OPERATIONS FROM JUNE 10 TO JULY 31
Fighting round Lens--Good work of Canadians and Forty-sixth
Division--Action on the Yser Canal--Great fight and eventual
annihilation of 2nd K.R.R. and 1st Northamptons--An awful
ordeal--Exit Russia.
The Battle of Messines was so complete and clean-cut within its
pre-ordained limitations that it left few readjustments to be
effected afterwards. Of these, the most important were upon the left
flank of the Anzac Corps, where, as already narrated, some Germans
had held out for some days in the gap left between the two forward
brigades of the Fourth Australians. These were eventually cleared
out, and upon the night of June 10 the 32nd Brigade of the Eleventh
Division extended the front of the Ninth Corps to the south, and
occupied all this sector, which had become more defensible since, by
the energy and self-sacrifice of the 6th South Wales Borderers, a
good road had been driven right up to it by which stores and guns
could proceed.
It was determined to move the line forward at this point, and for
this purpose the Twenty-fifth Division was again put in to attack,
with the 8th Borders on the left and the 2nd South Lancs on the
right, both of the 75th Brigade. The objective was {114} a line of
farmhouses and strong posts immediately to the east. The men were
assembled for the attack in small driblets, which skirmished forward
and coalesced into a line of stormers almost unseen by the enemy,
crouching behind hedges and in the hollows of the ground. At 7.30 in
the evening, before the Germans realised that there had been an
assembly, the advance began, while the New Zealanders, who had
executed the same manoeuvre with equal success, kept pace upon the
right. The result was a complete success within the limited area
attacked. The whole line of posts, cut off from help by the barrage,
fell into the hands of the British in less than half-an-hour. The
enemy was found lying in shell-holes and improvised trenches, which
were quickly cleared and consolidated for defence. After this second
success, the Twenty-fifth Division was drawn out, having sustained a
total loss of about 3000 during the operations. Their prisoners came
to over 1000, the greater number being Bavarians.
For a time there was no considerable action along the British line,
but there were large movements of troops which brought about an
entirely new arrangement of the forces, as became evident when the
operations were renewed. Up to the date of the Battle of Messines
the Belgians had held the ground near the coast, and the five British
Armies had lain over their hundred-mile front in the order from the
north of Two, One, Three, Five, and Four. Under the new arrangement,
which involved a huge reorganisation, it was the British Fourth Army
(Rawlinson) which came next to the coast, with the Belgians upon
their immediate right, and an interpolated French army upon the right
of them. Then came Gough's {115} Fifth Army in the Ypres area,
Plumer's Second Army extending to the south of Armentières, Horne's
First Army to the south end of the Vimy Ridge, and Byng's Third Army
covering the Cambrai front, with dismounted cavalry upon their right
up to the junction with the French near St. Quentin. Such was the
general arrangement of the forces for the remainder of the year.
Save for unimportant readjustments, there were no changes for some
time along the Messines front, and little activity save at the
extreme north of that section on the Ypres-Comines Canal. Here the
British gradually extended the ground which had been captured by the
Forty-seventh Division, taking some considerable spoil-heaps which
had been turned into machine-gun emplacements by the Germans. This
supplementary operation was brought off upon June 14 and was answered
upon June 15 by a German counter-attack which was completely
repulsed. Some brisk fighting had broken out, however, farther down
the line in the Lens sector which Holland's First Corps, consisting
of the Sixth, Twenty-fourth, and Forty-sixth Divisions, had faced
during the Battle of Arras. This sector was rather to the north of
the battle, and the German line had not been broken as in the south.
These divisions had nibbled their way forward, however, working up
each side of the Souchez River until they began to threaten Lens
itself. The Germans, recognising the imminent menace, had already
blown up a number of their depots and practically destroyed
everything upon the surface, but the real prize of victory lay in the
coal seams underground. Huge columns of black smoke which rose over
the shattered chimneys and winding gears {116} showed that even this,
so far as possible, had been ruined by the enemy.
On June 8, the Forty-sixth Division carried out a raid upon so vast a
scale that both the results and the losses were greater than in many
more serious operations. The whole of the 138th Brigade was
concerned in the venture, but the brunt was borne by the 4th Lincolns
and 5th Leicesters. On this occasion, use was made upon a large
scale of dummy figures, a new device of the British. Some 400 of
these, rising and falling by means of wires, seemed to be making a
most heroic attack upon an adjacent portion of the German line, and
attracted a strong barrage. In the meanwhile, the front trenches
were rushed with considerable losses upon both sides. When at last
the assailants returned, they brought with them twenty prisoners and
a number of machine-guns, and had killed or wounded some hundreds of
the enemy, while their own losses came to more than 300. A smaller
attack carried out in conjunction with the 11th Canadian Brigade upon
the right also gave good results.
On June 19, the 138th Brigade, moving in conjunction with the
Canadians, took and consolidated some of the trenches opposite them.
Unhappily, their position did not seem to be clearly appreciated, as
some of our own gas projectors fell in their new trench, almost
exterminating a company of the 5th Leicesters. The sad tragedy is
only alleviated by so convincing if painful a proof of the powerful
nature of these weapons, and their probable effect upon the Germans.
The combined pressure of the Forty-sixth Division and of the Fourth
Canadians began now to close in {117} upon Lens. Upon June 25 the
6th South Staffords, with the brave men of the Dominion operating to
the south of them, pushed the Germans off Hill 65. Upon June 28
there was a further advance of the 137th and 138th Brigades, which
was much facilitated by the fact that the Canadians upon the day
before had got up to the village of Leuvette upon the south. A
number of casualties were caused by the German snipers after the
advance, and among the killed was M. Serge Basset, the eminent French
journalist, who had followed the troops up Hill 65.
A successful advance was made by the Forty-sixth Division and by the
Canadians upon the evening of June 28, which carried them into the
village of Avion and ended in the capture of some hundred prisoners.
This operation was undertaken in conjunction with the Fifth Division
near Oppy, upon the right of the Canadians. Their advance was also
attended with complete success, the 95th and 15th Brigades clearing
by a sudden rush more than a mile of German line and killing or
taking the occupants. To the north of them both the 4th Canadians
and the 46th Midlanders carried the success up the line. The advance
was an extraordinary spectacle to the many who looked down upon it
from the Vimy heights, for a violent thunderstorm roared with the
guns, and a lashing downpour of rain beat into the faces of the
Germans. They were tired troops, men of the Eleventh Reserve
division, who had already been overlong in the line, and they could
be seen rushing wildly to the rear before the stormers were clear of
their own trenches. An unfired and brand-new machine-gun was found
which had been abandoned by its demoralised crew. The flooded fields
impeded {118} the advance of the Canadians, but the resistance of the
enemy had little to do with the limits of the movement.
Upon June 30 the 6th North Staffords and 7th Sherwood Foresters made
a fresh advance and gained their objectives, though with some loss,
especially in the case of the latter battalion. This operation was
preparatory to a considerable attack upon July 1. This was carried
out upon a three-brigade front, the order being 139th, 137th, 138th
from the north. The 139th were in close touch with the Sixth
Division, who had lent two battalions of the 71st Brigade to
strengthen the assailants. The objective was from the Souchez River
in the south, through Aconite and Aloof Trenches, to the junction
point of the Sixth Division, north-west of Lens. The day's fighting
was a long and varied one, some ground and prisoners being gained,
though the full objective was not attained. The dice are still badly
loaded against the attack save when the guns throw their full weight
into the game. The Lincoln and Leicester Brigade in the south had
the suburb of Cité du Moulin as their objective, and the 4th Lincolns
next to the Canadians got well up; but the 5th Lincolns on their left
were held up by wire and machine-guns. Through the gallantry of
Sergeant Leadbeater one party penetrated into the suburb and made a
lodgment in outlying houses, although their flank was entirely in the
air. As the day wore on, the line of the 138th Brigade was driven in
several times by the heavy and accurate shell-fire, but was each time
reoccupied by the enduring troops, who were relieved in the morning
by the 4th and 5th Leicesters, who spread their posts over a
considerable area. One of these {119} small posts, commanded by
Lieutenant Bowell, was forgotten, and held on without relief, food,
or water until July 5, when finding himself in danger of being
surrounded this young officer effected a clever withdrawal--a
performance for which he received the D.S.O.
Whilst the 138th Brigade had established itself in the fringes of
Cité du Moulin, the Stafford men upon their left (137th Brigade) had
captured Aconite Trench and also got among the houses. A number of
the enemy were taken in the cellars, or shot down as they escaped
from them, the Lewis guns doing admirable work. About one o'clock,
however, a strong attack drove the Stafford men back as far as Ague
Trench. The support companies at once advanced, led by Major Graham
of the 5th North Staffords, who was either killed or taken during the
attack, which made no progress in face of the strong masses of German
infantry. The result of this failure was that the remnants of two
companies of the 5th North Staffords, who had been left behind in
Aconite Trench, were cut off and surrounded, all who were not killed
being taken. In spite of this untoward result, the fighting on the
part of the battalions engaged had been most spirited, and the
conflict, after the fall of most of the officers and sergeants, had
been carried on with great ardour and intelligence by the junior
non-commissioned officers.
On the left, the Sherwood Forest Brigade (strengthened by the 2nd
Regular battalion of their own regiment) advanced upon the
Lens-Lievin Road and the network of trenches in front of them. It
was all ideal ground for defence, with houses, slag-heaps, railway
embankments, and everything which the Germans could desire or the
British abhor. The {120} brigade had advanced upon a three-battalion
front, but as the zero hour was before dawn, and the ground was
unknown to the Regular battalion upon the right, the result was loss
of direction and confusion. Separated parties engaged Germans in
isolated houses, and some very desperate fighting ensued. In the
course of one of these minor sieges, Captain Chidlow-Roberts is said
to have shot fifteen of the defenders, but occasionally it was the
attackers who were overpowered by the number and valour of the enemy.
The Germans tried to drive back the British line by a series of
counter-attacks from the Lens-Bethune Road, but these were brought to
a halt during the morning, though later in the afternoon parties of
German bombers broke through the scattered line, which presented
numerous gaps. The losses of the Sherwood Forester Brigade were
considerable, and included 5 officers and 186 men, whose fate was
never cleared up. Most of these were casualties, but some remained
in the hands of the enemy. The total casualties of the division in
this action came to 50 officers and about 1000 men.
This hard-fought action concluded the services of the North Midland
Division in this portion of the front. It had been in the line for
ten weeks, and under constant fire for the greater part of that time.
The strength of the battalions had been so reduced by constant
losses, that none of them could muster more than 300 men. Upon July
2 the Forty-sixth Division handed over their line to the Second
Canadians and retired for a well-earned rest. Save for two very
fruitful raids in the Hulluch district in the late autumn, this
Division was not engaged again in 1917.
{121}
The Germans had strengthened the defence of Lens by flooding the
flats to the south of the town, submerging the Cité St. Augustin, so
that the Fourth Canadians on the right of the Forty-sixth Division
could not push northwards, but they had advanced with steady
perseverance along the south bank of the Souchez, and got forward,
first to La Coulotte and then as far as the village of Avion, which
was occupied by them upon June 28--a date which marked a general move
forward on a front of 2000 yards from the river to Oppy. Meanwhile,
the Sixth Division had also pushed in upon the north and north-west
of Lens, which was closely invested. The First Canadian Division
relieved the Sixth Division early in July, so that now the pressure
upon Lens was carried out by three Canadian Divisions, one to the
north, one to the west, and one to the south of the town. No actual
attack was made until the middle of August, but for the sake of
continuity of narrative we may reach forward and give some short
account of the operations upon that occasion. After constant
pressure, and the drifting of a good deal of gas over the huge
house-covered area which faced them, the Canadians made an attack
upon August 15, which brought them into the very suburbs of the town,
while advancing their line both to the north and to the south of it.
Two Canadian divisions, the First upon the left and the Second upon
the right, made the main attack, while the Fourth Division guaranteed
their southern flank. The First Division found itself in what was
practically the old British line, as it was defined at the end of the
Battle of Loos in September 1915, nearly two years before. This
veteran division had not far to go to find its enemy, for the German
{122} trenches were not more than 120 yards away. Flooding over them
after a heavy discharge of flaming oil drums, the Canadians swept
with little loss up that deadly slope of Hill 70, sacred to the
memory of the Scots of the Fifteenth Division and of many other brave
men who found their last rest upon it. The 3rd Brigade upon the left
and the 2nd upon the right topped the low hill and charged roaring
down into the Cité St. Auguste beyond. There was a fierce fight at
Cinnebar Trench and the other points which made up the German second
line. The enemy infantry stood up stoutly to the push of bayonet,
and there was some bloody work before the line was finally taken and
consolidated by the Canadians. The Second Division in the meanwhile,
advancing with the 5th Brigade upon the left and the 4th upon the
right, had carried their charge right up to the edge of the city
itself, and had established themselves among the shattered houses.
As the 5th Brigade rushed forward, they encountered a body of German
infantry advancing as if to an attack, so that for a few glorious
minutes there was close bludgeon work in No-Man's-Land before the
German formation was shattered and the stormers rushed on. A
counter-attack developed about mid-day in front of the First
Division, and the grey-clad troops could be clearly seen marching up
in fours, breaking into artillery formation and finally deploying in
line, all after the most approved British fashion--a fact which was
explained later by the discovery in the dug-outs of official copies
of a translation of the latest Aldershot regulations--surely a most
unexpected result of the clash of the two nations, and one which is a
compliment to our military instructors. The British methods of
defence, however, proved {123} upon this occasion to be more
efficient than those for attack, and the Germans were shot back into
the rubble-heaps behind them. The losses of the Canadians in this
advance were not heavy, save in the 5th Brigade, which had in front
of it a network of trenches in front of Cité St. Emile, and carried a
hard task through with great valour and perseverance. From this time
forward the advanced line was held, and it was only the deflection of
the Canadian Corps to the north which prevented them from increasing
their gains at Lens.
The seven weeks of comparative peace between the conclusion of the
Battle of Messines and the beginning of those long-drawn operations
which may be called the Battle of the Ridges, was broken by one
tragic incident, which ended in the practical annihilation of two
veteran battalions which held a record second to none in the Army.
As misfortunes of this sort have been exceedingly rare in the
progress of the war, it may be well to narrate this affair in greater
detail than the general scale of this chronicle would justify.
Strickland's First Division had taken over the sector which was next
the sea, close to the small town of Nieuport. The frontage covered
was 1400 yards and extended to Lombardzyde, where Shute's
Thirty-second Division carried the line along. The positions had not
been determined by the British commander, but were the same as those
formerly occupied by the French. It was evident that they were
exceedingly vulnerable and that any serious attempt upon the part of
the Germans might lead to disaster, for the front line was some six
hundred yards beyond the Yser River, and lay among sand {124} dunes
where the soil was too light to construct proper trenches or
dug-outs. The river was crossed by three or four floating bridges,
which, as the result showed, were only there so long as the enemy
guns might choose. The supporting battalions were east of the river,
but the two battalions in the trenches were to the west, and liable
to be cut off should anything befall the bridges behind them. It was
indeed a very difficult situation both for Strickland and Shute, for
the Germans had complete local supremacy both in guns and in the air.
Upon July 10, the day of the tragedy, the two battalions in front
were the 2nd King's Royal Rifles, next the sea, and the 1st
Northamptons, upon their right. The Brigadier of the 2nd Brigade had
been wounded only a few days before, and a new man was in local
command. The story of what actually occurred may be told from the
point of view of the Riflemen, who numbered about 550 on the day in
question. Three companies, A, D, and B, in the order given from the
left, were in the actual trenches, while C Company was in immediate
support. The night of July 9-10 was marked by unusually heavy fire,
which caused a loss of seventy men to the battalion. It was clear to
Colonel Abadie and his officers that serious trouble was brewing. An
equal shellfall was endured by the Northamptons on the right, and
their casualties were nearly as heavy. So weakened was A Company in
its post along the sand dunes that it was drawn into reserve in the
morning of July 10, and C Company took its place. During this night
an officer and twenty men, all Rhodesians, from B Company, were
pushed forward upon a raid, but lost nine of their number on their
return. From 8.50 {125} in the morning until 1 P.M. the fire was
exceedingly heavy along the whole line of both battalions, coming
chiefly from heavy guns, which threw shells capable of flattening out
any dug-out or shelter which could be constructed in such loose soil.
For hour after hour the men lay motionless in the midst of these
terrific ear-shattering explosions, which sent huge geysers of sand
into the air and pitted with deep craters the whole circumscribed
area of the position. It was a horrible ordeal, borne by both
battalions with the silent fortitude of veterans. Many were dead or
shattered, but the rest lay nursing the breech-blocks of their rifles
and endeavouring to keep them free from the drifting sand which
formed a thick haze over the whole position. The two supporting
battalions across the canal, the 2nd Sussex and 1st North Lancashire,
were also heavily shelled, but their position was more favourable to
taking cover. There was no telephone connection between the Rifles'
Headquarters and the advanced trenches, but Lieutenant Gott made
several journeys to connect them up, receiving dangerous wounds in
the attempt. About twelve, the dug-out of B Company was blown in,
and a couple of hours later that of C Company met the same fate, the
greater part of the officers in each case being destroyed. An
orderly brought news also that he had found the dug-out of D Company
with its inmates dead, and a dead Rifleman sentry lying at its door.
As the man was staggering and dazed with shell-shock, it was hoped
that his message was an exaggeration. The telephone wire to the rear
had long been cut, and the doomed battalions had no means of
signalling their extreme need, though the ever-rising clouds of sand
were enough to show what they were enduring. No {126} message of any
sort seems to have reached them from the rear. The fire was far too
hot for visual signaling, and several pigeons which were released did
not appear to reach their destination. With sinking hearts the
shaken and dazed survivors waited for the infantry attack which they
knew to be at hand. There were really no means of resistance, for,
in spite of all care, it was found that the all-pervading sand, which
nearly choked them, had put out of gear the mechanism of all the
machine-guns and most of the rifles. The divisional artillery was
doing what it could from the other side of the Yser, but the volume
of fire from the heavies was nothing as compared with the German
bombardment. To add to the misery of the situation, a number of
German aeroplanes were hawking backwards and forwards, skimming at
less than 100 feet over the position, and pouring machine-gun fire
upon every darker khaki patch upon the yellow sand.
Both the battalion commanders behaved with the utmost intrepidity and
coolness. Of Colonel Abadie of the Rifles, it was said by one of the
few survivors: "He inspired all with the utmost confidence. He did
everything in his power and was splendid the whole time." Great
hopes were entertained that some diversion would be effected by the
gunboats upon the flank, but for some reason there was no assistance
from this quarter. Hour after hour passed, and the casualties
increased until the dead and wounded along the line of both
battalions were more numerous than the survivors. At 3 P.M. the
regimental dug-out of the Rifles showed signs of collapse under the
impact of two direct hits. Those who could move betook themselves to
an unfinished tunnel in the sand in {127} which a handful of
Australian miners were actually working. These men had changed their
picks for their rifles, and were ready and eager to help in the
defence of the position. In little groups, unable to communicate
with each other, each imagining itself to be the sole survivor, the
men waited for the final German rush. At 7.15 it came. A division
of German marines made the attack, some skirting the British line
along the seashore and approaching from the flank or even from the
rear. As many Riflemen as could be collected had joined the
Australians in the tunnel, but before they could emerge the Germans
were dropping bombs down the three ventilation shafts, while they
sprayed liquid fire down the entrance. The men who endured this
accumulation of horrors had been under heavy fire for twenty-four
hours with little to eat or drink, and it would not have been
wonderful if their nerve had now utterly deserted them. Instead of
this, every one seems to have acted with the greatest coolness. "The
Colonel called to the Riflemen to sit down, and they did so with
perfect discipline." By this means the spray of fire passed over
them. The entrances were blown in, and the last seen of Colonel
Abadie was when, revolver in hand, he dashed out to sell his life as
dearly as possible. From this time the handful of survivors, cut off
from their Colonel by the fall of part of the roof, saw or heard no
more of him. The few groups of men, Rifles or Northamptons, who were
scattered about in the sandy hollows, were overwhelmed by the enemy,
the survivors being taken. Four officers, who had been half-buried
in the tunnel, dug their way out, and finding that it was now nearly
dark and that the Germans {128} were all round them, proceeded to
make their way as best they could back to the bank of the river. An
artillery liaison officer made a gallant reconnaissance and reported
to the others that there was a feasible gap in the new line which the
enemy was already digging. The adjutant of the battalion, with the
second-in-command, and his few comrades, who included an Australian
corporal, crept forward in the dusk, picking their way among the
Germans. Altogether, there were 4 officers, 20 Australians, and 15
Riflemen. One of the Australians, named McGrady, was particularly
cool and helpful, but was unfortunately killed before the party
reached safety. Even at this crisis the military code was strictly
observed, and the confidential documents of the battalion carefully
destroyed by the adjutant. As the British emerged into the gloom
from one end of the tunnel, a party of Germans began to enter at the
other, but were so skilfully delayed by two Riflemen, acting as
rearguard, that they were unable to stop the retreat. The men
streamed out at the farther end under the very noses of their
enemies, and crept swiftly in small parties down to the river, which
at this point is from 70 to 100 yards broad. Across their path lay a
camouflage screen some twelve feet high, which had been set on fire
by the shells. It was a formidable obstacle, and held them up for
some time, but was eventually crossed. Here they were faced by the
problem of the broken bridges, and several were shot while
endeavouring to find some way across. Finally, however, the swimmers
helping the others, the greater number, including the four Rifle
officers, got safely across, being nearly {129} poisoned by gas
shells as they landed upon the farther side. Of the Northamptons, it
would appear that only one officer, Captain Martin, made his escape,
though badly wounded. Colonel Tollemache was heard calling out to
his men: "It may be the last time, but fight like Englishmen!" He
and all his staff became casualties or prisoners. The Northampton
front was not more than forty yards from that of the Germans, and the
rifle-fire of the latter swept the parapet to such an extent that it
was impossible to stop the rush. A private who was No. 1 of a
machine-gun, with two other men, who knew nothing of the mechanism,
rushed a gun out upon the flank and held up the grey wave for a
minute or so before being submerged, while a sergeant also
distinguished himself by a determined resistance and by finally
crossing the Canal to explain the situation to those in command there.
So ended an experience which can have had few parallels even in this
era of deadly adventure. Of the Riflemen, it was found next day that
3 officers and 52 men had rejoined their brigade. If so many got
away it was largely due to the action of Rifleman Wambach, who swam
the canal with a rope in his mouth, and fixed it for his more
helpless comrades. Even fewer of the Northamptons ever regained the
eastern bank. "Like the Spartans at Thermopylae the men of
Northampton and the Riflemen had died where they had been posted.
Heroism could do no more." Out of about 1200 men, nearly all, save
the casualties, fell into the hands of the victors. Every officer
seems to have behaved with the utmost possible gallantry, and not
least the battalion surgeon, Captain Ward, who stood by his wounded
until both he and {130} they fell into the hands of the Germans.
Such was the deplorable affair of Nieuport, a small incident in so
great a war, and yet one which had an individuality of its own which
may excuse this more extended account. The total German advance was
600 yards in depth, upon a front of three-quarters of a mile.
The attack had extended to the eastward upon the farther side of the
Geleide Creek, but here the positions were more favourable for
defence, as there were supports available and the communications had
not been broken. It is a most significant sign of the enormous
respect which the German authorities entertained for the British
Army, that this limited action in which only two weak British
battalions were overwhelmed was solemnly announced by them in their
official bulletin to be "a great and magnificent victory." When one
remembers how the British in turn would have dismissed so small an
action as a mere incident in the campaign, had they been the victors,
it is indeed a most memorable tribute. The main cause of the defeat,
apart from the faulty position, appears to have been that the
infantry took over the new line more quickly than the artillery, and
that the French heavies had withdrawn before the British heavies were
ready for action. A British officer, afterwards released, was
informed by the Germans that they had 182 batteries concentrated upon
the position, while there were only 13 ready for the defence.
It was hoped in Germany and feared in Britain that the new position
gained by the Germans at the north of the Yser River would enable
them to outflank the British defences at Lombardzyde, and to destroy
the 97th Brigade, which lay to the north of {131} the river. The
situation certainly looked most alarming in the map, and no military
critic could have imagined that the position could be held. The
British soldier has a way of doing, however, what the lecture-rooms
would denounce, and after some very desperate fighting the lines were
maintained. The attack was not on so overwhelming a scale as on the
left, but it was severe and long continued, from 7.30 P.M. till the
evening of July 11. The enemy had at one time won three lines of
defence, but they were eventually thrust back, General Shute feeding
his fighting line from his reserves until he had the upper hand. The
main strain fell upon the 11th Borders and 16th H.L.I., but as the
action went on the 17th Highland Light Infantry, 15th Lancashire
Fusiliers, and 16th Northumberland Fusiliers were all in turn
involved. It was a real infantry fight, often in the dark and
sometimes at close grips, and it ended with the line as it was before
the attack commenced. The severity of the action may be judged by
the fact that the brigade had nearly a thousand casualties. From
this time the line remained unchanged until the great Battle for the
Flanders Ridges turned the thoughts of both parties to larger issues.
Before we enter upon an account of that terrific and protracted
engagement, one should mention a brisk action which was fought by
those stark fighters the New Zealand Division, upon the Warneton
front, to the immediate south of the Messines area. There is a small
ruined village, hardly rising to the dignity of a mention upon the
maps, called La Basseville, which was held by the Germans under the
very noses of the men with the red hatbands. Upon the night {132} of
July 27 the Wellington battalion, a name of good military omen,
captured this place with some of its Bavarian garrison. In the early
morning the Germans came again with a rush, however, and regained the
place. The New Zealanders attacked once more in the night of July
31, so that their venture may appear to have been in connection with
the larger operations in the north. Once more the village was
captured by the Wellington and Auckland infantry with some fifty more
prisoners and seven machine-guns. The Germans lost heavily in
killed, and the losses were doubled or trebled by their gallant but
unsuccessful counter-attacks, which were undertaken often by such
limited groups of men that they seemed the results less of reasoned
tactics than of desperation. From this time La Basseville passed
into the British system.
This month of July was signalised by the last efforts of the Russian
Army so long as it remained a serious force. Under Brusiloff and
Korniloff they made an attack upon the Austro-German lines, but after
initial successes they were paralysed by the growing disaffection and
disorganisation of the soldiery, who had all the want of discipline
of the old French republicans without the fiery valour and
patriotism. From this time onward Russia played no real military
part in the great war, save as the betrayer of Roumania, the deserter
of Serbia, and the absorber of such ill-spared supplies as she could
get from her former allies.
{133}