Equal Opportunity in the Military Community
When Secretary McNamara issued his equal opportunity directive in
1963, all segregated public accommodations, schools, and even housing
near military reservations became potential targets of the Department
of Defense's integration drive. This change in policy was substantive,
but the traditionalists who feared the sudden intrusion of the
services into local community affairs and the reformers who later
charged McNamara with procrastination missed the point. More than a
declaration of racial principles, the directive was a guideline for
the progressive application of a series of administrative pressures.
Endorsing the Gesell Committee's concept of command responsibility,
McNamara enjoined the local commander to oppose discrimination and
foster equal opportunity both on and off the military base. He also
endorsed the committee's recommendation for the use of economic
sanctions in cases where voluntary compliance could not be obtained.
By demanding the approval of the service secretaries for the use of
sanctions, McNamara served notice that this serious application of the
commander's authority would be limited and infrequent. He avoided
altogether the committee's call for closing military bases.
The secretary's critics overlooked the fact that no exact timetable
was set for the reforms outlined in the directive, and actually
several factors were operating against precipitate action on
discrimination outside the military reservation. Strong sentiment
existed among service officials for leaving off-base discrimination
problems to the Department of Justice, and, as early reactions to the
committee report revealed, the committee's findings did little to
alter these feelings. More important, the inclination to postpone the
more controversial aspects of the equal opportunity directive received
support from the White House itself. Political wisdom dictated that
the Department of Defense refrain from any dramatic move in the civil
rights field while Congress debated the civil rights bill, a primary
legislative goal of both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
"Avoid civil rights spectaculars" was the White House's word to the
executive departments while the civil rights act hung fire.[22-1]
[Footnote 22-1: Quoted in Ltr, Fitt to author, 22 May
72; see also Interv, author with Jordan, 7 Jun 72.]
The lack of pressure by black servicemen and civil rights advocates
lent itself to official procrastination. Civil rights organizations,
preoccupied with racial unrest throughout the nation and anxious for
the passage of new civil rights legislation, seemed to lose some (p. 557)
of their intense interest in service problems. They paid scant
attention to the directive beyond probing for the outer limits of the
new policy. In the months following the directive, officials of the
NAACP and other organizations shot off a spate of requests for the
imposition of off-limits sanctions against certain businesses and
schools and in some cases even whole towns and cities.[22-2] When
Defense Department officials made clear that sanctions were to be a
last, not first, resort and offered the cooperation of local
commanders for a joint effort against local discrimination through
voluntary compliance, the demands of the civil rights organizations
petered out.[22-3]
[Footnote 22-2: See Ltr, J. Francis Pohlhous, Counsel,
Washington Bureau, NAACP, to SecDef, 5 Aug 63, ASD
(M) 291.2; Telg, NAACP Commanders to SecDef, DA IN
886952, ASD (M) 334 Equal Opportunity in Armed
Forces (21 Jul 63); Ltr, Juanita Mitchell,
President, Baltimore Branch, NAACP, to SecDef, 11
May 64, copy in CMH. Sec also New York _Times_,
July 23, 1963.]
[Footnote 22-3: See Ltrs, DASD (CR) to J. Francis
Pohlhous, 15 Aug and 6 Sep 63; Albert Fritz, Utah
Branch, NAACP, 29 Aug 63; and Juanita Mitchell, 18
Mar 64. See also Ltr, DASD (Civ Pers, Industrial
Relations, and Civil Rights) to Moses Newsom,
_Afro-American Newspapers_, 2 Feb 65. Copies of all
in CMH.]
According to a 1964 survey of black servicemen and veterans, this
group enjoyed military life more than whites and were more favorably
disposed toward the equal opportunity efforts of the Department of
Defense.[22-4] They continued to complain, but the volume of their
complaints was considerably reduced. One unsettling note: although
fewer in number, the complaints were often addressed to the White
House, the Justice Department, the civil rights organizations, or the
Secretary of Defense, thus confirming the Gesell Committee's finding
that black servicemen continued to distrust the services' interest in
or ability to administer justice.[22-5]
[Footnote 22-4: Charles Moskos, "Findings on American
Military Establishment" (Northeastern University,
1967), quoted in Yarmolinsky, _The Military
Establishment_, p. 343.]
[Footnote 22-5: For many examples of these racial
complaints and their disposition, see DASD (CR)
files, 1963-64, especially Access Nos. 68-A-1006
and 68-A-1033.]
The Secretary of Defense's manpower staff processed all these
complaints. It dismissed those considered unrelated to race but
forwarded many to the individual services with requests for immediate
remedial action. Significantly, those involving the violation of a
serviceman's civil rights off base continued to be sent to the Justice
Department for disposition. Defense Department officials themselves
adjudicated the hundreds of discrimination cases involving civilian
employees.[22-6]
[Footnote 22-6: The Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower) prepared a monthly compilation of all
discrimination cases in the Department of Defense
involving civilian employees. Originally requested
by then Vice President Lyndon Johnson in his
capacity as chairman of the President's Committee
on Equal Opportunity in Employment in June 1962,
the reports were continued after the Gesell
Committee disbanded. The report for November 1963,
for example, listed 144 cases of "Contractor
Complaints" investigated and adjudicated and 159
cases of "In-House Complaints" being processed in
the Department of Defense. See Memo, ASD (M) for SA
et al., 20 Dec 63, ASD (M) 291.2.]
In the weeks and months following publication of the equal opportunity
directive, official replies to the demands and complaints of black
servicemen and their allies in the civil rights organizations
continued to be carefully circumscribed. Whatever skepticism such
restricted application of the Gesell recommendations may have produced
among the civil rights leaders, the department found itself
surprisingly free from outside pressure. It was able to set the pace
of its own reform and to avoid meanwhile a clash with either (p. 558)
reformers or segregationists over major civil rights issues of the
day.
_Creating a Civil Rights Apparatus_
The Defense Department could do little about discrimination either on
or off the military reservation until it was better organized for the
task. The secretary needed new bureaucratic tools with which to
develop new civil rights procedures, unite the disparate service
programs, and document whatever failures might occur. He created a
civil rights secretariat, assigning to his manpower assistant, Norman
S. Paul,[22-7] the responsibility for promoting equal opportunity in
the armed forces. Although racial affairs had always been considered
among the manpower secretary's general duties, with precedents
reaching back through the Personnel Policy Board to World War II when
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy supervised the employment of
black troops, McNamara now significantly increased these
responsibilities. The assistant secretary would represent him "in
civil rights matters," would direct the department's equal opportunity
programs, and would provide policy guidance for the military
departments, reviewing their policies, regulations, instructions, and
manuals and monitoring their performance.[22-8] To carry out these
functions, the Secretary of Defense authorized his assistant to create
a deputy assistant secretary for civil rights.[22-9] Again a precedent
existed for the secretary's move. In January 1963 Paul had assigned an
assistant to coordinate the department's racial activities.[22-10] The
reorganization transferred the person and duties of the secretary's
civilian aide, James C. Evans, to the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Civil Rights. The new organization was thus provided
with a pedigree traceable to World War I and the work of Emmett J.
Scott,[22-11] although Evans' move to the deputy's staff was the only
connection between Scott and that office. The civilian aides, limited
by the traditionally indifferent attitudes of the services toward
equal opportunity programs, had been used to advise civilian officials
on complaints from the black community, especially black servicemen,
and to rationalize service policies for civil rights organizations.
The new civil rights office, reflecting McNamara's positive
intentions, was organized to monitor and instruct military
departments.
[Footnote 22-7: Norman S. Paul succeeded Carlisle
Runge as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)
on 8 August 1962.]
[Footnote 22-8: DOD Dir 5120.36, 26 Jul 63. For an
extended discussion of the functions of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) and his
civil rights deputy, see Memo, DASD (CR) for Mr.
Paul, 21 Sep 65, sub: Policy Formulation, Planning
and Action in the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Civil Rights), 26 July
1963-26 September 1965, ASD (M) 291.2. This
significant document, a progress report on civil
rights in the first two years of McNamara's new
program, is an important source for much of the
following discussion and will be referred to
hereafter as Paul Memo.]
[Footnote 22-9: DOD News Release 1057-63, 29 Jul 63.]
[Footnote 22-10: Memo, ASD (M) for DASD (Education) et
al., 23 Jan 63, sub: Coordination of All Matters
Related to Racial Problems, ASD (M) 291.2.]
[Footnote 22-11: Evans' predecessors included Emmett
J. Scott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
War, 1917-19; William H. Hastie, Civilian Aide to
the Secretary of War, 1940-43; Truman K. Gibson,
1944-46; and Marcus H. Ray, 1946-47. Evans left
Army employ to join the staff of the Secretary of
Defense in 1947. See Memo for Rcd, Counselor to ASD
(M), 1 Mar 62, ASD (M) 291.2.]
The civil rights deputy was a relatively powerless bureaucrat. (p. 559)
He might investigate discrimination and isolate its causes, but he
enjoyed no independent power to reform service practices. His
substantive dealings with the services had to be staffed through his
superior, the Assistant Secretary for Manpower, a man to whom equal
opportunity was but one of many problems and who might well question
new or aggressive civil rights tactics. Such an attitude was
understandable in an official with little or no experience in civil
rights matters and no day-to-day contact with civil rights operations.
Norman Paul, whose experience was in legislative liaison, might also
be especially sensitive to the possibility of congressional or public
criticism.[22-12] Indicative of the assistant secretary's attitude
toward his civil rights deputy was the fact that the position was
reorganized and retitled, with some significant corresponding changes
in function each time, a bewildering five times in ten years.[22-13]
To add to the problems of the civil rights office, nine different men
were to occupy the deputy's position, three of them in the capacity of
acting deputy, in that same decade.[22-14]
[Footnote 22-12: Before assuming the manpower
position, Norman Paul was the chief of legislative
liaison for the Department of Defense. For a
critique of the work of the ASD (M) incumbents in
the racial field, see O'Brien's interview with
Gilpatric, 5 May 70, J. F. Kennedy Library.]
[Footnote 22-13: For a discussion of the effect of the
proliferation of assistants in the manpower office,
see USAF oral history interview with Evans, 24 Apr
73.]
[Footnote 22-14: The incumbents were Alfred B. Fitt,
Stephen N. Shulman, Jack Moskowitz, L. Howard
Bennett (acting), Frank W. Render II, Donald L.
Miller, Curtis R. Smothers (acting), Stuart Broad
(acting), and H. Minton Francis.]
The organization of the equal opportunity program of the Secretary of
Defense was not without its critics. Some wanted to enhance the
prestige of the equal opportunity program by creating a separate
assistant secretary for civil rights.[22-15] Such an official,
accountable to the Secretary of Defense alone, would be free to direct
the services' racial activities and, they agreed, would also serve as
a highly visible symbol to servicemen and civil rights advocates alike
of the department's determination to execute its new policy. Others,
however, defended the existing organization, arguing that racial
discrimination was a manpower problem, and the number of assistant
secretaries was fixed by law and the chance of congressional approval
for yet another manpower position was remote.[22-16]
[Footnote 22-15: This solution was still being
recommended a decade later; see Department of
Defense, "Report of the Task Force on the
Administration of Military Justice in the Armed
Forces," 30 Nov 72, vol. I, pp. 51, 112. See also
Interv, author with L. Howard Bennett (former DASD
[CR]), 13 Dec 73, CMH files.]
[Footnote 22-16: Interv, author with Col George R. H.
Johnson, Deputy, Plans and Policy, DASD (Equal
Opportunity), 9 Aug 73, CMH files.]
These organizational problems had yet to appear in July 1963 when at
Yarmolinsky's suggestion Secretary McNamara appointed Alfred B. Fitt
the first civil rights deputy. Since 1961 the Army's Deputy Under
Secretary for Manpower, Fitt had recently been on loan to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to coordinate the department's responses
to the Gesell Committee. He was the author of the equal opportunity
directive signed by McNamara, and his personal views on the subject,
while consistent with those of Yarmolinsky and McNamara, were often
expressed in more advanced terms. Going beyond the usual arguments for
equal treatment based on morale and military efficiency, Fitt (p. 560)
referred to the black servicemen's struggle as a moral issue. He was
glad, he later confessed, to be on the right side of such an issue,
and he felt indebted to the positive racial policies of Kennedy and
Johnson and their Secretary of Defense.[22-17] He quickly gathered
around him a staff of like-minded experts who proceeded to their first
task, a review of the services' outline plans called for in the
secretary's directive.[22-18]
[Footnote 22-17: Ltr, DASD (CR) to Gesell, 28 Jul 64,
Gesell Collection, J. F. Kennedy Library.]
[Footnote 22-18: Interv, author with Jordan, 7 Jun
72.]
[Illustration: ARRIVING IN VIETNAM. _101st Airborne Division troops
aboard the USNS General Le Roy Eltinge._]
Although merely outlines of proposed service programs, the three plans
submitted in July and August nevertheless reflected the emphasis on
off-base discrimination preached by the Gesell Committee and endorsed
by the Secretary of Defense.[22-19] The plans also revealed the
services' essential satisfaction with their current on-base programs,
although each outlined further reforms within the military community.
The Navy, for example, announced reforms in recruitment methods, and
the Army planned the development of more racially equitable training
programs and job assignments. All three services discussed new (p. 561)
provisions for monitoring their equal opportunity programs, with the
Army including explicit provisions for the processing of servicemen's
racial complaints. And to insure the coordination of equal opportunity
matters in future staff decisions, each service also announced (the
Navy in a separate staff action) the formation of an equal opportunity
organization in its military staff: an Equal Rights Branch in the
office of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, an Equal
Opportunity Group in the Air Force's Directorate of Personnel Planning
to work in conjunction with its Secretary's Committee on Equal
Opportunity, and an Ad Hoc Committee in the Navy's Bureau of
Personnel.
[Footnote 22-19: Memos: Dep to SecAF for Manpower,
Personnel, and Organization for ASD (M), 15 Aug 63,
sub: Implementation of DOD Directive 5120.36; SA
for ASD (M), 15 Aug 63, sub: Equal Opportunity in
the Armed Forces; Under SecNav for ASD (M), 15 Aug
63, sub: Outline Plan for Implementing Department
of Defense Directive 5120.36, "Equal Opportunity in
the Armed Forces," dated 26 Jul 63. All in ASD (M)
291.2.]
The outline plans revealed that the services entertained differing
interpretations of the McNamara call for command responsibility in
equal opportunity matters. The Gesell Committee had considered this
responsibility of fundamental importance and wanted the local
commander held accountable and his activities in this area made part
of his performance rating. There was some disagreement among manpower
experts on this point. How, one critic asked, could the services set
up standards against which a commander's performance might be fairly
judged? How could they insure that an overzealous commander might
not, in the interest of a higher efficiency report, upset
anti-discrimination programs that called for subtle negotiation?[22-20]
But to Chairman Gesell the equal opportunity situation demanded
action, and how could this demand be better impressed on the commander
than by the knowledge that his performance was being measured?[22-21]
The point of this argument, which the committee accepted, was that
unless personal responsibility was fixed, policies and directives on
equal opportunity were just so much rhetoric.
[Footnote 22-20: Interv, author with Davenport, 2 Aug
73, CMH files.]
[Footnote 22-21: Interv, author with Gesell, 13 May
72.]
Only the Army's outline plan explicitly adopted the committee's
controversial recommendation that "the effective performance of
commanders in this area will be considered along with other
responsibilities in determining his overall manner of duty
performance." The Navy equivocated. Commanders would "monitor
continually racial matters with a goal toward improvement." The
Inspectors General of the Navy and Marine Corps were "instructed to
appraise" all command procedures. The Air Force expected base base
commanders to concern themselves with the welfare nondiscriminatory
treatment of its servicemen when they were away from the base, but it
left them considerable freedom in the matter. "The military mission is
predominant," the Air Force announced, and the local commander must be
given wide latitude in dealing with discrimination cases since "each
community presented a different situation for which local solutions
must be developed."
The decision by the Navy and Air Force to exempt commanders from
explicit responsibility in equal opportunity matters came after some
six months of soul-searching. Under Secretary of the Navy Fay agreed
with his superior that the Navy's equal opportunity "image" suffered
in comparison to the other services and the percentage of Negroes in
the Navy and Marine Corps left much to be desired. But when (p. 562)
ordered by Secretary Fred Korth to develop a realistic approach to
equal opportunity in consultation with the Gesell Committee, Fay's
response tended to ignore service shortcomings and, most significantly,
failed to fix responsibility for equal opportunity matters. He
proposed to revise Navy instructions to provide for increased liaison
between local commanders and community leaders and monitor civil
rights cases involving naval personnel, but his response neither
discussed new ways to increase job opportunities for Negroes nor
mentioned making equal opportunity performance a part of the military
efficiency rating system.[22-22] His elaborate provisions for
monitoring and reporting notwithstanding, his efforts appeared
primarily cosmetic.
[Footnote 22-22: Memo, Under SecNav for SecNav, 7 Feb
63, sub: Equal Opportunity in the Navy and Marine
Corps, SecNav file 5420, GenRecsNav.]
[Illustration: DIGGING IN. _Men of M Company, 7th Marines, construct a
defense bunker during "Operation Desoto," Vietnam._]
Undoubtedly, the Navy's image in the black community needed some
refurbishing. Despite substantial changes in the racial composition of
the Steward's Branch in recent years, Negroes continued to avoid naval
service, as a special Navy investigation later found, because "they
have little desire to become stewards or cooks."[22-23] Fay believed
that the shortage of Negroes was part of a general problem shared by
all the services. His public relations proposals were designed (p. 563)
to overcome the difficulty of attracting volunteers. His recommendations
were approved by Secretary Korth in February 1963 and disseminated
throughout the Navy and Marine Corps for execution.[22-24] With only
minor modification they were also later submitted to the Secretary of
Defense as the Navy's outline plan.
[Footnote 22-23: Memo, David M. Clinard, Spec Asst,
for SecNav, 11 Oct 63, sub: Interviews With Negro
Personnel at Andrews Air Force Base, copy in CMH.]
[Footnote 22-24: SecNav Instruction 5350.2A, 6 Mar 63;
Personal Ltr, SecNav to All Flag and General
Officers et al., 26 Mar 63, copy in CMH; SecNav
Notice 5350, 3 Apr 63; AlNav 28, 6 Sep 63. See also
Cmdt, USMC, Report of Progress--Equal Opportunity
in the United States Marine Corps (ca. 30 Jun 63),
Hist Div HQMC; Memo, Chief, NavPers, for Under
SecNav, 20 May 63, sub: Interim Progress Report on
Navy Measures..., SecNav file 5420, GenRecsNav.]
Even as Fay settled on these modest changes, signs pointed to the
possibility that the department's military leaders would be amenable
to more substantial reform. The Chief of Naval Personnel admitted that
the Gesell Committee's charges against the service were "to some
extent" justified and warned naval commanders that if they failed to
take a more positive approach to equal opportunity they would be
ordered to take actions difficult for both the Navy and the community.
Better "palatable evolutionary progress," he counseled, than "bitter
revolutionary change."[22-25]
[Footnote 22-25: Ltr, Chief, NavPers, to CONUS
District Cmdrs et al., 22 Apr 63, attached to Memo,
Chief, NavPers, for Distribution List, 24 Apr 63,
sub: President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in
the Armed Forces, SecNav file 5420, GenRecsNav.]
Air Force officials had also considered the problem of command
responsibility in the months before submitting their outline plan. As
early as December 1962, Under Secretary Joseph V. Charyk admitted the
possibility of confusion over what the policy of base commanders
should be concerning off-base segregation. He proposed that the staff
consider certain "minimum" actions, including "mandatory evaluation of
all officers concerning their knowledge of this program and the extent
to which they have complied with the policy of anti-discrimination."[22-26]
Secretary Zuckert discussed Charyk's proposal with his assistants on
23 January 1963. It was also considered by McNamara, who then passed
it to the other services, calling on them to develop similar
programs.[22-27] Finally, Air Force officials discussed command
responsibility in preparing their critique of Gesell Committee
recommendations, and Secretary Zuckert informed Assistant Secretary of
Defense Paul that "the responsibility for this [the Air Force's
anti-discrimination] program will be clearly designated down to base
level."[22-28] Despite this attention, the subject of specific command
responsibility was not clearly delineated in the Air Force's outline
plan.
[Footnote 22-26: Memo, Actg SecAF CofSAF, 8 Dec 62,
sub: Anti-Discrimination Policy in the Military
Service, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 22-27: Memo, SecDef for SA and Navy, 4 Mar
63, sub: Anti-Discrimination Policy in the Military
Service, copy in CMH. McNamara received the Air
Force document from Charyk through Yarmolinsky. See
Memo, Benjamin Fridge, Spec Asst for Manpower and
Reserve Forces, for SecAF, 4 Mar 63, sub:
Anti-Discrimination Policies; see also Memo, Asst
Vice CofS, USAF, for SecAF, 26 Feb 63, same sub,
687-63; both in SecAF files.]
[Footnote 22-28: Memo, SecAF for ASD (M), 10 Jul 63,
sub: Air Force Response to the Gesell Committee
Report, ASD (M) 291.2.]
Paul ignored the critical differences in the services' outline plans
when he approved all three without distinction on 13 September.[29]
Alfred Fitt later explained why the Department had not insisted (p. 564)
the services adopt the committee's specific recommendations
on command responsibility. Commenting on the committee's call for the
appointment of a special officer at each base to transmit black
servicemen's grievances to base commanders, Fitt acknowledged that
most Negroes were reluctant to complain, but said the services were
aware of this reluctance and had already devised means to overcome it.
Problems in communication, he pointed out, were leadership problems,
and commanders must be left free to find their own method of learning
about conditions in their commands. As for the committee's suggestion
that equal opportunity initiatives in the local community be made a
consideration in the promotion of the commander, the Defense
Department had temporized. Such initiatives, Fitt explained, might be
considered part of the commander's total performance, but it should
never be the governing factor in determining advancement.[30]
[Footnote 22-29: Memo, ASD (M) for Under SA et al., 13
Sep 63, sub: DOD Directive 5120.36, 26 Jul 63,
Equal Opportunity, ASD (M) 291.2.]
[Footnote 22-30: Alfred B. Fitt, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Civil Rights), "Remarks
Before Civilian Aides Conference of the Secretary
of the Army," 6 Mar 64, copy in CMH.]
Yet the principle of command responsibility was not completely
ignored, for Paul made his approval of the plans contingent on several
additional service actions. Each service had to prepare for commanders
an instruction manual dealing with the discharge of their equal
opportunity responsibilities, develop an equal opportunity information
program for the periodic orientation of all personnel, and institute
some method of insuring that all new commanders promptly reviewed
equal opportunity programs applicable to their commands. The secretary
also set deadlines for putting the plans into effect. The preparation
of these comprehensive regulations and manuals, however, took much
longer than expected, a delay, Fitt admitted, that slowed equal
opportunity progress to some extent.[22-31] In fact, it was not until
January 1965 that the last of the basic service regulations on equal
opportunity was published.[22-32]
[Footnote 22-31: Ltr, DASD (Civil Rights) to Gesell,
30 Apr 64, ASD (M) 291.2.]
[Footnote 22-32: AR 600-21, 2 Jul 64 (superseded by AR
600-21, 18 Mar 65); AFR 35-78, 19 Aug 64
(superseded in May 71); SecNav Instructions 5350.6,
Jan 65, 5350.5A, 16 Dec 65, and 5370.7, 4 Mar 65.
See also NAVSO P2483, May 65, "A Commanding
Officer's Guide for Establishing Minority Community
Relations."]
There were several reasons for the delay. The first was the protracted
congressional debate over the civil rights bill. Some service
officials strongly supported the stand that off-base complaints of
black servicemen were chiefly the concern of the Justice Department.
On a more practical level, however, the Department of Defense was
reluctant to issue new directives while legislation bearing directly
on discrimination affecting servicemen was being formulated. Accepting
these arguments, Paul postponed the services' submission of new
regulations and manuals until the act assumed final form.
The delayed publication of the service regulations could also be
blamed in part on the confusion that surrounded the announcement of a
new Defense policy on attendance at segregated meetings. The issue
arose in early 1964 when Fitt discovered some defense employees
accepting invitations to participate in segregated affairs while
others refused on the basis of the secretary's equal opportunity
directives. Inconsistency on such a delicate subject disturbed the
civil rights deputy. The services had fortuitously avoided several (p. 565)
potentially embarrassing incidents when officials were invited to
attend segregated functions, and Fitt warned Paul that "if we don't
erect a better safeguard than sheer chance, we're bound somewhere,
sometime soon to look foolish and insensitive."[22-33] He wanted
McNamara to issue a policy statement on the subject, admittedly a
difficult task because it would be hard to write and would require
White House clearance that might not be forthcoming. For the short run
Fitt wanted to deal with the problem at a regular staff meeting where
he could discuss the matter and coordinate his strategy without the
delay of publishing new regulations.
[Footnote 22-33: Memo, DASD (CR) for Paul, 10 Feb 64,
sub: Official Attendance at Segregated Meetings,
ASD (M) 291.2.]
As it turned out, anxiety over White House approval proved groundless.
"The President has on numerous occasions made clear his view that
Federal officials should not participate in segregated meetings,"
White House Counsel Lee C. White informed all department and agency
heads, and he suggested that steps be taken in each department to
inform all employees.[22-34] The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus R.
Vance, complied on 7 July by issuing a memorandum to the services
prohibiting participation in segregated meetings. Adding to the text
prepared in the White House, he ordered that this prohibition be
incorporated in regulations then being prepared, a move that
necessitated additional staffing of the developing equal opportunity
regulations.[22-35]
[Footnote 22-34: Memo, Assoc Spec Counsel to President
for Heads of Departments and Agencies, 12 Jun 64,
sub: Further Participation at Segregated Meetings,
copy in CMH.]
[Footnote 22-35: Memo, Dep SecDef for Secys of
Military Departments et al., 7 Jul 64, sub: Federal
Participation at Segregated Meetings, SD 291.2. The
Army's regulation, published on 2 July, five days
before Secretary Vance's memorandum, was
republished on 18 May 1965 to include the
prohibition against segregated meetings and other
new policies. The Navy prepared a special Secretary
of Navy instruction (5720.38, 30 Jul 1964) on the
subject.]
Objections to the prohibition were forthcoming. Continuing on a tack
he had pursued for several years, the Air Force Deputy Special
Assistant for Manpower, Personnel, and Organization, James P. Goode,
objected to the application of the Vance memorandum to base
commanders. These men had to maintain good relations with community
leaders, he argued, and good relations were best fostered by the
commander's joining local community organizations such as the Rotary
Club and the Chamber of Commerce, which were often segregated. These
civic and social organizations offered an effective forum for
publicizing the objectives of the Department of Defense, and to forbid
the commander's participation because of segregation would seriously
reduce his local influence. Goode wanted the order "clarified" to
exclude local community organizations from its coverage on the grounds
that including them would be "detrimental to the best interests of all
military personnel and their dependents and would result in a
corresponding reduction in military effectiveness."[22-36] The Defense
Department would have nothing to do with the idea. Such an exception to
the rule, the civil rights deputy declared, would not constitute a (p. 566)
clarification, but rather a nullification of the order. The Air Force
request was rejected.[22-37]
[Footnote 22-36: Memo, James P. Goode for Dep SecDef,
29 Sep 64, sub: Federal Participation at Segregated
Meetings, copy in CMH.]
[Footnote 22-37: Draft Memo, DASD (Civ Pers, Indus
Rels, and CR) for Dep for Manpower, Personnel, and
Organization, USAF, 7 Oct 64, sub: Federal
Participation at Segregated Meetings. The
memorandum was not actually dispatched, and a note
on the original draft discloses that after
discussion between the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower) the rejection of the Air Force request
was "handled verbally." Copy of the memo in CMH.]
The confusion surrounding the publication of service regulations
suggested that without firm and comprehensive direction from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense the services would never develop
effective or uniform programs. Service officials argued that
commanders had always been allowed to execute racial policy without
specific instructions. They feared popular reaction to forceful
regulations, and, in truth, they were already being subjected to
congressional criticism over minor provisions of the Gesell
Committee's report. Even the innocuous suggestion that officers be
appointed to channel black servicemen's complaints was met with
charges of "snooping" and "gestapo" tactics.[22-38]
[Footnote 22-38: Fitt, "Remarks Before Civilian Aides
Conference of the Secretary of the Army," 6 Mar
64.]
Although both the Gesell Committee and Secretary McNamara had made
clear that careful direction was necessary, the manpower office of the
Department of Defense temporized. Instead of issuing detailed
guidelines to the services that outlined their responsibilities for
enforcing the provision of the secretary's equal opportunity
directive, instead of demanding a strict accounting from commanders of
their execution of these responsibilities, Paul asked the services for
outline plans and then indiscriminately approved these plans even when
they passed over real accountability in favor of vaguely stated
principles. The result was a lengthy period of bureaucratic confusion.
Protected by the lack of specific instructions the services went
through an Alfonse-Gaston routine, each politely refraining from
commitment to substantial measures while waiting to see how far the
others would go.[22-39]
[Footnote 22-39: Interv, author with Evans, 23 Jul 73,
CMH files.]
_Fighting Discrimination Within the Services_
The immediate test for the services' belatedly organized civil rights
apparatus was the racial discrimination lingering within the armed
forces themselves. The Civil Rights Commission and the Gesell
Committee had been concerned with the exceptions to the services'
generally satisfactory equal opportunity record. It was these
exceptions, such chronic problems as underrepresentation of Negroes in
some services, in the higher military grades, and in skilled military
occupations, that continued to concern the Defense Department civil
rights organization and the services as they tried to carry out
McNamara's directive. Seemingly minor compared to the discrimination
faced by black servicemen outside the military reservation, racial
problems within the military family and how the services dealt with
them would have direct bearing on the tranquility of the armed forces
in the 1970's.
[Illustration: LISTENING TO THE SQUAD LEADER. _Men of Company D, 21st
Infantry, prepare to move out, Quang Tin Province, Vietnam._]
Two pressing needs, and obviously interrelated ones, were to (p. 567)
attract a greater number of young blacks to a military career and
improve the status of Negroes already in uniform. These were not easy,
short-term tasks. In the first place the Negro, ironically in view of
the services' now genuine desire to have him, was no longer so
interested in joining. As explained by Defense Department civil rights
officials, the past attitudes and practices of the services,
especially the treatment of Negroes during World War II, had created
among black opinion-makers an indifference toward the services as a
vocation.[22-40] Lacking encouragement from parents, teachers, and
peers, black youths were increasingly reluctant to consider a military
career. For their part the services tried to counter this attitude
with an energetic public relations program.[22-41] Encouraged by the
department's civil rights experts they tried to establish closer (p. 568)
relations with black students. They even reorganized their recruitment
programs, and the Secretary of Defense himself initiated a program to
attract more black ROTC cadets.[22-42] Service representatives also
worked with teachers and school officials to inform students on
military career opportunities.
[Footnote 22-40: Paul Memo.]
[Footnote 22-41: For accounts of Navy and Marine
Corps attempts to attract more Negroes, see Memos:
Smedberg for Under SecNav, 20 May 63, sub: Interim
Progress Report on Navy Measures in the Area of
Equality of Opportunity in the Armed Forces; Under
SecNav for SecNav, 15 Jul 63, sub: First Report of
Progress in the Area of Equal Opportunity in the
Navy Department; E. Hidalgo, Spec Asst to SecNav,
for L. Howard Bennett, Principal Asst for Civil
Rights, OASD (CR), 1 Oct 65, sub: Summary of Steps
Deemed Necessary to Increase Number of Qualified
Negro Officers and Enlisted Personnel on the
Navy/Marine Corps Team, SecNav file 5420 (1179).
All in GenRecsNav. See also Memos, Marine Aide to
SecNav for CofS, USMC, 5 Aug 63, sub: Equal
Opportunity in the Armed Services, and ACofS, G-1,
USMC, for CofS, USMC, 17 Aug 63, same sub, both in
MC files. For OSD awareness of the problem, see
Stephen N. Shulman, "The Civil Rights Policies of
the Department of Defense," 4 May 65, copy in CMH.]
[Footnote 22-42: Memo, SecDef for Educators, 6 Oct 65,
sub: Equal Opportunity at the Service Academies of
the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force, SD
291.2.]
Enlistment depended not only on a man's desire to join but also on his
ability to qualify. Following the publication of a presidential task
force report on the chronic problem of high draft rejection rates, the
Army inaugurated in August 1964 a Special Training and Enlistment
Program (STEP), an experiment in the "military training, education,
and physical rehabilitation of men who cannot meet current mental or
medical standards for regular enlistment in the Army."[22-43] Aimed at
increasing enlistments by providing special training after induction
for those previously rejected as unqualified, the program provided for
the enlistment of 8,000 substandard men, which included many Negroes.
Before the men could be enlisted, however, Congress killed the
program, citing its cost and duplication of the efforts of the Job
Corps. It was not until 1967 that the idea of accepting many young men
ineligible for the draft because of mental or educational deficiencies
was revived when McNamara launched his Project 100,000.[22-44]
[Footnote 22-43: DOD News Release, 13 Aug 64. See the
President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation,
_One-Third of a Nation: A Report on Young Men Found
Unqualified for Military Service_ (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1964). Kennedy
established the task force in September 1963. Its
members included the Secretaries of Labor, Defense,
and Health, Education and Welfare and the Director
of Selective Service.]
[Footnote 22-44: McNamara, _The Essence of Security_,
pp. 131-38. See also Bahr, "The Expanding Role of
the Department of Defense," ch. V.]
The services were unable to bring off a dramatic change in black
enlistment patterns in the 1960's. With the exception of the Marine
Corps, in which the proportion of black enlisted men increased 4
percent, the percentage of Negroes in the services remained relatively
stationary between 1962 and 1968 (_Table 24_). In 1968, when Negroes
accounted for 11 percent of the American population, their share of
the enlisted service population remained at 8.2, with significant
differences among the services. Nor did there seem much chance of
increasing the number of black servicemen since the percentage of
Negroes among draftees and first-time enlistees was rising very (p. 569)
slowly while black reenlistment rates, for some twenty years a major
factor in holding black strength steady, began to decline (_Table 25_).
Actually, enlistment figures for both whites and blacks declined, a
circumstance usually attributed to the unpopularity of the Vietnam
War, although in the midst of the war, in 1967, black first-term
reenlistment rates continued to exceed white rates 2 to 1.
Table 24--Black Percentages, 1962-1968
| Army | Navy | Marine Corps | Air Force
Year| Enlisted| Enlisted| Enlisted| Enlisted
|Officers| Men |Officers| Men |Officers| Men |Officers| Men
1962 3.2 12.2 .2 5.2 .2 7.6 1.2 9.2
1964 3.4 13.4 .3 5.8 .4 8.7 1.5 10.0
1965 3.5 13.9 .3 5.8 .4 9.0 1.6 10.7
1967 3.4 12.1 .3 4.7 .7 10.3 1.8 10.4
1968 3.3 12.6 .4 5.0 .9 11.5 1.8 10.2
_Source_: Records of ASD (M) 291.2.
Table 25--Rates for Reenlistments, 1964-1967
Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force
Year | White | Black | White | Black | White | Black | White | Black
1964 18.5 49.3 21.6 41.3 12.9 25.1 27.4 50.3
1965 13.7 49.3 24.2 44.8 18.9 38.9 19.1 39.2
1966 20.0 66.5 17.6 24.7 10.5 19.5 16.0 30.1
1967 12.9 31.7 16.7 22.5 10.7 17.4 17.3 26.9
_Source_: Records of ASD (M) 291.2; see especially Paul Memo.
The low percentage of black officers, a matter of special concern to
the Civil Rights Commission and the Gesell Committee as well as the
civil rights organizations, remained relatively unchanged in the
1960's (_see Table 24_). Nor could any dramatic rise in the number of
black officers be expected. Between 1963 and 1968 the three service
academies graduated just fifty-one black officers, an impressive
statistic only in the light of the record of a total of sixty black
graduates in the preceding eighty-six years. Furthermore, there were
only 116 black cadets in 1968, a vast proportional increase over
former years but also an indication of the small number of black
officers that could be expected from that source during the next four
years (_Table 26_). Since cadets were primarily chosen by
congressional nomination and from other special categories, little
could be done, many officials assumed, to increase substantially the
number of black cadets and midshipmen. An imaginative effort by Fitt
in early 1964, however, proved this assumption false. Fitt got the
academies to agree to take all the qualified Negroes he could find and
some senators and congressmen to relinquish some of their appointments
to the cause. He then wrote every major school district in the
country, seeking black applicants and assuring them that the academies
were truly open to all those qualified. Even though halfway through
the academic year, Fitt's "micro-personnel operation," as he later
called it, yielded appointments for ten Negroes. Unfortunately, (p. 570)
his successor did not continue the effort.[22-45]
[Footnote 22-45: Ltr, Fitt to author, 21 Oct 76, CMH
files.]
Table 26--Black Attendance at the Military Academies, July 1968
Class Class Class Class Total Total
Academy | of 1969 | of 1970 | of 1971 | of 1972 | Negro | Attendance
Army 10 7 5 9 31 3,285
Navy 2 8 8 15 33 4,091
Air Force 6 10 13 23 52 3,028
Totals 18 25 26 47 116
_Source_: Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil
Rights).
The ROTC program at predominantly black colleges had always been the
chief source of black officers, but here, again, there was little hope
for immediate improvement. With the exception of a large increase in
the number of black Air Force officers graduating from five black
colleges, the percentage of officers entering the service from these
institutions remained essentially unchanged throughout the 1960's
despite the services' new equal opportunity programs (_Table 27_).
Some civil rights leaders had been arguing for years that the
establishment of ROTC units at predominantly black schools merely
helped perpetuate the nation's segregated college system. Fitt agreed
that as integrated education became more commonplace the number of
black ROTC graduates would increase in predominantly white colleges,
but meanwhile he considered units at black schools essential. Among
the approximately 140 black colleges without ROTC affiliation, some
could possibly qualify for units, and in February 1965 Fitt's
successor, Stephen N. Shulman, called for the formation of more (p. 571)
ROTC units as an equal opportunity measure.[22-46] The Army responded
by creating a unit at Arkansas A&M Normal College, and the Navy opened
a unit at Prairie View A&M in the President's home state of Texas.
Balancing the expectations implied by the formation of these new units
were the growing antiwar sentiment among college students and the
special competition for black college graduates in the private
business community, both of which made ROTC commissions less
attractive to many black students.
[Footnote 22-46: Fitt left the civil rights office in
August 1964 to become the General Counsel of the
Army. At his departure the position of Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Rights was
consolidated with that of the Deputy for Civilian
Personnel and Industrial Relations. The incumbent
of the latter position, Stephen Shulman, became
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian
Personnel, Industrial Relations, and Civil Rights.
Shulman, a graduate of Yale Law School and former
Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Labor, had
been closely involved in the Defense Department's
equal opportunity program in industrial contracts.]
Table 27--Army and Air Force Commissions Granted at Predominantly
Black Schools
Army Commissions
Class of|Class of|Class of|Class of
School 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967
A&T College, N.C. 24 22 10 17
Central State College, Ohio 29 14 26 25
Florida A&M College 29 15 23 15
Hampton University, Va. 29 34 20 19
Lincoln University, Pa. 19 14 16 19
Morgan State College, Md. 21 27 12 16
Prairie View A&M College, Tex. 20 27 31 38
South Carolina State College 16 23 24 24
Southern University, La. 23 37 19 21
Tuskegee Institute, Ala. 14 14 20 26
Virginia State College 21 14 18 21
West Virginia State College 22 19 15 14
Howard University, Washington, D.C. 19 37 30 23
Total 286 297 264 278
Percentage of total such commissions
granted 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.6
Air Force Commissions
Class of Class of Class of
School 1964 | 1965 | 1966
A&T College, N.C. 12 10 33
Howard University, Washington, D.C. 24 31 23
Maryland State College 2 4 4
Tennessee A&I University 13 26 32
Tuskegee Institute, Ala. 14 33 41
Total 65 104 133
_Source_: Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil
Rights).
Chance of promotion for officers and men was one factor in judging
equal treatment and opportunity in the services. A statistical
comparison of the ranks of enlisted black servicemen between 1964 and
1966 reveals a steady advance (_Table 28_). With the exception of the
Air Force, the percentage of Negroes in the higher enlisted ranks
compared favorably with the total black percentage in each service.
The advance was less marked for officers, but here too the black share
of the O-4 grade (major or lieutenant commander) was comparable with
the black percentage of the service's total strength. The services
could declare with considerable justification that reform in this area
was necessarily a drawn-out affair; promotion to the senior ranks must
be won against strong competition.
Table 28--Percentage of Negroes in Certain Military Ranks, 1964-1966
E-6 (Staff Sergeant or Petty Officer, First Class)
_1964_ _1965_ _1966_
Army 13.9 15.5 18.1
Navy 4.7 5.0 5.6
Marine Corps 5.0 5.3 10.4
Air Force 5.3 5.6 6.6
O-4 (Major or Lieutenant Commander)
Army 3.6 4.5 5.2
Navy 0.3 0.3 0.3
Marine Corps 0.3 0.3 0.2
Air Force 0.8 0.9 1.6
_Source_: Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil
Rights).
The department's civil rights office forwarded to the services
complaints from black servicemen who, despite the highest efficiency
ratings and special commendations from commanders, failed to win
promotions. "Almost uniformly," the office reported in 1965, "the
reply comes back from the service that there had been no bias, no
partiality, no prejudice operating in detriment on the complainant's
consideration for promotion. They reply the best qualified was
promoted, but this was not to say that the complainant did not have a
very good record."[22-47] While black officers might well have (p. 572)
been subtly discriminated against in matters of promotion, they also,
it should be pointed out, shared in the general inflation in
efficiency ratings, common in all the services, that resulted in
average officers being given "highest efficiency ratings."
[Footnote 22-47: Paul Memo.]
In addition to complaining of direct denial of promotion opportunity,
so-called "vertical mobility," some black officers alleged that their
chances of promotion had been systematically reduced by the services
when they failed to provide Negroes with "horizontal mobility," that
is, with a wide variety of assignments and all-important command
experience which would justify their future advancement. Supporting
these claims, the civil rights office reported that only 5 Negroes
were enrolled at the senior service schools in 1965, 4 black naval
officers with command experience were on active duty, and 26 black Air
Force officers had been given tactical command experience since 1950.
The severely limited assignment of black Army officers at the major
command headquarters, moreover, illustrated the "narrow gauge"
assignment of Negroes.[22-48] This picture seemed somewhat at variance
with Deputy Assistant Secretary Shulman's assurances to the Kansas
Conference on Civil Rights in May 1965 that "we have paid particular
attention to the assignment of Negro officers to the senior Service
schools, and to those positions of command that are so vital to
officer advancement to the highest rank."[22-49]
[Footnote 22-48: Ibid.]
[Footnote 22-49: Shulman, "The Civil Rights Policies
of the Department of Defense," 4 May 65.]
Since promotion in the military ranks depended to a great extent on a
man's skills, training in and assignment to vital job categories were
important to enlisted men. Here, too, the statistics revealed that the
percentage of Negroes in the technical occupations, which had begun to
rise in the years after Korea, had continued to increase but that a
large proportion still held unskilled or semiskilled military
occupational specialties (_Table 29_). Eligibility for the various
military occupations depended to a great extent on the servicemen's
mental aptitude, with men scoring in the higher categories usually
winning assignment to technical occupations. When the Army began
drafting large numbers of men in the mid-1960's, the number of men in
category IV, which included many Negroes, began to go up. Given the
fact that many Negroes with the qualifications for technical training
were ignoring the services for other vocations while the less
qualified were once again swelling the ranks, the Department of
Defense could do little to insure a fair representation of Negroes in
technical occupations or increase the number of black soldiers in
higher grades. The problem tended to feed upon itself. Not only were
the statistics the bane of civil rights organizations, but they also
influenced talented young blacks to decide against a service career,
in effect creating a variation of Gresham's law in the Army wherein
men of low mentality were keeping out men of high intelligence. There
seemed little to be done, although the department's civil rights
office pressed the services to establish remedial training for
category IV men so that they might become eligible for more technical
assignments.
Table 29--Distribution of Servicemen in Occupational Groups by Race, 1967
| White | Black |Unknown|Total
| | | | | Percent| |
| | | | |of Total| |
| |Percent| |Percent| in Each| |
Group/Activity | Number| Dist. | Number| Dist. | Group/ | Number|Number
| | | | |Activity| |
Combat troops 324,560 12.1 55,518 18.7 14.5 2,646 382,724
Electronics
repairmen 239,595 9.0 13,843 4.7 5.5 204 253,642
Communications
specialists 191,372 7.2 12,856 4.4 6.3 392 204,620
Medical personnel 101,793 3.8 11,074 3.8 9.8 76 112,943
Other technicians 52,132 1.9 3,812 1.3 6.8 86 56,030
Administrative
personnel 430,186 16.1 55,543 18.8 11.4 986 486,715
Mechanical
repairmen 498,899 18.6 39,820 13.5 7.4 794 539,513
Draftsmen 144,070 5.4 15,728 5.3 9.8 248 160,046
Service & supply
personnel 283,976 10.6 53,136 18.0 15.7 998 338,110
Miscellaneous/
unknown 245,055 9.1 14,964 5.1 13.5 1,337 261,356
Trainees[a] 166,478 6.2 18,753 6.4 10.1 1,194 186,425
Total 2,678,116 100.0 295,047 100.0 9.9 8,961 2,982,124
[Tablenote a: Represents an Army category only.]
_Source_: Bahr, "The Expanding Role of the Department of Defense As an
Instrument of Social Change." Bahr's table is based on unpublished
data from the DASD (CR).
If a man's assignment and promotion depended ultimately on his (p. 573)
aptitude category, that category depended upon his performance in the
Armed Forces Qualifying Test and other screening tests usually
administered at induction. These tests have since been widely
criticized as being culturally biased, more a test of an individual's
understanding of the majority race's cultural norms than his mental
aptitude. Even the fact that the tests were written also left them
open to charges of bias. Some educational psychologists have claimed
that an individual's performance in written tests measured his
cultural and educational background, not his mental aptitude. It is
true that the accuracy of test measurements was never reassessed in
light of the subsequent performance of those tested. The services paid
little attention to these serious questions in the 1960's, yet as a
Defense Department task force studying the administration of military
justice was to observe later:
the most important determination about a serviceman's future
career (both in and out of the service) is made almost solely on
the basis of the results of these tests: where he will be placed,
how and whether he will be promoted during his hitch, and whether
what he will learn in the service will be saleable for his
post-service career.[22-50]
[Footnote 22-50: Department of Defense, "Report of the
Task Force on the Administration of Military
Justice in the Armed Forces," 30 Nov 72, vol. I, p.
47.]
The Department of Defense depended on the "limited predictive
capability of these tests," the task force charged, in deciding
whether a serviceman was assigned to a "soft core" field, that is,
given a job in such categories as transportation or supply, or whether
he could enter one of the more profitable and prestigious "hard core"
fields that would bring more rapid advancement.
Accurate and comprehensive testing and the measurement of acquired (p. 574)
skills was obviously an important and complex matter, but in 1963 it
was ignored by both the Civil Rights Commission and the Gesell
Committee. President Kennedy, however, seemed aware of the problem.
Before leaving for Europe in the summer of 1963 he called on the
Secretary of Defense to consider establishing training programs keyed
primarily to the special problems of black servicemen found ineligible
for technical training. According to Lee White, the President wanted
to use new training techniques "and other methods of stimulating
interest and industry" that might help thousands of men bridge "the
gap that presently exists between their own educational and cultural
backgrounds and those of the average white serviceman."[22-51]
[Footnote 22-51: Memo, Asst Spec Counsel to President
for SecDef, 27 Jun 63, copy in CMH.]
Because of the complexity of the problem, White agreed with Fitt that
the program should be postponed pending further study, but the
President's request happened to coincide with a special survey of the
deficiencies and changes in recruit training then being made by Under
Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes.[22-52] Ailes offered to develop a
special off-duty training program in line with the President's
request. The program, to begin on a trial basis in October 1963, would
also include evaluation counseling to determine if and when trainees
should be assigned to technical schools.[22-53] Such a program
represented a departure for the services, which since World War II had
consistently rejected the idea frequently advanced by sociologists
that the culturally, environmentally, and educationally deprived were
denied equal opportunity when they were required to compete with the
middle-class average.[22-54] Although no specific, measurable results
were recorded from this educational experiment, the project was
eventually blended into the Army's Special Training and Enlistment
Program and finally into McNamara's Project 100,000.[22-55]
[Footnote 22-52: ACSFOR, "Annual Historical Summary,
Fiscal Years 1963-64," copy in CMH; Memo, DASD (CR)
for Paul, 25 Sep 63, sub: Training Program Keyed
Primarily to the Special Problems of Negro
Servicemen, ASD (M) files.]
[Footnote 22-53: Memo, Under SA for ASD (M), 14 Sep
63, sub: Training Program Keyed Primarily to the
Special Problems of Negro Servicemen; Memo, ASD (M)
for Asst Spec Counsel to President, 25 Sep 63; both
in ASD (M) files.]
[Footnote 22-54: For a discussion of this argument,
see [BuPers] Memo for Rcd, Capt K. J. B. Sanger,
USN, 9 Oct 63, Pers 1, BuPersRecs.]
[Footnote 22-55: Interv, author with Davenport, ASA,
Manpower (Ret.), 2 Aug 73, CMH files.]
Beyond considering the competence of black servicemen, the Department
of Defense had to face the possibility that discrimination was
operating at least in some cases of assignment and promotion.
Abolishing the use of racial designations on personnel records was one
obvious way of limiting such discrimination, and throughout the
mid-1960's the department sought to balance the conflicting demands
for and against race labeling. Along with the integration of military
units in the 1950's, the services had narrowed their multiple and
cumbersome definition of races to a list of five groups. Even this
list, a compromise drawn up by the Defense Department's Personnel
Policy Board, was criticized. Reflecting the opinion of the civil
rights forces, Evans declared that the definition of five races and
twelve subcategories was scientifically inaccurate, statistically (p. 575)
complicated, and racially offensive. He wanted a simple "white,
nonwhite" listing of servicemen.[22-56] The subject continued to be
discussed throughout the 1960's, the case finally going to the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the ultimate authority on
government forms. In August 1969 the director announced a uniform
method for defining the races in federal statistics. The collectives
"Negro and Other Races," "All Other Rates," or "All Other" would be
acceptable to designate minorities; the terms "White," "Negro," and
"Other Races" would be acceptable in distinguishing between the
majority, principal minority, and other races.[22-57]
[Footnote 22-56: See, for example, the following
Memos: Evans for Judge Jackson, 1 Apr 63, and Mr.
Jordan, 3 Sep 64, sub: Racial Designations; Douglas
Dahlin for E. E. Moyers, 3 Sep 58, sub: Case
History of an OSD Action; James Evans for Philip M.
Timpane, 10 Aug 65, sub: Race and Color-Coding. See
also Memo for Rcd, Evans, 15 Aug 62, sub: Racial
Designations. All in DASD (CR) files.]
[Footnote 22-57: Bureau of the Budget, Circular No.
A-46, Transmittal Memorandum No. 8, 8 Aug 69.]
It was the use to which these definitions were put more than their
number that had concerned civil rights leaders since the 1950's. Under
pressure from civil rights organizations, some congressmen, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services began to abandon some
of the least justifiable uses of racial designations, principally
those used on certain inductees' travel orders, reassignment orders,
and reserve rosters.[22-58] But change was not widespread, and as late
as 1963 the services still distinguished by race in their basic
personnel records, casualty reports, statistical and command strength
reports, personnel control files, and over twenty-five other
departmental forms.[22-59] They continued to defend the use of racial
designations on the grounds that measurement of equal opportunity
programs and detection of discrimination patterns depended on accurate
racial data.[22-60] Few could argue with these motives, although
critics continued to question the need for race designations on
records that were used in assignment and promotion processes. When
public opposition developed to the use of racial entries on federal
forms in general, the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity
appointed a subcommittee in 1963 under Civil Service Chairman John W.
Macy, Jr., to investigate. After much deliberation this group
conducted a statistical experiment within the Department of
Agriculture to discover whether employees could be identified by
racial groups in a confidential manner separate from other personnel
data.[22-61]
[Footnote 22-58: See Ltr, Clarence Mitchell, NAACP, to
ASD (M), 8 Jul 53; Ltr, Congressman Henry S. Reuss
of Wisconsin to SecDef, 27 Sep 56; Memo,
Yarmolinsky for Fitt, 29 Nov 61; Memo, Dep Under SA
for ASD (M), 1 Dec 61, sub: Racial Designation in
Special Orders; Ltr, Chmn, Cmte on Gov Operations,
House of Representatives, to SA, 9 Jul 62; Memo,
ASD (M) for SA, 29 Mar 51, sub: Racial Designations
on Travel Orders; Memo, Chief, Mil Personnel
Management Div, G-1, for Dir, Personnel Policies, 5
Aug 52, sub: Racial Designations, G-1 291.2; Memo,
SecNav for ASD (M), 7 May 54, sub: Deletion of
Question Regarding "Race" ... Copies of all in
CMH.]
[Footnote 22-59: See Memo, TAG for Distribution, 21
Sep 62, sub: Racial Identification in Army
Documents, AGAM (M) 291.2; Memo for Rcd, Evans, 20
Dec 62, sub: Racial Designations--Navy, ASD (M)
291.2; Memo, DASD (CR) for DASD (H&M) et al., 19
Feb 64, sub: Racial Designations on Department of
Defense Forms, copy in CMH.]
[Footnote 22-60: See, for example, Ltr, Dir of
Personnel Policy (OSD) to J. Francis Pohlhous,
Counsel, NAACP, 6 Jul 55, ASD (M) 291.2.]
[Footnote 22-61: Ltr, Director, Civil Service
Commission, to Rear Adm Robert L. Moore, Chief of
Industrial Relations, USN, 9 Jul 63, copy in CMH.]
[Illustration: SUPPLYING THE SEVENTH FLEET. _USS Procyon crewmen rig
netload of supplies for a warship._]
The civil rights staff of the Defense Department was also (p. 576)
interested in further limiting the use of race in departmental forms.
In April 1963 Assistant Secretary Paul ordered a review of military
personnel records and reporting forms to determine where racial
entries were included unnecessarily.[22-62] His review uncovered
twenty-five forms used in common by the services and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense that contained racial designations. On 3 March
1964 Paul discreetly ordered the removal of race designations on all
but nine of these forms, those concerning biostatistical, criminal,
and casualty figures.[22-63] His order did not, however, extend to
another group of forms used by individual services for their own
purposes, and later in the year Fitt drafted an order that would have
eliminated all racial designations in the services except an entry for
data processing systems and one for biostatistical information. The
directive also would have allowed racial designations on forms that
did not identify individuals, arranged for the disposition of remains
and casualty reporting, described fugitives and other "wanted" types,
and permitted other exceptions granted at the level of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense or that of the service secretary. Finally it
would have set up a system for purging existing records and removing
photographs from promotion board selection folders.[22-64] The
services strongly objected to a purge of existing records on the
grounds of costliness, and they were particularly opposed to the
removal of photographs. Photographs were traditional and remained
desirable, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army Roy K. Davenport
explained, because they were useful in portraying individual physical
characteristics unrelated to race.[22-65] Davenport added, however,
that photographs could be eliminated from promotion board materials.
[Footnote 22-62: Memo, Spec Asst to ASD (M) for Under
SA, 15 Apr 63, sub: Racial Identification on
Military Records (similar memorandums were sent to
the Secretaries of Navy and Air Force on the same
day); Memo, ASD (M) for OASD (Comptroller) (ca. 1
Jun 63); both in ASD (M) 291.2. For service
reviews, answers, and exchanges on the subject, see
ASD (M) 68A-1006. See also Memo, SSJ [Stephen S.
Jackson, Spec Asst to ASD (M)] for Valdes, OASD
(M), and James C. Evans, 11 Jun 63, ASD (M) 291.2.]
[Footnote 22-63: Memo, DASD (CR) for DASD
(Management), 3 Mar 64, sub: Elimination of Racial
Designations on DD Forms (the Army adopted this DOD
policy in the form of Change 1 to AR 66-21 in
October 1965). See also Memo, DASD (CR) for DASD
(H&M) et al., 19 Feb 64, sub: Racial Designations
on Department of Defense Forms; idem for Lee C.
White, 9 Jul 64. All in ASD (M) files. See also
Washington _Evening Star_, June 22, 1964, p. A2.]
[Footnote 22-64: Memo, Philip M. Timpane for DASD
(CR), 10 Aug 64, sub: Race on Records, ASD (M)
291.2.]
[Footnote 22-65: Memo, Dep Under SA for DASD (CR), 3
Jun 64, sub: Proposed DOD Instruction Re: Use of
Racial Designations in Forms and Records and Annual
Racial Distribution Report, copy in CMH.]
These proposals marked a high point in the effort to simplify and (p. 577)
reduce the use of racial designations by the Department of Defense.
Although several versions of Fitt's 1964 draft order were discussed in
later years, none was ever published.[22-66] Nor did the Bureau of the
Budget, to which the matter was referred for the development of a
government-wide policy, publish any instructions. In fact, by the
mid-1960's an obvious trend had begun in the Department of Defense
toward broader use of racial indicators but narrower definition of
race.
[Footnote 22-66: L. Howard Bennett, Untitled Minutes
of Equal Opportunity Council Meetings on the
Subject of Racial Indicators, 30 Sep 66; Memo,
Bennett for Thomas Morris and Jack Moskowitz, 8 Dec
66, sub: Actions to Aid in Assuring Equality of
Opportunity During Ratings, Assignment, Selection,
and Promotion Processes, copies of both in CMH.
Judge Bennett was the executive secretary of the
Equal Opportunity Council within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, an interdepartmental working
group dealing with racial indicators in September
1966 and consisting of two members from each
manpower office of the services and P. M. Timpane
of the DASD (Equal Opportunity) office.]
Several changes in American society were responsible for the changes.
The need for more exact racial documentation overcame the argument for
removing racial designations, for the civil rights experts both within
and outside the department demanded more detailed racial statistics to
protect and enlarge the equal opportunity gains of the sixties. The
demand was also supported by representatives of the smaller racial
minorities who, joining in the civil rights revolution, developed a
self-awareness that made detailed racial and ethnic statistics
mandatory. The shift was made possible to a great extent by the change
in public opinion toward racial minorities. As one civil rights
official later noted, the change in attitude had caused black
servicemen to reconsider their belief that detrimental treatment
necessarily followed racial identification.[22-67] Ironically, just a
decade after the McNamara directive on equal opportunity, a
departmental civil rights official, himself a Negro, was defending the
use of photographs in the selection process on the grounds that such
procedures were necessary in any large organization where individuals
were relatively unknown to their superiors.[22-68] So strong had the
services' need for black officers become, it could be argued, that a
promotion board's knowledge of a candidate's race redounded to the
advantage of the black applicants. For whatever reason, the pressure
to eliminate racial indicators from personnel forms had largely
disappeared at the end of the 1960's.
[Footnote 22-67: Memo, Bennett for ASD (M) and DASD
(Civ Pers, Indus Rels, and CR), 8 Dec 66, copy in
CMH.]
[Footnote 22-68: Interv, author with Johnson, 9 Aug
73.]
The Gesell Committee's investigations also forced the Department of
Defense to consider the possibility of discrimination in the rarefied
area of embassy and special mission assignments and the certainty of
discrimination against black servicemen in local communities near some
overseas bases. Concerning the former, the staff of the civil rights
deputy concluded that such assignments were voluntary and based on
special selection procedures. Race was not a factor except for three
countries where assignments were "based on politically ethnic
considerations."[22-69] Nevertheless, Fitt began to discuss with
the services ways to attract more qualified black volunteers for (p. 578)
assignments to attache, mission, and military assistance groups.
[Footnote 22-69: Memo, Exec to DASD (CR) for DASD
(CR), 20 Mar 64; see also OASD (CR), Summary of
Military Personnel Assignments in Overseas Areas;
both in ODASD (CR) files. Negroes were not the only
Americans excluded from certain countries for
"politically ethnic considerations." Jewish
servicemen were barred from certain Middle East
countries.]
The department was less responsive to the Gesell Committee's
recommendations on racial restrictions encountered off base overseas.
The services, traditionally, had shunned consideration of this matter,
citing their role as guests. When the Department of Defense outlined
the commander's responsibility regarding off-base discrimination
overseas, it expressly authorized commanders to impose sanctions in
foreign communities, yet just five weeks later the services clarified
the order for the press, explaining that sanctions would be limited to
the United States.[22-70] A spokesman for the U.S. Army in Germany
admitted that discrimination continued in restaurants and bars, adding
that such discrimination was illegal in Germany and was limited to the
lowest class establishments.[22-71] Supporting these conclusions was a
spate of newspaper reports of segregated establishments in certain
areas of Okinawa and the neighborhood around an Army barracks near
Frankfurt, Germany.[22-72]
[Footnote 22-70: DOD directive cited in Gesell
Committee's "Final Report," p. 7; see also New York
_Times_, September 12, 1963.]
[Footnote 22-71: New York _Times_ and Washington
_Post_, December 29, 1964.]
[Footnote 22-72: See, for example, New York _Herald
Tribune_, January 3, 1965; New York _Times_, March
29, 1964.]
Despite these continuing press reports, the services declared in
mid-1965 that the "overwhelming majority" of overseas installations
were free of segregation problems in housing or public accommodations.
One important exception to this overwhelming majority was reported by
General Paul Freeman, the commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe. He
not only admitted that the problem existed in his command but also
concluded that it had been imported from the United States. The
general had met with Gerhard Gesell and subsequently launched a
special troop indoctrination program in Europe on discrimination in
public accommodations. He also introduced a voluntary compliance
program to procure open housing.[22-73]
[Footnote 22-73: Memo for Rcd, Timpane, 25 Nov 64,
ODASD (CR) files.]
The Gesell Committee had repeatedly asserted that discrimination
existed only in areas near American bases, and its most serious
manifestations were "largely inspired by the attitude of a minority of
white servicemen" who exerted social pressure on local businessmen. It
was, therefore, a problem for American forces, and not primarily one
for its allies. The civil rights office, however, preferred to
consider the continuing discrimination as an anti-American phenomenon
rather than a racial problem.[22-74] Fitt and his successor seemed
convinced that such discrimination was isolated and its solution
complex because of the difficulty in drawing a line between the
attitudes of host nations and American GI's. Consequently, the problem
continued throughout the next decade, always low key, never
widespread, a problem of black morale inadequately treated by the
department.
[Footnote 22-74: Paul Memo.]
The failure to solve the problem of racial discrimination overseas
and, indeed, the inability to liquidate all remaining vestiges of
discrimination within the military establishment, constituted the
major shortfall of McNamara's equal opportunity policy. With no (p. 579)
attempt to shift responsibility to his subordinates,[22-75] McNamara
later reflected with some heat on the failure of his directive to
improve treatment and opportunities for black servicemen substantially
and expeditiously: "I was naive enough in those days to think that all
I had to do was show my people that a problem existed, tell them to
work on it, and that they would then attack the problem. It turned out
of course that not a goddamn thing happened."[22-76]
[Footnote 22-75: For an example of McNamara's
extremely self-critical judgments on the subject of
equal opportunity, see Brock Brower, "McNamara Seen
Now, Full Length," _Life_ 64 (May 10, 1968): 78.]
[Footnote 22-76: Interv, author with McNamara, 11 May
72.]
Although critical of his department's performance, McNamara would
probably admit that more than simple recalcitrance was involved. For
example, the services' traditional opposition to outside interference
with the development of their personnel policies led naturally to
their opposition to any defense programs setting exact command
responsibilities or dictating strict monitoring of their racial
progress. Defense officials, respecting service attitudes, failed to
demand an exact accounting. Again, the services' natural reluctance to
court congressional criticism, a reluctance shared by McNamara and his
defense colleagues, led them all to avoid unpopular programs such as
creating ombudsmen at bases to channel black servicemen's complaints.
As one manpower official pointed out, all commanders professed their
intolerance of discrimination in their commands, yet the prospect of
any effective communication between these commanders and their
subordinates suffering such discrimination remained unlikely.[22-77]
Again defense officials, restrained by the White House from
antagonizing Congress, failed to insist upon change.
[Footnote 22-77: Memo, William C. Baldes, ODASD (CR),
for DASD (CR), 8 Jul 63, ASD (M) 291.2.]
Finally, while it was true that the services had not responded any
better to McNamara's directive than to any of several earlier and less
noteworthy calls for racial equality within the military community, it
was not true that the reason for the lack of progress lay exclusively
with the service. Against the background of the integration
achievements of the previous decade, a feeling existed among defense
officials that such on-base discrimination as remained was largely a
matter of detail. Even Fitt shared the prevailing view. "In three
years of close attention to such matters, I have observed [no] ...
great gains in on-base equality," because, he explained to his
superior, "_the basic gains were made in the 1948-1953 period_."[22-78]
It must be remembered that discrimination operating within the armed
forces was less tractable and more difficult to solve than the
patterns of segregation that had confronted the services of old or the
off-base problems confronting them in the early 1960's. The services
had reached what must have seemed to many a point of diminishing
returns in the battle against on-base discrimination, a point at which
each successive increment of effort yielded a smaller result than its
predecessor.
[Footnote 22-78: Memo, DASD (CR) for ASD (M), 2 Jul
64, copy in CMH. Emphasis not in original.]
No one--not the Civil Rights Commission, the Gesell Committee, the
civil rights organizations, and, judging from the volume of complaints,
not even black servicemen themselves--seriously tried to disabuse
these officials of their satisfaction with the pace of reform. (p. 580)
Certainly no one equated the importance of on-base discrimination with
the blatant off-base discrimination that had captured everyone's
attention. In fact, problems as potentially explosive as the
discrimination in the administration of military justice were all but
ignored during the 1960's.[22-79]
[Footnote 22-79: The administration of military
justice was not considered by the Civil Rights
Commission nor by the Gesell Committee, although it
was mentioned once by the NAACP as a cause of
numerous complaints and once by the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights in regard to
black representation on courts-martial. See NAACP,
"Proposals for Executive Action to End Federal
Supported Segregation and Other Forms of Racial
Discrimination," submitted to the White House on 29
Aug 61, White House Central Files, J. F. Kennedy
Library; Memo, Philip M. Timpane, ODASD (Civ Pers,
Indus Rels, and CR) for DASD (Civ Pers, Indus Rels
and CR), 23 Feb 65, sub: Representation by Race on
Courts-Martial. ODASD (Civ Pers, Indus Rels, and
CR) files.]
[Illustration: USAF GROUND CREW, TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE, VIETNAM,
_relaxes over cards in the alert tent_.]
The sense of satisfaction that pervaded Fitt's comment, however
understandable, was lamentable because it helped insure that certain
inequities in the military community would linger. The failure of
Negroes to win skilled job assignments and promotions, for example,
would remain to fester and contribute significantly to the bitterness
visited upon a surprised Department of Defense in later years. In
brief, because the services had become a model of racial equality when
judged by contemporary standards, the impulse of almost all concerned
was to play down the reforms still needed on base and turn instead to
the pressing and spectacular challenges that lay in wait outside the
gates.