THE BATTLE OF ARRAS
April 9 to April 23, 1917
Vast preparations--Attack of Snow's Seventh Corps--The Ibex
Trench--Attack of Haldane's Sixth Corps--Attack of Fergusson's
Seventeenth Corps--A Scottish Front--The splendid Canadians--Capture
of Monchy--Essex and Newfoundland--A glorious episode--The Chemical
Works--Extension of the battle to the north--Desperate fight of the
Australians at Bullecourt.
Whilst the German line was falling back to its new positions, and the
Allies were eagerly following it across the ravished countryside
until the increased resistance and the familiar lines of barbed wire
warned them that the immediate retreat had come to an end, Sir
Douglas Haig had managed, without relaxing his pursuit, to collect a
strong striking force at the point of junction between the new German
line and the old. The blow which he contemplated was no small local
advance, but was a wide movement extending from the neighbourhood of
Lens in the north to Arras in the south, a front of more than twelve
miles. Upon this sector a tremendous concentration of artillery had
been effected, and four corps were waiting the signal for the
assault, the three southern ones forming Allenby's Third Army, while
the fourth or northern one was the right-hand corps of Horne's {21}
First Army. The southern corps were the Seventh (Snow), which
operated to the south of Arras, having Croisilles for its southern
boundary; the Sixth (Haldane), which advanced due east from Arras
with the Scarpe for its northern boundary; the Seventeenth
(Fergusson), which had its right on the Scarpe and its left on
Thelus, with its front facing the three spurs which form this end of
the Vimy Ridge; and finally the Canadian Corps (Byng), which faced
this long and sinister slope, the scene of so much bloodshed in the
past. Each corps was marshalled with three divisions in front and
one in reserve, so that there were roughly 120,000 men in the
storming line with 40,000 advancing behind them. Maxse's Eighteenth
Corps was in reserve in the rear of the Third Army, while M'Cracken's
Thirteenth Corps was behind the First Army. The Germans had six
divisions, the Eleventh Prussian, Fourteenth Bavarian, First Bavarian
Reserve, and the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Seventy-ninth reserve
in the line. Their guns also were numerous, as subsequent captures
were to prove, but it is probable that an extension of the Hindenburg
retreat was in contemplation, and that some of the heavy artillery
was already on the move. A second strong line from Drocourt to
Queant was known to exist, and its occupation would form a natural
sequel to the retirement in the south.
The German strategists had imagined that by withdrawing their troops
over a long front they would throw out of gear all the preparations
of the Allies for the spring offensive. What they actually did was
to save their force in the Gommecourt peninsula from being cut off,
which would surely have been their fate had they waited. But in the
{22} larger issue they proved to be singularly ill-informed, for they
had stayed their retreat at the very points of the line on which the
offensive had been prepared, so that the plans of attack were neither
modified nor delayed. That this is true is evident, since such
tremendous blows as Arras in the north and Rheims in the south could
not possibly have been delivered had the preparations only begun
after the Hindenburg retreat.
One of the most difficult problems of this attack was how to arrange
it upon that section which was covered by the town of Arras. It is
true that the German line was 1700 yards east of the market-place,
but the suburbs extended right up to it, and it was fringed with
houses. The town itself, in which the storming troops must assemble
and through which all supports and supplies must pass, was full of
narrow streets within easy range of the German guns, and previous
French experience had proved that each exit was so carefully and
accurately barraged by the German fire that it was most difficult for
the troops to debouch from it. This problem was solved by a fine
piece of military engineering. The large cellars and other
subterranean excavations with which the place abounded were connected
up and fresh tunnels constructed, so that it was eventually found to
be possible to put three whole divisions underground, with permanent
headquarters and every necessary detail, including water, electric
light, and a three-foot tramway. This fine work was carried out by
the New Zealand, the 179th, and the 184th Tunnelling Companies. A
huge dressing-station with 700 beds was also constructed. In this
great underground place of assembly the greater part of the Sixth
{23} Corps was assembled, while many of the tunnels on the south side
of the town were allotted to the use of the Seventh Corps. All this
had been carried out during the winter in the anticipation of a big
attack being made at this point. For purposes of communication, over
1000 miles of twin cable was buried in six-foot trenches or secured
to the sides of tunnels. Besides these special preparations, the
usual immense labour of preparing for a modern attack had been
thoroughly carried out along the whole line, including the
construction of very many gun positions, trench mortar emplacements,
dressing-stations, and innumerable dumps of munitions and engineering
stores. Some dislocation had been caused in the plans by a partial
withdrawal in the enemies' front trenches upon March 18, opposite the
right end of the British lines. The abandoned works were occupied
and linked up with the old system, so that upon April 9 all was in
order for the assault. The extreme difficulties caused by the
formidable defensive preparations of the enemy were fully realised,
but everything which human forethought could suggest had been done to
meet them. Above all, two great lessons taught by the Somme
experience had been thoroughly assimilated; the one that the broader
the attack the more successful it is likely to be, as it prevents a
concentration of the German guns upon a single area; the other that
it is wiser, even in the heat of battle and the glow of victory, to
limit your objective to an area which is well within the range of
your guns. That last blue line so far forward upon the map has been
the cause of many a rebuff.
The British bombardment, which came in gusts during the days
preceding the attack, did enormous {24} damage to the German
defences. The evidence of prisoners showed that for several days
they had been reduced to their emergency rations. The wire, which in
places was a hundred yards thick, was mostly destroyed in the first
line, and greatly damaged in the second, though in the third it was
found to be largely intact, save upon the left of the line. The
space between the first and second German lines was roughly 500
yards. Between the second and third it was about 3000. The usual
forms of bombardment were varied upon April 4 by the use of a large
number of Liven's gas projectors, throwing drums of compressed gas,
which were seen to burst in the second German line. Fifteen hundred
of these were discharged upon the front of a single corps, and they
were said to have considerable effect, the reports of prisoners
stating that in the suburb of Blangy alone there were 460 casualties
from this cause. On April 8 there was a severe gas bombardment from
4-inch trench mortars. Finally, in the early morning of April 9,
came the fearful whirlwind of fire which was the prelude to the
attack. Some idea of its intensity may be gathered from the fact
that the number of guns was so great that they could have rubbed
wheels from end to end of the line had they been so placed. At 5.30
the word was given, and in the first dim grey of a rainy, windy, and
sleety morning, the infantry dashed forward to the attack--"wave
after wave of grimy, mud-covered, determined men, with hearts as hard
as steel and as light as feathers," to use the words of one of them.
The events may best be described from the south of the line as being
the nearest to Arras from which the battle derives its name.
{25}
Snow's Seventh Corps had the Twenty-first North Country Division upon
the extreme right, the Thirtieth Lancashire Division in the centre,
the Fifty-sixth London on their left, and the Fourteenth Light
Division upon the extreme northern wing. The soldiers, soaked to the
skin, with the rain beating upon their backs, and their feet
ankle-deep in the mud, set about their task in a calm, businesslike
fashion which would take no denial. No village or notable fixed
points lay in their path, but they plodded without a check or halt
over the first two lines of entrenchments, finding no very strong
resistance, save at one point upon the left of their line, and
suffering little loss from the German artillery. Considerable
numbers of the enemy were found scattered in their shattered trenches
or cowering in the dug-outs. Over a thousand of these were sent to
the rear. The advance was at the point where the new German line
branched away from the old one, the Twenty-first Division on the
right joining the left of Gough's Army in the neighbourhood of the
Cojeul River, while the Fourteenth Division was in touch with the
Third Division on the north.
The immediate objectives of the various divisions of this Seventh
Corps were Telegraph Hill in the north opposite to the Fourteenth
Division, Neuville Vitasse opposite to the Fifty-sixth Division, St.
Martin-sur-Cojeul opposite the Thirtieth Division, and the Hindenburg
line opposite the Twenty-first Division. Taking them in turn from
the south, we shall first follow the fortunes of the north countrymen
of Campbell's Division. This division upon the first day was not
expected to do more than make a strong demonstration, because both
it, and to a less extent {26} the division upon its left, had in
front of it sheets of uncut wire and all the devilries of the fixed
German line. The object, therefore, was that they should make a
holding attack in the hope that the northern divisions of the corps
should get well forward to the east, and then swing to the south in
such a way as to make the German position untenable. This was
eventually done, and a way was cleared so that the two divisions in
the south should be able to advance with the remainder of the line.
The whole operation of the Seventh Corps has to be continually judged
by the fact that they were on the edge of the abandoned area, and
that therefore their southern front bulged out to the east in a way
which brought the successive divisions almost into an echelon
formation.
On the left of the Twenty-first Division were the Lancashire pals of
the Thirtieth Division. Upon April 8 they had made a good start, as
the 2nd Bedfords carried the village of St. Martin, an outlier of the
Hindenburg line, but on the same date the 21st Brigade was held up in
an attempt to advance upon the left. They advanced on April 9 with
the 21st Brigade upon the left and the 90th upon the right. The
first dash behind a splendid barrage was most successful, but the
21st Brigade, after passing the front German lines, ran into uncut
wire and was held, the 18th Liverpools suffering severely. The
brigade upon the right managed, however, to get forward for some
distance, but it also was faced by uncut wire, and was compelled to
dig in as best it could. The attack was renewed two days later with
the aid of four tanks, but the wire still held, though the devoted
infantry tried again and again. Finally, however, the Fifty-sixth
{27} Division having cleared its own front sent the Victoria Rifles
bombing down the front of the Thirtieth Division, who in turn cleared
the front of the Twenty-first Division on their right, and so by the
evening April 11 the line was finally advanced. The clearing of the
front of the Twenty-first was done by the 18th Manchesters, who,
unsupported, bombed their way down 1700 yards of Hindenburg line, a
very notable achievement.
To Hull's Fifty-sixth Division, the next upon the north, was assigned
the capture of Neuville Vitasse and the strong works which surrounded
it. The advance was carried out at 7.45--the zero time was earlier
as it travelled up the line--and was led by the 167th Brigade upon
the right and by the 168th Brigade upon the left, while the 169th
were in support. "The bombardment and the covering fire were
magnificent," says one who marched in the ranks; "I almost felt sorry
for the poor old Hun, only, after all, he is such a Hun." The chief
fighting was on the right, where the 3rd London and 8th Middlesex
stormed the main portion of the village. At 10.30 all the eastern
edge had been secured, and the 1st London moved forward to take the
Cojeul Switch line. Unfortunately, they struck up against uncut wire
and a very heavy belt of fire. Colonel Smith, the commanding
officer, and the great majority of the other officers were killed or
wounded, and the advance was brought to a stand. The 18th Liverpools
of the 21st Brigade upon the right had also been halted by the uncut
wire. The colonel of the 7th Middlesex took command of this
difficult situation so far as it affected the advance of his brigade,
and threw his battalion in to strengthen the 1st Londons, so that
{28} together they captured the Cojeul Switch Trench. The Londoners
were then well ahead of the Liverpool men upon their right, so the
1st London threw back a defensive flank while the 7th Middlesex
stormed forward against the powerful Ibex Trench. Three separate
attempts were made, much impeded by the deep mud, and all ending in
failure, so that darkness fell before the task had been accomplished,
but with true British tenacity, at 3 A.M., in the darkest hour before
dawn, the Middlesex men tried once more and carried Ibex, taking a
number of prisoners. The 168th Brigade had with varying fortunes
kept pace upon the left, and in the early morning the London Scottish
on its right were in touch with Ibex Trench. The position of the
167th was still dangerous upon the flank, as it was always ahead of
its southern neighbours, so that instead of advancing eastwards, the
colonel of the Middlesex now turned south, his depleted ranks being
strengthened by the 9th London (Victorias) from the reserve brigade.
The enemy were only forty yards off upon the flank, with a perfect
warren of trenches, and the mud was so dreadful that some men who got
in could hardly be dragged out again alive. In spite of every
difficulty the Londoners, after an initial check, swept triumphantly
down Ibex and Zoo trenches, clearing in one wild, glorious rush the
whole position, capturing 197 more prisoners of the 31st Prussian
Regiment with several machine-guns. Captain Cousens, who led this
charge, after being badly wounded, was unhappily killed by a sniper
in the moment of victory. The Victorias were too late to join in the
victorious charge which stands to the credit of the 7th Middlesex,
but they helped to hold and to extend what had been won. {29} The
general effect of the advance of this division was to turn the flank
of the southern German defences and to open up a road for the
Thirtieth and Twenty-first Divisions upon the right.
The Fourteenth Light Division to the north of the Londoners was faced
by the slight slope and formidable defences of Telegraph Hill. They
went forward in close conformity with the Sixth Corps upon their
left, the 42nd Brigade being upon the left and the 43rd upon the
right. Their movement during the day was a particularly fine one,
and they not only took the strong position of Telegraph Hill, but
they carried the British line to a point far to the east of it.
Their whole advance was largely regulated by the situation upon their
northern flank, and they were exposed to such an enfilade fire
whenever they got at all ahead, that they found it impossible to act
entirely upon their own.
Upon the left of the front was a strong German position called "The
Harp," which was very gallantly carried by the 42nd Brigade. Sixteen
tanks which were to have lent them a hand in this difficult operation
failed for some reason to arrive in time, and the infantry had to
advance with no help save their own stout hearts. The attack was
carried out by the 9th K.R.R. with the 4th Royal Fusiliers of the
Third Division acting upon their left, and their comrades of the 6th
Oxford and Bucks upon their right. Their only serious opponents here
as elsewhere were snipers and machine-gunners, but these were all of
the best, and caused heavy losses before the whole objective with its
garrison had been captured. By 9.15 in the morning it was entirely
in British hands, and as the day wore on the division kept steadily
improving {30} their position, though still short of their final
objective, that elusive line, which is so easy to draw and so hard to
attain. In the evening, an attempt was made by the Fourteenth
Division to struggle still further eastwards. This advance had no
success, and so the forward units of the whole Seventh Corps dug in
on the general line from Feuchy Chapel Road in the north to near
Croisilles in the south, having after a desperate day's fighting
achieved a gain which averaged two or three miles, and a total of
nearly 2000 prisoners with a number of guns. Concerning these
prisoners, it may be unsafe to generalise, but it is certain that
many of them surrendered very readily. As to their general type the
opinion of a commanding officer who handled many of them may be
quoted: "The officers were mild persons, none of the bullet-headed,
bristly-moustached, truculent Prussian type. The prisoners generally
do not inspire one with respect. Braggarts and bullies in
prosperity, in adversity they cringe."
Haldane's Sixth Corps was to the immediate left of the Seventh, and
its operations were directed due east of Arras. The three front
divisions, counting from the south, were the Third, the Twelfth South
of England, and the Fifteenth Scottish, with the Thirty-seventh
English in reserve. The troops of the assaulting divisions had been
assembled for three days in the caves under Arras, but on the night
of April 8 they were silently passed into the assembly trenches, an
operation which was carried through with little interference or loss.
The vile weather may have been a blessing in disguise, as it covered
all the preparations from the German observation.
The right of the attacking line was formed by the {31} 76th Brigade
of the Third Division, a unit which had distinguished itself greatly
in previous fighting. The 8th and 9th Brigades were in close
support. Its front was south of the Arras-Cambrai Road. To the left
of the 76th Brigade the line was carried on by the 37th and 36th
Brigades of the Twelfth Division. Their right rested on the
Arras-Cambrai Road. To their left were the 44th and 45th of the
Fifteenth Division. Their left rested upon the Scarpe. Nothing
could have gone more smoothly than the advance, which kept well up
with the barrage. Only at Observation Hill was vigorous resistance
encountered, and the German barrage was so belated that it fell upon
empty trenches after the stormers had left them. The line of
infantry as it swept forward in its irresistible advance was formed,
counting from the south, by the 10th Welsh Fusiliers, the 1st
Gordons, the 6th Queen's, the 7th East Surreys, the 11th Middlesex,
the 7th Sussex, the 8/10th[1] Gordons, the 9th Black Watch, the 6/7th
Scots Fusiliers, and the 11th Argyll and Sutherlands. To the courage
which had always been their birthright, the infantry now added all
the cool war wisdom which experience of many battles must bring with
it, and all those devices for overcoming the scattered forts of the
enemy and avoiding their machine-guns, which had been learned on the
Somme and the Ancre, were now practised to keep down the losses of
the assault.
[1] Where two numbers are given for one battalion, it means that two
battalions with these numbers have been telescoped into one.
The advance of the 76th Brigade had been to the south of the great
high road which leads from Arras to Cambrai--a road which was
destined to be second only to the Menin Road as a centre of hard
fighting. {32} The Gordons led the attack and took the front line
with a number of the Prussian 38th Regiment. The 10th Welsh
Fusiliers then passed through the ranks of the Highlanders and
captured Devil's Wood. So swift were these movements that the German
barrage was always in the rear. Having thus secured the first
objective, the 9th Brigade, strengthened by the 2nd Suffolks, stormed
forward to the next line of defence. The 4th Royal Fusiliers on the
right took Nomeny, Spring, and Lynx Trenches, when the Suffolks
passed through them and took Neuilly Trench. The 12th West
Yorkshires took Tilloy village. The 13th Liverpool, after being held
up on the left, carried the line forward and, by getting its
machine-gun on to the roof of Tilloy Château, dominated the country
to the extreme discomfort of the German snipers. Besides these
numerous trenches and strong points, the 9th Brigade helped to take
the fortified position known as The Harp, an exploit in which they
were much assisted by a couple of tanks. Here a considerable number
of prisoners were made, including most of a battalion of the 162nd
Regiment, together with its commander.
It will save confusion if we follow the fortunes of each division for
the day, regardless of what is going on upon its flank, as it is
impossible to understand a narrative which switches continually from
one portion of the line to another. The whole operation of the Sixth
Corps was somewhat behind the time appointed, as each division had
met with some delays, but the advance towards the third objective was
begun about one o'clock in this southern area. The 8th Brigade had
now taken up the running, and the 9th had fallen into support.
Reinforced by the two reserve {33} battalions of the 76th Brigade,
the victorious advance was resumed, the 2nd Royal Scots and 7th
Shropshires carrying the Bois des Boeufs to the south of the Cambrai
Road, together with five guns which had been concealed in it. To
those who had experienced what the capture of a wood meant in the
Somme fighting, it was indeed a promise for the future that this
considerable plantation should offer so slight a resistance. The 8th
Brigade fought its way onwards for another mile or more until it had
attained the line of Feuchy Chapel. Here the German resistance had
thickened and the artillery fire had increased in the same ratio as
the British had weakened. A halt was called, therefore, and the
infantry consolidated their advanced position. An attempt by the
Gordons and the 8th Royal Lancasters to reach the extreme final
objective was checked in the evening by a very heavy fire upon both
flanks.
In the centre, the Twelfth Division had met with strong resistance at
several points, which caused the assault to fall behind the barrage.
These centres of German resistance were usually isolated houses or
small redoubts, so that it was possible in many cases to mask them
and to push onwards. No village or large fixed defence lay in their
path, and in spite of a check for some time at the estaminet upon the
Cambrai Road, they were able to line up with their comrades to the
south upon the second objective about half-past twelve o'clock. At
this point the 35th Brigade passed through the advanced lines and
moved to the front. A number of difficult positions were taken,
including Observation Hill, and the ground was so thoroughly cleared
that the assailants were able to go forward with the assurance that
their {34} wounds would not be in the back. It was found, however,
as they neared the line of the third German position, that
considerable stretches of wire had been imperfectly cut, and that the
machine-gun fire was so severe as to make the final assault
impossible. The infantry dug in, therefore, and waited for further
support from the guns, many of which were already on the move. The
9th Essex upon the right actually reached the Feuchy Chapel Work and
held their grip of it, keeping in line with the 8th Brigade upon the
south.
The Fifteenth Division to the north of the corps' front had before
them the very strong position called the Railway Triangle, where the
line to Lens branches away from the line to Douai. This formidable
place was attacked by the Scotch infantry, and after a severe
struggle it was captured about 11.30 save for its eastern side, which
was finally taken later in the morning, the artillery aiding the
assailants by some extraordinarily good shooting. The advance was
then resumed, and the division found itself shortly after noon in the
line of the second objective. Six brigades of field artillery had
followed closely upon the heels of the infantry and managed, in spite
of the unfavourable state of the ground, to take up a position to
cover the further attack. When one recalls the dreadful weather and
the shell-pocked state of the countryside, it was a remarkable feat
upon the part of the gun-teams to get their pieces so rapidly
forward. Several tanks came forward also, and did good work not only
upon this front, but at Tilloy and The Harp.
The Fifteenth Division was now somewhat behind the others, but
shortly after two o'clock the 46th Lowland Brigade advanced upon the
third objective. {35} These splendid soldiers brushed aside every
obstacle, and when fired upon at short range by German guns rushed
onwards with a yell and captured the battery. By 4 P.M. they had
fully reached their final line and had pushed out their patrols some
hundreds of yards to the eastwards. This fine advance, which was the
only one to reach the extreme limit upon this front, was carried out
by the 7th Scots Borderers, 10th Scots Rifles, and 12th Highland
Light Infantry, with the 10/11th Highland Light Infantry mopping up
behind them.
At 7 P.M. an attempt was made by the two southern divisions to get
forward from the Feuchy Chapel Line and gain a position level with
the 46th Brigade. Evening was setting in, however, the men were
weary and the difficulties manifold, so that no progress was made,
both the Third and the Fourteenth Divisions suffering additional
losses in the attempt.
The Thirty-seventh Division, composed entirely of English troops,
North, South, and Midland, had moved up in the rear of the fighting
line, and in the middle of the afternoon it found itself in the
German second line system, while the corps' mounted troops had
followed behind the Fifteenth Division, as far as the Railway
Triangle. As evening fell, the Thirty-seventh Division pushed
forward with the intention of reaching the extreme point attained by
the Fifteenth Division and then swinging to the right in the hope of
capturing Monchy. The advance seems, however, to have taken a
direction rather too much to the south, with the result that instead
of finding the opening made by the 46th Brigade they came upon the
more contracted Feuchy line held by the {36} Twelfth and Third
Divisions. Here they were held up by a field of wire as their
comrades had already been, and the two brigades concerned--the 111th
upon the left and the 112th upon the right--remained in line with the
35th and the 8th Brigades, the units being considerably intermingled.
The 63rd Brigade, however, which was now a brigade of the
Thirty-seventh Division, though the reader will associate it with the
Twenty-first Division in the past, was able to keep its true
direction, and before night had finally established itself at the
north end of Orange Hill well up to the third objective and in touch
with the 46th Brigade. The corps' cavalry also pushed forward along
the south bank of the Scarpe, capturing three 8-inch howitzers upon
the way, and halting opposite Fampoux, where they were in touch with
the Fourth Division upon the northern bank of the river.
Such was the splendid day's work of Haldane's Corps. It is true that
in the south the uncut wire had made it impossible for them to reach
their ultimate objective, but they had in the space of the one Easter
day captured the villages of Feuchy and of Tilloy, the strong
redoubts of The Harp and the Railway Triangle, gained some thirty-six
square miles of ground, and taken 2000 prisoners with 60 guns. It
was a most notable achievement. We shall now pause on the evening of
this first day of battle and we shall go back to reconstruct the
operations upon the northern bank of the Scarpe.
The Seventeenth Corps (Fergusson) was upon the left of the Sixth.
Its right-hand unit, Lukin's Ninth Division, consisting of two
Scottish and one South African brigade, was operating upon the
immediate north of the Scarpe. This division was to attack with {37}
three brigades in line, the 26th on the right, 27th on the left, and
South Africans between. Upon the left of the Ninth was Nicholson's
Thirty-fourth Division, drawn largely from Scotland and Tyneside, the
same fine division which had been the very pivot upon which the
battle of July 1 had turned. Upon the left of the corps was the
Fifty-first Highland Territorial Division which had distinguished
itself so greatly at Beaumont Hamel five months before. It may be
said, therefore, that the fighting line of the Seventeenth Corps upon
this great day was predominantly Scottish, but Lambton's veteran
Fourth Division was in immediate support. The whole battle-front was
from the right bank of the Scarpe near Arras up to the post known as
the Commandant's House, just south of Thelus. There were no villages
over the greater part of this front, but there were great numbers of
fortified farms and strong posts of every description, besides the
usual lines of wired trenches. The ground was in successive ridges
and a big tactical obstacle existed in the Lens-Arras railroad in its
alternate cuttings and embankments. The long eager line of
Highlanders, Tynesiders, and South Africans rolled over every
obstacle, and by ten o'clock had mastered all the first objectives,
which were the three lines of German trenches. In the south the
Ninth Division, led by a well-known South African Imperial soldier,
had carried first Blangy and then Athies by storm. There was a time
when the 26th Brigade upon the right was hung up, but with fine
initiative the right flank of the Transvaal Regiment worked down
along the railway cutting and helped to clear the front of its
neighbours. In the centre, the Thirty-fourth Division, after a short
check at a network {38} of trenches called "The Pump," had reached
its allotted positions. In the north the clansmen, who as
Territorials were sprung from the very soil of the Highlands, had
swiftly advanced to the south of Thelus and had covered the right
wing of the First Canadians while they captured that village. It was
victory all along the line, and victory without those excessive
losses which have made many of our greatest successes as tragic as
they are glorious. The artillery barrage had been found to be a
powerful antidote against the deadly machine-guns. "When our barrage
lifted off the railway cutting, the machine-guns had been silenced
and all the gunners were found to be dead." Such was the report of a
South African officer.
[Illustration: THE ARRAS FRONT]
Allusion has been made to the check caused by the strong point called
"The Pump" and the trenches called the Kleemanstellung just east of
it. Some detail should be added in this matter, for it retarded the
attack of the flanks of two divisions, and the delay caused by it had
the effect that the Canadians on the left and the Ninth upon the
right were further forward in the late afternoon than part of the
Fifty-first and the Thirty-fourth, which might have caused a
dangerous situation. The Thirty-fourth Division had advanced upon a
three-brigade front, which consisted from the south of the 101st, the
102nd, and the 103rd. On the north of the 103rd was the 152nd
Brigade of the Fifty-first Division with the Seaforths as the flank
battalion. This pestilent strong point, armed with well-served and
well-concealed machine-guns, lay between the two brigades and held up
the flanks of both, inflicting considerable losses not only on the
Seaforths, but {39} on the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers, who were on
the left of the Thirty-fourth Division. For a considerable time the
advance was held. The 27th reserve battalion of the Northumberland
Fusiliers were sent up, and one of its companies, led with a fine
mixture of valour and cunning, carried the place by storm. The whole
line then got forward, but the losses had been heavy, including
Colonel Hermon of the 24th Northumberland Fusiliers. In the evening
it was found that the final objective had not yet been fully attained
at this quarter of the field, for it had been marked at a farm called
Maison de la Côte, from which the front line was still a thousand
yards distant. A brilliant little attack, however, by the 103rd
Brigade, in the early morning of April 10, captured the whole
position. Besides the check at The Pump, there had been another on
the Fifty-first divisional front at a post called the "Deutsche
Haus." The consequence of this was a loss of the barrage and a delay
which led to the isolated left of the Fifty-first losing direction
entirely and wandering round in a half-circle. The circumstances
were so complex that it was not until next morning that they could be
cleared up. Had the Germans had the spirit for a counter-attack,
they would certainly have found a considerable gap in the line.
These events were in the northern area of the Seventeenth Corps. In
the southern portion, at about eleven o'clock, the reserve division
came forward, and, passing through the weary ranks of the Ninth,
pushed on along the northern bank of the river. The advance had
already been a splendid one, the Ninth Division having 2000 prisoners
to its credit, but this {40} movement of the Fourth Division against
an enemy who was already badly shaken was a very fruitful one. The
12th Brigade was nearest the Scarpe, with the 11th upon the left,
while the 10th moved forward in close support. Two obstacles faced
the division, the straggling village of Fampoux upon the bank of the
river, and the Hyderabad Redoubt, a considerable fort to the north of
the village. The 12th Brigade moved swiftly forward in the nearest
approach to open warfare that had been seen for years. The 1st Royal
Lancasters were on the right of the swift flexible line, the 2nd
Lancashire Fusiliers in the centre, and the 2nd Essex upon the left.
The brigade fought its way in the teeth of a very hot fire to the
outskirts of Fampoux, where the reserve battalion, the 2nd West
Ridings, passed through the King's Own and carried the village in
splendid style late in the evening at the point of the bayonet. It
is a remarkable fact that the wire in front of the village had not
been cut by the artillery, and the infantry passed in single file
through the gaps in it, after disposing of the only German
machine-gunner who offered resistance. At the same time the 11th
Brigade kept pace upon their left flank--the Hampshires to the left
and Somersets to the right, while the 1st Rifle Brigade, passing
through them, rushed the strong position of the Hyderabad Redoubt,
and the East Lancashires formed a defensive flank. Communication was
at once opened across the Scarpe with Haldane's Corps upon the south
side. By this fine advance of the Fourth Division the right of the
Seventeenth Corps had got considerably further forward than the
centre, so that a defensive line had to be formed sloping back from
this advanced point. This was the position {41} upon the evening of
the first day of battle, and it was destined to remain so in the
south for many a day to come, for the formidable Chemical Works lay
immediately to the east on either side of the Arras-Douai railway
track, and these were to prove a very grave obstacle to a further
advance on this line. Meanwhile, 3500 prisoners with 50 captured
guns testified to the success of the Seventeenth Corps.
Following upon this brief sketch of the work done by the Seventh,
Sixth, and the Seventeenth Corps upon the first day of the Battle of
Arras, we must now turn to the splendid achievement of the Canadian
Corps upon the left. The reputation of the Canadians as brilliant
soldiers, as dashing in attack as they were steady in defence, had
already been solidly established by a long series of military feats
beginning with the ever-memorable second battle of Ypres and
continuing on to the capture of Courcelette and the fine fighting of
the Somme. Hitherto, they had acted in comparatively small bodies,
but now the whole might of Canada was drawn together in the four fine
divisions which lay facing the historic Vimy Ridge--a long gradual
slope which reaches a height of more than 450 feet at the summit.
They were arranged in their numerical order from the south, the First
(Currie) being in touch with the Fifty-first British Division, while
the Fourth (Watson) had upon its left Holland's First Corps, which
was not engaged in the first day's operations. The front covered by
the Canadians was from the south end of the Ridge to the Souchez
River, close to Lens. Nothing could have been more magnificent or
more successful than their advance, the Second and Third Divisions
(Burstall and Lipsett) attaining their full objectives {42} at every
point, and the First doing the same after a short check. There was
no rebuff save in the extreme north of the line. Sweeping onwards
with irresistible fury, they overran three lines of German trenches,
including the famous La Folie Farm, captured the village of Farbus,
and secured the splendid total of 70 officers and 3500 men as
prisoners, the same number as were taken by their British comrades to
the immediate south. They not only crowned the redoubtable ridge,
but they made their way down the eastern slope and established their
line beyond it. Many of the German infantry were captured in the
great chalk excavations in which they had taken refuge, two large
tunnels in particular--the Volker and the Prinz Arnault
Tunnels--being crammed with men. Incredible incidents happened in
these subterranean burrows, where small bodies of Canadian moppers-up
were faced suddenly by large numbers of armed Germans in hiding. In
one well-authenticated case four Canadians bluffed and captured 2
officers and 70 men from a Bavarian unit who were found in such a
pocket, an incident which meant a V.C. for Major Macdowell. When the
Kaiser in prophetic mood had spoken about what would happen when his
Bavarians met the British, such an incident was far from his
thoughts. It should be mentioned that the Fifth British Division was
in close support of the Canadians, and that the 13th Brigade of this
division was incorporated with the Second Canadians upon that day.
It was used in conjunction with the 6th Canadian Brigade on its right
to take the final objectives, the eastern slopes of the Ridge, just
north of Farbus Wood, which they did successfully with slight losses.
{43}
[Sidenote: April 10]
During the night of the 9/10th April there was fighting at several
points, notably at the north end of the Vimy Ridge. Here the Fourth
Canadian Division had some difficulty in holding its ground against
several strong counter-attacks of the Germans. It is probable that
no body of troops in the whole battle had a harder task, or stuck to
it more tenaciously, than this Fourth Canadian Division. Hill 145,
which was an outlier of the Ridge, was very strongly held and
desperately defended, so that it would have turned any but
first-class troops. The final clearing of this point was effected
upon April 10, and led to further operations in conjunction with
British troops to the north, which will be afterwards described.
The second day of the Battle of Arras, April 10, was spent partly in
the consolidation of the ground gained and partly in increasing the
area now occupied. The troops were in high heart, for although the
full extent of the victory had not yet been realised, it was already
known that at least 10,000 prisoners and 100 guns had fallen into
their hands, figures which showed that the battle had been the most
serious military disaster which had yet befallen the enemy. A fuller
enumeration taken some days later gave 13,000 men, 3 howitzers, 28
heavy guns, 130 field-guns, 84 trench-mortars, and 250 machine-guns
as the total capture. It may be mentioned that over 1000 prisoners
were taken from each of the six different German divisions already
enumerated, which disposes of their mendacious assertion that only
two divisions occupied their front. It was certainly the greatest
blow delivered by the British Army up to that date, and the only
other day's fighting at all comparable in its results was the French
attack upon the Champagne {44} front on September 25, 1915, where the
number of prisoners was greater but the capture of guns was less.
The Battle of Arras may be considered as having been in truth a
one-day battle in the same sense as the succeeding Battle of
Messines, for in each case the attack was delivered in order to gain
a definite objective, which was the ridge from which observation
could be obtained. The extreme limit of advance had not, however,
been reached either in the south or in the north, and so in both
these areas hard fighting continued, due partly to the efforts of the
British to enlarge their gains and partly to the rally of the Germans
and their attempts at counter-attack. There was no concentration of
troops or guns, however, upon the side of the British, and no attempt
at any considerable advance. We shall first follow these operations
in the south where they centred chiefly round the village of Monchy
and Wancourt in the areas of the Sixth and Seventh Corps. These we
shall weave into a connected narrative, after which we shall return
to the Vimy region and trace the movements which led to hard fighting
in that quarter.
In the Seventh Corps to the south the Fifty-sixth Division of London
Territorials had, as already described, enlarged the area which it
had taken the day before in the Neuville Vitasse sector. The general
curve of the line was such that it was not possible for the units of
the Seventh Corps to get forward until the Sixth Corps to the north
had won some ground, but upon the afternoon of the 12th a very fine
advance was made, by which the 169th Brigade stormed Heninel. The
Cojeul River was crossed by the {45} Fourteenth Light Division, and
the heights upon the eastern bank were occupied. The 41st Brigade of
this unit had now come into the line. The first attempt upon the
heights failed with heavy losses. Next morning it was found that
Hill 90 had been evacuated, and they were able to advance and seize
Wancourt. This brought the left flank of the Seventh Corps up to the
right flank of the Sixth Corps, and ensured close co-operation in
those operations to the north which will presently be more fully
described. This storming of the German position in this section was
the more important as the troops were faced by the new Hindenburg
Line. It was well known that an alternative line from Drocourt to
Queant existed some miles to the eastward, but none the less the fall
of the front section at a period when much of its wire was still
intact proved to the Germans how impossible it was to hold off
British troops by mere passive obstacles. The tanks were of great
assistance to the assailants in this difficult operation. Upon April
13 and 14 the Twenty-first Division, with the aid of the 19th Brigade
from the Thirty-third Division, carried forward the line to the high
ground about 1000 yards east of the stream at Henin, astride of that
portion of the Hindenburg Line. Here all further attempts to advance
were stopped by fresh German troops, until the operations were
renewed upon April 23. This advance of the Twenty-first Division
upon April 13 and 14 was in connection with a general movement of
Snow's Corps, but neither the Fifty-sixth London Territorials in the
centre nor the Fiftieth North Countrymen on the left, both of them
enfiladed from the north, could make much progress beyond the line of
Wancourt Tower, and there was little to {46} show for a hard day's
work. The Thirty-third Division (Pinney) now took over the front
from the Twenty-first.
[Sidenote: April 10]
The immediate task which lay before the Sixth Corps upon April 10 was
to get the Third and Twelfth Divisions forward to the same line which
the Fifteenth Division had reached. It will be remembered that the
46th Brigade of the latter division, together with the 63rd Brigade
from the supporting Thirty-seventh Division, had pushed on as far as
Orange Hill, half a mile farther eastward than the Feuchy Line which
formed the front of the two southern Divisions. Six brigades of
field artillery had been hurried up, and with the help of these guns,
aided by trench-mortars, the wire which held up the advance was
partly blown away. The Third and Twelfth Divisions were then able to
move forward and to make one line with the Fifteenth--an operation
which was completed by mid-day, the 8th Brigade doing some brilliant
work. The strongly fortified village of Monchy, elevated above the
plain, lay immediately in front of the Sixth Corps, and its capture
was their next task. With this object in view, the 63rd Brigade was
swung round from the north and worked its way south and east, getting
into touch with the other brigades of the Thirty-seventh Division,
which passed through the newly captured third objective and occupied
the ground upon the west of the village. A general advance was then
made on each side of the village, the 112th Brigade occupying La
Bergère upon the Cambrai road due south of Monchy, while the 1/11th
Brigade, with the 9th and 10th Royal Fusiliers in the lead, in the
face of a considerable opposition, pushed onwards until it gained a
footing on the outskirts {47} of the village and on the high ground
to the north of it, where the 154th Company R.E. dug a temporary
line. This was the position on the evening of April 10, while the
British line had been strengthened by the presence of the 7th Brigade
of Cavalry from the Third Cavalry Division, who were following
closely behind the Thirty-seventh Division. In all these operations
the weather greatly impeded progress, as it prevented the advance of
the guns needed to break down wire and other obstacles.
During the night of April 10 the Twelfth Division was withdrawn into
reserve, and the advance was resumed in the early morning by the
remaining divisions and the cavalry. At 5 A.M. the infantry was
closing in upon Monchy under a heavy fire. The line of advance
extended right across the Cambrai road, the 76th Brigade finding
itself opposite to the village of Guémappe. Here they were exposed
to a very heavy fire of machine-guns, and this famous brigade
sustained heavy losses, which were increased by a second attempt to
get forward in the afternoon. The 76th Brigade finally entrenched
itself some half a mile to the west of Guémappe and waited for
developments. The 8th Royal Lancasters were particularly hard hit in
their attack.
In the meantime the 111th Brigade of the Thirty-seventh Division had
advanced directly upon Monchy, and after severe fighting, in which
the splendid infantry struggled onwards in the face of every possible
difficulty of German resistance and of driving snowstorms, the place
was carried by assault. The three regiments of cavalry from the 8th
Brigade, the Royal Horse Guards, 10th Hussars, and Essex Yeomanry,
advanced at a gallop and did splendid service by taking {48} part in
the attack, following closely upon the infantry, and helping to
consolidate the village. By nine o'clock in the morning the 13th
K.R.R. and 13th Rifle Brigade, greatly aided by a very active and
efficient tank, had driven their way to the farthest houses upon the
eastern side. About 150 of the garrison remained in their hands,
while very many lay dead among the ruins of the shattered buildings.
The cavalry, who lost their brave leader, General Bulkeley Johnson,
emerged on the eastern side of the village and lost heavily at that
point, especially in horses, some 500 of which were hit. They had
the satisfaction, however, of getting their light guns fairly on to
the Germans, as they streamed across the open. One who was present
says: "The cavalry filled the gap between us and the 112th Brigade.
They lost heavily, and their conduct was magnificent." The new gain
was instantly consolidated by the Colonel of the Rifles.
The Fifteenth Division upon the left of the Thirty-seventh had been
fighting its way forward upon the north, endeavouring to keep in line
with the Thirty-seventh. It had got somewhat ahead of the Fourth
Division, however, which was to the north of the Scarpe, and in
consequence had to face the whole fire from the strong village of
Rœux, which held them up. The general line of the corps that
night was La Bergère, Monchy, and then the line of the Monchy-Fampoux
road as far as the Scarpe. To the north of the Scarpe there had been
no forward movement, as the Chemical Works to the east of Fampoux
presented an obstacle which was beyond the immediate scope of Sir
Charles Fergusson's operations.
[Sidenote: April 11]
On the night of April 11 the Thirty-seventh {49} Division, which had
suffered considerably in the capture of Monchy, and the Fifteenth
which had lived up to its reputation during fifty-six hours of
incessant fighting under most inclement conditions, were withdrawn
for a short rest, while the Twelfth Division returned into the line,
and the Seventeenth took the place of the Thirty-seventh. April 12
was spent in consolidation and in bringing up heavy howitzer
batteries along the Cambrai road, and placing them in positions
between Feuchy and Tilloy where they could support the coming
operations.
[Sidenote: April 12]
From the time that the British had captured the village, both it and
the whole front line in that area had been subjected to a most severe
German bombardment, which tried the troops extremely, but did not
prevent them from repulsing several attempts at counter-attack, none
of which reached the front trenches. On the night of April 12 the
Twelfth Division, which was considerably worn from its exertions, was
drawn out and was replaced by the famous Twenty-ninth Regular
Division, which had gained such honour and suffered such losses at
Gallipoli and on the Somme. There was no forward movement upon April
13 in the region of Monchy, but farther south the 9th Brigade, which
had taken the place of the 76th in front of Guémappe, endeavoured to
reach that village, but were met and checked by the same murderous
machine-gun fire which had held up their comrades, a fire which came
both from the hamlet itself and from the high ground to the south
which lay within the area of the Seventh Corps. The 1st
Northumberland Fusiliers and 12th West Yorks, which led the attack,
both suffered severely.
[Sidenote: April 14]
As no large movement was contemplated upon {50} this front it was now
held by only two divisions, the Twenty-ninth to the south and the
Seventeenth to the north, covering the whole broad area from the
north of the Cojeul River to the south of the Scarpe. At 5.30 upon
April 14 both divisions advanced in order to test the German strength
and, if possible, to push them farther back from Monchy. It was an
unsuccessful day, and yet it was one of those failures which will be
remembered where facile successes have been forgotten, for it brought
with it one episode which elicited in the highest degree the
historical qualities of British infantry. It had been arranged that
the 88th Brigade, consisting of the 2nd Hants, 4th Worcesters, 1st
Essex, and the Newfoundland Regiment, should attack due east of
Monchy, while another brigade of the Twenty-ninth Division should
advance to their right, and the Seventeenth Division guard their
flank upon the left. Both of the flank attacks failed, however, and
the result was that the storming line of the 88th Brigade, consisting
of the Essex men on the left and the Newfoundlanders on the right,
found themselves in possession of the German trenches on Infantry
Hill, east of Monchy, but with both wings exposed and with so
terrific a barrage behind them that they were practically cut off
from assistance. This might have mattered little under ordinary
circumstances, since two such battalions might be counted upon to
hold their ground, but by an evil chance their advance had coincided
with a considerable German counter-attack from the Bois du Sart, made
by a whole Bavarian division with the intention of retaking Monchy.
The result was a Homeric contest in which two battalions held up a
whole division, shattered a considerable attack, and {51} were
practically annihilated in doing so. Of some companies not a single
man returned and yet few were ever reported as prisoners in Germany.
No more gallant feat of arms has been performed in the war. The 2nd
Hants and 4th Worcesters in support did their best to help their
comrades, and sustained considerable losses themselves in the
attempt, but they were never able to reach the real front line, and
it is undoubtedly true that the two battalions alone received and
broke the full strength of the Bavarian Division, which was entirely
fresh, having taken no part in any previous fighting. It was
difficult in the barrage and confusion--the ground being
unreconnoitred--to direct reinforcements to the points where they
were so urgently needed, but a lieutenant of the Essex passed through
the German barrage and managed to bring up one company of the 2nd
Hants, who came too late to retrieve the fight, but were able to take
up the defence of the northern flank and to prevent the Germans from
getting round in that quarter. Small parties of the enemy got up to
the fringes of the village, but the edge had been taken completely
from their assault, and in spite of the heavy barrage, the staff of
the brigade headquarters, who were the only troops available, were
sufficient to hold them off; Colonel Forbes Robertson doing
particularly good work with a Lewis gun. No German set foot in
Monchy. Of the headquarter staff there were only nine survivors,
each of whom was decorated.
Apart from the attack so heroically repelled, a second had developed
to the south-east of Monchy which was driven back by rifles and
machine-guns. The total German losses during the day must have been
very heavy, and they had nothing to show for {52} it, though the
British casualties amounted to some 4000, chiefly in the Twenty-ninth
Division.
It must be admitted that the Germans, who had been strongly
reinforced in men and in guns, were fighting with great resolution on
this front, and their defence and counter-attacks were equally
gallant.
From this date onwards until April 22, there was no particular
forward movement, and every effort was concentrated upon the
improvement of defences and communications. There were no fresh
German counter-attacks, but there was constant and heavy bombardment
upon both sides, the Germans pouring shells into Monchy and raking
every road which led to the front, while the British overwhelmed
Guémappe, Rœux, and Pelves with their fire. The only change of
troops was that upon the night of April 19 the Fifteenth Scottish
Division, after its short rest, pushed in upon the right of the
Twenty-ninth Division, taking over the ground between La Bergère on
the north and the Cojeul River on the south. The order of battle of
the Sixth Corps was therefore from the north the Seventeenth,
Twenty-ninth, and Fifteenth Divisions.
We shall now retrace our steps to glance at what had been going on
since the first day of the battle upon the front of the Seventeenth
Corps to the immediate north of the Scarpe. It has already been
recorded how the flank unit, the Fourth Division, after relieving the
Ninth Division found itself faced with the strongly-fortified
Chemical Works and the village of Rœux. The position was a very
formidable one, as future tragic experiences were to prove. Two
brigades of the Ninth Division, the 27th Lowlanders upon the left and
the South Africans upon the right, were ordered to pass the line of
the Fourth Division {53} and to endeavour to carry the place by
assault. The attempt was not successful, though it was urged with
great valour. The wastage of the division had already been such that
neither brigade numbered 2000 bayonets. The average strength of the
South African regiments was about 400 men. As a result, the attack
was wanting in weight, and was repulsed with considerable loss, which
fell chiefly upon the 1st Cape and 2nd Natal battalions in the front
line of the South Africans. The attackers endured heavy losses in
debouching from the narrow exits of Fampoux under fire, and they were
afterwards faced with 700 yards of open ground swept by bullets. In
spite of this, some of the stormers did actually penetrate the German
lines, as was proved later by the discovery of their bodies.
[Sidenote: April 10]
To the north of this section of fierce fighting the line, which had
sagged upon the evening of April 9, had been brought level upon April
10 by the readjustment of the Fifty-first Division, and by the attack
of the 103rd Brigade of Tyneside Scottish upon the Maison de la Côte
position. From that time the British front was firm in this region,
and a strong counter-attack of four German battalions, who could be
seen streaming westwards in lines of motor 'buses, was broken to
pieces upon the night of April 11 by the steady rifle-fire of the
27th Northumberland Fusiliers who occupied the front trenches.
Facing this section of the line was the village of Bailleul which was
abandoned by the Germans, and was taken over by Pereira's Second
Division, who had relieved the Highland Territorials upon April 13.
Shortly afterwards the Sixty-third Naval Division took over from the
Thirty-fourth. These two {54} divisions belonged to the Thirteenth
Corps (M'Cracken), which from now onward occupied a space in the line
between the Seventeenth to the south and the Canadians to the north.
The strong villages of Oppy and of Gavrelle lay now in front of the
British in this quarter, but the German line was destined to remain
unbroken for a considerable period. An attack was made upon Gavrelle
by the 190th Brigade, the landsman unit of the Naval Division, but
this was only partially successful. Farther to the north the Second
Division had no better fortune against Oppy, which was attempted more
than once. The further advance against these places will be found
recorded further on, where it will fit into its place among the other
incidents of the renewed general attack upon April 23.
[Sidenote: April 13]
The Canadians in the Vimy Ridge area were occupied during three days
of dreadful weather in consolidating their new positions, and in
pushing the Germans out of that northern portion which they still
held. The Fourth Canadian Division had suffered much from
machine-gun fire from Hill 145 in the Souchez district, but this was
taken upon April 10. There was still a good deal of work to be done,
however, at that end of the line, and upon April 12 a joint attack of
Canadians and British cleared the ground in this quarter. Attacking
at dawn in a snowstorm, the resolute Canadian infantry drove their
way over the northern limits of Vimy Ridge, capturing among other
positions an outlier of the Vimy Ridge, the venomous little hill
called The Pimple, which had been a thorn in their side. At the same
time the Twenty-fourth British Division moved forward nearly opposite
to Lens, the river Souchez separating them from the Canadians. The
immediate obstacle which {55} faced the British troops was a
scattered wood, the Bois-en-Haches, which was most gallantly attacked
by the 73rd Brigade. The front line in this fine advance was formed
by the 9th Sussex on the left and the 2nd Leinsters upon the right,
supported by the 13th Middlesex and 7th Northamptons. Both the
Sussex and the Irish battalions, especially the latter, had heavy
losses, but they never faltered until their objective was won. Upon
April 13 there was a general forward movement along the whole
Canadian line, in the course of which they occupied Willerval in the
south and both Vimy and Givenchy-en-Gohelle in the north. On the
same date the 15th and 95th Brigades of the British Fifth Division
took over from the Fourth Canadian Division from the Souchez River to
south of Givenchy-en-Gohelle. These two brigades actually took over
on the move forward, and did not stop until they had reached a line
Cité-des-Petits-Bois to the Vimy-Lens Road just short of La Coulotte.
The Twenty-fourth Division in the north joined in this attack as, to
a limited extent, did the Sixth Division upon its left. It may be
explained that both of these divisions, together with the Forty-sixth
in support of them, formed Holland's First Corps. The Twenty-fourth
Division advanced upon a three-brigade front, the 72nd, 17th, and
73rd Brigades in that order from the left, sweeping forward in one
line. Complete success attended their efforts. Angres, Lievin, and
Cité St. Pierre were all stormed and occupied. The 17th Brigade,
which had been strengthened by the inclusion of the 1st Marine
Battalion, did particularly well, for it was faced by two dangerous
strong points called Crook and Crazy, both of which were carried, the
3rd Rifle Brigade {56} being conspicuous in each operation. Some
days later, the Forty-sixth Division took over from the Twenty-fourth
and the new line was firmly held, the area of the Forty-sixth being
from the Souchez River in the south to Fosse 12 de Lens in the north.
Farther to the north the Sixth Division had made some progress, but
had not been able to surmount the old enemy, Hill 70, the long, clear
glacis of which had cost the British such losses at Loos. The
Twenty-fourth Division had lost 3000 men in these operations, but
their services had been of great value, for the grip upon Lens was
appreciably tighter, and according to Sir Douglas Haig's despatch it
was the capture of this position which prevented the Germans from
attempting the retaking of the positions which they had lost. The
British Army was close to the great mining centre, one of the springs
of wealth in France. Ominous explosions and dense plumes of dark
smoke seemed to show that it was a spring which would be sealed for
many a day. So precipitate had been the German retreat in this area
that candles were found burning in the dug-outs, meals were half
consumed, and large stores of engineering materials and grenades were
left behind.
Pausing for a moment at this instant, with the line advanced from
three to six miles along the whole front, one may take a glance at
the practical results of this great battle. As a mere military
triumph it was a considerable one, since the total booty in the
immediate battle came by this date to some 14,000 men and 180 guns.
Its strategical result was to win the high ground along the whole of
a front which had been considered impregnable, and so to give both
better observation and drier foothold to the army. {57} It was clear
that it must entail a prolongation of the same operation to the
north, and this was manifested two months later at the victory of
Messines. That again pointed to a fresh prolongation towards the
higher ground round Ypres, which led to the severe but successful
fighting in the autumn. Thus the Arras Battle was the prologue to
the whole campaign of 1917.
It is impossible, even in so brief an account as this, to turn away
from this great victory without a word as to the splendid service of
the airmen, and the glorious efforts by which they secured the
supremacy over their brave adversaries. The air, the guns, the
infantry--those are the three stages which lead from one to the other
in a modern battle. Starting with every possible disadvantage, our
knight-errants of the air, as without hyberbole they may well be
called, by a wonderful mixture of reckless dare-devil bravery and
technical skill brought their side to victory. The mixture of the
Berserk fighter and of the cool engineer, as ready with the spanner
and oil-can as with the pistol and machine-gun, is indeed a strange
product of modern tactics. No mention of these grand men, most of
them hardly more than boys in their years, could be complete which
did not specially name one who is likely to remain as a great memory
and inspiration in the Service, Captain Albert Ball, a gallant youth
whose bravery and modesty were equally beautiful. He brought down
not less than forty-three German planes in single combat before
meeting his own glorious end.
[Sidenote: April 9-12]
Whilst this battle had been raging along the Arras front, the great
southern curve which marked the eventual halting-place of the German
retreat was {58} the scene of continual fighting, which attained no
great intensity save at Bullecourt, but smouldered all along the
line, as the British drove in the outlying German posts and impinged
upon the main Hindenburg position from Croisilles to St. Quentin.
Detail of these smaller operations hardly comes within the scale of
this narrative, but some indication of their nature and sequence may
be given. On April 2 had been the successful advance upon Ecoust,
Noreuil, Louverval, and Doignies, which was carried out to the
immediate south of the Seventh Corps area by the left of Gough's
Fifth Army. The troops engaged were the British Divisions--the
Seventh, Fifty-eighth, and Sixty-second upon the left near
Croisilles, the Fourth Australians at Noreuil, and the Fifth
Australians at Doignies and Hermies. This brought the army in this
section up to the front Hindenburg Line, which the Australians with
little support behind them proceeded at once to break, a most valiant
but rather rash undertaking, as it was clear that the task was one
which required the massed batteries of several army corps to bring it
to success. The idea was to connect up with the flank of the Third
Army in its new positions and the Sixty-second British Division
advance on the left for the same purpose. The attack, which began
upon April 12, was directed against the line at a point between
Bullecourt village upon the left and Lagnicourt upon the right. A
broad apron of barbed wire covered the whole German front, and the
only means of piercing it, in the absence of heavy gun power, was by
the crushing force of tanks. The attack was delivered across the
snow in the early morning by men many of whom had never seen snow
{59} in their lives until they entered the war zone. In some places
the tanks broke the wire, but for the greater part the infantry--West
Australians and New South Welshmen on right, Victorians on left--with
extraordinary gallantry and with considerable loss worked its way
through it, taking the village of Riencourt. On the farther side,
however, they were met with repeated bombing attacks which continued
through the morning and afternoon with such pertinacity that the
Australian supply of bombs was exhausted. There were only three
tanks, and though they behaved with the greatest audacity they were
all put out of action. The artillery support being inadequate, the
infantry had to fall back, and one considerable party, some 700 in
number, were unable to get through the wire, so that after doing all
that men could do they were compelled to surrender. Several of these
men escaped later with fresh tales of that German brutality to
prisoners which has been their constant policy, with a few honourable
exceptions, since the first days of the war. When the large national
issues have been settled or forgotten, these smaller villainies will
leave Germans as outcasts among the civilised nations of the earth,
with no living men save the murderers of Armenia with whom they can
hold equal converse. This temporary repulse upon the Hindenburg Line
by no means disheartened the Australians, who argued that if with so
little support they could effect so much, a more deliberate assault
could hardly fail of success. Within three weeks, as will be shown,
they were to prove the truth of their contention.
[Sidenote: April 15]
In the meantime, a considerable German attack had been prepared which
fell upon the Australian line {60} in the early morning of April 15.
Two Guards Divisions and two ordinary divisions took part in it, so
that it was no small matter. The outposts were weak and a number of
the field-guns had been brought well forward into the front line, so
that the first onset crashed through the defences and brought about a
situation which might have been dangerous. The front line rallied,
and with the aid of supports advanced so swiftly upon the Germans
that they had little time to injure the guns which had come for the
moment into their power. The front of the attack was nearly six
miles, from Hermies to Noreuil, with its centre at Lagnicourt, and
all along this extended position the stormers had rushed forward in
heavy masses into the Australian line. It was easier to break than
to destroy, for every scattered post spat out bullets from rifles and
Lewis guns, fighting viciously until it was either submerged or
rescued. In some posts, notably that of Subaltern Pope, an old
warrant-officer of the Navy from West Australia, the men fired away
every cartridge and then all died together, stabbing and thrusting
with their bayonets into the grey clouds which hemmed them in.
Seventy German dead were found round his position. In front of
Lagnicourt, the Germans had the advanced guns in their hands for
nearly two hours, but they had been dismantled by the gunners before
they were abandoned, and the Prussian Guardsmen had apparently no
means of either moving or of destroying them. All of them, save
five, were absolutely intact when retaken. A rush of Queenslanders
and New South Welshmen drove back the intruders, retrieved the guns,
and followed the fugitives into Lagnicourt. Large numbers of the
Germans were shot down in their retreat, {61} especially in their
efforts to get back through the gaps in their own wire. Both sides
took several hundred prisoners in this action, but the German losses
were heavy, and nothing at all was gained.
The units which have been mentioned, the Seventh, Fifty-eighth, and
Sixty-second Divisions, with the Fourth and Fifth Australian
Divisions, constituted for the moment the whole of Gough's Fifth
Army. To its south, extending from the right of the Australians at
Hermies down to the junction with the French at St. Quentin, lay
Rawlinson's Fourth Army, which consisted at this period of the
Fifteenth Corps (Du Cane) upon the left, with the Twentieth, Eighth,
and Forty-eighth Divisions in the line. To the south of this was the
Third Corps with the Fifty-ninth, Thirty-fifth, and Thirty-second
Divisions in the line. Their general instructions were to push the
enemy back so as to gain complete observation of the Hindenburg
system. The Twentieth Division pushed up into Havrincourt Wood, and
gradually by many skirmishes cleared it of the enemy, an operation
which extended over some time, but was not accompanied by any hard
fighting.
A sharp little action, already described, was fought at the extreme
south of the British line upon April 13, in which the Thirty-second
Division was engaged. This unit captured Fayet, which is only one
mile north of St. Quentin. At the same time, the two divisions upon
the left, the Thirty-fifth and the Fifty-ninth, advanced and captured
the ground in front of them. After some fighting, these two
divisions occupied the Gricourt-Pontruet line. This section of the
line ceased after April to concern the {62} British commanders, for
the St. Quentin end of it was taken over by the French, while the
trenches north of that were occupied by Canadian and Indian cavalry,
so as to release fresh divisions for the operations in the north.
The full objects of the Arras battle, so far as they could be
attained, had been reached after a week of fighting. Had he only
himself to consult, Sir Douglas would have assumed a strict defensive
from that time onwards and begun at once to transfer his forces for
those operations which he had planned in Flanders. It was essential,
however, that he should hold and use up as many German divisions as
possible in order to help the French offensive which was about to
start in the south. How successful the British General had been
already in this design is shown by his own statement that after this
week of fighting the Germans had twice as many divisions opposite to
him as they had at the beginning, and were driven into constant
counter-attacks which cost them heavy losses. The whole aftermath of
the Battle of Arras, extending until the end of May, is to be judged
from this point of view, and though we may be inclined to wince at
the heavy losses and the limited results, we have to bear in mind
continually the wider strategic meaning of the operations.
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[Illustration: Chart of ORDER OF BATTLE--ARRAS April 9, 1917]
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