It has been said that "the history of war is a magnificent lie," and
from what we know in our times, particularly of the history of the
Mexican War and of the present Rebellion, if the despatches from the
battle-fields are to be received as history, we are inclined to believe
the saying is true; and it is natural that it should be so. A general
writes his despatches under the highest mental excitement. His troops
have won a great victory, or sustained a crushing defeat; in either
event, his mind is riveted to the transactions that have led to the
result; in the one case, his ambition will prompt him to aspire to a
name in history; in the other, he will try to save himself from
disgrace. He describes his battles; he gives an account of his marches
and counter-marches, of the hardships he has endured, the
disappointments he has experienced, and the difficulties he has had to
overcome. The principal events may be truthfully narrated; but his hopes
of rising a hero from the field of victory, or of appearing a martyr
from one of defeat, will mould his narrative to his wishes.
If it be frequently the misfortune of our generals, in writing their
reports, not to content themselves with the materials at hand, but to
draw on their imaginations, not for gross falsehoods, but for that
coloring which, diffused through their despatches, makes the narrative
affecting, while it leaves us in doubt where to draw the line between
fiction and fact, it is not always so, particularly when their
despatches are not written amidst the excitement of the battle-field,
but are deferred until the events which they describe have passed into
history.
Such, we may suppose, to be the case in respect to the Reports of
Brigadier-Generals Barnard and Barry on the Engineer and Artillery
Operations of the Army of the Potomac. Written, as these Reports were,
after the organization of that army had been completed and the
Peninsular campaign had terminated, by men who, though playing an
important part in its organization and throughout this its first
campaign, yet never aspired to be its heroes, we may reasonably hope,
that, if they have not told the "whole truth," they have told us
"nothing but the truth."
The points of particular interest in these Reports, so far as relates to
organization, are the inauguration of a great system of
field-fortifications for the defence of the national capital, and the
preparation of engineer-equipments, particularly bridge-equipage for
crossing rivers. These are only sketched, but the outline is drawn by an
artist who is master of the subject. The professional engineer, when he
examines the immense fortifications of Washington and sees their
skilful construction, can appreciate the labor and thought which must
have been bestowed on them. He alone could complete the picture. To
appreciate these works, they must be seen. No field-works on so
extensive a scale have been undertaken in modern times. The nearest
approach to them were the lines of Torres Vedras, in Portugal,
constructed by the British army in 1809-10; but the works constructed by
General Barnard for the defence of Washington are larger, more numerous,
more carefully built, and much more heavily armed than were those justly
celebrated lines of Wellington.
And it should not be forgotten, that, after the Battle of Bull Run, we
were thrown on the defensive, and the fortifications of our capital were
called for in a hurry. There were no models, in this country, from which
to copy,--and few, if any, in Europe. Luckily, however, the art of
fortification is not imitative; it is based on scientific principles;
and we found in General Barnard and his assistants the science to
comprehend the problem before them, and the experience and skill to
grasp its solution.
Only the citizens of Washington and those who happened to be there after
the two disastrous defeats at Bull Run can appreciate the value of these
fortifications. They have twice saved the capital,--perhaps the nation;
yet forts are passive,--they never speak, unless assailed. But let
Washington be attacked by a powerful army and successfully defended, and
they would proclaim General Barnard one of the heroes of the war.
As has already been said, the engineer-equipage is only sketched; but
enough is said to show its value. Speaking of the bridges, General
Barnard says,--"They were used by the Quartermaster's department in
discharging transports, were precisely what was needed for the
disembarkation of General Franklin's division, constituted a portion of
the numerous bridges that were built over Wormley Creek during the siege
of Yorktown, and were of the highest use in the Chickahominy; while over
the Lower Chickahominy, some seventy-five thousand men, some three
hundred pieces of artillery, and the enormous baggage-trains of the
army, passed over a bridge of the extraordinary length of nearly six
hundred and fifty yards,--a feat scarcely surpassed in military
history." Pontoons, like forts, cannot talk; but every soldier of the
Army of the Potomac knows that these same bridges, which were prepared
when that army was first organized, have since carried it in safety four
times over the Rappahannock, twice at the Battle of Fredericksburg and
twice again at the Battle of Chancellorsville, and three times over the
Upper Potomac, once after the Battle of Antietam, and again both before
and after the Battle of Gettysburg.
Of the Peninsular campaign General Barnard does not profess to give a
history. He mentions only the operations which came under his
supervision as the Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac. The siege
of Yorktown was a matter of engineering skill. General Barnard gives us
his report to General Totten, the Chief Engineer of the Army, on the
engineering operations of the siege,--also his journal, showing the
progress of the siege from day to day. These, with the maps, convey a
very clear idea of the place to be taken, and the way it was to have
been reduced, had the enemy continued his defence until our batteries
were opened; but they do not convey to the mind of any except the
professional engineer the magnitude of the works which were constructed.
General Barnard says that fifteen batteries and four redoubts were built
during the siege, and he gives the armament of each battery. On
comparing this armament with that used in other sieges, we find the
amount of metal ready to be hurled on Yorktown when the enemy evacuated
that place second only to that of the Allies at Sebastopol, the greatest
siege of modern times.
But these batteries, with a single exception, never spoke. Like their
predecessors around Washington, they conquered by their mere presence.
After all the skill and labor that had been bestowed on their
construction, the enemy evacuated Yorktown just as our batteries were
about to open. He was at our mercy. General Barnard says that "the
enemy's position had become untenable,--that he could not have endured
our fire for six hours." We can readily understand how mortifying it
must have been to the Commanding General, and particularly to the
officers of engineers and artillery who had planned, built, and armed
these siege-works, to hear that the enemy had evacuated his
fortifications just at the moment when we were prepared to drive him
from them by force; and we can appreciate the regrets of General
Barnard, when he says, in reviewing the campaign, and pointing out the
mistakes that had been committed, that "we should have opened our
batteries on the place as fast as they were completed. The effect on the
troops would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege and
shortened our labors; and, besides, we would have had the credit of
driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms; whereas, as it was, we
only induced him to evacuate for prudential considerations." And General
Barry says, in his report of the artillery operations at the siege,--"It
will always be a source of great professional disappointment to me, that
the enemy, by his premature and hasty abandonment of his defensive line,
deprived the artillery of the Army of the Potomac of the opportunity of
exhibiting the superior power and efficiency of the unusually heavy
metal used in this siege, and of reaping the honor and just reward of
their unceasing labors, day and night, for nearly one month."
The next serious obstacle to be overcome, after the siege of Yorktown,
was the passage of the Chickahominy. Here, says General Barnard, "if
possible, the responsibility and labor of the engineer officers were
increased." The difficulties of that river, considered as a military
obstacle, are given in a few touches; but in the sketch of the opposing
heights, and of the intermediate valley, filled up with the stream, the
heavily timbered swamp, and the overflowed bottom-lands, we have the
Chickahominy brought before us so vividly that we can almost _feel_ the
difficulty of crossing it. Well may General Barnard say that "it was one
of the most formidable obstacles that could be opposed to the advance of
an army,--an obstacle to which an ordinary _river_, though it be of
considerable magnitude, is comparatively slight."
The labors of the engineers in bridging this formidable swamp are
detailed with considerable minuteness. Ten bridges, of different
characters, were constructed, though some of them were never used,
because the enemy held the approaches on his side of the river.
We are glad that General Barnard has elaborated this part of his Report.
There is a melancholy interest attaching to the Chickahominy. To it, and
to the events connected with it, history will refer the defeat of
General McClellan's magnificent army, and the failure of the Peninsular
campaign. And what a lesson is here to be learned! The fate of the
contending armies was suspended in a balance. The hour when a particular
bridge was to be completed, or rendered impassable by the rising floods,
was to turn the scales!
That mistakes were committed on the Chickahominy the country is prepared
to believe. Our army was placed astride of that stream, and in this
situation we fought two battles, each time with only a part of our
force; thus violating, not only the maxims of war, but the plainest
principles of common sense.
The Battle of Fair Oaks began on the thirty-first of May. At that time
our army was divided by the Chickahominy. Of the five corps constituting
the Army of the Potomac, two were on its right bank, or on the side
nearest to Richmond, while the other three were on the left bank. There
had been heavy rains, the river was rising, and the swamps and
bottom-lands were fast becoming impassable. None of the upper bridges
had yet been built. We had then only Bottom's Bridge, the
railroad-bridge, and the two bridges built by General Sumner some miles
higher up the river. Bottom's Bridge and the railroad-bridge were too
distant to be of any service in an emergency such as a battle demands.
At the time of the enemy's attack, which was sudden and unexpected,
completely overwhelming General Casey's division, our sole reliance to
reinforce the left wing was by Sumner's corps, and over his two bridges.
It happened to be the fortune of the writer to see "Sumner's upper
bridge,"--the only one then passable,--at the moment the head of General
Sumner's column reached it. The possibility of crossing was doubted by
all present, including General Sumner himself.
The bridge was of rough logs, and mostly afloat, held together and kept
from drifting off by the stumps of trees to which it was fastened; the
portion over the thread of the stream being suspended from the trunks of
large trees, which had been felled across it, by ropes which a single
blow with a hatchet would have severed. On this bridge and on these
ropes hung the fate of the day at Fair Oaks, and, probably, the fate of
the Army of the Potomac too; for, if Sumner had not crossed in time to
check the movement of the enemy down the river, the corps of Heintzelman
and Keyes would have been taken in flank, and it is fair to suppose that
they must have been driven into an impassable river, or captured.
But Sumner crossed, and saved the day. Forever honored be his name!
As the solid column of infantry entered upon the bridge, it swayed to
and fro to the angry flood below or the living freight above, settling
down and grasping the solid stumps, by which it was made secure as the
line advanced. Once filled with men, it was safe until the corps had
crossed. It then soon became impassable, and the "railroad-bridge," says
General Barnard, "for several days was the only communication between
the two wings of the army." Never was an army in a more precarious
situation. Fortunately, however, whatever mistakes we made in allowing
ourselves to be attacked when the two wings of the army were almost
separated, the enemy also committed serious blunders, both as to the
point of his attack and the time when his blow was delivered. His true
point of attack was on the right flank of our left wing. Had the attack
which Sumner met and repulsed been made simultaneously with the assault
in front, a single battalion, nay, even a single company, could have
seized and destroyed "Sumner's upper bridge," the only one, as before
remarked, then passable, Sumner would consequently have been unable to
take part in the battle, and our left wing would have been taken in
flank, and, in all probability, defeated; or, had the attack been
deferred until the next day, or even for several days, as the bridges
became impassable during the night of the thirty-first, it would
probably have been successful.
It is easy to make such criticisms after the events have happened; their
mere statement will carry conviction to the minds of all who were in a
position, during these memorable days, to know the facts that decided
the movements; and it is right that they should be made, for it is only
by pointing out the causes of success or failure in military affairs,
as, indeed, in every human undertaking, that we can hope to be
successful. But, in doing so, we need not confine ourselves to one side
of the question; we may look at our enemies as well as at ourselves. Nor
need they be made in a spirit of censoriousness; for the importance of
individuals, in speaking of such great events, may safely be overlooked
without affecting the lesson we would learn. Neither should it be
forgotten that the general who has always fought his battles at the
right time, in the right place, with the proper arms, and pursued his
victories to their utmost attainable results, has yet to appear. He
would, indeed, be an intellectual prodigy.
Such we may suppose to be the reflections of General Barnard, when he
points out the mistakes which were made in the Army of the Potomac while
on the Chickahominy. He does not, indeed, bring to our view the mistakes
of the enemy. That would have been travelling outside of the record in
the report of the operations falling under his supervision, and such
criticism is wisely left for some of the enemy's engineers, or for a
more general history. In speaking of the difficulties of crossing the
Chickahominy immediately after the battle of the thirty-first of May,
General Barnard says,--"There was one way, however, to unite the army on
the other side; it was to take advantage of a victory at Fair Oaks, to
sweep at once the enemy from his position opposite New Bridge, and,
simultaneously, to bring over by the New Bridge our troops of the right
wing, which would then have met with little or no resistance"; and
again, in a more general criticism of the campaign, he says,--"The
repulse of the Rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of.
It was one of those 'occasions' which, if not seized, do not repeat
themselves. We now _know_ the state of disorganization and dismay in
which the Rebel army retreated. We now _know_ that it could have been
followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no
resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing."
But the "occasion" which the morning of the first of June presented of
uniting the two wings of the army, and thus achieving a great victory,
was not seized, because, as General Barnard says, "we did not then know
all that we now do." At the moment when the New Bridge became passable,
8.15, A. M., it is not probable the Commanding General knew it.
Nor did he know, that, at this very moment, the enemy was retreating to
Richmond in a "state of disorganization and dismay." Besides, the troops
of the left wing had fought a hard battle the preceding afternoon, and
they had been up all night, throwing up works of defence, and making
dispositions to resist another assault by the enemy. They were not in a
condition to assume the offensive against an enemy who was supposed to
be in force and in position, himself preparing to resume the attack of
the previous day, however competent they may have been to pursue a
demoralized foe flying from the field. The propitious moment was lost,
not to return,--for, during the day, the rising flood rendered all the
bridges, except the railroad-bridge, impassable.
The necessity for more substantial bridges to connect the two wings of
the army had now been made manifest, and two fine structures, available
for all arms, were completed by the nineteenth. At the same time two
foot-bridges were made, the other bridges repaired, and their approaches
made secure, though the enemy still held the approaches of the three
upper bridges on the right bank.
While these bridges were being made, mostly by the right wing of the
army, the left wing was engaged in constructing a strong line of
defence, stretching from the White-Oak Swamp to the Chickahominy,
consisting of six redoubts connected by rifle-pits or barricades.
General Barnard says,--"The object of these lines (over three miles
long) was to hold our position of the left wing against the concentrated
force of the enemy, until communications across the Chickahominy could
be established; or, if necessary, to maintain our position on this side,
while the bulk of the army was thrown upon the other, should occasion
require it; or, finally, to hold one part of our line and communication
by a small force, while our principal offensive effort was made upon
another." At the same time, several batteries were constructed on the
left bank of the river in the neighborhood of the upper bridges, either
to operate on the enemy's positions in their front, or to defend these
bridges.
All these preparations were made with the understood purpose of driving
the enemy from his positions in front of New Bridge; and they appear to
have been about completed, for on the night of the twenty-sixth "an
epaulement for putting our guns in position" to effect this object was
thrown up. But it was too late. Lee's guns had been heard in the
afternoon, in the neighborhood of Mechanicsville, attacking the advance
of our right wing, and Jackson was within supporting distance. The
battle of the twenty-seventh of June, on which "hinged the fate of the
campaign," was to be fought to-morrow. This battle, or rather the policy
of fighting it, or suffering it to be fought, has been more criticized
than any other battle of the campaign. We fought a battle which was
decisive against us with less than one-third of our force.
General Barnard is severe in his criticisms. In his "retrospect,
pointing out the mistakes that were made," he says,--
"At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the
initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had
Porter been withdrawn the night of the twenty-sixth, our army would have
been _concentrated_ on the right bank, while two corps at least of the
enemy's force were on the _left_ bank. Whatever course we then took,
whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right
bank, or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated
army, and a fair chance of a brilliant result, in the first place; and
in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the
same case on the morning of the twenty-seventh as we were on that of the
twenty-eighth,--_minus_ a lost battle and a compulsory retreat; or, had
the fortified lines (thrown up _expressly_ for the object) been held by
twenty thousand men, (as they could have been,) we could have fought on
the other side with eighty thousand men instead of twenty-seven
thousand; or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on
the right bank of the Chickahominy, we might have fought and crushed the
enemy on the left bank, reopened our communications, and then returned
and taken Richmond.
"As it was, the enemy fought with his _whole force_, (except enough left
before our lines to keep up an appearance,) and we fought with
twenty-seven thousand men, losing the battle and nine thousand men.
"By this defeat we were driven from our position, our advance of
conquest turned into a retreat for safety, by a force probably not
greatly superior to our own."
It is to be hoped that the forthcoming report of General McClellan will
give us the reasons which induced him to risk such a battle with such a
force, and modify, to some extent at least, the justice of such
outspoken censure.
The services of the engineers in passing the army over White-Oak Swamp,
in reconnoitring the line of retreat to James River, in posting troops,
and in defending the final position of the army at Harrison's Landing,
are detailed with great clearness. Of his officers the General speaks in
the highest terms. It appears, that, with a single exception, they were
all _lieutenants_, whereas "in a European service the chief engineer
serving with an army-corps would be a field-officer, generally a
colonel." In this want of rank in the corps of engineers the General
says there is a twofold evil.
"_First_, the great hardships and injustice to the officers themselves:
for they have, almost without exception, refused or _been_ refused high
positions in the volunteer service, (to which they have seen their
contemporaries of the other branches elevated,) on the ground that their
services as _engineers_ were absolutely necessary. _Second_, it is an
evil to the service: since an adequate rank is almost as necessary to an
officer for the efficient discharge of his duties as professional
knowledge. The engineer's duty is a responsible one. He is called upon
to decide important questions,--to fix the position of defensive works,
(and thereby of the _troops_ who occupy them,)--to indicate the manner
and points of attack of fortified positions. To give him the proper
weight with those with whom he is associated, he should have, as _they_
have, adequate rank.
"The campaign on the Peninsula called for great labor on the part of the
engineers. The country, notwithstanding its early settlement, was a
_terra incognita_. We knew the York River and the James River, and we
had heard of the Chickahominy; and this was about the extent of our
knowledge. Our maps were so incorrect that they were found to be
worthless before we reached Yorktown. New ones had to be prepared, based
on reconnoissances made by officers of engineers.
"The siege of Yorktown involved great responsibility, besides exposure
and toil. The movements of the whole army were determined by the
engineers. The Chickahominy again arrested us, where, if possible, the
responsibility and labor of the engineer officers were increased. In
fact, everywhere, and on every occasion, even to our last position at
Harrison's Landing, this responsibility and labor on the part of the
engineers was incessant.
"I have stated above in what manner the officers of engineers performed
their duties. Yet thus far their services are ignored and unrecognized,
while distinctions have been bestowed upon those who have had the good
fortune to command troops. Under such circumstances it can hardly be
expected that the few engineer officers yet remaining will willingly
continue their services in this unrequited branch of the military
profession. We have no sufficient officers of engineers at this time
with any of our armies to commence another siege, nor can they be
obtained. In another war, if their services are thus neglected in this,
we shall have none."
It is to be hoped that the General's appeal for additional rank to the
officers of engineers will not be overlooked. The officers of this corps
have demonstrated not only their skill as engineers, but also their
ability to command troops and even armies. On the side of our country's
cause we have McClellan, Halleck, Rosecrans, Meade, Gillmore, and
Barnard, besides a score of others, all generals; and in the ranks of
the Rebels we find Lee, Joe Johnston, Beauregard, Gilmer, and Smith, all
generals, too, and all formerly officers of engineers. Nobly have they
all vindicated the scale of proficiency which placed them among the
distinguished of their respective classes at their common Alma Mater.
Whatever may have been the services of other men during our present
struggle for nationality, and whatever may be their services in the
future, to General Barry, the Chief of Artillery of the Army of the
Potomac, from the organization of that army to the close of the
Peninsular campaign, more than to any other person, belongs the credit
of organizing our admirable system of field-artillery.
We have two reports from General Barry: one, on "The Organization of the
Artillery of the Army of the Potomac"; the other, a "Report of the
Operations of the Artillery at the Siege of Yorktown." Of the services
of the artillery during the remainder of the campaign we have no record
from its chief; but they were conspicuous on every battle-field, and
will not be forgotten until Malvern Hill shall have passed into
oblivion.
After the first Battle of Bull Run, the efforts of the nation were
directed to organizing an army for the defence of the national capital.
Of men and money we had plenty; but men and money, however necessary
they may be, do not make an army. Cannon, muskets, rifles, pistols,
sabres, horses, mules, wagons, harness, bridges, tools, food, clothing,
and numberless other things, are required; but men and money, with all
this added _matériel_ of war, still will not make an _efficient_ army.
Organization, discipline, and instruction are necessary to accomplish
this. At the time of which we speak the people of this country did not
comprehend what an army consisted of, or, if they did, they comprehended
it as children,--by its trappings, its men and horses, its drums and
fifes, its "pomp and circumstance."
Few even of our best officers who had honestly studied their profession
had ever seen an army, or fully realized the amount of labor that was
necessary, even with our unbounded resources, to organize an efficient
army ready for the field. Happily for our country, there were some who
in garrison had learned the science and theory of war, and in Mexico, or
in expeditions against our Western Indians, had acquired some knowledge
of its practice. Of these General McClellan was selected to be the
chief. He had seen armies in Europe, and it was believed that he could
bring to his aid more of the right kind of experience for organization
than any other man. If there is any one thing more than another for
which General McClellan is distinguished, it is his ability to _make an
army_. Men may have their opinions as to his genius or his courage, his
politics or his generalship; they may think he is too slow or too
cautious, or they may say he is not equal to great emergencies; but of
his ability to organize an army there is a concurrent opinion in his
favor.
By himself, however, he would have been helpless. He required
assistance. He was obliged to have chiefs of the several arms about
him,--a chief of engineers, of artillery, of cavalry, and chiefs of the
several divisions of infantry.
General Barry was his chief of artillery. To him was assigned the duty
of organizing this arm of the service. We learn from his Report, that,
"when Major-General McClellan was appointed to the command of the
'Division of the Potomac,' July 25th, 1861, a few days after the first
Battle of Bull Run, the whole field-artillery of his command consisted
of no more than parts of nine batteries, or thirty pieces of various,
and, in some instances, unusual and unserviceable calibres. Most of
these batteries were also of mixed calibres. My calculations were based
upon the expected immediate expansion of the 'Division of the Potomac'
into the 'Army of the Potomac,' to consist of at least one hundred
thousand infantry. Considerations involving the peculiar character and
extent of the force to be employed, the probable field and character of
operations, the utmost efficiency of the arm, and the limits imposed by
the as yet undeveloped resources of the nation, led to the following
general propositions, offered by me to Major-General McClellan, and
which received his full approval."