AUGUST, 1861.

The truth about Bull Run -- The press staggers -- The Blairs

alone firm -- Scott's military character -- Seward -- Mr. Lincoln

reads the Herald -- The ubiquitous lobbyist -- Intervention --

Congress adjourns -- The administration waits for something to

turn up -- Wade -- Lyon is killed -- Russell and his shadow --

The Yankees take the loan -- Bravo, Yankees! -- McClellan works

hard -- Prince Napoleon -- Manassas fortifications a humbug --

Mr. Seward Improves -- Old Whigism -- McClellan's powers enlarged

-- Jeff. Davis makes history -- Fremont emancipates in Missouri

-- The Cabinet.

The truth about Bull Run will, perhaps, only reach the people when it

becomes reduced to an historical use. I gather what I am sure is true.

About three weeks ago General McDowell took upon himself the

responsibility to attack the enemy concentrated at Manassas. Deciding

upon this step, McDowell showed the determination of a true soldier,

and a cool, intelligent courage. According to rumors permeating the

whole North; rumors originated by secessionists in and around

Washington, and in various parts of the free States; rumors gulped by

a part of the press, and never contradicted, but rather nursed, at

headquarters, Manassas was a terrible, unknown, mysterious something;

a bugbear, between a fortress made by art and a natural fastness,

whose approaches were defended for miles by numberless masked

batteries, and which was filled by countless thousands of the most

ferocious warriors. Such was Manassas in public opinion when McDowell

undertook to attack this formidable American Torres Vedras, and this

with the scanty and almost unorganized means in men and artillery

allotted to him by the senile wisdom of General Scott. General

McDowell obtained the promise that Beauregard alone was to be before

him. To fulfil this promise, General Scott was to order Patterson to

keep Johnston, and a movement was to be made on the James River, so as

to prevent troops coming from Richmond to Manassas. As it was already

said, Patterson, a special favorite of General Scott, kindly allowed

Johnston to save Beauregard, and Jeff. Davis with troops from Richmond

likewise was on the spot. McDowell planned his plan very skilfully; no

European general would have done better, and I am sure that such will

be the verdict hereafter. Some second-rate mistakes in the execution

did not virtually endanger its success; but, to say the truth,

McDowell and his army were defeated by the imbecility of the supreme

military authority. Imbecility stabbed them in the back.

One part of the press, stultified and stupefied, staggered under the

blow; the other part showed its utter degradation by fawning on Scott

and attacking the Congress, or its best part. The Evening Post

staggered not; its editors are genuine, laborious students, and, above

all, students of history. The editors of the other papers are

politicians; some of them are little, others are big villains. All,

intellectually, belong to the class called in America more or less

well-read men; information acquired by reading, but which in itself is

not much.

The brothers Blair, almost alone, receded not, and put the defeat

where it belonged--at the feet of General Scott.

The _rudis indigestaque moles_, torn away from Scott's hands, already

begins to acquire the shape of an army. Thanks to the youth, the

vigor, and the activity of McClellan.

General Scott throws the whole disaster on politicians, and abuses

them. How ungrateful. His too lofty pedestal is almost exclusively the

work of politicians. I heard very, very few military men in America

consider Scott a man of transcendent military capacity. Years ago,

during the Crimean campaign, I spent some time at West Point in the

society of Cols. Robert Lee, Walker, Hardee, then in the service of

the United States, and now traitors; not one of them classed Scott

much higher above what would be called a respectable capacity; and of

which, as they said, there are many, many in every European army.

If one analyzes the Mexican campaign, it will be found that General

Scott had, comparatively, more officers than soldiers; the officers

young men, full of vigor, and in the first gush of youth, who

therefore mightily facilitated the task of the commander. Their names

resound to-day in both the camps.

Further, generals from the campaign in Mexico assert that three of the

won battles were fought against orders, which signifies that in Mexico

youth had the best of cautious senility. It was according to the law

of nature, and for it it was crowned with success.

Mr. Seward has a very active intellect, an excellent man for current

business, easy and clear-headed for solving any second-rate

complications; but as for his initiative, that is another question.

Hitherto his initiative does not tell, but rather confuses. Then he

sustains Scott, some say, for future political capital. If so it is

bad; worse still if Mr. Seward sustains Scott on the ground of high

military fitness, as it is impossible to admit that Mr. Seward knows

anything about military affairs, or that he ever _studied_ the

description _of any battle_. At least, I so judge from his

conversation.

Mr. Lincoln has already the fumes of greatness, and looks down on the

press, reads no paper, that dirty traitor the New York Herald

excepted. So, at least, it is generally stated.

The enemies of Seward maintain that he, Seward, drilled Lincoln into

it, to make himself more necessary.

Early, even before the inauguration, McDowell suggested to General

Scott to concentrate in Washington the small army, the depots

scattered in Texas and New Mexico. Scott refused, and this is called a

general! God preserve any cause, any people who have for a savior a

Scott, together with his civil and military partisans.

If it is not direct, naked treason which prevails among the nurses,

and the various advisers of the people, imbecility, narrow-mindedness,

do the same work. Further, the way in which many leech, phlebotomize,

cheat and steal the people's treasury, is even worse than rampant

treason. I heard a Boston shipbuilder complain to Sumner that the

ubiquitous lobbyist, Thurlow Weed, was in his, the builder's, way

concerning some contracts to be made in the Navy Department, etc.,

etc. Will it turn out that the same men who are to-day at the head of

affairs will be the men who shall bring to an end this revolt or

revolution? It ought not to be, as it is contrary to logic, and to

human events.

Lincoln alone must forcibly remain, he being one of the incarnated

formulas of the Constitution, endowed with a specific, four years'

lasting existence.

The Americans are nervous about foreign intervention. It is difficult

to make them understand that no intervention is to be, and none can be

made. Therein the press is as silly as the public at large. Certainly

France does not intend any meddling or intervention; of this I am

sure. Neither does England seriously.

Next, if these two powers should even thirst for such an injustice,

they have no means to do it. If they break our blockades, we make war,

and exclude them from the Northern ports, whose commerce is more

valuable to them than that of the South. I do not believe the foreign

powers to be forgetful of their interest; they know better their

interests than the Americans.

The Congress adjourned, abandoning, with a confidence unparalleled in

history, the affairs of the country in the hands of the not over

far-sighted administration. The majority of the Congress are good, and

fully and nobly represent the pure, clear and sure aspirations,

instincts, nay, the clear-sightedness of the people. In the Senate, as

in the House, are many, very many true men, and men of pure devotion,

and of clear insight into the events; men superior to the

administration; such are, above all, those senators and

representatives who do not attempt or aim to sit on a pedestal before

the public, before the people, but wish the thing to be done for the

thing itself. But for _the formula_ which chains their hands, feet,

and intellect, the Congress contained several men who, if they could

act, would finish the secession in a double-quick time. But the whole

people move in the treadmill of formulas. It is a pity that they are

not inspired by the axiom of the Roman legist, _scire leges non est

hoc verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem_. Congress had positive

notions of what ought to be done; the administration, Micawber-like,

looks for that something which may turn up, and by expedients patches

all from day to day.

What may turn up nobody can foresee; matter alone without mind cannot

carry the day. The people have the mind, but the official legal

leaders a very small portion of it. Come what will, I shall not break

down; I shall not give up the holy principle. If crime, rebellion,

_sauvagerie_, triumph, it will be, not because the people failed, but

it will be because mediocrities were at the helm. Concessions,

compromises, any patched-up peace, will for a century degrade the name

of America. Of course, I cannot prevent it; but events have often

broken but not bent me. I may be burned, but I cannot be melted; so if

secesh succeeds, I throw in a cesspool my document of naturalization,

and shall return to Europe, even if working my passage.

It is maddening to read all this ignoble clap-trap, written by

European wiseacres concerning this country. Not one knows the people,

not one knows the accidental agencies which neutralize what is grand

and devoted in the people.

Some are praised here as statesmen and leaders. A statesman, a leader

of such a people as are the Americans, and in such emergencies, must

be a _man_ in the fullest and loftiest comprehension. All the noblest

criteria of moral and intellectual manhood ought to be vigorously and

harmoniously developed in him. He ought to have a deep and lively

moral sense, and the moral perception of events and of men around him.

He ought to have large brains and a big heart,--an almost

all-embracing comprehension of the inside and outside of events,--and

when he has those qualities, then only the genius of foresight will

dwell on his brow. He ought to forget himself wholly and

unconditionally; his reason, his heart, his soul ought to merge in

the principles which lifted him to the elevated station. Who around me

approaches this ideal? So far as I know, perhaps Senator Wade.

I wait and wait for the eagle which may break out from the White

House. Even the burning fire of the national disaster at Bull Run left

the egg unhatched. _Utinam sim falsus_, but it looks as if the slowest

brains were to deal with the greatest events of our epoch. Mr. Lincoln

is a pure-souled, well-intentioned patriot, and this nobody doubts or

contests. But is that all which is needed in these terrible

emergencies?

Lyon is killed,--the only man of initiative hitherto generated by

events. We have bad luck. I shall put on mourning for at least six

weeks. They ought to weep all over the land for the loss of such a

man; and he would not have been lost if the administration had put him

long ago in command of the West. O General Scott! Lyon's death can be

credited to you. Lyon was obnoxious to General Scott, but the

General's influence maintains in the service all the doubtful

capacities and characters. The War Department, as says Potter,

bristles with secessionists, and with them the old, rotten,

respectable relics, preserved by General Scott, depress and nip in the

bud all the young, patriotic, and genuine capacities.

As the sea corrodes the rocks against which it impinges, so egotism,

narrow-mindedness, and immorality corrode the best human

institutions. For humanity's sake, Americans, beware!

Always the clouds of harpies around the White House and the

Departments,--such a generous ferment in the people, and such

impurities coming to the surface!

Patronage is the stumbling stone here to true political action. By

patronage the Cabinet keeps in check Congressmen, Senators, etc.

I learn from very good authority that when Russell, with his shadow,

Sam. Ward, went South, Mr. Seward told Ward that he, Seward, intends

not to force the Union on the Southern people, if it should be

positively ascertained that that people does not wish to live in the

Union! I am sorry for Seward. Such is not the feeling of the Northern

people, and such notions must necessarily confuse and make vacillating

Mr. Seward's--that is, Mr. Lincoln's--policy. Seward's patriotism and

patriotic wishes and expectations prevent him from seeing things as

they are.

The money men of Boston decided the conclusion of the first national

loan. Bravo, my beloved Yankees! In finances as in war, as in all, not

the financiering capacity of this or that individual, not any special

masterly measures, etc., but the stern will of the people to succeed,

provides funds and means, prevents bankruptcy, etc. The men who give

money send an agent here to ascertain how many traitors are still kept

in offices, and what are the prospects of energetic action by the

administration.

McClellan is organizing, working hard. It is a pleasure to see him, so

devoted and so young. After all, youth is promise. But already

adulation begins, and may spoil him. It would be very, very saddening.

Prince Napoleon's visit stirs up all the stupidity of politicians in

Europe and here. What a mass of absurdities are written on it in

Europe, and even by Americans residing there. All this is more than

equalled by the _solemn_ and _wise_ speculations of the Americans at

home. Bar-room and coffee-house politicians are the same all over the

world, the same, I am sure, in China and Japan. To suppose Prince

Napoleon has any appetite whatever for any kind of American crown!

Bah! He is brilliant and intelligent, and to suppose him to have such

absurd plans is to offend him. But human and American gullibility are

bottomless.

The Prince is a noble friend of the American cause, and freely speaks

out his predilection. His sentiments are those of a true Frenchman,

and not the sickly free-trade pro-slaveryism of Baroche with which he

poisoned here the diplomatic atmosphere. Prince Napoleon's example

will purify it.

As I was sure of it, the great Manassas fortifications are a humbug.

It is scarcely a half-way fortified camp. So say the companions of the

Prince, who, with him, visited Beauregard's army. So much for the

great Gen. Scott, whom the companions of the Prince call a

_magnificent ruin_.

The Prince spoke with Beauregard, and the Prince's and his companions'

opinion is, that McDowell planned well his attack, but failed in the

execution; and Beauregard thought the same. The Prince saw McClellan,

and does not prize him so high as we do. These foreign officers say

that most probably, on both sides, the officers will make most correct

plans, as do pupils in military schools, but the execution will depend

upon accident.

Mr. Seward shows every day more and more capacity in dispatching the

regular, current, diplomatical business affairs. In all such matters

he is now at home, as if he had done it for years and years. He is no

more spread-eagle in his diplomatic relations; is easy and prompt in

all secondary questions relating to secondary interests, and daily

emerging from international complications.

Hitherto the war policy of the administration, as inspired and

directed by Scott, was rather to receive blows, and then to try to

ward them off. I expect young McClellan to deal blows, and thus to

upturn the Micawber policy. Perhaps Gen. Scott believed that his name

and example would awe the rebels, and that they would come back after

having made a little fuss and done some little mischief. But Scott's

greatness was principally built up by the Whigs, and his hold on

Democrats was not very great. Witness the events of Polk's and

Pierce's administrations. His Mississippi-Atlantic strategy is a

delirium of a softening brain. Seward's enemies say that he puts up

and sustains Scott, because in the case of success Scott will not be

in Seward's way for the future Presidency. Mr. Lincoln, an old Whig,

has the Whig-worship for Scott; and as Mr. Lincoln, in 1851, stumped

for Scott, the candidate for the Presidency, the many eulogies

showered by Lincoln upon Scott still more strengthened the worship

which, of course, Seward lively entertains in Lincoln's bosom. Thus

the relics of Whigism direct now the destinies of the North. Mr.

Lincoln, Gen. Scott, Mr. Seward, form a triad, with satellites like

Bates and Smith in the Cabinet. But the Whigs have not the reputation

of governmental vigor, decision, and promptitude.

The vitiated impulse and direction given by Gen. Scott at the start,

still prevails, and it will be very difficult to bring it on the right

track--to change the general as well as the war policy from the

defensive, as it is now, to the offensive, as it ought to have been

from the beginning. The North is five to one in men, and one hundred

to one in material resources. Any one with brains and energy could

suppress the rebellion in eight weeks from to-day.

Mr. Lincoln in some way has a slender historical resemblance to Louis

XVI.--similar goodness, honesty, good intentions; but the size of

events seems to be too much for him.

And so now Mr. Lincoln is wholly overshadowed by Seward. If by miracle

the revolt may end in a short time, Mr. Seward will have most of the

credit for it. In the long run the blame for eventual disasters will

be put at Mr. Lincoln's door.

Thank heaven! the area for action and the powers of McClellan are

extended and increased. The administration seems to understand the

exigencies of the day.

I am told that the patriotic and brave Senator Wade, disgusted with

the slowness and inanity of the administration, exclaimed, "I do not

wonder that people desert to Jeff. Davis, as he shows brains; I may

desert myself." And truly, Jeff. Davis and his gang make history.

Young McClellan seems to falter before the Medusa-_ruin_ Scott, who is

again at his tricks, and refuses officers to volunteers. To carry

through in Washington any sensible scheme, more boldness is needed

than on the bloodiest battle-field.

If Gen. Scott could have disappeared from the stage of events on the

sixth of March, his name would have remained surrounded with that halo

to which the people was accustomed; but now, when the smoke will blow

over, it may turn differently. I am afraid that at some future time

will be applied to Scott * * * _quia turpe ducunt parere minoribus, et

quae imberbi didicere, senes perdenda fateri_.

Not self-government is on trial, and not the genuine principle of

democracy. It is not the genuine, virtual democracy which conspired

against the republic, and which rebels, but an unprincipled, infamous

oligarchy, risen in arms to destroy democracy. From Athens down to

to-day, true democracies never betrayed any country, never leagued

themselves with enemies. From the time of Hellas down to to-day, all

over the world, and in all epochs, royalties, oligarchies,

aristocracies, conspired against, betrayed, and sold their respective

father-lands. (I said this years ago in America and Europe.)

Fremont as initiator; he emancipates the slaves of the disloyal

Missourians. Takes the advance, but is justified in it by the

slowness, nay, by the stagnancy of the administration.

Gen. Scott opposed to the expedition to Hatteras!

If it be true that Seward and Chase already lay the tracks for the

Presidential succession, then I can only admire their short-sightedness,

nay, utter and darkest blindness. The terrible events will be a

schooling for the people; the future President will not be a schemer

already shuffling the cards; most probably it will be a man who serves

the country, forgetting himself.

Only two members in the Cabinet drive together, Blair and Welles, and

both on the right side, both true men, impatient for action, action.

Every day shows on what false principle this Cabinet was constructed,

not for the emergency, not in view to suppress the rebellion, but to

satisfy various party wranglings. Now the people's cause sticks in the

mud.

Diary from March 4, 1861, to November 12, 1862 · 第 39 / 55 题