I Cut my Way Through Sixty Thousand Troops
The English could not endure the thought that we had their guns in our
possession. And, accordingly, when General Michal Prinsloo came near the
Liebenbergsvlei, on the road between Reitz and Heilbron, he met a strong
force of the enemy which had come from Kroonstad. The English then had a
taste of what it was like to be under the fire of our artillery; and so
well did the gunners do their work that the enemy were forced to
retreat. This occurred shortly before sunset on the afternoon of the
28th of December.
But the forces in front of General Prinsloo were too strong for him, and
so when night came he marched past, and the following morning was twelve
miles to the south-west of them.
The enemy advanced against the position which General Prinsloo had
occupied the previous day, quite unaware that he was now in their rear.
In the meantime the General was watching their movements from behind,
and quietly enjoying their mistake.
I left the hospital that afternoon, and crossing the Liebenbergsvlei to
the rear of the English, I joined the Heilbron commando.
The following day the enemy retreated to the farm of Groenvlei, which
lies just to the north of Lindley. They remained there for a few days
awaiting large reinforcements.
"I quite understand your plan," I said to myself, as I set to work to
split up the great force which the enemy were concentrating. And with
this object in view I sent each Commandant to his own district,
believing that by dispersing my own men I should again induce the
English to divide their troops into smaller parties. Commandant Mears,
with his fifty men, I ordered to remain with the guns and the artillery,
and to guard them by very careful scouting.
In less than a fortnight seven large columns of the enemy were operating
in the district between Heilbron and Bethlehem and Harrismith. These
columns burnt all the houses within their reach, and those which had
been spared before were now given over to the flames. And not only were
the houses destroyed, but every head of cattle was taken.
Towards the end of January, 1902, still more columns arrived and a
"drive" began.
I remained in the neighbourhood until the 2nd of February and stationed
Commandant Mears with the guns to the east of the Wilge River. The
English formed a circle round him, but he succeeded in getting the guns
away in safety. When he was out of their clutches, I sent him orders to
bring the guns through the blockhouse line between Lindley and
Bethlehem, and then to push on towards Winburg.
It was my intention, on arriving there, to collect as rapidly as
possible a commando from the men of Bethlehem, Kroonstad, and Winburg,
and to attack the first column that gave me a chance of doing so.
Commandant Mears carried out my orders at once. A force of the enemy had
been waiting for him for three or four days at the farm of Fanny's Home,
on the Liebenbergsvlei. But before the sun had risen, a strong force
under Colonel Byng had surrounded him and forced him to abandon the
guns. And not only were the guns lost, but Captain Muller and thirteen
gunners were taken prisoner.
Thus the guns had not been of much benefit to us, for the English had
kept us so constantly on the move that it had been impossible to use
them.
The forces of the enemy between Harrismith and Vrede had formed a line
extending from the Harrismith-Bethlehem blockhouses to the blockhouses
between Vrede, Frankfort and Heilbron. And now the troops were advancing
in close contact with each other, hoping thus to force us against one or
other line of blockhouses.
Nearer and nearer they came, until at noon on February the 5th we saw
them to the east of Liebenbergsvlei. As I was watching their movements
from the top of Elandskop, I was informed by heliogram[102] from
Blaauwkop and Verkijkerskop that there was a cordon of the English from
Frankfort to a spot between Bethlehem and Lindley.
The intention of the enemy appeared to be to drive us against the
Heilbron-Kroonstad blockhouses and the railway line. We had therefore to
be prepared to fight our way through the blockhouses. And these, as I
found out lately, had been greatly strengthened.
On the 6th of February I was on the march, intending to advance to
Slangfontein, to the west of Heilbron. I sent orders to Commandants
Mentz, Van der Merwe, and Van Coller, to take a portion of Commandant
Bester's burghers, telling them to go to Slangfontein. For I hoped to
break through at some point or other that night.
Still nearer the enemy came, marching almost shoulder to shoulder.
The Commandants Van Coller and Van der Merwe did not go to Slangfontein.
They broke through the English columns near Jagersrust, and crossed the
Heilbron-Frankfort blockhouse line, where they put a few soldiers to
flight, not, however, without a loss of two burghers, who were killed.
Neither did the burghers under Veldtcornets Taljaart and Prinsloo
arrive. They preferred to go their own way--and all were captured with
the exception of twenty-eight men. But this misfortune was not due to
the blockhouses. On the contrary, they were taken prisoners when they
were attempting to hide themselves in small bodies. In this way more
than a hundred burghers fell into the hands of the English.
There were now with me Commandant Mentz, and portions of the commandos
of Commandants Bester, Cilliers, and Mears.
That afternoon we marched to a farm which was twelve miles from the
Lindley-Kroonstad line of blockhouses. When it was quite dark, we left
the farm with the intention of breaking through this line before
daybreak. There had been five or six hundred head of cattle with us,
but, without my being aware of it, they had gone astray in the darkness.
We intentionally left the path, because we thought that the English
would be most vigilant at points where paths crossed the line.
Suddenly we found ourselves at a wire fence. The darkness was so thick,
that it was only after we had cut the wire that we discovered that we
were close to a blockhouse. Although the house was not more than a
hundred paces from us, we could hear and see nothing. When we were some
four hundred paces on the other side of the line of the blockhouses, I
sent a burgher back to see if all the men and cattle had crossed
safely--for we were riding in a long trail, and amongst us were old men
and youngsters of only ten years, or even less. These boys would have
been taken away from their mothers had they stayed at home; and thus the
only way to keep them from captivity was to let them join the commandos.
The burgher soon returned, and told me that the whole commando and all
the cattle had crossed the line. Then I marched forward again.
At break of day we were close to the Valsch River. Here I made a short
halt, in order to allow the stragglers to come up. It was then that a
man came to me who had been riding far behind, and had thus not seen
that we had cut the wire. He was probably one of those who quite
needlessly feared a blockhouse line.
"General, when shall we come to the blockhouses?" he asked me.
"Oh! we are through long ago!" I answered.
It did not require any deep insight, I can assure you, to see how
delighted this burgher was that we were safely out of it!
We discovered now that the cattle had not crossed the line. When I
investigated the matter more closely, I found that they had gone astray
before we reached the blockhouses. But it was impossible to wait for
them, and there was nothing left but to proceed without them.
When we arrived at the Valsch River, there was a sound of shouting
behind us, and presently the cattle appeared coming over a rise. I heard
from the drivers that they had lost their way, and had only reached the
blockhouses at daylight. But they had succeeded in breaking through
under a fierce rifle fire. Twenty head of cattle had been killed or
wounded, and one of the men's horses had been shot under him.
The burghers who had accomplished this valiant deed were: Jan Potgieter,
Gert Potgieter, Jzoon, and Wessel Potgieter--all from the district of
Heilbron.
I have, myself, seen a report in an English paper of my breaking through
the blockhouse line. This paper declared that I had driven a great herd
of cattle in front of me to break down the fencing!... This is the way
the English write the reports.
This breaking through of my cattle inspired the English, at least so I
thought, to dig trenches everywhere. But they were again wrong; for
although a vehicle might have some difficulty before the trench was
filled in, no riders, pedestrians, or cattle would have been stopped for
a moment.
And now we marched on, till we reached a spot about fourteen miles to
the south of the blockhouse line; and there we remained for three days.
Whilst we were waiting here, I sent two burghers back to the blockhouse
line, to discover in what direction the English columns had marched, so
that I might know where I should go myself. Now, less than ever, was it
advisable to make night marches, for our horses were in a very poor
condition.
The day following I received a heliographic message from these burghers,
who were now on the other side of the line. They signalled that I could
come on with my commando, since the English columns had returned to
Kroonstad and Heilbron.
When night came I started on my way back. I did not go (as before) to
the east of Lindley, but to the farm of Palmietfontein, which lies to
the west. When we were close to the line, I sent some burghers in
advance to cut the wire. But this time there was a reception ready for
us, which we certainly would rather have been without! This was to be
ascribed to the fact that instead of only two scouts, as I had ordered,
about ten had gone to reconnoitre. So large a number had attracted the
attention of the enemy, and the guards had concentrated at the spot
where we wished to break through.
Thus before my commando reached the line a fierce fire was opened on it
from two sides. Yet notwithstanding this the wires were cut and we
reached the other side, but not without loss. One of my burghers was
killed, and one wounded. A boy of ten was also killed, and another of
seven severely wounded. We could not ascertain the losses of the enemy.
It was terrible that children should be exposed to such dangers; but, as
I have already said, if we had not taken them with us they would have
been captured. During the very "drive" I have just described, two
children who had remained at home with their mothers were taken
prisoner by the English. One of these was a boy of nine, the little son
of Jacobus Theron. Notwithstanding the prayers and entreaties of the
poor mother, he was torn from her and carried away. In the same way
another boy, twelve years old, whose name I do not know, was dragged
from his mother's arms.
The chronicling of such inexplicable cruelties I leave to other pens. I
have drawn attention to them to make it clear that it was not without
good cause that children joined the commandos. Some of these little ones
became a prey to the bullets of the enemy, and the South African soil is
stained by the blood of children slain by England.
With the exception of the sad incidents I have described, we came
through in safety.
I afterwards heard that Lord Kitchener had on this occasion gone to
Wolvehoek Station in order to see President Steyn and myself carried
away in the train to banishment! But his calculations were not
altogether correct.
A Higher Power had willed it otherwise.
The burghers had now returned to their own districts. I myself went to a
farm in the neighbourhood of Elandskop belonging to Mr. Hendrick
Prinsloo--the _rooije_.[103] After I had been there a few days I heard
that a strong column was approaching Lindley from Kroonstad. During the
night of the 17th of February this column attacked some burghers who
were posted less than four miles from Elandskop, with the object--as I
heard later--of catching me. And they would have been quite successful
in their attempt had I been sleeping in the house where their
information led them to believe they would find me. But as a matter of
fact, I seldom, if ever, slept in a house, for to tell the truth, there
were scarcely any houses left to sleep in! The women who had escaped
capture lived in narrow shelters, which had been made by placing
corrugated iron sheets on what was left standing of the walls that
remained.
I crossed the Liebenbergsvlei on the 18th of February, and proceeded to
the farm of Rondebosch, which stands to the north-east of Reitz. There I
met the Government.
And now another big "drive" took place. The English columns marched to
the south of the Kroonstad-Lindley blockhouse line in the direction of
Bethlehem. Other troops came from Heilbron, and advanced to the north of
the Heilbron-Frankfort line, driving Commandant Ross across this line to
the south.
Nearer and nearer these two great divisions approached each other, until
at last they stretched without any break from the Bethlehem-Lindley to
the Frankfort-Vrede line of blockhouses. On the 21st of February the
whole column moved towards Vrede and Harrismith.
It seemed to me that my best plan would be to go with President Steyn
and the Government to the Witkopjes, which lay between Harrismith and
Vrede, and then to break through the English columns near Vrede or
Harrismith, or, if it proved impossible to do so at these points, at
least to force a way through somewhere.
On this occasion we had a great deal more difficulty in escaping from
the English than we had had during the previous "drive." Not only had we
to deal with these large forces behind, but also with thousands of
troops which were now approaching from Villiersdorp, Standerton,
Volksrust, and Laingsnek, and which were extended across the country in
one continuous line. The whole cordon thus formed consisted, as the
English themselves acknowledge, of sixty thousand men.
And again on this occasion they did not attempt to drive us against one
or other of the blockhouse lines, but they came, column on column, from
all sides, and formed a big circle round us. They thus made it quite
apparent that they had lost all faith in their blockhouses.
I only received news of the approach of these reinforcements on the
evening of the 22nd of February, after they had passed the blockhouses.
The report was brought to me by Commandant Hermanus Botha, a party of
whose burghers had been driven across the Vrede-Frankfort line during
the previous night. I have already stated that some of the burghers
under Commandant Ross had shared the same experience, and now they were
retreating before the English. I also heard that Commandant Mentz had
gone eastwards, in the belief that the forces behind him would move to
the west, but that unfortunately the columns also moved to the east, so
that he jumped into the lion's mouth, which was only too ready to close!
We marched that night to Cornelius River, and the day following to Mr.
James Howell's farm at Brakfontein. It was my intention to break through
somewhere between Vrede and Bothaspas.
But my scouts brought me word in the evening that there was a very poor
chance of success in that neighbourhood, for the columns had
concentrated there. Other scouts, however, reported that there was a
small opening at Kalkkrans, on the Holspruit; and so I decided to march
to Kalkkrans.
When the sun had set I left Brakfontein and started on my road to
Kalkkrans, with the firm determination to force my way through there,
cost what it might. If I failed in the attempt I knew that it would mean
an irretrievable loss, for not only should I myself be captured, but
also President Steyn and the whole Government.
I had with me a portion of the Harrismith burghers, the commandos from
Vrede and Frankfort, and sections of the commandos from Standerton and
Wakkerstroom, these latter under Commandant Alberts. This Commandant had
come to these districts to obtain horses for his burghers; he was
obliged to be content with the wild horses of the veldt, for there were
no others to be had.
Beside the above burghers, I had with me old men and children, and
others who were non-combatants. These had joined the commando to escape
falling into the enemy's hands.
Altogether I had well-nigh two thousand persons with me. Commandant
Mentz was, like myself, enclosed in the "drive," but some distance away.
General Wessels, Commandant Beukes, and some of the Bethlehem burghers
were in the same predicament to the west of us. I did not know for
certain where these officers were placed, and therefore I could not
inform them of my plan to break through that night, for I had only come
to this determination after the sun had set. But I felt sure that they
would at all costs make their way through the cordon.[104]
Commandant Jan Meijer had met me at Brakfontein, but one party of his
burghers was still six miles to the south. When I decided to break
through, I sent him orders to follow me; and this he was quite capable
of doing, as he was well acquainted with this part of the country. My
orders were that the mounted men were to proceed in advance, taking with
them my little waggon drawn by eight mules.
This waggon had accompanied me into Cape Colony, and since that
time--for fourteen weary months--had never left me. I had even taken it
with me when, a fortnight previously, I had broken through the
blockhouse lines.
Behind the horsemen came the aged and the sick, who occupied the
remaining vehicles, and lastly the cattle, divided into several herds.
In this order we rode on.
When we were approaching the spot at which I expected to find the enemy,
I ordered Commandant Ross and one hundred men, with Hermanus Botha and
Alberts, and portions of their commandos, to go on ahead of us.
After passing through Holspruit we inclined to the west, as the road to
the east would, according to my scouts, have led us right into the
English camp. But it was not with one camp only that we had to deal: the
English were everywhere: a whole army lay before us--an army so immense
that many Englishmen thought that it would be a task beyond the stupid
and illiterate Boer to count it, much less to understand its
significance. I will pander to the English conception of us and say, "We
have seen them: they are a great big lot!"
We had hardly moved three hundred paces from where we had crossed
Holspruit, when the English, lined up about three hundred yards in front
of us, and opened fire. We saw that they did not intend our flight to be
an easy one.
Before we had reached the "spruit,"[105] and while crossing it, the
burghers had kept pushing ahead and crowds had even passed us, but the
enemy's fire checked them and they wheeled round.
Only the men under Commandants Ross, Botha, and Alberts did not waver.
These officers and their veldtcornets with less than one hundred men
stormed the nearest position of the enemy, who were occupying a fort on
the brow of a steep bank.
I shouted to my command: "Charge."
I exerted all my powers of persuasion to arrest the flight of my
burghers; even bringing the sjambok into the argument.
Two hundred and fifty were all that I could bring back to the fight,
whilst, as I have said, the Commandants had a hundred with them when
they charged; the rest, regardless of my attempts to stop them, fled.
I was also without my staff, some of whom had remained under the fire of
the enemy awaiting my orders as to what was to be done with my little
waggon. Others, amongst whom was my son Kootie, who was then acting as
my secretary, had followed me, but had got lost in the confusion of the
moment.
This confusion arose from the fact that the burghers imagined that they
had got through at the first attempt, but had found themselves again
fired at from the front. Meanwhile, I hurried to and fro, encouraging
the burghers in their attempts to break through. When thus engaged I
came across two of my staff, Albertus Theunissen and Burt Nissey. To
them I gave the order: "Get the waggon through at all costs." I also
found my son, Isaac, and kept him with me. The English now were firing
not only from in front but also on our right, and there was nothing for
it but to clear a road for ourselves, and this we eventually succeeded
in doing, and in about forty minutes had at last broken through.
The enemy had dug trenches, thirty to forty paces from each other, which
served as _schanzes_. In each of these trenches were placed ten to
thirty men. They had also a Maxim-Nordenfeldt, which, at first, kept up
a hot fire; but soon was silenced as the gunners were shot down. The
rest of the troops retired with the gun, but had to leave the caisson
behind them. It was evident to me from the way in which they fired that
the English were retreating, and so I dispatched two men to tell the
burghers, who had gone back, to come on; but this they did not do,
thinking perhaps that they could discover a safer route on the following
evening. This was short-sighted policy on their part, for the circle
within which they were caught was daily becoming narrower, and it was
plain that on the third day the enemy would be so close that all hope of
escape would be gone.
The two burghers did not return, and we went on without them, taking
with us our wounded--twelve in number. Two of these, whose injuries were
serious, had been placed by some of my staff on my waggon; one was Van
der Merwe, a member of President Steyn's bodyguard; the other was a boy
of thirteen years old, named Olivier.
We hurried on, and came, shortly after sundown, to the farm called
"Bavaria," on the Bothasberg. There Van der Merwe died.
The boy had already been relieved from his sufferings. Thus, once again,
the soil drank the blood of a child.
Eleven of my men were left dead on the battlefield. We had to leave them
there, for to recover their bodies might have meant the sacrifice of
more lives.
When the burghers and I forced our way through the storm of bullets, we
had with us President Steyn, the Members of the Government, and the Rev.
D. Kestell, minister of the Dutch Reformed Church at Harrismith.
The greater part of the English, indeed all of them, so far as we could
observe, remained, during the 24th, on the spot where we had left them.
We found out, later on, that we had broken through their lines at the
point where Colonel Rimington's force was stationed.
The following day the columns departed. We then went to bury our dead,
but found that the enemy had already done so. But as the graves which
they had made were very shallow, we dug them deeper.
During that night (the 25th) another force of burghers, to the number of
about three hundred and fifty, broke through the English cordon. Our men
only lost two killed, and eleven wounded.
Besides those already mentioned, the burghers under General Wessel
Wessels and Commandant Mentz were also among those who escaped of the
two thousand troops surrounded by the enemy.
With the others it fared but ill.
The English closed in, and the circle became narrower and narrower.
On the 27th of February, 1902--"Majuba Day"--Commandant Van Merwe and
four hundred men fell into the hands of the enemy.[106]
On that very day, in the year 1881, the famous battle of Majuba had been
fought. Nineteen years afterwards, on the same day of the same month, we
suffered a terrible defeat at Paardeberg, where we lost General Piet
Cronje and a great force of burghers.
And now the 27th of February had come round again, and this time it was
the twenty-first anniversary of Majuba that we were celebrating. The day
of our coming of age had thus arrived, if I may be allowed to say so.
But instead of the Republics now attaining their majority--as they
should have done, according to all precedent--_minority_ would have been
a more fitting word to describe the condition in which we now found
ourselves--for, through the losses which we had just sustained, we were
_minus_ not only a large number of burghers, but also an enormous
quantity of cattle, which ought to have served as food to our commandos
and families, but which the enemy had captured.
The cattle which had just been taken from us had formed the greater part
of our cattle in this district. We had always been able, until now, to
get them safely away; the unevenness of the veldt here was greatly in
our favour. This time we could not. How am I to explain the
inexplicable? _We had sinned--but not against England!_
[Footnote 102: We had heliographic communication between Elandskop and
Blaauwkop, which formed a connecting link between Bethlehem and Lindley;
and from Blaauwkop we had communication with Verkijkerskop. There was
also heliographic communication between Bethlehem and Lindley, and
Biddulphsberg, across the line of blockhouses.]
[Footnote 103: "Rooije" is the Taal for "red."]
[Footnote 104: In this I was correct. They contrived to break through
where the enemy were more scattered.]
[Footnote 105: Spruit--rivulet.]
[Footnote 106: Also my son, Jacobus (Kootie). He has now returned from
St. Helena, whither he had been sent as a prisoner, and we have met. He
tells me that on the night when I broke through, he wanted to come with
me, but was unable to do so, because his horse had been shot under
him.]