JUNE, 1862.

Diplomatic circulars seasoned by stories -- Battle before

Richmond -- Casey's division disgraced -- McClellan afterwards

confesses he was misinformed -- Fair Oaks -- "Nobody is hurt,

only the bleeding people" -- Fremont disobeys orders -- N. Y.

Times, World, and Herald, opinion-poisoning sheets -- Napoleon

never visible before nine o'clock in the morning -- Hooker and

the other fighters soldered to the mud -- Senator Sumner shows

the practical side of his intellect -- "Slavery a big job!" --

McClellan sends for mortars -- Defenders of slavery in Congress

worse than the rebels -- Wooden guns and cotton sentries at

Corinth -- The navy is glorious -- Brave old Gideon Welles! --

July 4th to be celebrated in Richmond! -- Colonization again --

Justice to France -- New regiments -- The people sublime! --

Congress -- Lincoln visits Scott -- McDowell -- Pope --

Disloyalty in the departments.

Mr. Seward takes off from Mr. Adams the gag on the question of

slavery. Perhaps even Mr. Adams might have been a little fretting. A

long speculative dispatch, wherein, among some good things, one finds

some generalizations and misstatements concerning the distress in

Ireland, generated by want of potatoes (vide Parl. De.), and not from

want of cotton, as says Mr. Seward--a confession that the government

"covers the weakness of the insurgents" and "takes care of the welfare

of the insurgents." What a tenderness, and what an ingratitude of the

rebels to acknowledge it by blows! Another confession, more precious,

that the poor slaves are the best and the only bravely devoted Union

men in the South, although occasionally shot for their devotion by our

generals, expelled from the lines (vide Halleck's order No. 3), and

delivered to the tender mercies of their masters. Finally, _immediate_

emancipation is held before the eyes of the English statesmen rather

as a Medusa head; then a kind of story--perhaps to please Mr.

Lincoln--or quotation from _some_ writer, etc. So far as I recollect,

it is for the first time that diplomatic circulars are seasoned by

stories. But, _dit moi qui tu hante je te dirai qui tu es_.

Mr. Seward repeatedly asserts, in writing and in words, that he has no

eventual views towards the White House. Well, it may be so or not. But

if his friends may succeed in carrying his nomination, then, of

course, reluctantly, he will bend his head to the people's will,

and--accept. When in past centuries abbots and bishops were elected,

they _reluctantly_ accepted fat abbeys and bishoprics; the investiture

was given in the sacramental words, _accipe onus pro peccatis_.

A battle by Richmond. McClellan telegraphs a victory, and it comes out

that we lost men, positions, camps, and artillery. The President

patiently bears such humbugging, and the country--submits.

McClellan disgraces a part of the brave General Casey's division.

Whatever might have been the conduct of the soldiers in detail, one

thing is certain, that the division was composed of rough levies;

that they fought three hours, being almost surrounded by overwhelming

forces; that they kept ground until reinforcements came; that the

breaking of the division cannot be true, or was only partial, and that

McClellan was not at all on the ground.

This battle of Fair Oaks is another evidence of the transcendent

incapacity of the chief of the staff of the army of the Potomac, and

of Gen. McClellan's veracity. In a subsequent bulletin the general

confesses that he was misinformed concerning the conduct of Gen.

Casey's division.

In any other army in the world, a chief of the staff who would assign

to a division a post so advanced, so isolated, so cut off from the

rest of the army, as was Gen. Casey's position,--such a chief of the

staff would be at once dismissed. Here, oh here, nobody is hurt,

nobody is to be hurt--only the bleeding people.

As to the conduct of the soldiers, they fought well; thorough veterans

scarcely could have behaved better. McClellan turns out worse even

than I expected.

The President's campaign against Jackson--very unsuccessful. Fremont

came not up to the mark; disobeyed orders. No excuse whatever for such

disobedience.

One is at a loss which is to be more admired, the ignorance or the

impudence of such opinion-confusing and opinion-poisoning sheets as

the New York Times, the World, the Herald, etc. They sing _hosanna_

for McClellan's victories. In advance they praise the to-be-fought

battles on selected fields of battle, and after the plans have been

matured for weeks, nay for months.

A plan of a whole campaign, a general survey of it, may be prepared

and matured long before the campaign begins. But to mature for weeks a

plan of a battle! All the genuine great captains seldom had the

selection of a field of battle, as they rapidly moved in search of or

to meet their enemies, and fought them where they found them. For the

same reason, they scarcely had more than forty-eight hours to mature

their plans. Such is the history and the character of nine-tenths of

the great battles fought in the world.

When Napoleon overthrew Prussia and Austria, he beforehand prepared

those campaigns; but neither Jena, Eylau, Friedland, Austerlitz or

Wagram were the fields of battle of his special choice. But Napoleon

moved his armies as did all the great captains before him, and as must

do all great captains after him. Only American great captains sit down

in the mud and dig.

At times in the West, Pope, Mitchell, Nelson, Grant moved their

forces, and beat the enemy. I am sure that these brave generals and

the braves of the army of the Potomac most certainly are early risers.

A certain Napoleon never is visible before nine o'clock in the

morning. So I hear from a French officer who is not in the service,

but follows the movements of the Potomac army.

In McClellan's army Heintzelman, Hooker, Kearney, Sumner, and many

others, would move quick, would fight and beat; but a leaden weight

presses, and solders them to the mud. I must write an article to the

press concerning the rapidity of movements,--this golden rule for any

conduct of a war.

Since he was in the field, McNapoleon neither planned nor assisted in

person in any encounter. When are his great plans to burst out?

In one of his recently published dispatches, Mr. Seward makes an awful

mistake in trying to establish the difference between a revolution and

a civil war, as to their respective relations to foreign interference

and support. A little knowledge of history, and a less presumption,

would have spared to him such an exposure. A revolution in a nation

can be effected, and generally is effected, without a foreign

intervention, and without even an appeal to it. Most of the civil wars

look to foreign help. So teaches history, whatever may be Mr. Seward's

contrary generalizations.

Mr. Seward is unrelenting in his efforts to build up the Union-saving

slavery party, and is sure, as he says, to be able to manage the

Republicans, in and out of Congress. We shall see.

Senator Sumner very well discusses the tax-bill, and again shows the

practical side of his intellect. Sumner proves that a laborious

intellect can grasp and master the most complicated matters. If Sumner

could only have more experience of men and things, he would not be so

Germanly--_naive_.

Mr. Seward triumphantly publishes the Turkish hatti, by which pirates

are excluded from the Ottoman ports. Oh, Jemine! to be patronized by

the Turks! Misfortune brings one with strange bedfellows.

On the occasion of the organization of slaves at Beaufort, Mr. Lincoln

exclaimed, "Slavery is a big job, and will smother us!" It will, if

dealt with in your way, Mr. President.

McClellan sends for mortars and hundred-pounders; these monsters are

to fight, but not he. Well, even so, if possible.

The Southern leaders send to Europe officers of artillery to buy arms

and ammunition, and are well served. Our good administration sends

speculators, railroad engineers, agents of sewing machines, and the

arms bought by them kill our own soldiers, and not the enemies.

English papers taunt the Americans that in one hundred years the

country must become a monarchy. The Americans have now a foretaste of

some among the features of monarchy, among others of favoritism. The

Pompadours and the Dubarrys could not have sustained a McClellan at

the cost of so many lives and so many millions. Then the dabbling in

war, and other etc.'s, performed in the most approved Louis XIV.'s or

Nicolean style.

Worse than the rebels, and by far more abject and degraded, are the

defenders of slavery, of treason, and of rebellion in the Congress, in

the press, and in the public opinion. No gallows high enough for

them.

McClellan crowds the marshes with heavy artillery, and may easily lose

them at the smallest disaster. His army is overburdened with artillery

in a country where the moving of guns must be exceedingly difficult,

nay, often impossible. And then the difficulty of having such a large

number of men drilled for the service of guns. Scarcely any army in

Europe possesses artillerists in such numbers as are now required

here. Few guns well served make more execution than large numbers of

them fired at random.

Instead of concentrating his army and attacking at once the rebels in

Richmond, McClellan extends his army over nearly sixty miles! To keep

such an extensive line more than 300,000 would be required. Oh,

heavens! this man is more ignorant of warfare than his worst enemies

have suspected him.

It is reported that at Corinth the rebels had not only wooden guns,

but cotton manikins as sentries. God grant it may not be true, as it

would make the slow, pedantic Halleck even below McClellan.

The future historian will be amazed, bewildered, nay, he may lose his

senses, discovering the heaps of confusion and of ignorance which

caused the disasters of Banks, the escape of Jackson, etc., etc.

It is impossible to resist the admiration inspired by the skill, the

daring, the fertility of intellectual resources displayed by the

rebels; all this is so thoroughly contrasted by what is done by our

legal chiefs.

Pity that such manhood is shown in the defence of the most infamous

cause ever known in the history of the world. To conquer an

independence with the sole object to procreate, to breed, to traffic

in, and to whip slaves!

The navy is glorious everywhere, and not fussy. The people can never

sufficiently remunerate the navy, if patriotic services are to be

remunerated. The same would be with the army but for the Napoleons!

The published correspondence between the rebels Rust and Hunter fully

justifies my confidence in Louis Napoleon's sound judgment. That

publication clearly establishes how the press here is wholly unable to

conceive or to comprehend the policy of the great European nations.

The press heaps outrages and nurses suspicions against Napoleon. The

Sandfords and others knowingly stir up suspicions to make believe that

their smartness averts the evil. Poor chaps! When great interests are

at stake, neither their fuss, nor any dispatch, however elaborate, can

exercise a shadow of influence.

It seems that a Babylonian confusion prevails in the movements, in the

distribution, and in the combination of the various parts of the army

under McClellan. I should wonder if it were otherwise, with such a

general and supported by such a chief of the staff.

Brave old Gideon Welles (Neptune) instructing his sailors to fight,

and not to calculate, and "not to deliver anybody against his personal

wish."

These imbecile reporters and letter-writers for the press, and other

sensationists, make me enraged with their sneers at the poverty of the

rebels. If so, the more heroism. They forget the "beggars" of the

Dutch insurrection against Philip II.

The cat is out, and I am sorry for it. The world is informed that the

revolution is finished, and now the civil war begins. Oh generalizer!

oh philosopher of history! oh prophet as to the speedy end of the

civil _war_! Oh stop, oh stop! Not by digging will your pet McClellan

bring the war to a speedy close.

I am often enraged against myself not to be able to admire Mr. Seward,

and to be obliged to judge his whole policy in such, perhaps too

severe, a manner. What can I do, what can I do? No one, not even Gen.

Scott and Mr. Lincoln, since January, 1861, has exercised an influence

equal to Mr. Seward's on the affairs of the country, and _amicus

Plato, etc., sed magis amica veritas_.

Mr. Seward believes that July 4th will be celebrated by us in

Richmond. He and McClellan spread this hope; Doolittle believes it. We

could be in Richmond any day under any other general, not a Napoleon;

we may never be there if led on by McClellan, inspired by Mr. Seward's

policy.

The French amateur in McClellan's army is disgusted with McNapoleon,

and speaks with contempt of the reckless waste of men, of material,

etc. He calls it cruel, brainless, and uses a great many other

exclamations.

The healthful activity of Stanton, his broad and clear perception of

almost all exigencies of these critical times, are continually baffled

and neutralized by the allied McClellan, Blair, Seward, New York Times

and New York Herald. Such an alliance can easily confuse even the

strongest brains.

The colonization again on the _tapis_, and all the wonted display of

ignorance, stupidity, ill-will, and phariseeism towards genuine

liberty.

Seward gave up his Yucatan scheme. Chiriqui has the lead. And finally,

some foreign diplomats try to make conspicuous their little royalties.

So Denmark tries to cultivate the barren rocks of St. Thomas with the

poor captives. It will be a new kind of apprenticeship under cruel

masters. I hear that Mr. Lincoln is caught in the trap, and that a

convention _ad hoc_ is soon to be concluded. This time, at least, Mr.

Seward's name will remain outside.

I am uneasy, fearing we may commit some spread-eagleism towards France

during this present Mexican imbroglio. I will do my utmost to explain

to influential senators the truth concerning Louis Napoleon's

political conduct towards the North, the absurdity of any hostile

demonstration against France, and the dirt constituting the substratum

of the new Mexican treaty.

"French policy may change towards us," say the anti-Napoleons; "Louis

Napoleon will unmask his diplomatic batteries," etc., etc.

Well, Louis Napoleon may change when he finds that we are incorrigible

imbeciles, and that the great interests, which to defend is his duty,

are jeopardized; but not before. As for masked batteries, I considered

worse than fools all those who believed in masked batteries at

Manassas; and in the same light I consider all the believers in

diplomatic masked batteries. I was not afraid of the one, and am not

of the other.

Not one single French vessel has run, or attempted to run, the

blockade; not one has left the ports of France, or of the French West

Indies, loaded with arms or ammunition for the insurgents. As for the

barking of French papers, or of some second or third rate saloons,

barkings thus magnified by American letter-writers, I know too much of

Paris and of society to take notice of it. I am sure that the whole

rebel tross in Paris, male and female, have not yet been admitted into

any single saloon of the _real_ good or high society in Paris, and

never will be. A thus called _highly accomplished and fashionable

lady_ from New Orleans, or from Washington, may easily be taken for a

country dress-maker, or for a chamber-maid, not fit for first families

of the genuine good and high society in Paris, and all over Europe.

Stanton, the true patriot, frets in despair at McClellan's keeping the

army in the unhealthiest place of Virginia. Stanton's opponents, the

rats, find all right, even the deaths by disease. In the end

McClellan is to be all the better for it. Is there no penitentiary for

all this mob?

New regiments pour in, the people are sublime in their devotion; only

may these regiments not become sacrificed to the Jaggernaut of

imbecility.

Whatever may say its revilers, this Congress will have a noble and

pure page in American history. I speak of the majority.

The Congress showed energy, clear and broad comprehension and

appreciation of the events and of men. The Congress was ready for

every sacrifice, and would have accelerated the crushing of the

rebellion but for the formulas, and for the inadequacy of the majority

in the administration. If the Congress had no great leaders, the

better for it; it had honest and energetic men, and their leader was

their purpose, their pure belief in the justice of their cause and in

the people. Such leaders elevate higher any political body than could

ever a Clay, a Webster, etc., etc.

The Congress is palsied by the inefficiency of the administration, and

but for this, the Congress would have done far more for the salvation

of the country. All the best men in Congress support Stanton, and this

alone speaks volumes. It is a curse that the administration is so

independent of the Congress. Oh, why this Congress possesses not the

omnipotence of an English Parliament? Then the Congress would have

prevented all the evils hitherto brought upon the country by the

vacillating military and general policy. Step by step this policy

brings the country to the verge of an abyss, and it will tax all the

energy of the people not to be precipitated in it.

Mr. Lincoln has gone to get inspiration and information from Gen.

Scott. Good God! Can this man never go out from this rotten treadmill?

One more advice from the "great ruin," and the country will also be a

ruin.

Flatterers, sensation writers, and all this _magna clientum caterva_

extol to the skies Mr. Lincoln's firmness and straightforwardness. The

firmness is located, and is to be discovered in various places--in the

lips, in the chin, in the jaw, and God knows where else. I cannot

detect any firmness in his actions beyond that of sticking to

McClellan,--of whom he has the worst opinion,--and of resisting the

emancipation and the arming of Africo-Americans. He has firmness in

letting the country be ruined.

McClellan's bulletins constitute the most original and strange

collection of style in general, and of military style in particular.

Capt. Morin says that the first thing is to teach McClellan how to

write military bulletins.

Mr. Seward's crew of politicians is busily at work among congressmen,

etc., to prepare a strong party in support of the administration's

eventual concessions to slavery, in case Richmond is taken. Ultra

Democratic, half secession Senators are sounded.

The more the events complicate, the more they require a powerful,

all-embracing mind, but in the same proportion subside Mr. Lincoln,

Mr. Seward, Mr. Weed, and all the rest of the great men. Alone the

people and their true men subside not.

Poor McDowell suffers for the sins of others--above all, for those of

Mr. Lincoln and of his aulic council. He is internally broken down,

but behaves nobly; not as does this poor Fremont, whose disappearance

from the military scene cannot and must not be regretted. He is not a

military capacity; he was again badly surrounded, and his last battle

was fought at random, without any unity. I spoke about it with various

foreign officers serving under him, and all agree in the incapacity of

Fremont and of his staff.

Gen. Pope, a man for the circumstances, acted well in the West; at

last a new man.

McClellan inaugurated new tactics. It is to approach the enemy's army

by parallels and by trenches. He will not take or scare the enemy, but

he will immortalize his name far above the immortality of all not

great generals.

Night and day ambulances are conveying the sick and wounded here, and

large numbers, thousands upon thousands, going north. One must cry

tears of blood to witness such destruction, such a sacrifice of the

noblest people on the shrine of utter military incapacity. And the

traitors, the imbeciles, and the intriguers sing _hallelujah_ to

McClellan, and daily throw their slime at Stanton.

From time to time rumors and complaints are made concerning the

ill-will or disloyalty of some of the _employes_ in the Departments.

The explanation thereof may be that some of the thus called old

fogies, above all in the War Department, may be unfriendly to the war

without being disloyal. Such venerables took root in comfortable

situations; they slowly trod in the easy path of rusty and musty

routine, and at once the war shook them to the bone, exposing the

incapacity and the inefficiency of many; it forced upon them the

horror of _cogitandi_ about new matters, and an amount of daily duties

to be performed in offices which formerly equalled sinecures. Further,

these relics dread to be superseded by more active and intelligent

men; and _inde irae_.

Diary from March 4, 1861, to November 12, 1862 · 第 49 / 55 题