The Overwhelming Forces of Lord Roberts
I speedily discovered the object which the English had in view in taking
such advanced positions and in bombarding Magersfontein. They wished to
give us the impression that they were able to attack us at any moment
and so to keep us tied to our positions. In the meantime they were
making preparations in another direction, for the movement which was
really intended--namely, the advance of Lord Roberts with his
overwhelming force.
The Commander-in-Chief, Piet de Wet (and before him Commandant H.
Schorman), had plenty of work given them by the English. But General De
la Rey had been so successful that he had prevented Lord Roberts,
notwithstanding the enormous numbers he commanded, from crossing the
Orange River at Norvalspont, and had thus forced him to take the Modder
River route.
Lord Roberts would have found it more convenient to have crossed the
Orange River, for the railway runs through Norvalspont. Yet had he
attempted it, he would have fared as badly as Sir Redvers Buller did in
Natal. Our positions at Colesberg, and to the north of the river, were
exceedingly strong. He was wise, therefore, in his decision to march
over the unbroken plains.
It was now, as I had foreseen, that the English renewed their flanking
tactics.
On the 11th of February, 1900, a strong contingent of mounted troops,
under General French, issued from the camps at Modder River and
Koedoesberg. This latter was a kop on the Riet River, about twelve
miles to the east of their main camp.
At ten o'clock in the morning, General French started. Immediately I
received orders from General Cronje to proceed with three hundred and
fifty men to check the advancing troops. As I stood on the ridges of
Magersfontein, I was able to look down upon the English camps, and I saw
that it would be sheer madness to pit three hundred and fifty men
against General French's large force. Accordingly I asked that one
hundred and fifty more burghers and two guns might be placed at my
disposal. This request, however, was refused, and so I had to proceed
without them.
When we arrived at Koedoesberg that afternoon, we found that the English
had already taken possession of the hill. They were stationed at its
southern end, and had nearly completed a stone wall across the hill from
east to west. Their camp was situated on the Riet River, which flows
beside the southern slopes of the _berg_. The enemy also held strong
positions on hillocks to the east of the mountain, whilst on the west
they occupied a ravine, which descended from the mountain to the river.
Commandant Froneman and I determined to storm the _berg_ without a
moment's delay. We reached the foot of the mountain in safety, and here
we were out of sight of the English. But it was impossible to remain in
this situation, and I gave orders that my men should climb the mountain.
We succeeded in reaching the summit, but were unable to get within seven
hundred paces of the enemy, owing to the severity of their fire from
behind the stone wall. And so we remained where we were until it became
quite dark, and then very quietly went back to the spot where we had
left our horses.
As General French was in possession of the river, we had to ride about
four miles before we could obtain any water.
Early the following morning we again occupied the positions we had held
on the previous evening. Although under a severe rifle fire, we then
rushed from position to position, and at last were only three hundred
paces from the enemy. And now I was forced to rest content with the
ground we had gained, for with only three hundred and fifty men I dare
not risk a further advance, owing to the strength of the enemy's
position.
The previous day I had asked General Cronje to send me reinforcements,
and I had to delay the advance until their arrival. In a very short time
a small party of burghers made their appearance. They had two
field-pieces with them, and were under the command of Major Albrecht. We
placed the guns in position and trained them on the English.
With the second shot we had found our range, while the third found its
mark in the wall, so that it was not long before the enemy had to
abandon that shelter. To find safe cover they were forced to retreat
some hundred paces. But we gained little by this, for the new positions
of the English were quite as good as those from which we had driven
them, and, moreover, were almost out of range of our guns. And we were
unable to bring our field-pieces any nearer because our gunners would
have been exposed to the enemy's rifle fire.
Our Krupps made good practice on the four English guns which had been
stationed on the river bank to the south. Up till now these had kept up
a terrific fire on our guns, but we soon drove them across the river, to
seek protection behind the mountain. I despatched General Froneman to
hold the river bank, and the _sluit_[17] which descended to the river
from the north. While carrying out this order he was exposed to a heavy
fire from the enemy's western wing, which was located in the
above-mentioned ravine, but he succeeded in reaching the river under
cover of the guns. Once there, the enemy's artillery made it impossible
for him to move.
And now a curious incident occurred! A falcon, hovering over the heads
of our burghers in the _sluit_, was hit by a bullet from one of the
shrapnel shells and fell dead to the ground in the midst of the men. It
was already half-past four, and we began to ask ourselves how the affair
would end. At this juncture I received a report from a burgher, whom I
had placed on the eastern side of the mountain to watch the movements of
the English at the Modder River. He told me that a mountain corps, eight
hundred to a thousand men strong, was approaching us with two guns, with
the intention, as it appeared, of outflanking us. I also learnt that
eighty of my men had retreated. I had stationed them that morning on a
hillock three miles to the east of the mountain, my object being to
prevent General French from surrounding us.
It now became necessary to check the advance of this mountain corps. But
how? There were only thirty-six men at my disposal. The other burghers
were in positions closer to the enemy, and I could not withdraw them
without exposing them too seriously to the bullets of the English. There
was nothing for it, but that I with my thirty-six burghers should attack
the force which threatened us.
We rushed down the mountain and jumping on our horses, galloped against
the enemy. When we arrived at the precipice which falls sheer from the
mountain, the English were already so near that our only course was to
charge them.
In front of us there was a plain which extended for some twelve hundred
paces to the foot of an abrupt rise in the ground. This we fortunately
reached before the English, although we were exposed all the way to the
fire of their guns. But even when we gained the rise we were little
better off, as it was too low to give us cover. The English were
scarcely more than four hundred paces from us. They dismounted and
opened a heavy fire. For ten or fifteen minutes we successfully kept
them back. Then the sun went down! and to my great relief the enemy
moved away in the direction of their comrades on the mountain. I ordered
all my men from their positions, and withdrew to the spot where we had
encamped the previous night. The burghers were exhausted by hunger and
thirst, for they had had nothing to eat except the provisions which they
had brought in their saddle-bags from the laager.
That evening Andreas Cronje--- the General's brother--joined us with two
hundred and fifty men and a Maxim-Nordenfeldt.
When the sun rose on the following day, the veldt was clear of the
enemy. General French had during the night retreated to headquarters.
What losses he had suffered I am unable to say; ours amounted to seven
wounded and two killed.
Our task here was now ended, and so we returned to Magersfontein.
The following morning a large force again left the English camp and took
the direction of the Koffiefontein diamond mine. General Cronje
immediately ordered me to take a force of four hundred and fifty men
with a Krupp and a Maxim-Nordenfeldt, and to drive back the enemy. At my
request, Commandants Andreas Cronje, Piet Fourie, Scholten and Lubbe
joined me, and that evening we camped quite close to the spot where the
English force was stationed!
Early the next day, before the enemy had made any movement, we started
for Blauwbank,[18] and, having arrived there, we took up our positions.
Shortly afterwards the fight began; it was confined entirely to the
artillery.
We soon saw that we should have to deal with the whole of Lord Roberts'
force, for there it was, advancing in the direction of Paardenberg's
Drift. It was thus clear that Lord Roberts had not sent his troops to
Koffiefontein with the intention of proceeding by that route to
Bloemfontein, but that his object had been to divide our forces, so as
to march via Paardenberg's Drift to the Capital.
I accordingly withdrew with three hundred and fifty of the burghers in
the direction of Koffiefontein, and then hid my commando as best I
could. The remainder of the men--about a hundred in number--I placed
under Commandant Lubbe, giving him orders to proceed in a direction
parallel to the advance of the English, who now were nearing
Paardenberg's Drift, and to keep a keen eye on their movements. It was a
large force that Lubbe had to watch. It consisted chiefly of mounted
troops; but there were also nine or ten batteries and a convoy of light
mule waggons.
I thought that as General Cronje was opposing them in front, my duty was
to keep myself in hiding and to reconnoitre.
I wished to communicate with General Cronje before the English troops
came up to him, and with this object I sent out a despatch rider. The
man I chose for the mission was Commandant G.J. Scheepers--whose name
later in the war was on every man's lips for his exploits in Cape
Colony, but who then was only the head of our heliograph corps. I
informed General Cronje in my message that the English, who had been
stationed at Blauwbank, had made a move in the direction of
Paardenberg's Drift; and I advised him to get out of their road as
quickly as he could, for they numbered, according to my computation,
forty or fifty thousand men.
I thought it wise to give Cronje this advice, on account of the women
and children in our camps, who might easily prove the cause of disaster.
When Scheepers returned he told me what reply General Cronje had made.
It is from no lack of respect for the General, whom I hold in the
highest honour as a hero incapable of fear, that I set down what he
said. It is rather from a wish to give a proof of his undaunted courage
that I quote his words.
"Are you afraid of things like that?" he asked, when Scheepers had given
my message. "Just you go and shoot them down, and catch them when they
run."
At Paardenberg's Drift there were some Free-Staters' camps that stood
apart from the others. In these camps there were a class of burghers who
were not much use in actual fighting. These men, called by us "water
draggers," correspond to the English "non-combatants." I ordered these
burghers to withdraw to a spot two hours' trek from there, where there
was more grass. But before all had obeyed this order, a small camp,
consisting of twenty or thirty waggons, was surprised and taken.
In the meantime, keeping my little commando entirely concealed, I spied
out the enemy's movements.
On the 16th of February, I thought I saw a chance of dealing an
effective blow at Lord Roberts. Some provision waggons, escorted by a
large convoy, were passing by, following in the wake of the British
troops. I asked myself whether it was possible for me to capture it then
and there, and came to the conclusion that it was out of the question.
With so many of the enemy's troops in the neighbourhood, the risk would
have been too great. I, therefore, still kept in hiding with my three
hundred and fifty burghers.
I remained where I was throughout the next day; but in the evening I saw
the convoy camping near Blauwbank, just to the west of the Riet River. I
also observed that the greater part of the troops had gone forward with
Lord Roberts.
On the 18th I still kept hidden, for the English army had not yet moved
out of camp. The troops, as I learnt afterwards, were awaiting the
arrival of columns from Belmont Station.
On the following day I attacked the convoy on the flank. The three or
four hundred troops who were guarding it offered a stout resistance,
although they were without any guns.
After fighting for two hours the English received a reinforcement of
cavalry, with four Armstrong guns, and redoubled their efforts to drive
us from the positions we had taken up under cover of the mule waggons.
As I knew that it would be a serious blow to Lord Roberts to lose the
provisions he was expecting, I was firmly resolved to capture them,
unless the force of numbers rendered the task quite impossible. I
accordingly resisted the enemy's attack with all the power I could.
The battle raged until it became dark; and I think we were justified in
being satisfied with what we had achieved. We had captured sixteen
hundred oxen and forty prisoners; whilst General Fourie, whom I had
ordered to attack the camp on the south, had taken several prisoners and
a few water-carts.
We remained that night in our positions. The small number of burghers I
had at my disposal made it impossible for me to surround the English
camp.
To our great surprise, the following morning, we saw that the English
had gone. About twenty soldiers had, however, remained behind; we found
them hidden along the banks of the Riet River at a short distance from
the convoy. We also discovered thirty-six Kaffirs on a ridge about three
miles away. As to the enemy's camp, it was entirely deserted. Our booty
was enormous, and consisted of two hundred heavily-laden waggons, and
eleven or twelve water-carts and trollies. On some of the waggons we
found klinkers,[19] jam, milk, sardines, salmon, cases of corned beef,
and other such provisions in great variety. Other waggons were loaded
with rum; and still others contained oats and horse provender pressed
into bales. In addition to these stores, we took one field-piece, which
the English had left behind. It was, indeed, a gigantic capture; the
only question was what to do with it.
Our prisoners told us that columns from Belmont might be expected at
any moment. Had these arrived we should have been unable to hold out
against them.
By some means or other it was necessary to get the provisions away, not
that we were then in any great need of them ourselves, but because we
knew that Lord Roberts would be put in a grave difficulty if he lost all
this food. I did not lose a moment's time, but at once ordered the
burghers to load up the waggons as speedily as possible, and to inspan.
It was necessary to reload the waggons, for the English troops had made
use of the contents to build _schanzes_; and excellent ones the
provisions had made.
The loading of the waggons was simple enough, but when it came to
inspanning it was another matter. The Kaffir drivers alone knew where
each span had to be placed, and there were only thirty-six Kaffirs left.
But here the fact that every Boer is himself a handy conductor and
driver of waggons told in our favour. Consequently we did not find it
beyond our power to get the waggons on the move. It was, however, very
tedious work, for how could any of us be sure that we were not placing
the after-oxen in front and the fore-oxen behind? There was nothing left
for it but to turn out the best spans of sixteen oxen that we could, and
then to arrange them in the way that struck us as being most suitable.
It was all done in the most hurried manner, for our one idea was to be
off as quickly as possible.
Even when we had started our troubles were not at an end. The waggons
would have been a hard pull for sixteen oxen properly arranged; so that
it is not surprising that our ill-sorted teams found the work almost
beyond their strength. Thus it happened that we took a very long time to
cover the first few miles, as we had constantly to be stopping to
re-arrange the oxen. But under the supervision of Commandant Piet
Fourie, whom I appointed Conductor-in-Chief, matters improved from hour
to hour.
After a short time I issued orders that the convoy should proceed over
Koffiefontein to Edenberg. I then divided my burghers into two parties;
the first, consisting of two hundred men with the Krupp gun, I ordered
to proceed with the convoy; the second, consisting of a hundred and
fifty men with the Maxim-Nordenfeldt, I took under my own command, and
set out with them in the direction of Paardenberg's Drift.
My spies had informed me that there were some fifty or sixty English
troops posted about eight miles from the spot where we had captured the
convoy. We made our way towards them, and when we were at a distance of
about three thousand yards, I sent a little note to their officer,
asking him to surrender. It was impossible for his troops to escape, for
they found themselves threatened on three sides.
The sun had just gone down when my despatch-rider reached the English
camp; and the officer in command was not long in sending him his reply,
accompanied by an orderly.
"Are you General De Wet?" the orderly asked me.
"I am," replied I.
"My officer in command," he said in a polite but determined voice,
"wishes me to tell you that we are a good hundred men strong, that we
are well provided with food and ammunition, and that we hold a strong
position in some houses and kraals. Every moment we are expecting ten
thousand men from Belmont, and we are waiting here with the sole purpose
of conducting them to Lord Roberts."
I allowed him to speak without interrupting him; but when he had
finished, I answered him in quite as determined a voice as he had used
to me.
"I will give you just enough time to get back and to tell your officer
in command that, if he does not surrender at once, I shall shell him and
storm his position. He will be allowed exactly ten minutes to make up
his mind--then the white flag must appear."
"But where is your gun?" the orderly asked. In reply I pointed to the
Maxim-Nordenfeldt, which stood a few hundred paces behind us, surrounded
by some burghers.
"Will you give us your word of honour," he asked me when he caught sight
of the gun, "not to stir from your position till we have got ten miles
away? That is the only condition on which we will abandon our
positions."
I again allowed him to finish, although his demand filled me with the
utmost astonishment. I asked myself what sort of men this English
officer imagined the Boer Generals to be.
"I demand unconditional surrender," I then said. "I give you ten minutes
from the moment you dismount on arriving at your camp; when those ten
minutes have passed I fire."
He slung round, and galloped back to his camp, the stones flying from
his horse's hoofs.
He had hardly dismounted before the white flag appeared. It did not take
us long to reach the camp, and there we found fifty-eight mounted men.
These prisoners I despatched that evening to join the convoy.
I then advanced with my commando another six miles, with the object of
watching Lord Roberts' movements, in case he should send a force back to
retake the convoy he could so ill spare. But the following day we saw
nothing except a single scouting party coming from the direction of
Paardenberg's Drift. This proved to consist of the hundred burghers whom
I had sent with Commandant Lubbe to General Cronje's assistance. I heard
from Lubbe that General French had broken through, and had in all
probability relieved Kimberley; and that General Cronje was retreating
before Lord Roberts towards Paardeberg. I may say here that I was not at
all pleased that Commandant Lubbe should have returned.
On account of Lubbe's information, I decided to advance at once in the
direction of Paardenberg's Drift, and was on the point of doing so when
I received a report from President Steyn. He informed me that I should
find at a certain spot that evening, close to Koffiefontein, Mr. Philip
Botha[20] with a reinforcement of one hundred and fifty men. This report
convinced me that the convoy I had captured would reach Edenberg Station
without mishap, and accordingly I went after it to fetch back the gun
which would no longer be needed. I found the convoy encamped about six
miles from Koffiefontein. Immediately after my arrival, General Jacobs,
of Fauresmith, and Commandant Hertzog,[21] of Philippolis, brought the
news to me that troops were marching on us from Belmont Station. I told
Jacobs and Hertzog to return with their men, two or three hundred in
number to meet the approaching English.
We were so well supplied with forage that our horses got as much as they
could eat. I had, therefore, no hesitation in ordering my men to
up-saddle at midnight, and by half-past two we had joined
Vice-Vechtgeneraal Philip Botha. I had sent him word to be ready to
move, so that we were able to hasten at once to General Cronje's
assistance. Our combined force amounted to three hundred men all told.
[Footnote 17: A ravine or water-course.]
[Footnote 18: In the district of Jacobsdal.]
[Footnote 19: Biscuits.]
[Footnote 20: Mr. Philip Botha had just been appointed
Vice-Vechtgeneraal.]
[Footnote 21: Brother to Judge Hertzog.]
[Illustration: PAARDEBERG (CRONJE'S).
FROM A SKETCH BY THE AUTHOR.]