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The Cambridge Manuals of Science and
Literature
NAVAL WARFARE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
London: FETTER LANE, E.C.
C.F. CLAY, MANAGER
[Illustration]
Edinburgh: 100 PRINCES STREET
Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO.
Leipzig: F.A. BROCKHAUS
New York: G.P. PUTNAM'S SONS
Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.
_All rights reserved_
NAVAL
WARFARE
BY
JAMES R. THURSFIELD
M.A.
Hon. Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford
WITH AN INTRODUCTION
by Rear-Admiral
SIR CHARLES L. OTTLEY
K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O.
Sometime Director of Naval Intelligence
and Secretary to the Committee of
Imperial Defence
Cambridge:
at the University Press
New York:
G.P. Putnam's Sons
1913
_With the exception of the coat of arms at the foot, the design on the
title page is a reproduction of one used by the earliest known Cambridge
printer, John Siberch, 1521_
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION BY SIR CHARLES OTTLEY vii
PREFACE xiii
CHAP.
I. INTRODUCTORY 1
II. THE COMMAND OF THE SEA 11
III. DISPUTED COMMAND--BLOCKADE 20
IV. DISPUTED COMMAND--THE FLEET IN BEING 30
V. DISPUTED COMMAND IN GENERAL 49
VI. INVASION 68
VII. COMMERCE IN WAR 93
VIII. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE 111
IX. THE DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY OF NAVAL FORCE 129
INDEX 147
INTRODUCTION
The title chosen by its author for this little volume would assuredly
commend it to the Naval Service, even if that author's name were not--as
it is--a household word with more than one generation of naval officers.
But to such of the general public as are not yet familiar with Mr
Thursfield's writings a brief word of introduction may perhaps be
useful. For the matters herein dealt with are by no means of interest
only to the naval profession. They have their bearing also on every
calling and trade. In these days when national policy is at the mercy of
the ballot-box, it is not too much to say that a right understanding of
the principles of maritime warfare is almost as desirable amongst
civilians as amongst professional sailors.
Regrettable indeed would it be if the mere fact that this little book
bears a more or less technical title should tempt the careless to skip
its pages or pitch it to that dreary limbo which attends even the best
of text-books on subjects which we think do not concern us. The fruits
of naval victory, the calamities attendant on naval defeat are matters
which will come home--in Bacon's classic phrase--to the business and the
bosoms of all of us, landsmen and seamen alike. Most Englishmen are at
least dimly aware of this. They realise, more or less reluctantly
perhaps, that a decisive British defeat at sea under modern conditions
would involve unspeakable consequences, consequences not merely fatal to
the structure of the Empire but destructive also of the roots of our
national life and of the well-being of almost all individuals in these
islands.
Elementary prudence insists on adequate safeguards against evils so
supreme, and amongst those safeguards the education of the people to-day
occupies a foremost place. Our Empire's destinies for good and evil are
now in the hands of the masses of the people. Sincerely as all lovers of
ordered freedom may rejoice in this devolution of political power to the
people, thoughtful men will be apt to reflect that an uninstructed crowd
is seldom right in its collective action. If Ministerial responsibility
has dwindled, _pro tanto_ that of each one of His Majesty's lieges has
enormously increased; and it is more incumbent on the nation's rank and
file to-day than ever in the past to equip themselves with the knowledge
necessary to enable them to record their votes aright.
It is from this point of view that this Manual should be read. It
epitomises the principles upon which success in naval warfare depends.
It shows how the moral factor in all cases and at every epoch dominates
and controls the material; how the "_animus pugnandi_," as Mr Thursfield
calls it, the desire to get at the enemy in "anything that floats,"
transcends every other weapon in a nation's armoury; how if that spirit
is present, all other difficulties can be surmounted, and how without it
the thickest armour, the biggest all-shattering guns shrivel in battle
to the measure of mere useless scrap iron.
This is the message of the book for the seaman. But--and this is of the
essence of the whole matter--for the landsman it has also a lesson of a
very different kind. His responsibility is for the material factor in
naval war. Let him note the supreme value of the moral factor; let him
encourage it with all possible honour and homage, but let him not limit
his contribution to the nation's fighting capital to any mere empty
lip-service of this kind. The moral factor is primarily the sailor's
business. The landsman's duty is to see to it that when war comes our
sailors are sent to sea, not in "anything that floats" but in the most
modern and perfect types of warship that human ingenuity can design.
How can this fundamental duty be brought home to the individual
Englishman? Certainly not by asking him to master the niceties of
modern naval technique, matters on which every nation must trust to its
experts. But, the broad principles of naval warfare are to-day precisely
as they were at Salamis or Lepanto; and to a people such as ours, whose
history from its dawn has been moulded by maritime conditions, and which
to-day more than ever depends upon free oversea communications for its
continued existence, these broad principles governing naval warfare have
so real a significance that they may wisely be studied by all classes of
the community.
Tactics indeed have profoundly altered, and from age to age may be
expected to change indefinitely. But so long as the sea remains naval
warfare will turn upon the command of the sea; a "Fleet in Being" will
not cease to be as real a threat to its foe as it was in the days of
Torrington; invasion of oversea territory will always be limited by the
same inexorable factors which for centuries have told in favour of the
British race and have kept the fields of England inviolate from the
tread of a conqueror.
There are indications that still more heavy sacrifices will be demanded
from the British taxpayer for the upkeep of the Fleet in the future than
has been the case even in the recent past. Nothing but iron necessity
can justify this unfruitful expenditure, this alienation of the
national resources in men and money to the purposes of destruction.
Even as it is, naval administrators are finding it increasingly
difficult to carry all sections of politicians and the whole of the
masses of this country with them in these ever-increasing demands. The
best way of ensuring that future generations of Englishmen will rise to
the necessary height of a patriotic sense of duty and will record their
votes in support of such reasonable demands is to prepare their minds by
an elementary knowledge of what naval warfare really means.
No Englishman, so far as the writer is aware, is better fitted than Mr
Thursfield to undertake this task, and this little book is a very
excellent example of the way in which that task should be fulfilled. It
unites--very necessarily--a high degree of condensation with a
simplicity of language and a lucidity of exposition both alike
admirable. And Mr Thursfield's right to be heard on naval questions is
second to that of no civilian in these islands. His relations with the
British Navy have been for more than a quarter of a century of the
closest kind. His reputation in the particular field of literary
endeavour which he has made his own ranks high amongst writers as
celebrated as Admiral Mahan, Sir George Sydenham Clarke (Lord Sydenham),
the late Sir John Colomb, and his brother the late Admiral P.H. Colomb,
Sir J.K. Laughton, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, Admiral Sir R.N.
Custance, Mr Julian Corbett, Mr David Hannay, Mr Archibald Hurd, and
others. In the domain of naval history, its philosophy and its
literature, he has done brilliant work. When it is added that Mr
Thursfield is known to have been, for many years, one of the chief naval
advisers of _The Times_, enough will probably have been said to ensure a
sympathetic attention for this the veteran author's latest publication.
C.L. OTTLEY
_24th July 1913_
PREFACE
Intelligent readers of this little Manual will perceive at once that it
pretends to be nothing more than an introduction, quite elementary in
character, to the study of naval warfare, its history, and its
principles as displayed in its history. As such, I trust it may be found
useful by those of my countrymen who desire to approach the naval
problems which are constantly being brought to their notice and
consideration with sound judgment and an intelligent grasp of the
principles involved in their solution. It is the result of much study
and of a sustained intimacy with the sea service, both afloat and
ashore, such as few civilians have been privileged to enjoy in greater
measure. Even so, I should have thought it right, as a civilian, to
offer some apology for undertaking to deal with so highly technical and
professional a subject, were I not happily relieved of that obligation
by the kindness of my friend Rear-Admiral Sir Charles L. Ottley, who
has, at the instance of the Editors of this series, contributed to this
volume an Introduction in which my qualifications are set forth with an
appreciation which I cannot but regard as far too flattering. It would
ill become me to add a single word--unless it were of deprecation--to
credentials expounded on such high authority.
I should hope that readers who have found this volume useful to them
will not confine their studies to it. Abundant materials for a deeper
and more comprehensive study of the subject will be found in the several
works incidentally mentioned or quoted in my text, and in the writings
of those other contemporary authors with whom Sir Charles Ottley has
done me the high honour to associate myself. In these several works
further guidance to a still more sustained study of the subject will be
found, and in this regard I would specially mention the admirable _Short
History of the Royal Navy_, by Mr David Hannay--two volumes which, in
addition to their other and more conspicuous merits, contain a
well-selected list of authorities to be consulted prefixed to each
chapter. These references, which in truth cover the whole subject, will,
I trust, better serve the purpose of the advanced or advancing student
than any such Bibliography as I could compile on a scale commensurate
with the form and purpose of the present Manual.
Readers of my other writings on naval topics will, perhaps, observe that
in one or two cases, where the same topics had to be discussed, I have
not hesitated to reproduce, with or without modification, the language I
had previously employed. This has been done deliberately. The topics so
treated fell naturally and, indeed, necessarily within the scope of the
present volume. To exclude them because I had discussed them elsewhere
was impossible. Wherever I found I could improve the language previously
employed in the direction of greater lucidity and precision I have done
so to the best of my ability, so that the passages in question are close
paraphrases rather than mere transcripts of those which occur elsewhere.
But I have not attempted to disguise or weaken by paraphrase any
passages which still seemed to me to convey my meaning better than any
other words I could choose.
Changes in the methods, though not in the principles, of naval warfare
are in these days so rapid and often so sudden that one or two topics
have emerged into public prominence even since the present volume was in
type. I desire therefore to take this opportunity of adding a few
supplementary remarks on them. The first, and possibly in the long run
the most far-reaching of these topics, is that of aviation, which I have
only mentioned incidentally in the text. That aviation is still in its
infancy is a truism. But to forecast the scope and direction of its
evolution is as yet impossible. For the moment it may perhaps be said
that its offensive capacity--its capacity, that is, to determine or even
materially to affect the larger issues of naval warfare--is
inconsiderable. I say nothing of the future, whether immediate or
remote. Any day may witness developments which will give entirely new
aspects to the whole problem. In the meanwhile the chief functions of
aircraft in war will probably be, for some time to come, those of
scouting, observation, and the collection and transmission of
intelligence not obtainable by any other means. Offensive functions of a
more direct and formidable character will doubtless be developed in
time, and may be developed soon; but as I am no prophet I cannot attempt
to forecast the direction of the evolution, to determine its limits, or
to indicate its probable effects on the methods of naval warfare as
expounded in the following pages. I will, however, advance two
propositions which will not, I believe, be gainsaid by competent
authorities. They are true for the moment, though how long they may
remain true I do not know. One is that no aircraft yet constructed can
take or keep the air in all conditions of weather. The number of days in
the year in which it can do so in safety can only be represented by the
formula 365-_x_, in which _x_ is as yet an unknown quantity, though it
is no doubt a quantity which will diminish as the art of aviation is
developed. The other is that there is as yet no known method of
navigating an aircraft with accuracy and precision out of sight of land.
The air-currents by which it is affected are imperceptible to those
embarked, variable and indeterminate in their force and direction, and
quite incapable of being charted beforehand. In these conditions an
airman who sought to steer by compass alone, say, from Bermuda to New
York, might perchance find himself either at Halifax, on the one hand,
or at Charleston on the other.
In my chapter on "Invasion" no mention is made of those subsidiary forms
of military enterprise across the sea which are known as raids. I have
treated invasion as an enterprise having for its object the subjugation
of the country invaded, or at least the subjection of its people and
their rulers to the enemy's will. As such it requires a force
commensurate in numbers with the object to be attained, and it stands to
reason that this force must needs be so large that its chances of
evading the vigilance of an enemy who is in effective command of the sea
must always be infinitesimal. A raid, on the other hand, is an
enterprise of much lesser magnitude and much smaller moment. Its method
is to elude the enemy's naval guard at this or that point of his
territory; and, having done so, its purpose is to land troops at some
vulnerable point of the territory assailed, there to create alarm and
confusion and to do as much harm as they can--which may be considerable
before their sea communications are severed by the defending naval force
assumed to be still in effective command of the sea affected. If that
command is maintained, the troops engaged in the raid must inevitably be
reduced sooner or later to the condition of a forlorn hope which has
failed. If, on the other hand, that command is overthrown, then the
troops aforesaid may prove to be the advanced guard of an invasion to
follow. Thus, although a successful raid may sometimes be carried out in
the teeth of an adverse command of the sea, yet it cannot be converted
into an invasion until that adverse command has been assailed and
overthrown. It is thus essentially fugitive in character, possibly very
effective as a diversion, certain to be mortifying to the belligerent
assailed, and not at all unlikely to cause him much injury and even more
alarm, but quite incapable of deciding the larger issues of the conflict
so long as his command of the sea remains unchallenged. It is perhaps
expedient to say this much on the subject, because the programme of the
Naval Manoeuvres of this year is known to have included a series of
raids of this fugitive character. Whether, or to what extent, any of
these operations were adjudged to have been successful I do not know. I
am only concerned to point out that, whether successful or not, their
utmost success can throw little or no light on the problem of invasion
unless in the course of the same operations the defenders' command of
the sea was adjudged to have been overthrown.
In my chapter on "The Differentiation of Naval Force" I endeavoured to
define the functions of the so-called "battle-cruiser" and to forecast
its special uses in war. At the same time I pointed out that "it is held
by some high authorities that the battle-cruiser is in very truth a
hybrid and an anomaly, and that no adequate reason for its existence can
be given." It would appear that the views of these high authorities have
now been adopted, in some measure at least, by the Admiralty. Since the
chapter in question was in type it has been officially announced that
the battle-cruiser has been placed in temporary, and perhaps permanent,
abeyance. Its place is to be taken by a special type of fast battleship,
vessels in every way fit to lie in a line and yet, at the same time,
endowed with qualities which, without unduly increasing their size and
displacement, will enable them to discharge the special functions which
I assigned to the battle-cruiser in the line of battle. This is done by
employing oil instead of coal as the source of the ship's motive power.
The change thus adumbrated would seem to be in the natural order of
evolution, and at the same time to be in large measure one rather of
nomenclature than of substance. The battle-cruiser, as its name implies,
is itself essentially a fast battleship in one aspect and an exceedingly
powerful cruiser in another. In the fast battleship which is to replace
it, the battle function will be still further developed at the expense
of the cruiser function. But its speed will still qualify it to be
employed as a cruiser whenever occasion serves or necessity requires,
just as the battle-cruiser was qualified to lie in a line and do its
special work in a fleet action. The main difference is that the fast
battleship is much less likely to be employed as a cruiser than the
battle-cruiser was; but I pointed out in the text that the employment
even of the battle-cruiser in cruiser functions proper was likely to be
only occasional and subsidiary.
The decision to use oil as the exclusive source of the motive power of
fast battleships, and of certain types of small cruisers of exceptional
speed, is undoubtedly a very significant one. It may be taken to point
to a time when oil only will be employed in the propulsion of warships
and coal will be discarded altogether. But that consummation can only be
reached when the internal combustion engine has been much more highly
developed for purposes of marine propulsion than it is at present. At
present oil is only employed in large warships for the purpose of
producing steam by the external combustion of the oil. But it may be
anticipated that a process of evolution, now in its initial stages in
the Diesel and other internal combustion engines, will in course of time
result in the production of an internal combustion engine capable of
propelling the largest ships at any speed that is now attainable by
existing methods. When that stage is reached oil will, for economic
reasons alone, undoubtedly hold the field for all purposes of propulsion
in warships. It is held by some that this country will then be placed at
a great disadvantage, inasmuch as it possesses a monopoly of the best
steam coal, whereas it has no monopoly of oil at all, and probably no
sufficient domestic supply of it to meet the needs of the Fleet in time
of war. But oil can be stored as easily as coal and, unlike coal, it
does not deteriorate in storage. To bring it in sufficient supplies from
abroad in time of war should be no more difficult for a Power which
commands the sea than to bring in the supplies of food and raw material
on which this country depends at all times for its very existence.
Moreover, even if we continued to depend on coal alone, that coal,
together with other supplies in large quantities, must, as I have shown
in my last chapter, be carried across the seas in a continuous stream
to our fleets in distant waters, and one of the great advantages of oil
over coal is that it can be transferred with the greatest ease to the
warships requiring it at any rendezvous on the high seas, whether in
home waters or at the uttermost ends of the globe, which may be most
conveniently situated for the conduct of the operations in hand. For
these reasons I hold that no serious apprehension need be entertained
lest the supply of oil to our warships should fail so long as we hold
the command of the sea. If ever we lost the command of the sea we should
not be worrying about the supply of oil. Oil or no oil, we should be
starving, destitute and defenceless.
It only remains for me to express my gratitude to my friend Sir Charles
Ottley, not merely for an Introduction in which I cannot but fear that
he has allowed his friendship to get the better of his judgment, but
also for his kindness in devoting so much of his scanty leisure to the
reading of my proofs and the making of many valuable suggestions
thereon. I have also to thank my friend Captain Herbert W. Richmond,
R.N., for his unselfish kindness in allowing me to make use of his notes
on the Dunkirk campaign which he has closely studied in the original
papers preserved at the Admiralty and the Record Office. To my son,
Lieutenant H.G. Thursfield, R.N., I am also indebted for many valuable
suggestions. Finally, my acknowledgments are due to the Editors of this
series and the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for their
uniform courtesy and consideration.
J.R.T.
_4th September 1913._
NAVAL WARFARE
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
War is the armed conflict of national wills, an appeal to force as
between nation and nation. Naval warfare is that part of the conflict
which takes place on the seas. The civilized world is divided into
separate, independent States or nations, each sovereign within its own
borders. Each State pursues its own ideas and aims and embodies them in
a national policy; and so far as this policy affects only its own
citizens, it is subject to no control except that of the national
conscience and the national sense of the public welfare. Within the
State itself civil war may arise when internal dissensions divide the
nation into two parties, of which either pursues a policy to which the
other refuses to submit. In this case, unless the two parties agree to
separate without conflict, as was done by Sweden and Norway a few years
ago, an armed conflict ensues and the nation is divided into two
belligerent States which may or may not become, according to the
fortune of war, separate, independent, and sovereign in the end. The
great example of this in our own time was the War of Secession in
America, which, happily for both parties, ended without disruption, in
the surrender of the weaker of the two, and after a time in a complete
reconciliation between them.
Thus war may arise between two parties in a single State, and when it
does the two parties become, to all intents and purposes, separate,
independent, and sovereign States for the time being, and are, for the
most part, so regarded and treated by other independent States not
taking part in the conflict. For this reason, though the origin of a
civil war may differ widely in all its circumstances and conditions from
that of a war between two separate States, sovereign and independent _ab
initio_, yet as soon as a state of war is established, as distinct from
that of a puny revolt or a petty rebellion, there is, for a student of
war, no practical difference between a civil war and any other kind of
war. Both fall under the definition of war as the armed conflict of
national wills.
Between two separate, sovereign, independent nations a state of war
arises in this wise. We have seen that the internal policy of an
independent State is subject to no direct external control. But States
do not exist in isolation. Their citizens trade with the citizens of
other States, seeking to exchange the products of their respective
industries to the advantage of both. As they grow in prosperity, wealth,
and population, their capital seeks employment in other lands, and their
surplus population seeks an outlet in such regions of the earth as are
open to their occupation. Thus arise external relations between one
State and another, and the interests affected by these relations are
often found--and perhaps still more often believed--by one State to be
at variance with those of another. In pursuit of these interests--which,
as they grow and expand, become embodied in great consolidated kingdoms,
great colonial empires, or great imperial dependencies, and tend to be
regarded in time as paramount to all other national interests--each
State formulates and pursues an external policy of its own which may or
may not be capable of amicable adjustment to the policy of other States
engaged in similar enterprises. It is the function of diplomacy to
effect adjustments such as these where it can. It succeeds much more
often than it fails. Conflicting policies are deflected by mutual
agreement and concession so as to avoid the risk of collision, and each
State, without abandoning its policy, modifies it and adjusts it to the
exigencies of the occasion. Sometimes, however, diplomacy fails, either
because the conflicting policies are really irreconcilable, or because
passion, prejudice, national ambition, or international misunderstanding
induces the citizens of both States and their rulers so to regard them.
In that case, if neither State is prepared so to deflect its policy as
to avert collision, war ensues. The policy remains unchanged, but the
means of further pursuing it, otherwise than by an appeal to force, are
exhausted. War is thus, according to the famous definition of
Clausewitz, the pursuit of national policy by other means than those
which mere diplomacy has at its command--in other words by the conflict
of armed force. Each State now seeks to bend its enemy's will to its own
and to impose its policy upon him.
The means of pursuing this policy vary almost indefinitely. But inasmuch
as war is essentially the conflict of armed force, the primary object of
each belligerent must in all cases be to subdue, and, in the last
resort, to destroy the armed forces of the adversary. When that is done
all is done that war can do. How to do this most speedily and most
effectively is the fundamental problem of war. There is no cut-and-dried
solution of the problem, because although war may be considered, as it
has been considered above, in the abstract, it is the most concrete of
all human arts and, subject to the fundamental principle above
enunciated, its particular forms may, and indeed must, vary with the
circumstances and conditions of each particular war. Many commentators
on war distinguishing, with Clausewitz, between "limited" and
"unlimited" war, would further insist that the forms of war must vary
with its objects. I cannot follow this distinction, which seems to me to
be inconsistent with the fundamental proposition of Clausewitz, to the
effect that war is the pursuit of policy by means of the conflict of
armed force. If you desire your policy to prevail you must take the best
means that are open to you to make it prevail. It is worse than useless
to dissipate your energies in the pursuit of any purpose, however
important in itself, which does not directly conduce, and conduce better
than any other purpose you could pursue, to that paramount end. The only
limitation of your efforts that you can tolerate is that they should
involve the least expenditure of energy that may be necessary to make
your policy prevail. But that is a question of the economics of war; it
is not a question of "limited war" or of "war for a limited object."
Your sole object is to bend the enemy to your will. That object is
essentially an unlimited one, or one that is limited only by the extent
of the efforts which the enemy makes to withstand you. The only sure way
of attaining this object is to destroy his armed forces. If he submits
before this is done it is he that limits the war, not you. Bacon's
unimpeachable maxim in this regard is often misinterpreted. "This much
is certain," he says, "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and
may take as much or as little of the war as he will." That is
indisputable, but its postulate is that the belligerent has secured the
command of the sea; that is, as I shall show hereafter, that he has
subdued, if not destroyed, the armed forces of the enemy afloat. Having
done that he may, in a certain sense, take as much or as little of the
war as he chooses; but he must always take as much as will compel the
enemy to come to terms.
Naval warfare is no essential part of the armed conflict between
contending States. In some cases it exercises a decisive influence on
the conduct and issue of the conflict, in others none at all or next to
none. But sea power, that is, the advantage which a nation at war
derives from its superiority at sea, may largely affect the issue of a
war, even though no naval engagements of any moment may take place. In
the Crimean War the unchallenged supremacy of England and France on the
seas alone made it possible for the Allies to invade the Crimea and
undertake the siege of Sebastopol; while the naval campaigns of the
Allies in the Baltic, although they resulted in no decisive naval
operation, yet largely contributed to the success of the Allied arms in
the Crimea by compelling Russia to keep in the north large bodies of
troops which might otherwise have turned the scale against the Allies in
the South. In the War of 1859, between France and Austria, with the
Sardinian kingdom allied to the former, the superiority of the Allies at
sea enabled considerable portions of the French army to be transported
from French to Piedmontese ports, and by threatening the flank of the
Austrian line of advance, it accelerated the concentration of the Allies
on the Ticino. It also enabled the Allies to maintain a close blockade
of the Austrian ports in the Adriatic, and might have led to an attack
from the sea on the Austrian rear in Venetia had not the military
reverses of Austria in Lombardy brought the war to an end. In the War of
Secession in America the issue was largely determined, or at least
accelerated, by the close but not impenetrable blockade established by
the North over the ports and coasts of the South, and by the
co-operation of Farragut on the Mississippi with the Federal land forces
in that region. On the other hand, in the War of 1866 there was no naval
conflict worth mentioning between Austria and Prussia, because Prussia
had no navy to speak of; but as Italy, a naval Power, was the ally of
Prussia, and as Austria had a small but very efficient naval force led
by a great naval commander, the conflict between these two Powers led
to the Battle of Lissa, in which the Italian fleet was decisively
defeated, though the triumph of Prussia over the armies of Austria saved
Italy from the worst consequences of defeat, and indeed obtained for
her, in spite of her military reverses on land, the coveted possession
of Venetia. In the War of 1870 again, although the supremacy of France
on the seas was never seriously challenged by Prussia, yet her collapse
on land was so sudden and complete that her superiority at sea availed
her little or nothing. The maritime trade of Prussia was annihilated for
the time, but it was then too insignificant a factor in the economic
fabric of Prussia for its destruction to count for much, and the fleets
of France rode triumphant in the North Sea and the Baltic; but finding
no ships to fight, having no troops to land, and giving a wide berth to
fortifications with which they were ill-equipped--as ships always are
and always must be--to contend without support from the military arm,
their presence was little more than an idle and futile demonstration. In
the Boer War the influence of England's unchallenged supremacy at sea,
albeit latent, was decisive. The Boers had no naval force of any kind;
but no nation not secure in its dominion of the seas could have
undertaken such a war as England then had to wage, and it was perhaps
only the paramount sea power of this country that prevented the
conflict taking a form and assuming dimensions that would have taxed
British endurance to the uttermost and must almost certainly have
entailed the loss of South Africa to the Empire. Certain naval features
of the Cuban War between Spain and the United States, and of the War in
the Far East between Russia and Japan, will be more conveniently
considered in subsequent chapters of this manual.
The normal correlation and interdependence of naval and military forces
in the armed conflict of national wills is sufficiently illustrated by
the foregoing examples. In certain abnormal and exceptional cases each
can act and produce the desired effect without the other. In a few
extreme cases it is hard to see how either could act at all. If, for
instance, Spain and Switzerland were to fall out, how could either
attack the other? They have no common frontier, and though Spain has a
navy, Switzerland has no seaboard. Cases where naval conflict alone has
decided the issue are those of the early wars between England and
Holland. Neither could reach the other except across the sea, there was
no territorial issue directly involved, and the object of both
combatants was to secure a monopoly of maritime commerce. But as
territorial issues, and territorial issues involving the sea and
affected by it directly or indirectly, are nearly always at stake in
great wars, history affords few examples of great international
conflicts in which sea power does not enter as a factor, often of
supreme importance.
It must of course enter as a factor of paramount importance in any war
between an insular State and a continental one--as in the war between
Russia and Japan--or between two continental States which--as in the war
between Spain and the United States--have no common frontier on land.
War being the armed conflict of national wills, it is manifest that the
opposing wills cannot in cases such as these be brought into armed
conflict unless one State or the other is in a position to operate on
the sea. The first move in such a conflict must of necessity be made, by
one belligerent or the other, on the sea. This involves the conception
of "the command of the sea," and as this is the fundamental conception
of naval warfare as such, our analysis of naval warfare must begin with
an exposition of what is meant by the command of the sea.