FROM WASHINGTON TO GENOA
The Struggle for the Oil-fields of Russia
A period of calm followed the Washington Conference. On his way to
the United States, Sir John Cadman, the Grand Master of British Oil
Policy, was lavish with protestations of peace and good will. He
affirmed that British policy in no way aimed at eliminating Americans
from the oil-bearing regions of the world, and he even declared himself
in favour of co-operation between British and American capital in the
exploitation of oil. "If," he added, "there are restrictions in certain
Dominions and Colonies, it is because the home Government could not
resist the demand for them. Besides, in Canada, the biggest company,
the _Imperial Oil_, is American. In Trinidad there is a law excluding
all but British companies from oil concessions upon Crown lands, but no
restriction exists upon other lands in the colony. In Burma also the
participation of foreign capital is forbidden, but this prohibition is
of long standing; it goes back 35 or 40 years, and there is reason to
believe that it may soon be repealed."
Sir John Cadman went so far as to declare that he categorically
repudiated all governmental intervention in the oil question. In the
mouth of one of the directors of the _Anglo-Persian_, this statement is
somewhat amusing.
But undoubtedly, the British Government, feeling that it had gone
too far, realized the necessity of dropping some ballast. During the
Washington Conference, on the fringe of the main naval agreement, an
oil truce was secretly negotiated. Britain even consented to allow the
_Standard Oil_ to establish itself in the five provinces of Northern
Persia which had formerly been reserved for Russian interests. In
order to obtain concessions form the Persian Government, in spite of
the initial opposition of the _Anglo-Persian_, the _Standard_ had not
hesitated to make use of the American minister at Teheran.[37] _The
support which the representatives of Washington never refused has
always been one of the principal causes of its triumphs._
But the struggle between Britain and the United States was not long
in breaking out again with renewed intensity, this time for the
conquest of the remaining oil lands, now escheat, from the Caucasus
to the Urals and Turkestan. The Genoa Conference will be regarded
by history, not so much as a great effort towards world peace, as a
"Conference on Oil," at which the immense riches of the old Tsarist
Empire were offered by Tchitcherin to the appetites of the Powers. I
have developed this point in the preface to the Russian edition of
this book, which has recently been translated under the direction
of M. Melik-Noubaroff, formerly President of the Imperial Technical
Commission of Baku and chief engineer of the Nobel Company: "Though
Russia, which held first place in the world's production for a few
years at the beginning of the twentieth century, has now dropped back
to third place, the reserves contained in her soil still exceed 1,000
million cubic metres, almost equalling those of the United States and
Alaska together (1,113 million cubic metres). Persia and Mesopotamia,
Mexico itself, as well as the north of South America, rank after her.
All other countries are far behind. The time will come, perhaps in less
than twenty years (exceptional circumstances apart) in view of the
terrific rate of consumption, when the reserves of the United States
will be exhausted; then Russia will play a big part in the world."
The developed areas throughout Russia, Siberia, and the Caucasus are
much smaller than the extent of the proved deposits, which themselves
are but a small fraction of those whose existence has been indicated
with certainty by preliminary surveys. The oil resources of Russia
represent alone _one-sixth of the reserves of the world_. Hence the
greed and covetousness with which they were regarded at Genoa.
The question of oil is the primary political question of the present
age, but in this Conference at which the future of Europe was to be
enacted, France was the only nation which seemed not to notice the fact.
The Quai d'Orsay had not deigned to appoint a single oil expert to
Genoa.[38] More than that, I am in a position to state that the only
one of the French delegates who was acquainted with the oil question
had received precise instructions before his departure to keep strictly
aloof from all discussions about oil. It was, of course, manifestly
impossible to expect to settle the question of Russia's oil at Genoa
in the absence of any representative of the United States. The French
delegation therefore held only a watching brief.
By this self-denial France at any rate earned the distinction of taking
no part in the scandalous concession-hunting which went on behind the
scenes at Genoa while the Soviet delegates were discussing the great
principles of international morality with the official representatives
of the Powers. Into this feverish atmosphere the news dropped like
a bomb-shell that Krassin had signed a contract conferring upon the
_Royal Dutch-Shell_ a monopoly of the oil in the Caucasus. The news
caused a great sensation, and immediately provoked solemn denials,
which were more resounding than convincing. The few oil magnates and
their satellites who were not already at Genoa hurried thither prepared
for battle. The French Government at once dispatched M. Laurent Eynac.
The Cabinet, however, had decided that he alone should be attached
to the delegation in an official capacity. And it was not until
the afternoon of the day upon which it made this decision that it
recognized the necessity of adding M. Pincan, the very able director of
the Oil and Petrol Department of the Ministry of Commerce, on account
of the fact that M. Eynac for over a year had been out of touch with
his former colleagues.
The French delegation adopted the Belgian point of view upon the
restitution of private property, and energetically defended French
pre-War interests in Russian oil, which, in December 1920, represented
a value of 200 million francs. A common policy was elaborated in
conjunction with the principal Belgian oil companies, whose importance
in the Caucasus equalled our own, with a view to the defence of rights
acquired before and after the nationalization of mines and factories
by the Soviets. In order to obtain absolute equality of treatment for
French interests in the Caucasus, M. Laurent Eynac very pointedly
called the British Government's attention to the stipulations of the
San Remo Agreement. He relied upon Article 2 of the Agreement, based
upon the principle of cordial co-operation and reciprocity in all
countries where the oil interests of France and Britain can in practice
be combined, and upon Article 6, which runs thus:
In the territories which belonged to the late Russian Empire the
two Governments will give their joint support to their respective
nationals in their joint efforts to obtain petroleum concessions and
facilities to export and to arrange delivery of petroleum supplies.
The British Government, anxious not to obstruct the private
negotiations of the _Royal Dutch-Shell_ and the Soviets, got out
of the difficulty very skilfully by giving to this latter clause a
restricted interpretation. On May 15, 1922, in the House of Commons,
Mr. Chamberlain went so far as to declare that Article 6 and the other
analogous provisions of the San Remo Agreement would only become
effective if French and British nationals decided jointly to acquire
specific concessions. Nationals of a single country, like the British
trusts, would therefore retain complete liberty of action.
If, in the light of these explanations, one appreciates the threat of
monopoly contained in the insertion, at the instance of the British
delegation, of Clause 7 in the Memorandum of May 2, 1922, stipulating
that in cases where the exploitation of property formerly belonging to
foreigners could be assured only by incorporating them in a general
group, the preferential right to the restitution of the property should
not apply, one is driven to wonder what in such circumstances has
become of the cordial "Franco-British co-operation" spoken of in the
San Remo preamble. Would it not be merely an empty formula?
* * * * *
For a long time past, the _Royal Dutch-Shell_ had been striving to
obtain a grasp of the oil deposits in Russia, and thus to realize, by
arrangement with the British Government, its dream of world hegemony
in oil. Its only reason for not amalgamating with the _Anglo-Persian_
and the _Burmah Oil_ at the beginning of 1922 was fear of American
reprisals. The question was much debated, but after considerable
hesitation Mr. Lloyd George refused to give his consent; so soon after
the Naval Pact of Washington it would have caused something approaching
a sensation in the United States and would have appeared intentionally
provocative.
As soon as Britain had signed the trade agreement with Moscow, the
_Royal Dutch_ opened negotiations with the Soviet representatives, and
it was not long before these relations bore fruit in the sale of 10,000
tons of oil to the _Asiatic Petroleum_, one of the _Royal Dutch-Shell_
subsidiaries.
I may mention here that the signatories on behalf of the co-operatives
of Russian producers were Krassin, Rakovsky, Mrs. Varvara Polovtsef,
Victor Nogin, and Basil Krysin. The notorious agreement between the
_Shell_ and the Soviets, which agitated the Press of the whole world
and produced a scandal which almost wrecked the Conference, was not
concluded at Genoa; it was drafted in London during February in the
following form:--
The Russian Soviet Government is prepared to give consideration to a
proposal by which the sale of all oil products available for export
from the various oil-fields of Russia would be placed in the hands of
a syndicate formed upon the following basis:--
The initial capital will be provided by equal contributions from the
Russian Government and the foreign group.
The management of the syndicate will have control of all sales
and will be entrusted to a Council composed of an equal number of
representatives of the Russian Government and the foreign group.
The syndicate will be responsible to the Russian Government for
the most favourable sale of oil products possible. In order to
derive the maximum advantage from such sale, the syndicate will
provide or within an agreed period create the necessary distributive
organization, which will entail a certain capital expenditure.
It is suggested that the capital thus required be raised by the issue
of bonds bearing a fixed rate of interest.
Payment of the interest upon these bonds will be guaranteed by the
foreign group.
The syndicate will receive, as remuneration for its activities, a
certain commission upon all sales, which commission will be fixed
upon a sliding scale according to the quantities sold.
For quantities not exceeding 100,000 tons 5 per cent. is suggested;
for larger quantities a proportionate rate will be arranged by mutual
agreement. Furthermore, it is understood that any surplus realized
by the sale of Russian oil over and above the export price of the
American market will belong entirely to the syndicate.
After meeting working expenses, the profits thus realized will be
applied in the first place to the payment of the interest upon any
bonds which the syndicate may issue, and the balance will be divided
equally between the two parties to the syndicate, i.e., the Russian
Government and the foreign group.
These arrangements will hold good for five years certain, after which
period the Russian Government will have the right to redeem the bonds
at the price of issue or upon such other terms as may be stipulated
at the time of issue, and to terminate the agreement. The Russian
Government, however, will be obliged to give one year's notice at
the end of the fourth year if it desires to terminate the agreement.
In default of such notice, the agreement will hold good for another
period of five years.
It is understood that the Russian Government reserves the right at
any time to sell oil products directly to foreign Governments, but
such sales will in no case exceed 50 per cent. of the total quantity
available for export in any year.
The success of the syndicate will depend entirely in the early stages
upon transport facilities between the places where the stocks of oil
products are available and the ports of embarkation. Unfortunately,
at the present time these facilities are in some measure lacking,
and with a view to remedying the situation, the foreign party to
the syndicate will be required to invest at least £500,000 in the
transport system. This sum, as well as all other sums mentioned
below, will be guaranteed by the Russian Government, and in case of
necessity will be secured upon the stocks of Russian oil.
This money will be used for the purchase of the necessary rolling
stock, for the maintenance of pipe-lines, and, if required, for the
installation of new pipe-lines for the various products.
Against the sums thus employed, transport bonds will be issued
bearing interest at the rate of 8 per cent.; furthermore, these
bonds will carry the right to a bonus, the amount of which will be
determined by the quantity of oil products transported over and above
a pre-arranged quantity.
The amount of this bonus will be fixed by mutual agreement, and
will take the form of an agreed tax upon each pool of oil products
transported in Russia over and above a pre-arranged quantity.
Payment of the interest upon these bonds will be guaranteed by the
Russian Government, and in case of necessity will be secured upon the
existing stocks of oil.
The transport organization thus formed by the rolling stock to be
acquired and by that which is at present available will be under the
management of a Council composed of an equal number of delegates of
the Russian and the foreign group.
All rolling stock and everything belonging to this joint undertaking
will be exempt from requisition or confiscation whether by the
Central Government or by local authorities.
The Council of the undertaking will be free to appeal for qualified
foreign workmen, and in general to administer and manage the business
in the best interests of the enterprise and the objects it has in
view.
Any additional capital which may be required will be provided by
equal contributions from the Russian Government and the foreign group.
Such additional capital will be raised by the issue of bonds bearing
interest at a rate to be fixed by mutual agreement at the time of
issue, the Russian Government being responsible for the subscription
of one-half of the issue and the foreign group for the subscription
of the other half.
These bonds will carry the right to a bonus in the same way as the
bonds mentioned above.
The activities of the Council of the joint undertaking will be
subject to all laws and decrees of the Russian Socialist Federal
Soviet Republic and to all regulations which may be in force.
Of all the employés of the syndicate in Russia, 50 per cent. only may
be non-Russian.
If an agreement upon this basis is deemed possible, the foreign group
will have the right to appoint representatives in Russia to examine
conditions of transport, to take samples of existing stocks, etc.
After the expiry of ten years the Russian Government will be free to
redeem the transport bonds at the price of issue or upon such other
terms as may be stipulated at the time of issue.
It is clearly understood that these terms will provide for certain
bonuses at the time of redemption to be calculated upon the average
profits of the joint enterprise during the last two years of its
operations.
The Russian Government will signify its intention to redeem these
bonds by the end of the ninth year at latest.
I am aware that serious changes in this contract were contemplated by
the two parties in the course of the negotiations. _They were only to
be introduced if Mr. Lloyd George succeeded in bringing about the_ de
jure _recognition of the Federal Soviet Republic_. This agreement,
which was duly initialled, _but not signed_, at Genoa, referred only
to concessions for deposits not hitherto exploited. But the Soviet
Government had given an oral promise to hand over to the English the
fields which were already developed and which had been nationalized
for the past four years. Moreover, during this winter, British groups,
through Krassin as intermediary, had entered into relations with the
former owners and had negotiated with them for the resumption of their
concessions. The Bolshevik Government has always urged foreign Powers
seeking to acquire a share of Russian oil to deal separately with the
dispossessed owners in order to protect themselves against all possible
claims in the future.
From the very beginning of 1922, the _Royal Dutch_ spread a rumour
in France that it was experiencing difficulties with the British
Government and must rely upon the support of the French Government.
This manoeuvre succeeded so well that, when the French representatives
at Genoa were given precise information about the impending conclusion
of the agreement between the _Shell_ and the Soviets, they shrugged
their shoulders and smiled contemptuously; the rivalry between the
_Royal Dutch_ and Great Britain was unquestionable. If the great trust
obtained certain advantages, France would benefit; it was best to let
it carry on. Their disillusionment was bitter.
* * * * *
Now the British Government, in conjunction with the _Royal
Dutch-Shell_, has been seeking to obtain for itself the products of the
oil wells of the Caucasus, not since 1922, but since 1919. The early
negotiations proceeded slowly. Mr. Lloyd George had then but little
confidence in the permanence of the Bolshevik régime. He did not even
contemplate negotiations with its representatives. The financiers of
the _Royal Dutch-Shell_ approached only the most important of the
dispossessed Russian oil magnates. On July 27, 1920, one of the most
powerful subsidiaries of the trust, the _Bataafsche Petroleum_, bought
a large quantity of the shares in Caucasian companies owned by MM.
Mantasheff, Lianosoff and Pitoieff. For the celebrated Russian actor,
Pitoieff, is also a great oil proprietor. The purchase price was fixed
at £11,042,000, of which £645,000 was paid in cash. The balance was to
be paid by instalments, but the Russian proprietors have not received
even the first.
Events had moved quickly. Mr. Lloyd George had developed a sudden
and violent sympathy with the Government of Moscow. He now saw in it
a saviour who would secure for dormant British industry the work of
reconstructing the immense devastated empire. He had decided to bestow
upon it his official blessing, to obtain that of all Europe, and to
approve its theories and practices, in particular nationalization.
Henceforward, the _Shell_ considered it had no further concern with
the proprietors of the old régime. And Colonel Boyle, one of its most
active agents, entered into relations with Krassin, who _promised
to reserve to the_ Royal Dutch-Shell _the monopoly of the export of
Russian oil_.
Krassin promised everything he was asked, and allowed the contract to
be drafted. But as soon as there was talk of signing it at Genoa, he
gave the project such publicity that the general diplomatic hue-and-cry
which resulted prevented its signature. _It was the Soviets themselves
which divulged their agreement with the_ Shell. They have no wish to
place the greatest riches of Russia in the hands of a single people,
and especially a people so successful and ambitious as the British.
The British Government just failed to realize its greatest dream; the
conquest of the remaining oil deposits throughout the world--a conquest
which would have assured its supremacy in the future and would have
made all other peoples its tributaries.
But, in spite of everything, I believe in the future of the British
people, one of whose leaders was not afraid to say, twenty years before
Germany had begun to dream of European hegemony: "I believe in this
race, one of the greatest governing races the world has ever known,
this Anglo-Saxon race, proud, tenacious, self-confident, resolute,
which no climate and no vicissitude can corrupt, and which will
infallibly be the predominant force in future history."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 37: I believe that the exploitation of these deposits will
shortly be placed in the hands of the Sinclair Company, one of the most
powerful American concerns after the _Standard_. A large number of
shares in this company have recently been bought by the _Standard_.]
[Footnote 38: Nevertheless, it had been warned as early as the previous
March of the agreement which was afoot between the _Shell_ and the
Soviets, and it had seen the text of the contract.]
PART IV
FRANCE'S PART IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES
CHAPTER XVII
THE CARTEL OF TEN
In this bitter struggle between Britain and the United States for
dominion over the world's oil, what is France's position? France as yet
possesses very little oil, although petroleum has been found in various
parts of her colonial empire and that of Alsace has been restored to
her; but on account of her political importance, she is a "second"
who may decide the victory. Hence the efforts made by the two great
Anglo-Saxon nations for her alliance.
After 1870, there was no free competition in petroleum in France. The
industry fell into the hands of the great firms which, sheltered behind
the customs barriers established by the National Assembly at Versailles
immediately after the Commune, formed a cartel enjoying a veritable
monopoly, and apportioning the different regions of France. These
ten firms did not compete. They fixed their prices in agreement and
shared among themselves the quantities to be sold. It would have been
impossible for an eleventh to establish itself in France without their
consent. In the original cartel of 1885 there were only three members;
round these the other existing refineries grouped themselves in 1893.
Thus the Cartel of Ten was formed:--
_Fenaille et Despeaux._
_Désmarais frères._
_Fils de A. Deutsch._
_Compagnie Industrielle des Pétroles._
_Raffinerie du Midi._
_Société Lille-Bonnières et Colombes_ (_L.B.C._).
_Paix et Cie._
_G. Lesieur et ses fils._
_Compagnie Générale des Pétroles._
_Raffinerie de Pétrole du Nord._
These were the ten firms which, protected by the ridiculously high
customs tariff fixed on July 8, 1871, had monopolized for their own
profit the sale of the petroleum brought in by the then all-powerful
_Standard_. With a total capital not exceeding 100 million francs,
_they made for the ten of them a profit of 50 million francs a
year_.[39] Thus, France paid more for her oil than any other country
in Europe. Protected by its agreement with the trusts by which it
guaranteed them the monopoly of its supplies, the cartel did not exert
itself. We had only 400 tank-wagons, 54 ill-organized depots, and 17
refineries. The process of refining in France has never employed more
than 300 to 400 men, of whom just over a third were specialists.[40]
Their fleet of tankers in 1914 comprised only 14 small boats of 3,000
to 6,000 tons, of which only three sailed under the French flag. The
others were under the British flag "in order to profit by the less
burdensome shipping regulations." It was a veritable humiliation for
France, when, at the beginning of the War, she had to beg Great Britain
to be good enough to return them. Britain had requisitioned them. If
the two countries had not been allied, France would have been disarmed
from the very first day! Eight of these ships were sunk during the War,
and when the cartel was asked to build new ones it refused, "so as not
to give offence" to the great trusts.
Except for Charles Paix, who made a disastrous attempt to the south of
Cheliff in Algeria, none of the "oil men" tried to discover petroleum
in France or her colonial empire, and so to endow the country with a
real independent petroleum industry. They much preferred, with the
aid of the _Standard_, to draw large profits without running any
risks. A remark of M. Deutsch de la Meurthe on this subject has become
famous: "The greatest misfortune that could happen to us would be to
discover petroleum deposits." M. Barthe well remarked in the course
of a comprehensive indictment: "Our oil magnates have been neither
producers nor transporters of oil, and they have not even continued to
be refiners." For, since the law of 1893, which lowered the import duty
from 20 francs to 9 francs a metric quintal[41] for crude oil, and from
32 francs to 13.50 francs for refined oil, thus reducing the incredible
difference of 120 francs a ton between the two, the Cartel of Ten has
arranged with the _Standard Oil_ to bring into France refined American
oil with 7 or 8 per cent. of residual impurities, _which it passes
as crude oil_, so frustrating the fiscal duty and realizing enormous
gains. The understanding with the _Standard_ was changed about 1904
to a close dependence; the Ten became nothing more than Rockefeller's
representatives in France, his _oil importers. The_ Standard _fixed the
quantities to be sold by each one and made them sign an undertaking
to sell at the prices fixed by it at the beginning of each week_. In
the old refineries of Paris, Rouen, Bordeaux, etc., the agents of the
_Standard_ carried on a simple process of distillation, a mere pretence
of refining, well-known under the name of "cracking." They imported a
mixture of mineral spirit and petroleum, oil manufactured in America,
a mixture which they had only to heat slightly in order to separate
the volatile spirit (petrol) from the heavy constituents (petroleum
oils). This fiction has always been admitted by the State officials. It
has allowed really refined oils to come into the country as crude oil,
paying the minimum duty. Millions have thus been lost by the State to
the profit of a few privileged individuals.
Later on, when the cartel made an arrangement with _André et Cie._ that
they should deliver Russian oil to it alone, the _Standard_ wanted the
agreement submitted to it for ratification, and laid down the condition
that _André et Cie._ should only make deliveries in the proportions it
decided upon.
Thus, the _Standard_ was dominant in France up to the War, fixing
prices and eliminating other importers. But, in spite of the lowering
of the customs duties in 1893 they still remained so high that the
_Conseil Supérieur de Navigation Maritime_, at its meeting of May 15,
1913, complained of the difficulties of procuring petroleum in France
at "reasonable terms." Mazut, the price of which is very low, could
not enter the country on account of the 9 francs duty, with which the
legislature had burdened it without discriminating between various
kinds of crude oil of greater or lesser value. In 1918, the world as a
whole was consuming 30 million tons of mazut, France not one quintal.
And her shipping was very much behind that of other nations with regard
to the use of the Diesel engine. Very few of her vessels burned oil.
"What absolutely prevents the fitting up of our ships" wrote the
Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Marine, in a letter to the
Minister for Commerce on June 2, 1913, "is the exaggerated price of
liquid fuel caused by the fiscal exactions." On July 21st, M. Charles
Roux, president of the _Comité Central des Armateurs_, took steps to
obtain a lowering of these tariffs. They were without result until
1919, the year in which M. Clemenceau got the Chamber to pass the law
of August 7th, which lowered the import duties on mazut from 9 francs
to 0.40 francs. At last the prohibitive customs barrier was broken
down. The tax on coal was then 1.10 francs a ton. A ton of liquid fuel
paid duties _one hundred times as high_ (90 to 120 francs). From the
fiscal point of view, this tax brought in nothing to the Treasury. _It
was so high that it prevented all importation._ And thanks to that,
also, France was left behind by all her rivals.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 39: Henry Bérenger, _Le Pétrole et la France_, p. 280.]
[Footnote 40: Le Page, _L'Impérialisme du Pétrole_.]
[Footnote 41: 220 lb.]
CHAPTER XVIII
THE PETROLEUM CONSORTIUM
At the beginning of the War, the French State possessed no reserves
of petrol or petroleum: a new example of the unpreparedness so often
remarked!
The "refineries" disposed of a stock amounting at the end of July 1914,
according to the Customs statistics, to:--
408,200 quintals of crude oil,
433,560 quintals of refined oil,
342,090 quintals of petrol.
To meet the earliest needs, these were requisitioned. But, from the
month of September, this method was changed for that of contracts with
the "Ten." The cartel undertook to meet the needs of France; it made
itself responsible for purchases from abroad. The State was thus a mere
customer enjoying the rights of priority over other customers.
The consumption was then unimportant. At the time of the first battle
of the Marne, France had 22 squadrons of 6 aeroplanes (= 132), with
engines of 80 or 100 horse-power; 110 motor-lorries and 50 tractors (=
160). The Germans had 70,000![42]
At the time of the battle of Champagne, France had 4,000 aeroplanes
and 8,500 motor-lorries; that compelled her to increase her reserves
of oil from 22,000 to 40,000 tons. But the crisis as regards supplies
began in April 1916. Payments to foreign countries were more than could
be met by the cartel, which, having just paid an account of a hundred
million francs for purchases made by the State, could advance no more
money. The position grew steadily worse and reached its culminating
point after the United States came into the War in November 1917. The
original little fleet of tankers quickly proved as inadequate as the
size of the docks provided in our ports, which were intended for boats
of 4,000 to 5,000 tons while the American tank-steamers were of 10,000
to 15,000 tons. On December 5, 1917, the Cartel of Ten had to confess
its impotence and resign to the State a task which was too much for its
powers. The stocks ran grave risk of becoming too completely exhausted
on March 1, 1918. It was imperative "to effect a reorganization
which history will record as one of the most substantial triumphs of
the Entente at the decisive moment, and which resulted--thanks to
the pressure on behalf of France which President Wilson put on the
_Standard_--in doubling the figures of our importations of oil and
petrol" (Report addressed to M. Clémentel, Minister of Commerce, in
April 1918). Mr. Wilson, as soon as he received M. Clemenceau's moving
appeal, summoned Bedford and W. Teagle to his room, and insisted that
a certain number of their ships should be taken off their usual routes
and sent to France. Eight days later, three magnificent tank-steamers
entered a French port, bringing 30,000 tons of petrol. And since then,
thanks to a new system of rotation of ships, France was enabled to
receive annually a quantity which, finally, exceeded a million tons.
(Each boat was made to do one extra voyage a year; that gave a gain of
160,000 tons.) Consumption steadily increased; the requirements at the
front rose, at certain times, to 1,800 tons _a day_. France consumed:--
Tons. Tons.
1914 (first half-year: peace) 200,000 } 476,000
1914 (second half-year: war) 276,000 }
1915 457,000
1916 640,000
1917 610,000
1918 1,000,000
_87-1/2 per cent. of this oil was supplied by the American continent_,
the United States, Mexico, Trinidad, South America, etc.; _12-1/2 per
cent. only by the Old World. That is why, in case of a new war, it
would be impossible for any Power whatever to gain the victory if its
tank-steamers could be barred from access to the New World._
During the month of October 1918, alone, the consumption of the Allied
armies was:--
French 39,000 tons
American 20,000 tons
British 32,000 tons
The _Shell_ could scarcely cope with the task of supplying the British
Army. But for the help of the _Royal Dutch_ and the _Standard Oil_, "we
should have had to cease hostilities to our disadvantage, in the fifth
month of the War."[43]
After the Cartel of Ten was obliged to confess its impotence in the
midst of a crisis which nearly lost the War, its work was limited to
putting into good condition the products bought and stored by the
State. Its rôle had become singularly unimportant when the Minister of
Commerce transformed it into a consortium.
The petroleum consortium was born of the necessities of war, like the
consortium of cotton and the consortium of oils. In the midst of these
great conflicts, powerful economic associations, controlled by the
State, can alone save national manufactures and commerce from perishing
for want of materials, and can supply the enormous requirements created
by the war. When, through fear of other countries, the French Republic
took the form of an absolute monarchy, it inaugurated, under the guise
of a protective State socialism, a system of intense exploitation
of the nation's economic forces and of its products, which were
monopolized, seized, or requisitioned. The Government was, in fact,
reduced to a society of consortiums, which, each in its own domain,
were the sole buyers and distributors of wealth. There was the _Comité
des forges_ to deal with metallurgy; there was another for oil.
Because of the difficulties of importation, manual labour, raw
materials, freightage, and exchange, the simple liberty of the merchant
or the isolated manufacturer is no more than an empty word, perhaps
even a dangerous illusion.
The system of the consortium was urged by the United State Government.
Having created centralized organizations for its exports, it desired
that these organizations should come into contact, not with scattered
merchants, but with the Allied States themselves. The important
inter-allied agreements made in Paris and London, in November 1916
and December 1917, on the initiative of M. Clémentel, confirmed the
principle of these industrial and commercial syndicates, financially
responsible to the State, which becomes a direct buyer. Besides, the
French State was not anxious to see the incredible profits which were
going to result from the doubling of oil imports--imports of a value
of a thousand million francs yearly--fall into the hands of the Cartel
of Ten. It therefore imposed upon it, on March 29, 1918, after three
months of inquiries and hesitations, a curious contract.
The State reserved to itself the monopoly of the purchase and import
of oils, and sold them to a special organization (the consortium),
constituted under the form of a limited company with a capital of
thirty million francs, of which half was to be paid up immediately.
This company undertook delivery of the commodity, reimbursed the State
for its expenditure (cost, insurance, freight), itself met the charges
for unloading and storage, and re-sold the oil to the ten members
of the cartel at prices fixed for each variety by the Ministers of
Commerce and Supply. _The distributive trade within the country was
left free._ Each of the Ten subscribed towards the formation of the
capital in the following proportions:--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Nominal Capital| Paid-up | Percentage.
| subscribed. | Capital. |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Francs | Francs | Francs
_Fenaille et Despeaux_ | 4,725,000 | 2,362,500| 15.75
_Désmarais frères_ | 4,725,000 | 2,362,500| 15.75
_Fils de A. Deutsch_ | 4,725,000 | 2,362,500| 15.75
_Cie. Industrielle des Pétroles_| 3,861,000 | 1,930,500| 12.87
_Raffinerie du Midi_ | 3,504,000 | 1,752,000| 11.68
_Société L.B.C._ | 2,526,000 | 1,263,000| 8.42
_Paix et Compagnie_ | 2,238,000 | 1,119,000| 7.46
_Cie. Générale des Pétroles_ | 1,428,000 | 714,000| 4.76
_Lesieur et fils_ | 1,284,000 | 642,000| 4.28
_Raffinerie du Nord_ | 984,000 | 492,000| 3.20
----------------------------------------------------------------------
| 30,000,000 |15,000,000| --
----------------------------------------------------------------------
As the consortium was founded in the general interest, they agreed to
take interest at the rate of only 6 per cent. on the capital they had
provided. Beyond that, all profits were to go to the State. They were
fairly high, for on July 1, 1919, they amounted to 67 million francs.
This organization constituted a first monopoly of importation by
the State, under the financial management of the consortium, which
arranged for the reception and storage of the products and their sale
to refiners. Under the system which prevailed before that of the
consortium, the Ten pocketed the supplementary profits arising from
buying and transport. These were retained by the consortium for the
benefit of the community.
The oil magnates will never forgive the State for interfering with
their affairs. According to M. Henry Bérenger, "although the State left
to the cartel a large share in the management and the profits--more
than 100 million francs--the latter never consented with a good grace
to the intervention of their country's Government in matters concerning
oil. They never freely accepted the principle of collaboration with the
public authorities." In August, 1918, at the height of Marshal Foch's
offensive, a grave crisis arose from the extraordinary particularism
of the oil magnates. For fear of losing an additional profit of 15
centimes a litre, they refused to pool their cans, as the French High
Command required of them. The reports sent in at this time by General
Head-quarters are categorical in tone. The resistance from private
interests became so strong that the Government decided, in the critical
days of the great advance, to create a Commissioner-General for Petrol
with full executive powers to subordinate rigorously all private
commerce in oil to the requirements of the public safety.
M. André Tardieu, the High Commissioner at Washington, was sometimes
also greatly impeded in his negotiations by the Ten. From the end of
1917, he made direct purchases of oil from the _Standard Oil_, the
_Atlantic Refining_, and the _Texas Oil_, because of the difficulties
that had been made for him by the rivalry and manoeuvring which he
denounced in his telegrams. While the French Government was trying
to buy at £5, the oil dealers were offering £7 10s. Their clumsy and
inopportune intervention furnished the _Standard Oil_ in many cases
with an instrument of pressure.[44]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 42: Report placed before the Chamber on March 20, 1919, by
the Duc de la Trémoïlle.]
[Footnote 43: Statement by M. Henry Bérenger in the Senate, June 2,
1920.]
[Footnote 44: Affairs of the _Archbold_, the _Goldshell_, and the
_Muskogee_. André Tardieu's reply to the oil magnates when challenged
by them to state exactly when and how his mission was impeded by their
proceedings.
The oil-men revenged themselves for the State collaboration which was
imposed upon them by a bitter criticism of the system of the consortium
in the _Revue Politique et Parlementaire_: accounts badly kept; profits
arising from the State's arbitrary allowances for working expenses;
ships arriving in ports where they were not expected, and without bills
of lading (hence no means of control), etc....]
CHAPTER XIX
HOW GREAT BRITAIN WON OVER FRANCE TO HER SIDE IN THE STRUGGLE WITH THE
UNITED STATES
I. Activities of the Royal Dutch and the Anglo-Persian.
On the morrow of the Armistice, on November 21, 1918, Lord Curzon
gathered together all the members of the Inter-Allied Petroleum
Conference at a great banquet, and there uttered the famous saying:
"The Allies floated to victory on a wave of oil." M. Henry Bérenger,
the French Commissioner for Petrol, proposed to retain the great
inter-allied organizations for the distribution of oil, wheat, coal,
etc. The _Standard Oil_ refused. Besides, Sir John Cadman, Sir Marcus
Samuel and Lord Curzon were not sorry to regain their freedom. They had
only one idea--to bring to a successful conclusion their vast scheme,
followed up for ten years with such admirable tenacity, in every
country of the globe, for the acquisition of oil-bearing territories.
France, in compensation for the great damage she had suffered during
the War, was to receive important rights for the development of
concessions in Galicia, Rumania, and Turkey, formerly belonging to
Germany. The great thing was to keep out the American rival. To attain
this end, as M. Delaisi pointed out, the task was rather complex.
Several things were necessary:--
1. To negotiate directly with the Quai d'Orsay in order to get the
principle admitted of an _exclusive association_ between France and
Great Britain, for the exploitation of French concessions throughout
the world;
2. To create Franco-British companies to carry out this agreement;
3. To establish a State monopoly in France, which, under pressure of
diplomatic conventions, would be bound to keep off American competitors.
On January 21, 1919, although the War was over, the mandate of the
Petrol Commission was extended for another six months. The State
retained the monopoly of buying oil and the system of the consortium.
That prevented our oil-men from working hand in hand with the _Standard
Oil_ as they did before the War.
Then, on January 30th, M. Clemenceau granted diplomatic powers to M.
Henry Bérenger. He immediately sent commissions of inquiry into every
country in which France might have petroleum interests, to London,
Warsaw, Bukarest, Constantinople, Baku, and Mesopotamia. M. Bérenger
was all in favour of a great scheme for founding an inter-allied
company in which the French State, bringing as its share the German
concessions which would be ceded to her by the treaty of peace, should
enter into association with Great Britain and the _Royal Dutch_. On
March 7th, the Walter Long-Bérenger agreement was signed, fixing the
broad outlines of a common oil policy in Mesopotamia, Rumania, and
eventually in Galicia and Russia. It was a preliminary sketch of the
San Remo Agreement. It remained only to prepare for its realization.
Eighteen days later, without losing any time, the _Royal Dutch_
offered to co-operate in the plans of the French Government in
matters concerning the management and exploitation of the various oil
interests which might be reserved to France as a consequence of the
treaty of peace. It proposed, moreover, to place at France's disposal
"all its world-wide technical, industrial, commercial and financial
organization, not only in the countries mentioned, but also _in all
other countries_" in which she might need its co-operation. And it
offered to supply France by priority, in time of peace as in time of
war.
M. Clemenceau welcomed the proposal. In order not to offend Parliament
and public opinion, which was tending more and more in favour of a
national oil policy, the _Royal Dutch_ entered into partnership with
one of the great commercial banks, the _Union Parisienne_, in order to
create with its concurrence companies of which the nationality, if not
the capital, should be French.
In this manner were created the _Société pour l'Exploitation des
Pétroles_ in July, and the _Société Maritime des Pétroles_ in August
1919, the former with a capital of 20 million francs, and the
latter of 10 million francs. In the first of these companies five
out of nine of the directors bear names well-known in the _Royal
Dutch_: Deterding, Gulbenkian (the Talleyrand of oil), Colijn, who
at one time nearly succeeded Deterding and who has been Minister
of War in the Netherlands, Cohen, Jonckheer, Hugo. France has only
a minority on the Board of this "French" company, for M. Deutsch
de la Meurthe, whose influence brought over the Cartel of Ten from
the side of the _Standard_ to that of the _Royal Dutch_, is little
more than the mouthpiece of London and The Hague. The _Royal Dutch_,
besides, subscribed 60 per cent. of the capital of the _Société pour
l'Exploitation des Pétroles_, though it now holds only 49 per cent.
In the _Société Maritime des Pétroles_, the disproportion is still
greater; out of seven directors, two only are French, and have played
an important part in French politics during the last few years. It is
to them, in particular, and to the skill of Gulbenkian, who conducted
the negotiations very cleverly, that the _Royal Dutch_ owes its triumph
in French official circles.[45]
But the British Government is not content with these two companies
founded by the _Royal Dutch_, (The second is so little French
that 19,600 out of the 20,000 shares of its capital belong to the
Anglo-Dutch trust, and 400 only have been subscribed by the two French
members of its council.) In spite of the opposition of Parliament, it
authorized the _Anglo-Persian_ to found a company much more important
than the other two put together, a company with a capital of 227
million, the _Société des Huiles de Pétrole_. This Franco-British
_Anglo-Persian_ was created by one of the most powerful personalities
of the financial world in Eastern, Southern, and Western Europe,[46] to
whom Great Britain owed the policy she was then following against the
Turkish Empire.[47]
Through the agency of Sir Basil Zaharoff, who is interested both in the
_Société Navale de l'Ouest_ and in the _Banque de la Seine_, and holds
70 per cent. of the capital of Vickers, this British firm undertook to
construct immediately, giving preference over the other trusts, the
whole of the tank-boats, of 10,000 tons on an average, destined to
ensure to the new "French" company the monopoly of the transport of oil
for the French market. France will depend for its future supplies, in
great part, on this Franco-British _Anglo-Persian_. Its stations will
be found on all her coasts, as well as in her African possessions. The
_Société Générale des Huiles de Pétrole_ will erect vast reservoirs
at Dunkirk, Le Havre, Rouen, Saint-Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux,
Marseilles, Bizerta, Algiers, Oran, Casablanca, and Dakar (Senegal).
As the United States will probably still have the advantage for another
dozen years as regards oil supplies--for it is not very likely that
they will exhaust their reserves so soon as 1927, as the Smithsonian
Institute pretends--, the new enterprise set out to gain immediate
control in the matter of tank-steamers.
Everything being thus prepared in the banks and chancelleries, it
only remained to drive out the _Standard Oil_ from the French market
and to establish firmly the monopoly of purchase and importation
granted provisionally to the Petrol Commission. On May 6, 1919, M.
Henry Bérenger announced in the Chamber the profits which remained
for the State under the consortium system--profits not paid into the
Treasury, but devoted to a special object, the development of the
petroleum industry; and on June 17th, M. Klotz brought forward a Bill
to establish this monopoly permanently.
The _Standard_, which, since the Armistice, had been impatiently
waiting for the time when restrictions upon trade in France would be
removed, no longer had any illusions about the desire of the Commission
to expel it from that country. Although the _Standard_ had resumed
its freedom from the conclusion of hostilities, it had none the less
continued its supplies of oil to France, and knowing the Treasury was
in difficulties, had accepted 5 per cent. bonds in payment. Now, in
self-defence, it declared that it refused all credit.
The Oil Commission, in thus breaking free, had taken precautions
against being caught unprovided. Three days after the rupture with
the _Standard_, on November 25th, it obtained a credit of £2,000,000
from the _Royal Dutch_, which was increased on January 5, 1920, to
£5,000,000. The _Standard Oil_ was ejected and the great Franco-British
trust established in its place, thanks to this long-date contract.
But shortly after the fall of the Clemenceau Cabinet, this success
came near to being undone. No new commissioner had been appointed in
place of Henry Bérenger: a high official of the Exchequer was given the
title of Director-General. The politics of oil, when we needed a real
Petroleum Department, as in Britain, were reduced to the common level
of current events.
For more than a month (February-March, 1920), what remained of
the Petrol Commission was left at a loose end, only indispensable
deliveries were made. A state of anarchy ruled. The stocks, which
had, until then, been laid in four months in advance, fell to almost
nothing. The _Standard Oil_ took advantage of this to regain its
footing.
In spite of its promises, the _Royal Dutch_ did not succeed in
delivering sufficient quantities of oil. By March 13, 1920, the
reserves had fallen below the danger-line, to less than 75,000 tons.
The Director-General, anxious about supplies, decided to resort to the
Americans. And as the powers of the Petrol Commission had been legally
extinct since April 26th, and its provisional monopoly at an end since
April 21st, he established the system of authorizing imports, and
granted licences to several companies which had made contracts with the
_Standard Oil_. Would the _Standard Oil_ succeed in re-entering France?
It was not given the time, for the San Remo Agreement had just been
signed (April 24, 1920). A few days later, the French Government
resumed control of oil, and M. Laurent Eynac, the new Commissioner,
taking the view that what had happened during the interregnum had no
legal existence, hastened to annul the licences to import granted to
the _Standard_.
The great American trust found once more in France, as it had so often
found since the War in other parts of the world, the "closed door."
II. Diplomatic Negotiations
"The diplomatic history of the Franco-British negotiations concerning
Mosul will, when it is made known, constitute the most eloquent
document upon British policy towards France."[48] According to the
agreements of 1916, Mosul was in the French zone of influence in
Arabia. Great Britain began by obtaining the cession of our territorial
rights, as recognized by this treaty. The French Government gave way
to her desires in spite of the opposition of its Foreign Minister. But
when, later on, we demanded in compensation that 50 per cent. of the
oil of Mosul should be reserved for us, Great Britain produced at the
propitious moment the difficulty, unsuspected by our negotiators, of
the _Turkish Petroleum_, a company which she had opportunely created
in collaboration with the _Royal Dutch_ a few months before the
declaration of War in 1914. Now the _Turkish Petroleum_ had obtained
from the Turkish Government the grant of all the naphtha of the
vilayets that we lost in renouncing the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.
So, having abandoned Mosul, all we were to receive in exchange was the
oil with which Britain consented, as a special favour, to supply us.
"When one knows England well," wrote M. Le Page, with justice, "one is
not surprised that, when, with the help of France she has driven out
America from the territory she covets, she should strive to throw over
her helper, having got rid of her rival."
The petroliferous basin, which extends from Persia to Mesopotamia, is
one of the most extensive as yet discovered in the whole world. The
great deposits reach as far as twenty miles to the north of Mosul. In
the valley of the Naphat, the oil flows naturally into the river. At
Hit, on the Euphrates, there are asphalt deposits which have long been
exploited by the natives. And it is probable that this petroleum basin,
which also includes Palestine,[49] continues through Syria right to the
shores of the Mediterranean. Near Latakia (Laodice) there are asphalt
beds, which the _Latakia Oil_, a British company, has been exploiting
since 1915. On the eastern side of the Gulf of Alexandretta, the
streams which flow down from Mount Alma bear traces of oil. Thus, it is
not surprising that this region has aroused, and still arouses, so much
covetousness among the Powers. As early as 1903, the _Imperial Ottoman
Bagdad Railway Company_, the famous _Bagdad Bahn_, obtained the grant
of the right of exclusive exploitation of all deposits found within a
distance of fifty kilometres from its lines. Germany transferred this
right to the _Turkish Petroleum_ when the latter company was created.
The capital of the _Turkish Petroleum_ was, to begin with,
50 per cent. British;
25 per cent. German (_Deutsche Bank_);
25 per cent. Dutch (_Royal Dutch_).
Germany's share has been handed over to France by Great Britain in
order to obtain her support in the struggle against the United States.
As the War broke out almost at once, the _Turkish Petroleum_ had not
time to begin the exploitation of the oils of Mesopotamia. After the
new King of Iraq has decided definitely what is to happen to them, it
will take nearly five years to develop them fully.
In 1914, an Anglo-German agreement had expressly recognized the rights
of France in Asia Minor. These rights, moreover, were respected in all
essentials in the agreements between France, Russia, and Great Britain,
in 1915 and 1916, for the partition of Asia Minor. This latter, in
March 1916, defined French and British zones and French and British
spheres of influence. "In a letter of May 15th," wrote the reporter
of the Public Works Commission, "Sir Edward Grey requested that, in
the zone which was to become French under the Sykes-Picot Agreement,
it should be understood that _all existing concessions_, navigation
rights, and the rights and privileges of all British religious,
educational and medical establishments would be maintained."
In a letter of the same date, M. Cambon agreed. By these means France
was tricked, for doubtless M. Cambon was not aware at the time that,
from June 26, 1914, a British firm, the _Turkish Petroleum Company_,
had obtained from the Turkish Minister of Finance, Saïd Halim, the
concession of all rights over oil discovered or to be discovered in the
vilayets of Mosul, Basra, and Bagdad.[50] Now, it was just from these
three vilayets that the oil in the French zone came; so much so that,
by the interpretation of the Franco-British Agreement of May, 1916,
France was completely ousted from the oil production of Mesopotamia.
Thanks to Henry Bérenger, a new agreement was concluded between him and
Mr. Walter Long in March and April, 1919. Henry Bérenger recalled the
agreement made before 1914 between Saïd Halim and the _Bagdad Bahn_,
the railway company which had passed into French and British hands
since the German defeat. The _Turkish Petroleum Company_ was subject
to this agreement, because the railway passed through its oil-fields.
Rights had been reserved for the Germans over half the production of
Mesopotamia. "Thus, France obtained 25 per cent. as her half-share of
the German rights." Unfortunately, this agreement met with a certain
opposition at the Quai d'Orsay. It was held up, and M. Clemenceau did
not sign it, "because, on February 8, 1919, after we had ceded Mosul
and Palestine at the request of Mr. Lloyd George upon the threefold
condition of the oil agreement--whole-hearted British support of the
French point of view in the event of American objections--and finally
the exact fulfilment of the 1916 treaty concerning the frontiers of
Syria, Mosul excepted, our British friends presented to us a map which
deprived us of one-third of Syria in addition."
Such was the explanation given to the Chamber by André Tardieu! A
certainty was sacrificed for a possibility. M. Henry Bérenger strove
to have the treaty revived, and on December 21st signed a new contract
with Sir Hamar Greenwood, the British Minister in charge of oil
questions, very similar to the Long-Bérenger Agreement, except in the
matter of native interests. This time, however, Lloyd George, not
considering it advantageous enough to Britain, refused to sign it.
Such was the situation when France went to the Conference of San Remo.
The San Remo Agreement
It was not merely the oil deposits of Mesopotamia that France, in
return for a lowly and subordinate participation in British control,
was abandoning to Britain--as they would have had the Chamber believe
at the time of the noisy debate upon Mosul--but the whole of French
oil interests, present and future, whether in the colonies or abroad.
The first article of the agreement which Mr. Lloyd George and the real
"Grand Master" of British oil policy, Sir John Cadman, presented for
signature, stipulated, it is true, that "this memorandum relates to the
following States or countries: Rumania, Asia Minor, territories of the
old Russian Empire, Galicia, French Colonies," and that the agreement
might be extended to other countries by mutual consent; but, of British
territories, only "British Crown Colonies" were opened to French
co-operation, and then only "so far as existing regulations allow."
Thus, London kept an easy method of evasion in reserve. Now, though the
British Empire counts many "Dominions," there is not nowadays a large
number of "Crown Colonies." The former German Colonies themselves, with
one exception, have been handed over to the Commonwealth of Australia,
or to New Zealand, or to the Union of South Africa. Thus, apart from
former German East Africa and a small strip of the Cameroons which
France ceded to Nigeria, these will not be open to "Franco-British
co-operation."
There is but a single country in which the San Remo Agreement has
provided equal treatment for France and Britain, at least in theory;
that country is Rumania.
Rumania is the State in which French interests were the most important;
they would be increased still more by the spoils of the _Deutsche Bank_
and the _Disconto-Gesellschaft_. Accordingly, the two Governments
pledged themselves to support each other in acquiring concessions
which belonged to sequestrated companies, such as the _Steaua Romana_,
_Concordia_, and _Vega_, and in obtaining fresh concessions. "All
shares belonging to former enemy concessions which can be secured and
all other advantages derived from these negotiations shall be divided,
50 per cent. to British interests and 50 per cent. to French interests.
It is understood that in the company or companies to be formed to
undertake the management and the exploitation of the said shares,
concessions, and other advantages, the two countries shall have the
same proportion of 50 per cent. in all capital subscribed, as well as
in representatives on the board, and voting power."
This equality was not a favour, for the French capital invested in
Rumanian oil was at least as important as that of Britain.
In the territories of the old Russian Empire, where French interests
are much less important than British interests, an equal distribution
is not provided for: it would have been to the advantage of France.
But it is stated that the two Governments will give their "joint
support" to those of their nationals who make "joint efforts" to
obtain concessions, and to export and deliver oil. Now, at the present
moment, such efforts are being made by the _Royal Dutch-Shell_
alone, which is even going to the length of proposing to the Soviet
Government to restore the oil industry of Russia, if it is granted
extra-territoriality for its concessions.
In Mesopotamia, "the British Government undertake to grant to the
French Government 25 per cent. of the net output" if the Mesopotamian
oil-fields are developed by Government action. If a private company is
used, the British Government will place at the disposal of the French
Government a share of 25 per cent. in such company. Thus, in the one
case France will be simply a consumer of oil, or in the other she will
be both a producer and a consumer. The negotiators took care to have
inserted that "the price to be paid for such participation shall be no
more than that paid by any of the other participants." They remembered
the price at which British coal had been sold them!
"It is also understood that the said petroleum company shall be _under
permanent British control_." Should a private company be constituted,
"the native Government or other native interests shall be allowed, if
they so desire, to participate up to a maximum of 20 per cent. of the
share capital of the said company, the French contributing one-half of
the first 10 per cent. of such native participation." With this system,
as M. Delaisi has observed, France would subscribe a _third_ of the
capital, upon which condition she would have a right to a _quarter_ of
the oil produced.
If Britain consented to give France this share of the Mesopotamian oil,
when, according to the document which Sir Edward Grey had got M. Paul
Cambon to sign on May 15, 1915, she was _under no obligation_ to give
anything at all--the more so because France had given up Mosul without
previously laying down any conditions about the oil[51]--it was because
the present carried with it as a counterpart privileges and exemptions
granted by France to the _Anglo-Persian_, which will have access, if it
so desires, to the Mediterranean by pipe-lines across Syria. It will
even be able to build railways, refineries, and reservoirs there, and
France is pledged to guarantee the security of its installations in her
zone without levying any tolls. No export or transit dues are to be
levied upon the oil which it sends through French ports.
Finally, while the British Government only opens its "Crown Colonies"
to French penetration, and in these restricts the favour to the
"territories of the Crown,"[52] with the further condition that the
concessions in question are not already the subject of negotiations
initiated by private interests, the French Government threw open the
whole of its great colonial empire, and undertook to facilitate the
acquisition of concessions by "any Franco-British group or groups of
good standing." It simply called attention to the fact that Parliament
had resolved that, in companies formed for the exploitation of colonial
deposits, French interests should be represented in the proportion
of 67 per cent. But the French Parliament was under an illusion: in
order to have control of a business, it is not sufficient to hold
one-half or three-quarters of the shares. Every one knows that, in
France, shareholders rarely attend the general meetings which appoint
the directors. Still less will they undertake the journey to London,
where the head office will almost always be located. They do not
even go to The Hague; this explains why they have no influence in the
_Royal Dutch_, although they hold more than half its capital. The last
increase of capital of the _Royal Dutch_ was voted by _forty-four
persons_, representing 218 votes. People did not allow their private
arrangements to be disturbed by an event which might have notable
results upon the world-future of this trust: not one share in 1,110 was
represented.
However, Britain did not wait till the San Remo Agreement was signed
before grasping the oil-fields of the French colonial empire: she
gained possession of them while the War was being fought!
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 45: These facts are still too recent and too controversial
for me to be able to make any more detailed reference to them.]
[Footnote 46: Agreement signed in London, October 27, 1920. Cp. chap.
xi, _A State-subsidized Company (the Anglo-Persian)_.]
[Footnote 47: Policy of the "Auxiliary Greek Empire."]
[Footnote 48: _Revue Universelle_, October 15, 1920, Le Page,
_L'Impérialisme du Pétrole_.]
[Footnote 49: The _Standard Oil_ obtained the grant of seven
concessions there, to the south of the Dead Sea, which the British are
preventing it from exploiting.]
[Footnote 50: If he knew of it, there can never have been so serious a
diplomatic blunder.]
[Footnote 51: One of two things should have been done: either Mosul
should only have been given up against the promise of a large share
of its production, or Upper Mesopotamia should have been retained,
because, even if its deposits had been exploited by British companies,
the presence of France would have forced them to reckon with her.]
[Footnote 52: This phrase does not appear in the official English text
of the San Remo Agreement.--Translator's Note.]
CHAPTER XX
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE OIL-FIELDS OF THE FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE
As early as July 10, 1914, M. Clémentel had appealed to the French
Government to prevent foreign Powers from laying their hands upon the
oil deposits of Northern Africa. "At a time when Britain is pursuing in
Persia a policy which is well known to you, and when oil concessions
are, at bottom, the chief cause of the troubles in Mexico," he
exclaimed, "the French Government cannot permit its representatives in
Algeria, or in Morocco, to give deposits of oil to all comers."
The Government paid no attention to this, for, two years later, Lord
Cowdray (Pearson) had obtained a concession of 730,000 hectares for
prospecting, and 101,000 for immediate exploitation. These extensive
territories were bounded on the east by the railway from Ténès to
Orléansville, on the south by the railway from Orléansville to Relizane
and thence to Saint-Lucien, on the west by the lines from Saint-Lucien
to Saint-Barbe and from Trelat to Oran, and on the north by the sea
between Oran and Ténès. And when, on November 9, 1916, M. Ernest
Outrey submitted to the Chamber documents demonstrating how the French
Government had proceeded to hand over the oil riches of Algeria without
consulting Parliament, M. Marcel Sembat, the Minister for Public Works,
deemed the following reply a complete justification:
"If you are dealing with lands where the presence of oil is doubtful
and where, according to technical experts, you would have to spend many
millions upon prospecting, and if a company says to you 'Here are our
guarantees; we have competent technicians, and we are prepared, under
Government control, to spend four million francs upon prospecting,'
what are you to do?"
When the Pearson firm addressed its request for a concession to the
French Government, on January 18, 1915, the Minister, in forwarding
it to the Governor of Algeria, did not hesitate to write that "the
question would have to be submitted to Parliament."[53]
But he was not long in changing his opinion, and, in order to dispense
with Parliament, it was decided to deal with the request "by decree
enacted by the Council of State."[54]
On August 18, 1916, before any final decision had been taken upon the
matter, M. Marcel Sembat instructed the Governor of Algeria "to give
the petitioning company every facility for the sale of oil obtained as
a result of the investigations which it may undertake." And, on October
11th, M. Lutaud forwarded to him the following letter from the Prefect
of Oran, which pointed out an ingenious method of _evading the law upon
concessions_:
"In conclusion, M. Dussert (Engineer-in-Chief for Mines at Algiers)
proposes, if the Administration should decide not to present a Bill to
Parliament, a different solution from that contemplated by the Minister
for Public Works. He suggests that an immense mining concession,
covering the whole of Dahra, the Bel-Hacel range, and the forest of
Mouley-Smaïl, should be granted to Algeria, leaving the colony, from
the date of this concession, to give the oil company a three years'
lease, renewable for two years, which could be made permanent as soon
as the company had selected the lands which it wished to retain."
There followed a report by M. Dussert upon the petition: "This petition
is formulated upon entirely abnormal conditions; _the boundaries to
which it would apply would enclose an area fifteen times as great as
the concessions which are usually granted_."
What the English desired above everything was to get a grip on
these vast lands so as to keep off their American rivals, should
important sources of oil be found there later on. The production of
oil in Algeria is still insignificant, though it increased almost
tenfold between 1914 and 1917. Henceforward, the majority of companies
operating there, the _Société co-intéressée des Pétroles algériens_,
the _Société algérienne des Pétroles de Tiliouanet_, the _Société
d'Études, de Recherches et d'Exploitation des Pétroles en Algérie_, are
invariably British. Lord Murray has even been ingenious enough to have
inserted in the articles of association of the last-mentioned company
a clause which nullifies all the precautions taken by the legislature:
two-thirds of the directors are to be French, as the law requires;
the managing director is to be French; but "the Board may in addition
by special resolution confer powers upon such persons as it deems
fit and for such purpose or purposes as it may determine."[55] This
little paragraph alone changes the whole aspect of these articles of
association, which, on the surface, appear to conform so closely with
the requirements of Parliament. The company will entrust its interests
to whomsoever it wishes.
But Britain has not been content with seizing the deposits in
Algeria.[56] She has also installed herself in Madagascar. Since June,
1921, the _Royal Dutch_ has been making a minute inspection of the
fields of Sakalava.[57]
And if the hope to which M. Launay gave expression at the Academy of
Sciences is realized, and oil is found in Indo-China, Laos, Tonkin, and
Annam, the _Royal Dutch-Shell_ will probably waste no time in gaining
possession of deposits so near its base.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 53: Letter from the Minister to M. Lutaud, Governor of
Algeria, January 27, 1915.]
[Footnote 54: _Ibid._, June 26, 1916.]
[Footnote 55: Article 27 of the articles of association of the _Société
d'Études, de Recherches, et d'Exploitation des Pétroles en Algérie_,
registered at Algiers, December 18, 1918.]
[Footnote 56: The majority of firms operating in Algeria are British
companies registered under French law, just as the _Mexican Eagle_ (_El
Aguila_) is a British company registered under Mexican law. The most
important is the _Société co-intéressée des Pétroles algériens_, which
Pearson founded with a capital of ten million francs, and in which he
has retained a considerable interest. But the one which has given the
best results is the _Société algérienne des Pétroles, de Tiliouanet_,
whose oil yields 15 per cent. of petrol, 65 per cent. of illuminating
oil, and 20 per cent. of paraffin residues.]
[Footnote 57: The _Royal Dutch-Shell_ contemplates the formation of a
French company with a capital of twenty-five million francs for the
exploitation of the oil deposits of Madagascar. This company would take
over the concessions of the _Sakalava Proprietary Oil-fields_, which is
already working there.]
CHAPTER XXI
THE _STANDARD_ AND FRANCE
On May 17, 1921, Mr. Hughes Wallace, the United States Ambassador,
handed to France an official statement of his Government's grievances.
He pointed out all the obstacles which American companies encountered
in France, and asserted that _British companies did not meet with the
same difficulties_.
Now, as Mr. Hughes Wallace observed, France needed ten times the
quantity of mazut that she was getting, and many French factories were
idle for want of fuel. Thus there was room in the French market for
both British and American firms. Mr. Wallace therefore asked that they
should be treated on an equal footing.
M. Laurent Eynac, under whom the Commissariat for Petrol had been
re-established, without mentioning the Agreement which bound him to the
British, replied by putting all the blame on the inevitable delays of
official inquiries, which were "the same for everybody."
But a few days afterwards, _Le Temps_ published an incomplete summary
of the San Remo Agreement; it did not give the official text till July
25th.
The United States now understood the reasons for the attitude of
silent hostility which France had adopted towards American oil
companies. The San Remo Agreement aroused grave anxiety in Washington.
President Harding displayed very clearly his intention not to tolerate
such a policy. He made representations to the British and French
Governments and protested against the exclusion of America from the
Franco-British partition of the oil of Asia; he declared firmly that
the British monopoly countersigned by France at San Remo was not to
be tolerated, and that United States citizens were not to be ousted
through the complacency of France towards the imperialism of London.
The _Washington Post_ wrote as follows: "Oil is indispensable to
America, and American companies only provide inadequate quantities at
excessive prices. The complacent arrangement between France and Britain
for the partition of the oil resources of lands which are not in their
possession is subject to revision upon the request of the United
States, intent on the pursuit of their naval policy."
By subservience to British policy in the East, France was to reap
the enmity of the United States. Its effects were soon felt, for, at
the Brussels Conference in the following October, the "unofficial"
delegate of the American Government declared that his country would
not participate in any international loan for the capitalization of the
German indemnity. This was one hope definitely lost, upon which France
had long been relying. The same thing happened with the repayment of
the French debt to the United States: France fondly hoped that the
Americans would renounce what they had lent her during the War, just
as Louis XVI renounced the millions which he advanced to their infant
Republic, but when President Harding was sounded indirectly upon the
subject, he returned a pointed refusal.
The French Government recognized somewhat tardily the mistakes which
it had committed, and, when Mr. Bedford came to Paris in the autumn
to found the _Standard Franco-Américaine_, it allowed M. Jules Cambon
to accept the presidency. To get round the eviction order which has
been served upon them in the Near East and the French colonial empire,
the United States adopted the ingenious method of founding a French
company, which will have just as good a right as the _Société pour
l'Exploitation des Pétroles_ to share in any concessions reserved to
France. Abandoning the high-handed policy, which played the game of its
opponents, the _Standard_, upon the advice of Walter Teagle, decided
to employ the insinuating methods of the Anglo-Dutch trust. In France,
the _Royal Dutch_ relied upon the _Banque de l'Union Parisienne_, the
_Banque Bénard_, the _Banque Rothschild_, and also, it is said, the
_Crédit Lyonnais_. The _Anglo-Persian_ had the support of the _Banque
Transatlantique_ and the _Banque de la Seine_. The _Standard_ now
allied itself with the _Banque de Paris_, the most powerful of the
commercial banks in Europe.
51 per cent. of the capital of the _Standard Franco-Américaine_
(20 million francs) was subscribed by the _Banque de Paris et des
Pays-Bas_, and 49 per cent. by the American Trust. And in the
constitution of the Board, the _Standard_ acted much more prudently
than the _Royal Dutch_: five out of eight directors were French.
Mr. Bedford, the actual head of the _Standard Oil_, went so far as to
content himself with the vice-presidency, leaving the first place to a
Frenchman.
The establishment of the _Standard Franco-Américaine_ at this time
was the more hazardous because M. Laurent Eynac, taking up the former
Klotz-Bérenger program, was working for a definite State monopoly of
the purchase and importation of oil. But the French market is of such
importance to the _Standard Oil_ in its struggle with the _Royal Dutch_
that it preferred to take all the risks. "France," Mr. Bedford said,
"on account of its geographical situation, is naturally a field for
competition among all great companies." The _Standard_ desires to have
its place there. It proposes to resuscitate the refining industry,
which has almost passed out of existence, and set up great warehouses
in the ports to receive the crude oil; and it would even go to the
length of installing special reservoirs of petrol for supplying motor
vehicles in the neighbourhood of the municipal toll-houses.
Events have turned in its favour, for the idea of monopoly is to-day
thoroughly discredited in France. M. Laurent Eynac was obliged
hurriedly to withdraw his proposal owing to the commotion which it
aroused. An extremely violent Press campaign broke out, and the
political and diplomatic dangers of the San Remo Agreement became plain
to every eye.
The present diplomatic situation is strangely like that of Fashoda. In
1905, France was at one of the turning-points of her history: she had
to choose between the two Powers which had hitherto been her hereditary
enemies. She decided to follow the British, and not the German, policy.
Will she have to choose between the British policy and the American
policy--between the two countries which helped her to emerge victorious
from the great world conflict?
CHAPTER XXII
CONCLUSION
The World in 1923
The political independence of a people may sometimes be nothing but a
sham. France, having neglected to obtain her share in the division of
the world's oil, is to-day in a position of dependence upon Britain
and America. If, to-morrow, she had to defend herself against a fresh
attack, her tanks, her aeroplanes, her submarines, and the whole of her
supply services could only function by consent of her Allies. Even with
the first army in the world, France could be victorious only if Britain
and the United States permitted.[58]
Already in time of peace, nations without oil were in a position of
considerable inferiority, in view of the hundreds of uses to which
oil is put in industry, and especially in the important sphere of
the transport and distribution of commodities. There is no true
independence for a people but that which is assured economically and
financially. Military supremacy is only the happy result of proper
efforts undertaken to attain it. During the War, such independence was
to be desired for France even more than during peace: it would have
avoided the heavy debts which she incurred to her Allies, and it would
have enabled her to exploit herself the resources at home and in the
colonies which she has been compelled to hand over to foreigners.
Before the War, France consumed more than 400,000 tons of oil a year.
To-day, she requires 1,500,000, and the oil wells of Alsace, which the
Treaty of Versailles has restored to her, produce only 60,000 tons, and
Algeria 3,000-4,000 tons.[59] Thus, she is obliged to pay the foreigner
nearly 2,000 million francs a year in order to obtain the oil which she
lacks.
Nevertheless, there is almost certainly oil in France, in the Ain
valley, the Jura Mountains, Auvergne, and the Landes; there is oil in
the French possessions in Northern Africa and in Madagascar; there
must be some in the Cameroons, in Indo-China, and in New Caledonia.
Is it not abnormal that the West Indies and Guiana, when in British
or American hands, produce oil, but when in French hands never yield
anything? The same applies to Oceania. But there is no reason to be
astonished at this; for, under the legislation which was in force
since 1810, no Frenchman had any inducement to search for oil. This
explains the epigram of one of the most important members of the French
cartel, when he declared that "the greatest misfortune that could
happen to an oil magnate in France would be to discover a spring of
oil." Happily, on March 22, 1922, the Chamber altered this state of
affairs by granting, as was suggested in the first edition of this
book, the guarantees which are indispensable to prospectors. Till that
year, the exploitation of deposits which a prospector had discovered
might be conceded to any foreign company which came on the scene at
the right moment to reap the fruits of his labours. Repayment of money
laid out was highly problematical, for the local authorities used to
grant this only to those responsible for the final investigations
leading directly to the discovery of oil. Now, hunting for a "wild
cat"--the American term for a boring--is a very risky operation,
which entails considerable expenditure. In a protest submitted to the
Ministry of Public Works by five Algerian colonists, who had carried
out explorations and borings upon land for which a concession was now
asked by a company of foreign origin, the colonists stated by affidavit
that they had spent 870,000 francs upon 14 borings and 85 wells, of
which seven alone were actually producing a few tons of petroleum.
Even so, the proportion of seven successful wells out of 85 is rather
high. O'Donnell, the president of the American Petroleum Institute,
estimates that, out of every hundred borings made, 98 are unprofitable.
But for fifty years the 2 per cent. which succeeded sufficed for the
consumption of the world.
The policy of France in the Near East since the War has been simply
one long suicide. Little by little, French diplomacy has abandoned
everything that was promised by the agreements of London. While the
San Remo Agreement marked the complete downfall of France in Asia, it
considerably strengthened the position of Britain: not only does it
recognize all rights acquired by Great Britain, including those which,
as in Mesopotamia, rested upon a highly insecure foundation, but it
gives British capitalists an important opening in French colonies which
are still almost untouched, whereas the corresponding advantages which
it confers upon France in some (not all) British colonies apply to
territories where the most desirable fields are already being exploited.
France is paying for her past inertia.
If the Allies have to thank the two great trusts for enabling them to
get their supplies of oil during the War, the latter in return have
notably increased their power. The defeat of the Central Empires has
brought about the ruin of their rival, the _Europeanische Petroleum
Union_, and the destruction of the network of interests which Germany
had succeeded in spreading over Galicia, Rumania, Russia, and Turkey.
The ambition of the _Royal Dutch_ since it linked its fortunes with
those of the British Empire knows no bounds. Its latest success at
Djambi has now spurred it to ask the Netherlands Government for a
monopoly of exploitation in all the Sunda Islands. It has almost
reached the point of eliminating its American rival completely from the
Far East.
The _Standard_ retaliates, and sends prospectors wherever they are
admitted--to Abyssinia (January 1921), Peru, Colombia, the Philippines,
Bolivia. It has gained a footing in the Azores, and in July 1922
was trying in Ecuador to acquire control of the _Lobitos_ from the
_Anglo-Ecuadorian_. It is actively cultivating the Government of
Czecho-Slovakia for the grant of exclusive rights of exploitation, and
it has obtained from the Italian Government a concession for the oil
deposits of San Saba, near Trieste. But the Chinese Government has
refused the permanent agreement which it proposed.
Walter Teagle wishes the _Standard_, like the _Royal Dutch-Shell_,
to become a producer of oil and not to content itself with the mere
control of refining and distribution. But the time is long past when
Rockefeller controlled 95 per cent. of the sales of oil in the United
States. Although the _Standard's_ capital has risen to $1,310,000,000
and the number of its subsidiaries to 62 it now refines only 49 per
cent. of American oil. In the United States there are forty-four
independent companies, representing a capital of two thousand
million dollars, which carry on, not only the extraction, but also
the transport, refining, and sale of oil. Still more serious, the
Anglo-Dutch trust has succeeded in establishing itself on the territory
of the Union itself; at a recent congress of the American Petroleum
Institute, Walter Teagle showed that the _Royal Dutch-Shell_ drew 43
per cent. of its total production from the United States. Be that as
it may, the _Standard_, in America, is always regarded as the great
national champion, upon which falls the task of fighting the _Royal
Dutch_ and the British Empire, which have laid plans for depriving the
United States of their supremacy in oil. _Who attacks the_ Standard
_attacks the Washington Government directly_. And in Europe it still
occupies a strong position through its various subsidiary companies.
_The struggle for oil is no longer a rivalry between great trusts; it
is a struggle between nations._
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 58: Herein lies the explanation of the undecided policy of
France since the signature of the Treaty of Versailles.]
[Footnote 59: But she also possesses at Les Telets, near Autun,
bituminous shale which, in 1917, produced 103,400 tons, yielding 75
litres of oil per cubic metre.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
FRANCE
_Agence Économique et Financière_ (1920-21).
_Annales Franco-Helléniques_ (1920).
Bérenger, Henry, _Le Pétrole et la France_ (1920). _La Politique du
Pétrole_ (1920).
_Brésil_ (1920, "Le Pétrole en Amérique latine").
_Capital_ (1914).
_Courrier des Pétroles._
Delaisi, Francis, _Oil: Its Influence on Politics_ (1920: English
translation, 1922).
_Économiste Européen_ (1906-21).
_Épargne_ (1919).
_Europe Nouvelle_ (1921).
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_France Économique et Financière._
_Illustration Économique et Financière._
_Information_ (1906-21).
Le Page, _L'Impérialisme du Pétrole_ (1921).
_Messager de Paris_ (1919-20).
_Moniteur Économique et Financier._
_Mouvement Financier_ (1909).
_Nouvelles Économiques et Financières._
Parliamentary publications: Reports presented for the Customs
Commission by the Duc de la Trémoïlle (March 1919), and Senator Jean
Morel (June 1919).
Report presented for the Finance Commission by M. Charles Leboucq
(June 1920). #/
Documents submitted to the Sub-Committee on Oil of the Chamber of
Deputies (1920).
_Producteur_ (1921).
_Revue des Deux Mondes_ (1st April, 1920, Contre-Amiral Degouy, "Le
Pétrole et la Marine").
_Revue Financière_ (1911-21).
_Revue Politique et Parlementaire_ (August 1920).
_Revue Universelle_ (October-December 1920).
_Vie Financière_ (1914-21).
_Vie Économique et Financière_ (1912).
GERMANY
Ludendorff, _My Memoirs_.
Potonie, _Entstehung der Steinkohle, des Petroleum, u.s.w._ (Berlin,
1910).
_Vossische Zeitung_ (1913, "The Troubles in Mexico").
BELGIUM
_Revue Belgo-Roumaine_ (1920, "Le Pétrole en Roumaine").
_Revue Économique Internationale_ (1921).
GREAT BRITAIN
_Daily Graphic_ (1913, "The Troubles in Mexico").
_Daily Mail_ (1920).
_Engineering and Mining Journal._
_Financial News_ (1912-21).
_Financial Times_ (1921).
_Financier._
Lord Fisher's Letters to the _Times_ (September 1919).
_Manchester Guardian_ (1921).
_Petroleum Review_ (1910-21).
_Petroleum Times_ (1920).
UNITED STATES
Barnes, _The Romance of Persian Oil_. _The Standard Oil Companies_
(1920).
_Brooklyn Eagle_ (1920-21).
_Nation_ (1921).
_Petroleum Magazine_ (1921).
_Public Ledger_ (Philadelphia).
Reports of the State Department for Foreign Affairs.
Hepburn Committee.
Inter-State Commerce Commission.
Director of the Bureau of Mines to the Secretary of State for the
Interior.
Statistics of the Geological Survey.
Smithsonian Institute.
Independent Oil Producers' Agency.
American Chamber of Commerce in Paris.
_National Bank of Commerce_ of New York.
_Washington Post_ (1919-20).
_World's Work_ (1920).
MEXICO
_Boletin del Petroleo_ (1920-21).
Statistics of the Technical Commission on Petroleum of the Ministry
of Commerce, Industry and Labour.
INDEX
Abyssinia, 248
Africa, 42, 245
Aktien Gesellschaft für Petroleum Industrie, 73, 74
Alaska, 40
Algeria, 234
Alleghanies, 28
Alpine Railways, 35
America, 66, 78, 239, 240 _et passim_
American Navy, 19, 40
American Petroleum, 51
Anglo-American Oil Co., 51
Anglo-Egyptian Oil-fields, 74
Anglo-Persian Oil Co., 87, 93, 151 _et passim_
Anglo-Saxon Petroleum, 62, 74
Anglo-Swedish Oil Co., 73, 74
Antipodes, 72
Apsheron, 26
Aquila Franco-Romana, 98
Argentine, 140, 143, 163
Arizona, 69
Asia, 72
Asia Minor, 225
Asiatic Petroleum Co., 74
Associated Oil, 80
Astra Romana, 75, 98
Australia, 42, 140
Austria, 35
Automobilism, 34
Aviation, 34
Azores, 72, 248
Bagdad, 26
Baku, 24, 29, 73
Banks Interested in Oil, 97, 98, 241, 242
Batavia, 85
Batavian Oil Company, 62, 74
Bibliography, 251
Bituminous Shale, 40
Black Sea, 72
Black Sea Co., 98
Bolivia, 248
Borneo, 61, 68, 75
Brazil, 144
British Controlled Oil-fields, 11, 143, 166
British Crown Colonies, 232
British Government, 89, 98, 133, 147, 152, 153, 157, 168
British Imperial Oil Co., 75
British Oil Policy, 158, 162, 182, 184, 215
British Pearson Syndicate, 80
British Petroleum Co., 75
British Tanker Co., 75
Burlington Investment Co., 76, 90, 130
Burmah Oil Co., 98, 131, 132
California, 68, 152
Californian Oil-fields, 76
Cape Verde Islands, 72
Carib Syndicate, 129
Caribbean Petroleum, 75
Carpathians, 98
Cartel of Ten, 52, 201, 208, 212
Caspian Sea, 72
Caucasus, 22, 45, 78, 97
Central Refining Co. of Pittsburg, 49
Ceram Oil Syndicate, 75
Ceram Petroleum, 75
China, 26, 65, 68, 92, 248
Coal, 12, 16, 17
Colby Note, 168
Colombia, 129, 152, 248
Colon Development Co., 90, 129
Colorado, 40, 69
Commercial and Industrial Companies of Caspian and Black Seas, 75
Companies Controlled by Royal Dutch, 73
Companies forming Standard Oil Trust, 49
Concordia Co., 229
Control of the Seas, 11, 18, 178
Costa Rica, 129, 144
Curaçao, 71
Curaçao Petroleum, 76
Czecho-Slovakia, 248
Dakota, 69
Danske Petroleum Altieselskabet, 51
Danube Navigation Co., 99
D'Arcy Exploration, 137
Deutsche Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, 51
Deutsche Bergin A.G., 73, 74
Deutsche Erdol Aktien Gesellschaft, 98
Deutsche Petroleum Verkaufs Gesellschaft, 98
Diesel Engine, 14, 34
Dissolution of Standard Oil, 54
Distribution of Oil in Europe, 41
Distribution of Oil in New World, 40
Doheny Interests, 45, 80
Dordesche Petroleum Company, 75
Dordesche Petroleum Industrie, 75
Dutch Indies, 13, 77
Eagle Oil Transport, 76
East Indies, 152
Ecuador, 144
Egypt, 42, 152
Empire Refining Company, 49
Erdol Industrie Anlagen Gesellschaft, 103
Erdol und Kohle Veränderung Aktien Gesellschaft, 73, 74
Europeanische Petroleum Union, 79
Exhaustion of Oil-fields, 176
Far East, 65, 66, 80
Financial Groups, 78
Galicia, 51, 78
Galician Companies, 99
General Asphalt Company, 71, 76
General Leasing Act, 180, 181
Genoa Conference, 185
German Battleships, 19
German Submarines, 15
Grosny Sundja Oil-fields, 75
Hague Conference, 93
Home Light Oil Company, 75
Hungarian National Petroleum Co., 139
Hungary, 137
Imperial Oil Co., 184
Increase in Consumption of Oil, 33, 34
India, 90, 152
Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference, 107, 153
Internal Combustion Engine, 14, 15
International Oil Company, 51
Italian Company for the Import of Oil, 75
Java, 63, 80
Jugo-Slav Petroleum, 77
Jugo-Slavia, 73
Keystone Refining Company, 49
Konzern Group, 99
Kotoku Oil-fields Syndicate, 76
La Corona, 76
Latakia Oil, 224
Lianosoff, 72, 76
Limanowa, 98
Lobitos, 248
Louisiana, 70, 152
Mantasheff, 72, 75, 197
Market-price of Oil, 36
Mazut, 14, 16, 37, 112
Mazut Company, 75
Mesopotamia, 158, 168, 230
Mexican Eagle, 22, 71, 76, 121, 151
Mexico, 29, 30, 32, 70, 81, 113, 114, 115, 125, 143
Mineral Rights, 162
Moebi Hid, 75
Monopoly in Oil, 98, etc.
Monroe Doctrine, 129
Montana, 69
Moreni, Region of, 30
Mormons, 141
Mosul, 10, 26, 223, 224
Motor-traction, 38
National Transit Company, 49
Nederlandsche Indische Tanks Troomboat, 75
Nevada, 69
New Mexico, 69
New Russian Standard Company, 72
New Shibaïeff Petroleum Corporation, 75, 88
New Zealand, 42, 141
Nobel Properties, 73, etc.
Norsk Encelska Mineralojeanie Colaget, 75
North Caucasian, 75
Oceania, 42
Oil as Fuel, 13, 17, 19
Oil Borings, 21, etc.
Oil Lamp, Invention of, 28
Oil Policy, 9
Oil Springs, 21, etc.
Oil Union of Oklahoma, 80
Oklahoma, 80, 152, etc.
Orleans Refining Company, 76
Ownership of Land and Minerals, 116, 129
Ozark Pipe-Line Corporation, 77
Palestine, 161, 179
Panama Canal, 70, 71, 130, 144
Panama Canal Storage Co., 76
Panuco, 70
Persia, 133, 152
Peru, 156, 248
Philippines, 248
Photogen, 77
Poland, 45
Polk Report, 163
Producers' Associated Oil Company, 50
Protective Tariff, 89, etc.
Railways, 35
Royal Dutch, 45, 68, 77
Royal Dutch-Shell, 42, 59, 63, 73, 81, 84, 130, 147, 151
Roxana Petroleum Company, 69, 76
Roxana Petroleum Corporation, 77
Roxana Petroleum Maatschappij, 76
Rumania, 30, 45, 78, 102, 152, 229, etc.
Russia, 29, 30, 152, 186, 230
Revolution of 1905, 30
Bolshevik Revolution, 13
Russia, Soviets, 73, 157
Agreement between Shell and Soviets, 191
Russian Standard, 75
Salt Water in Oil Wells, 20, 122
San Remo Agreement, 10, 165, 169, 228, 239
Sandstone, 23
Shell Co. of California, 76
Shell Group, 167
Shell Marketing Co., 75
Shell Transport & Trading Co., 35, 61, 74
Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 56
Simplex Refining Co., 76
Sinclair Oil Co., 45
Societa Italo-Americana per Petrollo, 51
Société Bnito, 75
Société Générale des Huiles de Pétrole, 137
Société Maritime des Pétroles, 73, 77, 218
Société Navale de l'Ouest, 137, 219
Société pour l'Exploitation des Pétroles, 74, 218
Société pour le Vente du Pétrole, 51
Spain, 74
Standard Franco-Américaine, 241
Standard Oil Co., 9, 11, 42, 45, 57, 65, 77, 86, 92, 130, 174, 215, 221,
239 _et passim_
Standard Oil Trust, 48
Steaua Romana, 99, 140
Submarines, 15, 104, 154
Suez Canal, 72
Sumatra, 63
Sumatra Palembang, 75
Sunda Islands, 59, 248
Swenska Petroleum Altiebolage, 51
Tampico, 70
Tampico-Tanuco Petroleum, 76
Tank Steamers, 155, 209
Tei-Koku (Japanese), 140
Telegram from Clemenceau to Wilson, 104
Texas, 69
Tierra del Fuego, 40
Treaty of Brest Litovsk, 103
Treaty of Bukarest, 103
Trinidad, 144, 152
Trusts, 79
Tsatouroff, 72, 76
Turkey, 45
Turkish Petroleum, 76, 98, 99, 140, 223, etc.
Union Oil of Delaware, 77
United British Oil-fields of Trinidad, 76
United British Refineries, 76
United States, 9, 18, 29, 30, 32, 34, 38, 45 _et passim_
United States Pipe-Line Co., 50
Ural Caspian Co., 75
Utah, 40, 69
Vacuum Oil, 51
Vega Co., 229
Venezuela, 70, 71, 90, 144, 152
Venezuelan Concessions Co., 76
Vereinigte Benzinwerke, 75
Virginia, 70
Volley Pipe-Line Co., 76
Wages of Coolies, 13
War of 1914-1918, 12, 33, 101, 159, 210, etc.
Washington Conference, 184, 185, etc.
World-consumption of Oil, 39, etc.
World-production of Coal, 36, etc.
World-production of Oil, 32, etc.
W.V. Oil Co., 76