THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864.
The Republican reverses of the fall of 1862 were not repeated in 1863.
Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the anti-draft riots in New York, and the
formal acceptance of Vallandigham as a trusted party leader by the
Democracy stimulated and strengthened the Union spirit of the North,
and the State elections of that year were emphatic endorsements of
the party of freedom and of its policy. The political verdicts of
the spring of 1864 were equally gratifying to the friends of liberty
and the advocates of a vigorous prosecution of the war, and, with
the accession of General Grant to the command of the Union armies
and his "advance all along the line," it became evident that nothing
but discord among the Republicans could deprive them of a sweeping
victory in the presidential election. The masses of that party were
unequivocally in favor of Mr. Lincoln's renomination; the common people
saw one of themselves in the White House and fully met his firm trust
in them with an answering confidence. But among men of influence within
the Republican ranks there was an exceedingly earnest opposition to
his second candidacy. Some of this sprang from rival aspirations;
more of it from disappointed office-seeking and from personal pique;
but there was outside and above such considerations a strong feeling,
entirely disinterested in origin and honorable in character, and held
by thousands of sincere men, that the President was unduly conservative
in policy and that a man of more aggressive temperament ought to be
elected in his stead. There were also not a few experienced politicians
who regarded the personal opposition to Mr. Lincoln as sufficiently
formidable to jeopard party success, and who were inclined to think
that the selection of some candidate who was not identified with the
existing Administration, and thus would not be compelled to defend
its acts, was demanded on the ground of superior "availability." The
anti-Lincoln wing of the party at that time included such men as
Mr. Chase and Mr. Greeley, was represented by many of the leading
newspapers, including the entire New York press except the _Times_,
and counted among its especially active members not a few of the most
earnest and devoted of the original Abolitionists.
In this chaotic condition of party sentiment a call appeared (in April,
1864) addressed "To the Radical Men of the Nation," and requesting them
to meet by representatives in convention at Cleveland, O., on May 31.
Those of its signers who were best known were B. Gratz Brown, Lucius
Robinson, John Cochrane, Frederick Douglass, Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
George B. Cheever, James Redpath, Wendell Phillips and Emil Pretorious.
Its tone will appear from this paragraph:
The imbecile and vacillating policy of the present Administration
in the conduct of the war, being just weak enough to waste its men
and means to provoke the enemy, but not strong enough to conquer
the rebellion--and its treachery to justice, freedom and genuine
democratic principles in its plan of reconstruction, whereby the
honor and dignity of the nation have been sacrificed to conciliate
the still-existing and arrogant slave power, and to further the
ends of unscrupulous partisan ambition--call in thunder tones upon
the lovers of justice and their country to come to the rescue of
the imperiled nationality and the cause of impartial and universal
freedom threatened with betrayal and overthrow.
The way to victory and salvation is plain. Justice must be throned
in the seats of national legislation, and guide the executive will.
The things demanded, and which we ask you to join us to render
sure, are the immediate extinction of slavery throughout the whole
United States by Congressional action, the absolute equality of
all men before the law without regard to race or color, and such a
plan of reconstruction as shall conform entirely to the policy of
freedom for all, placing the political power alone in the hands of
the loyal, and executing with vigor the law for confiscating the
property of the rebels.
This document was widely published, and the New York _Tribune_ in
advance approved the calling of this convention, although it did not in
the end support its action. The call was answered by about 350 persons
from fifteen States; while very few of them were men of more than
limited reputation, yet they made up a body representing widespread
convictions strongly and sincerely held. Ex-Governor W. F. Johnston
of Pennsylvania was the temporary and Gen. John Cochrane of New York
the permanent presiding officer of the convention. It nominated John
C. Fremont for President, and General Cochrane for Vice-President, and
adopted a platform exceedingly radical in terms, including declarations
in favor of unconditional emancipation, a one-term presidency, the
Monroe doctrine, and the wholesale confiscation of the property of the
rebels. Two letters were received by it which at the time produced a
strong impression. In one of them, Lucius Robinson, then Comptroller of
New York, severely condemned "a weak Executive and Cabinet," and urged
the nomination of General Grant, "a man who has displayed the qualities
which give all men confidence." In the second, Wendell Phillips
attacked a Republican administration with that polished invective which
had made him one of the most formidable assailants of the slave power.
He wrote:
For three years the Administration has lavished money without
stint and drenched the land in blood, and it has not yet
thoroughly and heartily struck at the slave system. Confessing
that the use of this means is indispensable, the Administration
has used it just enough to irritate the rebels and not enough to
save the state. In sixty days after the rebellion broke out the
Administration suspended _habeas corpus_ on the plea of military
necessity--justly. For three years it has poured out the treasure
and blood of the country like water. Meanwhile slavery was too
sacred to be used; that was saved lest the feelings of the rebels
should be hurt. The Administration weighed treasure, blood, and
civil liberty against slavery, and, up to the present moment, has
decided to exhaust them all before it uses freedom heartily as a
means of battle.... A quick and thorough reorganization of States
on a democratic basis--every man and race equal before the law--is
the only sure way to save the Union. I urge it, not for the black
man's sake alone, but for ours--for the nation's sake. Against
such recognition of the blacks Mr. Lincoln stands pledged by
prejudice and avowal. Men say, if we elect him he may change his
views. Possibly. But three years have been a long time for a man's
education in such hours as these. The nation cannot afford more. At
any rate the constitution gives this summer an opportunity to make
President a man fully educated. I prefer that course.
The Administration, therefore, I regard as a civil and military
failure, and its avowed policy ruinous to the North in every point
of view. Mr. Lincoln may wish the end--peace and freedom--but he
is wholly unwilling to use the means which can secure that end.
If Mr. Lincoln is re-elected I do not expect to see the Union
reconstructed in my day, unless on terms more disastrous to liberty
than even disunion would be. If I turn to General Fremont, I see a
man whose first act would be to use the freedom of the negro as his
weapon; I see one whose thorough loyally to democratic institutions
without regard to race, whose earnest and decisive character, whose
clear-sighted statesmanship and rare military ability justify my
confidence that in his hands all will be done to save the state
that foresight, skill, decision, and statesmanship can do.
Generals Fremont and Cochrane promptly accepted the nominations
thus tendered them. General Fremont resigned his commission in the
army before doing so, and in his letter of acceptance accused the
Administration of "incapacity and selfishness," of "managing the war
for personal ends," of giving to the country "the abuses of a military
dictation without its unity of action and vigor of execution," and of
"feebleness and want of principle" in its dealings with other powers.
He further vindicated the Cleveland action by declaring that, "if
Mr. Lincoln had remained faithful to the principles he was elected
to defend, no schism could have been created," and added: "If the
convention at Baltimore will nominate any man whose past life justifies
a well-grounded confidence in his fidelity to our cardinal principles,
there is no reason why there should be any division among the really
patriotic men of the country." There was a lack of any popular response
to this demonstration, and it at once appeared--and, in fact, this was
the sum of the original expectations of its shrewder promoters--that
this movement was only formidable as a rallying point for any serious
disaffection which might spring up in the future.
The "Union National" convention assembled at Baltimore on June 7,
with every State, except those still wholly in possession of the
rebels, represented upon its floor. It adopted a platform denouncing
any peace by compromise, endorsing the Administration, and demanding
the abolition of slavery by constitutional amendment. Abraham Lincoln
was renominated for the Presidency, receiving every vote save that of
the delegation of Missouri radicals who supported General Grant, and
Andrew Johnson was on the first ballot nominated for Vice-President as
the representative of the Union men of the South. The response of the
masses and the leading papers of the Republican organization to this
action was prompt and hearty; but, notwithstanding this encouraging
fact, the political horizon grew rapidly darker. General Grant was in
that summer fighting a series of bloody battles on and about the banks
of the James, whose immediate results were indecisive, the attendant
steady reduction of Lee's available force not being then apparent at
the North. In like manner, Sherman was forcing his way through the
mountainous regions between Chattanooga and Atlanta, winning no great
victories and losing thousands of men; the mortal effects of his blows
at the rebels are evident now, but could not be seen then. General
Early, in July, swept down the Shenandoah and over the Potomac, burning
Chambersburg and threatening the defenses of Washington, finally
making good his retreat. In the face of this military situation, so
encouraging to discontent and so calculated to invite criticism, the
premium on gold rose rapidly to its highest war point. This disastrous
depreciation of the paper money of the government was materially
helped by the unexpected resignation, on June 30, of Secretary of the
Treasury Salmon P. Chase. Differences of opinion as to some details
of department management were assigned as the cause of this step,
but its real origin was much deeper, and Mr. Chase's course was
universally ascribed, and was undoubtedly due, to lack of sympathy
with and confidence in the Administration. The effect of a change in
so important a position at such a critical moment was profound, and it
gave a powerful stimulus to Republican disaffection. This was followed
by the abortive peace negotiations at Niagara Falls with C. C. Clay, J.
P. Holcombe and G. N. Sanders. That this was a crafty scheme to place
the Administration in a false position before both the North and the
South cannot now be doubted. It failed to yield all that its projectors
hoped, but it did ensnare Mr. Greeley most disagreeably, and it had the
effect of furnishing the enemy with grounds for charging the President
with being "hostile to peace except on impossible conditions." It
also materially augmented the public restlessness and deepened the
vague apprehensions which naturally sprang from such exhibitions of
cross-purposes among the leaders of the national cause. Another event
followed which was of still graver moment:
The problem of the reconstruction of the Southern States after the
defeat of the rebel armies was from the outset surrounded with grave
difficulties, and the views held upon this subject by the ablest
Republicans were diverse and conflicting. Bills and resolutions
embodying various theories of reconstruction were presented in
Congress early in the war, but nothing was done with them, and no
definite policy was fixed by enactment or even determined upon in
private consultations. On Dec. 8, 1863, and in connection with the
transmission to Congress of his third annual message, Mr. Lincoln
issued a proclamation offering amnesty to all rebels (with a few
conspicuous exceptions) who should take an oath of loyalty, and
declaring that whenever, in any of the seceded States, persons to the
number of not less than one-tenth of the votes cast in such States at
the presidential election of 1860, having first taken and abided by the
prescribed oath, should re-establish a State government, republican in
form and recognizing the permanent freedom of the slaves, it should
"be recognized as the true government of the State." This plan Mr.
Lincoln explained and defended at length in the message, and under it
provisional governments were soon organized in Louisiana and Arkansas,
and application was made for the admission of their Senators and
Representatives to Congress. The President's action in this respect did
not receive congressional sanction and was not endorsed by the majority
of his supporters at the capitol. Many held that the subject was one
which was wholly within the control of the legislative branch of the
government, and that his proclamation was itself an unwarrantable
assumption of authority by the Executive. Others objected strenuously
to the "one-tenth clause," as oligarchical in tendency and certain to
leave the real advantages of position within easy reach of the disloyal
majority in any State thus reconstructed. As a rule those who opposed
Mr. Lincoln's scheme favored establishing provisional governments in
the South until there should spring up a loyal majority, which could be
safely trusted with political power. Congress, therefore, referred the
message and proclamation to special committees, refused to recognize
the Louisiana and Arkansas governments, and passed on the last day of
the session a reconstruction act differing radically in terms from the
President's plan. Its bill provided that provisional governors should
be appointed with the consent of the Senate, that an enrollment of
white male citizens should be made when armed resistance ceased in
any State, and that when a majority of the citizens so enrolled took
the oath of allegiance the loyal people should be entitled to elect
delegates to a convention to establish a State government; upon the
adoption of an anti-slavery constitution by such a convention it was
to be certified to the President, who, with the assent of Congress,
was to recognize the government thus established as "the lawful State
government." This measure the President defeated by withholding his
signature. On July 8, 1864, he issued a second proclamation upon the
subject, setting forth that he had not signed this bill because "less
than one hour" intervened between its passage and the adjournment of
Congress, and because he was not ready by its approval to be inexorably
committed to this or any other specific plan of reconstruction which
would set aside the _quasi_-governments of Louisiana and Arkansas and
thus repel their citizens from further efforts in the same direction.
He added that he was not yet prepared to admit the "constitutional
competency of Congress to abolish slavery in the States," although he
did earnestly desire that it should cease through the adoption of a
constitutional amendment. The proclamation closed by declaring that he
was satisfied with the terms of the bill, and by pledging the hearty
co-operation of the Executive with all who might avail themselves
of the method therein laid down to return to their places in the
Union. In response to this proclamation, which treated the process
of reconstruction as a matter of executive discretion merely, there
was published early in August a vigorously worded and cogently argued
manifesto, addressed "To the Supporters of the Government," and signed
by Senator Benjamin F. Wade and Representative Henry Winter Davis, as
chairmen of the committees of their respective houses upon the _status_
of the rebel States. This document commenced with the declaration that
its authors had "read without surprise, but not without indignation,"
the President's proclamation, and proceeded as follows:
The President, by preventing this bill from becoming a law, holds
the electoral votes of the rebel States at the dictation of his
personal ambition. If those votes turn the balance in his favor, is
it to be supposed that his competitor, defeated by such means, will
acquiesce? If the rebel majority assert their supremacy in those
States, and send votes which elect an enemy of the government,
will we not repel his claims? And is not that civil war for the
presidency inaugurated by the votes of rebel States? Seriously
impressed with these dangers, Congress, "the proper constitutional
authority," formally declared that there are no State governments
in the rebel States, and provided for their erection at a proper
time; and both the Senate and House of Representatives rejected
the Senators and Representatives chosen under the authority of
what the President calls the free constitution and government of
Arkansas. The President's proclamation "holds for naught" this
judgment, and discards the authority of the Supreme Court and
strides headlong toward the anarchy his proclamation of the 8th of
December inaugurated. If electors for President be allowed to be
chosen in either of those States, a sinister light will be cast
on the motives which induced the President to "hold for naught"
the will of Congress rather than his governments in Louisiana and
Arkansas. That judgment of Congress which the President defies was
the exercise of an authority exclusively vested in Congress by
the constitution to determine what is the established government
in a State, and in its own nature and by the highest of judicial
authority binding on all other departments of the government....
A more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people
has never been perpetrated. Congress passed a bill; the President
refused to approve it, and then by proclamation puts as much of
it in force as he sees fit, and proposes to execute those parts
by officers unknown to the laws of the United States and not
subject to the confirmation of the Senate! The bill directed the
appointment of provisional governors by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The President, after defeating such a law,
proposes to appoint without law, and without the advice and consent
of the Senate, military governors for the rebel States! He has
already exercised this dictatorial usurpation in Louisiana, and he
defeated the bill to prevent its limitation....
The President has greatly presumed on the forbearance which the
supporters of his administration have so long practiced, in view
of the arduous conflict in which we are engaged, and the reckless
ferocity of our political opponents. But he must understand that
our support is of a cause and not of a man; that the authority of
Congress is paramount and must be respected; and that the whole
body of the Union men of Congress will not submit to be impeached
by him of rash and unconstitutional legislation; and if he wishes
our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties--to
obey and execute, not make the laws--to suppress by arms armed
rebellion, and leave political reorganization to Congress.
If the supporters of the government fail to insist on this, they
become responsible for the usurpations which they fail to rebuke,
and are justly liable to the indignation of the people, whose
rights and security, committed to their keeping, they sacrifice.
Let them consider the remedy for these usurpations, and, having
found it, fearlessly execute it!
The damaging force of this attack was undoubted. Mr. Wade was a
veteran of the anti-slavery "Old Guard," and was known through the
North to be as sturdy, true and honest as he was "radical" in his
Republicanism. No man sat in the House who surpassed--but few men
then in public life equaled--Henry Winter Davis in mental vigor, in
brilliant accomplishments, and in moral fearlessness. Originally sent
to Congress by the Maryland "Americans," it was his vote which elected
Mr. Pennington to the Speakership in 1859; to the formal censure of
that act by his Legislature he replied by telling the men who voted
for it to take their message back to their masters, for only to their
masters, the people, would he reply. He made a magnificent fight
against secession in his State, and waged there a still more gallant
battle for emancipation, winning both. In the House he spoke always
with force, often with impassioned eloquence, and the Republican
ranks contained no champion more ardent in patriotism or more firmly
attached to the fundamental principles of Freedom. The formal uniting
of these two men, both able, influential and unquestionably sincere,
in strictures so severe upon the President, materially invigorated the
"radical" opposition to the Baltimore ticket, increased Republican
discouragement, and furnished the Opposition with additional ground
for accusing the President of the gross use of arbitrary power. The
series of events thus recapitulated naturally gave to the action of the
Cleveland convention a fresh importance, and by the fall of 1864 it had
become a factor of moment in the political calculations of the year.
Greatly encouraged by the evident demoralization of the dominant
party, the Democrats held their national convention at Chicago on
August 29. Its platform in effect declared the war "a failure," and
its ticket consisted of George B. McClellan, representing war without
vigor, and George H. Pendleton, representing peace by compromise. The
most conspicuous figure on its floor was Clement L. Vallandigham, a
banished traitor _posing_ as a martyr, and the sedition which was
thinly disguised in its deliberations was boldly shouted to cheering
mobs about its hall and in front of the great hotels which its
delegates thronged. The character and action of this body made clear
the issues of 1864; in Mr. Seward's apt language, the people were
called upon to decide whether they would have "McClellan and Disunion
or Lincoln and Union." To make the latter the accepted alternative was
impossible without complete Republican harmony, and to restore that
fully and promptly was plainly a matter of the first importance. This
task was undertaken by Mr. Chandler, whose relations with all parties
peculiarly fitted him for the work. He was a pronounced "radical," and
had steadfastly opposed many features of Mr. Lincoln's policy;[31] but
honest disagreement of opinion had not impaired his full confidence
in the man, and that firm grasp upon the practical aspects of all
political questions, which was one of his marked characteristics then
as always, prevented him from putting in jeopardy essentials by unduly
magnifying differences as to details. To the wisdom of renominating
Mr. Lincoln he assented, and his election he believed necessary to the
preservation of the government. With Mr. Wade he was on terms of the
closest intimacy; both Mr. Davis and General Fremont were his personal
friends; and his record and public attitude gave him a claim upon
the attention of the "radicals" everywhere. His qualifications as a
mediator were thus numerous and apparent, and were rounded out by his
political experience and sagacity.
Mr. Chandler commenced work by visiting Mr. Wade at his home in Ohio,
being accompanied thither by his intimate friend and adviser, the Hon.
George Jerome of Detroit. The Ohio senator's vigorous common sense was
Mr. Chandler's ally in the long interview that followed, and it only
required a thorough review of the situation to convince him that, if
Lincoln was defeated, the Union cause, and not an individual, would
be the sufferer. Mr. Wade, however, urged that Mr. Lincoln himself
should make some sacrifices of opinion and preference in the face of
the common danger, that the "radical" element of the Republicans was
entitled to more considerate treatment at his hands, and that, at
least, his Cabinet, which was wholly within his control, should not
contain men who were obnoxious to the stanchest members of his own
party. Mr. Wade then denounced in the strongest terms the presence
in and influence upon the Administration of Montgomery Blair, whom
he believed to be at heart a Democrat. Later years have shown how
well-grounded were the doubts then felt of Mr. Blair's political
trustworthiness, doubts which were, even in 1864, general and strong
enough to lead the Baltimore convention to declare in its platform
that it regarded "as worthy of public confidence and official trust
only those who cordially endorsed" its principles. Mr. Wade readily
agreed, as the result of this conference, to pursue any course that
should command the approval of his associate in the manifesto, and Mr.
Chandler left him to visit Mr. Lincoln at Washington and Henry Winter
Davis at Baltimore. He obtained from the President what were practical
assurances that Mr. Blair should not be retained in the Cabinet in the
face of such strong opposition if harmony would follow his removal. Mr.
Davis promptly recognized the logic of the situation, and expressed his
willingness to accept Blair's displacement as an olive branch and give
his earnest support to the Baltimore ticket.
Mr. Chandler next proceeded to New York, and opened negotiations there
with the managers of the Fremont movement. He had expected Mr. Wade to
join him, but was disappointed in this; he met at the Astor House the
Hon. David II. Jerome of Saginaw and the Hon. Ebenezer O. Grosvenor of
Jonesville, with whom he frequently counseled, and he also obtained the
assistance of George Wilkes of the _Spirit of the Times_. Mr. Wilkes
was well known as the master of a pure and vigorous English, and no war
correspondent equaled him in accurate, lucid and graphic descriptions
of important movements and famous battles. The public, however, did
not know the extent of his political ability, of his skill in affairs
and of his patriotic energy, and these qualities proved of the highest
usefulness to Mr. Chandler in the completion of his delicate mission.
Without the aid so intelligently and zealously rendered by Mr. Wilkes,
Mr. Chandler doubted whether complete success would have been possible.
The negotiations were protracted for some days, but ultimately the
leaders of the Fremont organization agreed that, if Mr. Blair (whom
General Fremont regarded as a bitter enemy) left the Cabinet and all
other sources of Republican opposition to the Baltimore nominees were
removed, the Cleveland ticket should be formally withdrawn from the
field. While these conferences were in progress Mr. Chandler learned
that the editor of one of the influential evening papers of New York,
who had originally doubted the propriety of Mr. Lincoln's renomination,
had concluded that his election was not possible and had prepared "a
leader" urging his withdrawal, the holding of a second convention, and
Republican union upon either General Fremont or some other candidate
who could command the solid party support. It was not until the day
of the intended publication of the article and after it was in type
that Mr. Chandler learned of its existence, and then by instant and
earnest efforts he obtained its withholding until the result of
his labors could be known. Ultimately all obstacles yielded to his
persistence and skill, and he started for the capital to inform Mr.
Lincoln of the close of the negotiations and to ask the fulfillment of
the assurances concerning Mr. Blair's removal. On reaching Washington
he went instantly to the White House, was admitted to an immediate
private interview with the President in preference to a great throng
of visitors, and reported in detail the successful result of his
labors. On the day of this call upon Mr. Lincoln (Sept. 22, 1864) the
newspapers published General Fremont's letter withdrawing his name as a
presidential candidate. In it he said:
The presidential contest has in effect been entered upon in such a
way that the union of the Republican party has become a paramount
necessity. The policy of the Democratic party signifies either
separation or re-establishment with slavery. The Chicago platform
is simply separation. General McClellan's letter of acceptance is
re-establishment with slavery. The Republican candidate is, on the
contrary, pledged to the re-establishment of the Union _without_
slavery, and, however hesitating his policy may be, the pressure of
his party will, we may hope, force him to it. Between these issues
I think that no man of the Liberal party can remain in doubt. I
believe I am consistent with my antecedents and my principles in
withdrawing--- not to aid in the triumph of Mr. Lincoln, but to do
my part toward preventing the election of the Democratic candidate.
In respect to Mr. Lincoln, I continue to hold exactly the
sentiments contained in my letter of acceptance. I consider that
his administration has been politically, militarily and financially
a failure, and that its necessary continuance is a cause of regret
to the country.
On the following day this correspondence took place:
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Sept. 23, 1864.
_Hon. Montgomery Blair._
MY DEAR SIR: You have generously said to me more than once that,
whenever your resignation could be a relief to me, it was at my
disposal. That time has come. You very well know that this proceeds
from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally or officially.
Your uniform kindness has been unsurpassed by that of any friend,
and while it is true that the war does not seem greatly to add to
the difficulties of your department, as to those of some others, it
is not too much to say, which I most truly can, that in the three
years and a half during which you have administered the general
postoffice I remember no single complaint against you in connection
therewith. Yours as ever,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
POSTOFFICE DEPARTMENT, Sept. 23, 1864.
MY DEAR SIR: I have received your note of this date referring to
my offer to resign whenever you would deem it advisable for the
public interest that I should do so, and stating that in your
judgment that time has come. I now, therefore, formally tender my
resignation of the office of Postmaster-General.
I cannot take leave of you without renewing the expression of my
gratitude for the uniform kindness which has marked your course
toward me.
Yours truly,
M. BLAIR.
_To the President._
Mr. Blair's resignation was accepted by the majority of Republicans
throughout the North as a "cleansing of the Cabinet,"[32] and party
lines were at once re-formed. The "radicals" became earnest supporters
of the Baltimore ticket, no Republican demand for a new nomination or a
second convention appeared, Mr. Davis ceased his trenchant criticisms,
and Mr. Wade took the stump and made a series of exceedingly effective
speeches in Ohio and Pennsylvania. Military success also came with its
powerful help. General Sherman crowned his campaign by the capture of
Atlanta, General Grant drew the coils of "the anaconda" daily tighter
about the rebel capital, and General Sheridan fairly "swept" Early from
the valley of the Shenandoah. The results of the September elections
had been dubious in significance, but those of October were decisive
Republican victories and preceded an overwhelming triumph in November.
Mr. Chandler (who had in 1863 taken an active share in the campaigns in
New York and Illinois,[33] Michigan not holding any general election
in that year) returned from his labors of mediation to his own State
and spoke to almost daily mass-meetings in its chief towns throughout
the month of October. Michigan gave to the Lincoln electors a majority
of 16,917, and sent only Republicans to the Thirty-ninth Congress. Mr.
Chandler's contribution to this result was not unimportant, but it
was of meagre value compared with his labors upon a broader field in
healing grave dissensions and in quietly removing a cause of danger
which was deeply founded, and which, although now almost forgotten, was
then of no slight actual proportions and of very serious possibilities.
It was characteristic of the man that this self-prompted and successful
service, one of the greatest he ever rendered to Republicanism, was
rarely mentioned by him afterward, and never as if it was more than
was due to the cause of his political faith nor as if it gave him any
especial claim upon the party gratitude.
FOOTNOTES:
[31] Mr. Chandler explained the ground of his opposition to the ten
per cent. loyal basis plan of reconstruction proposed by Mr. Lincoln
for the admission of Louisiana and Arkansas. There were not more
than seven or eight members of the Senate with him at the beginning
of the session on that question, although there was a large majority
before its close. The Democrats did not believe in this ten per cent.
doctrine, and they voted with those who did not believe in admitting
those States without guarantees. This admission was finally prevented
by a night of filibustering. Only six Republicans remained and voted
during that night. The result, however, proved that those six men were
right, and that Mr. Lincoln and the others were wrong. If Louisiana and
Arkansas had been admitted, then we would have been compelled to admit
all the other States in the same way, and to-day we would have eleven
rebel States in the Union. Those two States, Louisiana and Arkansas,
had become the most intensely rebel of all the States that were in
rebellion.--_Report of his speech, before the Republican caucus at
Lansing on Jan. 6, 1869._
[32] Mr. Greeley's comment in the New York "Tribune" was: "Precisely
why Mr. Lincoln thought this action called for at this moment, rather
than at any other time in the last four months, we are not told." This
chapter shows that Mr. Chandler could have "told" him.
[33] If the North had been a unit the rebellion would long ago have
been crushed. But the rebels found out we were not a unit at any time,
so they persevered, so they invaded Pennsylvania, so they hoped to take
Washington, and to raise insurrection all over the land. The only hope
of the South to-day is in the traitors of the North.... They will fail
in the contest. Instead of having established a slave empire they will
have, by their own acts, destroyed all the securities that slavery
ever possessed. They will have swept away all the compromises by which
slavery has been tolerated by a forbearing people.--_Senator Chandler
at Springfield, Ill., on Sept. 7, 1863._