COMMERCE IN WAR
The maritime trade of a nation at war has always been regarded by the
other belligerent as his legitimate prey. In the Dutch Wars the
suppression of the enemy's commerce was the main objective of both
parties to the conflict. In all wars in which either belligerent has any
commerce afloat worth considering one belligerent may always be expected
to do all that he can for its capture or suppression, while the other
will do as much as he can for its defence. In proportion to the volume
and value of the national trade afloat is the potency of its destruction
as an agency for bringing the national will into submission. If, for
example, the maritime trade of England could be suppressed by her
enemies, England would thereby be vanquished. Her commerce is her
life-blood. On the other hand there are nations, very powerful in war,
which either by reason of their geographical position, or because their
oversea trade is no vital element in their national economy, would
suffer comparatively little in like circumstances. It thus appears that
the volume and value of the national trade afloat is the measure of the
efforts which an enemy is likely to make for its suppression. But it is
not directly the measure of the efforts which a nation so assailed must
make for its defence. The measure of these efforts is determined not by
the volume and value of the trade to be protected but by the amount and
character of the naval force which the enemy can employ in assailing it.
In the Boer War British maritime commerce was unassailed and
uninterrupted in all parts of the world, and yet not a single ship of
the British Navy was directly employed in its protection. If on the
other hand England were at war with a naval Power of the first rank, she
might have to employ the whole of her naval resources in securing the
free transit of her maritime commerce. So long as she can do this with
success she need give no thought to the menace of possible invasion. A
command of the sea so far established as to secure freedom of transit
for the vast and ubiquitous maritime commerce of this country is also,
of necessity, so far established as to deny free transit to the
transports of an enemy seeking to invade. The greater includes the less.
It may at first sight seem to be an anomaly--some, indeed, would
represent it as a mere survival of barbarism--that whereas in war on
land the private property of an enemy's subjects is, by the established
law and custom of civilized nations, not liable to capture or
destruction without compensation to its owners, the opposite rule still
prevails in war at sea. But a little consideration will, I think, show
that the analogy sought to be established between the two cases is a
very imperfect one. War on land does _ipso facto_ suspend in large
measure the free transport of commerce in transit. As between the two
belligerents it interrupts it altogether. Moreover, throughout the
territory occupied by the enemy, the railways, and in large measure the
roads, are practically monopolized for the movements of his troops and
the transport of his supplies--in a word for the maintenance of his
communications. There can have been little or no consignment of goods
from Paris to Berlin or _vice versa_ during the war of 1870, and even
though at certain stages of the war goods might have been consigned,
say, from Lyons to Geneva, or from Lille to Brussels, yet such cases are
really only the counterparts of the frequent failure of one
belligerent's cruisers to intercept the merchant vessels of the other on
the high seas. Again, in the case of a beleaguered fortress, the
besiegers would never dream of allowing a convoy of food or of munitions
of war--or for the matter of that of merchandise of any kind--to enter
the fortress. They would intercept it as a matter of course, and if
necessary they would appropriate it to their own use. The upshot of it
all is that even in war on land the transit of all commerce, albeit the
private property of some one, is practically suspended within the area
of the territory occupied, and very seriously impeded throughout the
whole country subject to invasion. It is not, therefore, true to say
without many qualifications that in war private property is respected on
land and not respected at sea. The only difference that I can discern is
that by the law and custom of nations private property cannot be
appropriated on land, whereas at sea it can. But this difference is not
really essential. The essential thing in both cases is that the wealth
of the enemy is diminished and the credit of his traders destroyed--a
far more important matter in these days than the destruction of this or
that cargo of his goods--by the suspension of that interchange of
commodities with other nations which is the chief element of national
prosperity, and may be, as in the case of England, the indispensable
condition of national existence. Indeed, although private property on
land is exempt from capture, and at sea it is not, yet there are many
nations which would suffer far more from the interruption of their
mercantile communications which war on land entails than they would from
the destruction of their commerce at sea.
For these reasons I hold that the proposed exemption of private property
from capture or molestation at sea is a chimerical one. War is
essentially an act of violence. It operates by the destruction of human
life as well as by all other agencies which are likely to subdue the
enemy's will. Among these agencies the capture or destruction of
commerce afloat is by far the most humane since it entails the least
sacrifice of life, limb, or liberty, and at the same time its coercive
pressure may in some cases, though not in all, be the most effective
instrument for compelling the enemy's submission. Moreover, it is not
proposed to exempt from capture or destruction such merchant vessels of
the enemy--or even of a neutral for that matter--as attempt to break a
blockade. Now the modern conditions of blockade are such that the
warships conducting it may be stationed hundreds of miles from the
blockaded port or ports, and their outlying cruisers, remaining in touch
with each other and with the main body, may be much further afield.
Within the area of the organized patrol thus established, every vessel
seeking to enter a blockaded port or to issue from it will still be
liable to capture. In these conditions the proposal to exempt the
remainder of the enemy's private property afloat from capture would be a
mockery. There would not be enough of such property afloat to pay for
the cost of capture.
It is an axiom of naval warfare that an assured command of the sea is at
once the best defence for commerce afloat and an indispensable
condition for any such attack on it as is likely to have any appreciable
effect in subduing the enemy's will. War is an affair not of pin-pricks
but of smashing blows. "The harassment and distress," says Admiral
Mahan, "caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce
will be conceded by all. It is doubtless a most important secondary
operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned until war
itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure
sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a
most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of
cheapness to the representatives of a people." Here again we may discern
some of the larger implications of that potent and far-reaching agency
of naval warfare, the command of the sea. If a belligerent not aiming at
the command of the sea, and having no sufficient naval force wherewithal
to secure it, thinks to crush his enemy by directing sporadic attacks on
his commerce, he will, if history is any guide, soon find out his
mistake. His naval forces available for this purpose, are, by the
hypothesis, inferior to those of the enemy. It is certain that they will
sooner or later be hunted down and destroyed. Moreover, the mercantile
flag of the weaker belligerent will, as I have shown, disappear from the
sea from the very outset of the conflict; and the maritime commerce of
such a belligerent must be of very insignificant volume if the loss
entailed by its suppression is not greater than that likely to be
inflicted by such a belligerent on the enemy's commerce which crosses
the seas under the _aegis_ of a flag which commands them. Admiral Mahan
has estimated that during the whole of the war of the French Revolution
and Empire the direct loss to England "by the operation of hostile
cruisers did not exceed 2-1/2 per cent. of the commerce of the Empire;
and that this loss was partially made good by the prize ships and
merchandise taken by its own naval vessels and privateers." It should be
noted, however, that the Royal Commission on Food Supply was of opinion
that 4 per cent. would be a more accurate estimate. It is also well
known that during the same period the maritime commerce of England was
doubled in volume while that of France was annihilated. In point of fact
the risks run in war by commerce afloat are measured very exactly by the
degree in which the flag which covers it has secured the command of the
sea--that is, be it always remembered, the control of the maritime
communications affected. During the War of American Independence, when
British supremacy at sea was seriously challenged and at times was in
grave jeopardy--owing quite as much to faulty disposition as to
inferiority of force--premiums of fifteen guineas per cent. were paid in
1782 on ships trading to the Far East; whereas from the spring of 1793
until the close of the struggle with Napoleon no premiums exceeding half
that rate were paid. Yet to the very end of the war British merchant
vessels were being seized even in the Channel almost every day. There
is, however, good reason to think that many of these seizures were in
reality collusive operations undertaken for the purpose of carrying on
clandestinely the direct trade with the Continent which Napoleon sought
in vain to suppress. The full history of the memorable conflict between
the Berlin Decrees of Napoleon and the British Orders in Council, is
still to be written. Some very illuminating side-lights are thrown on it
by Mr David Hannay in a volume entitled _The Sea-Trader, His Friends and
Enemies_.
It would seem to follow from these premisses--fortified as they are by
other historical examples that might be cited--that of two belligerents
in a naval war, that one which establishes and maintains an effective
command of the sea will be absolute master of the maritime commerce of
the other, while his own maritime commerce, though not entirely immune,
will suffer no such decisive losses as will determine or even materially
affect the course and issue of the war; and that he may indeed emerge
from the war much stronger and more prosperous than he was at the
beginning. Such is assuredly the teaching of history, and although vast
changes have taken place alike in respect of the methods, opportunities,
implements, and international conventions of naval war and in respect of
the conditions, volume, and national importance of maritime commerce,
yet I think it can be shown that the sum total of these changes has made
on the whole rather for the advantage of the superior belligerent than
otherwise. In the first place privateering--formerly a very effective
weapon in the hands of the weaker belligerent--is now abolished. It is
true that the Declaration of Paris, which recorded and ratified its
abolition, has not been formally accepted by all the naval Powers of the
world; but it is also true that since its promulgation no naval Power
has sought to revive privateering. It is indeed held by some that the
right claimed by certain maritime Powers to convert merchant ships of
their own nationality into warships by arming and commissioning them on
the high seas is, or may be, equivalent to the revival of privateering
in its most dangerous and aggressive form. But those who argue thus
appear to overlook the fact that this process of conversion on the high
seas is by the Seventh Convention of the Second Hague Conference hedged
round with a series of restrictions which differentiate the warship thus
improvised very sharply from the privateer of the past. The following
are the leading provisions of this Convention:--
1. A merchant ship converted into a warship cannot have the rights and
duties appertaining to vessels having that status unless it is under the
direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the Power the
flag of which it flies.
2. Merchant ships converted into warships must bear the external marks
which distinguish the warships of their nationality.
3. The commander must be in the service of the State and duly
commissioned by the proper authorities. His name must figure on the list
of the officers of the fighting fleet.
4. The crew must be subject to military discipline.
5. Every merchant ship converted into a warship is bound to observe in
its operations the laws and customs of war.
6. A belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship must, as
soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of its warships.
This Convention has been accepted and ratified by all the great maritime
Powers. It is true that it gives the converted merchant ship what may be
called the dog's privilege of taking a first bite with impunity, but it
makes it very difficult for any second bite to be taken. Such a vessel
may as a merchant ship have obtained coal and other supplies in a
neutral port before conversion, but she cannot after conversion return
to the same or another neutral port and repeat the process; nor can she
easily play the game which some have attributed to her of being a
merchant ship one day, a warship the next, and a merchant ship again on
the third. Further, as a weapon to be employed against England in
particular, the method of conversion here prescribed would seem to be
largely discounted by the fact that this country could, if it were so
disposed, convert as many merchant ships into warships in this way as
all the rest of the world put together.
It will be argued, perhaps, that a belligerent when hard pressed will
not respect the provisions of a mere paper Convention, but will, if it
suits him, treat them as non-existent. In that case it is not easy to
see why he should ever have accepted and ratified them. The preamble of
this very Convention recites that "whereas the contracting Powers have
been unable to come to an agreement on the question whether the
conversion of a merchant ship into a warship may take place upon the
high seas, it is understood that the question of the place where such
conversion is effected remains outside the scope of this agreement, and
is in no way affected by the following rules." In other words some of
the very Powers which have ratified the Convention as it stands
categorically declined to add to it a provision forbidding altogether
the conversion of a merchant ship into a warship on the high seas. If
this does not mean that, while reserving their freedom of action in this
respect, they are prepared to abide by the provisions of a Convention
which they have not less categorically accepted and ratified we are
driven to the absurd conclusion that all International Law is a nullity.
Secondly, the practical disappearance of the sailing ship from the seas
has profoundly modified all the pre-existing conditions affecting the
attack and defence of commerce afloat. In the days of sailing, all
vessels were compelled to sail according to the wind, that is, to take
devious courses whenever the wind was adverse, so that some of them
might at all times be found scattered over very wide areas of the seas
connecting the ports of departure with those of arrival. Accordingly the
sporadic attack on commerce by isolated warships cruising at large
within the limits of trade routes, which might be hundreds of miles in
width, was often productive of very appreciable results. There were few
blank coverts on the seas to be drawn. Nowadays a steamer can always
take the most direct course to her destination. As a consequence, trade
routes have now been narrowed down to what may more fittingly be called
lines of communication, and these lines possess the true characteristic
of all lines, namely, that they have practically no breadth. Thus the
areas bounded by these lines are nowadays all blank coverts. Any one who
happens to cross the Atlantic, as I have crossed it more than once, by
one of the less frequented routes, will know that the number of vessels
sighted in a voyage quite as long as any warship could take without
coaling may often be counted on the fingers of one hand. Another
characteristic of these lines is that though their points of departure
and destination are fixed, yet the lines joining these points may be
varied if necessary to such an extent that any warship hovering about
their ordinary direction would be thrown entirely off the scent. On the
other hand their ports of departure and destination being fixed, the
lines of communication must inevitably converge as they approach these
points. There are other points also more in the open at which several
lines of communication may intersect. At these "terminal and focal
points," as Mr Corbett has aptly called them, the belligerent, being by
hypothesis inferior to his adversary, must needs endeavour to
concentrate his attack on his enemy's commerce, because at any other
points the game would not be worth the candle. But it is precisely at
these points that the superior adversary will concentrate his defence,
and being superior, will take care to do so in force sufficient for the
purpose. So far as the remaining portions of the lines of communication
need any direct defence at all this can be afforded, if and when
necessary, by collecting the merchant ships about to traverse them into
convoys and giving them an escort sufficiently powerful to deal
effectually with attacks which from the nature of the case can only be
sporadic and intermittent. Be it remembered that the last thing a
warship bent on commerce destruction wants is to encounter an enemy in
superior or even in equal force. The moment she does so her game is up.
Thirdly, the substitution of steam for sails has very largely reduced
the enduring mobility of the commerce-destroying warship. In time of war
no warship will ever go further from the nearest available supply of
coal than is represented by considerably less than half of the distance
that she can steam at full speed with her bunkers full. If she does so
she runs the risk, if chased, of burning her last pound of coal before
she has reached shelter. Coaling at sea is only possible in exceptional
circumstances, and is in any case a very tedious operation. A warship
which attempts it will be taken at a great disadvantage if an enemy
catches her in the process. Colliers, moreover, are exposed to capture
while proceeding to the appointed rendezvous, and if they fail to reach
it the warship awaiting them will be placed in extreme danger. All these
difficulties and dangers may be surmounted once and again, but they must
needs put a tremendous handicap in the long run on the commerce-destroying
efforts of a belligerent who is not superior to his adversary at sea.
Of course if he is superior at sea the enemy's commerce will be at his
mercy, and nothing can prevent its destruction or at least its total
suppression. But that is not the hypothesis we are considering.
Fourthly, the power of the modern warship to send her prizes into court
for adjudication, or to destroy them off-hand on capture is much more
limited than was that of her sailing predecessor. If she sends them into
port she must either put a prize crew on board or escort them herself.
In the former case the prizes, and in the latter case both prizes and
their captors are liable to recapture, a liability which becomes the
greater in proportion as the enemy is superior at sea. As to the former
alternative, moreover, the crew of a modern man-of-war is highly
specialized, and in particular its engine-room complement, which must
furnish a portion of every prize crew, is at the outset no greater than
is required for the full fighting efficiency of the ship. It is
probable, therefore, that the captor would in nearly all cases adopt the
alternative of destroying his prizes at sea. In that case there will be
no prize money for any one concerned, but that is perhaps a minor
consideration. A far more important consideration is that before
destroying the prize the captor must take its crew on board and provide
food and accommodation for them. Any other course would be sheer piracy
and would inevitably lead to drastic reprisals. Now, before the captor
had destroyed many prizes in this fashion--especially if even one of
them happened to be a passenger steamer well filled with passengers--she
would find herself gravely embarrassed by the number of her prisoners,
and the need of providing for them even in the roughest fashion. A
captain having to fight his ship even with a few hundreds of prisoners
on board would be in no very enviable position.
The foregoing are the leading considerations which appear to me to
govern the problem of the attack and defence of maritime commerce in
modern conditions of naval warfare. I have discussed the question in
greater detail in a work entitled _Nelson and Other Naval Studies_, and
as I have seen no reason to abandon or substantially to modify the
conclusions there formulated, I reproduce them here for the sake of
completeness:--
1. All experience shows that commerce-destroying never has been, and
never can be, a primary object of naval war.
2. There is nothing in the changes which modern times have witnessed in
the methods and appliances of naval warfare to suggest that the
experience of former wars is no longer applicable.
3. Such experience as there is of modern war points to the same
conclusion and enforces it.
4. The case of the "Alabama," rightly understood, does not disallow this
conclusion but rather confirms it.
5. Though the volume of maritime commerce has vastly increased, the
number of units of naval force capable of assailing it has decreased in
far greater proportion.
6. Privateering is, and remains abolished, not merely by the fiat of
International Law, but by changes in the methods and appliances of
navigation and naval warfare which have rendered the privateer entirely
obsolete.
7. Maritime commerce is much less assailable than in former times,
because the introduction of steam has confined its course to definite
trade routes of extremely narrow width, and has almost denuded the sea
of commerce outside these limits.
8. The modern commerce destroyer is confined to a comparatively narrow
radius of action by the inexorable limits of her coal supply. If she
destroys her prizes she must forgo the prize money and find
accommodation for the crews and passengers of the ships destroyed. If
she sends them into port she must deplete her engine-room complement and
thereby gravely impair her own efficiency.
9. Torpedo craft are of little or no use for commerce destruction except
in certain well-defined areas where special measures can be taken for
checking their depredations.
Of course all this depends on the one fundamental assumption that the
commerce to be defended belongs to a Power which can, and does, command
the sea. On no other condition can maritime commerce be defended at
all.