters, were brought
up after dusk. A body of dismounted cavalry drawn from the 2nd and
5th Dragoon Guards and the 11th Hussars were also pushed into the
fight. With these troops the Brigadier made a strong attempt upon
the morning of November 25 to force his way through the village,
which was now mostly in German hands, but the tanks which he had
expected did not arrive, and his infantry were not strong enough for
the task. Colonel Battye of the Highlanders had been killed, and
Colonel Warden of the East Surreys, who had assumed local command,
did all that a man could do, but the losses were too heavy, and the
Highlanders were seen no more. Up to the 26th Colonel Warden, with
his headquarters in the firing line, was able to send up rations to
the survivors of the three isolated companies who had made a
wonderful resistance for nearly two days. In the end it was only by
great skill that his own battalion, the East Surreys, were rescued
from {264} their dangerous position, for the forces of the Germans
were in overwhelming strength, and overlapped the village upon both
sides. Some of the East Surreys were cut off for two days in the
south-eastern part of the village before the survivors could be got
clear. Colonel Warden received the D.S.O. for his splendid work.
In the meantime, from the morning of the 25th, the 119th Brigade had
made a splendid fight in the wood against fierce attacks which beat
up against their right flank. The Guards had come up to relieve the
51st Highlanders, and on this date three battalions of the 3rd Guards
Brigade, the 2nd Scots Guards, 1st and 4th Grenadier Guards, were
thrown in to help the Fortieth Division in its heavy task. Two
companies of the 11th Royal Lancasters were also brought forward, and
succeeded in doing some very brilliant work. The flank was held
during the day. Upon that night the weary division was drawn out,
being relieved by the Sixty-second Yorkshire Division, which by some
miracle after only two days of rest was judged to be battle worthy
once more. It was indeed a case of the tired relieving those who
were only a little less tired than themselves, but the line had to be
held and not another man was available. The artillery of the
Fortieth Division, which had shown remarkable efficiency and
co-operated very closely with the infantry, remained in action.
During its brilliant spell of service the Fortieth Division had taken
750 prisoners, but its casualties were very heavy, amounting to 172
officers and more than 3000 men.
The British position was now a difficult one, for the enemy held the
ridge above Fontaine and also the {265} high ground between Bourlon
and the Hindenburg Line, so that they had commanding observation upon
both sides. With great persistence, however, in spite of the
continual thickening of the German line the British commanders
determined, after a pause for breath, to make one more effort to
capture both Fontaine, which had relapsed into enemy hands, and the
village of Bourlon with the whole of the Ridge. The Guards, the
Forty-seventh London Territorials, and the Second Division had all
appeared upon the scene, so that the striking force was stronger than
before. Upon November 27 the Guards made a strong effort upon
Fontaine, having relieved the Fifty-first Division in that sector.
The 3rd Guards Brigade had already become involved, as described in
the defence by the Fortieth Division of Bourlon Wood. It was the 2nd
Brigade which was now marshalled to attack upon a very wide front
from Fontaine village on the right to Bourlon village on the left,
this latter advance being in support of the attack by the
Sixty-second Division upon the position which had been lost. This
attack made at 6.20 in the morning of November 27, after a night of
snow and tempest, was carried out by the 186th and 187th Brigades,
the object being to get back Bourlon wood and village. The latter
brigade got half-way through the village at one time, but could not
make good the ground. The 186th, working through the woods to the
north-west of Fontaine, gained their objectives, but had both flanks
in the air, and were eventually in the evening compelled to fall
back, all the West Riding battalions having lost heavily. Meanwhile
the 2nd Brigade of Guards had been fighting hard in support of the
Sixty-second. This {266} attack was carried out by the 2nd Irish,
while the 3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and 1st Scots were
respectively upon the left, centre, and right of the advance upon the
village, which came down the line of the Cambrai Road.
The attack started at 6.20 in the morning after a night of snow and
tempest. The flank battalion of Scots Guards by the use of a sunken
road got well up to the village without heavy loss, but a blast of
machine-gun fire from a small house about 200 yards away played havoc
with the 3rd Grenadiers, who none the less rushed forward, stormed
the house, and secured their first objective. The Coldstreams also
suffered heavily from machine-gun fire from a post north of the
railway, and half their numbers were on the ground before they also
reached their objective. The remains of these two gallant battalions
cleared the whole village and captured about a thousand prisoners,
but were unable to get more than six hundred to the rear. By ten
o'clock the whole position had been taken, but the victors had
suffered so severely that they were unable to cover so large a
perimeter, and about eleven o'clock the Germans, passing through the
numerous gaps in the defence, bade fair to cut off the whole British
force. The 4th Grenadiers of the 3rd Brigade was sent up under Lord
Gort to reinforce, and the remains of the 2nd Brigade was drawn clear
of the village and settled into trenches in front of it. The attack
was in many ways a very difficult one, for the village was strongly
fortified, there was much wire intact south of the Cambrai road, and
the machine-gun fire from La Folie Wood swept all the approaches.
Eventually the force of the enemy was so strong, and it had {267}
penetrated so far round the flanks of the battalions that Lord
Fielding, who commanded the Guards division, gave orders that they
retire to their original line. The brigade lost heavily in the
venture.
Meanwhile the gallant Yorkshiremen of the Sixty-second, together with
the 2nd Irish Guards, drove their way through Bourlon Wood in spite
of a desperate resistance from a German line which included several
battalions of the Guards. Many prisoners were taken, but many others
escaped in the confused fighting among the brushwood and tree-trunks.
Once again the counter-attacks were too strong for the thin ranks who
had reached their goal, and the British, after reaching both the
village and the north end of the wood, were pushed out once more. At
the same time the British held a strong position on the hill and in
the wood, so that there were still hopes of a successful issue if the
German resistance could be outworn. It should be remarked that
through all the fighting the battle line was greatly strengthened by
the fact that a dismounted battalion was formed from each brigade of
cavalry, or nine in all, who relieved and supported the very weary
infantry. The trophies of the battle up to date had been over 100
German guns, 10,500 prisoners, 350 machine-guns, and, above all, the
valuable stretch of Hindenburg's Line.
It was in this last phase of the advance, and indeed after the
fighting had ended, that General Bradford was killed by a chance
shell. This young soldier, who at the age of twenty-five commanded
one of the brigades of the Sixty-second Division, was one of the
great natural leaders disclosed by the war. It was indeed a cruel
fate which took him away between full {268} promise and full
performance. "He had the dash and enthusiasm of youth tempered by
the knowledge and experience which comes to most men only with later
years." So wrote his immediate commander. England could ill spare
such a man at such a time.
All was quiet for the next few days, during which the Fifty-ninth
Division relieved the Guards, while the Forty-seventh Division
relieved the Sixty-second Yorkshiremen.
[Illustration: FIGHTING LINE NOV. 30th 1917]
{269}