So far as I can see, the whole effect is in a certain unexpected order

and arrangement of words, independent and distinguished, like the

perfect manners of an eccentric gentleman. Say instead “Put on in death

the weeds of Dominic,” and the whole unique dignity of the line has

broken down. It is something in the quiet but confident inversion of

“Dying put on” which exactly achieves that perpetual slight novelty

which Aristotle profoundly said was the language of poetry. The idea

itself is at best an obvious and even conventional condemnation of

superstition, and in the ultimate sense a rather superficial one. Coming

where it does, indeed, it does not so much suggest moral earnestness as

rather a moralizing priggishness. For it is dragged in very laboriously

into the very last place where it is wanted, before a splendidly large

and luminous vision of the world newly created, and the first innocence

of earth and sky. It is that passage in which the wanderer through space

approaches Eden; one of the most unquestionable triumphs of all human

literature. That one book at least of “Paradise Lost” could claim the

more audacious title of “Paradise Found.” But if it was necessary for

the poet going to Eden to pass through Limbo, why was it necessary to

pass through Lambeth and Little Bethel? Why should he go there viâ Rome

and Geneva? Why was it necessary to compare the débris of Limbo to the

details of ecclesiastical quarrels in the seventeenth century, when he

was moving in a world before the dawn of all the centuries, or the

shadow of the first quarrel? Why did he talk as if the Church was

reformed before the world was made, or as if Latimer lit his candle

before God made the sun and moon? Matthew Arnold made fun of those who

claimed divine sanction for episcopacy by suggesting that when God said

“Let there be light,” He also said “Let there be Bishops.” But his own

favourite Milton went very near suggesting that when God said “Let there

be light,” He soon afterwards remarked “Let there be Nonconformists.” I

do not feel this merely because my own religious sympathies happen to be

rather on the other side. It is indeed probable that Milton did not

appreciate a whole world of ideas in which he saw merely the

corruptions: the idea of relics and symbolic acts and the drama of the

deathbed. It does not enlarge his place in the philosophy of history

that this should be his only relation either to the divine demagogy of

the Dogs of God or to the fantastical fraternity of the Jugglers of God.

But I should feel exactly the same incongruity if the theological animus

were the other way. It would be equally disproportionate if the approach

to Eden were interrupted with jokes against Puritans, or if Limbo were

littered with steeple-crowned hats and the scrolls of interminable

Calvinistic sermons. We should still feel that a book of “Paradise Lost”

was not the right place for a passage from Hudibras. So far from being

morally earnest, in the best sense, there is something almost

philosophically frivolous in the incapacity to think firmly and

magnanimously about the First Things, and the primary colours of the

creative palette, without spoiling the picture with this ink-slinging of

sectarian politics. Speaking from the standpoint of moral earnestness,

I confess it seems to me trivial and spiteful and even a little vulgar.

After which impertinent criticism, I will now repeat in a loud voice,

and for the mere lust of saying it as often as possible:

Dying put on the weeds of Dominic

Or in Franciscan think to pass disguised.

And the exuberant joy I take in it is the nearest thing I have ever

known to art for art’s sake.

In short, it seems to me that Milton was a great artist, and that he was

also a great accident. It was rather in the same sense that his master

Cromwell was a great accident. It is not true that all the moral virtues

were crystallized in Milton and his Puritans. It is not true that all

the military virtues were concentrated in Cromwell and his Ironsides.

There were masses of moral devotion on the other side, and masses of

military valour on the other side. But it did so happen that Milton had

more ability and success in literary expression, and Cromwell more

ability and success in military science, than any of their many rivals.

To represent Cromwell as a fiend or Milton as a hypocrite is to rush to

another extreme and be ridiculous; they both believed sincerely enough

in certain moral ideas of their time. Only they were not, as seems to be

supposed, the only moral ideas of their time. And they were not, in my

private opinion, the best moral ideas of their time. One of them was the

idea that wisdom is more or less weakened by laughter and a popular

taste in pleasure; and we may call this moral earnestness if we like.

But the point is that Cromwell did not succeed by his moral

earnestness, but by his strategy; and Milton did not succeed by his

moral earnestness, but by his style.

And, first of all, let me touch on the highest form of moral earnestness

and the relation of Milton to the religious poetry of his day. “Paradise

Lost” is certainly a religious poem; but, for many of its admirers, the

religion is the least admirable part of it. The poet professes indeed to

justify the ways of God to men; but I never heard of any men who read it

in order to have them justified, as men do still read a really religious

poem, like the dark and almost sceptical Book of Job. A poem can hardly

be said to justify the ways of God, when its most frequent effect is

admittedly to make people sympathize with Satan. In all this I am in a

sense arguing against myself; for all my instincts, as I have said, are

against the æsthetic theory that art so great can be wholly irreligious.

And I agree that even in Milton there are gleams of Christianity. Nobody

quite without them could have written the single line: “By the dear

might of Him that walked the waves.” But it is hardly too much to say

that it is the one place where that Figure walks in the whole world of

Milton. Nobody, I imagine, has ever been able to recognize Christ in the

cold conqueror who drives a chariot in the war in heaven, like Apollo

warring on the Titans. Nobody has ever heard Him in the stately

disquisitions either of the Council in Heaven or of Paradise Regained.

But, apart from all these particular problems, it is surely the general

truth that the great religious epic strikes us with a sense of

disproportion; the sense of how little it is religious considering how

manifestly it is great. It seems almost strange that a man should have

written so much and so well without stumbling on Christian tradition.

Now in the age of Milton there was a riot of religious poetry. Most of

it had moral earnestness, and much of it had splendid spiritual

conviction. But most of it was not the poetry of the Puritans; on the

contrary, it was mostly the poetry of the Cavaliers. The most real

religion--we might say the most realistic religion--is not to be found

in Milton, but in Vaughan, in Treherne, in Crashaw, in Herbert, and even

in Herrick. The best proof of it is that the religion is alive to-day,

as religion and not merely as literature. A Roman Catholic can read

Crashaw, an Anglo-Catholic can read Herbert, in a direct devotional

spirit; I gravely doubt whether many modern Congregationalists read the

theology of “Paradise Lost” in that spirit. For the moment I mention

only this purely religious emotion; I do not deny that Milton’s poetry,

like all great poetry, can awaken other great emotions. For instance, a

man bereaved by one of the tragedies of the Great War might well find a

stoical serenity in the great lines beginning “Nothing is here for

tears.” That sort of consolation is uttered, as nobly as it could be

uttered, by Milton; but it might be uttered by Sophocles or Goethe, or

even by Lucretius or Voltaire. But supposing that a man were seeking a

more Christian kind of consolation, he would not find it in Milton at

all, as he would find it in the lines beginning “They are all gone into

the world of light.” The whole of the two great Puritan epics do not

contain all that is said in saying “O holy hope and high humility.”

Neither hope nor humility were Puritan specialities.

But it was not only in devotional mysticism that these Cavaliers could

challenge the great Puritan; it was in a mysticism more humanistic and

even more modern. They shine with that white mystery of daylight which

many suppose to have dawned with Wordsworth and with Blake. In that

sense they make earth mystical where Milton only made heaven material.

Nor are they inferior in philosophic freedom; the single line of

Crashaw, addressed to a woman, “By thy large draughts of intellectual

day,” is less likely, I fancy, to have been addressed by Adam to Eve, or

by Milton to Mrs. Milton. It seems to me that these men were superior to

Milton in magnanimity, in chivalry, in joy of life, in the balance of

sanity and subtlety, in everything except the fact (not wholly remote

from literary criticism) that they did not write so well as he did. But

they wrote well enough to lift the load of materialism from the English

name; and show us the shining fields of a paradise that is not wholly

lost.

Of such was the Anti-Puritan party; and the reader may learn more about

it from the author of “The Glass of Fashion.” There he may form a

general idea of how, but for the Puritans, England would have been

abandoned to mere ribaldry and licence; blasted by the blasphemies of

George Herbert; rolled in the mire of the vile materialism of Vaughan;

tickled to ribald laughter by the cheap cynicism and tap-room

familiarities of Crashaw and Treherne. But the same Cavalier tradition

continued into the next age, and indeed into the next century; and the

critic must extend his condemnation to include the brutal buffooneries

of Bishop Ken or the gay and careless worldliness of Jeremy Collier.

Nay, he must extend it to cover the last Tories who kept the tradition

of the Jacobites; the careless merriment of Dean Swift, the godless

dissipation of Dr. Johnson. None of these men were Puritans; all of them

were strong opponents of political and religious Puritanism. The truth

is that English literature bears a very continuous and splendid

testimony to the fact that England was not merely Puritan. Ben Jonson in

“Bartholomew Fair” spoke for most English people, and certainly for most

English poets. Anti-Puritanism was the one thing common to Shakespeare

and Dryden, to Swift and Johnson, to Cobbett and Dickens. And the

historical bias the other way has come, not from Puritan superiority,

but simply from Puritan success. It was the political triumph of the

party, in the Revolution and the resultant commercial industrialism,

that suppressed the testimony of the populace and the poets. Loyalty

died away in a few popular songs; the Cromwellians never had any popular

song to die. English history has moved away from English literature. Our

culture, like our agriculture, is at once very native and very

neglected. And as this neglect is regrettable, if only as neglect of

literature, I will pause in conclusion upon the later period, two

generations after Milton, when the last of the true Tories drank wine

with Bolingbroke or tea with Johnson.

The truth that is missed about the Tories of this tradition is that they

were rebels. They had the virtues of rebels; they also had the vices of

rebels. Swift had the fury of a rebel; Johnson the surliness of a

rebel; Goldsmith the morbid sensibility of a rebel; and Scott, at the

end of the process, something of the despair and mere retrospection of a

defeated rebel. And the Whig school of literary criticism, like the Whig

school of political history, has omitted or missed this truth about

them, because it necessarily omitted the very existence of the thing

against which they rebelled. For Macaulay and Thackeray and the average

of Victorian liberality the Revolution of 1688 was simply an

emancipation, the defeat of the Stuarts was simply a downfall of tyranny

and superstition; the politics of the eighteenth century were simply a

progress leading up to the pure and happy politics of the nineteenth

century; freedom slowly broadening down, etc., etc. This makes the

attitude of the Tory rebels entirely meaningless; so that the critics in

question have been forced to represent some of the greatest Englishmen

who ever lived as a mere procession of lunatics and ludicrous

eccentrics. But these rebels, right or wrong, can only be understood in

relation to the real power against which they were rebelling; and their

titanic figures can best be traced in the light of the lightning which

they defied. That power was a positive thing; it was anything but a mere

negative emancipation of everybody. It was as definite as the monarchy

which it had replaced; for it was an aristocracy that replaced it. It

was the oligarchy of the great Whig families, a very close corporation

indeed, having Parliament for its legal form, but the new wealth for its

essential substance. That is why these lingering Jacobites appear most

picturesque when they are pitted against some of the princes of the new

aristocratic order. That is why Bolingbroke remains in the memory,

standing in his box at the performance of “Cato,” and flinging forth his

defiance to Marlborough. That is why Johnson remains rigid in his

magnificent disdain, hurling his defiance at Chesterfield. Churchill and

Chesterfield were not small men, either in personality or in power; they

were brilliant ornaments of the triumph of the world. They represented

the English governing class when it could really govern; the modern

plutocracy when it still deserved to be called an aristocracy also. And

the whole point of the position of these men of letters is that they

were denying and denouncing something which was growing every day in

prestige and prosperity; which seemed to have, and indeed had, not only

the present but the future on its side. The only thing it had not got on

its side was the ancient tradition of the English populace. That

populace was being more and more harried by evictions and enclosures,

that its old common lands and yeoman freeholds might be added to the

enormous estates of the all-powerful aristocracy. One of the Tory rebels

has himself made that infamy immortal in the great lines of the

“Deserted Village.” At least, it is immortal in the sense that it can

never now be lost for lovers of English literature; but even this record

was for a long time lost to the public by under-valuation and neglect.

In recent times the “Deserted Village” was very much of a deserted poem.

But of that I may have occasion to speak later. The point for the moment

is that the psychology of these men, in its evil as well as its good, is

to be interpreted not so much in terms of a lingering loyalty as of a

frustrated revolution. Some of them had, of course, elements of

extravagance and morbidity peculiar to their own characters; but they

grew ten times more extravagant and more morbid as their souls swelled

within them at the success of the shameless and the insolence of the

fortunate. I doubt whether anybody ever felt so bitter against the

Stuarts. Now this misunderstanding has made a very regrettable gap in

literary criticism. The masterpieces of these men are represented as

much more crabbed or cranky or inconsequent than they really were,

because their objective is not seen objectively. It is like judging the

raving of some Puritan preacher without allowing for the fact that the

Pope or the King had ever possessed any power at all. To ignore the fact

of the great Whig families because of the legal fiction of a free

Parliament is like ignoring the feelings of the Christian martyrs about

Nero, because of the legal fiction that the Imperator was only a

military general. These fictions do not prevent imaginative persons from

writing books like the “Apocalypse” or books like “Gulliver’s Travels.”

I will take only one example of what I mean by this purely literary

misunderstanding: an example from “Gulliver’s Travels” itself. The case

of the under-valuation of Swift is a particularly subtle one, for Swift

was really unbalanced as an individual, which has made it much easier

for critics not to keep the rather delicate balance of justice about

him. There is a superficial case for saying he was mad, apart from the

physical accident of his madness; but the point is that even those who

have realized that he was sometimes mad with rage have not realized

what he was in a rage with. And there is a curious illustration of this

in the conclusion of the story of Gulliver. Everyone remembers the ugly

business about the Yahoos, and the still uglier business about the real

human beings who reminded the returned traveller of Yahoos; how Gulliver

shrank at first from his friends, and would only gradually consent to

sit near his wife. And everybody remembers the picturesque but hostile

sketch which Thackeray gives of the satire and the satirist; of Swift as

the black and evil blasphemer sitting down to write his terrible

allegory, of which the only moral is that all things are, and always

must be, valueless and vile. I say that everybody remembers both these

literary passages; but, indeed, I fear that many remember the critical

who do not really remember the creative passage, and that many have read

Thackeray who have not read Swift.

Now it is here that purely literary criticism has a word to say. A man

of letters may be mad or sane in his cerebral constitution; he may be

right or wrong in his political antipathies; he may be anything we

happen to like or dislike from our own individual standpoint. But there

is one thing to which a man of letters has a right, whatever he is, and

that is a fair critical comprehension of any particular literary effect

which he obviously aims at and achieves. He has a right to his climax,

and a right not to be judged without reference to his climax. It would

not be fair to leave out the beautiful last lines of “Paradise Lost” as

mere bathos; without realizing that the poet had a fine intention in

allowing that conclusion, after all the thunder and the trumps of doom,

to fall and fade away on a milder note of mercy and reasonable hope. It

would not be fair to stigmatize the incident of Ignorance, damned at the

very doors of heaven at the end of Bunyan’s book, as a mere blot of

black Calvinist cruelty and spite, without realizing that the writer

fully intended its fearful irony, like a last touch of the finger of

fear. But this justice which is done to the Puritan masters of

imagination has hardly been done to the great Tory master of irony. No

critic I have read has noticed the real point and climax of that passage

about the Yahoos. Swift leads up to it ruthlessly enough, for an artist

of that sort is often ruthless; and it is increased by his natural

talent for a sort of mad reality of detail, as in his description of the

slowly diminished distance between himself and his wife at the

dinner-table. But he was working up to something that he really wished

to say, something which was well worth saying, but which few seem to

have thought worth hearing. He suggests that he gradually lost the

loathing for humanity with which the Yahoo parallel had inspired him,

that although men are in many ways petty and animal, he came to feel

them to be normal and tolerable; that the sense of their unworthiness

now very seldom returns; and indeed that there is only one thing that

revives it. If one of these creatures exhibits Pride----.

That is the voice of Swift, and the cry arraigning aristocracy. It is

natural for a monkey to collect nuts, and it may be pardonable for John

Churchill to collect guineas. But to think that John Churchill can be

proud of his heap of guineas, can convert them into stars and coronets,

and can carry that calm and classic face disdainful above the

multitude! It is natural for she-monkeys to be mated somehow; but to

think that the Duchess of Yarmouth is proud of being the Duchess of

Yarmouth! It may not be surprising that the nobility should have

scrambled like screaming Yahoos for the rags and ribbons of the

Revolution, tripping up and betraying anybody and everybody in turn,

with every dirty trick of treason, for anything and everything they

could get. But that those of them who had got everything should then

despise those who had got nothing, that the rich should sneer at the

poor for having no part of the plunder, that this oligarchy of Yahoos

should actually feel superior to anything or anybody--that does move the

prophet of the losing side to an indignation which is something much

deeper and nobler than the negative flippancies that we call blasphemy.

Swift was perhaps more of a Jeremiah than an Isaiah, and a faulty

Jeremiah at that; but in this great climax of his grim satire he is none

the less a seer and a speaker of the things of God; because he gives the

testimony of the strongest and most searching of human intellects to the

profound truth of the meanness and imbecility of pride.

And the other men of the same tradition had essentially the same

instinct. Johnson was in many ways unjust to Swift, just as Cobbett was

afterwards unjust to Johnson. But looking back up the perspective of

history we can all see that those three great men were all facing the

same way; that they all regretted the rise of a rapacious and paganized

commercial aristocracy, and its conquest over the old popular

traditions, which some would call popular prejudices. When Johnson said

that the devil was the first Whig, he might have merely varied the

phrase by saying that he was the first aristocrat. For the men of this

Tory tradition, in spirit if not in definition, distinguished between

the privilege of monarchy and that of the new aristocracy by a very

tenable test. The mark of aristocracy is ambition. The king cannot be

ambitious. We might put it now by saying that monarchy is authority; but

in its essence aristocracy is always anarchy. But the men of that school

did not criticize the oligarch merely as a rebel against those above;

they were well aware of his activities as an oppressor of those below.

This aspect, as has already been noted, was best described by a friend

of Johnson, for whom Johnson had a very noble and rather unique

appreciation--Oliver Goldsmith.

A recent and sympathetic critic in the _Mercury_ used the phrase that

Mr. Belloc had been anticipated by Disraeli in his view of England as

having evolved into a Venetian oligarchy. The truth is that Disraeli was

anticipated by Bolingbroke and the many highly intelligent men who

agreed with him; and not least by Goldsmith. The whole view, including

the very parallel with Venice, can be found stated with luminous logic

and cogency in the “Vicar of Wakefield.” And Goldsmith attacked the

problem entirely from the popular side. Nobody can mistake his Toryism

for a snobbish submission to a privilege or title:

Princes and lords, the shadow of a shade,

A breath can make them, as a breath has made:

But a bold peasantry, a nation’s pride,

When once destroyed can never be supplied.

I hope he was wrong; but I sometimes have a horrible feeling that he may

have been right.

But I have here, thank God, no cause for touching upon modern politics.

I was educated, as much as my critic, in the belief that Whiggism was a

pure deliverance; and I hope I am still as willing as he to respect

Puritans for their individual virtue as well as for their individual

genius. But it moves all my memories of the unmorality of the ’nineties

to be charged with indifference to the importance of being earnest. And

it is for the sake of English literature that I protest against the

suggestion that we had no purity except Puritanism, or that only a man

like the author of “Paradise Lost” could manage to be on the side of the

angels.

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