_At the end of a very long fight, a Marine flamethrower operator pauses
to light up._]
[Illustration: _LtGen Holland M. Smith, USMC, with his Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific, chief of staff, Col Dudley S. Brown, surveys the
wreckage along the landing beaches. Iwo Jima was Gen Smith’s last
battle. After this, he returned to his headquarters on Hawaii._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110635
]
Two aspects of the battle remain controversial: the inadequate
preliminary bombardment and the decision to use piecemeal replacements
instead of organized units to strengthen the assault forces. Both
decisions, rendered in the context of several competing factors, were
made by experienced commanders in good faith. Unavoidably, Iwo Jima’s
biggest cost to the V Amphibious Corps was the loss of so many combat
veterans in taking the island. While the battle served to create a
new generation of veterans among the survivors, many proud regiments
suffered devastating losses. With these same units already designated
as key components of the landing force against the Japanese home
islands, such losses had serious potential implications. These factors
may well have influenced General Holland Smith’s unpopular decision
to withhold the 3d Marines from the battle. From the perspective of
an exhausted company commander on Iwo Jima, Smith’s decision seemed
inexcusable, then and now; from the wider perspective of the commanding
general, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, the decision makes more sense.
Whatever his shortcomings, Holland Smith probably knew amphibious
warfare better than anyone. Of the hundreds of after-action reports
filed immediately following the battle, his official analysis best
captured the essence of the struggle:
There was no hope of surprise, either strategic or tactical.
There was little possibility for tactical initiative; the entire
operation was fought on what were virtually the enemy’s own
terms.... The strength, disposition, and conduct of the enemy’s
defense required a major penetration of the heart of his prepared
positions in the center of the Motoyama Plateau and a subsequent
reduction of the positions in the difficult terrain sloping to the
shore on the flanks. The size and terrain of the island precluded
any Force Beachhead Line. It was an operation of one phase and one
tactic. From the time the engagement was joined until the mission
was completed it was a matter of frontal assault maintained with
relentless pressure by a superior mass of troops and supporting
arms against a position fortified to the maximum practical extent.
We Americans of a subsequent generation in the profession of arms find
it difficult to imagine a sustained amphibious assault under such
conditions. In some respects the fighting on Iwo Jima took on the
features of Marines fighting in France in 1918, described by one as
“a war girt with horrors.” We sense the drama repeated every morning
at Iwo, after the prep fires lifted, when the riflemen, engineers,
corpsmen, flame tank crews, and armored bulldozer operators somehow
found the fortitude to move out yet again into “Death Valley” or “The
Meatgrinder.” Few of us today can study the defenses, analyze the
action reports, or walk the broken ground without experiencing a sense
of reverence for the men who won that epic battle.
Fleet Admiral Nimitz said these words while the fighting still
raged: “Among the Americans who served on Iwo Jima, uncommon valor
was a common virtue,” a sentiment now chiseled in granite at the
base of Felix de Weldon’s gigantic bronze sculpture of the Suribachi
flag-raising.
Twenty-two Marines, four Navy corpsmen, and one LCI skipper were
awarded the Medal of Honor for utmost bravery during the battle of Iwo
Jima. Half were posthumous awards.
General Erskine placed these sacrifices in perspective in remarks
made during the dedication of the 3d Marine Division cemetery on the
embattled island:
Victory was never in doubt. Its cost was. What was in doubt, in all
our minds, was whether there would be any of us left to dedicate
our cemetery at the end, or whether the last Marine would die
knocking out the last Japanese gunner.
[Sidebar (page 50): Above and Beyond the Call of Duty
Twenty-seven men received the Congressional Medal of Honor for
conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity during the battle of Iwo Jima:
22 Marines, four Navy corpsmen, and one Navy landing craft commander.
Exactly half of the awards issued to Marines and corpsmen of the
V Amphibious Corps were posthumous. Within a larger institutional
context, Iwo Jima represented more than one-fourth of the 80 Medals of
Honor awarded Marines during the Second World War. This was Iwo Jima’s
Roll of Honor:
Cpl Charles J. Berry, 1/26, 3 March 1945[A]
PFC William R. Caddy, 3/26, 3 March[A]
LtCol Justice M. Chambers, 3/25, 19-22 February
Sgt Darrell S. Cole, 1/23, 19 February[A]
Capt Robert Dunlap, 1/26, 20-21 February
Sgt Ross F. Gray, 1/25, 21 February
Sgt William G. Harrell, 1/28, 3 March
Lt Rufus G. Herring, USNR, LCI 449, 17 February
PFC Douglas T. Jacobson, 3/23, 26 February
PltSgt Joseph J. Julian, 1/27, 9 March[A]
PFC James D. LaBelle, 1/27, 8 March[A]
2dLt John H. Leims, 1/9, 7 March
PFC Jacklyn H. Lucas, 1/26, 20 February
1stLt Jack Lummus, 2/27, 8 March[A]
Capt Joseph J. McCarthy, 2/24, 21 February
1stLt Harry L. Martin, 5th Pioneer Battalion, 26 March[A]
Pvt George Phillips, 2/28, 14 March[A]
PhM 1/c Francis J. Pierce, USN, 2/24, 15-16 March
PFC Donald J. Ruhl, 2/28, 19-21 February[A]
Pvt Franklin E. Sigler, 2/26, 14 March
Cpl Tony Stein, 1/28, 19 February[A]
PhM 2/c George Wahlen, USN, 2/26, 3 March
GySgt William G. Walsh, 3/27, 27 February[A]
Pvt Wilson D. Watson, 2/9, 26-27 February
Cpl Hershel W. Williams, 1/21, 23 February
PhM 3/c Jack Williams, USN, 3/28, 3 March[A]
PhM 1/c John H. Willis, USN, 3/27, 28 February[A]
[A] Posthumous
[Illustration]
]
[Sidebar (page 52): Assault Divisions’ Command Structures
As the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions conducted their final
preparations for Operation Detachment, these were the infantry
commanders who would lead the way at the beginning of the battle: