To sum up:—these arguments, if not pressed to the full as to

Transcribed from the 1868 Church Press Company (Limited) edition by David

Price, email ccx074@pglaf.org

REMARKS

UPON THE

FIRST REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON RITUAL,

IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTEGRITY OF THE

BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER.

* * * * *

A Lecture

DELIVERED AT THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BRIGHTON BRANCH

OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH UNION, NOV. 27, 1867,

(F. BARCHARD, ESQ. IN THE CHAIR,)

BY

THE REV. M. W. MAYOW, M. A.

INCUMBENT OF ST. MARY’S, WEST BROMPTON,

AND LATE STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.

* * * * *

CHURCH PRESS COMPANY (LIMITED),

13, BURLEIGH STREET, STRAND, LONDON,

AND G. WAKELING, ROYAL LIBRARY, BRIGHTON.

1868.

* * * * *

It is right to state that the Brighton Branch of the English Church Union

kindly requested leave to publish the following Lecture. It may be well

to add that it was likewise delivered at Bradford and Leeds.

* * * * *

REMARKS UPON THE FIRST REPORT OF THE

ROYAL COMMISSION ON RITUAL, ETC.

THE Executive of the Brighton Branch of the English Church Union, through

you, sir, their Chairman, have, too rashly, I fear, as well as too

kindly, supposed that I might have something to say upon the above

subject which may repay this assemblage of Churchmen for their trouble in

coming here this evening. It is certainly not for me to say you have

deluded them, but rather, without wasting time in apology, to do my best

to save (if it may be so) your credit and my own; and, what is of more

consequence, to throw some light upon the very important matter to which

my remarks are to be directed. At any rate, the great importance of the

subject itself and the imminent likelihood of some action being taken to

disarrange or subvert the present standing of the Church of England by an

alteration in her Book of Common Prayer will ensure your deep interest,

and, I do not doubt, secure me an indulgent hearing; whilst the very

large and influential, and,—I think it will be on all hands allowed,—most

successful meeting held last week in London, gives an additional reason

for strengthening, if it may be so, the action then taken by diffusing as

widely as possible information as to the dangers apprehended, and the

means of resistance to be used in order to preserve its integrity.

It is a trite saying just now that there is a great crisis in Church

affairs; but I think it must be allowed to be not less true than trite,

even after making all allowance for the magnitude with which the time

present always invests things present. In secular and material warfare

it may be that sometimes an underrating difficulties, a blindness to the

peril, is the very cause and means of safety or success. But in assaults

like the present, where the battle-field is the Law and Order of the

Church, where the contest is carried on not with sword or spear, but with

the keen weapons of intellectual and moral contention, where very much

turns and must turn upon the enlistment of public opinion upon this side

or that; where prejudice, and ridicule, and sneer, and scoff, appealing

constantly to the irreverence and perverseness of the evil side of human

nature, backed up in large measure, as might be expected, by a licentious

and unbelieving press, adapting itself to a licentious and unbelieving

age; where these things are the daily engines of assault, there would

seem to be no safety in shutting our eyes to the danger, merely hoping

that all “will come some strange way right at last.” Especially when the

assault is made upon doctrine, either directly or indirectly, (for if it

be upon ceremonial representing doctrine it is indirectly upon doctrine

itself,) when it takes the form of assault upon the integrity of the

Prayer Book, and the Catholic _status_ of the Church of England in

connection with it, we must be wise, and wary, and far-seeing to the

utmost of our vision, if we would duly organize our defence and fight

_well_ the battle for God’s Church and Gods Truth. We must indeed try

not to exaggerate anything, but we must also endeavour not to underrate

any real danger which exists, and especially not suffer our citadel to be

undermined, whilst we are merely regarding a plausible or fair surface.

There seems, too, to be a peculiar and apt propriety in this term crisis,

as applied to the present aspect of Church affairs. It is not merely

that there is a great _danger_, but a danger coming to a head, which, if

happily now overcome, will again subside. Johnson gives as the first

sense of crisis, “The point in which the disease kills or changes to the

better;” and, as the second, “The point of time at which any affair comes

to the height,” according to the exact use of the word by Dryden:—

Now is the very _crisis_ of your fate,

And all the colour of your life depends

On this important Now.

And we may well believe that if the present dangers which beset the

Church of England be overcome, God may have in store for her a very

glorious future indeed, even to her being a great instrument in His hand,

not merely for the spreading His Kingdom here at home, but also (may He

in mercy grant it) for the restoration of the Unity of Christendom, and

thereby for the Evangelization of the world. As our hopes of this must,

however, depend upon her being able to maintain her Catholicity, so must

we watch with the most jealous care, and resist with the firmest

constancy all which shall impair, her maintenance of Catholic truth and

that position which God of His mercy has hitherto permitted her to hold.

One great means of her maintaining this position is the maintaining

untouched her Book of Common Prayer, and therefore there is and must be

need of the most careful watchfulness as to every threatening of assault

upon it.

Now I affirm without hesitation that the first Report of the Royal

Commission, appointed, to use its own terms, “to enquire into the

Rubrics, Orders, and Directions for regulating the course and conduct of

public worship, &c., &c., according to the use of the United Church of

England and Ireland,” threatens, and even leads, such an assault. And

this gives the connection of the two parts of my subject as announced to

you in the title of this Lecture.

As to this threatening or assault contained in the Report, take a witness

the most unexceptionable perhaps of any who may be found anywhere, and

one whose testimony is only the more convincing as to the danger because

he himself does not see it at all, so that it is impossible to suppose

him to be straining anything to make a case. Nay, he does not consider

what he himself suggests or advocates as a measure carrying out the

recommendations of the Report, or as a means to remedy certain

embarrassments, to be an alteration in the Prayer Book at all. In his

recent Charge, the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol (himself one of the

Commissioners), after considering and dismissing as useless or dangerous,

or otherwise inadmissible, several other plans, recommends this:—“A

simple and positive enactment declaring what shall be, and be considered

to be, the ministerial dress, until further order be taken concerning the

same by lawful authority.” And he adds;—“This of course must be by

direct legislation. We may shrink from it,” he continues, “but in my

judgment it is now inevitable. The very appointment of the Commission

seems to involve it, and the general temper of the country will demand

it.” {6} If the Bishop’s witness is that the mere appointment of the

Commission seems to involve a legislative measure touching the Prayer

Book, how much more does its Report—leading even such a man as the Bishop

on to advocate it—shew that here is _more_ than a threatening of assault

upon it!

Perhaps we shall have something by and by to add upon the views and

recommendations of the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol’s Charge. At

present I merely cite this passage as an evidence that the appointment

and work of the Royal Commission tend directly to an alteration in the

Book of Common Prayer, because such an enactment as is here contemplated

would be, I must venture to affirm, whatever his lordship may suppose, a

repeal of the Rubric on Ornaments as it stands, and has stood since the

last revision. To this, however, I shall have occasion to refer again in

the sequel.

But now let us turn for a little while to the Report itself, as issued by

the Commissioners on the nineteenth of August, 1867. After reciting the

matters for enquiry contained in their appointment, the Commissioners

say:—“We, your Majesty’s Commissioners, have, in accordance with the

terms of your Majesty’s Commission, directed our first attention to the

question of the vestments worn by the ministers of the said United Church

at the time of their ministration, and especially to those the use of

which has been lately introduced into certain churches.” They

proceed:—“We find that whilst these vestments are regarded by some

witnesses as symbolical of doctrine, and by others as a distinctive

vesture whereby they desire to do honour to the Holy Communion as the

highest act of Christian worship, they are _by none regarded as

essential_, _and they give grave offence to many_.”

From this premiss they arrive at the following conclusion:—“We are of

opinion that it is expedient to restrain in the public Services of the

United Church of England and Ireland _all variations_ in respect of

vesture from that which has long been the established usage of the said

United Church; and we think that this may be best secured by providing

_Aggrieved Parishioners_ with an easy and effectual process for complaint

and redress.” They then state that they have not yet arrived at a

conclusion how best effect may be given to this recommendation, but they

have (they say {7}) “deemed it to be their duty in a matter to which

great interest is attached not to delay the communication to her Majesty

of the results at which they have already arrived.”

Now from this, which is the whole substance of the Report, it is evident

that the conclusions of the Commissioners are wholly based upon the

ground that the vestments are “by none regarded as essential,” whilst

“they give grave offence to many.” And of course the stress of the

argument, such as it is, rests upon their being admitted to be

_non-essential_; because, if they were _essential_, the consideration of

their giving grave offence to however many would be no reason at all for

restraint in the matter. A thousand things give offence to a world lying

in wickedness which are only all the more to be proclaimed and declared

on that account. The “offence of the Cross” has not “ceased” now any

more than it had in S. Paul’s day. It is well known and widely spread,

but this affords no reason for restraining the preaching of the Cross.

But it may be said, admitting all this, yet as these vestments are

confessed to be _un_essential, the conclusion is very sound that their

use should be restrained; and, in fact, a great deal has been made on all

hands amongst the advocates of restraint of this the solitary argument of

the Commissioners. There is often a sort of triumphant appeal:—“The

Ritualists themselves admit the vestments to be non-essential. What can

be the hardship or evil of compelling them to give them up?”

Let us examine this view a little more closely, and see whether there be

not a lurking fallacy running through the whole argument.

In the first place, more than one of the witnesses has repudiated the

admission of the non-essentiality of these things; and even granting that

the term may have been used, it is a further question in what application

or connection. Essential is a relative term, depending as to its sense

on the context in which it occurs, or the subject matter upon which it

bears. It needs, therefore, in each case to be asked, Essential to what?

To the _being_ or to the _well-being_? There is here a great and

important difference. It is quite true that no one maintains that the

vestments are essential to the office of the priesthood, or to the

validity of any priestly act. But they may be essential to the giving

due expression to the act; and to give this due expression may be

essential to the salvation of many. Or yet further, the _thing itself_

may be unessential as to the validity of acts done, and yet the _liberty_

to use it may be of essential importance—aye, even though it may give

grave offence to some, perhaps to many.

An illustration may possibly help us to estimate the true value of the

Commissioners’ argument, or, as I should rather say, their sophism. And

it seems very important to shew that it is a sophism, because the

paragraph in question in their Report is the one thing reiterated over

and over again by the advocates of legislation or repression. It is the

stock argument, the only argument on which the demand for change is

based; and it is often urged as if it were irresistible, and there were

no reply to it. Let us, then, examine it, and try to see its true force.

Now there is, as it seems to me, a very apt illustration of its fallacy

in a matter of ceremonial treated of in the 30th Canon, and a matter,

too, be it observed, where the ceremonial referred to, and defended, was

certainly not an essential of Christianity, and as certainly, at the

time, gave grave offence to many.

The 30th Canon, by far the longest and most elaborate of the Canons of

1603, treats of “the lawful use of the Cross in Baptism.” The grave

offence taken at this usage is declared in the very first words of the

Canon—“We are sorry that his Majesty’s most princely care and pains taken

in the Conference at Hampton Court, amongst many other points touching

this one of the Cross in Baptism, hath taken no better effect with many,

but that the use of it in Baptism is so gravely stuck at and impugned.”

And then the Canon, instead of upon this account recommending that the

use be restrained, or that persons aggrieved (“Aggrieved Parishioners”)

should have provided for them “an easy and effectual process for

complaint and redress” instead of this, the Canon goes on to give various

godly reasons why the usage should be retained, even though it gave this

grave offence—aye, and though the cause of the offence was its being

supposed to have a savour of Rome, and though it was a matter in itself

indifferent. Without reciting the whole Canon we may remark that the

reasons stated are exactly such as, _mutatis mutandis_, might be applied

to the very ceremonial brought under censure by the Commissioners; such

as, that whilst some derided it, others valued it and were edified by it;

that it brought into sight and kept in men’s minds certain great truths

of the Gospel; that it had the weight and authority of wide-spread and

Catholic use; that not all which was of Roman belief or practice was to

be condemned, &c., &c. So the Canon says “it is to be observed that

although the Jews and Ethnics derided both the Apostles and the rest of

the Christians for preaching and believing in Him Who was crucified upon

the Cross; yet all, both Apostles and Christians, were so far from being

discouraged from their profession by the ignominy of the Cross, as they

rather rejoiced and triumphed in it.” Again, that “the honour and

dignity of the name of the Cross begat a reverend estimation even in the

Apostles’ times (for aught that is known to the contrary) of the sign of

the Cross, which the Christians shortly after used in all their actions.”

And although the Synod goes on to “confess that in process of time the

sign of the Cross was greatly abused in the Church of Rome,” yet it

affirms in the plainest and most unhesitating manner the great principle,

that “the abuse of a thing doth not take away the lawful use of it;” and

adds, even further, “Nay, so far was it from the purpose of the Church of

England to forsake and reject the Churches of Italy, France, Spain,

Germany, or any such like Churches, in all things which they held and

practised, that, as the Apology of the Church of England confesseth, it

doth with reverence retain those ceremonies which doth (do) neither

endamage the Church of God nor offend the minds of sober men; and only

departed from them in those particular points, wherein they were fallen

both from themselves in their ancient integrity, and from the Apostolical

Churches which were their first founders; in which respect, amongst some

other very ancient ceremonies, the sign of the Cross in Baptism hath been

retained in this Church.” Now, all this seems to me not irrelevant to

many other ceremonies besides the sign of the Cross, and indeed to have a

very close bearing upon the principles on which a high Ritual may be

defended. But this is not all. We come next to a point especially and

peculiarly to our purpose, for the Canon, going on to say that the sign

of the Cross is retained “with such sufficient cautions and exceptions

against . . . superstition and error as in the like cases are either fit

or convenient,” proceeds to instance some of these cautions and guards;

and the very first in the list is this, that the ceremony in question is

unessential. The “vestments are by none regarded as essential,” and

therefore abolish them, says the Report. The sign of the Cross is

unessential, and therefore retain it, says the Canon.

Mark this a little more fully, for what can be more aptly illustrative of

the Commissioners’ argument? The Canon does not merely confess and

admit, but claims has an advantage and reason for the retention of the

usage, that it is not in any way essential to the Sacrament of Baptism.

So it says, “First, the Church of England, since the abolishing of

Papery, hath ever held and taught, and so doth hold and teach still, that

the sign of the Cross used in Baptism is no part of the substance of that

Sacrament: for when the Minister, dipping the infant in water, or laying

water upon the face of it, (as the manner also is,) hath pronounced these

words, _I baptize thee in the Name of the Father_, _and of the Son_, _and

of the Holy Ghost_, the infant is fully and perfectly baptized. So as

the sign of the Cross, being afterwards used, doth neither add any thing

to the virtue and perfection of Baptism, nor being omitted, doth detract

any thing from the effect and substance thereof.” Nor is this all.

Another paragraph follows, insisting upon the same thing with a second

reason, shewing forth still the value of the ceremony, though

unessential. “Secondly, it is apparent in the Communion Book, that the

infant baptized is, by virtue of Baptism, before it is signed with the

sign of the Cross, &c., received into the congregation of Christ’s flock,

as a perfect member thereof, and not by any power ascribed unto the power

of the Cross. So that, for the very remembrance of the Cross, which is

very precious unto all them who rightly believe in Jesus Christ, and in

the other respects mentioned, the Church of England hath retained still

the sign of it in Baptism; following therein the primitive and

Apostolical Churches, and accounting it a lawful outward ceremony and

honourable badge, whereby the Infant is dedicated to the Service of Him

that died upon the Cross, as by the words used in the Book of Common

Prayer it may appear.” This very confession, then, of its being, first,

no essential part of the Sacrament; nor, secondly, essential to any one’s

being received as a perfect member of Christ’s flock;—is a safeguard and

security, it is argued, against any error or superstitious veneration of

the sign of the Cross, and so it ought, for its other values to be

retained. How near is this to what the Commissioners, upon the evidence

before them, might justly have said in relation to the vestments; where

in the indifferency of the ceremonial in question they can only find an

argument for restraint or abolition. Surely they might not have been far

wrong, on the ground both of reason and Scriptural authority, had they,

after the pattern of the Canon, asserted the vesture in question to be “a

lawful outward ceremony and honourable badge, whereby” more honour is

intended and done “unto the Service of Him,” and the blessed Sacrament of

_His_ Body and Blood, “that died upon the Cross.”

But the Canon has yet another argument bearing upon the duty of using

(not abolishing) things indifferent (nonessentials in other words) when

ordered by the law of the Church. “Lastly,” it says, “the use of the

sign of the Cross in Baptism being thus purged from all Popish

superstition and error, and reduced in the Church of England to the

primary institution of it, upon those true rules of doctrine concerning

things indifferent, which are consonant to the Word of God and the

judgment of all the ancient Fathers, we hold it the part of every private

man and other reverently to retain the true use of it prescribed by

public authority: considering that things indifferent do in some sort

alter their natures, when they are either commanded or forbidden by a

lawful magistrate; and may not be omitted at every man’s pleasure

contrary to the law when they be commanded, nor used, when they are

prohibited.” Is there nothing here to justify such as simply obey the

authority of the Rubric?

There is a passage in the answers of the Bishops to the Nonconformist

divines at the Savoy Conference, which aptly illustrates this statement

of the Canon, and is of the more moment because it shews that the mind of

those who managed that controversy in 1661 was entirely in harmony with

that of the framers of the Canons in 1603; and as the Savoy Conference

was the immediate precursor of the Convocation of the next year, which in

substance ratified and adopted its recommendations in the last revision

of our Prayer Book, those Episcopalian divines may well be taken as the

exponents of the mind of the very Convocation which passed the Rubric

upon ornaments.

We find the following among their replies to the objections of the

Nonconformists in relation to things indifferent in themselves. “Whereas

the Nonconformists plead that they cannot obey the commands of the Church

for fear of violating the precept which forbids adding to the Word of God

(Deut. xii. 32): We answer, those Ministers do not well consider that it

is no addition to the Word of God to command things for order and decency

provided they are enjoined only as regulations of human authority. And

supposing some persons continue perplexed and under scruples, the Church

may, notwithstanding, without sin, insist upon compliance with decent

ceremonies; and all this without being guilty of offending our weak

brethren, for here the offence is _taken_, not _given_. It is the

prejudice and mistake of the scrupulous person that disturbs himself.” A

somewhat more exact discrimination as to causes of offence than the

Commissioners seem to have “dreamed of in their philosophy!” But the

Bishops of 1661 continue, “Neither will the case of St. Paul not eating

flesh if it offended his weak brother give any support to the objection.

For here, it must be observed, the Apostle speaks of things not commanded

by God, or His Church, of matters which had nothing of decency or

significancy for religious purposes, and therefore in a case thus

unconnected with Divine worship St. Paul was willing to resign his

liberty rather than offend his brother.” Surely a remark not without a

very close significance in defence of those who are unwilling to forego

what they deem so important to the due celebration of Divine Service,

even though some are offended at it. “But if any man should venture to

break a just law or custom of the Church, the Apostle marks him for a

contentious person (1 Cor. xi. 16).” Has this no bearing upon objectors

now? And the Bishops continue, “That these ceremonies have occasioned

many divisions, as it is pretended, is no more their fault than the

misunderstandings between the nearest relations, accidentally consequent

upon the preaching of the Gospel (Luke xii.) can be fairly charged upon

the Christian religion.” {13} Have our present Commissioners duly

regarded all this in their hasty conclusion?

To sum up:—these arguments, if not pressed to the full as to sin or fault

in those who may not use or carry out a prescribed ceremonial in all

circumstances, such as, for instance, long desuetude, may, at the very

least, one would think, be of sufficient weight defensively for such as

have merely obeyed the Law to prevent hard words being used either by

Royal Commissioners, or any others in high places, towards those, I say,

whose offence is merely that they have thus obeyed it. And the fact of a

ceremony, significant, though giving offence, being thus prescribed by

the Canon, and others of like kind, contended for by the Savoy

Episcopalian Divines, though confessed to be _things indifferent_, gives

a special application of the whole to the one argument of the

Commissioners concerning the vestments being “regarded by none as

essential.” For let it be well observed that the argument of the Canon

is; This ceremony, the sign of the Cross, though derided by Ethnics and

Jews, is rejoiced in by the Apostles; it begets a reverend estimation in

regard to a Sacrament: even the abuse of a thing doth not take away the

lawful use (no, not when the abuse has been by Rome). The usage is

indifferent, non-essential, in itself, and the conclusion is, it is all

the more to be retained. Moreover, being ordered by lawful authority, it

ought not to be made light of, or objected to. In which principles the

divines of the Savoy Conference and the last revisers of our Prayer Book

agree. Surely, then, these authorities in all this are as widely

divergent from the views and reasoning of the Royal Commissioners as east

is from west, or black from white. And the whole comparison teaches us

much as to the value of their one argument, which I have ventured to call

a sophism, as to the vestments being “by none regarded as essential.”

Moreover, if Bishop Sanderson’s remark is sound, that “to take away the

indifferency of things indifferent is superstition,” it will not be hard

to decide between those who reverently use, and those who bitterly

denounce, the vestments, which are the _superstitious_ persons in the

present controversy.

But let us proceed to another point. I said, that even when a thing or

usage may be in itself not essential, yet the liberty to use it may be

highly essential, and this, in spite of its giving grave offence to many.

Take a brief illustration of this. We all know there was a time when the

marriage of the clergy gave grave offence to many. Suppose at such

period a Royal Commission had been appointed to inquire into the

importance of the celibacy of the clergy. Say the Commissioners had

reported, “We have examined many witnesses, married and unmarried. We

find considerable difference of opinion. But we find that by none, even

among the married clergy, is the marriage of priests regarded as

essential to any priestly act, whilst their marriage gives grave offence

to many. We are therefore of opinion that it is expedient to enforce a

greater uniformity of practice by restraining the marriage of priests,

and admitting no deviation from what has been a long-established usage in

the Church, &c. &c.” Now no one among us will deny the fact of marriage

being unessential to the functions of the priesthood, and yet the liberty

to marry may be very essential indeed to the welfare of the Church. This

liberty, for “Bishops, Priests, and Deacons, as for all other Christian

men, to marry at their own discretion, as they shall judge the same to

serve better to godliness,” was at any rate thought essential enough to

be made the subject of one of our Articles. And surely this may shew

something as to the weight to be attached to the one argument of the

Commissioners, for the “opinion” which they put out, and the conclusion

at which, on this sole basis, they arrive.

There is one point, further, which I should like briefly to touch upon

before leaving this matter of essential or non-essential, for it shews

how very carelessly or unscrupulously the Commissioners have done their

work, and made their Report. The citation, which in its commencement

they give from the Commission appointing them, contains these words: that

“it is expedient that a full and impartial enquiry should be made into

the matters aforesaid,” viz. ornaments, vestments, and such like, “with

the view of explaining or amending the said rubrics, orders, and

directions, so as to secure general uniformity of practice _in such

matters as are essential_.” {15} Now, observe, by their own shewing, by

the evidence they adduce, by the one argument they advance, they

recommend changes to secure a greater uniformity in things which are _not

essential_! Their own very statement about these things, their sole

ground on which they form their opinion and base their recommendation,

is, that in regard to those witnesses whom they have examined, they (the

ornaments or vestments) are by none _regarded as essential_. They accept

and endorse this; and then, in spite of the terms of their commission to

enquire how to secure a general uniformity of practice in _such __things

as are essential_, the only recommendation which they make is upon that

which they proclaim to be _unessential_, and what is more, upon the very

ground of its being _unessential_! {16}

But now, having considered the Commissioners’ one reason, and their

“opinion,” and their consequent recommendation, we must come a little

more particularly to examine their proposed mode of operation. It is

true they here become vague and uncertain. They think “it is expedient

to restrain in the public services of the Church all variations in

respect of vesture from that which has long been the established usage,

&c.” and, “that this may be best secured by providing aggrieved

parishioners with an easy and effectual process for complaint and

redress.”—(Report, p. vii.) But as to the details of this provision, as

to “the best _mode_ of giving effect to these conclusions,” they are not

yet prepared with their scheme.

Perhaps this is all very natural, and it may be very fortunate. We may

be thankful that we have not a scheme devised, to carry out their

proposal, as crude as the proposal and the Report itself. But though

these details are not before us, and we have a little respite before they

come, we are not without some indication as to what they are likely to

be; and we shall do well to use the time we have before they actually

take definite shape, in providing as far as possible to thwart any

pernicious principles which may be embodied in them.

Now I affirm, and I think I shall be able to shew, that the remedy to be

provided for the “aggrieved parishioner,” by which he is to be enabled by

law to make complaint of, and obtain redress as to variations in respect

of vesture, (where being legal they yet displease him,) can _only_ be by

an alteration in the Book of Common Prayer. I am not saying, remember,

that a due and a great regard is not to be had for the feelings, and even

the prejudices, of our people; though it can hardly be denied that it is

very desirable these prejudices should be met, and these feelings

directed by careful enlightenment, into a more reverent estimation of

holy things, than prevailed some years since. If the _usage_ of Church

ritual which reigned, say, thirty, or forty, or fifty years ago, had been

stereotyped at any time as that which should be established for ever in

our Church, we should certainly have had a state of things perpetuated

which most of us would now regard as an immense spiritual misfortune, and

at which we should be wholly ashamed and grieved. But what we have to

consider in relation to this Report is not at all this regard, on the

part of the clergy, for the feelings of their people, but the putting

into their hands a positive and express legal process of remedy and

restraint, where any change from long-established custom, however

accordant with the law, is proposed to be adopted. And I say

unhesitatingly, that such redress, redress of such a nature, for the

so-called “aggrieved parishioner,” can only be by a repeal of the Rubric.

This surely is plain on the very face of the matter. For the Prayer Book

gives the law (Church Law and State Law in one) as to what vesture or

ornament shall be used; and what power on earth can give the aggrieved

parishioner a right or power to interfere with this law, as much statute

law as any other thing in the statute book, but the repeal of the law?

There is no other conceivable mode. What can restrain a priest from

complying with the law of his Church and the law of the land? what can

make it penal to obey it, but the repeal of the said law? This may be

done directly or indirectly. It may be done explicitly or implicitly;

but done it must be if any one or any number of aggrieved parishioners

are to be empowered to restrain their parish priest from, not, observe,

the mere impulse of his own fancy, but from an obedience to that which is

the law of his Church, and the statute law of the land, as laid down in

the Prayer Book.

This seems evident enough in the very nature of things. And therefore if

we value the Prayer Book as it is, and the _status_ of the Church of

England as in such large measure depending upon it, we have every right,

and more than the right, the duty, to be up and stirring to defend it,

under the assault upon its integrity which this, the present Report,

threatens. Indeed, under such intimations as we have, where “coming

events cast their shadows before,” it seems to me that it would be

absolute infatuation to wait until the attack is more matured, and the

danger nearer, before organizing every mode and means of defence and

resistance to that which is already so obviously impending.

But we are not even left to our own mere reasoning, or natural

anticipations, to guide us to the mode in which the Commissioners must be

prepared to carry out their opinion and recommendation. We have a light

thrown upon this, in a lucid commentary upon the bare Report, furnished

us by one of the Commissioners. I have already alluded to it. The

recent Charge of the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol not only deals with

the question of Ritual itself, but specifically, in relation to it, with

the modes in which the recommendation of the Report may be carried out;

and I will venture to affirm, even in the face of his Lordship’s

disclaimer as to the mode which he himself advocates being an alteration

in the Prayer Book, that there is not one of the courses suggested

(except the course of leaving the matter to the decision of the Courts,

which he at once rejects,) that does not involve a repeal, direct or

indirect, of the rubric upon ornaments. It will not be alien from, but

indeed very much to, our purpose to take his statements in some detail,

and see what they indicate as to the likely progress of the

Commissioners’ work. Bishop Ellicott’s Charge in this relation is very

important, for it cannot but give us the key to what he at least will

press upon his brother Commissioners when again they meet, and perhaps is

now pressing upon them.

Let us turn to the Charge, and mark both its general tone and specific

recommendations as to high Ritual. Having adverted to the “deteriorating

developement of the Ritual movement,” he says: {19}—“Reluctant as I am to

enter upon a subject of such difficulty and controversy, yet I feel it my

clear duty to place succinctly before you the present state of the

question, to endeavour dispassionately to estimate the real amount and

extent of the _evil_” (Bishop Ellicott has no doubts as to this term);

“and, lastly, to consider the remedies that have been proposed, and the

general counsel that may seem at this serious crisis most calculated to

bring back peace to our now disquieted Church.” Then, after an

historical sketch, with remarks, shewing his lordship’s feelings upon the

subject, and a brief—almost, as it seems to me, a needless—apology for

the bishops for not having put down with a quick and strong hand certain

presumably _legal_ ornaments or usages, he proceeds to consider what may

be done in the way of remedy for the _evil_, as he deems it, of Ritual

representing doctrine, in the following terms:—

“Let us now,” he says, “leave the past, and with the past all antagonisms

and recriminations, and rather as calm, earnest, and loyal sons of the

Reformed Church of England, confer together as to what now remains to be

done. Let us soberly and dispassionately consider what measures seem

wisest, what remedies most hopeful, at the present momentous crisis. Let

us clear the ground by considering briefly some courses and remedies that

have already been proposed, and that probably will be reiterated with

pertinacity. One proposed remedy is, the simple omission of the

Ornaments’ Rubric as in the Irish Book of Common Prayer; or its definite

and express repeal by some legislative measure. This is a prompt remedy,

but a dangerous one—dangerous in part from reasons already adduced, in

part from the deep and rankling bitterness arising from the thus greatly

increased conviction that the law is really in favour of the use of

vestments, and being so is to be overridden by an unjust Act of

Parliament. Two courses are always dangerous in this country; one is to

leave in the hearts of any party an enduring sense of injustice, a ready

political illustration of which is perhaps at once rising in the thoughts

of many of us; the other is, to come in direct conflict with that

constitutional principle which is embodied in the familiar and

traditional ‘_Nolumus leges Angliæ mutari_.’ We cannot, then, I think,

wisely adopt the remedy just mentioned.”

I imagine few of us will be disposed to question the justice of these

remarks, or to quarrel with the dismissal of this first proposed mode of

remedy. But next he mentions another course, in these terms:—“Still less

wise should we be to adopt another but very dissimilar remedy that has

been pressed upon us, and will probably be pressed upon us with continued

earnestness. This remedy may be considered as summed up in the following

formula:—‘Arm your bishops with more power, and then leave it to their

Fatherly wisdom to allow or disallow these innovations according to the

peculiarities of the case.’ In plainer words, let the bishop become,

instead of the administrator of the law, the manipulator of the law; and

let a want of reasonable uniformity, now dangerously great, be multiplied

tenfold.”

Observe here, before we proceed further, that this power of manipulation,

over and above being open to the objection which the Bishop notices of

multiplying diversities of practice, is in fact nothing else than setting

the bishop above the law as it exists, and is, therefore, as we said all

these remedies would be found to be, a repeal of the rubric which is the

present law. But at any rate, here again, the Bishop rejects the

proposed mode of action, though, he says, we should “pause” upon it.

“On this remedy it is necessary to pause. Every clear-headed man among

us must see, in the first place, that it is giving to bishops a power

which they have never even attempted to exercise, except in the unsettled

times which immediately followed the Reformation; secondly, that our

dioceses would exhibit varieties of usage dependent on the general views

and convictions of the bishop for the time being, and liable to be

altered when a successor came into his place; thirdly, that men of

advanced opinions would make every effort to get into the diocese of that

bishop who might be supposed, rightly or wrongly, most to favour

them—and, when there, would exercise a combined pressure which would be

very difficult to resist; fourthly, and lastly, that, after all, this is

but an ingenious expedient to postpone that settlement of the question

which common sense and common foresight now perceive to be inevitable.”

Without endorsing the concluding remark of the Bishop’s comment, we may

say that with great justice he condemns the remedy, though not expressly

upon the ground which I have mentioned as the strongest—viz., its setting

the bishop above the law, and so altering the Prayer Book. He adds,

however, something more as to a modification of the plan of giving more

power to the bishops.

“We may, then, I think, fairly dismiss this proposed remedy as even less

hopeful than the first. But there is a sort of phase and form of it, a

kind of intermediate course, which deserves more consideration. The

proposed measure would be of this kind—to give the bishop not only power

to restrain, but to require him to stop, all Ritualistic innovations,

more especially in regard of vestments, whenever he might be appealed to

by a certain number of trustworthy parishioners. The effect of this, of

course, would be to leave things alone where no complaint was preferred,

the justifying grounds being the uncertainty of the law on the one side,

and the deliberate preference shown by the parishioners for the mode of

conducting public worship then prevailing. No doubt this, in some

degree, helps us over the plain difficulty we must expect to meet with in

those cases where Ritualistic practices have prevailed for some time

unopposed. We must not disguise from ourselves that it will be extremely

difficult to bring back to simpler forms of worship a minister and a

congregation that have not only been accustomed to, but deliberately

prefer, much more ornate forms; the putting off of these vestments will,

in some cases, involve much more difficulty and trouble than their

original introduction. It is human nature to cling tenaciously to what

is distinctive, and this deposition of the distinctive will be

complicated by the assumed close connection between the vestment and the

doctrine. All these great and real difficulties we have before us, and

we may feel at first inclined to favour that which seems to reduce their

dimensions, but I do venture to think here again that the dangers likely

to arise from thus practically leaving the matter unsettled, and still

more from the local discords that would be sure to arise during the

constant attempts that would be made to bring the prohibitory bishop in

some way or other on the scene, and the sad divisions that would follow

if the attempt succeeded—all these things, I fear, must lead us to decide

against a remedy, which, while saving us from some immediate

difficulties, would bequeath to us and to our children a heritage of

future difficulties and dangers far exceeding both in number and degree

the difficulties and dangers of the present.”

There is much truth in these objections, but the most potent objection of

all is, that here, again, as in all other modes proposed by way of

remedy, there is the real and tangible repeal of the Rubric; so an

alteration of the Prayer Book, and a manifest change in the _status_ of

the Church and of Churchmen.

The Bishop next touches upon another plan, which indeed is not a mode of

remedy (in the sense of making a change to meet the difficulty) at all,

which therefore does not lie open to the same objection. The Bishop,

indeed, dismisses it at once as hopeless and useless, though it remains

to be seen whether it really be so. I mean the due interpretation of the

law by the courts of law; which being done, to let the law alone, and the

Prayer Book alone, and the Church alone. However he continues;—“But,

lastly, it may be said, is all hope entirely past of finally settling the

question by an appeal to the law courts, and thence to that highest

tribunal that has already had the impleaded rubric before it, though

under a somewhat different point of view? Yes, I fear we must now say

that all hope is finally past. The knot cannot now be laboriously

untied; it must be removed by gentle drawing out on either side, or—it

must be cut. In the first place, the country at large would not now be

content to wait for what experience has shewn might be a long-delayed

issue. It would be urged that such delay would only aid the progress of

innovation, and that now when a Commission has been appointed and has not

recommended a reference to law courts, it would be a practical retracing

of steps that would seriously add to our present disquietude. To which

we may subjoin this comment—that even if a speedy reference to the

ultimate tribunal (by some thought possible) could be secured, the

decision now, after the startling evidence given before the Commission,

would not, it is to be feared, whichever way it might be, bring to us all

the blessing of peace and settlement. If it were _for_ the Ritualists, a

prompt effort would be made to set aside the rubric by legislation; and

then bitterness, struggle, and all the evils above alluded to, in

connection with a sense of injustice, would at once be in malignant

working among us. If it were _against_ the Ritualists, I now sadly fear,

after the painful language publicly used by many of them against those in

authority, and the disregard of the Convocation Resolutions of last year,

that they would decline to submit to the decision, force unwilling men to

put the law in action against them, accept the issue, and leave the

communion of the Reformed Church.”

There is much here from which I cannot do other than express most

strongly my dissent; for—

1. Why should the rabid violence of all that is uncatholic and

unbelieving in the country be taken to be the voice of the country to

which heed is to be given? The Canon before quoted, when it speaks of

offending the minds of men, is careful to say “the minds of sober men;”

but here it seems that all which is most violent, unreasoning, and

intemperate, is to be accepted as the mind of the country from which

there is no appeal. Nay, more, as is evident, this temper is hounded on

to be even more violent and rabid, by such unseemly deference to its

clamour, and by the pusillanimous assertion that law and order must be

overridden because the impatience of such minds will not be content even

to wait till the law courts have spoken.

2. Why should we not wait, if it be needful to wait, in order to

determine with all due care and deliberation what the law is upon the

main points brought into controversy—what it allows and what it

disallows? This tremendous impatience, this overwhelming desire for

exterminating obnoxious Ritual and Ritualists, this awe-struck terror

that if these men, and their practices, and their teaching be only given

fair play, their opponents of the uncatholic school will be defeated, and

be found to have clamoured for illegal restraints—all this is surely the

most wonderful admission against themselves and their cause, which men

even pretending to seek truth and right could possibly make, and one

least likely to commend their cause and mode of action to any just and

honest mind. Hear a few words upon this head from a venerable Archdeacon

(_venerabilis_ not merely by station and age, but by learning and

Christian wisdom also), one of whom England may well be proud. In the

_Guardian_ of November 6 you will find a letter from Archdeacon Churton,

enforcing with very great weight Gamaliel’s advice, “Let these men

alone,” at the present momentous crisis. Allow me to read a few lines

from it. He says:—“The advice which alone can save the Church from a new

schism is plainly Gamaliel’s advice. I am very sorry that so many of our

present bishops, younger men than myself, are averse from it, or uttering

uncertain sounds which I could never adopt without suspecting my own

magnanimity. It is to be regretted that they do not rather seek to guide

a movement which has in it too many elements of good to be rudely

condemned; and that they do not speak first of vindicating the law before

they alter it. On the contrary, however, they seem to contemplate a new

statute to establish, as if of perpetual obligation, certain vestments

invented by clerical tailors of the last century, at which S. Ambrose

would have stood aghast. . . . One of our sacred legislators has

declared himself above all things anxious not to allow the Ritualists

time to plead their cause with the public. It was the praise of Bishop

Henry Spencer in King Richard’s time, according to Walsingham, that he

gave the Lollards the shortest possible shrift-time for coming to their

senses.”