Costly Infatuation -- The do-nothing strategy -- Cavalry on lame
horses -- Bayonet charges -- Antietam -- Effect of the
proclamation -- Disasters in the West -- The abolitionists not
originally hostile to McClellan -- Helplessness in the War
Department -- Devotedness of the people -- McClellan and the
proclamation -- Wilkes -- Colonel Key -- Routine engineers --
Rebel raid into Pennsylvania -- Stanton's sincerity -- O,
unfighting strategians! -- The administration a success -- _De
gustibus_ -- Stuart's raid -- West Point -- St. Domingo -- The
President's letter to McClellan -- Broad church -- The elections
-- The Republican party gone -- The remedy at the polls --
McClellan wants to be relieved -- Mediation -- Compromise -- The
rhetors. -- The optimists -- The foreigners -- Scott and Buchanan
-- Gladstone -- Foreign opinion and action -- Both the extremes
to be put down -- Spain -- Fremont's campaign against Jackson --
Seward's circular -- General Scott's gift -- "O, could I go to a
camp!" -- McClellan crosses the Potomac -- Prays for rain --
Fevers decimate the regiments -- Martindale and Fitz John Porter
-- The political balance to be preserved -- New regiments -- O,
poor country!
With what a bloody sacrifice of men this people pays for its
infatuation in McClellan, for the moral cowardice of its official
leaders, and the intrigues and the imbecility of the regulars, of some
among the West Pointers, of traitors led by the New York Herald, by
the World, and by certain Unionists on the outside, and secessionists
at heart! All these combined nourish the infatuation. All things
compared, Napoleon cost not so much to the French people, and at least
Napoleon paid it in glory. Mind and heart sicken to witness all this
here. The question to-day is, not to strengthen other generals, as
Heintzelman and Sigel, and to take the enemy in the rear, but to give
a _chance_ to McClellan to win the ever-expected, and not yet by him
won, _great battle_. McClellan continually calls for more men; all the
vital forces of the people are absorbed by him; and when he has large
numbers, he is incapable of using and handling them; so it was at the
Chickahominy, so it was at Antietam. In the way that McClellan acts
now, he may use up all the available forces of the people, if nobody
has the courage to speak out; besides, any warning voice is drowned in
the treacherous intrigues of the clique, in imbecility and
infatuation.
At the meeting of the governors, at the various public conventions, in
the thus called public resolutions--platforms, in one word--wherever,
in any way. North, West, and East, the public life of the people has
made its voice heard: _a vigorous prosecution of the war_ was, and is,
earnestly recommended to the administration. All this will be of no
avail. By this time, by bloody and bitter experience, the American
people ought to have learned it. With his civil and military aids and
lieutenants, as the McClellans, the Hallecks, the Sewards, Mr. Lincoln
has been at work; and at the best, they have shown their utter
incapacity, if not ill-will, to carry the war on vigorously and upon
strictly military principles. Many persons in Washington know that Mr.
Seward last winter firmly backed the _do-nothing_ strategy, in the
firm belief that the rebels would be worried out, and submit without
fighting. To those statesmen and Napoleons, Carnots, &c., it is as
impossible to manoeuvre with rapidity, to strike boldly and decidedly,
as to dance on their _well-furnished_ heads. Only such a good-natured
people as the Americans can expect _something_ from that whole
_caterva_. To expect from Mr. Lincoln's Napoleons, Carnots, &c.,
vigorous and rapid military operations, is the same as to mount
cavalry on thoroughly lame horses, and order it to charge _a fond de
train_.
The worshippers of McClellan peddle that the Antietam victory became
neutralized because the enemy fell back on its second and third line.
Whatever may be in this falling back on lines, and accepting all as it
is represented, one thing is certain, that when commanders win
victories, generally they give no time to the enemy to fall back in
order on its second and third lines. But every thing gets a new stamp
under the new Napoleon. A few hours after the Antietam battle, General
McClellan telegraphed that he "_knew not_ if the enemy retreated into
the interior or to the Potomac." O, O!
Many from among the European officers here have some experience of the
manoeuvring of large bodies--experience acquired on fields of battle,
and on reviews, and those camp manoeuvres annually practised all over
Europe. In this way the European officers, more or less, have the
_coup d'oeil_ for space and for the _terrain_, so necessary when an
army is to be put in positions on a field of battle, and which _coup
d'oeil_ few young American officers had the occasion to acquire. If
judiciously selected for the duties of the staffs, such European
officers would be of use and support to generals but for jealousy and
the West Point cliques.
During this whole war I hear every body, but above all the West Point
wiseacres and strategians, assert that charges with the bayonet and
hand-to-hand fighting are exceedingly rare occurrences in the course
of any campaign. It is useless to speak to all those great judges of
experience and of history.
In the account of the battles of Ligny and of Waterloo, Thiers
mentions four charges with the bayonet and hand-to-hand fighting at
Ligny, and nine at Waterloo, wherein one was made by the English, one
was made by Prussians and by French, and one by the French with
bayonet against English cavalry. In 1831 the Poles used the bayonet
more than it was used in any one campaign known in history. O, West
Point!
It deserves to be noticed that the conspirators against Pope and
McDowell, and the pet pretorians of September 6 and 7, distinguished
themselves not very much in the battle of Antietam. Hooker commanded
McDowell's corps.
To the number of evils inflicted upon this country by the McClellan
infatuation, must be added the fact that many young men, with
otherwise sound intellects, have been taken in, stultified, poisoned
beyond cure, by high-sounding words, as strategy, all-embracing
scientific combinations, &c.--words identified with incapacity,
defeats, and intrigue.
In all probability, Hooker alone, when he fought, had a fixed plan at
the Antietam battle. As for a general plan, aiming either to throw the
enemy into the river, or to cut him from the river, or to accomplish
something final and decisive, seemingly no such plan existed. It looks
as if they had ignored, at the headquarters, what kind of positions
were occupied by the enemy; and the only purpose seems to have been to
fight, but without having any preconceived plan. This, at least, is
the conclusion from the manner in which the battle was fought. If any
plan had existed, the brave army would have executed it; but the enemy
retreated in order, and rather unmolested. _As always, so this time,
the bravery of the army did every thing; and, as a matter of course,
the generalship did--nothing._
_Oct. 4._--The proclamation of September 22 may not produce in Europe
the effect and the enthusiasm which it might have evoked if issued a
year ago, as an act of justice and of self-conscientious force, as an
utterance of the lofty, pure, and ardent aspirations and will of a
high-minded people. Europe may see now in the proclamation an action
of despair made in the duress of events; (and so it is in reality for
Mr. Lincoln, Seward, and their squad.) And in this way, a noble deed,
outpouring from the soul of the people, is reduced to pygmy and mean
proportions by ----. The name is on every body's lips.
But it was impossible to issue this proclamation last year; at that
time the master-spirit of Mr. Lincoln's administration emphatically
assured the diplomats that the Union will be preserved, _were
slavery--to rule in Boston_.
The continued disasters in the West can easily be explained by the
fact, that those rotten skeletons, Crittenden, Davis, and Wickliffe
control the operations of the generals.
_Among the countless lies peddled by McClellan's worshippers, the most
enormous and the most impudent is that one by which they attempt to
explain, what in their lingo they call, the hostility of the
abolitionists towards McClellan. Concerning this matter, I can speak
with perfect knowledge of almost all the circumstances._
_Not one abolitionist of whatever hue, not one republican whatever,
was in any way troubled or thought about the political convictions of
General McClellan at the time when he was put at the head of the army.
All the abolitionists and republicans, who then earnestly wished, and
now wish, to have the rebellion crushed, expected General McClellan to
do it by quick, decisive, soldier-like, military operations,
manoeuvres, and fights. Senators Wade, Chandler, Trumbull, &c., in
October, 1861, principally aided McClellan to become independent of
General Scott. When, however, weeks and months elapsed without any
soldier-like action, manifestation, or enterprise whatever, all those
who were in earnest began to feel uneasy, began to murmur, not in
reference to any political opinions, whatever, held by General
McClellan, but solely and exclusively on account of his military
supineness. All those who ardently wished, and wish, that neither
slaveholders nor slavery be hurt in any way, such ones early grouped
themselves around General McClellan, believing to have found in him
the man after their own heart. That cesspool of all infamies, the New
York Herald, became the mouthpiece of all the like hypocrites. They
and the Herald were the first to pervert and to misrepresent the
indignation evoked by the do-nothing or nobody-hurt strategy, and to
call it the abolition outcry against their fetish._
Scarcely will it be believed what disorder, what helplessness, and
what incapacity rule paramount in the expedition of any current
business in the strictly military part of the War Department. It is
worse than any imaginable red-tape and circumlocution. And all this,
being considered a speciality and a technicality, is in the exclusive
hands of the adjutant general, a master spirit among the West
Pointers. Generally, all relating to the thus celebrated organization
of the army is an exclusive work of the West Point wisdom--is handled
by West Pointers; and, nevertheless, the general comprehension of all
details in relation to an army, how it is to be handled, all the
military details of responsibility, of higher discipline, &c., all
this is confusion, and strikes with horror any one either familiar
with such matters or using freely his sound sense. A narrow routine
which may have been innocuous with an army of sixteen thousand with
General Scott and in peace, became highly mischievous when the army
increased more than fifty times, and the war raged furiously. All this
confusion is specially produced by the wiseacres and doctors of
routine. Undoubtedly it reacts on the army, and shows of what use for
the country is, and was, that whole old nursery.
Wherever one turns his eyes, every where a deep line separates the
patriotic activity of the people from the official activity. With the
people all is sacrifice, devotion, grandeur, and purity of purpose, by
great and small, by rich and poor, and with the poor, if possible,
even more than with the rich. With the highest and higher officials it
is either weakness, or egotism, or coolness, or intrigue, or
ignorance, or helplessness. The exceptions are few, and have been
repeatedly pointed out.
_Oct. 8._--General McClellan's order to the army concerning the
President's proclamation shows up the man. Not a word about the object
in the proclamation, but rather unveiled insinuations that the army is
dissatisfied with emancipation, and that it may mutiny. The army ought
to feel highly honored by such insinuations in that lengthy
disquisition about his (McClellan's) position and the duties of the
army. For the honor of the brave, armed citizen-patriots it can be
emphatically asserted that the patriotic volunteers better know their
duties than do those who preach to them. Some suspect that Mr. Seward
drew the paper for McClellan, but I am sure this cannot be. It may
have been done by Bennett or some other of the Herald, or by Barlow.
If this order is the result of Mr. Lincoln's visit to the camp, and of
a transaction with Mac-Napoleon, then the President has not thereby
increased the dignity of his presidential character.
Wilkes's Spirit of the Times incommensurably towers above the New York
Press by its dauntless patriotism; by its clear, broad, and deep
comprehension of the condition of the country.
Colonel Key's disclosures concerning the McClellan-Halleck programme,
not to destroy the rebels and the rebellion until the next
presidential election, are throttled by the dismissal of the colonel.
But what he said, if put by the side of the words of the order to the
army, that "the remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is
to be found only in the action of the people at the polls,"--all this
ought to open even the most obtuse intellects.
Poor (Carlyle fashion) old Greeley hurrahs for McClellan and for the
order No. 163 to the army. O for new and young men to swim among new
and young events!
_Oct. 11._--Will any body in this country have the patriotic courage
to reform the army? that is, to dismiss from the service the West
Point clique in Washington and in the army of the Potomac. Such a
proof of strong will cannot be expected from the President; but
perhaps Congress may show it. Those first and second scholars or
graduates from West Point are all routine engineers; and who ever
heard of whole armies commanded, moved, and manoeuvred by engineers?
American invention; but not to be patented for Europe.
_Oct. 11._--The rebel raid into Pennsylvania, under the nose of
McClellan. Is there any thing in the world capable of opening this
people's eyes?
I doubt if at any time, and in the life of any great or small people,
there existed such a galaxy of civil and military rulers, chiefs, and
leaders, stripped of nobler manhood, as are the _great men_ here. The
blush of honor never burned their cheeks! O, the low politicians! Some
persons doubt Stanton's sincerity in his dealings with individuals. I
am not a judge thereof; but were it so, it can easily be forgiven if
he only remains sincere and true to the cause.
One is amazed and even aghast at the impudence of the McClellan and
West Point cliques. In their lingo, heroes like Kearney, like Hooker
and Heintzelman, all such are superciliously mentioned as _only
fighting generals_. O, unfighting strategians!
Stuart's brilliant raid was executed the day of McClellan's bombastic
proclamation about his having cleared Pennsylvania and Maryland of the
enemy. On the same day McClellan and other generals straggled about
the country, visiting cities hundreds of miles distant from the camp.
And such generals complain of straggling! Make the army fight!
inspire with confidence the soldier--then he will not straggle.
The Evening Post, October 13, demonstrates that up to this day Mr.
Lincoln's administration is "a grand and brilliant success." Well, _de
gustibus non est disputandum_. Others may rightly think that the
achievements enumerated by the Evening Post are exclusively due to the
people; that by the people they were forced upon the administration,
(Stanton and the navy excepted;) and that the numerous failures, the
waste of human life, of money, and of time, are to be logically and
directly traced to the administration. O, subserviency!
The McClellanites are indignant against the Pennsylvanians for not
having caught Stuart and his three thousand horses. Bravo! And what is
the army for? and, above all, what are the so expensive commander and
his staff for?
It is perhaps natural that many from among the republican leaders
attempt to prop up the reputation of Mr. Lincoln's administrative
capacity, to kindle a halo around his name, and to sponge the waste of
blood, of means, and of time, from the tracks of his Seward-Scott-Blair
administration; but stern historical justice shall not, and cannot, do
it.
Whatever be the high _military and scientific prowess_ shown by the
first West Point graduates and scholars, all this in no way
compensates for the _summum_ of perverted notions which are reared
there, and for the mock, sham, and clownish aristocracy by which a
high-toned West Pointer is easily recognized. Of course many and many
are the exceptions; many West Point pupils are animated by the noblest
and purest American spirit; but the genuine West Point spirit consists
in sneering and looking down with contempt at the mother and nurse;
that is, at the purely republican, purely democratic political
institutions, at the broad political and intellectual freedom to which
those clown-aristocrats owe their rearing, their little bit of
information, and those shoulder-stripes by which they are so mightily
inflated.
What silly talk, to compare the St. Domingo insurrection with the
eventual results of emancipation in the South! In St. Domingo the
slaves were obliged to tear their liberty from the slaveholding
planter, and from a government siding with the oppressor. Here the
lawful government gives liberty to a peaceful laborer, and the planter
is an outlawed traitor. But the genuine pro-slavery democrat is
stupidly obtuse.
_Oct. 18._--A few days ago the President wrote a letter to McClellan,
with ability and lucidity, exposing to view the military urgency of a
movement on the enemy with an army of one hundred and forty thousand
men, as has now McClellan at Harper's Ferry. But the letter ends by
saying that all that it contains is _not_ to be considered by
McNapoleon as being an order. Of course Mac obeys--the last injunction
of the letter. Mr. Lincoln wishes not to hurt the great Napoleon's
feelings; as for hurting the country, the people, the cause, this is
of--no consequence! Ah! to witness all this is to be chained, and to
die of thirst within the reach of the purest water.
Reverend Dr. Unitarian Sensation's broad church, admirer of the
Southern gentleman, and a Jeremy Diddler.
_Oct. 18._--The elections in several of the States evidence the deep
imprint upon the country of Lincoln-Seward disorganizing, because from
the first day vacillating, undecided, both-ways policy. The elections
reverberate the moral, the political, and the belligerent condition in
which the country is dragged and thrown by those two _master spirits_.
No decided principle inspires them and their administration, and no
principle leads and has a decided majority in the elections; neither
the democrats nor the republicans prevail; neither freedom nor
submission is the watchword; and finally, neither the North nor the
South is decidedly the master on the fields of battle. All is
confusion!
Scarcely one genuine republican was, or is, in the cabinet; the
republican party is completely on the wane--and perhaps beyond
redemption; all this is a logical result, and was easily to be
foreseen by any body,--only not by the wiseacres of the party, not by
the republican papers in New York, as the Times, the Tribune, and the
Evening Post, only not by the Sumners, Doolittles, and many of the
like leaders, all of whom, when, about a year ago, warned against such
a cataclysm, self-confidently smiled; but who soon will cry more
bitter tears than did the daughters of Judah over the ruins of
Jerusalem.
And now likewise the phrase in McClellan's order No. 163, about "the
remedy at the polls," the disclosures made by Colonel Key, receive
their fullest, but ominous and cursed, signification; and now the
blind can see that it is policy, and not altogether incapacity, in
McClellan to have made a war to preserve slavery and the rebels. And
thus McClellan outwitted Mr. Lincoln.
In general, human nature is passionately attracted, nay, is subdued,
by energy, above all by civic intrepidity. It would have been so easy
for Mr. Lincoln to carry the masses, and to avoid those disasters at
the polls! But stubbornness is not energy.
From a very reliable source I learn that a few days after the battle
of Antietam, General McClellan, or at least General or Colonel Marcy,
of McClellan's staff, insinuated to the President that General
McClellan would wish to be relieved from the command of the army, and
be assigned to quiet duties in Washington--very likely to supersede
Halleck. And the President seized not by the hairs the occasion to get
rid of the nation's nightmare, together with the pets of the commander
of the army of the Potomac. McClellan acted honestly in making the
above insinuation; he is now, in part at least, irresponsible for any
future disaster and blood.
_Oct. 20._--I have strong indications that European powers, as England
and France, are very sanguine to mediate, but would do it only if, and
when, _asked_ by our government. Those two governments, or some other
half-friendly, may, semi-officially, insinuate to Mr. Seward to make
such a demand. A few months ago, already Mr. Dayton wrote from Paris
something about such a step. Mr. Seward is desperate, downcast, and
may believe he can serve his country by committing the cabinet to some
such combination. I must warn Stanton and others.
In the Express and in the World the New York Herald found its masters
in ignominy.
More or less mean, contemptible ambition among the helmsmen, but
patriotism, patriotic ambition are below zero--here in Washington. For
the sake and honor of human nature, I pray to destiny Stanton may not
fail, and still count among the Wadsworths, the Wades, and the like
pure patriots.
The democratic elections and majorities united to Mr. Seward may
enforce a compromise, and God knows if Mr. Lincoln will oppose it to
the last. Then the only seeming salvation of the north will be the
indomitable decision of the rebels not to accept any terms except a
full recognition.
_Oct. 22._--The incapacity of the military wiseacres borders on
idiotism, if not on something worse. To do nothing McClellan absorbs
every man, and keeps one hundred and forty thousand men on the
Maryland side of the Potomac. Sigel has only a small command of twelve
thousand men, in a position where, with one quarter of what is useless
under McClellan, with his skill, his activity, and the _truly_
patriotic devotion of his troops, of his officers, and of the
commanders under him, Sigel would force the rebels to retreat from
Winchester, and otherwise damage them far more than _will_ or can do
such McClellans, Hallecks, and all this c----e.
One of the greatest misfortunes for the American people is to have
considered as statesmen the rhetors, the petty politicians, and the
speech-makers. Now, those rhetors, petty politicians, and
speech-makers are at the helm, are in the Senate, and--ruin the
country.
The optimists and the subservients still console themselves and
confuse the people by asserting that Mr. Lincoln will yet _come out_
as a man and a statesman. Previous to such a happy change the
country's honor and the country's political and material vitality will
_run out_.
More than a year ago Mr. Seward said to the Prince Salm and to me,
that this war ought to be fought out by foreigners; that the Americans
fought the revolutionary war, but now they are devoted to peaceful
pursuits; and that it is the duty of Europeans to save this refuge
from the thraldoms in the old world.
Now, I see that Mr. Seward was right, although in a sense different
from that in which he uttered the above sentence.
The Irish excepted, all the other foreign-born Americans, but
preeminently the Germans, are more in communion with the lofty, pure,
and humane element in the thus called American principle, are
therefore more in communion with the creed of the immense majority of
Americans, than are they, the present dabblers in politics, the
would-be leaders, (civil and military,) the would-be statesmen, all of
whom are eaten up by the admixture into what is vital and perennial in
the signification of America, of all that in itself is local, muddy,
petty, accidental, and transient.
_Oct. 23._--The recent publication of General Scott's letter, and of a
writing to President Buchanan, confirms my opinion that "the highest
military authority in the land" faltered after March 4, 1861, and
inaugurated that defensive warfare wherein we _stick_ on the Potomac
until this day.
Pseudo-liberal right-honorable Gladstone asserts that Jeff. Davis "has
made the South a nation;" then Abraham Lincoln, with W. H. Seward and
G. B. McClellan, have destroyed a noble and generous nation.
England may now recognize the South, France may join in it, but other
great European powers, as Russia, Spain, Prussia, Austria, will not
follow in such a wake. The recognition will not materially improve the
condition of the rebels, nor raise the blockade. But as soon as
recognized, Jeff. D. may ask for a mediation, which the people--if not
Mr. Seward--will spurn. An armed mediation remains to be applied,
wherein, likewise, the other European powers will not concur. An armed
mediation between the two principles will be the _summum_ of infamy to
which English aristocracy and English mercantilism can degrade itself;
if Louis Napoleon joins therein, then his crown is not worth two
years lease, provided the Orleans have ----
If we should succumb under the united efforts of imbecility, of
pro-slavery treason, of Anglo-Franco-European and of American perjury,
then
Ultima coelestis terram Astraea reliquit.
_Oct. 25._--Only two or three days ago, in a conversation with a
diplomat, Mr. Seward asserted that both the extreme parties will be
mastered--that is, the secessionists and the abolitionists. So Mr.
Seward confesses the _credo_ and the gospel of the New York Herald,
the World, the Journal of Commerce, the National Intelligencer, and
other similar organs of secession.
Notwithstanding the numerous complications naturally generated by the
vicinity of Cuba to Secessia, the Spanish government, Count Serrano,
the captain-general of Cuba, and Tassara, the Spanish minister here,
all have maintained the most loyal relations towards the Federal
government. It were to be very much regretted if a drunkard or a
brute, as in the affair of the Montgomery, should disturb such
relations.
_Oct. 26._--McClellan-Blair-Seward tactics are crowned with splendid
success. By his _simplicity_ Mr. Lincoln aided therein as much as he
could. The bad season is in; any successful campaign impossible. The
rebels will be safe, and Gladstone justified.
It is so difficult to find out the truth concerning Fremont's campaign
against Jackson, that some generalship may, after all, be credited to
him. At any rate Fremont is a better general than McClellan and the
pets in command under him, and Fremont is with his heart and soul in
the cause, of which the McClellanites cannot be accused, all of them,
their fetish included, having no heart and no soul.
Old Europe, and, above all, official Europe, and even the Gladstones,
must be vindicated. Official Europe generally appreciates nations by
their leaders. Europe demands from such leaders actions and proofs of
statesmanship, of high capacity, if not of heroism. The attempt to
astonish Europe by speeches, by oratory, and, still worse, by
second-rate legal arguments, by what is called papers here, and in
Europe diplomatic circulars and despatches, is the same as the attempt
to eclipse bright sunlight with a burning candle. But our orators,
and, above all, Mr. Seward, flooded the European and the English
statesmen with their, at the best, indifferent productions. Official
Europe was favored with a shower of three various editions of _papers
relating to foreign relations_ in 1862, issued by the _State
Department_, together with the Sanfords, the Weeds, the Hugheses, _et
hoc genus omne_. Undoubtedly, the traitor Mason shows in England more
of fire than does the cold, stiff, prickly, and dignified son and
grandson of Presidents; and then the average of our press! O, Jemima!
In his circular, September 22, to our agents in Europe, Mr. Seward
belies not himself. The emancipation is rather coldly announced, and
it is visible that neither Mr. Seward's heart nor soul is in it.
The President has now the most reliable information that when Corinth
was invested by Halleck, the rebel troops were wholly demoralized, and
the enemy was astonished not to be attacked, as very little resistance
would have been made. So much for General Scott's gift in Halleck.
The almost daily occurrences here long ago would have exasperated the
hot-headed and warm-hearted nations in Europe, and treason would have
become their watchword. O American people! thou art warm-hearted, but
of _unparallelled endurance_!
No European nation, not even the Turks, would patiently bear such a
condition of affairs. Every where the sovereign would have been forced
to change, or to modify, the _personnel_ of his ministers and
advisers; and Mr. Lincoln is in the hands of Messrs. Seward and Blair,
both worse even than McClellan, and--cannot shake them off.
Now, for the first time in my life, I realize why, during the last
stages of the dissolution of the Roman empire, honest men escaped into
monasteries, or why, at certain epochs of the great French revolution,
the best men went to the army.
Ah! to witness here the meanest egotism, imbecility, and intrigue,
coolly, one by one, destroy the honor and the future of this noble
people. Curse upon my old age! above all, curse upon my obesity!
Curse upon my poverty! What a cesspool! what a mire! Only legal
slaughterers all around! O, could I go to a camp! but, of course, not
to one under McClellan. Sigel's camp. Sigel's men are not soulless;
they fight for an idea, without an eye to the White House.
The rhetors, the stump-speakers, the politicians, and the intriguers
hold the power, and--humanity and history shudder at the results.
_Oct. 29._--McClellan, with his wonted intrepidity and rapidity,
crossed the Potomac from all directions, pushes on Winchester,
and--will find there wherefrom every animal willingly discharges
itself.
A foreign diplomat, one of the most eminent in the whole _corps_, said
yesterday, "No living being so ardently prays for rain as does
McClellan; rain will prevent fighting, marching, &c." Such is the
estimation of our hero.
Fevers decimated many regiments at Harper's Ferry. If McClellan would
have marched only five miles a day, fighting even such battles without
any generalship, as he did at Antietam, the army would be healthier,
and by this time would be in Richmond.
The decision of the court of inquiry between a patriot and the
incarnation of West Point McClellanism, between Martindale and that
Fitz-John Porter, ought to open the eyes of any one, but--not those of
Mr. Lincoln.
Only two days ago Mr. Lincoln declared, that the reason why McClellan
and his pets are not removed is, not any confidence in McClellan's
capacity, but to preserve the political balance between the republican
and the democratic parties.
If there exist such spiritual creations as providence, genii, or
angels watching over the destinies of nations, then, at the sight of
Lincoln-Seward-Blair doings, providence, angels, genii avert their
faces in despair.
_Oct. 30._--New regiments coming in. It cuts into the deepest of the
heart to see such noble and devoted fellows going to be again wantonly
slaughtered by the combined military and civic inefficiency of
McClellan-Lincoln-Seward, and, above all, by their utter
heartlessness.
When the rebels invaded Maryland, the _fighting_ generals, as
Heintzelman, advised to mass the troops between the rebels and the
Potomac, cut them from their bases and communications, push them
towards the North without a possibility of escape, instead of throwing
them back on the Potomac. Harper's Ferry would have been saved. Every
progress made by the rebels in a Northern direction would have assured
their ruin; soon their ammunition would have been exhausted, and
surrender was inevitable. But this bold plan of a _fighting_ general
could not be comprehended by pets and pretorians. Since, daily and
daily occasions occur to destroy the rebels; but that is not the game.
Instead of cutting the rebels from Gordonsville and Richmond, which
could have been done any time during the last five weeks if
Heintzelman and Sigel were not so thoroughly weakened by an ignorant,
or worse, distribution of troops, McClellan with all his might pushes
the rebels back to Richmond, back on their bases and their resources.
O, poor country!
Even I feel humiliated to continually ascertain, by various direct and
indirect sources from Europe, in what little estimation--if not
worse--is held our administration by the principal statesmen and
governments of the old world.